PRINCETONSTUDIES ONTHENEAREASTIRANIBetween TwoRevolutionsErvandAbrahamian/1PRINCETONUNIVERSITYPRESSPRINCETON, NEW JERSEYCopyright 1982 by PrincetonU'riiversity PressPublishedby Princeton UniversityPress, 41William Street,Princeton,New Je'rseyIn theUnitedKingdom: Princeton UniversityPress, Guildford, SurreyAllRightsReservedLibrary of Congress Cataloging inPublication Datawill be foundonthelast printedpage of this bookThisbookhasbeen composed inLinotronBaskervilleClothbound editions of PrincetonUniversityPress booksareprinted on acid-freepaper, andbinding materials are chosenforstrength anddurabilityPrinted intheUnited States of Americaby PrincetonUniversityPress, Princeton, New JerseyTOTHEMEMORYOFJess(Helen)HarbisonContentsList of Tables and FigurePrefaceIntroductionxxi3PART1. HISTORICALBACKGROUNDOne. TheNineteenth Century 9Social Structure 9Communal Organizations 19Communal Conflicts 26Communal Conflicts and Class Consciousness 33The Qajar Dynasty 37Two. The Constitutional Revolution 50The Impact of the West 50The Traditional Middle Class 58TheIntelligentsia 61FromProtest toRevolution (1800-1905) 69The Revolution (June1905-August 1906) 81The Struggle for the Constitution(August 1906-June1908) 86The Civil War (June1908-July1909) 92Three. Reza Shah 102ThePeriod of Disintegration (1909-1921) 102TheRise of Reza Shah (1921-1925) 118The Reign of Reza Shah(1926-1941) 135Reza Shah's State andIran's Society 149viii ... ContentsContents .. ixConclusionGlossaryBibliographyIndex510525530539541551419419426435446450450473480496496TheIslamic RevolutionMiddle-Class Protest (May1977-June1978)Middle- and Working-Class Protests aune1978-December1978)TheFall of the Shah aanuary-February1979)The OppositionPolitical Parties (1953-1977)Clerical Opposition (1963-1977)Guerrilla Organizations (1971-1977)PARTIII. CONTEMPORARYIRANThe Politics of Uneven DevelopmentConsolidation of Power (1953-1963)Socioeconomic Development (1963-1977)Political Underdevelopment (1963-1977)Iran on the Verge of Revolution169Nine.169176186Ten.199203225Eleven.PARTII. POLITICSOFSOCIALCONFLICTFour. The Evolving Political System: FromMilitary toEmbattledMonarchyNew BeginningsThe ThirteenthMqiles (November1941-November1943)TheFourteenthMajles Elections (November1943-February1944)Convening the FourteenthMajles (February-March1944)TheFourteenthMajles(March1944-March1946)TheEvolving Political System: From Embattled toMilitaryMonarchyQavam as Prime Minister (March1946-December1946) 225The FifteenthMajles Elections (December1946-June1947) 240TheFifteenth Majles aune1947-June1949) 242The Sixteenth Maj1es Elections auly1949-February1950) 250The Sixteenth Majles(February1950-May 1951) 261PremierMossadeq (May1951-August 1953) 267Five.Six. The Tudeh Party 281 .Formation (September1941-0ctober 1942) 281ExpansionNorth(November1942-August 1944) 290Expansion South (August 1944-0ctober1946) 299Repression(October1946-February 1950) 305Revival(February1950-August 1953) 318Seven. Class Bases of the Tudeh 326ClassProfile 326SalariedMiddle Class 328Urban Working Class 347PropertiedMiddle Class 371RuralMasses 375Eight. Ethnic Bases of the Tudeh 383Ethnic Profile 383Christians 385Azeris 388List of Tables and FigurePrefaceTable 1. Ethnic Structure of IranTable 2. Leading Personalities of the Early CommunistMovementTable 3. Social andPolitical Background of the Fifty-ThreeTable 4. Early Leaders of the Iran PartyTable 5. Leaders of the Democrat PartyTable 6. Founding Members of theNational FrontTable 7. Occupational andRegional Background of TudehRank andFile MembersTable 8. Decile Distribution of Urban HouseholdExpendituresTable 9. Dead GuerrillasTable 10. Occupations of Dead GuerrillasFigureInflation andMajor Strikes12132156190232254330449480481351This work began in1964 as a study on the social bases of the Tudehparty, the main communist organization in Iran. Focusing on the shortperiod between the party's formation in 1941 and its drastic repressionin1953, theoriginalworktriedtoanswerthequestionwhyanor-ganizationthat wasclearlysecular, radical, andMarxist wasabletogrow into a mass movement in a country noted for its fervent Shi'ism,traditional monarchism, and intense nationalism. The study, however,gradually expanded as I realized that the Tudeh success could not befullyassessed without constant references to the failures, On the onehand, of its many contemporary nationalistic parties; and, on the otherhand, of its ideological predecessors, especially the Social Democratsof 1909-1919, the Socialists of the1920s, and the Communists of the1930s. The study further expanded as the1977-1979 revolution un-folded, shattered the Pahlevi regime, and brought to the fore not theTudehbut theclerical forces. Thusthestudyhasevolvedintoananalysis of the social bases of Iranian politics, focusing on how socio-economic development has gradually transformed the shape of Iran-ian politics fromthe eve of the Constitutional Revolution in the late'nineteenth century to the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Feb-ruary1979.Thebookisdividedintothreeparts. Part Iprovidesahistoricalbackground to the understanding of modern Iran, surveying the nine-teenth century, the Constitutional Revolution, and the reign of RezaShah. Part II analyzes the social bases of politics in the period betweenthefall of RezaShah'sautocracyinAugust of1941andtheestab-lishment of Muhammad Reza Shah's autocracy in August 1953. Thesethirteen years are the only major period in the modern era in whichthehistoriancanlookbelowthepoliticalsurfaceintothesocial in-frastructureof Iranianpolitics, andtherebyexamineindepththeethnic aswell astheclassroots of thevariouspolitical movements.Readers who are not interested in the internal workings of the com-munist movement in thisperiod are advised to skim Chapters 7 and8, whichexamine indetailtheclass andethnic basesof the Tudehxii * PrefacePart IIIexamines contemporaryIran, describing theSOCIOeconomIc programscarned out byMuhammadReza Shah, thepoliticaltensionsaggravatedbytheseprograms, andeventuallytheeruption of the recentIslamic Revolution.In working my way through the complex maze of Iranian politics,Ihavereliedasmuchaspossible onthie"important sourcesothersocial scientists have often overlooked:the gold mine of informationin the British Foreign Office andIndia Office in London-especiallythe weekly, monthly, annual, anddetailedsurveyreportssentfromIran betweenI 905and1949 byprovincialconsular officialsaswellas ministers, ambassadors, andspecial attachesinTehran; theval-uablematerial revealedinparliamentarydebates, particularlyfromthe time of the First Majles in 1906 to the Seventeenth Majles in 1953;these debates have been published under the title ofMozakerat-iMajles-, Shawra-yi Melli (TheProceedings of theNationalConsultativeAs-sembly); and the equally valuable information found in the numerousPersian-language newspapers, journals, andperiodicals published from1905 until 1980 both inside the country and outside Iran. I have alsoasas necessary memoirs, histories, and articles written byactive pohuclans, retIredstatesmen, andexiles livingabroadafter1953. All thesesources havetheir biases, of course. But thesocial can still obtain a fairly objective picture of Iranian politics bytakmg mto account their biases, double-checking the information withother primary materials, and using as many countervailing sources aspossible. Itistobehopedthatfuturehistorianswill beabletotestmy findings by gaining access to the onemajor source left unused-the archives of the Soviet Union on Iran.I would like to thank those who helped in the writing of this book: Donaldfor readingtheoriginal monograph; po-htlcal actlVlsts who WIsh to remam anonymous for their patient inter-VIews, raredocuments, andvaluable reminiscences; Nikki Keddie,Joseph Upton, E. P. Elwell-Sutton, Bozorg 'Alavi, Hormoz Shahdadi,and the late T. C. Cuyler Young for commenting on earlier drafts ofvariouschapters; andShahenAbrahamianandMargaret Casefortheir meticulous editorial work.I wouldalsoliketothankthefollowinginstitutionsfor financialt?e Research Institute on International Change at Colum-bIafor Junior Fellowshipsfrom1967to 1969; theCityUmverslty of New York for summer travel grants during 1972, 1974,1976, and1979; the Social Science Research Council for a postdoctoralgrant m 1977; and Baruch College in the City University of New Yorkfor a sabbatical fellowship in 1979-1980 to complete the book. Finally,I would hke to thank the Controller, H. M. Stationary Office in Britain,Preface '*xiiifor permission to quote from unpublished Foreign Office documentsat the Public Record Office and the India Office in London. Of course,neither these institutions nor the readers thanked above are respon-sible for any errors or political opinionsfoundin. the book.For the sake of space, I have used footnotes only to cite quotations,todocument controversial issues, andtorefer tohighlyimportantprimary sources. Secondary works, however distinguished, as well asotherimportant sourceshavebeenleft for theconcludingbibliog-raphy. Alsofor thesake of space, thefootnotescontainonlytrans-lations of articletitlesfromPersiannewspapers, journals, andperi-odicals. They docontain, however, thetransliterationas wellas thetranslation of Persian books andpamphlets.The method of transliteration inevitably needs an explanation, sincefew linguists agree on a commOn system, some vowels are not writteninPersian, and pronounciationvaries greatlyfromone region toanother withinIran. Toeasethese problems, I havemodifiedtheversion devised by the Library of Congress. In my modified version,place names well known in the English-speaking world have been keptin their familiar form (e.g. Tehran, Isfahan, and Mashad); letters "0"and"e"havebeenintroducedtodenotetheirequivalent soundsinPersian; diacriticalmarks have been eliminated onthegrounds thatthisisa workforsocialscientists, not linguists; and, for thesake ofconsistencybutat therisk of appearingtobeametropolitanchau-vinist, I have based my transliteration on the pronunciation of Persianas spoken in contemporary Tehran.IRANBETWEENTWOREVOLUTIONSIntroductionSociologistswhohavestoppedthetime-machineand, withagooddeal ofconceptual huffing and puffing, have gone down to the engine-room to look,tell us that nowhere at allhave they been ableto locate and classify a class.They can only find a multitude of people and different occupations, incomes, andtherest. Of coursetheyareright, sinceclassisnotthisOr that part of the machine, but the way the machine works once it is set inmotion-not this andthat interest, but the friction of interests, the heat, thethundering noise.... Class itself is not a thing, it is a happening.-E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English WorkingClass (London, 1968), p. 939._.. . Inthe last twodecades, socialscientistsstudying Western. countrieshavedevelopedanewdisciplinecalledpoliticalsociology. Disregarding thenineteenth-centurypremise thatstate and society were two separate and contradictory entities, modernsocial scientistshaveformulatedalessgrandbut morepreciseper-spective that sees state andsociety as intricately connected, and statepolitics ascloselyrelated toboth political organizations andsocialforces. Equipped withthis three-dimensional perspective, contem-porary social scientists have produced not only perceptive theoreticalframeworksonpoliticalsociology, butalsomanyvaluableempiricalcase studies of Western societies, analyzing the social bases of politicsandonthecomplexrelationshipbetweenstatepolitics, politicalor-ganizations andsocial structures.!IFor examples of empirical case studies onthe social bases of politics inthe West,see R. BendixandM. Lipset, Class, Status, and Power(NewYork, 1960); L. Coser,Political Sociology (New York, 1966); S. Upset, Political Man (New York, 1960); S. UpsetandS. Rokkan, Party SystemsandVoter Alignments(NewYork, 1967); R. RoseandD. Unwin, eds., "Social Structure, PartySystems, andVoting,"ComparativePoliticalStudies,2(April 1969), A. Stinchcombe, "Social Structure andOrganizations,"Handbook of Organizations, edited by J. March (Chicago, 1957), pp. 143-97. For an earlyexample of sucha casestudy, see K. Marx,"The Class Struggles inFrance," SelectedWorks (Moscow, 1958), voL1.Introduction '*5of modernization, answersindepththereasonswhytheshahfailedto winoverthemodern intelligentsia.4 T. Parsons, "Social Classes andClass Conflict intheLight of Recent SociologicalTheory," Essays inSociological Theory(NewYork, 1967); R. Merton, SocialTheory andSocial Structure(Chicago, 1957). For a discussion of whether MiddleEastern societiesare divided into classes or occupational strata, see A. Perlmutter, "Egypt and the Mythof the New Middle Class," Comparative Studies in History and Society, 10 (October1967),46-65; M. Halpern, "Egypt andtheNew Middle Class," ComparativeStudies in Historyand Society, 11 (January 1969),97-108,t> L. Pye, Aspects of Political Development (Boston, 1966); G. Almond and S. Verba, TheCivicCulture(Boston, 1965). Forastudyontheimportance of ideologyinIranianpolitics, see L. Binder, Iran: Political Development in Changing Society (Berkeley and LosAngeles, 1962).4 * IntroductionWhereas social scientists analyzing Western states have adopted the Thepresent work intendsto examine the politics of modern Iranthree-dimensional perspectiveof politicalsociology, however,. social by analyzing the interaction between political organizations and socialscientists examiningnon-Westernstates havetendedto;etainthe forces. Theseforcescanbecategorizedgenerallyas ethnicgroupsnineteenth-century, two-dimensional outlook. Some, espeCially polit- andsocial classes. Thebookwill usethephrase"ethnicgroup"toical scientists fromthestructural-functional school,havefocusedon describethevertical groupingsof individualswithcommontiesofthe state:they have discussed how the state modernizes. society, grap- language, tribal lineage, religion, or regional affiliation. It will applypies with crises of legitimacy, and builds such ner institutions as bu- theterm"socialclass" tothebroadhorizontal layerscomposedofreaucracies, armies, andone-party systems. Others, particularlyan- individualswithcommonrelationshipstothemeans of production,thropologists and political scientists from the behavioral school, have common interactions with the mode of administration,and, in a de-concentratedonsociety: theanthropologistsonsmall commUnIties, velopingenvironment, commonattitudes towardeconomic, social,the political scientists onwhole "political cultures" of"developing and political modernization.nations."Social scientists havethus writtenmuchonhowpolitIcal Although the concept of social class has been employed, in slightlysystems transform social systems, and social systems at times-through different forms, by such contrasting authorities as Marx and deviolence riots and alienation-disrupt the political systems. But they Tocqueville, Machiavelli andTawney, Weber andDahrendorf, me-have little 0ll; howshapeconflicts, dieval ideologuesandMuslimtheologians, Romancensorsandtheandhow social forces, interacting WIthpolitical organIzations, affect AmericanFederalist Papers, ithascomeunder firerecentlyfromdi-the course of development innon-Western states.' . versesocial scientists. Structural-functionalistshavearguedthatso-Similarly, fewscholarshaveexaminedthesocialbases ofcieties aredividednotintoafewmajorclassesbutintomany smallpolitics.Whereas the past experts on Iran t 600 I\-l::;I\100 ti./'"0500I\//)] Ion \ /750I\ / u400"-..,J/\// \/ 50300// -/\ /\/200\/25L '/100------1941 '42 '43 '44 '45 '46 '47 '48 '49 '50 '51 '52 1953--Cost-of-LivingIndex.___ Number of IndustrialStrikes.NOTE: The cost-of-living indexhasbeen compiledfrom theBulletin of theNational The number of industrialhas been compiled from newspapers, especiallylUtla at, Mardom, Zafar, Kayhan. Besu-yt Ayandeh,Emruz, andEmruz.352 ..ClassBases of the Tudehknowthat I canalwaysfindworkelsewhere, especiallyinthecon-struction industry."" Fourth, the CCFTU had no viable competitors.Itsmain competitor, theUnion of Workers, was created in1942byYousef Eftekhari,aradical but vehementlyanticommunist labor or-ganizer who had spent eleven years in prison for his role in the1929oil strike. Althougha genuine trade unionist, Eftekhari failedto re-cruit many workers, lost some of his early supporters to the Tudeh,andfoundhimself relyingmore andmoreorSayyidZiya, who hadno intention of encouraging labor militancy.Finally, the CCFTUobtained valuable assistance fromthe Tudeh.Party organizations collected contributions for striking workers. Partyintellectuals set up literacy courses, published Zafar for the CCFTU,and publicized labor grievances through the impressive array of left-wing newspapers. Party lawyersformed a legal aid society to defendtrade unionists. Moreover, pro-Tudeh judges, engineers,andpoliceofficers at times used their influencetoprotect strikersandlabororganizers. For example, engineers in the sugar mill in Tehran threat-ened to close down the whole plant when their manager tried to fireeight militant workers. TheBritish consul reported that the author-ities in Yazd during 1946 did not even bother to arrest demonstratingworkers, for theyknewthatthelocalcourtswerecontrolledbytheTudeh. Theconsul inBandar 'Abbas wrote in1946 that a strikeinthe town's textile mill had been successful mainly because the managersupported the Tudeh. The consul in Shiraz described how the policebroke a strike in the city's electrical plant by arresting all the ringlead-ers, but the local courts promptly restarted it by releasing them. Andthe consul in Zahedan claimedthat the Tudeh created a "semblanceof unityamong workersagainst the' Alamfamilybecausethepartyhad sympathizers in the local courts, police,and gendarmerie."'6Making full use of these advantages, the CCFTU moved into action.In1944, itledoverfortymajorstrikes, absorbedsmallerunionsinIsfahan, Fars, andKerman, andtherebyincreaseditsmembershipfrom 100,000 to nearly 200,000." Similarly, in 1945 it helped organize55 British Consul in Bushire, 15 May 1943, F.G. 371/Persia 1943/34-35087; M. Sultani,"Speech to theFirst Conference of the Council of United Workers," Rahbar, 1 August1943.56 M. 'Azimi, "SpeechtotheFirst Conference of theCouncilofUnitedWorkers,"Rahbar,1 August1946; British Consul in Kerman, 30 December1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946134-52749; British Consul in Bandar 'Abbas, 30 June1946, F.o. 37I/Persia 194613452699; BritishConsulinShiraz, 30April 1944, F.G. 37I/Persia194413440162;British Consul in Zahidan, 30 June1946, F.G. 37I/Persia1946134-52756.57 The1944 strikes included those among textile workers in Isfahan, Tehran,Yazd,Mashad, Chalus, Semnan, Behshahr, and Ahwaz; among telephone operators in Shirazand Tehran;among electricians in Shiraz; amongdock workersin Bandar ShahpourUrban Working Class"353'another forty major strikes, and, establishingnewbranches, couldboast of having thirty-three affiliated unions with a total membershipof over 275,000.58The CCFTU's peak came, however, in the following year. By mid-1946, itclaimed186unionswithatotal membershipof 335,000-90,000 in Khuzistan, 50,000 in Azerbaijan,50,000 in Tehran, 45,000in Gilan andMazandaran, 40,000 in Isfahan, 25,000 in Fars,20,000inKhurasan, and15,000inKerman.59Havingunionizedsome75percent of the industrial labor force, it had branches in almost all ofthecountry's346 modernplants, andwasrecognizedbythe WorldFederation of Trade Unions as the "only genuine labor organizationinIran."6oMoreover, themembersof its 186affiliatescamefromdiverse walks of life. They includedindustrial wage earners suchasthe unions of oil workers, textile workers, railway workers, and tobaccoprocessors; skilledmodernwage earners, particularlytheunions ofprinters, garage mechanics, and truck drivers; skilled traditional han-dicraftsmen, notably the union of carpet weavers; relatively unskilledwage earners-for example, the unions of construction workers, mu-nicipalroadsweepers, andhousepainters; serviceemployees,espe-(Khomeini); among shoemakers, carpenters, and road sweepers, as well as silo, bakery,and brewery workers in Tehran; and among factory workers in sixteen of the eighteenindustrialplants in Tabriz.58 The1945 strikes includedthose amongtextileworkersin Yazd, Mashad,Ahwaz,Chalus, and Semnan; road sweepers inKerman;carpet weavers in Mashad; skilled oilworkersintheAbadanrefinery; unskilledworkersintheAlOCinstallationinmanshah; andgeneral strikes in Tabriz, inMashad, andintheIsfahan cotton mills,The275,000included20,000railwaymen, 3,000munitionsworkers, 45,000con-structionlaborers, 8,000miners, 45,000oil workers, 2,200tobaccoworkers, 12,000breweryworkers andfoodprocessors, 40,000textile workers,20,000 carpet weavers,..2,000 printers, 600 electricians, 6,000 truck and taxi drivers,3,000 cart drivers,2,000glass makers, 3,000sugar workers, 3,500siloworkers, 1,200cement mixers, 2,300chemical workers, 3,000 slaughter houseworkers, 3,000 clerks in theEducation istry, 1,500municipal workers, 1,500bathassistants, 2,700hospital workers, 11,000dockers, 9,000 craftsmen, 2,000 cotton cleaners, 2,000 silk workers, 5,000 fishery workers, 8,000tobaccogrowers, 1,500employeesintheWarMinistry, 1,000technicians,and150newspapersellers. SeeBritishLabourAttachetotheForeignOffice, "TheTudeh Party andthe Iranian TradeUnions," F.O. 3711Persia59 R. Rusta, "Speech toRailwayWorkers," Zafar, 15 August1946.60 WorldFederation of Trade Unions, Report on the Activity of the W.F.T.U.: Report onIran (October 1945-April1949) (Milan, 1949), p. 167. Reluctant to antagonize the Iraniangovernment, theInternational LaborOffice refusedtorecognizethe CCFTUasthe"only genuinelabormovement," but diddescribe it asthe "only organizationwithanationalnetwork."International Labor Office, Provisional Record of the Twenty-SeventhSession(Paris, 1945), Afewyears later, however, anILOreport statedthat "tradeunionism may be said to owe its existence to the Tudeh Party." D. Jamalzadeh, "Socialand Economic Structure of Iran," International Labour Review, 43 (February1951),91.354 * Class Bases of the Tudehciallytheunions of restaurant waiters, clothes cleaners,andcinemaattendants; professional and white-collar associations, such as the Syn-dicateofEngineers andTechnicians, AssociationofLawyers, andunionof teachersandeducational employees; wageearnersinthebazaar workshops, particularly the unions of tailors, carpenters, andshoemakers; and even some shopkeepers, notably the guilds of phar-macists, confectioners, andnewspaper sellers.Furthermore, the CCFTU during the first nine months of 1946 ledover160 successful strikesfor higher wages. Thesestrikes includedtextile workers in Bushire, Rasht, Kashan, Shiraz, and Bandar 'Abbas;tailors in Rasht; dockers inBushire, Bandar 'Abbas, and BandarShahpour;railwaymeninQazvin; miners in Shamshak; printers, to-bacco processors, butchers' assistants, railway repairmen, bus drivers,clothescleaners, electricians, andbreweryworkersinTehran; andgeneral strikes in Khuzistan, Isfahan, Nowshahr, and Chalus. For thefirst time since I936, real wages among skilled factory workers caughtup with and even surpassed food prices.61As one foreign visitor noted,"the Tudehwassuccessfulinobtainingamomentousimprovementin the conditions of factory workers. It was under Tudeh's pressure,and also with an eye to winning labor away from Tudeh's influence,that AhmadQavaminMay1946 decreedthemostadvancedlaborlegislation in theMiddleEast."62 Thenew labor lawpromised to setminimum wages based on local food prices; to outlaw the employmentof children;to limit thework day to eighthours; to enforce payforFridays andfor six days'vacation per year, including May Day; andto permit unions to organize and bargain with management. On pa-per, at least, the Tudeh and the CCFTU had won many of their initialdemands.Thereasons for the rapiddevelopment ofthelabor movementbetween I94l and 1947 can best be seen in the textile mills of Isfahanand in the oil industry of Khuzistan. In Isfahan, the Tudeh obtainedits first organization as early as March 1942, when Fedakar, the younglawyer who later won a Majles seat, opened a party branch. His right-handmanwas 'AbbasAzeri, amember of the"Fifty-three"andacobbler from Azerbaijan who had been employed as a mill worker inIsfahanat thetimeof hisarrest. Withinfiveweeks of openingthefirst branch, the Tudehhadnumerous cells in two of the nine largetextilemills. Thesefactories provedfertile groundfor theTudehpartly because prices in the previous five years had jumped from anindex of 100 to 243 but daily wages had risen only from 4 to 8 rials;61 World Federation of Trade Unions, Report (1945-49), p. 167.62 M. Hindus, InSearchof a Future(New York, 1948),p. 88.Urban Working Class * 355partly becausethe warhadcut off foreigncompetition andtherebybrought windfall profits tothe owners; partly becausethe work dayhad been increased from nine to ten hours to meet the new demand;and partly because work conditions in the mills were even worse thanthoseinmostindustrial plants. TheBritish consul commentedthatthe Isfahan mill owners hadgrown accustomed to phoning the localarmybarrackswheneverthey werefacedwithlaborproblems. Themillworkersthemselvescomplainedbitterlythat in1939 thepolicehad murdered one of their union organizers; that the managers usedthe contemptuous term ajir (hired hand) instead of the more accept-able word kargar (worker);and that the factory owners had for yearshandedoverbatchesof Isfahanworkers toRezaShahasbirthdaypresentstotransporttohisprivatemillsinmalaria-infestedMazan-daran.63Thefirst signof TudehsuccesscameinAugust 1942, whentheworkers in the twomillsformedthe Union of Isfahan Workersanddemanded a 30 percent wage increase, the eight-hour day, and specialrates for overtime work. At first the mill owners refused to negotiate,firedthe ringleaders, and dismissed the union as a bunch of trouble-makers who would prove incapable of working together for long. Butconfronted witha determinedstrike in both factories, andreluctantto lose markets to their rivals, the mill owners backed down and metall the major demands. Not unexpectedly, this encouraged the work-ersintheother sevenmills to jointhe unionandtoput forwardsimilar demands. Rebuffed again, the union organized a general strikeamong the10,500 workers employed in the nine mills. To break thestrike, the mill owners persuaded and perhaps bribed General Zahedi,ihecommander of thelocal garrison, toarrest theringleadersandplacetroopsaroundthefactories.64Thistacticfailed, however; forthe central government, fearful of street confrontations and Tudeh-ledsympathystrikes elsewhere, steppedintodismiss Zahedi andimpose a settlement on the mill owners. The settlement not only metthewagedemands, butalsogavemillworkerstheeight-hourworkday, monthly medical checkups, foodsubsidies, two suits per year, abanonchildlabor, andonemonth'sbonusestosharethewindfallprofits.65 Thegovernment, moreover, promisedto draft a labor lawto COver all industrial workers. The British ambassador commented,63 British Consul in Isfahan, 10 July1945, F.O. 3711Persia1945/34-45476; "A ShortHistory of the TradeUnion Movement inIsfahan," Rahbar, 18-20 June1944.$1 British Consul inIsfahan, 31August 1942, F.O.3711Persia1942/34-31412.65 British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, "Report on Industrial Developments inIsfahan," F.G. 37I1Persia1944/3440222.356 ..Class Bases of the Tudeh"becauseofconsiderablelabour activity, the government is underpressure toregulate relations betweenmanagement and labour."66In the months after the big victory, the Union of Isfahan Workersconsolidateditsorganizationintheninemills. ABritishofficer sta-tionedin Isfahanreportedthat bytheendof 1942the executivecommittee of the union was a significant force in the city.67 It includedrepresentativesfromall themills, kept disciplineon thes.hopfloor,transmittedgrievancestothemanagers, obtamedrecogmtiOnfromthe owners as the proper spokesman of the workers, and acted as "anarbitrator of anytroublebetween men andmanagement because itsnegotiations were invariablysuccessful."TheBritishofficeraddedthat althoughintheorytheUnionwasindependent of all politicalparties, inpractice most of its leaders came fromthe Tudeh party.The unionwon another victory in July1943, ironically as a resultofanabortive attempt bythe mill owners toundotheir previousdefeat. Complaining that hightaxes and exhorbitant wages were ru-ining private industry, the mill owners took the offensive. They threat-ened to end the food subsidies, invited Sayyid Ziya to extend his partyinto Isfahan, and encouraged the Bakhtiyari chiefs to prepare for aninvasion of the city.68 One mill owner who had villages nearby broughtpeasants into the city to physically attack Fedakar. The union reactedsharply, threatening not only demonstrations and strikes in the millsbut also a general strike throughout Isfahan. This ultimatum worked;for thecentral government, againfearful of bloodyrepercussions,quickly intervenedandforcedthemill owners to back down. In thenew agreement, signed before the governor-general, the factory own-ersagreedtocontinuethefoodsubsidy, tonegotiateonlywiththepro-Tudeh union, andto obtain unionpermission before laying offany workers. In return, the union promised to protect company prop-erty, enforce work discipline, and permit the firing of unneeded labor.The Britishconsul reported that theindustrialists hadreluctantlysignedthe"humiliatingagreement"but hadnotgivenuptheirin-trigues: "TheGovernorGeneral hasmadehimself veryunpopularamong vested interests by hisrefusalto suppress theworkers' party... . Therichhopetoremovehimandtousethearmy, bybribingthe commander, to suppress all political activity among the workers."69Similarly, theBritishambassadorsummarizedthesituation of early1944 in a special report:66 British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, 26 May1944, ibid.67 E. Sykes, "Isfahan,"Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 33 (July-October 1946).307-17.'" British Consul inIsfahan, 3 July1943, F.G. 3711Persia1943/34-35120.69 British Consul in Isfahan, 16 August 1943, F.O. 371IPersiaUrban Working Class ..357Two years ago the exploitation of workers was almost complete. They weremade to work ten hours a dayfOT a wage as low as ten rials. No precautions takentotheirhealthandnocompensationwasgivenforlfiJunes. Meanwhlle, the owners amassedimmensefortunes. Whenthe firstsign of resistancer;nade appearance, theOwnersandthegovernmenthad no understandmg of Its importance. They feared Soviet Russia and riedthat theirmillswouldfall preytotheallegedly communist ideasnowspreading amongtheworkers. Moreover, theyfeel outragedthat suchportant persons as themselves, literally cousus d'or, should be treated spectfully by mere workmen. They are motivated by fear and injured dignity.Tothesemaybeaddedgreed-fortheirsolethought ismoney andmoremoney and the thought of losing any of their enormous profits to the workersIS unpalatable to them. They find the whole topic of labour disputes distaste-ful, andusuallytaketheline that disputes aremerework of agitators andthat workers are too ignorant to exercise responsibility.... In Persia we aredearly at the beginning of a new era and are seeing the rise of a new socialmovement. Theadvantageswhichtheworkers havewonareconsiderableand theywill certainly continue to make the employers feel their newly dis-covered power.70Despitetheoppositionof themill owners, theTudehcontinueddnring 1943 to expand in Isfahan-especially among the bazaar wageearners, theArmemanand Jewish communities, andthefoursmallfactories located in the city. In the elections for the Fourteenth Majles,Fedakarwonwithsome30,000votes. Inthememorial servicesforSulayman Iskandari, the Tudeh procession drew over 25,000 mOurn-ers. Andinthesend-off giventoFedakar asheleft for Parliamentall thirteenfactories inthecitycloseddownandnearly30,000ad:mlrers gathered at the airport. TheBritish consul reportedthat thesend-off wassoenthusiasticthatoneworkman"offeredtosacrificehis son as'a token of his gratitude forFedakar's efforts on behalf ofthemill operators.""Meanwhile, themill ownersschemedtounderminetheprevious TheyhelpedSayyidZiya'sFatherlandpartyto createaUmon of PeasantsandWorkers, andtorecruit themill handsthathadbeenlaidoffwiththeconsent of theTudehunion. Theyen-couragedviolent confrontationsbetweenthetworival unions. Andthey sparked a major crisis in April 1944 by suddenly locking Out theworkers from the factories and the factory granaries-their only sOurceof bread. As expected, hungry workers battled the army to break intothe granaries, andthe Tudehorganizedageneral strike inIsfahan.Eyewitnesses estimated that fifty were injured in the week-long crisis.70 British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, "Report on Labour Conditions in Persia"F.o.3711Persia1944/34-4022. '71 British Consul in Isfahan, 4 February1944, F.O. 3711Persia1944/34*40163.358 ..Class Bases of the TudehTehran newspapers, however, described the event as a workers' revolt,and claimedthat over fivehundredhadbeen injured. In the subse-quent agreement draftedby the cenu'al government and the Tudeh,the mill owners ended the lockout whtle the pro-Tudeh umon openedtheshopfloorstotherivalunion. Shortly aftertheagreement, theUnion of Isfahan Workers affiliated with theCCFTU.The Tudeh suffered temporary setbacks in Isfahan during the firsthalf of 1945. The Soviet demand for oil provided the opposition witha propaganda weapon. The affiliation with the CCFTU caused somedefections from the union, since Isfahanis were traditionally resentfulof any form of control from Tehran. The Bakhtiyari,Khamseh chiefs, shaken by the upheavel, formedan alhance agamstthe Tudeh. The archconservative administration of Premier Sadr namedastaunchanticommunist politicianasgovernor-general of Isfahan.The newgovernor-generalplacedthe large mills under martial law,arrested some of the labor leaders, and distributed armsto the localtribes. The takeover of the mills alsofrightenedthe bazaar commu-nity, especially since many of the merchants held shares in the textilecompanies. Sayyid Ziya's paper, Ra'ad-i Emruz, exclaimed, "the Tudehthreatens small as well as large capitalists since its aim is to abohsh allformsof privateproperty."72 Thetwoleadingpreachers. inthecitybegan areligiouscampaign against the Tudeh, It asanatheisticcommunist conspiracy. Inthewordsof theBrItlshconsul,"oneimportant advantageenjoyedbytheTudehoppositionis thestrong latent feeling of religiositywhichcaneasilybe stirred up.""Moreover, thelargelandlordsdrewcloser tothemill ownersoncetheysawthe Tudehmounta concerteddriveintothecountryside.For example,Akbar Mas'oud, theson of Zil aI-Sultan andthe city'selder statesman, threwhissupport behindtheindustrialists assoonashediscovered Tudehagitatorsinhisvillages. Twoyearsearlier,Mas'oudhadrebuffedthe sameindustrialistsas social upstartswholackedthefinesse tohandletheirworkmen. Furthermore, themillownerscontinuedtounderminetheUnion of IsfahanWorkers, ontheonehandfiring 150membersof theunion, andontheotherhand contributing generously to the Fatherland party, and awarding10 percent wage increases to members of the Union of Peasants andWorkers.The Tudeh reached its low point in April 1945, when Sayyid Ziya'sparty collected some 1,000 men-many of them from the neighboringvillages-to attack and loot the offices of the Union of Isfahan Work-72 Emruz, 1 May1944.75 British Consul in Isfahan, 3 March1945, F.O. 3711PersiaUrban Working Class ..359ers. The police refused to intervene. The British consul reported thatthemill owners were confident thatthe Tudehhadbeen "scorchedfor good." He also predicted that the overconfident mill owners wouldsoonrevert totheiroldways, loweringwages, opposing allunions,andschemingtomake more and moremoney.74Infact, the Tudeh began to recover as soon as Qavam was electedpremier. Givingthegovernorshiptoamoreimpartial civil servant,the newgovernment arrestedSayyidZiya, expropriatedhis partyfunds, andwarnedindustrialists tokeepout ofunionpolitics. ByMarch1946, theUnionofIsfahanWorkerswasstrongenoughtolead a general strike in the nine large mills. By April, it was sufficientlystrong enough to defeat an attempt made by the mill owners to trans-port some 5,000 peasants into the factories.By May Day, it could onceagainbring out asmanyas40,000supportersintothestreets. Andby August, the British consul was reporting that the Tudeh had fright-enedthe local authorities into submission; scared the mill owners somuch that they did not dare enter their plants; and controlled muchof thelocal administrationaswell asall of thetextilefactories. Healso warnedthat the Tudeh was "readyto seizepower in Isfahan ascompletely as the Democrats had done in Tabriz."75 Contributing tothis revival, according to the consul, were the political protection ex-tendedfromthecentral government; thegenuine supportenjoyedby the Tudeh among many mill workers; the disillusionment of othermill workers with Sayyid Ziya's party; and, most important of all, theremarkableabilityofthe pro-TudehuniDn towinfavorable con-tracts.' According to the contract signed in May1946, for example,thetextileworkers obtainedtheeight-hour workday, thehighestwages in the country, pay for Fridays, two free suits per year, and nolayoffs without union approval.The Tudeh was equally successful among the oil workers of Khu-zistan. The party first appeared in the oil installations in early1943,but quickly withdrew after its organizers were arrested, and its leadersresolvedtokeepoutof thevital industry. Insteadtheydecidedtoformlocalunions among nonoil workers, such asroadsweepers,ir-rigation cleaners, taxi drivers, cotton spinners, and bakery assistants.Disappointed by this decision, a group of radical intellectuals in Aba-dan organized some twohundred AIOC employees into a Union ofIranian Workers, and inMay1945helpeda wildcat strike of twelve"Ibid., 19 June1945.75 British ConsulinIsfahan, 31December1946, Indiaidem,IMay andI June1946, F.G. 371/Persia1946/34-52736.76 British Consul in Isfahan, 1April, 1June, 1December 1946, F.O. 371lPersia 1946/34-52736.360-;, Class Bases of the Tudehhundredlaborersat theKermanshahrefinery. Althoughthepartyleaders condemnedthe strike andthe CCFTUintervenedto endit,theBritishambassadorfelt that thewholeincident hadbeenengi-neered by the Tudeh, and advised the AIOC to improve their housingand medical facilities to deprive the Tudeh of legitimate grievances."In a separatereport on labor conditions in the oil fields, theBritishembassywarnedthat theshortageof housingandother amenitiescouldprovidethe Tudehwithasplendidopening. Theofficials ofAIOC, however, replied that such criticisms were unjustified and thattheonlytrueprotectionagainst subversionwasarmedmight. "Al-though the (local) Arab villagers are well armed, they are inadequate.The only adequate safeguard against the likelihood of serious labourdisorderswhichmayfollowthewithdrawal of foreigntroopsistheintroduction of a strong police force."?'The problems of the oil industry were compounded in1944-1945withlaborunrest among theBritish employees. Findingtheir workhoursraisedandtheir homeleavescanceledwithout consultation,British employeesformedaUnion of Shift Workers, threatenedtostrike, and denounced the consuls as "company clerks."?9 The Britishgovernment promptly dispatched aparliamentary delegationledbya womanmember of the Conservativeparty to investigatethe situa-tion. When the leader of the delegation lectured the British employeeson how lucky they were not to be in aJapanese prison, angry membersof the audience suggested taking her "on a tour of the Abadan grave-yard" or "dealing with her in SOme dark corner in the proper Japanesefashion."8o The Foreign Office commented that the British employeeswereunlikelytostrikeaslongasthewarcontinuedsincemanyofthem were communists; but thattheir unconventional behavior waslikely to"adversely influence thePersian workmen."8!The Tudeh moved into the oil industry as soon as the war ended.Opening party branches in the oil centers, the Tudeh set up the Unionof KhuzistanWorkersastheprovincial sectionof theCCFTU, ab-sorbedtheindependentUnions of IranianWorkers,andorganized77 British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, 31May 1945, F.O. 3711Persia45448; idem, "DiscussionswiththeAlOe(September1945)," F.O. 371/Persia1945134-45461.?S British Embassy to the Foreign Office, "Labour Conditions in the Oil Fields," F.O.3711PersiaOil Company to the Foreign Office, oranclum on Security (June1944)," F.O. 37JJPersia79 British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, 24 February 1944, F.O. 3711Persia 1944/34-40158.80 AlOe Employees to the Foreign Office, "The Situation in the Oil Industry," F.O.3711Persia1944/34-40158." BriIish Foreign Office, 17March1944, F.G. 3711Persia1944/34-40158.Urban Working Class-;, 361themassivebut orderlyMayDayparadeof1946. Speakersat theparade demanded higher wages, better housing, pay for Fridays, theeight-hour work day, and a comprehensive labor law. Awoman oratordescribedoil asthe jewel ofIran, accusedtheBritishof spendingmoreondog foodthanon workers' wages,andurgedthetakeoverof the AIOC." This was probably the first time that a public audiencein Abadan heard the cry for oilnationalization.The Tudeh followedup the successful May Day rally with a seriesof well-organized strikes against the oil company. The very next day,in fact, some 250 artisans and laborers at the Abadan distillation plantstopped work, demanding higher wages and shorter work hours. Thecompany met their demands a week later, when employees at the localasphalt factory andlocomotive plant called for sympathy strikes. OnMay 10, the entire labor force of2,500 at the AghaJari oilfield stoppedwork, requesting benefits similar to those won recently by the Isfahantextile workers-especiallyhigher wages, pay forFridays, and betterovertime rates. At first the company dismissed the requests as unrea-sonable and cut off the water supply to Agha Jari. But it reluctantlycame to the negotiating table three weeks later when the Tudeh threat-enedageneral strikeinAbadan, collectedcontributionsfor AghaJari,andpersuadedQavamto senda mediation committeetoKhu-zistan. Intheeventual settlement, thecompanynot onlymet manyof the original demands, but also gave wages for the three-week strikeand promised to implement any labor legislation drafted by the centralgovernment. The correspondent of the London Times, unfamiliar withlabor conditions inIsfahan,commentedthat "it wasunprecedentedin Iranian history to give seven days pay for only six days work." TheBritish embassy reportedthat the AIOC had no choice but tonego-tiate, sincetheTudehwasinanextremelystrongposition, havingenrolledinitsunionsome75percent of theoilworkers. Similarly,the British consul in Khorramshahr wrote that the company acceptedthe unfavorable settlement and treated the Tudeh as the proper rep-resentativeof theworkersbecauseitwasalarmedbytheextent ofcommunist influence and feared the spread of the strike to the Abadanrefinery.83Bymid-June, theTudehorganization inKhuzistanparalleled,ri-valed,and, in many towns, overshadowedthe provincial administra-tion.In the words of the British consul in Ahwaz, "the effective gov-82 British Consul in Khorramshahr, "Report on Tudeh Activities in the Oil Industry(1946),"F.o. 37l!Persia1946/34-52714.83 The Times, 30 July1946; British Ambassador to the Foreign Office, 20 May 1946,F.O. 3711Persia 1946/34-52713; British Consul in Khorramshahr. "Report on the Gen-eral Strike," India OjjiceIUP&S/123490A.362 * ClassBases of the Tudehernment of the province has passed into the hands of the Tudeh."s4Its branches determined food prices, enjoyed the support of the localfirebrigades, andcontrolledcommunications, especiallytruck com-munications, between the main urban centers. Its unions representedworkers' grievancesbeforemanagement, collectedfundsfor futureemergencies,organized an elaborate shop-steward system,and openedforty-five clubhouses in Abadan alone. Moreover, its militias patrolledthestreets, guardedtheoil installations, andimpressedforeignob-servers byquickly transporting2,500volunteers fromAbadantoKhorramshahr tobuildanemergencyflood wall. TheBritishau-thoritiesreportedthat during the floodwarnings"the company ad-mittedthat theycouldnot, norcouldthePersianauthorities, havecommandedtheAbadanworkersinthenumbersorganizedbytheTudeh. It wascertainlyanimpressiveillustrationof Tudehpowerovertheworker." TheBritishambassadoradded, "it isindeedtrueto say that at the present time the security of the refinery and fields,and the safety of the British personnel, depends on the good will andpleasure of the Tudeh Party."8' Similarly, the British military attachereported in mid-June:The present situation in Abadan and AghaJari, though quiet on the surface,is extremely precarious. The Tudeh Party is in complete control of labour atthe refinery and is gaining ground in the fields. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Com-pany's management exists only on sufferance, At any moment, at any reason,a strike could be called which would bring production to a standstill. Hithertothe Tudeh leaders have used their power to maintain order. Although incitingto violenceintheory, theyhavediscouragedit inpractice. The Tudehhasconstituted itself the de factorepresentative of labour in Persia and theagement is discussingwithit, inthat capacity, the organization of thetradeunionscontemplatedunderthenewlabourlaw, Bydoingsothecompanycanmaintainsome SOrt of contact withtherepresentativesoflabourandproduction in the fields, but few will believe that such a course of action willresult in anything more than a short respite,86The expected confrontation came on July10, but, as it turned out,it wasinstigatedbytheauthoritiesratherthantheTudeh. Onthatday, the company rescinded its promise of Friday pay, the Anglophilegovernor-general declaredmartial law, and the military commanderof Agha J ariarrestedthelocal laborleaders, whomhehadinvited84 British Consul in Ahwaz, 30 June1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946/34M52700.85 M, Audsley, "Report ontheOil Fields," F.G. 3711Persia1946/34-52723; BritishAmbassador tothe Foreign Office, "The TudehParty in the Oil Industry," .0. 3711Persia1946/34-52714.8f> British Military Attache to the Foreign Office, 10 June 1946, F.O. 3711Persia1946134-52710.Urban Working Class *363for discussions. A spontane?us strike broke out at Agha Jari, and theTudeh and the CCFTU qUickly endorsed it. In addition, they calledupon all employees throughout Khuzistan to stay away from work onJuly13 and toremain absent until the central government removedthegovernor-general, liftedmartial law, releasedthelaborleadersandguaranteedpayforFridays. Theircallfora general strike heeded by Over 65,000 workers, making it the largest industrial stop-pagemIranandone of thelargest intheMiddleEast. Itinvolvednot only50,000manual workersandclerical employeesof theoilcompany;but also 200 Indian artisans at the Abadan refinery; thou-sa?dsof fireme.n, truckdnvers, roadsweepers, railwaymen, textilespinners, and hIgh-school students throughout Khuzistan; hundredsofshopkeepers, craftsmen, andsmall traders locatedinthe townbazaars; andevencooks, chauffeurs, andservantsworkingfor Eu- households. TheBritishconsul inAhwazreportedthat thestnke wasWIth great efficiency." The Khorramshahr consulw.rotethat mthe beganwithanorderlyprocessiondIrectedat themIlItary authonttes.Similarly,theBritishmilitary at-tache reported that thegeneral strikestartedpeacefullyand"im-medIately gave the Tudeh complete control Over the industrial regionsof Khuzistan."87thegeneral strikebeganinapeaceful manner, itsoonIntoconfrontations betweenthe oil workers, the mil-Itaryauthonttes, andthelocal Arabcommunity. Inenteringanin-dustrynotedforitsethnicdiversity, theTudehhadmade a specialeffort to recrutt workers from different religious, regional, linguistic,andtnbal backgrounds. It hadbeenremarkablysuccessful amongm.'grant lab?rers fromthe Bakhtiyari, Luri, Khamseh, and Qashqayitnpes; unskIlled workers from Isfahan, Shiraz, Kerman, and Bushire;andskIlledworkers, especiallywelders, artisans, andtruckdrivers,fromthe Azeri, Armenian, and Assyrian communities. It had failed,however, among the Arab population.Three. factors explain this failure. First, the Arabs, unlike theQashqayts, Khamsehs, and Bakhtiyaris, resided within their own ter-nWnes. WhereastheothershadsteppedOut of the jurisdiction oftheIrkadkhudas, kalantars, andkhans, theArabscontinuedtoliveunde: thewatchful eyesof their tribal leaders. Inshort, theArabsbound by kinshipties. Second, the Arabs employed in theoIl Industry were hired not as individual wage earners but as members87 Bri.tish Consul inAhwaz, 1 August1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946/34-52700; BritishCo.n,sulm"Report on the General Strike," India GfjiceIUP&S/12-3490A;MIlItary Attache to the Foreign Office, 23 July1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946/34M364 * Class Bases of the Tudehof construction teams led by private contractors, many of whom Arab chiefs. As contract workers, they remained dependent on theirtribal shaykhs, received pay for piece work of daily work, andthereforedid not sharewith the vast maJontyof 011 workers theconcern for higher wages, shorter houes, and pay for Fridays. Third,the leaders of the Arab community had political, economiC, and SOCialreasonsforopposingtheTudeh. TheBritish ?OI:sulsreportedthatthe Arab chiefs had traditionally looked upon Bntam as their guardianprotector; that theArablandlordswereworriedtheTtidehwould"irretrievably poison ignorant minds" and "undern:me theIr autority over the peasantry";SS and that the Arab busmess communtty,especially shopkeepers and corn merchants m alarmedwhen it saw Tudeh "policemen and street guards wearmg' arm bands,ordering people in the streets, controlling the number of passengersin buses, andgiving orders to bakers about prices."s9The Arab opposition to the Tudeh surfaced In early July, whentribal chiefs at the urging of the governor-general, formed a farmersunion. The; soon changed the name to the Arab Union on the groundsthat "they were a martial race not a lot ofIran partysarcastically commented that "the Arab UntonIS a unton In the sameway Reza Shah's government was a constitutional government." TheTudeh chargedthat theso-called Arabwas scheming tosep-arateKhuzistanfromIranandwasrecelVlngarmsfromtheAIOCas well as from the governor-general.91The British consul wrote thattheopeningoftheArabUnion's headquartersinAbadancreatedconcern among the Tudehrank andfilesince the urbanpopulationhad been traditionally fearful of tribal attacks?'Thesefearsturnedintopanicontheseconddayof thegeneralstrike whennewsreachedAbadanthat armedArabtribesmenhadAgha JariandwerepreparingtoinvadeAbadan. TheBritish consul reported that he had advised the Arab leaders to keeptheir men out of Abadan, but "there were strong rumors the GovernorhadinstructedtheArabsheikhstobringintheirtribesmenandtoburn down the Tudeh offices." The consul added that the governor-general had probably "turned to the Arabs" because the Abadan gar-88 BritishMilitary Attache, 10July 1946, F.O. BritishConsul in Khorramshahr, 1June1946, F.G. 371JPersla 1946/34-52742; Brlttsh Consulin Ahwaz. I July, 1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946/3452700. . " .89 British ConsulinKhorramshahr, "Report ontheGeneralStnke, India OfficeiVP&SIl23490A.90 Ibid."jeb'ek, 18 July1946;Zafar, 5September 1946. . " .92 BritishConsulinKhorramshahr, "Report ontheGeneral Strike, IndiaOfficeJUP&SI123490A.Urban Working Class *365risonhadonly250troops.9SAs therumorsspread, angrycrowdsgatheredoutSIdetheofficesof theArabUnion. Andas thepolicepanicked andfired, theangrycrowdsattackedthe offices andthusbegan a night-long riot that left 19 dead and 338 hospitalized. Amongthe dead were 12 Arabs, including their leading contractor and richestmerchant. Contradictingtheevidencesent bytheBritish consuls inAhwazand Khorramshahr, the BritishmilitaryattacheinTehraninformedtheForeignOffice andtheWesternpressthat thewholecrisis had been instigated by "Tudeh hooligans.""Theriots lasteduntil thefollowingmorning, whenanemergencydelegationfromTehranlandedat Abadanairport. ThedelegationIncludedMuzaffarFlruz of theDemocrat party, Radmanesh of theTudeh, and Jowdat oftheCCFTU. Aftersixhoursof discussionswiththeAIOC, the governor-general, andtheTudehunions, thedelegation imposed a settlement on the warring sides. By the accord,theTudehagreedtoendthegeneral strike, dropthedemandfortheof the governor-general, and cease making inflammatorydenunCIations of theAIOCandof theArabUnion. Inreturn, themilitary authorities released the union leaders, and the company agreedbothtopayforFridaysandto raise minimum wages to35rials perday. Thustheoil workers' unionwonitsmaineconomicdemands.Once the employees started returning to work, Noel Baker, the Britishsecretary of state, confidentially told his fellow cabinet ministers thatthe entire upheaval had been caused by the company's intransigeanceonFridaypay. Similarly, ananonymous official of theAIOC wroteto the Foreign Office that the four-day general strike should be blamedondiehardcompanyleaderswhofailedtoappreciatetheproblemsof workersandhadnoexperience of dealing withorganizedlabor,anp whose "knowledge of trade unionismis limited to the repetitionof wor?-outjokes that went out with crinolines."Finally, theBritishconsul In Ahwaz, concluding his reports on the general strike, warnedthat the economic gains had strengthened communist influence overlabor and that the workers continued to insist that the Tudeh shouldrepresent them in their negotiations with the oil company.95With the successful general strikes in Isfahan and Khuzistan in thesummerof 1946, theCCFTUreachedits peak. But withQavam'ssharpturntotheright inthefall of1946, theCCFTUentereda93 Ibid."Britisb Military Attache, 31 July1946, F.G. 3711Pcrsia1946/3452711.95 Noel Baker, 17 July1946, F.G. 371lPersia1946/34-52719;Letter totheForeignOffice, 18 July1946, F.G. 371/Persia1946/3452720; British Consul in Ahwaz,I Sep.tember1946, F.G. 371/Persia1946/3452700.366 *Class Bases of the Tudehperiodofacutecrisis. InKhuzistan, the provincial authoritiesde-ported 120labororganizers, andtheoilfired813strikeleaders and discharged, on the grounds ofbemg absent wltho:,t leave,over 1,000workerswhohadbeenarrestedearlier for theIr unionactivities. In Isfahan, the military occupied the Tudeh headquarters,arrestedsome100partymilitants, and, inthewordsof theBritishconsul,conscriptedintothearmyasmanyworkersaspossib1e?6InFars and Kerman, the rebellious tribes forced the labor organizers toflee to Tehran. In the Caspian provinces, the authorities arrested 140unionactivists executedthree, and, as theBritishconsulmRashtreported,everyeffort possible tobreaktheTudehgriponworkersgoingtothelengthsof planningtomovewholemdustrlesfrom one town to another."97 And in the capital, the Tudeh and thegovernment openly clashed when, on November12, the CCFTU or-ganizeda one-daygeneralstrike intoprotest the. arrestsmthe provinces and the formatlon of the rival labor organlzatlo,:, ESKl.According to the Tudeh, thestrike was100 percem successful, ":Iththe vast majority of the CCFTU's 50,000 Tehran staymgawayfromwork. But accordingtotheBrltlshmtlltaryattache, thestrike wasonly50percent successful since thegovernmem arrested150 union organizers, occupied the headquarters of the CCFTU, usedarmy trucks to break through picket lines, hired unemployed workersto replace the strikers, and offered an extra day's pay to all employeeswho came to work."The general strike in Tehran ended a major chapter in the historyof the CCFTU. After four years of spectacular growth, the CCFTUbeganfour yearsofintermittent decline. There three majorreasons for this. First, government represSIOn contl?:,ed on andduring the next four years. In December 1946, the mtlltary authorltlesarrested the main labor leaders, including Rusta, on the grounds thattheyhadencouragedthesecessionist movement inAzerbaijan. InJanuary1947, Qavamassets of the CCFTU, claimingthat the organization's alms were polmcal rather than economIC. Andin February1949, theshah outlawedthe CCFTUtogether withtheTudeh. Second, ESKI wagedanaggressivewar toundermir:etheCCFTU. Usinggovernmemfunds, it cooptedthe Arab UnionmKhuzistan absorbedtheunion of peasants and workersmIsfahan,set up labor organizations, and promised to use itscon-nections to obtain substamial benefits for all wage earners. Third, the96 British Consul inIsfahan, 31December1946, India 97 British Consul in Rasht 31November1946, F.G. 3711Persia1946/34-52796.98 Rahbar, 13November 1946; BritishMilitaryAttachetotheForeignOffice, 18November1946, India 0fficeIUP&S/12-3505.UrbanWorking Class *367economic trends of the four years reversed and grew more for labor organizers. On the one hand, the cost-of-livingmdex, whIChhad Jumpedfrom472in1942-1943to1,030 in1944-1945, dropped to 780 in 1946-1947 and 832 in 1947-1948. Thus thereno longer spiraling inflation to drive apolitical workers into labor On the other hand, thefor labor fell drastically asthe Alhed forces withdrew, as the011 mdustry comracted to adjust tothe smaller postwar market, and as the nativefactoryowners foundthemselvesagainchallengedbyEuropeanindustrialists. Withthou- o':'tside the factory gates seeking work, those inside were hardlym a posmon to threaten strikes. Labor organizers, consequently, werebetweenfalling prices and risingunemployment. Not sur-prlsmgl