INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION

LÄSZLO ANTAL

1. In an article published in Lingua,1 Mr. Uhlenbeck criticizes the trans-formational theory proposed by Chomsky in his famous SyntacticStructures. Uhlenbeck's article clearly shows that our Dutch colleaguewas unable to understand the essence and the importance of this newtheory. His basic mistake is that he cannot distinguish - in the case ofthe sentence - between the meaning of the sentence and the interpretationof this meaning. As a necessary consequence of this, he represents - inreality - an anti-structuralist view, and his whole critique is deeplyimmersed in psychologism. However, here are his own words:

"It seems rather far-fetched to assume that the interpretation by thehearer of the phrase the shooting of the hunters finds place via different"kernel" sentences like the hunters shoot or they shoot the hunters. In anycase this has never been proved by any experiment and I don't expect itwill ever be proved. In our opinion it is not necessary to assume that theinterpretation of a sentence by the hearer finds place by comparison ofdifferent sets of other sentences."2

"... every single sentence, also a seemingly trivial sentence, has to beinterpreted by the hearer with the help of extra-linguistic data. This is ageneral principle of speech. In the absence of any situational data it isimpossible for the hearer to know how he has to interpret even a sentencelike John is playing golf. Does the speaker want to express the fact thatJohn, who never plays golf, is playing this game this time to the surpriseof his environment? May be the sentence is spoken by John's wife whileJohn - after a strenuous eighteen holes in the afternoon - is playingbridge after dinner and doing this so badly and obviously with his mindstill on his game of golf that his wife remarks to the players: John isplaying golf (instead of bridge what he should do at that moment)."3

1 "An Appraisal of Transformation Theory", Lingua, XII, No. 1, pp. 1-18.2 Op. cit., p. 9.* Ibid., p. 11.

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INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION 17

"... observation of speech-utterances taken out of their actual milieuis essentially imperfect observation and will lead to linguistically unten-able conclusions.

Language is not a selfcontained system. Its structure is founded onthe assumption that it will be used not in vacuo. It functions in its setting,but as soon as a speech-utterance is observed by the linguist outside of itssituational setting and as soon as the frame of reference of the speaker isnot taken into account the utterance becomes for him uninterpretable,that is, it becomes ambiguous. I consider it extremely important thatMrs. Slama-Cazacu in her recent book has stressed this fundamentalinsight."4

As we have seen, Uhlenbeck very often uses the term "interpretation".This term, taken in itself, if not a linguistic one, and Uhlenbeck does notexplain what is - according to his conviction - the relation between theinterpretation of the sentence and the meaning of the sentence which is tobe interpreted. I am afraid that he implies that the meaning of thesentence and the interpretation of the meaning are identical. It thereforeseems to be necessary to deal briefly with the problem of the differentcomponents of the sentence.

2. In the case of every sentence we have to distinguish between threefactors: form, meaning, and content. We are not concerned here withthe problem of form. The difference between meaning and content, onthe other hand, can be explained as follows:

Every normal individual belonging to a speech community who knowshis native language has to understand the meaning of every sentencewhich is spoken in his language. If the meaning (of the sentence) isa linguistic phenomenon, an inherent part of the language, the know-ledge of the language also by definition implies the ability to under-stand, "to know", every meaning expressed by the language in consider-ation. However, an understanding of the sentence's meaning does notalways go together with the understanding of the sentence's content. Thesentence expresses its content via its meaning, and it often happens thatsomeone, a member of a speech community, clearly understands themeaning of the sentence without at the same time understanding itscontent. For example, if I utter to an uneducated person a sentencetaken from a science or the sphere of higher culture, it can happen, andin fact often does happen, that my hearer understands every word of mysentence and is also familiar with the sentence structure but cannot grasp4 Ibid., pp. 11-12.

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18 LÄSZLO ANTAL

the content. Why? Because an understanding of the content presupposesmore than just a linguistic knowledge.

Thus, in the case of every sentence, we encounter two different kindsof understanding. The first, the understanding of the meaning, requiresonly linguistic knowledge. The second, the understanding of the content,requires, in addition to linguistic knowledge, specialized, extra-linguisticknowledge.5 Why does the understanding of the content require extra-linguistic knowledge? Because the content of the sentence is the extra-linguistic reality about which the sentence informs us.

However, linguistics is concerned not with the extra-linguistic contentbut with the means by which this extra-linguistic content is expressed.Meaning is not the ultimate aim of the sentence. Meaning is a means bywhich the ultimate aim is achieved, i.e. the communication of certaincontents.

The fact that meaning is not the "be all" and "end all" but is, in fact,a subordinate factor in the sentence has been suspected by some authors.We read the following, for instance, in Mowrer: "There is a very wide-spread assumption, which we shall later have occasion to question, thatin the process of spoken or written communication we, somehow, transfermeanings from mind to mind.6... Let us explore now, instead, the pro-position that in communication we are not transferring meanings fromperson to person as much as we are transferring meanings from sign tosign within a given person, within a single mind. Said a little differently,the suggestion is that in order for us to communicate effectively withanother person, he must already have the meanings with which we shallbe dealing A rudimentary sentence will illustrate this notion. Let usassume that John is telling Charles that: Tom is a thief. It is clear that,for the intended effect to be produced by this sentence, Charles mustalready know Tom and must know about thieves and thievery."7

Furthermore, here is a very important quotation from Buyssens:"Prenons, par exemple, la phrase 'Mon pere est malade'; celui qui ditcela connait son pere et sä maladie; il sait que son pere a, par exemple,cinquante ans, des cheveux blancs, des yeux bleus, une bronchite; maispour comprendre cette phrase 1'auditeur n'a pas besoin d'en savoirautant; la phrase ne doit pas faire surgir en lui ni 1'aspect physique ni lanature de la maladie du pere en question; la phrase n'evoque en lui que

5 On the trinity of the sentence see my book Content, Meaning, Understanding(Janua Linguarum, series minor, No. XXXI).6 Mowrer, H. O., Learning Theory and the Symbolic Processes (London, 1960), p. 137.7 Ibid., p. 139.

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INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION 19

les connaissances generates que chacun de nous attache aux quatre mots'Mon pere est malade'. La connaissance individuelle que le locuteur a deson pere et de s maladie ne constitue pas la signification de la phrase'Mon pere est malade'; cette signification est un fait social: c'est ce qu'iiy a de commun aux connaissances individuelles de tous les individuschaque fois qu'ils utilisent ces quatre mots. La phrase est fait pourcommuniquer cela, rien de plus; et eile le communique parfaitement."8

Now we can perhaps see more clearly where Uhlenbeck's confusionlies. As we know, Uhlenbeck maintains that every single sentence mustbe interpreted using extra-linguistic data as a guide. It is clear that thecontent of the sentence can often provide such aid, but the meaning of thesentence cannot depend on mere interpretation. Even Uhlenbeck hasshown that every sentence is capable of a great number, if not an infinitenumber, of possible interpretations. Does this mean that a sentence canhave an infinite number of meanings? The sentence John is playing golfhas only one meaning. This meaning can express different contents, justas Uhlenbeck has demonstrated it. Extra-linguistic factors can often aidthe precise evaluation of these contents. But it is only the meaning whichbelongs to the sentence. The contents expressed by it and the interpre-tations of these contents are extra-linguistic factors and processes. Lin-guistics is concerned purely with the language and not with the interpre-tation of the language.

As we have said, the sentence John is playing golf has one meaning butcan express different contents, and these contents can, naturally, beinterpreted in different ways. The construction the shooting of the huntershas two meanings and, just like the above-quoted sentence, it has manypossible interpretations. However, these interpretations take two basicallydifferent directions, and this is the qualitative difference between thelatter construction and the former one. Thus, we can summarize thedifference in the following manner:

John is playing golf - one meaning with many (but, in many respects,similar) interpretations;

the shooting of the hunters - two meanings, each having many, butbasically different, interpretations.

In the case of the sentence John is playing golf different interpretations arepossible, but - despite every difference - it is impossible to arrive at theinterpretation that the reverse is happening, viz. the golf is playing John.

8 Buyssens, Ε., Υέήίέ et langue, langue et pensde (Bruxelles, 1960), p. 37.

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In the case of the sentence the shooting of the hunters two directions ofinterpretation are linguistically possible. Uhlenbeck completely overlooksthe fact that, in the case of the first sentence, the only ambiguities possibleare those which can be traced back to the extra-linguistic environment;in the case of the second sentence, however, we are faced with a linguisticambiguity even before we attempt an interpretation.

Uhlenbeck, as we have noted, maintains that "observation of speech-utterances taken out of their actual milieu is essentially imperfect obser-vation and will lead to linguistically untenable conclusions". Uhlenbeckperhaps did not appreciate that his statement is nothing more than acomplete abnegation of language itself. If we were to accept the view thata linguistic phenomenon is of value only in a concrete milieu, this wouldbe no more than an acknowledgement of the existence of speech withoutany language.

Speech is the application of language in concrete situations - andlanguage can only be defined if we disregard the diversity of the forms ofconcrete speech and select from them common factors which are inde-pendent of concrete situations. A word can denote very many differentdenotata. If we want to detect the meaning of the word, we have to seekthose common elements which are present in the different applications ofthe word - despite any apparent difference in the denotata. The merefact that Uhlenbeck refers to Slama-Cazacu in a positive way clearlyshows how far he departed from structural linguistics or, from any formof linguistics, for that matter.9

Language - states Uhlenbeck - is not a selfcontained system. Althoughit is not selfcontained, it is, nevertheless, an independent system and anobjective phenomenon. The meaning of the word or the sentence is notidentical with the extra-linguistic thing meant but is an objective entity.It is this objective entity which is the object of our study and not thevarying ways in which these entities are interpreted.

In the case of the sentence the shooting of hunters two such objectiveentities are present, and therefore we are faced with two different sen-tences. This linguistic fact cannot be explained or resolved by referringto the extra-linguistic data; these data can, at the most, serve as aids tointerpretation. We repeat, however, that interpretation is not a lin-guistic phenomenon, because it does not belong to language. Onlysomething which belongs to language can be linguistic. It is clear thatthe speaker himself is not a "linguistic phenomenon", because he does9 I have criticized the pitiful compilation made by Slama-Cazacu in my book Ques-tions of Meaning (The Hague, 1963), pp. 48-69.

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INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION 21

not belong to language. He only uses language as an independentlyexisting means.

I can summarize what I have said above as follows:a) Uhlenbeck confuses the meaning with the interpretation of the

meaning.b) He denies - volens nolens - the existence of language as a regulating

system of speech and, in reality, simply acknowledges that only speechexists.

c) He confuses the differences which derive from the diversity of theextra-linguistic situations with the differences inherent in the linguisticstructure itself.

3. According to Uhlenbeck, it has never been proved that a phrase canbe interpreted on the basis of different key sentences. I should like toknow what would constitute a satisfactory proof for Uhlenbeck. In fact,what can serve as a proof in the field of grammatical description? Natur-ally, the answer to this question depends on the nature of grammar.In fact, what is grammar?

Grammar is a system of hypotheses which endeavour to define thelinguistic structure. Theoretically, an infinite number of grammars arepossible. Grammars do not vary so much in their direct accuracy as intheir relative ability to provide a full and clear description. When does agrammar or a part of it provide adequate proof? When it provides uswith a relatively simple way of explaining linguistic data.

Transformational analysis is just such a system of hypotheses. It cansolve relatively simply ambiguities whose linguistic nature was notappreciated by Uhlenbeck and which can be arranged in a grammar ofimmediate constituents only in a very complicated manner. This is agood functional proof. Another proof, such as a direct comparison withthe linguistic structure, is impossible, because of the special nature oflanguage itself.

Language, as we know, is an objective reality, but it belongs to thesphere of social objectivity and, as such, it cannot be investigated directly.As, in the case of human thinking, we are in direct contact only with thethinking mind and never with the thought itself, so, in the case of langu-age, we perceive only the results of language, the speech utterances, andnever language itself in a pure form.

Every assumption concerning language has, therefore, to take the formof a hypothesis, the correctness of which can be evaluated only function-ally. We have to assert that the explanation given by transformational

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analysis for the ambiguities quoted reflects in a more faithful way thereal structure than do explanations given by other grammatical models,because of the simplicity of the former.

Uhlenbeck poses the question: "What does Chomsky mean by trans-formational origin? It seems to me impossible to take this term origin inany diachronical sense. But then one would like to know what kind oforigin is meant."10 Now it is clear that transformational origin cannotbe identified with diachronical precedence. But it is my view that trans-formational analysis is of great importance simply because it has shown,though until now only in theory, that "time" in language is conceivablenot only as a simple historical sequence, as it is represented in traditionallinguistics, but its role is also conceivable in a functional, non-historicalsense, as it is represented in physics. If this theory can be confirmed, theold, traditional linguistics, which has used the term "time" in the his-torical sence, may lose every claim to being a science or at least to beinga part of linguistics.

4. According to Uhlenbeck, Chomsky errs when he subdivides the sen-tence the man hit the ball into the man as the nominal part and hit the ballas the verbal part. Uhlenbeck expresses the view that this method ofanalysis is an imitation of the old, traditional grammar which has beenbuilt up upon non-formal principles but upon semantic criteria. Toreplace this "bad analysis" Uhlenbeck proposes his own, according towhich the sentence quoted has the following levels:

the manthe man hitthe man hit the ball

Here we must touch briefly upon the following questions:a) Is it true that the old form of analysis followed by Chomsky is a

bad one and lacks the formal point of view in every respect?b) Is the form of analysis proposed by Uhlenbeck based on grammar,

and, if it is, what kind of grammar?It is true that the old, Aristotelian grammar directly applied semantic

criteria, but transformation analysis has shown that we interpret themeaning on the basis of the form and not the form on the basis of themeaning. It is true that the subdivision of the sentence into a nominaland a verbal part also has semantic relevance, but these two semanticvalues exist because they have a formal foundation. Thus, when tradi-

10 Op. cit.t p. 9.

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INTERPRETATION AND Tlf^NSFORMATION 23

tional grammar directly separates the nominal part from the verbal parton semantic grounds, it is indirectly applying a formal procedure. Chom-sky, when analysing the sentence quoted, consciously applied the formalprinciple, whilst traditional grammar would have done the same in thiscase, but unconsciously.

We very often obtain the same results with our modern structuralanalysis as did traditional grammar. This only means that this old typeof grammatical description - despite its consciously formulated principles -has frequently had to defer to the stronger influence of the linguistic form.

Moreover, what can we say about the form of analysis proposed byUhlenbeck? The form proposed by Uhlenbeck is not an analysis of thesentence structure but a rough approximation of the form in which thissentence is perceived by the native speaker. The structure of the sentenceand the perception of the sentence are two different things. The structureof the sentence is a linguistic fact. The perception of the sentence, on theother hand, is a psychological process which does not concern us. How-ever, we know of a grammatical model based on a slightly similar con-ception, and this is the string analysis elaborated by Harris. The con-struction the man hit is a centre string, and the construction the ball is aright-hand adjunct to hit.

5. As we have seen, we cannot agree with Uhlenbeck when he criticizestransformational analysis. Unfortunately, we cannot even concur whenhe comments on the linguistic activity of Harris.

Uhlenbeck declares: "It seems to me that Chomsky's insistence on theneed of a precise and complete formulation of grammatical rules canonly be understood as a quite sound reaction against a tendency pre-valent in certain descriptive studies like those of Harris and others todescribe not so much a language as a limited amount of data of a language,a so-called corpus

It is true that a linguist will always start working on a certain limitedbody of data, but his aim is to surpass these data. That is, he will onlyconsider his work finished if he has become reasonably sure that the rulesestablished by him will hold also for all future cases outside his corpus.Of course there may exist all kinds of reasons why a linguist in a certainsituation has to content himself with the description of an arbitrarilycollected corpus.... However, one has to be aware that such a descriptionis but a first step to a complete language description and not more thanthat. Again, one cannot but agree with Chomsky when he declares thata grammatical description that gives nothing more than what Harris has

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called 'a compact one-to-one representation of the stock of utterances inthe corpus' claims little and will provoke only a limited amount ofinterest."11

Before proceeding further, there is something which needs explaining.Uhlenbeck is not the only one who accuses Harris, the author of Methodsin Structural Linguistics, of wanting to investigate only a limited corpus.It will therefore perhaps be useful to quote an important passage fromthe book in question, which clearly shows that Harris - at least in prin-ciple - does not regard the investigation of the corpus as the ultimate aimof linguistics.

Here are his own words: "To persons interested in linguistic results,the analysis of a particular corpus becomes of interest only if it is virtuallyidentical with the analysis which would be obtained in like manner fromany other sufficiently large corpus of material taken in the same dialect.If it is, we can predict the relations among elements in any other corpus ofthe language on the basis of the relations found in our analyzed corpus.When this is the case, the analyzed corpus can be regarded as a descrip-tive sample of the language. How large or variegated a corpus must be inorder to qualify as a sample of the language, is a statistical problem; itdepends on the language and on the relations which are being investigated.For example, in phonologic investigations a smaller corpus may beadequate than in morphologic investigations. When the linguist findsthat all additional material yields nothing not contained in his analysis hemay consider his corpus adequate."12 The fact that the corpus - undercertain circumstances - is intended to be a sample of the whole languagewas disregarded not only by Uhlenbeck but also by Chomsky.

We may remember that, according to Uhlenbeck, the linguist may haveto content himself with a limited corpus. I believe that it is not only anobjective necessity, such as the lack of sufficient material, which forcesthe linguist to be content with a limited corpus. There is also a moreimportant theoretical necessity. Transformational analysis is a syntheticalmodel, but every synthetical model presupposes the existence of a reliableanalytical model. The type of description proposed by Harris in hismonumental work is an analytical model, and, as such, it has to work, bydefinition, with a limited corpus.

Is this of minor significance and will it provoke only limited interest?In actual fact, we could never make a transformation without referringto the results of this often despised type of grammar. To discover the11 Op. cit.9 p. 4.12 Methods in Structural Linguistics (Chicago, 1955), p. 13.

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INTERPRETATION AND TRANSFORMATION 25

transformational relations of a language, we have to know in the case ofevery sentence

a) the morpheme boundaries,b) the classes to which the morphemes belong, andc) the structure of the sentence at the level of the immediate constitu-

ents.All these data are furnished by the despised analytical model.There is a deep-rooted connection between the analytical model of

Harris and the synthetical model of Chomsky, despite the many differ-ences between them. Chomsky's work was the natural outcome of theepoch-making activity of Harris. Transformational analysis is not anegation of Hams' work but a more developed form of it. Both me-thods were products of the most valuable school of modern linguistics -that of the great Bloomfield.

Eötvös-University, Budapest.

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