INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES … DE ACCIDENT… · Cargo Ship Safety Const. Cert. Feb 12,...

Capt Khush Fitter Collision - M/V LEONIS Accidents Investigator

Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine Marine Casualty Investigation Branch

Panama, Republic of Panama

PANAMA MARITIME AUTHORITY

INVESTIGATION INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COLLISION OF M.V. LEONIS AT

HUMBER PILOT STATION – U.K.

Accident Reporting and Investigation

The fundamental purpose of investigating an accident under these Regulations is To determine its circumstances and the cause with the aim of improving the safety of life at sea and the avoidance of accidents in the future. It is not the purpose to

apportion liability, nor, except so as is necessary to achieve the fundamental purpose, to apportion blame.

R-021-07/DISAM


Panama Maritime Authority

Directorate General of Merchant Marine Marine Casualty Investigation Branch


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Index

SYNOPSIS 1. Factual Information 1.1. Ship Particular of Vessel Involved. 1.1.1. M.V. LEONIS General Data 1.1.2. M.V. AUDACITY General Data 1.2. Background 1.3. Summary 1.4. Weather Condition 1.5. The Crew on duty at the time of Incident

1.5.1. Interview of relevant crew members 1.5.2. Master’s Interview 1.5.3. Chief Officer’s Interview 1.5.4. Motorman’s Interview.

1.6. Narrative 1.6.1. Details with timings before collision from the VDR 1.6.2. Details with timings after the collision from the VDR 1.7. Cause of Incident 1.7.1. Personnel manning the bridge at the time of the Incident. 1.7.2. Personnel manning the engine room at the time of the Incident. 1.7.3. Communications during the Incident. 1.8. Assistance & sequence of events of rescue operations at the time of Incident.

1.8.1. Action by Master 1.8.2. Collision avoidance action.

1.9. Action after the Incident to Mitigate Casualty 1.9.1. Action by VTS 1.9.2. Action by Chief Engineer. 1.9.3. Action by Ship’s Crew.





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1.10. Details of Bridge Equipment. 1.11. Details of Engine Room Equipment. 1.12. Review of Documents 1.13. Details of Injuries / Fatalities / Oil Pollution / Property Damage. 1.13.1. Damage repair details of M.V. Leonis 1.13.2. Damage repair details of M.T. Audacity 1.14. Assistance after the Incident. 1.15. Extract and review of documents and authentication. 2.0 Nature and extent of Damage 2.1. M.V. Leonis 2.2. M.T. Audacity 3.0 Analysis and Conclusion 3.1. Human Element Error. 3.2. Recommendations 4.0 Corrective Actions by the Company 5.0. Foreword





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SYNOPSIS (Return to Index)

This casualty investigation report is carried out on behalf of the Panamanian Maritime Authority from 18th – 24th of May 2007 while the M.V. “LEONIS” was laying safely afloat, all fast starboard side alongside at Berth No. “C”, Alexandra Dock, at the Port of Hull, in the United Kingdom. The Panamanian vessel M.V. “LEONIS”, IMO Number 9335707 owned by Prebble Properties Group Inc., Panama, managed by Marper Sam, Monaco, registered with the classification society “Rina”, had collided with the British vessel M.T.“Audacity”, IMO Number 9134751, classified by Lloyds Register +100A1, at the mouth of the River Humber at 13:52 Hrs on the 14th of April 2007 in Position Lat 53.32.5’N , Long 000 13.37’E. At the time of the collision the M.V. “LEONIS” was on inbound passage to Grimsby, loaded with a cargo of 3315 Metric tons of Bauxite in bulk, GM of 2.89 Meters and drawing 3.00 Meters Fwd and 5.70 Meters Aft, sea water density being 1.025gms/cc., making good a speed of about 3 Knots on a course of 320(T). The other vessel, M.T. “Audacity” had sailed out from the Port of Hull, approaching the Humber Pilot Station to disembark the pilot, outbound for Aberdeen, loaded with a cargo of oil, making good a speed of about 6 Knots on a course of 085(T). At the time of the incident the weather conditions were dense fog with visibility of about 120 meters, Winds from NE at about 10 Knots, the sea conditions were slight sea with no swell, the tide was flooding at 3 knots in SSW direction. As a consequence of the collision, the M.V. “LEONIS” was damaged on the port bow with a hole, 4.5 meters above the waterline however, she continued her voyage to Grimsby. The M.T. “Audacity” also suffered damages to her bow thus abandoned its voyage for repairs at Humber River Roads anchorage, where she carried out repairs. There was no casualty to life nor any injury or pollution as a result, of this collision that was confirmed by the Humber Coast Guard. No damage to any property is suspected, and so far there have been no claims with respect to same, as confirmed by Master.





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The M.V. “LEONIS” was under the command of the captain D.O.B. 11/06/1964, of Ukrainian nationality, who had applied for the Panamanian License on Feb 6TH, 2007 and received Panamanian License No. 718252 issued on April 17th, 2007. The pilot on board to advise the Master. M.T. “Audacity” was under the command of Capt. and had a pilot on board. Both vessels did not exchange or follow the procedure of statutory requirement to give name and nationality to other ship, nor stood by after collision.





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AAbbbbrreevviiaattiioonnss uusseedd iinn tthhee ccoonntteexxtt ooff tthhiiss RReeppoorrtt:: A.B. Able Body Seaman AIS: Automatic Identification System ARPA: Automatic Radar Plotting Aid CPA: Closest Point Of Approach D.O.: Diesel Oil DPA: Designated Person Ashore EPIRB: Emergency Position-Indicating Radio Beacons GPS: Global Positioning System H.O.: Heavy Oil IMO: International Maritime Organization ISM: International Safety Management M.T.: Motor Tanker M.V.: Motor Vessel ROR: Rules of the Road TCPA: Time of Closest Point of Approach VDR: Voyage Data Recorder VHF: Very High Frequency VTS: Vessel Traffic Service





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M.V. LEONIS

M.V. AUDACITY

SECTION 1 - FACTUAL INFORMATION





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““MM..VV.. LLEEOONNIISS”” PPAARRTTIICCUULLAARRSS

11..11..11.. GGeenneerraall DDaattaa

IMO Number: 9335707 Nationality: Panamanian Port of Registry: Panama Class sign: H8VX Official Number: 32877-PEXT-Z Classification Society/Class: RINA Classification Number: 82474 Owners (WITH ADDRESS): Prebble Properties Group Inc., Panama Operators(WITH ADDRESS): Marper Sam, Monocco Charterer (WITH ADDRESS): Chandler Schiffahrt, Hamburg,Germany Type of Charter: Voyage Charter Agents: Cory Brothers, Hull U.K. Type of Ship: General Cargo Ship’s Gear: 3 Cranes SWL 15 MT Builder: Zhejiang Yongfa Shipyad Co. Ltd – Wenling, China. Keel Laid: June 9th, 2003 Delivered: Dec 30th, 2004 Summer Deadweight: 6858 MT Net Tonnage: 2743 MT Gross Tonnage: 4469 MT Length overall: 112.76 Meters Length (Between Perpendiculars): 102.23 Meters Breadth (Molded): 17.60 Meters Depth (Molded): 8.20 Meters Summer Draught: 6.30 Meters SShhiipp’’ss CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn CCoonnttaacctt DDeettaaiillss :: Ship’s Tlx Inmarsat “C”No.: 435650910 Ship’s Email: [email protected] BBuunnkkeerrss oonn BBooaarrdd :: H.O. 93.97 MT D.O. 36.86 MT





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““MM..VV.. AAUUDDAACCIITTYY”” PPAARRTTIICCUULLAARR

11..11..22.. GGeenneerraall DDaattaa Name: M.T. “AUDACITY” IMO Number: 9134751 Nationality: British Port of Registry: London Official Number: 730397 Classification Society/Class: Lloyds Register Class Notation: +100A1 Double skin ESP Notation +LM,+UMC Classification Number: N.A. Owners (with address) N.A. Operators (with address) N.A. Type of Ship: Tanker Ship’s Gear: N.A. Builder: N.A. Builder’s Hull No.: N.A. Keel Laid: N.A. Launched: N.A. Delivered: 1995 Summer Deadweight: N.A. Net Tonnage: 1136.00 MT Gross Tonnage: 2965.57 MT Length overall: 88.76 Meters LBP: N.A. Breadth (Moulded): 16.50 Meters Depth (Moulded): 7.65 Meters





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LIST OF STATUTORY CERTIFICATES. CCeerrttiiffiiccaattee DDaattee ooff DDaattee ooff IIssssuueedd IIssssuuee:: EExxppiirryy:: BByy:: Certificate of Classification Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2011 RINA Cargo Ship Safety Equip. Cert. Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2008 RINA Cargo Ship Safety Const. Cert. Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2011 RINA Cargo Ship Safety Radio Cert. Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2007 RINA International Tonnage Cert. Nov 8th, 2006 ------ PAN International Load Line Cert. Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2011 RINA Int’l Oil Pollution Prevention Cert. Feb 12, 2007 14 Nov 2011 RINA Safety Management Cert. Nov 14, 2006 13 May 2007 RINA Document Of Compliance May 3, 20027 3 Oct 2007 RINA Minimum Safe Manning Cert. Nov 8th, 2006 ------ Panama 1.2. BACKGROUND The M.V. “LEONIS” had loaded 6,324 MT of Bauxite in bulk, from the port of Linden, Guyana. After discharging part of Bauxite cargo, at the port of Rotterdam on 13th April 2007, with a draft of Forward 3.38 Meters, Aft 5.46 Meters, sea water density being 1.000 gms/cc, GM 2.89 Meters, HO 96.80 MT and DO 40.49MT, upright with no list, she sailed out for the port of Grimsby in U.K. Her remaining cargo on board was 3,315 MT of Bauxite, and ETA was 10:00 Hrs, 14th April 2007. The vessel arrives at Humber River Roads at 09:15Hrs and was advised to anchor and wait for pilot, who was to board at 1330 Hrs. At 12:10 Hrs, on receiving instructions, the vessel heaved up anchor to proceed to pilot station. The pilot Mr. boarded the vessel at 13:45 Hrs on 14th April 2007 and the vessel was scheduled to berth at Alexandra docks for discharging her of Bauxite cargo. On passage from Rotterdam to Grimsby the vessel made an average speed of about 10.40 Knots and consumed H.O. 2.83MT, and D.O. 1.73MT. During the voyage the vessel encountered good weather with no abnormalities.





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1.3. SUMARY PPllaaccee :: Humber River entrance Pilot Grounds.(U.K.) TTiimmee:: 13:52 Hrs DDaattee :: 14th April 2007 PPoossiittiioonn :: Lat 53.32.5N , Long 000 13.37E. Panamanian vessel M.V. “LEONIS”, collided with British tanker M.T.“Audacity” at Humber River entrance pilot grounds near the “A” buoy, where M.V. “LEONIS” had picked up pilot about 7 minutes before the incident and the M.T. “Audacity” was approaching the pilot station to disembark the pilot. Both pilots had communicated their intentions and agreed that the M.V. “LEONIS” will head in northerly direction and pass ahead of the M.T. “Audacity” who would head southerly and pass “Port to Port”. The M.V. “LEONIS” started heading northerly increased the engine speed to about 4 knots, but did not observe an appreciable change in bearings of the other vessel and also the closest point of approach was reducing and on a collision course. The pilot advised to put the helm midship and to go full astern however the two vessels collided. The M.V. “LEONIS” suffered damage on the port side under the forecastle area in way of the forepeak store, forepeak tank, anchor hawser, where the bow of the M.T. “Audacity” came in contact and also suffered indentation under the water line in way of forepeak tank and bulbous bow. There was no damage to any Fuel oil tanks, which are situated between frames 04 – 48 and mainly in engine Room. The M.T. “Audacity” suffered damaged to her bow, which had come in contact with the fore part of the M.V. “LEONIS”. The details of her damages were not available at the time of this investigation. 1.4. Weather Conditions At the time of the incident the weather conditions were dense heavy fog with visibility of about 120 meters, winds from NE at about 10 Knots, the sea conditions were slight sea with no swell, the tide was flooding at 3 knots in SSW direction. Neither low pressure, storms, or gale warnings were predicted nor any shipping warnings issued by the port of Grimsby.





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1.5. THE CREW ON DUTY AT THE TIME OF INCIDENT RRaannkk DD..OO..BB SSiiggnneedd OOnn Master: Nov 6th, 1964 Feb 7th, 2007 2nd.Off: Feb 13th, 1969 Oct 18th, 2006 A.B.: Mar 6th, 1968 Feb 7th, 2007 A.B. (Lookout) May 3, 1950 Jan 6th, 2007 Chief Engineer: Nov 30th, 1973 Aug 23th, 2006 2nd Eng: Mar 24th, 1967 Aug 16th, 2006 Motorman: Feb 07th, 1987 Jan 26th, 2007 1.5.1. IInntteerrvviieeww ooff rreelleevvaanntt ccrreeww mmeemmbbeerrss:: The Master and following staff were interviewed in the Master’s presence and their documents and certificates were reviewed. The 2ndOff, A.B, Chief Engineer, 2nd Eng, who were on watch at the time of the incident could not be interviewed as they had completed their contract and signed off from the vessel. The Drug and Alcohol Test report carried out after the incident for the Master, Ch.Officer, 2nd. Officer and A.B. indicated negative results. The rest period time sheet for duty personnel reflected that all had adequately rested and met the guidelines of IMO being: Rest Periods Hours of Rest Minimum Number All persons who are assigned duty as officer in charge of a watch or as a rating forming part of a watch,shall be provided with a minimum of ten (10) hours of rest in every 24 hour period. Number of Rest Periods per 24 Hour Period Such hours of rest may be divided into no more than two periods, one of which shall be at least six (6) hours in length. RRaannkk PPaann.. EExxppiirryy NNaattiioonnaalliittyy PPaassssppoorrtt CCeerrtt.. NNoo.. Master : 718252 July 16th,07 Ukrainian AH582693 Ch.Off: 718224 July 4ht, 07 Ukrainian AC504005 Motorman: 718137 May 21th, 07 Ukrainian PO325450





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11..55..22.. MMaasstteerr :: The Master 43 yrs of age, Panamanian Certificate No. 718252, expiry 16th July’07 stated that he joined the vessel on 7th Feb 2007, this was his first Command. He has been sailing since the year 1990 and during his sea service he had been a Chief Officer for about 4 years and 2nd officer for about 6 years. He came on the bridge at about 0750 Hrs on the day of the incident and performed the 3rd Officers watch from 08:00 -12:00 hrs. He was present on the bridge at the time of the collision and had adequately rested. He confirmed that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol and details of his attached report were concurred by him. 11..55..33.. CChhiieeff OOffffiicceerr:: The Chief Officer 40 years of age, holder of Panamanian Certificate No. 718224, expiry 4th July’07 stated that he had been on board for about 4 months, and been a Chief Officer for about three years. He had been sailing on board since the year 1988, was resting in his cabin at the time of the incident. On feeling the impact of the collision, he immediately rushed to the bridge, thereafter followed the Master’s orders, and organized crew for tank soundings and checking damaged area. 11..55..44.. MMoottoorrmmaann:: The Motorman on duty, 20 years of age holder of Panamanian Certificate No. 718137, expiry 21st May’07 stated that he joined vessel on 26th Jan 2007 and this was his first time on board, came to the engine room at about 1150 Hrs on the day of the incident. He was carrying out the routine duties and orders as per instructions of the Chief Engineer. After the incident, he was asked to check for oil in the bilges and he did not find any.

1. 6. NARRATIVE The M.V. “Leonis” heaved up anchor at 12:10 Hrs on the day of the incident and proceeded to pilot boarding grounds on a course of 270(T). At 13:20 the VTS informed that, the “Leonis” was no. 7 in the convoy. The details of the timings from the VDR, as stated by the Master were as follows: At 13:20Hrs Approaching pilot stations 0n 247(T), 3.30 knots,





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1.6.1. DDeettaaiillss wwiitthh ttiimmiinnggss bbeeffoorree ccoolllliissiioonn ffrroomm tthhee VVDDRR :: Time Heading Course

Made Good

Speed Engines Communication

1330 282 270 (T) 4.9knots Ahead1335 312 358 (T) Astern 1340 320 282 (T) 1.0knots Stop Pilot boat advised “Back

On Course 280(T), increase speed to 6 knots”

1343 255 (T) 4.5Knots 1345 283 250 (T) 3.9knots Stop1348 280 250 (T) 3.1knots Ahead Pilot contacted VTS and

established contact with M.T. “Audacity”, agreed to go northerly.

1350 302 270 (T) 4.0 Knots

Full Astern

Pilot trying to call “Audacity” but there was interference from VTS who was relaying Navigational Warnings.

After heaving up the anchor, the M.V. “Leonis” was approaching the pilot station on a course made good of 270(T), speed of 4.90 knots. At 13:30Hrs as per the chart position, she was at the pilot grounds. At 13:35Hrs as per VDR, as stated by the Master, she was going astern to reduce her speed. At 13:40Hrs the Pilot boat advised her to go back On Course 280(T) and increase her speed to 6 knots. As per position on chart, she had already started drifting southwards and was at the entrance of the channel in way of the outbound traffic. At 13:43Hrs, the pilot boarded the vessel, reached the bridge at 13:45Hrs, the vessel was entering the mouth of Humber River and pilot on board was Mr. C.P. Talbut.





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The Bridge was manned by the Master along with 2nd Officer Mr. Abdoul Huassan Ismail, A.B., Mr. Raychev Igor. The Lookout A.B., Mr. Kochergin Anatoliy was positioned at the forecastle. Chart in use was B.A. Chart No. 109 “River Humber and the Rivers Ouse and Trent” (the original chart was not available as the Lawyer from INCE &Co., London had removed the same for safekeeping, and thus the edition and correction dates could not be verified). The vessel was making good a speed of about 3 knots, course of 320(T), maneuvering on hand steering; both steering motors were in use, Engines were on D.O., and on Bridge remote control. The positions were being charted by the duty officer using data from GPS, bearing and distances from the Radar. The vessel had at the time two “X” Band – 3 Cm Radar in operation on 3 and 6 miles ranges. The Master stated that he heard sound signals of vessels in vicinity but did not identify nor was sure of the sound signals of M.T. “Audacity”. Since the visibility was poor, he did not use the Aldis Lamp to attract attention of the other vessel. No observations were reported to have been made from the AIS. Note: Automatic Identification System (AIS), is an equipment on the bridge from which you could learn the ship’s name, course and speed, classification, call sign, registration number, MMSI, and other information. Maneuvering information, closest point of approach (CPA), time to closest point of approach (TCPA) and other navigation information, more accurate and more timely than information available from an automatic radar plotting aid, could also be available The M.T. “Audacity” was sailing from (port not known), heading for the port of Aberdeen, with a cargo of oil and had a pilot on board. The Master on M.V. “Leonis” did observe the M.T. “Audacity” on the Radar but could not recollect any details or records of her with reference to:

1. When the vessel was first sited on the Radar. 2. The bearing, distance speed, course, closest point of approach and time of closest

point of approach (i.e. CPA & TCPA). 3. If the vessel was tracked, constantly monitored, plotted, if the bearings were

drawing out or in, or any change in CPA/TCPA observed. 4. No communication was established by the Master with the M.T.“Audacity”.





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1.6.2. DDeettaaiillss wwiitthh ttiimmiinnggss aafftteerr tthhee ccoolllliissiioonn ffrroomm tthhee VVDDRR:: Time Heading Course

Made Good

Speed Engines Communication

1350 302 270 (T) 4.0 Knots

Full Astern

Pilot trying to call “Audacity” but there was interference from VTS / who was relaying Navigational Warning.

1352 Collision 1353 016 013 (T) (-2.5knots) Pilot contacted “Audacity”

checked for condition 1355 013 010 (T) (-1.2knots) Ahead 1357 032 030 (T) 1.7Knots Ahead Pilot reported to VTS &

Coast guard about collision, damage to vessel, number of people on board.

1400 040 038 (T) 2.5Knots Ahead Pilot reported to VTS & Coast Guard: No pollution; No injury.

On reaching the Bridge, at 13:48Hrs the pilot contacted the pilot on the M.T. “Audacity” who was approaching the pilot station to disembark, and both pilots had communicated their intentions and agreed that the M.V. “LEONIS” will head in a northerly direction and pass ahead of the M.T. “Audacity” who would head southerly. At this point it is to be noted that the vessel had drifted south and was very much in the way of the outgoing channel, i.e. about 0.4 miles south east of the “A” buoy whereas the vessel was supposed to be north of the “A” buoy to enter the channel. It is also to be noted that the pilot on M.V. “Leonis” tried to contact the M.T. “Audacity” but could not communicate due to interference from VTS that was relaying Navigational warnings at that moment.





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At 13:50Hrs, when the pilot realized that a close quarters situation was evident and that he would not be able pass well clear of the M.T. “Audacity” he tried calling the M.T. “Audacity” on VHF radio but was unable to do so due to interference from VTS that was relaying Navigational Warnings on the same frequency. The pilot advised to put the steering wheel at ‘amidships’ and engines on full astern but unfortunately at 13:52Hrs, on 14th April, the two vessels collided in position Lat 53.32.5N , Long 000 13.37E. It was not clear from the Master’s statement as to when, how and by whom it was first realized that a collision was imminent nor were there any records available to understand if any action was taken by the other vessel. The exact details of all the timings and actions are available with the vessel’s managers, of the vessel who have a copy from the VDR (Voyage Data Recorder). Both vessels did not exchange statutory requirement data to give name and nationality to other ship nor stood by after collision. The Master did not lodge a Note of Protest. 1.7. CCaauussee ooff IInncciiddeenntt :: At the time of the incident both the vessels had pilots on board, were around pilot boarding grounds, there was no machinery failure, the visibility was very poor with dense fog, the current had set the M.V. “Leonis” south of the intended entrance channel. When the pilot reached the bridge at 13:45 hrs, he established contact with the pilot of M.V. “Audacity” and both pilots had communicated their intentions and agreed that the M.V. “LEONIS” will head in a northerly direction and pass ahead of the M.V. “Audacity” who would head southerly and pass “Port to Port”. However, the combined effect of inadequate timely and insufficient action plus the response of the intended action led to the collision of both vessels. 1.7.1. Personnneell MMaannnniinngg tthhee BBrriiddggee aatt tthhee ttiimmee ooff tthhee IInncciiddeenntt:: The Master was in command of the vessel, 2nd. Off I was the Officer on watch. At the time of the incident the vessel was on hand steering with both steering motors running, A.B. on wheel was Lookout, A.B. Mr. on the forecastle. The engines were on bridge remote control and Master along with Superintendent confirmed that there was no history of any engine problems in the past.





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The Master was on the bridge at the time of the incident. He had checked the arrival check list, the passage planning, and courses that were laid down on the chart. The duty officer on the bridge was 2nd Officer, who had also familiarized himself with the passage plan and was aware that pilot was to be picked up 13:30 Hrs on 14th April 2007. The company policy of passage planning, as per “Bridge Procedure Manual”, and checklist of equipment were carried out before arrival port / pilot station. Restricted visibility check list was also prepared and being complied with. The vessel was sounding a Fog signal being “One Prolonged Blast at Intervals of Not More Than Two Minutes” for restricted visibility, as per Rule 35 of the “Rules of the Road”. 1.7.2. PPeerrssoonnnneell MMaannnniinngg EEnnggiinnee RRoooomm aatt tthhee ttiimmee ooff tthhee IInncciiddeenntt:: The engine room was manned by Chief Engineer, Duty Engineer 2nd Eng. The Engines were running on diesel oil with remote control from bridge. 1.7.3. CCoommmmuunniiccaattiioonn dduurriinngg tthhee IInncciiddeenntt:: The M.V. “Leonis” is equipped with two VHF as per requirement; one was on listening watch Channel 16 and the other on channel 14 as per the requirement of Humber VTS. On realizing that the close quarter situation was evident, as heard on the VDR, The pilot tried to contact the pilot on the other vessel however there was interference from the Humber VTS who were relaying the Weather forecast and Navigational Warning. Thus at the final moment there was no communication between the two vessels. After the collision, both vessels inquired from each other about damages and condition. They also checked if there was any pollution, injury and safety of vessel with respect to integrated stability. The pilot contacted ships in vicinity and port authorities, coast guard informing them of the vessel’s Collision. About 14:15Hrs, the Master using his personal mobile telephone, tried to contact, the DPA Mr. Mario Pierotti, on cell phone No. (377) 680866810. However, the DPA was unavailable and he then called the Superintendent on Tel No. (377) 678633399 and informed him of the situation. The orders on bridge were being given by the Master on the advice of the pilot.





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1.8. AAssssiissttaannccee && SSeeqquueennccee ooff eevveennttss ooff RReessccuuee OOppeerraattiioonnss aatt tthhee ttiimmee ooff IInncciiddeenntt.. The Master was unable to contact the DPA, thus contacted the vessel’s Superintendent and updated him with the circumstances and the situation. The Superintendent advised the Master to remain calm, carry out the check of the damages as per company’s collision check list, to inform all concerned parties, being Port control, VTS, and that he would further inform the DPA and required office staff. 1.8.1. AAccttiioonn bbyy MMaasstteerr:: The Master was following the advice of the pilot and did not narrate of any special action or orders given by him. 1.8.2. CCoolllliissiioonn AAvvooiiddaannccee AAccttiioonn:: On realizing that a close quarter situation was evident, the pilot advised to put the wheel mid ship and engines on full astern. 1.9. AAccttiioonn aafftteerr tthhee IInncciiddeenntt ttoo MMiittiiggaattee CCaassuuaallttyy:: After the vessel encountered the collision, the Pilot informed the VTS who further relayed a Navigation Warning to all shipping traffic in the area. The Master checked for the safety of the lookout person who was forward, designated the Chief Officer to check the damaged area, soundings of the Double Bottom Tanks and tried contacting the Designated Person Ashore, (DPA) and when unable to contact him, he called the vessel’s Superintendent and updated him of the situation. The vessel steered Northerly to clear the out bound traffic separation lanes. 1.9.1. AAccttiioonn bbyy VVTTSS:: The VTS was in communication and updated by the pilots of the collision, extent of damage, that there was no pollution, and no injury to any personnel. They further relayed navigation warnings to shipping traffic and warned them to remain clear of the area. At 14:10Hrs the VTS gave permission to the vessel to proceed to berth, 1.9.2. AAccttiioonn bbyy CChhiieeff EEnnggiinneeeerr:: On feeling the impact in the Engine Room, the Chief Engineer contacted the Bridge to find out the cause. He further organized to check for any damages in the Engine Room and also





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checked soundings of all oil tanks. Since the Chief Engineer had signed off it could not be confirmed if he felt any abnormal vibrations after the collision. The deflection readings of the crankcase were taken after the collision as was not considered necessary. 1.9.3. AAccttiioonn bbyy tthhee CCrreeww:: Deck and Engine personnel were collectively involved in checking the damaged area and taking soundings of the ballast and oil tanks. 11..1100.. DDeettaaiillss ooff BBrriiddggee EEqquuiippmmeenntt:: The Vessel M.V. “Leonis” was built in Zhejiang Yongfa Shipyad Co.Ltd – Wenling, China. and delivered in the year 2004. The Bridge is equipped with all required navigational aids and in compliance with the requirements. The Bridge equipment was in good working order and had been checked as per the company’s policy of passage planning and as per “Bride Procedure Manual”,

Radio: Furuno, MF/HF FS-2570 S – Band Radar: (number, type, make) X – Band Radar: Furuno, FR 2125; 2Pcs Gyro compass: Tokogawa, MKR 024 Automatic pilot: Tokogawa, PM 208 Magnetic Compass: Course Recorder: GPS: Furuno, GP-90 Echo Sounder: Sperry Marine, ES S100 Speed Log: Furuno, DS-80 Automatic Identification System: Furuno, FA-100 GPS Automatic Identification System Furuno, FA-100 VHF Radio Furuno, FM-8500 Inmarsat “C” Furuno, FELCOM-15 EPIRB Mc Murdo, E3 Voyage Data Recorder HLD-A / 0312004A





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PHOTOGRAPHS OF BRIDGE EQUIPMENT

BBrriiddggee CCoonnttrrooll PPaanneell GGMMDDSSSS SSttaattiioonn

BBrriiddggee TTeelleeggrraapphh VVooyyaaggee DDaattaa RReeccoorrddeerr PPoowweerr uunniitt





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PHOTOGRAPHS OF BRIDGE EQUIPMENTS

GGPPSS EECCHHOO SSOOUUNNDDEERR

VVHHFF LLOOCCAATTEEDD OONN BBRRIIDDGGEE





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11..1111.. DDeettaaiillss ooff EEnnggiinnee EEqquuiippmmeenntt :: The vessel engines were reported to be in good working order and there has been no history of any breakdowns. (Details of Engines/Makers etc)

Type & number 8320 2 COL-6 Makers / Builder Guangzhou Diesel Engine Factory Output (MCO) 2060 KW (CSO [90%MCO]) 490 rpm Means of Propulsion Reduction gear Propeller (Screws) Right handed, Fixed Pitch, Single Screw, 5 blades Service Speed 10.50 Knots H.O. Capacity 264.10 MT D.O. Capacity 184.40 MT Amount of fuel carried H.O 93.97 MT- D.O. 36.86 MT





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PHOTOGRAPHS OF ENGINE ROOM

Engine Room Control Panel Main Engine

PHOTOGRAPHS OF ENGINE ROOM

Electrical Switchboard Steering Gear





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1.12. RReevviieeww ooff DDooccuummeennttss :: Following documents were reviewed at the time of investigation:

Oil Record Book Soundings Book Master’s and Ch. Eng’s night order book Companies Standing Orders / Operational Manual Chart correction Log Radio Log Compass error book Planned Maintenance System Repairs requisition records Articles of Agreement Bar Records – Daily purchase

1.13.DDeettaaiillss ooff IInnjjuurriieess // FFaattaalliittiieess // OOiill PPoolllluuttiioonn // PPrrooppeerrttyy DDaammaaggee :: There was no casualty to life nor injury or pollution as a result of this collision. No damage to any property is suspected and so far there have been no claims with respect to same. 1.13.1. DDaammaaggee RReeppaaiirr ddeettaaiillss ooff MM..VV.. ““LLEEOONNIISS”” :: The vessel had carried out repairs as per recommendation and to the satisfaction of class “Rina”. The repairs were carried out by MMS ship repairs and dry dock Company, Alexandra Dock, Hull, U.K. 1.13.2. DDaammaaggee RReeppaaiirr ddeettaaiillss ooff MM..TT.. ““AAuuddaacciittyy”” :: Not Available 1.14. AAssssiissttaannccee aafftteerr tthhee IInncciiddeenntt :: After the vessel collided assistance was received from following by way of Advise, Cooperation and/or Arrangements:

Humber VTS Mr. Mauro Kucic vessel’s Superintendent Classification Society “Rina” Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) Port Agents, Freshney Cargo Services, Gransby MMS ship repairs and dry dock, Alexandra Dock, Hull. U.K.





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1.15. EExxttrraacctt && RReevviieeww ooff DDooccuummeennttss aanndd AAuutthheennttiiccaattiioonn :: All attached documents in Item 2 were obtained from the Master, who confirmed same were true copies of the original documents from the ship’s records. The documents were all reviewed by the investigating Surveyor. Most Originals were sighted for authenticity however; the original of Chart in use, B.A. Chart No. 109 “River Humber and the Rivers Ouse and Trent” was not available, as the Lawyer from INCE &Co., London, had taken custody of it. 2.0. NNaattuurree aanndd EExxtteenntt ooff DDaammaaggee:: 2.1.““MM..VV.. LLEEOONNIISS”” :: The M.V. Leonis suffered damages as follows between:

• Frames, 153 to Frame 141 Shell Plating Holed Approx 5000MM X 3000MM.

• Deck Frame 142 to 146 Buckled Approx 4000MM X 600MM. • Frame 152 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 1200MM. • Frame 151 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3000MM. • Frame 150 Web and Flanges Buckled approx 3200MM. • Frame 149 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 148 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 147 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 146 Web and Flanges Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 145 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 144 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 143 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 3500MM. • Frame 142 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 1500 MM X 600MM. • Frame 141 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 1500MM.





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Inside Fore Peak:

• Frame 144 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 250MM at the intersection with deck. • Frame 145 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 300MM at the intersection with deck. • Frame 146 Bulb Frame Buckled approx 300MM at the intersection with deck.

Port side 1 meter from the Bottom Shell: • Indentation approx 1800MM X 800MM Max deflection 60MM between Frames

143 and 145; Frame 143; 144; 145. • Bulbs Flats in way of Damage buckled approx 1000MM each. • Stringer between Frame 143 to 144 bent approx 500MM X 400MM.

Anchor Hawse pipe: • Anchor hawse pipe bottom and external part and the pocket plate distorted and

fractured There was no damage to the cargo holds and thus no damage to any cargo. Since the fuel oil tanks are not situated in the way of the damaged area there was no damage to any fuel oil tanks nor was there any pollution. 2.2. ““MM..TT.. AAuuddaacciittyy””:: The M.T. Audacity suffered damages at the bow on the Forecastle, but the details of the damages were not available at the time of investigation. However, there was no damage to life and no pollution reported by the M.T. “Audacity”.





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33..00.. AAnnaallyyssiiss aanndd CCoonncclluussiioonn:: The collision of M.V. “Leonis” and M.T. “Audacity” can be attributed to the following reasons and their combinations:

3.1.1. Poor visibility due to dense fog. 3.1.2. The drifting of the M.V. “Leonis”, in way of the out bound traffic due to a strong current. The M.V. “Leonis” speed was reduced to about 1.0 Knots at 13:40 hrs, as she was getting ready to pick up the pilot, and this increased her drift and she landed in way of the outbound traffic lane. 3.1.3. The timing of both vessels reaching the pilot grounds were not spread out. 3.1.4. There were no statements or records kept by the Master to back up his constant monitoring, tracking or communication with the M.T. “Audacity” and to learn of her intentions well in time before the pilot boarded the vessel. 3.1.5. As stated by Master, there were no warnings given by VTS to both vessels updating them of each other’s locations. It is also to be noted that the weather conditions were dense fog with very poor visibility and that the M.V. “Leonis” had drifted southwards in way of the outbound traffic lane.

3.1.6. Presence of a pilot on board or approaching to pick up a pilot must not be a reason to avoid taking adequate collision avoid action. 3.1.7. The Collision Avoidance Action should have been taken in ample time as per Rule 8 Action to avoid collision, part (a) of the “Rules of the Road” which states: Any action taken to avoid a collision shall be taken in accordance with the Rules Of this Part and shall, if the circumstances of the case admit, be positive, made in ample time, and with due regard, to the observance of good seamanship.





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VVTTSS:: The primary purpose o, Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) is to improve the safety and efficiency of navigation, safety of life at sea facilitate the safe and efficient transit of vessel traffic in the waterways, its seaward approaches and tributaries in an effort to protect marine environment, adjacent shore area andt prevent collisions, ramming, groundings and the associated loss of life. The secondary purpose of VTS is to provide assistance to other Coast Guard units in the accomplishment of their missions, such as search and rescue, maritime law enforcement, and aids to navigation.

3.1. HHuummaann EElleemmeenntt EErrrroorr:: The Bridge manning staff was subjected to an independent Drug and Alcohol test soon after the vessel was alongside, and the results showed negative, ruling out any human error under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 3.2. RReeccoommmmeennddaattiioonnss::

3.3.1. After the collision, both the vessels did not exchange or follow the procedure of statutory requirements to give the name and nationality to the other vessel nor stood by after collision. 3.3.2. Chart in use was B.A. Chart No. 109 “River Humber And The Rivers Ouse And Trent”. The original chart was not available for investigation purposes, as the Lawyer Mr. Chris Farmer from INCE &Co., London, took custody of it. A full size photocopy of the chart used must be kept on board and should have been made available for investigation. 3.3.3. No details of the M.T. “Audacity” were obtainable from M.V. “Leonis” which could have been observed and obtained from AIS. 3.3.4. The VTS did not inform the M.V. “Leonis” of its having drifted southward and to keep clear of the M.T. “Audacity” that was also heading to disembark the pilot and vice versa to M.T. “Audacity” of the situation and location of the M.V. “Leonis”.





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3.3.5. The Pilot’s Station should have had a safe time gap margin for the embarkation and disembarkation of the Pilots from both vessels, especially in view of the prevailing dense fog, poor visibility and strong local currents.

44..00.. CCoorrrreeccttiivvee AAccttiioonn bbyy tthhee CCoommppaannyy:: The company’s Superintendent attended to the vessel and arranged all repairs per recommendations of Classification surveyor from ‘Rina’. 55..00.. FFoorreewwoorrdd:: Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine, Department of Navigation and Maritime Safety appointed the firm of K.P. Fitter and Associates Inc. to investigate the grounding. The on-board investigation took place on the vessel M.V. “LEONIS” while laying safely afloat, Starboard side alongside at Berth No. “C”, Alexandra Dock, at the Port of Hull, U.K. beginning at 14:00 Hrs hours (LT) on 21st May 2007. Panama Maritime Investigation Authorities acted in accordance to the IMO Resolution A.849 (20) adopted on 27th Nov 1997, concerning accident investigation as the leading party of the investigation. Capt. Ashok Jain represented K. P. Fitter & Associates to conduct the on-board investigation. All interviews, inspections, and other actions by Capt. Ashok took place in the presence of the Master of the vessel, Capt. Bondaruk Mykola In accordance with IMO Resolution A.849 (20) concerning investigations of marine casualties and incidents, this report is submitted to the Panama Maritime Authority Directorate General of Merchant Marine. All received statements, documents, and records as mentioned in item 2 are attached.

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