International Safeguards and the Role of SSACs and

RSACs

Tom Ellacott Director-International Safeguards Division

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission11 November 2011

Seminar – 20 Years of ABACC

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Introduction

• Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission is Canada’s Safeguards Regulatory Authority

• Evolution of Safeguards in Canada– 1969 Non-Proliferation Treaty– 1972 Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement– 2000 Additional Protocol– Sep 2005 Broad Safeguards Conclusion– Dec 2005 State-Level IS Approach for Canada– Jan 2010 SLA established for entire State

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Canadian Fuel Cycle

Uranium Miningand Milling

U3O8

Uranium Refining

UO3

Uranium Conversion UraniumFuel Fabrication

Power Reactors

UO2

FreshFuel

Research and Development

Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs)and Research Reactors

SpentFuel

Spent Fuel

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State-Level Concept

• Change in perspective

• IAEA’s Evaluation Process

• Optimization

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Features of the State-Level Approach

Main Considerations for Canada– Presence of an IAEA regional office– Natural uranium fuel cycle– Absence of enrichment or reprocessing

Elements– Division of the fuel cycle into Sectors– Secure electronic communication system– Randomization of inspections– Cooperative arrangements with the IAEA

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Sector-Based Approach

Sector 1– Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities– On-load reactors and associated dry storage facilities

Sector 2– Chalk River Laboratories

Sector 3– Research reactors and critical assemblies– Static spent fuel dry storage facilities– Locations Outside Facilities (LOFs)

Sector 4– Mines, mills and decommissioned facilities

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Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-1: Development of IAEA ProceduresCollaborative approach

– IAEA IS procedures developed through a consultative process involving IAEA, CNSC and facility operators

– Total of 10 procedures developed to cover all locations in Canada

– Ownership of documents with IAEA but used as the basis of IS implementation by CNSC and operators

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Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-2: Provision of InformationSecure communication system

– Secure channel for provision of information electronically

– Provides near-real time overview of the flows of nuclear material

– Content and frequency of submissions specified in agreed procedures

– Digital signature provides sender authentication and non-repudiation

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Enhanced Cooperation by SSAC-3:Inspector AccessShort-Notice Random and

Unannounced Inspections– For the detection and deterrence of nuclear

material diversion and facility misuse– Detection of borrowing

Physical Inventory Verification– Randomized selection– Short notification– Non-simultaneous inventory takings

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Enhanced Cooperation with SSAC-4:Expansion of Support ActivitiesPhysical Inventory Taking Evaluation

– Assessment to determine if a facility not selected for a physical inventory verification was properly prepared

Information flow– Supervision and administration of near-real

time accountancy and operational information through the mailbox

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Implementation of the SLA-1

• Considerations– Sector-by-sector approach– Determination of priorities

• Established order:– Spent fuel transfers at CANDU stations– Research reactors and LOFs – CANDU stations and bulk handling

facilities– Chalk River Laboratories

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Implementation of the SLA-2

Agreed work plani. Draft procedures agreed to by the

CNSC and the IAEAii. Bilateral meetings between the

CNSC and the facilitiesiii. Trilateral meetings among the

CNSC, the facilities and the IAEAiv. Field trials (as required)v. Operational experience and revision

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Timeline of SLA Implementation

Facility/Activity Implementation Date

Research reactors, Locations Outside Facilities, static spent fuel dry storages

January 2007

Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at multi-unit power reactors

March 2007

Multi-unit power reactor stations July 2008

Conversion and fuel fabrication facilities

October 2008

Single-unit power reactor stations January 2009

Chalk River Laboratories November 2009

Transfers of spent fuel to dry storage at single-unit power reactors

January 2010

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PDIs in Canada

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Lessons Learned / Good Practices• Importance of trilateral

collaboration

•Recognition of evolutionary approach

•Need for synchronization

•Need for information management

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Future Refinement

• Conceptual– DDG’s vision for information-driven and

objectives-based safeguards– Working group on a revised SLA for Canada

• Procedural/Technical– Quantity and type of information provided– Spent Fuel transfers at multi-unit stations– Material flows at Chalk River Laboratories

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Conclusion

• Achieve the goal of a unified State level approach

• Achieve further efficiencies in the application of safeguards

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Questions/discussions