IPCS Forecasts
Southeast Asia in 2015 Myanmar’s Democratic Challenge I Thailand’s Democratic Deficit I Indonesia’s
Democratic Surplus I ASEAN Community 2015 I A Strategy for India
Shankari Sundararaman
IPCS Special Report # 172 January 2015
IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #172, January 2015
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About the Author
Shankari Sundararaman
Shankari Sundararaman is
Professor of Southeast Asian
Studies and current Chair at
the Centre for Indo‐Pacific
Studies, School of International Studies,
Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.
She writes a column for the IPCS titled Indo
Pacific. See
http://www.ipcs.org/columnist/shankari‐
sundararaman/
This report is an updated and compiled version of
her earlier commentaries for her column during
2014.
© IPCS, 2015
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CONTENTS Section‐I Southeast Asia in 2015: A Forecast
Myanmar’s Democratic Challenge
Thailand’s Democratic Deficit
Indonesia’s Democratic Surplus
ASEAN Community 2015
A Strategy for India
Section‐II Southeast Asia in 2014: A Review
Myanmar
ASEAN and the Indo‐Pacific
South China Sea
Indonesia
Southeast Asia in 2015
IPCS Forecasts
Southeast Asia in 2015 Shankari Sundararaman
Professor&Chairperson,CentreforIndo‐PacificStudies,SchoolofInternationalStudies,JawaharlalNehruUniversity,NewDelhi
SoutheastAsiain2015:AForecastOne of themost challenging exercises for observerswho follow regional developments is tocomeoutwith trendsanalysis. It isparticularly tricky in regions that showgreatdiversity interms of political dynamics, economic disparities and where regional cohesion needs to beconsolidated to address the effects of major power politics. The emerging challenges forSoutheastAsia thisyearcanbecategorised into twodistinctsections– first, issues thataffectthedevelopmentsof individual statesandsecond, thoseproblems thathaveabearingon theregionasawhole.Myanmar’sDemocraticChallengeThechallengeofexpandingdemocraticshifts in theregionwillbecritical in thecomingyear.2015 will be particularly crucial for Myanmar and Thailand. Myanmar will face its firstdemocratic elections since the2010 elections and the reformprocess of 2011.Aspart of therun‐uptotheelections,thecurrentgovernmentunderPresidentTheinSeinwillhavetoworktowards amore concerted ceasefire and dialoguewith the ethnic groupswithin the country.Thiswill be the first step towards amore inclusive political participation. Among others, anissuethatplaguesthespaceofminoritiesarelawsrelatedtocurbsoninterfaithmarriage–thatisoneofthelatestattemptstoisolatetheMuslimcommunity.Second, the government needs to identify some important constitutional changes related toArticle59(f)thatcurrentlydisallowsDawAungSanSuuKyifromholdingthehighestofficeinthe country, as President. The clause debars anyone who is related to a person of foreigncitizenship from holding the office of President. This is a constitutional provision that iscurrentlybeingchallengedinMyanmarbutitappearsthattheprovisionmaynotbescrappedbeforetheelectionsattheendof2015.ArecentreportinTheSydneyMorningHeraldindicatedthatSuuKyiwouldbeunabletocontestforthepostofPresidentbecauseofthisclauseinthe2008Constitution.ItismorelikelythatshewillenduptakingtheChairintheParliamentthatwillbea critical roleas thiswillbring inher leadershipacrossparty lines– thatwill alsobecrucialforachievingnationalreconciliation.A more significant amendment to the Constitution is the move to change article 436. Thismandatesthatforanyconstitutionalamendmenttobepassed,itneedsover75percentofthevotes in parliament. This is near impossible to achieve given that the military enjoys a 25percent veto privilege which divides the parliament vertically. The basic tenets of the
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democraticsetuprequireaclearchangeinthisprovisionthatneedstobeaddressed.Therun‐up to the 2015 elections will be a period that will challenge the transition process withinMyanmar.Thailand’sDemocraticDeficitSince May 2014, Thailand has been under martial rule as a result of the renewed stand‐offbetweentheredshirtsandtheyellowshirts.Thelittleadvantagegainedbythecountryduringthe 2011 elections that ushered Yingluck Shinawatra in, was forced to a halt after anti‐government protesters held Bangkok hostage for nearly seven months. Now nearly eightmonthsafterthecoupd’étatthatdethronedtheYingluckShinawatragovernment,themilitary,which initially stated that elections would be held in 2015 has altered its view and is nowhintingthatelectionsmaynottakeplacetill2016.ThecurrentPrimeMinisterGeneralPrayutChan‐o‐chahasbeenfocusedonmorewhimsicalagendasofbringing“happinesstothepeople.”Thisfocusonemotionalappealandsentimentisafar‐offcallfrommovingforwardonresolvingrigidintransigencebetweenthetwoopposingpoliticalfactionsthathavesplitthecountry.Added to this there have been serious intrigues at the Royal Palace. The Monarchy that isconsidered sacred in the Thai context is witnessing one of its most difficult phases in Thaihistory. The revered and respectedmonarch the 87‐year‐old King Bhumibol Adulyadej is nolongerabletohandlethepressuresofhisresponsibility.TheheirtothethroneisPrinceMahaVajiralongkorn, who recently divorced his wife Princess Srirasmi after accusing her familymembersofconspiraciesagainstthethroneandonchargesofcorruption.HiscolourfullifeandirresponsiblebehaviorhasmadehimunpopularamongtheThais.Politicallyheisalsoknowntobe close to Thaksin Shinawatra,whichwill impact the political fortunes of the former primeminister.Themilitary’smovetodelayelectionswillhaveaseriousimpactonhowthepoliticalscenarioinThailandevolves.Indonesia’sDemocraticSurplusOn thepositive sideof thedemocratic shift is Indonesia,whichmarked its fourthdemocraticelectionsin2014.ThevictoryofPresidentJokoWidodosetsIndonesia firmlyonthetrackforfurther democratic consolidation. As 2014 ended, Indonesia’s Papua province witnessedviolenceasfiveyouthundertheageof18werekilledbythemilitary.PresidentJokowi’sresolvetoaddressthePapuanproblemwillremaincriticalintheyearahead.AsIndonesia’sdemocraticconsolidation progresses, the question of the military’s accountability in violence will loomlargeinthecaseofWestPapua.OneoftheagendasunveiledbyPresidentJokowiistheemergingimportanceofIndonesiaasamaritime fulcrum in the context of the `poros maritim dunia’. For the first time since itsindependence,anIndonesianpresidentislookingbeyondtheroleofaterrestrialarmythathasalwaysbeenfavouredamongtheforces.ForIndonesia,thepastfewmonthshavebeencriticalintermsofaddressingissuesrelatedtoillegalfishinginitsterritorialwaters.Themaritimeaxisalso draws Indonesia out to findmore investorswho can buildmaritime infrastructure; andseveral reports point to its growing economic dependence on China for these. While itsdemocraticconsolidationoccurs,thereisasimultaneousdrifttolookbeyondtheASEAN.While
Southeast Asia in 2015
thismayhelpIndonesiaachieveitsowninterests,itmayweakenthestrongestlinkwithintheASEANduringaperiodofregionaluncertainty.ASEANCommunity2015EvenasIndonesialookstomovebeyondtheASEANinitsforeignpolicy,theregionalgroupingisonthevergeofmovingtowardsanEU‐likeapproachinitscommunitybuildinginitiative.Themove towards the building of the ASEAN community has been challenged by several issuesincludingawatered‐downversionofthe2007ASEANCharterthathasleftseveralmembersofthegrouping feelingrestlesswith thepaceofchangeandreform.Primarilyamong thisgrouphas been Indonesia, which has been unable to push its co‐members in the group towardsgreater commitment on issues of democratisation and human rights. TheASEANCommunitythatseekstointegratetheregionalongpolitical,economicandsocio‐culturalparametershasalottoaddressoverthecourseof2015.Onthepoliticalfront,thegroupingisstrugglingtofindacohesiveidentitygiventheengagementofmajorpowersintheregion.BoththeriseofChinaandtheUSre‐balancingandpivottoAsiapolicyhasbeencriticalcentrifugalforcesintheregion.ThemannerinwhichtheSino‐USrivalrywilltakeshapein2015willhaveabearingontheASEANcountries.Inthiscontext,territorialconflicts in the South China Sea and the expanding Chinese footprint will be crucial for theregion. The significance ofmaritime issues and the need tomove towards a binding Code ofConductfortheSouthChinaSeawillbecriticalchallengesfortheASEANin2015.Ontheeconomicfront,theforecastisstillfarfromrosy.EvenasthemovetoformtheASEANEconomicCommunityisclosertothevision,therestillarechallengesahead.Whiletheregionmade progress vis‐à‐vis reduction of tariffs, other protectionist measures such as non‐tariffbarriershavebeenplaced.Thishascriticallyimpactedthemovetowardsgreaterintra‐ASEANtradethatstillneedstobeaddressed.TheASEANalsohastofindwaystomoveforwardontheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP),negotiationsforwhicharelikelytobeconcludedbytheendof2015.Throughthisyear,thefocushastobeonthereductionoftariffsandnon‐tariffbarriersaswellasaddressingthediscriminationagainstservices–thedilemmasholdingbackprogressontheRCEP.SoutheastAsia:AStrategyforIndiaInNovember2014,IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModirechristenedthe`LookEastPolicy’asthe`ActEastPolicy’.IfIndiaisseriousaboutmovingforwardonitstieswiththeASEANstates,2015willbecriticaltoformalizesomeoftheinitiativesthathavebeenonpaperbutareyettofructify.UndertheIndia‐ASEANComprehensiveEconomicCooperationAgreement,onecriticalagenda for2015 is theFTA inServicesandInvestments.Thishas toberatifiedat the levelofindividualcountriesandIndianeedstomoveitseffortsinthisregard.Asitstandscurrently,theFTAis tobeoperational fromJuly2015. Thequestionofbuilding infrastructure linkagesandconnectivitywillremainequallycriticalas,currently,theseremainwoefullyinadequate.Onthepolicyandreformsfront,Indiahastoshowconvincingeffortandprovethat`actionsarelouderthanwords’.
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WithregardstotheoverallsecurityoftheregionandIndia’sroleinthis,someindicatorsareofconcern.GrowingChineseeconomicpresenceintheregionwillhaveabearingonthelevelsofstrategicautonomythattheregioncanexercise.China’sexpandingfootprintintheIndianandPacificOceans–theMaritimeSilkRoute–ispartofBeijing’stwo‐prongedstrategytoaddressbotheconomicgainsandpoliticalleverage.IndiasignedeconomicanddefenceagreementswithJapan,theUSandAustraliaduringModi’svisittothesecountries,bringingitclosertothe`arcoffreedom’democraticalliancethatwasenvisionedbyJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbe.IndiaalsoneedstoactalongwithitsSoutheastAsianpartnerstomoveforwardonareasofsecurityanddefencecooperation.India's Project Mausam has evolved with the view to reaching out and re‐establishing thetraditional relationsand tieswhich Indiahadwith itsneighbours in the IndianOcean littoral,whichineffectwillseektocounterbalancetheChineseMaritimeSilkRouteThereissomevisiblemovementontheDefenceDialoguewithVietnamthatconcludedrecently.ThisneedstobeexpandedtoalltheASEANmembers,bothbilaterallyandmultilaterally.Whilethe substance of integration with Southeast Asia remains primarily on economics, it isimportanttomoveintoamorecomprehensivepoliticalandsecurity‐levelintegration.Whilethenaval component has actually been credible through joint‐patrolling of the Malacca Straits,initiativessuchastheMilanandIONS,andintermsofhumanitariananddisasterrelief,thereisstillscopeforbroadeningthistomoreconcretelevelsofengagement.
Southeast Asia in 2015
SoutheastAsiain2014:AReview
IMyanmar
Myanmar'sPoliticalTransition:Challengesofthe2015Election1
RecentchangesshapingMyanmar’stransitionprocesshavehighlightedthetenuousnessoftheProcessinthatcountry.Evenastheupcoming2015electionissettobeoneofthemostimportantindicatorsofthisdemocratictransition,eventstranspiringinthecountryareworrisome.Thegainsmadeoverthepastfouryears–sincethereformprocessbeganin2011–maybeaffectedbyseveralrecentdevelopmentsthathaveraisedanxietiesvis‐à‐visthetrajectorythetransitionwillfollow.
WhataretheindicatorsofchangesshapingMyanmar?Whatistheirsignificanceinthecontextofthe2015elections?
Sincethe2010electionsandtheannouncementofthereformprocessin2011,Myanmarhasseensomecrediblechangesthathavealteredtheperceptionsofbothregionalcountriesandtheinternationalcommunity.The2012by‐election–wheretheNationalLeagueforDemocracy(NLD)won43seatsof45seats–wasseenasawatershedmomentintheProcessandwasheraldedasamarkeroftheshiftshapingMyanmar.However,thepastfewmonthshaveseenchallengestothereformprocess.Theyhighlightthecomplexissuesthatneedtoberesolvedtoensurethefree‐nessandfairnessofthe2015elections.Theyincludeconstitutionalreforms;greaterfreedomandspaceforthemedia;managementofethnicconflictsandcommunalviolence;andviablepoliticalspaceforallminoritieswithinMyanmar.
TheConstitutionConundrum
FirstonthelististhedebatefortheamendmentofMyanmar’s2008Constitution–thathasensuedforthepastfewyears.ThisConstitutionstronglyendorsesaroleforthemilitarythroughtheimplementationoftheNationalDefenceandSecurityCouncil(NDSC)–thatclearlyvisualisesaroleforthearmedforcesintwocapacities:a.intheadministrationofthecountryviareservationsintheparliament,andb.intheprotectionandpreservationofthestate
Thisallowsforonefourthoftheparliamentaryseatstobereservedforthearmedforces–andisseenascrucialtothestabilityofthestate.Additionally,thereexistsaprovisionunderArticle436thatcurrentlydemandsover75percentvotesintheparliamenttomakeamendstotheConstitution–animpossibletaskgiventhat25percentofseatsreservedforthemilitaryallowsfortherighttovetoanymovetoreframethecharter.InJuly2014,AungSanSuuKyiledasignaturecampaigntowardsamendingthiscaveat;itstillshowsnosignsofprogress.
1 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 8 September 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database-myanmar/myanmars-political-transition-challenges-of-the-2015-election-4651.html
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TheseconddebaterelatesdirectlytoSuuKyi’srolewithregardstoArticle59(f)thatdebarsanypersonfromthepresidencyonaccountofbeingrelatedtoforeigners.ThisdirectlyimpingesonSuuKyi’schancestoleadherpartytovictoryinthe2015elections.GivenhowtheNLDdoesnothaveasecondrungofleadershiptocarryonthepartymantleintheabsenceofSuuKyi’sinfluentialandcharismaticguidance,thisdirectlyunderminestheparty’seffectivenessintheupcomingelections.
Furthermore,thereexiststhechallengeofmanagingrelationswiththemedia.Lastmonththerewerereportsthatfivejournalistshadbeenarrestedandchargedwithviolationofthe1923BurmaStateSecretsActforallegedlyleakingsensitiveinformationinthepress.Inanotherincident,journalistswerebookedunderviolationofthe1950EmergencyActforallegedlygivingunverifiedstatementsinthemedia.Onevisibleindicatorofchangesincetheannouncementofthereformprocesswastheliftingofrestrictionsthathadbeenimposedonthepress.TheaforementionedincidentshaveonceagainhighlightedthetenuousnessofState‐mediarelations.
Intheaftermathofthesetwoincidents,PresidentTheinSein’sresolvetomeetwiththePressCouncilwasasoundmove;andthemediawasaskedtoplaytheroleofastrongerstakeholderinthereformprocess,andtoshowgreaterresponsibilityinitsapproachtowardsreportingofincidentsthatweresensitive.
Akeychallengefacingthecountryisthenatureofshapethepeaceprocesswithethnicminoritieswilltake.Today,afternearly60yearsofarmedconflictbetweenthestateanditsethnicnationalities,thereisamovetowardsaNationalCeasefireAgreementthatisbeingcoordinatedbytheNationwideCeasefireCoordinationTeam.Whileindividualethnicgroupshavealreadysignedceasefireagreements,mostofthemareveryfragileandhavebeenunabletomovetowardsanypoliticalresolution.Moreimportantly,politicalnegotiationsthatwillfollowtheceasefirewillbethecruxofanyresolution.Bringingmajorchangestobothsides’perceptionswillbeagreaterchallenge.Compoundingtheethnicchallengeisthelevelsofreligiousviolencethathavebeenevidentinrecenttimes.Although,lately,therehasbeensomediscussiononmovingtowardssomeformofafederalstructure,thediscourseisstillvagueandundefined.
TheTheinSeingovernmenthasmadecredibleheadwayontheroadmaptoademocratictransition,inthepastfouryears.Thechallengetoanytransitionalphaseismoreevidentwhenitcomestoissuesofinstitutionalchangeandconsolidation.ThiswillbeacriticalphaseNaypyidawwillhavetoaddressinthecomingdays.
ModiinMyanmar:From‘LookEast’to‘ActEast’2
IndianPrimeMinisterNarendraModi’srecentvisittotheMyanmarendorsesthatalliswellwithIndia’spolicytothecountriesthatlietotheeast.SincehetookofficeinMay2014,thereweresomeviewsamongobserversthatIndia’sLookEastPolicy(LEP)wasnotreceivingthemerititshould.MuchofthiswascenteredonthedebateastowhyMyanmar,acloseandsignificantneighbourwasnotinvitedtotheswearing‐inceremonyoftheprimeminister.However,giventhefactthattheinvitationwasextendedtotheSouthAsiancountries,Myanmar
2 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 17 November 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/india-the-world/modi-in-myanmar-from-look-east-to-act-east-4742.html
Southeast Asia in 2015
technicallydidnotfitintothiscategory.Anotherviewwasthattheinvitationwasextendedonlytofulldemocracies,whichwouldthenexplainwhyPakistanwaspresent,giventhatthereiscurrentlyademocraticintermissioninthecountry.
ButModi’sthree‐dayvisittoMyanmarthismonthchangedtheperceptionsandbroughttheASEANregionbackintothecentre‐stagewiththefocusshiftingfromtheLEPtotheActEastPolicy(AEP).WhilethisdoesnotreallysignaladeparturefromtheLEP,itdoeshighlightamorenuancedpositionofacknowledgingtheneedto`act’orto`getone’sacttogether’,tomoveaheadontheimplementationofprojectsandproposalsthathavebeeninitiatedinprinciplebutarelagginginpractice.SotheshifttotheAEPshouldbeviewedasanattempttoprovideanimpetustotheregionalintegrationthatIndiahaswithitseasternneighbours.TheASEANcountrieshaveoftenexpressedalotofconcernontheslowpaceofreforminIndia.Addedtothisistheissuesofthesigningofseveralagreementsthatneedtocomeintoforcetohastentheimplementation.Thesearethecriticalareasthatdrivepolicyintotheaction‐orientedphase.
ThehighlightofthevisitwasthefocusgiventothethreeC’s:culture,commerceandconnectivity.Inthiscontext,India’sculturaltieswithSoutheastAsiaarebeingconsideredasasignificantonethatwillhelppushcriticaltiesforward.TherecentopeningoftheNalandaUniversityisanexampleofthisdynamic.Furthermore,anemphasisontourismtoowasmade.TourismisavitalcomponentofrelationsandtheindustryneedstoberevampedinordertomakeIndiaatouristdestinationforSoutheastAsianvisitorsandviceversa.TheOpenSkiesAgreementisthereforeamongthekeyareastofocuson,toprovideanymomentumtothetourismindustry.Atpresent,evendirectflightsfromIndiatoalltenSoutheastAsiancountriesandviceversaareunavailable.
Complementarytoboostingtourism,thereisalsoapotentialtointegratecitiesthatcanbelinkedassiblingcities.Inthiscontext,oneoftheoptionscouldbetolinkBodhgaya,LumbiniandYangon,ShwedagonPagodatogetherastheBuddhistcircuit.AnotherpotentialoptionwouldbethelinkingofcitieslikeJogjakarta,SiamReapandThanjavurtogetheraspotentialtouristhubs.Thiswouldmakeacriticalimpactintermsofrevitalisingthetourismsectorandwouldalsoactasaboostinbringingaboutgreaterpeople‐to‐peoplecontactbetweentheregions.
Thesecondfocus,oncommerce,isalreadyanareaIndiahasmadeconsiderablestridesin;andthatisexpectedtoprogressevenfurther.ProjectinganeweconomicenvironmentinwhichIndiahasembarkedupontargetedattractinginvestmentsintothecountryunderthebanneroftheMakeinIndiaslogan.CurrentlytheIndia‐ASEANFreeTradeAgreementin(FTA)ingoodshasbeenoperationalised,andtheFTAinservicesandinvestments,thoughsignedwithallbutone(thePhilippines)country,isexpectedtoberatifiedbytherespectivecountries’parliamentssoon.ThisisoneareawhereIndiahasanadvantagesince,globally,itranks9thintheservicessector.
AsthemovetointegratewiththeregionisfurtherenhancedthroughregionallydriveninitiativesliketheRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP),thereislikelihoodofwideninglinkagesacrosstheregion.TheRCEPlinkstheASEANanditsdialoguepartnersintoaregionaleconomicgroupingthatwillbecriticalsinceitwillbringthethreeAsianeconomicgiants–China,JapanandIndia–together.TheChinesemovetoenhanceregionalintegrationviatheAsianInfrastructuralInvestmentBankandtheenhancementoftheMaritimeSilkRouteto
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linktheIndianandthePacificOceansintoaneconomicchainareclearlymovingthecommercialsideoftheregionalagreementsforward.
Finally,ontheissueofconnectivity,thereisanurgentneedtomoveforwardwiththeplansthathavebeeninthepipeline.ProjectssuchastheIndia‐Myanmar‐ThailandtrilateralhighwayandtheImphal‐Mandalayroadareextremelyimportanttowardslinkingtheregionvialand,andopeninguptheborderareastofacilitatetheeasymovementofpeopleandgoods.WhilebothMyanmarandIndiaarefocusingonthedevelopmentoftheborderregions,theseprojectswillactasvitalcatalyststodeliverontheproposedoutcomes.
IIASEANandtheIndo‐Pacific
TheASEAN'sCentralityintheIndo‐PacificRegion3
Overnearlyadecade,theconceptoftheIndo‐Pacifichasbeengaininggroundasatermthatgivescredencetoastrategicperspectiveratherthanawell‐definedgeographicentity.WhenJapanesePrimeMinisterShinzoAbespokeaboutthe`confluenceofthetwoseas,wheretheIndianandPacificOceansaretobeviewedasasinglestrategicmaritimeunit’,itwasbasedontheunderstandingofageopoliticalrealityratherthanageographicone.
WhilethereisadebateontheexactcontoursoftheboundariesoftheIndo‐Pacificregion,thecommonunderstandingisthatitisatriangularregionthatconnectstheIndianandthePacificOceans.ThisregionisidentifiedashavingJapanonitsnorthernboundary,Australiaformingthesoutheasternparts,andasIndialyinginthesouthwesternend.MuchofSoutheastAsiafallswithinthetriangularboundariesoftheIndo‐Pacific,makingtheclaimofitscentralitytothisregionextremelysignificant.
Historically,therehasbeenanunderstandingthatSoutheastAsialiesbetweentwogreatcivilisationalworlds,IndiaandChina.SoutheastAsianhistorianReginaldLeMayhasdescribedtheregionasthebamboocurtainthatshiftswiththechangingculturalimpactsofbothIndiaandChina.Whilethesetwogreatcivilisationsinfluencedtheregionintheperiodpriortocolonialism,eventoday,theinvolvementofmajorpowersintheregionisanissuethatremainscritical.Fortheregionalcountries,potentially,therearebothrisksandpossibilitiesofgreaterintegration.
BeinginthecenteroftheIndo‐PacificregioncreatesstressfortheASEANcountriesregardingthewaytheyrelatetomajorpowers.TheASEANhasalwayslookedattheinvolvementofmajorpowersasameasureoftheregion’simportance.
However,China’sriseandtheindividualstates’responsetoitaltersthisview,particularlyatthebilaterallevel.AmongthekeyissuesinthiscontextaretheongoingtensionsinSouthChinaSea(SCS).ThelogicofextendingtheIndo‐PacifictoincludetheSCSandtheEastChinaSeareiteratestheimportanceofmaintainingthefreedomofnavigationintheseasandalsodoesnotentitleanysinglenationtoclaimthewatersastheirown. 3 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 20 October 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-audit-and-ceasefire-monitor/the-aseans-centrality-in-the-indo-pacific-region-4700.html
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OneoftheadvantagesfortheASEANcountriesisthatallthecurrentinstitutionalmechanismsintheregionarebeingdrivenbytheASEAN’sprocesses.ForthistobesuccessfultheASEANneedstobeunitedandcohesiveandthisitselfisachallenge.Overthepasttwoyears,therehavebeenattemptstoaddressthequestionofrevivingASEANunity,particularlyafterthepolarisationoftheorganisationduringthe2012summitovertheSCSdispute.DifferencesoverthemannerinwhichindividualcountriesrelateandrespondtoChina’srisearepushingcountriesoutoftheircomfortzonesandisthreateningthepillarsofconsensusandconsultationthathavebeencriticalfortheASEAN.Asaresult,thefocusonsecurityissuesintheregionmaynotremainASEAN‐centricbutislikelytogetovershadowedbyotherfactors.WhiletheASEANmayseektomaintainitselfasthecoreoftheIndo‐Pacific,therearevaryingopinionsonthemannerinwhichtheregion’spolitico‐securityrelationsarebeingshaped,andithasbeenunabletoprovidetheleadershipforaddressingsomeofthechallengesthathaveemergedintheregion.
AnotherareaofsignificantgainfortheASEANrelatestoitspotentialforeconomicgrowth.Theeconomicsuccessoftheregion,galvanisedbyChina,JapanandIndia,remaincriticalfactorsthatdriveforwardthecentralityofthisregion.TheASEAN‐initiatedRegionalComprehensiveEconomicPartnership(RCEP)willbringthesethreeAsiangiantsunderonecommonumbrella–thatwillbeasignificantsteptowardstheeconomicintegrationoftheregion.TheRCEPisacriticalelementinkeepingthecentralityofthefocusontheASEANcountriesasitseekstocoordinatetheASEANanditsdialoguepartnersintoacommoneconomicplatformthatwilladdressissuesoftariffreductionsandwillmovetowardsawide‐rangingregionalFreeTradeArea.TheinclusionofSouthKorea,AustraliaandNewZealandincreasestheeconomicstakesintheIndo‐Pacificfurther,makingthisoneofthecredibleareasforfurtherintegration.
Finally,whiletheASEANmayseeitselfasthelinkorcorridorthatconnectstheIndianandthePacificoceansthroughagamutofsecurity‐driveninstitutionalnormssuchastheASEANRegionalForum,theEastAsiaSummitandtheASEANDefenceMinister'sMeetingPlus,ithastolookbeyondpreliminaryinitiatives.Whiletheinitiativesseektoaddresstheneedforconfidence‐building,theyfallshortontheareasofpreventivediplomacyandconflictresolution.Thecurrentarrangementsfallwaybelowexpectationontheseareas.FortheASEAN,thecentralityofitspositioncanbemoreconsolidatedifitcanaddressandstrengthentheseaspectsofregionalcooperation.
InfactIndonesianForeignMinisterMartyNatalegawa’sproposalforanIndo‐PacificTreatyofFriendshipandCooperationwouldbeakeystepinthisdirection.HiscalltoaddressthetrustdeficitandtheneedtopromoteacommonsenseofresponsibilitywillneedtobekeptattheforefrontoftheASEANinitiativesintheregion.
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IIISouthChinaSea
IntransigenceOverTroubledWaters4
InAugust2014,theForeignMinistersofASEANanditsdialoguepartnersgatheredatNaypyidaw,Myanmar,forthe47thASEANForeignMinistersMeetingfollowedbythe21stASEANRegionalForum(ARF)and4thEastAsiaSummitForeignMinistersMeetings(EAS).OneoftherecurrentaspectsofthesemeetingswasthefocusonthedevelopmentsthathaveshapedtheSouthChinaSea(SCS)conflict.Asdivergentopinionsariseandpositionshard‐lineintodeeperdivides,theissuesrelatingtothestand‐offintheSCSarelikelytoemergeasthekeychallengefortheASEANcountries,particularlyinmanagingtheirrelationsandengagementwithmajorpowersintheregion.
Almostfrom2010,theSCSissuehasbeenattheforefrontofthechallengesinthewiderregion.China’sposturingintheregionhasbeenincreasingwithitsbelligerenceatcriticalintervalstofindwheretheweakestlinkintheregionlies.FromApril2012ScarboroughShoalincidentandtheJuly2012situationwhentheASEANdidnotissueajointcommunique,tillthemorerecenttiradeoverChina’sinstallationoftheHYSY981oilrigclosetoParacelislands,incidentsintheSCShavebeenmajorredflags.Chineseposturinginthelateststand‐offinMayincludedthemovingofitsoilrigtowhatitseesaspartofthenine‐dashlineterritorialclaims,whileVietnamidentifiestheParacelsaspartofitsownExclusiveEconomicZone(EEZ).WiththislatestaltercationbetweenChinaandVietnam,thisissuehasemergedasthecoreoftheASEAN’schallenges.
MuchofthisisrelatedtotheUSre‐engagementwiththeregion.TheUS’interpretationonChina’sofChina,particularlyinlightofitsowncloserelationswiththePhilippinesinparticularandSoutheastAsiaingeneral,criticallyre‐altersthedynamicsoftheSCSdispute.TheUS’emphasisonitsnationalinterestinpreservingtherightsoffreedomofnavigationiscriticalandhasbeengainingsomesupportoverthepastfouryears.Furthermore,smallerASEANcountriesarestilltryingtoengagewithregionalmajorpowersviadifferentstrategiesthatwillallowthemtomaximisetheirowninterestsinthepossibleeventofastand‐offamongthebiggerpowers.
TheUS’recentcallforafreezeonChina’sconstructionactivitiesintermsofexpansionviadredgingclearlyindicatestheheightenedtensions.ChinahasbeencarryingouttheseactivitiesparticularlyintheterritoriesthatfallunderBeijing’ssovereignclaims.Overthecourseoflastweek’smeetings,theUSSecretaryofState,JohnKerry,proposedfreezingofactivities–likeseizinguninhabitedislandsanddredgingactivities–thatchangethestatusquointheSCS.ThisfoundsupportfromtheUS’longstandingallyintheregion–thePhilippines.Simultaneously,otherASEANcountrieswhoareclaimantstothedisputehavealsosupportedthisinitiativeeventhoughChinahasnotagreedtothesedemands.
TheASEANforitspartseemstobedividedonthequestionoftheSCSissuewhereclaimantssuchasthePhilippinesandVietnamarelookingforstrongersupportwithinmultilateralbodiessuchastheEASandtheARF,whileothermemberssuchasCambodiaandMyanmarsimplyprefertokeepmumonthematter.AmongotherASEANcountries,Indonesiahasactivelybeen 4 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 18 August 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/south-china-sea-intransigence-over-troubled-waters-4605.html
Southeast Asia in 2015
advocatingtheneedforamoreconcertedefforttoaddressissuesofrivalclaimstotheterritorialextentsoftheSCS.IndonesiasupportsthemovetowardsamorebindingCodeofConduct(CoC)whichneedstobeaddressed,sincethedecisiontohaveanon‐bindingDeclarationontheCodeofConductwasmadeinNovember2002.
ChinaforitsparthasbeenclearthatthemovetowardsaresolutionoftheSCSissuewillbedependentupontheclaimantcountriesandnotonthegoodofficesofanyoutsidepower.Thisisclearlyseenastargetingthe`intent’oftheUS.China’spreferencefortheuseofbilateralmechanismsthatareinplace,insteadofusingmultilateralmechanismstoarriveatasolution,clearlytipsitsbalancetowardsamoreSino‐centricsolutiontotheproblem.Additionally,ChinahasalsoagreedtonegotiationviatheASEANtoeffectivelyresolvetheissue,whichcouldindicateitspreferenceforkeepingtheUSoutsidethisdebate.
IndianExternalAffairsMinisterSushmaSwaraj’sassertionsontheneedtoresolvethematterthroughtheuseofinternationalarbitrationiscriticalforthemembercountriesoftheASEAN.TherelevanceofendorsingasolutionthatabidesbytheUNCLOSwillcriticallyimpactthedispute.ChinaandtheUS’varyinginterpretationsontheUNCLOSwillhavedeeperimplicationsfortheregion.China’srelationswiththeregion–whichhas,sincethe1990s,beencarefullybuilttowardsgreaterintegrationwiththeASEANasacrediblepartnerforitseconomicgrowth–shouldnotbeheldhostagetothegrowingtensionsintheSCS.China’sposturingintheregionisacriticalfactorthathaspushedforwardtheagendaoflookingforacredibleresolutiontothisconflict.
IVIndonesia
The2014PresidentialElectionExplained5
Indonesia’spresidentialelectionhasheraldedachangeintheoldguard,withJokoWidodoemergingasthewinnerofthemandatethattookplaceon9July.Theelection,thattookplace16yearsafterIndonesia’stransitiontodemocracyandtheoverthrowoftheSuhartoregime,indicatestheconsolidationofthedemocraticstructureswithinthisnascentdemocracy.Interestinglyinthiselection,Jokowi,asheispopularlyknown,representsachangefromtheolderleadershipinIndonesia–thathasoftenbeenassociatedwithpoliticalfamiliesandthemilitaryleadership.Inthatcontext,heisanewcomeronthenationalpoliticalscene–withhisearlieravatarinpoliticsasthegovernorofJakartaandasthemayorofSolo.WhatissignificantabouthisvictoryisthathisopponentwasPrabowoSubianto–Suharto’sson‐in‐law,andhasbeenimplicatedforhumanrightsviolations.Thisisalsoindicativeofthedegreeofdiscomfortthelinkagestothepastregimebringsamongthepopulation,despitePrabowoSubiantobeinglikelytoallegetheresultstobefraudulent.
ThishasbeenanelectionyearforIndonesia.IntheMay2014electionstotheIndonesianparliament,,citizenscasttheirvotesforfourcouncils.Additionally,electionstolocalcouncils–createdasaresultofthedecentralisationprocessthatiscriticaltoIndonesia’sdemocraticconsolidation–toowereheld.TheProvincialandRegencyelectionstoowereheld,on9April. 5 Originally published as IPCS Commentary on 28 July 2014. See http://www.ipcs.org/article/peace-and-conflict-database/indonesia-2014-presidential-election-explained-4582.html
IPCS Forecasts 2015 I Special Report #172, January 2015
14
ThePartaiDemokrasiIndonesiaPerjuangan(PDI‐P)ortheIndonesianDemocraticPartyofStruggle,theoppositionpartyinthelastgovernment,wontheelectionswith18.95percentofthevote.ThiswasfollowedbytheGolonganKarya(Golkar),theisformerpartyofthemilitaryfunctionalgroupsthatsecured14.75percentofthevotes.Thethirdlargestparty,theGreatIndonesianMovementParty(Gerinda)thatwasledbyPrabowoSubianto,won11.81percentofthevotes.
Whiletheaforementionedgroupsemergedastheleadingpartiesinthelegislativeelections,neithercouldqualifytonominateacandidateforthepresidentialelectionsontheirown.Therefore,inordertonominateacandidate,thepartieshadtosecurecoalitionswithotherpartiesintheDPRtoproposeapresidentialcandidatefordirectpresidentialelections–thatIndonesiahasbeenfollowingsince2004.AccordingtothelawsgoverningthePresidentialelections,apoliticalpartymustofficiallysecureaminimumof25percentofthepopularvoteor20percentofseatsintheDewanPerwakilanRakyat(DPR),thelowerhouseoftheparliament,tobeeligibletonominateapresidentialcandidate.
FollowingthelegislativeelectionsinApril2014,theneedforcoalitionstosecurethenecessarypercentageofseatsandvotespromptedJokowitorequesttheformerVicePresidentofIndonesia,JusufKalla,tobehisrunningmate.ThiscombinationwascriticaltoJokowi’svictorybecauseKallaisaformerChairmanoftheGolkarpartythatcameinsecondinthelegislativeelection.Thetie‐upwithKallawaspotentiallythetrumpcardforJokowiasthiswasseenasacriticalfactorinsplittingtheGolkarvotes–givenKalla’sconsiderableinfluenceamongsupporters.InterestinglyAburizalBakrie,thecurrentChairmanoftheGolkar,had,duringoneoftheParty’snationalmeetings,statedthatthatthepartyactuallybackedthecombinationofPrabowoSubiantoandhisrunningmate,HattaRajasa.Infact,asplitintheGolkarwasaclearsignthatPrabowoSubiantomaynotbeacceptabletomanyduetohisviewsonIndonesiannationalismandthehumanrightsviolationsthathehasbeenassociatedwithundertheSuhartoregime.
Inthefinaltally,theJokowi‐Kallacombinationwon53.16percentofthevoteswhilethePrabowo‐Rajasacombinationwon46.48percentofthevotesinwhatemergedasthemostcloselycontestedelectionssinceIndonesia’stransition.WiththevictoryoftheJokowi‐Kallagroup,Golkarmaythrowitsfullweightbehindthenewteam,wantingtobeontherightsideofthepoliticalfault‐line.
OftheelectoralpromisesJokowimade,thecreationoftenmillionnewjobsandcontinuedeconomicreformsarethemostsignificantchallenges.JusufKallabringswithhimtheexperienceineconomicreforms,whichalsoneedstotranslateintothemuchpromisedsubsidiestoassistinpovertyalleviation.Agrarianlandreformsneedtobeaddressed,asdoesthecrucialquestionofenvironmentalconservationpolicies–thathavetobeimplementedtocounterdetrimentaleffectsofdeforestationIndonesiahasbeenfacing.RampantcorruptionandnepotismarecriticalfactorsthatunderminethedemocraticconsolidationinIndonesia.Thesearealsocrucialchallengeswhichthenewpresidentandhisteamwillhavetotackle.
