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IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challenges Prof. Sukumar Nandi Dept of Computer Sc. & Engg. Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati
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Page 1: IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challengesworkshop.nkn.in/2014/images/presentation/2015/IPV6... · 2015-01-06 · Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision between

Company

LOGO

IPv6 Security Considerations:

Future Challenges

Prof. Sukumar Nandi

Dept of Computer Sc. & Engg.

Indian Institute of Technology Guwahati

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Agenda Outline

Motivation for IPv6

Brief comparision between IPv6 and IPv4

IPv6 Addressing Architecture

IPv6 Header Fields

IPv6 Extension Headers

IPv6 Options

Internet Control Message Protocol version 6

(ICMPv6)

Neighbor Discovery for IPv6

Address Resolution

Stateless Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC)

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If you use IPv4?

I’m Running IPv4…Does This Affect Me?

Your network may be IPv4…

…but your devices may be another story!

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What about all These?

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IPv4 vs IPv6

IPv4 IPv6

Addressing 32 bits 128 bits

Address

resolution

ARP ICMPv6 NS/NA (+ MLD)

Auto-

configuration

DHCP & ICMP

RS/RA

ICMPv6 RS/RA &

DHCPv6 (optional) (+MLD)

Fault Isolation ICMPv4 ICMPv6

IPsec support Optional Mandatory (to "optional")

Fragmentation

Both in hosts

and routers

Only in hosts

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Protocol Format

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Brief comparision of IPv4 and

IPv6 (II)

Header formats:

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IPv6 header

Fixed-length (40-bytes) header

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The Big IPv6 Security Question

Built-In IPSec Offers Better

Security… Right?

IPSec is a mandatory part of

the IPv6 Protocol

Page 10: IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challengesworkshop.nkn.in/2014/images/presentation/2015/IPV6... · 2015-01-06 · Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision between

First and foremost issue!

Unfamiliarity Causes Misconfigurations

Many network administrators and IT practitioners are still relatively unfamiliar with all

IPV6’s “ins and outs”

Common issues: • Not realizing IPv6 is already in their network •Ignorance of Tunneling Mechanisms •Lack of ACL policy for IPv6 multi-homing •Unawareness of potential privacy issues •Over permissiveness, just to get it to work

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What is IPSec?

Among other things, IPSec consists of:

• Authentication Headers (AH) – Provides data origin

authentication and integrity (protects against replay

attacks)

• Encapsulating Security Payloads (ESP) – Adds

encryption to the mix to provide confidentiality

Internet Protocol Security (IPSec) is a standard for adding strong authentication, message integrity, antireply, and encryption (confidentiality) to IP packets, thus providing secure and private communications.

Page 12: IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challengesworkshop.nkn.in/2014/images/presentation/2015/IPV6... · 2015-01-06 · Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision between

What are IPv6 Extension

Headers?

Remember IPv6

header simplification?

Version IHL Type of

Service Total Length

Identification Flag

s

Fragmen

t Offset

Time to

Live Protocol

Header

Checksum

Source Address

Destination Address

Options Padding

IPv4 Header (20 bytes)

Version Traffic

Class Flow Label

Payload Length

Next

Heade

r

Hop Limit

Source Address

Destination Address

IPv6 Header (40 bytes)

Dropped

Dropped options need to go somewhere…

IPv6 Header

Payload

IPv6 Header

Extension Header

Payload

IPv6 Header

Extension Header

Extension Header

Payload

Ext. headers may include: •Hop-by-hop options •Destination Options •Routing •Fragmentation •AH Header •ESP Header •Etc…

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Built-In IPSec Offers Better

Security… Right?

IPSec is a mandatory

part of the IPv6 Protocol

What does this really mean? •Part of IPv6 protocol stack, not an optional add-on •Implemented with AH and ESP Extension Headers •Follows one standard (less interop issues) •Every IPv6 device can do IPSec •However, IPSec usage is still OPTIONAL! •Manual configuration of Security Associations (SA) and this can be a tedious or impractical task considering the volume. •Even if SAs were established, it is not possible to verify the ownership of dynamically generated IP addresses. •SAs can be created only through using the Internet Key Exchange (IKE). But IKE requires a functional IP stack in order to function and this result in a bootstrapping problem.

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Wait! Doesn’t IPv4 Offer IPSec

too?

Some truths about IPv6’s additional

IPSec Security:

• IPv4 has it too (though, not “natively”)

• You don’t have to use it, and most don’t

• Still complex

• May require PKI Infrastructure

So is this really a security benefit?

• Short term – probably no measureable advantage over IPv4 IPSec

• Long term – More applications will leverage it now that it’s

mandatory!

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I also have

192.168.20.1

A Look Back at IPv4 ARP

Poisoning

Who has

192.168.20.34?

I Do. Here’s

my MAC

Hey Everyone. I

have

192.168.20.34

And 192.168.20.2,

And …..

No authentication or

security

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I Do. Send

traffic to me

Neighborhood Discovery Suffers

from Similar Issues

Who has

2001::3/64?

I Do. Here’s my

Layer 2 address

Who has

2001::3/64?

Neighbor Solicitation

Neighbor Advertisement

ND Spoofing

No authentication or

security

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Many Other Neighbor and

Router Discovery Issues

Solution: SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) – RFC 3971

•Essentially adds IPSec to ND communications •Requires PKI Infrastructure •Not available in all OSs yet. •802.1X also an option

Other ND related attacks:

•Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) DoS attack •ND spoofing attack for router (allows for MitM) •Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NAD) DoS attack •Last Hop Router spoofing (malicious router advertisements) •And many more… (http://rfc-ref.org/RFC-TEXTS/3756/chapter4.html)

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New Multicast Protocol Helps

with Reconnaissance

IPv6 multicast addresses:

IPv6 multicast includes a ton of reserved addresses. Here’s a few:

Multicast Address Reservation

FF02::1 All Host Address

FF02::2 All Router Address (LL)

FF02::9 RIP Routers

FF02::A EIGRP Routers

FF02::B Mobile-Agents

FF02::1:2 All DHCP Agents

FF05::2 All Router Address (SL)

FF05::1:3 All DHCP Servers

FF05::1:4 ALL DHCP Relays

FF0X::101 NTP

FF0X::106 Name Service Server

Attackers can use

these multicast

addresses to

enumerate your

network.

Page 19: IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challengesworkshop.nkn.in/2014/images/presentation/2015/IPV6... · 2015-01-06 · Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision between

IPv6 Security Controls Lagging

Hacking Arsenal/Tools

Attacker already have many IPv6 capable tools:

THC-IPv6 Attack Suite

Alive6

Parasite6

Redir6

Fake_Router6

Detect-New-IPv6

DoS-New-IPv6

Smurf6

rSmurf6

TooBig6

Fake_MIPv6

Fake_mld6

Fake_Advertiser6

SendPees6

DNSDict6

Trace6

Flood_Router6

Flood_Advertise6

Fuzz_IP6

etc…

Unfortunately, IPv6 security controls and products seems to be

a bit behind.

THC-IPv6 Attack Suite

Nmap

Wireshark

Multi-Generator (MGEN)

IPv6 Security Scanner (vscan6)

Halfscan6

Strobe

Netcat6

Imps6-tools

Relay6

6tunnel

NT6tunnel

VoodooNet

Scapy6

Metasploit (etc.)

Web Browsers (XSS & SQLi)

TCPDump

COLD

Spak6

Isic6 Hyenae

SendIP

Packit

4to6ddos

6tunneldos

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Typical IPv6 Devices Have

Multiple Addresses

At least a Link-Local Address (FE80::/10)

Likely a Unique Global Address (2000::/3)

Possibly a Site-Local Address (FC00::/7)

You will probably need MULTIPLE

Firewall or ACL policies for these

extra networks within your

organization

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Extra Security Can Cause

Insecurity

Internet

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Firewalls (and Admins) Must

Learn New Tricks

How to filter ICMPv6?

Handling new extension headers

Filtering Multicast and Anycast

Hosts w/multiple addresses

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EXTRA: The Same

There are some security issues

that IPv6 has little effect on:

Application-layer attacks

Sniffing

Rogue Devices

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Flooding/DoS Attacks

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THANK YOU

Page 25: IPv6 Security Considerations: Future Challengesworkshop.nkn.in/2014/images/presentation/2015/IPV6... · 2015-01-06 · Agenda Outline Motivation for IPv6 Brief comparision between

Major References

IPv6 and IPv4 Threat Comparison and Best-Practice Evaluation

http://www.cisco.com/web/about/security/security_services/ciag/documents/

v6-v4-threats.pdf

IPv6 Security Challenges

https://www.cs.siue.edu/~wwhite/CS447/TopicalPaper/Originals/Bridges_IP

v6SecurityChallenges.pdf

IPv6 Security Challenges by Samuel Sotillo

http://www.infosecwriters.com/text_resources/pdf/IPv6_SSotillo.pdf

IPv6 Security Best Practices

http://www.cisco.com/web/SG/learning/ipv6_seminar/files/02Eric_Vyncke_S

ecurity_Best_Practices.pdf

IPv6 Security Considerations and Recommendations

http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/bb726956.aspx

NIST: Guidelines for the Secure Deployment of IPv6

http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-119/sp800-119.pdf

IPv6 Transition/Coexistence Security Considerations (RFC 4942)

http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4942.txt

And many more….


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