Iran: a hIstory of IgnorIng world demands

Iran is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and has legally foresworn nuclear weapons. But for more than 25 years, Iran has pursued a covert nuclear program in direct violation of its treaty obligations.

Iran’s continuing refusal to answer the concerns raised by the evidence of its covert activities, including evidence of specific military applications, demonstrates that Iran cannot be trusted. To restore that trust, Iran must comply with six mandatory United Nations Security Council resolutions that require suspension of its nuclear enrichment and reprocessing activities, as well as provide full answers to the questions posed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) concerning Tehran’s suspicious nuclear activities. Iran must fulfil these obligations to create the minimal conditions for a successful negotiated outcome.

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“ We have made clear that if Iran lives up to the obligations that every nation has, it will have a path to

a more prosperous and productive relationship with the international community. ”– President Obama

While negotiations with Iran continue, Washington must not forget Iran’s long history of exploiting negotiations to buy time to advance its nuclear program. In any negotiations, the United States must make clear that it will prevent Iran from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons, or the capability to quickly produce a nuclear weapon at a time of its choosing.

Iran’s acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability would mark a significant new regional danger, as Tehran would be able to use its status as a nuclear-capable state to increase its power and threaten U.S. national security. To stop Iran from becoming a nuclear threshold state, the United States must dramatically quicken the pace and scope of sanctions while bolstering the credibility of its option to use force. The United States cannot rely on a policy that seeks to contain a nuclear Iran.

www.aipac.org/Iran www.aipac.org/Iranthe threat from Iran

The ThreaT From Iranwww.aipac.org/Iran www.aipac.org/Iran

Access tO nucleAr fAcilities

requirement: Resolution 1737—passed in 2006—and subsequent

resolutions require Iran to provide the IAEA access to requested

nuclear sites.

Violation: Iran has repeatedly denied IAEA inspectors access to the

Arak heavy water reactor and refused inspectors access to documents,

individuals and locations needed to carry out their duties. The regime

has also refused IAEA access to the Parchin military facility for

four years.

enrichment ActiVities

requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require

Iran to suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities,

including research and development.

Violation: Iran continues enrichment activity and, according to IAEA

physical inventories, has now acquired enough low-enriched uranium

that—if further processed—would be sufficient for the cores of four to

five nuclear weapons.

weAPOns exPOrts

requirement: Resolution 1747—passed in 2007—requires Iran to

cease all weapons exports.

Violation: More than a dozen nations have intercepted Iranian

weapon exports destined for Syria, Hizballah, Hamas and other Iranian

allies. American and allied forces have repeatedly seized Iranian arms in

Iraq and Afghanistan.

rAtify AdditiOnAl PrOtOcOls

requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require

Iran to ratify and to act in accordance with the provisions of the

Additional Protocol to the NPT.

Violation: Iran has not ratified the Additional Protocol and has refused

to abide by its provisions, including unfettered no-notice nuclear

inspections and the prompt provision of design information for

new facilities.

heAVy wAter reActOrs

requirement: Resolution 1737 and subsequent resolutions require

Iran to suspend all work on heavy water-related projects, including the

construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.

Violation: Iran continues construction of a heavy water reactor at

Arak, according to IAEA inspections and satellite imagery. The reactor—

once operational—could be used in combination with a reprocessing

facility to produce plutonium for the core of a nuclear weapon.

bAllistic missiles

requirement: Resolution 1929—passed in 2010—requires Iran to

refrain from any activity related to ballistic missiles, which are capable

of delivering nuclear weapons.

Violation: Iran is busy developing a highly operational arsenal of

ballistic missiles, with constantly increasing ranges. “Iran continues

to test ballistic missiles and undertake research and development

activities,” according to the U.N. Panel of Experts on Iran.

nuclear nonprolIferatIon treatyIn 1970, Iran ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). By ratifying this agreement, 185

countries agreed to forego nuclear weapons and accept comprehensive safeguards put in place by the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

Despite ratifying the NPT, Iran has pursued a path to nuclear weapons, through an illicit program that

violates its NPT commitments.

mAnufActuring weAPOns

commitment: Iran committed not to manufacture or otherwise

acquire nuclear weapons.

Violation: Iran has carried out extensive work that has no civilian

purpose, including tests on nuclear triggers and technology used

to simulate nuclear explosions, according to a November 2011

IAEA report.

receiVing inAPPrOPriAte nucleAr AssistAnce

commitment: Iran committed not to seek or receive any assistance for

the manufacture of nuclear weapons.

Violation: Iran confessed to the IAEA in 2004 that it had received

substantial assistance in the development of key technologies

needed to produce nuclear weapons, including from the father of

Pakistan’s nuclear weapon, A.Q. Khan.

building new nucleAr fAcilities

commitment: Iran is required to provide design information to the

IAEA for any new nuclear facilities “as early as possible before nuclear

material is introduced…”

Violation: Iran has repeatedly built secret nuclear facilities, including

the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Qom. Iran only notified the

IAEA about Natanz in 2002 and Qom in 2009, after the facilities were

revealed to the press.

imPOrting urAnium

commitment: Iran is required to report the import of nuclear material

and place the material under IAEA safeguards.

Violation: In 1991, Iran imported uranium from China without

declaring this to the IAEA.

nucleAr sAfeguArds

commitment: Iran must provide the IAEA with information

“concerning nuclear material subject to safeguards … and the features

of facilities relevant to safeguarding such material.”

Violation: Beginning in the early 1990s, Iran acknowledges it carried

out uranium conversion experiments without notifying the IAEA and

allowing for monitoring.

u.n. securIty councIl resolutIonsSince 2006, the United Nations Security Council has adopted six resolutions demanding Iran suspend

uranium enrichment and heavy water activities, cooperate with the IAEA in answering questions about

its earlier activities, end weapons shipments and suspend ballistic missile work. To date, Iran has

refused to comply with any of the mandatory requirements of the Security Council.