Investing in Peace and thePrevention of Violence in theSahel-Sahara: Second RegionalConversation

AUGUST 2017

Introduction

Violent extremism expresses itself in different ways depending on the context.Fed by both endogenous and exogenous factors, it is a phenomenon that,while occurring locally or nationally, also has regional and internationaldimensions. Violent extremism has broad societal, security, and governanceimplications and touches upon religion, ideology, economics, social issues,justice, and development, making it a complex problem that can beunderstood and analyzed differently, depending on the approach taken. Are we witnessing the radicalization of Islamism or the Islamization ofradicalism, to reference a well-known debate on this topic? In what ways doextremism and violence differ? Are they an attempt to bring about change oreven a revolution (linked to political, social, or economic realities and thedeterioration of state-citizen relations) or a quest for meaning (due to loss oftraditional, historical, and normative guidelines)? What role do religion andreligious education play in the emergence of the phenomenon? How can thesequestions be asked and a respectful dialogue be engaged in while protectingsocieties from violence? What should be the role of researchers, religiousleaders, and scholars? Of politicians? Civil servants? The private sector? Themedia? Youth? Women? In the hope of pursuing and deepening regional exchanges on such matters,the International Peace Institute (IPI), the United Nations (UN), and theSwiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (DFAE) organized a secondround of regional conversations for the prevention of violent extremism inN’Djamena, Chad, on May 31 and June 1, 2017, under the title “Investing inPeace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara.” The seminar brought together over 100 participants from fourteen countriesin northern, western, and central Africa and approximately ten regional andinternational organizations, as well as a number of independent experts. Theycame from varied horizons: political leaders, civil servants, members ofvarious armed forces and security organizations, members of civil society(men, women, youth, NGOs), religious and traditional authorities, mediarepresentatives (in their capacity as experts), private sector representatives,researchers, delegates from regional and international organizations, anddiplomats. These conversations followed those held in Dakar in June 20161

This seminar was co-organized inN’Djamena, Chad, from May 31 toJune 1, 2017, by IPI, the UnitedNations, and the Swiss FederalDepartment of Foreign Affairs. Over100 participants from fourteencountries in northern, western, andcentral Africa and ten regional andinternational organizations as wellas a number of independent expertsparticipated in the discussionaround the issue of violentextremism from a regional perspec-tive. These conversations were afollow-up to discussions that tookplace in Dakar, Senegal, in June2016.

Arthur Boutellis, Delphine Mechoulan,and Aïssata Athie of IPI’s BrianUrquhart Center for Peace Opera -tions supervised substantive prepara-tions for the seminar. DelphineMechoulan and Marie-Joëlle Zahardrafted this report, which reflectstheir interpretation of the discussionsand does not necessarily reflect theviews of all participants.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to themany donors whose support makespublications like this possible. Inparticular, IPI is grateful to the SwissConfederation.

1 International Peace Institute, “Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in West Africa and the Sahel-Sahara: Conversations on the Secretary-General’s Plan of Action,” September 2016, available atwww.ipinst.org/2016/09/investing-in-peace-west-africa-sahel-sahara . The conversations in Dakar contributed tothe development of regional perspectives on the secretary-general’s Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism.UN General Assembly, Plan of Action to Prevent Violent Extremism: Report of the Secretary-General, UN Doc.A/70/674, December 24, 2015.

2 MEETING NOTE

and an initial seminar in Tunis in November 2015.2

The forum created by this initiative eighteenmonths ago appears to be unique and highly indemand. Its distinctive regional dimension (Northand sub-Saharan Africa), the care taken to includeparticipants from a variety of professionalbackgrounds, its space for free expression, and thepossibility it presents to cover subjects that areoften taboo were positive elements frequentlystressed. The initiators of this forum were calledupon to maintain those dynamics, and support wasexpressed for smaller-scale actions that could alsofeed into a further round of conversations. During the previous seminars, it was noted thatpolicies aimed at preventing violent extremismneed to be based on joint action involving institu-tions (local, national, regional, and international)and communities. Only such action could lead toinnovative responses suited to specific localcontexts and perceptions. Therefore, this secondround of regional conversations was furtherfocused on state-citizen relations, political partici-pation, inclusive dialogue, and various initiativescreating, even if unintentionally, alternatives toviolence. These themes were covered in fourworking groups dealing with state-citizen relations,the specific role of defense and security forces, therole of the media, and the particular situationprevailing in the Lake Chad Basin. Moreover, the violence of armed groups is nolonger considered inevitable, but rather assomething connected to various streams ofviolence permeating our societies. It is acknowl-edged that violence arises from social andeconomic inequalities, oppression, failure torespect minorities, uncontrolled behavior of armedgroups, and political exclusion. Although stillpoorly integrated into responses from state systemsand structures, this acknowledgement neverthelessis emerging as a factor in the thinking and actionsof political actors. The feeling that the future of oursocieties is in danger has become more commonlyshared. Economic and community rivalries,intolerance, and power struggles will not disappear,but violent extremism makes it more likely thatthey will affect the social and political foundationsof our societies.

In order to better understand the opportunitiesand challenges facing investment in peace and theprevention of violence, the conversations inN’Djamena also examined how to articulate theresponses and solutions envisaged. How can thedelicate balance between security, political, socio-economic, ideological, and developmentalresponses be attained and sustained? How canlocal, national, and international responses bearticulated? How can external agendas orunderstandings be prevented from holding backthe development of local solutions that are well-suited and therefore sustainable? How can supportbe provided to both public and private efforts thatare concretely strengthening prevention or veryclearly aiming to do so?

A Range of Actors and NewRelationships

The conversations in N’Djamena emphasized themultiplicity of actors involved in preventing violentextremism and reiterated the importance ofreconciling responses at different levels. Startingfrom the notion that violent extremism is linked togovernance failures, lack of dialogue, and the lackof a real social contract between the state and itscitizens (among other things and according to thecircumstances), participants nevertheless stressedthe centrality of state action. Indeed, violentextremism directly affects state sovereignty,inciting the state to respond accordingly. Notingthe importance of government leadership indeveloping and implementing prevention policies,participants expressed the wish that states woulddevote as much dynamism and willpower toprevention as they do to fighting violent extremismby military means. Although the battle against violent extremismhas long been the private domain of defense andsecurity forces, and responses have too oftenremained primarily security-focused, these forcesdo not have a monopoly over security. They cannottake on the political or economic functions neededto face the issues arising from violent extremism.Moreover, while defense and security forcescertainly promote stability, their behavior may just

2 International Peace Institute, “Violent Extremism: Toward a Strategy of Prevention in the Francophone Space,” January 2016, available atwww.ipinst.org/2016/01/violent-extremism-toward-a-strategy-of-prevention-in-the-francophone-space .

as easily become a source of problems, particularlywhen the deployment of forces is accompanied byabuses, which can accelerate the radicalization ofthe population, or parts of it. It is therefore important to make armies moreinclusive, as well as to make police more local andthus more representative of their societies’ diversityand more likely to be in sync with the population.Also, a number of questions related to the respon-sibilities of defense and security forces call for non-security follow-up, such as the reception ofreturnees (former militants) or the management ofthe humanitarian aspects of areas affected byextremist violence. Governments still seemdeficient in this regard, and a unified approach tonational security and human security is necessaryin all areas affected by violent conflict. Starting from the notion that state structures andstate action are necessary but inadequate, it iscrucial to engage all of society—women, youth,religious and traditional leaders, the media, and theprivate sector—as key actors in preventing violentextremism; it is no longer enough to consider themsimply as beneficiaries. In order to strengthen thisparticipation, state-society relations must evolve ina way that reinforces the role of traditionalstructures wherever they have retained local legiti-macy. It is also necessary to provide greater supportfor initiatives by women and youth and to create aspace for each category of actors to fully play itsrole (including economic and commercial) ininstigating initiatives that have shown themselvesin many cases to be powerful drivers of prevention,whether locally, nationally, or internationally.Beyond the prevention initiatives that institutionsand governments undertake themselves, the role ofthe state is to foster such initiatives, enhancingthem and considering them a common good. Many experiences and initiatives are alreadydemonstrating civil society’s strong will to becomeinvolved, led in particular by women’s and youthorganizations that are propagating dialogue foraand interdisciplinary projects (e.g., entrepreneur-ship trainings, various interventions in areas whereviolent ideologies and projects are prevalent, andeven attempts to engage with defense and securityforces to reflect on the issues surrounding violenceand its prevention). Communities directly affectedby violence have also developed preventive strate-gies by their own means. However, it is important

to understand the differences among variouscontexts and forms of governance in order to assessthe reactions of the communities directly affected,as they do not react in the same way in differentplaces. Understanding the diversity of suchresponses should thus make it easier to identify thespecific factors that foster clusters of positivereactions or worsen the situation in a givenenvironment. The discourse used to portray the dismay causedby violent extremism is rapidly evolving. Onceglobal and condescending, descriptions of thecomplex phenomenon of violent extremism arebecoming more subtle and closer to local realities.Awareness of the need to clearly define concepts,differentiate between distinct locations andbehaviors, and undertake more concrete studies ofmultiple realities shows that our societies aregradually adapting to the clear need to evaluateeach situation, however localized, on its own. Thefailure of approaches or discourses leading togeneralized, undifferentiated measures orattempting to deal with only a few, often minor,factors contributing to violent extremism confirmsthe need for a more sensitive, patient, attentive, andopen mindset. As for the media (community radio broadcasters,social media networks, newspapers, audio-visualmedia), their importance in promoting andgenerating awareness of prevention (particularly inusing appropriate language that can move efforts ina positive direction) goes without saying.Participants noted that the use of terms such as“barbarian” or “gangrène” to describe violentextremists or “rat extermination” to describerecommended actions against violent extremistsemphasize the role of the media (a negative role, inthis case) in forming public opinion. Communityradio stations, for their part, can contribute toprevention and dialogue by not broadcastinghateful statements, as shown by broadcasts of“political cafés” with exchanges between politicalactors and civil society activists in the form ofpodcasts. While journalists can contribute to prevention,they also face difficulties that limit their effective-ness: restrictions on freedom of the press thatthreaten their independence and lack of resources,training, and protection that would allow them tofulfill their vital role. The means that would enable

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 3

4 MEETING NOTE

them to take a more preventive role shouldtherefore be strengthened. The difficulties facingjournalists validate the need for independent,professional media, as well as the rise of profession-ally run local radio stations. Pressure from interna-tional media expressing the need for neutralinformation also reinforces this return to basicjournalistic principles.

Convergence of Local,National, and RegionalInitiatives

First of all, and given the cross-border and transna-tional nature of violent extremism, regional organi-zations such as those that manage the Lake ChadBasin and share common operational concepts andrules of engagement should also undertakepolitical, humanitarian, and developmentalresponses, not just security responses. It is expectedthat these organizations coordinate multi-sector,multi-partner, and multi-level actions, harmonizethe policies of different states, and ensure thesharing of information throughout the region.Regional military responses such as those of the G5Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, or theLiptako-Gourma Authority must develop withoutreplacing responsible state policies. Progress made in the development of regionalsecurity and military responses contrasts sharplywith the slow advance of regional prevention plansand the lack of coordination between them. Suchplans should include the development of regionallegal approaches, a common disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) policy,and standard training sessions on human rightsand international humanitarian law for armedforces. Fora for inclusive dialogue should also playan important role. In the course of the year between the first andsecond rounds of regional conversations, there wasa surge in events involving violent extremism inmany parts of the world. For many, this broughtabout a new awareness: violence by states andinternational actors, far from reducing the violenceperpetrated by armed groups, actually stimulatedit. Attacks increased and became more widespread.This turmoil strengthened the conviction thatmilitary approaches are far from sufficient; theentire population needs to be engaged on the

family, community, cultural, religious, social, andeconomic fronts, and through dialogue between allsectors of society. Authorities must more fullyrecognize that the population is the best protectionagainst violence and that its cooperation is not onlyobviously and urgently needed—it is indispensable.Toward this end, participants stressed the role ofvigilance committees and information receivedfrom communities, though that role is ambiguousand is still not given sufficient consideration,potentially leading to long-term difficulties. Participants in the conversation were faced withan urgent need: to build or consolidate bothhorizontal and vertical links between the multipleactors involved in prevention. Establishing collabo-ration between governments, security forces, thearmy, civil society organizations, communities, themedia, and the private sector will be particularlyhelpful in overcoming the lack of trust that oftentaints relations between those different actors. Theparticipation of the population, though often justsymbolic, and attempts at dialogue with theauthorities certainly represent limited efforts atconsultations. But they remain too rare, and civilsociety is generally seen to be absent from thediscussions that take place around prevention. As a matter of principle, national and regionalapproaches should be based on and support localinitiatives. This involves building the capacity ofcivil society organizations in places where violentextremism is prevalent in order to amplify themany initiatives already in existence. For example,civil society, particularly women’s groups and localcommunity groups, could assist in the rehabilita-tion and reintegration of radicalized individuals, aswell as of minorities and direct victims of violentextremism. Above all, this should be an opportu-nity for engaging in a society-wide dialogue amongthe government, civil society, victims, and formercombatants on the causes of violence. While thisdialogue should seek forgiveness, it should notavoid frank examination of the sources of hatredand should reinforce a common resolve to worktogether to prevent it from enduring. With a viewto future reconciliation, but above all to supportprevention efforts, it is equally important to engagein dialogue with violent extremists and those whosupport them as quickly as possible, howeverdifficult it may seem. The many crises that disrupt society—in families,

in the workplace, within communities, andbetween the governing and the governed—have ledto many responses from civil society. For example,youth centers have been created to raise awarenessof the dangers of terrorism through various activi-ties. Elders and religious leaders also play a key roleby attempting to restore traditional values, revivesocial norms, and propose readings of religioustexts that point to the problems of resorting toviolence and question it. It is important to capitalize on positive experi-ences by identifying and mapping past initiatives,any successes they have had, and how they wereadapted to their specific context, while acknowl-edging that it is not always possible to perfectlyreplicate successful experiences. The short-termnature of such initiatives must account for thespace and time required to implement them; evenurgent action needs to be accompanied by a searchfor structural solutions (e.g., in addressing landdisputes or tensions between farmers and herders,or in focusing on educational and economicopportunities for youth). Finally, policies and instruments of preventionmust be deployed quickly before crises flare up inorder to counterbalance the adaptability of violentextremist groups, which know how to use time intheir favor, since states often settle into inertia. Inthis respect, the response of the population tonegative environmental change, including whenviolent (as in the Lake Chad Basin), confirms theneed to take on crises in a different and fullyinformed way.

Supporting Local Actors,Engaging in Dialogue, andDeepening Collaboration

Three general recommendations emerged from theconversation: support local actors, engage indialogue, and deepen collaboration wherever itoccurs. On the other hand, participants also identi-fied challenges related to each of those recommen-dations.SUPPORTING LOCAL ACTORSENGAGED IN PREVENTION

Because the population is at the center of thequestion surrounding how to prevent violentextremism, it is important to gain its support, with

a view to supporting a home-grown quest forsolutions that have local legitimacy. To achievethis, three requirements should be prioritized:greater mobilization in support of coexistence bylegitimate civil society actors, particularlycommunity, religious, and traditional leaders; thecreation of fora for dialogue, particularly betweenand within belief systems; and the implementationof innovative solutions for bringing youth involvedwith extremist groups back into the community byoffering alternatives for them to achieve their legiti-mate aspirations rather than abandoning them. However, supporting local actors raises achallenge that became a focus of discussion in theconversation: as many countries face a governancecrisis, it is important for states and outside actors tosupport these local actors without delegitimizingthem. With that in mind, local actors should beincentivized to practice inclusion, even as thepolitical climate is poisoned by violence andcommunities take charge of their own security(community militias and vigilance committees arevery present in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Nigeria,and Cameroon). States and other actors in partic-ular will need to discover how to protectcommunity resources, as many countries in theregion are seeing traditional community leadersgradually being replaced by politico-militaryleaders or pushed out by new generations openingup to a globalized world. Women play a particularly essential role intoday’s globalized world, protecting their childrenand society and often safeguarding progress andhard-won political victories. However, onechallenge remains: women are often infantilizedand not treated as actors in their own right when itcomes to violence or its prevention. This is despitethe fact that women can hold significant influenceby holding back their husbands and children fromengaging in violence and actively working for peaceand inclusion or, on the contrary, by exhortingmen to join armed groups, armed forces, or self-defense groups. It is also important for states tofurther consider women’s role and possible placewithin armed groups, armed forces, and intelli-gence services. A specific warning was issued during the conver-sation: the tectonic movements affecting youth arenot yet given due attention by the older generation,existing frameworks, state institutions, or civil

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 5

6 MEETING NOTE

society. However, the speed with which youthdevelop awareness and the immediacy of theirresponses, in particular through the systematic useof social media, are already shaking up old habits.The creativity of youth is not yet adequatelyacknowleged and, as a result, may overtaketraditional institutional frameworks. The limitsthat are still imposed on youth lead to feelings ofabandonment, potentially accelerating acts ofviolence and increasing the number of youth whowant to break with the old order, whether throughviolent extremism or otherwise. This conversation came to the formal conclusionthat there is a need to quickly address the genera-tional divide, systematically listen to youth,immediately engage in dialogue with them, andgive meaning to their lives to prevent the spread ofnew types of violence arising from discourse that isinaudible to older ears. It is imperative and urgentthat youth be given the means for empowerment. Taking a fresh look at questions related toreligion, koranic schools, and the role of religiousleaders helps avoid oversimplification and ready-made solutions. Moving away from a simplisticview of Islam reveals the significant, varied role itcan play in prevention. This requiresunderstanding the cultural aspects and manysubtleties of religious questions, the futility of out-of-context efforts at de-radicalization, and theshaken position of religious leaders whosecredibility has been damaged by their connectionto intelligence services. The conversation also reflected on another issue:youth, in particular, remain fragile and vulnerablein most of the countries in the region in partbecause economic development is not based on anequitable distribution of resources, andunemployed youth are the first victims of thisinequality. Responses, therefore, must also offereconomic opportunities for youth. While theresponses of the UN and African Union (AU)already combine elements of security, develop-ment, and governance, particularly through theSustainable Development Goals (SDGs), it iscrucial that states follow suit.ENGAGING IN DIALOGUE TO BUILDTOGETHER

Many participants commented on the importanceof dialogue as a tool for preventing violence. Theconversations themselves are a forum for dialogue

and for creating bridges between multiple actors.Participants stressed their hope that all thoseinvolved in the conversations could collectivelydiagnose the problem of violent extremism; thatonly solutions thought through and developedcollectively will receive the support required toimplement them effectively; that only participatoryimplementation will benefit all; and that dialogue isessential to building the fragile trust that cansustain the social contracts that underpin peace. This dialogue must take place at all levels andbetween all stakeholders, but most of all betweenthe state—or more specifically the men and womenwho govern, administrate, provide justice, andensure defense and security—and the citizens.These conversations have shown that dialogue ispossible, even on sensitive and divisive matters,and that fear of the “other” or the unknown can beovercome. This presents a real opportunity forstates to develop new, trust-based relationshipswith their citizens and to support preventivesolutions, even when they are not the onesimplementing them. That is the essence of citizenparticipation in nation-building.DEEPENING COLLABORATION

Prevention of violent extremism is part of anumber of regional strategies and, in some regions,of many local initiatives and projects. In the LakeChad Basin, for example, a common security actionplan has emerged between countries on the frontlines, but there have been few or no other synergiesor concerted actions among states, NGOs, andcommunities to meet the needs of local popula-tions. How, then, can local and regional responsesbe formulated and scaled up? How can coopera-tion, which is still nascent in areas apart fromsecurity, be spurred on? As initiatives to preventviolent extremism can be hard to get financing for,particularly from donor agencies, because it isdifficult to describe them and measure theirimpact, it is also important to consider how tobreak free from the constraints of inadequateresources. It is equally essential to reinforce harmonizationamong different strategies in the same region.Regional strategies make it possible to proposetransnational responses to transnational threats.They facilitate coordination between various actorsand initiatives and the sharing of experiences—although with seventeen regional strategies for the

Investing in Peace and the Prevention of Violence in the Sahel-Sahara 7

Sahel, there is reason to fear that the number ofcoordinators might exceed the capacity to coordi-nate. Regional initiatives can also help supportdonor agencies and mobilize resources. Moreover,they offer fora where it may be easier to discussdisagreements, particularly surrounding differentunderstandings of local violence and how torespond in a way that avoids cookie-cutterapproaches that ignore the specific context. For their part, local strategies have the advantageof proximity, of the legitimacy of the actorsinvolved, and of the specificity of therecommended solutions. On the other hand, howcan all sides be convinced of the strategicimportance of conducting or supporting multiplelocal initiatives that, because they address therealities of differing contexts, may seem disparateand fragmented? How can a large UN or regionalmission be reconciled with a local approach? Whileregionalization promotes sharing of experiences, alocal approach places more initiative in the handsof communities and enables small-scale measureswith large-scale ambitions. The most importantthing is to identify local approaches that have beensuccessful and to pass on findings when they arerelevant to other situations.

Conclusions

This regional conversation, which brought togetheractors from highly diverse backgrounds, wasintended to promote mutual attentiveness, assesscapabilities for collaboration, identify possibilitiesfor working together, and share both difficultiesencountered and successful experiences inpreventing violent extremism. Despite themultitude of initiatives and widespread interest inthis subject from a range of actors, there is still noreal transnational collaboration beyond securitymatters or a strategy that goes beyond technicalapproaches. The conversation reiterated the need to returnto simple reflection processes to consider what ispossible and what is successful without, simply forthe sake of convenience, reproducing the oftenunsuccessful responses already tried elsewhere. The first conclusion shared by participants was

the need to create more fora for dialogue betweenall relevant sectors of society. Second, success is often found by those with theambition to accomplish small things, each at theirown level, rather than waiting for national orinternational measures related to protection andprevention to get underway. Third, governments hold the primary responsi-bility for establishing adequate governance basedon the political will for prevention, even if engagingin dialogue with populations affected by violence isrisky—and dialogue with armed groups that useextreme violence even more so. Fourth, states need to show the same determina-tion to obtain convincing results in their preventiveaction as they demonstrate in military engage-ments. To do so, states must find, build, and usebridges that will allow them to work hand in handnot only with each other but also with all politicalstakeholders in their societies. Fifth, there have been successful initiatives toprevent violent extremism, and these are worthpresenting and sharing, at least as much as, if notmore so, than the violence that continues to occupya large part of our day-to-day outlook. This second round of conversations has shownthat concerns about violent extremism, far fromfading away, have become more salient. As a result,some of the recommendations made during thefirst round of conversations were worthy ofrenewed attention, since there is still a long road totravel before implementing them. Theserecommendations included the involvement ofwomen in prevention efforts, the initiation ofdialogue between governments and civil society,the promotion of the economic resilience of youththrough private sector initiatives, and the creationof fora for dialogue in international institutions.Recurring challenges also came up again, includingthe obstacles to and slow progress of institutionalchange and the fact that the states in the region andtheir partners continue to prioritize security andmilitary approaches. Preventive approachestherefore still require sustained and seriousattention.

Agenda

Wednesday, May 31, 2017

8:15–8:45 Arrival and registration of participants

8:45–9:15 Opening remarks Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the

UN Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) Willi Graf, Director of the Office of Swiss Cooperation in Chad Arthur Boutellis, Representative of the International Peace Institute (IPI) Pierre Buyoya, African Union High Representative for Mali and the Sahel Stephen Tull, UN Resident Coordinator in Chad

9:15–9:25 Launch of work

Hawa Outmane Djame, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chad

9:25–10:00 Coffee break

10:00–11:30 First plenary session

Investing in peace and prevention of violence: What are the opportunities andchallenges?

This session will seek to revisit the main conclusions of the regional conversations on theprevention of violent extremism launched in Dakar and to pursue and deepen the discus-sion on preventive approaches based on political participation, the improvement of state-citizen/governing-governed relations, and inclusive dialogue in post-conflict societies inorder to avoid new cycles of violence. In particular, the question of dynamics amongsociopolitical actors will be raised.

President Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute

Panelists Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Center of International

Studies and Research, University of Montreal, Canada Bakary Sambe, Observatory of Religious Conflicts, Senegal Peter Harling, Founder and Director of SYNAPS, Lebanon Abdoulaye Maïga, Analyst in Chief, Head of Early Warning, ECOWAS

11:30–1:00 Second plenary session

Concrete signs of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara: What is the diagnosis ofregional, national, and local actors?

This session will seek to continue sharing experiences on how states, citizens, and organiza-tions from the region perceive and define the issue of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara. Local researchers and research centers will present their work conducted in variouscountries in the region on socioeconomic, political, and cross-border dynamics that can

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contribute to violence as a starting point for the conversations. Chair Stephen Tull, Resident Coordinator of the United Nations in Chad, Humanitarian

Coordinator, and UNDP Resident Representative

Panelists Larry Gbevlo-Lartey, African Union Special Representative for Counter-Terrorism

Cooperation and Director of the African Center for the Study and Research on Terrorism Saïbou Issa, Director of the Maroua École Normale Supérieure, University of Maroua,

Cameroon Herrick Mouafo Djontu, Research Fellow, Modus Operandi, France Yvan Guichaoua, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent, Belgium Séverin Kouamé, Professor and Researcher, University of Bouaké, Indigo Coordinator

Côte d’Ivoire/Interpeace, Côte d’Ivoire

1:00–2:00 Lunch

2:00–5:30 Thematic working groups

Exchanges on successful experiences of prevention in the Sahel-Sahara (Central Africa,North Africa, and West Africa)

Four separate working groups (each with a designated rapporteur) will discuss the preven-tion of violent extremism in the Sahel-Sahara region by looking at factors associated withpeaceful and resilient societies, with a particular focus on state-citizen/governing-governedrelations, which once strengthened can form a bulwark against the outbreak and spread ofviolence (rather than looking only at factors that drive and sustain violent acts). Partici -pants are encouraged to give concrete examples of how states, citizens, communities, andorganizations can prevent violent extremism in this specific area. Answers that have beenprovided or are needed at the transnational level will also be discussed.

These small working groups will be composed of approximately fifteen people and will each

deal with a particular dimension of the prevention of violent extremism. Participants areasked to initiate discussions based on their experiences (short interventions of four to fiveminutes maximum), but discussions will thereafter be conducted in an interactive manner.One rapporteur will be designated in each group to present the conclusions of the discus-sions of the working groups. Simultaneous French-English translation will be available.

Group 1: How can the potential of consultative structures, in particular those led by

women and youth, be realized?

Chair Hamid Boukrif, Ambassador, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria Rapporteur Emmanuel Tronc, Expert Consultant; Former Senior Analyst, Médecins Sans Frontières

Group 2: How can media coverage contribute to prevention?

Chair and Rapporteur Kouider Zerrouk, Chief of Communications and Public Information, UNOWAS

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Group 3: How can defense and security forces contribute to prevention efforts?

Chair General Paul Ndiaye, Centre of Advanced Studies on Defense and Security, Senegal

Rapporteur Yvan Guichaoua, Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent. Belgium

Group 4: Particularities of the Lake Chad basin: What are the challenges and opportu-nities for a preventive approach at the local, national, and regional levels?

Chair Moussa Dago, Secretary General, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chad

Rapporteur Christian Pout, President, Centre d’études diplomatiques et stratégiques, Cameroon

Thursday, June 1, 2017

9:30–11:00 Third plenary session

Presentation of the results of the working groups

12:00–1:00 Lunch

1:00–2:45 Fourth plenary session

Toward a regional approach to the prevention of violent extremism Based on the conclusions of the four working groups, participants will consider ways in

which citizens, states, and their regional and international partners can most effectivelywork toward preventing violent extremism, including through a cross-border regionalapproach that takes into account the challenges and opportunities of the transnationalcontext. The goal will be to make recommendations that can be implemented by practi-tioners from the region, both within states and through regional and subregionalgroupings, in some cases with support from the UN and its partners, including for existingor new mechanisms, processes, and initiatives at the local, national, and regional levels.

President Mahamat Saleh Annadif, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MINUSMA Panelists Najim El Hadj Mohamed, Permanent Secretary, G5 Sahel Sanusi Imran Abdullahi, Executive Secretary, Lake Chad Basin Commission Abdoulaye Mohamadou, Deputy Executive Secretary, Council of the Entente (“Conseil de

l'entente”), Niger Stephanie Wolters, Head of Peace and Security Research Program, Institute for Security

Studies, South Africa Jean-Hervé Jezequel, Deputy Director West Africa, International Crisis Group, Senegal

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2:45–3:00 Coffee break

3:00–3:45 Conclusions and closing remarks

Marie-Joëlle Zahar, Professor of Political Science and Fellow, Center of InternationalStudies and Research, University of Montreal, Canada

Mohamed Ibn Chambas, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head ofUNOWAS

Jean-Daniel Biéler, Special Advisor, Human Security Division, Swiss Federal Departmentof Foreign Affairs

Arthur Boutellis, International Peace Institute

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Sanusi Imran AbdullahiLake Chad Basin Commission

Christiane Agboton JohnsonCentre des hautes études de défense et de sécurité,Senegal

Mohamed AnackoRegional council of Agadez, Niger

Hannah ArmstrongConsultant, Algeria

Aïssata AthieInternational Peace Institute

Abdoulaye BaCordoba Foundation of Geneva, Switzerland

Ahmat Mahamat BachirMinistry of Public Security and Immigration,Chad

Colonel Didier BadjeckMinistry of Defense, Cameroon

Godefroy BarandagiyeAfrican Union

Pauline BendFondation Hirondelle, Niger

Ali BensaadUniversité Paris 8, France

Jean-Daniel BiélerFederal Department of Foreign Affairs,Switzerland

Hamid BoukrifMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Arthur BoutellisInternational Peace Institute

Pierre BuyoyaAfrican Union

Moussa DagoMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Chad

Romain DarbellayEmbassy of Switzerland in Tunisia

Marielle DebosUniversité Paris 10, France

Massaër DialloInstitut d’études politiques et stratégiques, Sénégal

Michael DidamaLe Temps, Forum des responsables des médias del’Afrique centrale

François Michel Moundor DieneMinistry of Foreign Affairs and of SenegaleseLiving Abroad, Senegal

Colonel Babacar DioufCentre des hautes études de défense et de sécurité,Senegal

Bichara Issa DjadallahMinistry of National Defense, FormerCombatants, and Victims of War, Chad

Hawa Outmane DjameSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Chad

Enoch DjondangG5 Sahel, Chad

Herrick Mouafo DjontuModus Operandi, France

Hillmann EgbeUnited Nations Counter-TerrorismImplementation Task Force, Mali

Abou El Mahassine Fassi-FihriSearch for Common Ground, Tunisia

Frej FennicheHuman rights expert, Switzerland

Participants

13

Annalena FluryOffice of Cooperation in Chad, Switzerland

Guibaï GatamaL’Œil du Sahel, Cameroon

Gali Ngothé GattaDeputy, Chad

Larry Gbevlo-LarteyAfrican Union, Centre africain d’études et derecherche sur le terrorisme, Algeria

Aliyu GebiMinistry of the Interior, Nigeria

Abderamane Ali GossoumianComité de suivi de l’appel à la paix et à la réconciliation, Chad

Willi GrafOffice of Cooperation in Chad, Switzerland

Romain GuelbeInter-confessional platform, Chad

Yvan GuichaouaBrussels School of International Studies,University of Kent, France

Peter HarlingSynaps Network, Lebanon

Idayat HassanCentre for Democracy and Development, Nigeria

Pascal HolligerEmbassy of Switzerland in Nigeria

Mohamed Ibn ChambasUnited Nations Office for West Africa and theSahel

Saïbou IssaUniversity of Maroua, Ministry of HigherEducation, Cameroon

Jean-Hervé JezequelInternational Crisis Group, Senegal

Moussokoro KaneUnited Nations, Chad

Nènè KonatéInstitut malien de recherche action pour la paix,Interpeace, Mali

Séverin KouaméIndigo Côte d’Ivoire/Interpeace, Côte d’Ivoire

Noélie KouraogoAmnesty International, Mys’TIC, Burkina Faso

Ahmed LabnoujInterpeace North Africa, Libya

Muhammad Nurudeen LemuIslamic Education Trust, Nigeria

Ngaryambang MadjimgayeNational Committee for Coordination, G5 Sahel

Lisa Magnollay KarlenAgency for Development and Cooperation,Swizterland

Issouf Ag MahaMayor of Tchirozérine, Niger

Abdoulaye MaïgaEconomic Community of West African States

Niamké E. Benjamin MalanMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Côte d’Ivoire

Bamanga Abbas MalloumEmbassy of Switzerland in Chad

Les McBrideUS Agency for International Development, Chad

Delphine MechoulanInternational Peace Institute

Florent MéhauleOffice for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs, Chad

Madeleine MembMediaWomen4Peace, Cameroon

Imam Abakar Walar ModouHigh Islamic Council, Chad

Abdoulaye MohamadouCouncil of the Entente, Niger

Ameur MokhtarNational Anti-terrorism Commission, Tunisia

Jolie-Ruth MorandGeneva Centre for the Democratic Control ofArmed Forces, Switzerland

Carol MottetFederal Department of Foreign Affairs,Switzerland

Vanessa MoungarCenter for Regional Strategies, World EconomicForum

Najim El Hadj MohamedG5 Sahel

General Paul NdiayeCentre des hautes études de défense et de sécurité,Senegal

Mahamat Saleh AnnadifMINUSMA, Mali

Abdullahi OmakiSavannah Centre for Diplomacy, Democracy andDevelopment, Nigeria

Christian PoutCentre africain d’études internationales diploma-tiques économiques et stratégiques, Cameroon

Mohammed Abdelwahab RafiqiSheikh, Morocco

Zakaria Ousman RamadanExpert, Chad

Bakary SambeObservatoire du radicalisme et des conflitsreligieux, Senegal

David SmithDandal Kura Radio International, Chad

Aslam SouliAssociation Beder pour la citoyenneté et ledéveloppement équitable, Tunisia

Moussa TchangariAlternative espaces citoyens, Niger

Massalbaye TenebayePrimature, Chad

Djeinaba TouréJe m’engage, Mauritania

Emmanuel TroncConsultant

Jérôme TubianaSmall Arms Survey

Stephen TullUnited Nations, Chad

Ashraf UsmanNeem Foundation, Nigeria

Stephanie WoltersInstitute for Security Studies, South Africa

Zara Mahamat YacoubEqual Access, Chad

Mahamat Ali YoussoufMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Chad

Marie-Joëlle ZaharUniversity of Montreal, Canada

Goukouni ZenCabinet d’analyses et d’actions pour la sécurité etla paix au Sahel, Niger

Kouider ZerroukUnited Nations Office for West Africa and theSahel

Barbara ZügerFederal Department of Foreign Affairs,Switzerland

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