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Introducing Introducing InstitutionsInstitutions

John Aldrich John Aldrich

andand

Arthur LupiaArthur Lupia

Condorcet Winner in Condorcet Winner in FranceFrance

Table 1 Results of Selected Pre-Election Polls in the French Presidential Election of 2007

Vote Preference in a

Vote Preference in First Round Hypothetical Runoff

Poll Sarkozy Royal Bayrou Le Pen CSA February 20 33 26 15 10 Sarkozy 52; Royal 48 Bayrou 54; Sarkozy 46 Bayrou 52; Royal 48 BVA February 27 31 25 17 14 Sarkozy 53; Royal 47 Bayrou 54; Sarkozy 46 Bayrou 55; Royal 45 TNS-Sofres March 15 31 24 22 12 Sarkozy 54; Royal 46 Bayrou 54; Sarkozy 46 Bayrou 60; Royal 40 Ifop 28 22 20 13 Sarkozy 51; Royal 49 April 20 Bayrou 55; Sarkozy 45 Bayrou 58; Royal 42 Source: Compiled from the websites of these polling organizations.

Notes: All these results are based upon telephone polls. CSA polls are based upon

about 1,000 respondents; BVA polls upon about 960 respondents; TNS-Sofres polls

upon about 1,000 respondents; and IFOP polls upon about 950 respondents. All these

polls report that they represent the French population.

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Introducing Introducing InstitutionsInstitutions

The Importance of Agenda The Importance of Agenda ControlControl

Institutional Structures Institutional Structures and their Effects on the and their Effects on the Existence and/or Existence and/or Location of EquilibriumLocation of Equilibrium

The Importance of Agenda The Importance of Agenda ControlControl

D. Black (1948) “On the Rationale of Group D. Black (1948) “On the Rationale of Group Decision Making,”Decision Making,”

T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978) “Political T. Romer and H. Rosenthal (1978) “Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo,”Status Quo,”

K. Shepsle, (1979) "Institutional Arrangements K. Shepsle, (1979) "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." Models."

M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990) “Coalitions and M. Laver and K. Shepsle (1990) “Coalitions and Cabinet Government.” Cabinet Government.”

Black (1948)Black (1948)

M:M: “When a decision is reached by voting or is “When a decision is reached by voting or is arrived at by a group all of whose members are arrived at by a group all of whose members are not in complete accord, there is no part of not in complete accord, there is no part of economic theory which applies.”economic theory which applies.”

NH:NH: Is there more than one point that can beat Is there more than one point that can beat all others by a simple majority.all others by a simple majority.

P:P: One dimension. Single-peaked preferences. One dimension. Single-peaked preferences. N voters, M alternatives. Majority rule. Complete N voters, M alternatives. Majority rule. Complete information.information.

C:C: The median voter theorem.The median voter theorem.

Romer and Rosenthal Romer and Rosenthal (1978)(1978)

M:M: Does monopoly power have the same effect in Does monopoly power have the same effect in politics as economics?politics as economics?

NH:NH: Agenda Control implies unlimited power.Agenda Control implies unlimited power.

PP11:: There are two completely informed players: an There are two completely informed players: an agenda setter and a voter.agenda setter and a voter. The setter wants to maximize his budget. The setter wants to maximize his budget. Voter preferences are single-peaked in one dimensionVoter preferences are single-peaked in one dimension

R&R PremisesR&R Premises PP22:: There exists a status quo policy, QThere exists a status quo policy, Q[0, 100].[0, 100].

PP33:: The setter makes a proposal XThe setter makes a proposal X[0, 100].[0, 100].

PP44:: The voter chooses a winner YThe voter chooses a winner Y{X, Q}.{X, Q}.

PP55:: Each player has an ideal point and single peaked Each player has an ideal point and single peaked preferencespreferences

UUS S = -|Y-S|= -|Y-S|

UUVV= -|Y-V|= -|Y-V|

R&R ConclusionsR&R Conclusions CC11: : Suppose VSuppose VQ (parallel solution for V>Q.) In Q (parallel solution for V>Q.) In

equilibrium, the voter will choose X only if Xequilibrium, the voter will choose X only if X[V-(|V-Q|), Q].[V-(|V-Q|), Q].

CC22:: The outcome is often not the median voter’s ideal The outcome is often not the median voter’s ideal point. point.

CC33:: The setter’s best response to his anticipation of The setter’s best response to his anticipation of voter reactions is:voter reactions is: If S If S [V-(|V-Q|), Q], then X=S=Y.[V-(|V-Q|), Q], then X=S=Y. If S If S [0, V-(|V-Q|)), then X=max[0, V-(|V-Q|)]=Y.[0, V-(|V-Q|)), then X=max[0, V-(|V-Q|)]=Y. If S If S (Q, 1], then X=S(Q, 1], then X=SY. Y.

R&R Example 1R&R Example 1

SS VV QQ RangeRange OutcomeOutcome

11 55 99 1-91-9 11

33 77 11 1-131-13 33

33 99 55 5-135-13 55

77 11 55 0-50-5 55

66 88 11 1-151-15 66

11 22 33 1-31-3 11

99 55 44 4-64-6 66

33 77 99 5-95-9 55

Shesple, “Institutional Shesple, “Institutional ArrangementsArrangements

M: Institutions can induce equilibrium, M: Institutions can induce equilibrium, jointly with preferences, where jointly with preferences, where preferences alone would not yield eq. preferences alone would not yield eq. (SIE even in the absence of PIE)(SIE even in the absence of PIE)

NH: In more than one dimension, NH: In more than one dimension, “democratic” equilibriums exist only by “democratic” equilibriums exist only by chance, even in a legislative/committee chance, even in a legislative/committee settingsetting

Shesple, “Institutional Shesple, “Institutional ArrangementsArrangements

PP Multidimensional spaceMultidimensional space Committees cover membersCommittees cover members Jurisdictions cover the issue spaceJurisdictions cover the issue space Committees have gate-keeping powersCommittees have gate-keeping powers Floor has amendment powersFloor has amendment powers

Shesple, “Institutional Shesple, “Institutional ArrangementsArrangements

C1: Existence result:C1: Existence result: Simple jurisdictionsSimple jurisdictions One jurisdiction per committeeOne jurisdiction per committee Non-open agenda ruleNon-open agenda rule

C2: SIEs may not be Pareto optimal C2: SIEs may not be Pareto optimal

Shesple, “Institutional Shesple, “Institutional ArrangementsArrangements

Laver and Shepsle, “Coalitions and Laver and Shepsle, “Coalitions and Cabinet Government”Cabinet Government”

M: The Shepsle model can M: The Shepsle model can generalize to parliamentary systemsgeneralize to parliamentary systems

NH: Yeah, right.NH: Yeah, right. P: P:

Coalitions are negotiations among Coalitions are negotiations among parties over control over ministries.parties over control over ministries.

Ministries are simple jurisdictions Ministries are simple jurisdictions Minister is a one-person committeeMinister is a one-person committee

Laver and Shepsle, “Coalitions and Laver and Shepsle, “Coalitions and Cabinet Government”Cabinet Government”

Thus, point AB in the southwest corner ofeach panel describes a proposal to enactpolicy AB, "policed by giving party Athe portfolio controlling the x dimensionand party B the portfolio controlling the ydimension. Obviously the ideal point of aparty, AA for example, represents a credibleproposal; this gives all relevant portfoliosto the party in question, allowing itto implement its ideal policies. Since aproposal is credible only if it is policed bythe right portfolio allocation, the pointAB in Figure 1, for example, represents acredible proposal if and only if party Agets portfolio x and party B gets portfolioy. If party Cis nominated for one of theseportfolios, then the point AB is not acredible proposal; its promise of policyoutput AB is cheap talk. More significantly,AB is not credible if party A gets portfolioy and B gets portfolio x. In this veryimportant sense, AB and BA representutterly different coalition governments,even though they involve precisely thesame coalition partners.

Problem Set 1 Problem Set 1 Romer and Rosenthal (1978)Romer and Rosenthal (1978)

(Due Tuesday, 9 a.m.)(Due Tuesday, 9 a.m.)

1.1. What happens if you add one more setter?What happens if you add one more setter?2.2. What happens if there is one setter and the What happens if there is one setter and the

voters have incomplete information?voters have incomplete information?3.3. What happens if there is one setter and the What happens if there is one setter and the

voter can offer one amendment?voter can offer one amendment?1.1. What happens if the voter lacks information?What happens if the voter lacks information?2.2. Does the amendment rule matter?Does the amendment rule matter?

Second AssignmentSecond Assignment(Due Thursday, 9am)(Due Thursday, 9am)

Take paper X, change three premises.Take paper X, change three premises.

Rank the changes using three criteria:Rank the changes using three criteria:1.1. Service to other scientists.Service to other scientists.2.2. Service to society.Service to society.3.3. Testability (if model) or generalizability (if Testability (if model) or generalizability (if

empirical).empirical).

Each group will make a 5-10 minute Each group will make a 5-10 minute presentation followed by 5-10 minutes of presentation followed by 5-10 minutes of questions. questions.

A class evaluation will follow.A class evaluation will follow.

Papers for Second Papers for Second AssignmentAssignment

Aldrich and McKelvey 1977Aldrich and McKelvey 1977 A Method of ScalingA Method of Scaling

Austen-Smith and Banks 1988Austen-Smith and Banks 1988 Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative OutcomesElections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes

Lupia and Strom 1995Lupia and Strom 1995 Coalition Termination Coalition Termination

Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992Kollman, Miller, and Page 1992 Adaptive Parties in Spatial ElectionsAdaptive Parties in Spatial Elections

McKelvey and Niemi 1978McKelvey and Niemi 1978 Sophisticated VotingSophisticated Voting

Gerber OverviewGerber Overview Reacts to claims from literatures that do not Reacts to claims from literatures that do not

employ formal models.employ formal models.

Uses insights from formal models to structure Uses insights from formal models to structure their data collection and empirical modeling.their data collection and empirical modeling.

The main insight is that observable variations are The main insight is that observable variations are insufficient to determine causalityinsufficient to determine causality understanding the incentive effects of institutions yields understanding the incentive effects of institutions yields

better empirical explanations.better empirical explanations.

Gerber (1996)Gerber (1996) M. Do initiatives affect legislative choices?M. Do initiatives affect legislative choices?

NH. They do not.NH. They do not.

P. Interest groups react to legislation by proposing P. Interest groups react to legislation by proposing initiatives.initiatives. Initiatives are costly.Initiatives are costly. Complete information.Complete information.

C. When voters or interest groups are “moderate,” the C. When voters or interest groups are “moderate,” the threat of initiatives yields legislation closer to the median threat of initiatives yields legislation closer to the median voter’s ideal point.voter’s ideal point.

Gerber ModelGerber Model

Sample DynamicSample Dynamic

Main Theoretical ResultMain Theoretical Result

Empirical EstimationEmpirical Estimation Use responses to questions about abortion Use responses to questions about abortion

policy on the 1980’s Senate Election policy on the 1980’s Senate Election Studies to estimate a median voter ideal Studies to estimate a median voter ideal point (i.e., point (i.e., lh lh support parental consent) support parental consent) for each state.for each state.

Regress actual consent on estimated Regress actual consent on estimated preferences, initiative dummy variable preferences, initiative dummy variable and control variables.and control variables.

Main Empirical ResultMain Empirical Result

ImplicationImplication

The mere threat of initiatives is sufficient to induce the legislature to be more responsive to

the median voter.

Additional empirical implication: “No initiatives” and “Initiative Process inducing

legislative responsiveness” are observationally equivalent.

Legislative Response Legislative Response to the Threat of to the Threat of

Popular InitiativesPopular Initiatives

What would you do?What would you do?