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The Iranian Revolution and its Nemesis:
The Rise of Liberal Values among Iranians
Mansoor Moaddel
he rise o revolutionary Shiism that led to the overthrow o the monarchy in 1979,
the establishment o theocracy in December o the same year, and postrevolutionary
development display two contradictory acets about the process o historical develop-
ment in twentieth-century Iran. On the one hand, the revolution in no uncertain term posed
a serious anomaly or the notion o universal history that projected an evolutionary process o
secularization and individuation. The overthrow o the monarchy was no triumph or secular
politics and democratic individualism. The zenith o the revolution marked by the establish-
ment o clerical absolutism and reinorcement o patriarchy in the amily was a low point or
the proponents o secular order. On the other hand, thirty years ater the overthrow o the
monarchy, the ruling clerics, despite their extensive nancial and organizational resources
and consistent brutality in eliminating their secular opponents, have ailed to create a reli-
gious order in the country. Iranians today appear to be less religious than the publics rom
other Islamic countries, and the trend in their value orientations is toward individualism,
gender equality, democracy, and national identity.
These postrevolutionary developments, while consistent with a secular view o history,cannot be explained in terms o the secular theory o values change. This is true because the
new secularism is dierent rom the secular trend unleashed by the constitutional revolution
o 1905. Many reormist critics o the clerical absolutism arrived at the notion o secular gov-
ernment through religious reasoning a secular orientation that is at variance with the overly
antireligious orientation o prerevolutionary secular intellectuals and policy makers. In act,
the intellectual leaders o the reormist movement are deending their democratic position
in terms o their reading o Islam; traditional liberal democratic discourse plays only a minor
role in legitimizing the demands or personal reedom and the rule o law. These two acets
are contradictory; the ormation o a massive bureaucratic administrative and military organi-
zation o the modern state and the impressive rate o economic development in prerevolution-
ary Iran did not produce a secular order, but the ormation o the repressive and administra-tive apparatus o the religious state seems to have given impetus to secular movements.
In this article, I argue that the rise o secular values is ar rom being an inevitable prod-
uct o historical development o capitalism, the development o modern social classes, or the
ormation o the modern state. It is rather an outcome o a specic social arrangement and
1. For analyses of the Iranian revolution, see Mansoor Moaddel,
Class, Politics, and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1993); and Misagh Parsa, Social Ori-
gins of the Iranian Revolution (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Uni-
versity Press, 1989).
2. See, e.g., Abdolkarim Soroush and Mohsen Kadivar, Monaziri
darbar-ye pluralism-i dini[A debate on religion pluralism] (Teh-
ran: Salam Newspaper, AH 1378/1999); and Mohsen Kadivar,
Nazariyyeh Doulat dar Fiqh-i Shieh (Theory of the State in Shii
Jurisprudence) (Tehran: Nay, AH 1376/1997).
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T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s
historical conjuncture. At the same time, the in-
stitutionalization o secular values also depends
on the existence o social support as well as
the behavior o secular intellectuals and policy
makers that may strengthen or undermine such
values. To support these arguments, I rst pre-
sent a theory o cultural change. Then, I speciy
the parameters o the conditions that promoted
secular values in Islamic countries in the past.
Next, I argue that such conditions have emerged
in postrevolutionary Iran. Finally, I present nd-
ings rom two major values surveys, carried out
in Iran in 2000 and 2005, to demonstrate that
the trend in values change among Iranians is
toward social and political individualism and
national identity.
What Is Cultural Change?
Cultural change is a complex process, involv-
ing changes in (1) peoples values, rituals, bases
o identity, and liestyle; (2) principles o social
organization; (3) arts and literature; and (4)
religious belies, institutions, and movements.
One way to manage this complexity is to con-
sider cultural change as resolutions o signi-
cant issues, when the existing societal model
is abandoned in avor o another one. For ex-
ample, the Iranian constitutional revolution
(1905 11) intended to resolve the problem o
politics; constitutional law replaced monarchi-
cal absolutism. The Iranian revolution o 1979resolved the same problem. This time the ab-
solutist rule o the clerics was substituted or
monarchical power. The rst step in explaining
change is thus to speciy the issues that domi-
nate the public discourse. The next is to identiy
the actors that shape the probable direction o
resolutions toward a religious or secular gov-
ernment, religious supranationalism or territo-
rial nationalism, individualism or collectivism,
democracy or authoritarianism, gender equality
or gender hierarchization, and peaceul or vio-lent methods in politics.
Issues resolutions are important or un-
derstanding cultural change. While the pro-
cesses and outcomes o cultural change in the
Islamic world have been diverse, the issues that
were the concerns o both intellectual leaders
and the public at large have remained remark-
ably invariant in the modern period. A mong
them are (1) the status o rational reasoning in
Koranic exegesis, (2) the orm o government,
(3) the relationship between religion and poli-
tics, (4) the nature o the Western world, (5)
bases o identity, (6) the status o women, and
(7) the proper orm o political activity. Diverse
ideologies such as Islamic modernism, liberal
nationalism, anticlerical secular ism, Arabism
and Arab nationalism, economic nationalism,
and undamentalism are thus dierent resolu-
tions o the same set o issues. In Islamic un-
damentalism, or example, constitutionalism
is abandoned in avor o the unity o religion
and politics in Islamic government, Western cul-
ture is portrayed as decadent, the institution o
male domination is endorsed and rigorously de-
ended, and a revolutionary method o change
is oten prescribed. In Islamic modernism, by
contrast, Islamic political theory and the idea
o constitutionalism are reconciled, Western
culture is acknowledged avorably, the construc-
tion o the modern state is endorsed, a eminist
exegesis o the Koran is advanced in order to
deend womens rights, and a revolutionary
method o change is proscribed while a reorm-
ist approach is recommended.
When issues are resolved, they oten lead
to sociopolitical and cultural movements, a new
orm o organizational hierarchy, a dierentliestyle (including style o dress), a resh way to
rame and address societal problems, and the
rise o a new set o sociopolitical attitudes all
bringing into relie a new historical pattern.
Explaining the Process of Cultural Change
as Issues Resolutions
A clue to understanding how issues wil l be re-
solved is to consider the dynamic context within
which they are discussed and debated among
diverse intellectual leaders, activists, and policymakers. In resolving issues, these individuals in-
voke the norms available in their culture, bor-
row ideas rom other cultures, or produce new
ideas. This context is structured by the distribu-
tion o political power and economic resources
as well as past historical practices and memories.
3. Mansoor Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, National-
ism, and Fundamentalism: Episode and Discourse (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 151.
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For example, a society that has a stronger tradi-
tion o patrimonialism may more readily accept
patrimonial ideas repackaged in a new political
arrangement than will a society with a weaker
experience in this tradition. Alternatively, peo-
ples orientations toward signiicant religious
events in their adult lives may be a unction o
whether they were socialized in a secular or reli-
gious environment during their impressionable
years. However, the pertinent characteristics o
this context being pluralistic or monolithic,
the nature o state ideology and the extent o
the states intervention in cultural aairs, and
whether the state is national or oreign consti-
tute the proximate conditions that shape how
these issues will be resolved. For example, under
an authoritarian state, cultural issues tend to-
ward religious or secular resolution, depending
on whether the state has primarily a secularist
or a religious orientation, respectively. In this ex-
ample, state ideology orms a target in relation
to which oppositional ideas are invoked or pro-
duced to resolve the problem o political order.
Generally, this model explains the rise
o diverse cultural movements in the contem-
porary Middle East. Liberal and secular ideas,
or example, have arisen within the context o
and in opposition to an alliance between the
absolutist monarch and the ulema. Thus the an-
ticlerical secularism and liberalism o the Ira-
nian constitutional revolution was in responseto monarchical absolutism (hence, liberalism)
and ulema obstructionism (hence, anticleri-
cal secularism). Economic nationalism among
Iranians in the 1940s and 1950s was shaped by
British control o the countrys oil industry.
Likewise, the rise o liberal Arabism among Syr-
ian intellectual leaders in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries was a response to
the Islamic despotism o Sultan Abdlhamid II
(1876 1908) and the subsequent rise o Turkish
nationalism. Pan-Arab nationalism arose in re-
sponse to the perception that Arab people were
commonly mistreated by colonial powers, as evi-
denced by the colonial partitioning o the Arab
lands into arbitrary states. In this new national-
ist discourse, Syrian and Iraqi ideologues like
Sati al-Husri (1880 1968) departed rom the
liberal views o Arabists such as Abdul Rahman
al-Kawakibi (1849 1903) to support the glori-
cation o the Arab people and the subordina-
tion o the idea o individual reedom to the
idea o sel-sacrice or the cause o national
liberation. The British occupation o Egypt in
1882 contributed to the rise o territorial na-
tionalism among Egyptians in the rst quarter
o the twentieth century.
Likewise, Islamic undamentalism origi-
nated in response to the secularism o the state.
The Egyptian liberal nationalist state o the
1920s and 1930s, the Nasserite Arab national-
ism, the socialist states in Algeria and Syria, and
the pro-Western state o the Pahlavis in Iran
all commonly ollowed a secularist ideology
that considered religion inimical to progress.
In all these countries, nationalist ideologues
and policy makers did not conne their activi-
ties to the realm o politics. They narrowed the
cultural and social spheres o religious institu-
tions; they rewrote history to t their national-
ist conception o the past and to overlook the
Islamic period, gloriying pre-Islamic kingship
and ancient history; and they reormed the edu-cational institutions to undermine the infuence
o religion, imposed eminism rom above, and
attacked religion and religious rituals in terms
o Western standards.
Trends in Values Change among Iranians
As evidenced in the examples above, the diverse
resolutions o sociopolitical issues by the intellec-
tual leaders in the Middle Eastern countries are
related to the nature o the ideological targets
they encountered. The absolutist states, religious
4. Mansoor Moaddel, Conditions for Ideological Pro-
duction: The Origins of Islamic Modernism in India,
Egypt, and Iran, Theory and Society(October 2001):
669731; Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, 125, 32043.
5. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran between Two Revolu-
tions (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1982); Janet Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolu-
tion, 19061911 (New York: Columbia University Press,
1996); Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, chap. 8.
6. William L. Cleveland,The Making of an Arab Nation-
alist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and Thought
of Sati al-Husri(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1971); Adeed Dawisha,Arab Nationalism in the
Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair(Prince-
ton, NJ: Princeton Universit y Press, 2003); Rashid Kha-
lidi, Lisa Anderson, Muhammad Muslih, and Reeva S.
Simon, eds., The Origins of Arab Nationalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991); Israel Gershoni
and James P. Jankowski, Redening the Egyptian Na-
tion, 19301945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995); N. Z. Zeine, The Emergence of Arab Na-
tionalism (Delmar, NY: Caravan Books, 1973); C. Ernest
Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism (Urbana: Univer-
sity of Illinois Press, 1973); Dawn, The Formation of
Pan-Arab Ideology in the Interwar Years, Interna-
tional Journal of Middle East Studies 20 (1988): 6791;
Moaddel, Islamic Modernism.
7. Gershoni and Jankowski, Redening the Egyptian
Nation; Moaddel, Islamic Modernism, part 3.
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T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s
obstructionism, oreign occupation, and secular-
ist ideology o the authoritarian state gave rise to
ideological resolutions in the orms o constitu-
tionalism, anticlerical secularism, nationalism,
and religious undamentalism, respectively.
A similar dynamic may also explain trends
in values change among the Iranian public at
large. Under state authoritarianism, trends in
values change are also related in an opposi -
tional manner to the ideology o the state and
its policies. I argue that the regimes claims to,
and the consequences o, Islamicity have shaped
the process o values change among Iranians.
These claims provided the justication or the
regime to impose a monolithic religious order
on society rom above, invent the institutional
structures to support this order, sanction a sys-
tem o gender inequality, and promote religious
identity.
The regimes authoritarian rule and its
inability to eectively provide or the socio-
economic and cultural needs o Iranians con-
tributed to the expansion o social discontent.
Social discontent, while undermining the legiti-
macy o regime, does not explain the rise o al-
ternative values among Iranians, however. The
ormation or invocation o alternative values is
related in oppositional manner to the values
promoted by the regime. This process explains
growing support or individualism, democracy,
gender equality, and national identity amongthe Iranian public and less support or women
to wear the veil. It also explains why Iranians
attend mosques less oten than does the public
rom other Islamic countries.
Data
The data are rom two comprehensive national
values surveys conducted by researchers rom
the University o Tehran. The rst used a na-
tionally representative sample o 2,532 adults
and was carried out in all 2000, and the second
used a nationally representative sample o 2,667
adults and was carried out in summer 2005.
Both surveys used multistaged random sam-
pling procedures in dierent provinces, broken
down into urban and rural areas o the country
in proportion to their size, with roughly equal
male and emale respondents. The response
rate in both surveys was around 10 percent.
The interviews, which required approxi-
mately one hour on average to complete, were
conducted ace-to-ace in respondents resi-
dences. Importantly, they were conducted by ex-
perienced Iranian personnel. The 2000 sample
includes all provinces in Iran except Sistan va
Baluchestan and Kurdistan; the 2005 sample
covers all the provinces o the country.
Trends in Changes between 2000 and 2005
To assess how the ideology o the Islamic re-
gime in Iran has shaped the religiosity and the
value orientations o the public, I rst compare
religiosity o the publics rom ten Islamic coun-
tries and then consider and measure attitudes
toward dierent types o individualism and na-
tional identity.
Religiosity
In assessing the religiosity o the Islamic pub-
lics, I ocus on two measures: (1) mosque atten-
dance and (2) the importance these publics at-
tached to religious aith as a avorable qualityor children.
Table 1 compares mosque attendance
among ten Islamic countries. As shown, Ira-
nians and Saudis, who live under religious re-
gimes, attended mosques less oten than the
citizens o other Islamic countries. The mean
mosque attendance or Iran (1.86) and Saudi
Arabia (1.85) is lower than it is or Iraq (1.87),
Pakistan (3.15), Turkey (1.87), Indonesia, (2.71),
Egypt (2.09), Morocco (2.24), Jordan (2.20), and
Algeria (2.23).
8. A systematic analysis of economic conditions and
distribution of resources in prerevolutionary and
postrevolutionary Iran showed that these conditions
deteriorated in the postrevolutionary period and
that, although they began to improve in the 1990s,
these conditions have not reached the prerevolution-
ary level. See Farhad Nomani and Sohrab Behdad,
Class and Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter?
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2006).
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In terms o placing high importance on
religious aith as a quality or children, again
Iranians and Saudis give this quality less em-
phasis (72 and 71 percent, respectively) than do
respondents rom Algeria (81 percent), Egypt
(87 percent), Indonesia (93 percent), Iraq (92
percent), Jordan (85 percent), and Pakistan
(86 percent). Only respondents in Morocco (65
percent) and Turkey (41 percent) rate religious
aith or children lower.
Individualism
The recognition o the autonomy o the indi-
vidual is a principle eature o modernity. This
recognition or John Stuart Mill is a refection
o the level o cultural development, where in-dividuality which is to say, that orm o lie in
which persons realize their peculiar natures in
autonomously chosen activ ities is the single
most important ingredient in human well-
being. Individualism is considered a major
trait in Western cultural tradition. Again and
again, says Samuel P. Huntington, both West-
erners and non-Westerners point to individual-
ism as the central distinguishing mark o the
West.
Individualism has political, economic, andsocial dimensions. In politics, it means equal-
ity o all political voices. This concept is mea-
sured in terms o attitudes toward democracy
and gender equality. Economic individualism
supports the value o hard work and belie in
the work-reward nexus. Measures o economic
individualism include attitudes toward private
ownership o businesses, preerence or indi-
vidual responsibility over governmental respon-
sibility in providing or personal well-being, and
attitudes toward merit pay. Social individualism
presumes the primacy o individual choice in
social matters such as the selection o a spouse
in marriage and child-rearing philosophy.
Here, I ocus on measures o social and
economic individualism and in the ollowing
section discuss political individualism by ocus-
ing on democracy and gender equality.
An import ant mani estat ion o va lue
change toward individualism would be a change
in attitudes toward avorable qualities or chil-dren and the basis or marriage. To measure
these changes, the respondents were asked the
ollowing:
Here is a list o qualities that children can be encour-
aged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider
to be especially important?
1. Independence
2. Religious faith
3. Obedience
In your view, what is the basis for marriage: parental
approval or love?
Figure 1 shows the change in Iranian at-
titudes toward avorable qualities or children
between the 2000 and 2005 surveys. The per-
Table 1. Mosque attendance in a selected number of Islamic countries (%)
Pakistan TurkeySaudi
Arabia Indonesia Egy pt Morocco Iran Jordan Algeria Iraq
Once a year or less or
on special holy days
Once a month
Once a week
More than once a week Total , , , , , , , , ,
Mean . . . . . . . . . .
Standard deviation . . . . . . . . . .
Source: World Values Survey
9. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (1869;
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), xv.
10. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations
and the Remaking of World Order(New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1996), 72.
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T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s
centage o respondents who considered inde-
pendence a avorable quality increased rom 53
to 64 percent, while those who mentioned obe-
dience decreased rom 41 to 32 percent between
the two surveys. These changes are statistically
signicant, indicating a trend toward individual
autonomy. Iranian att itudes toward relig ious
aith as a avorable quality or children, however,
did not change between 2000 and 2005.
Att itudes toward the basis or marriage
may constitute an even stronger indication
o the extent o public support or individual-
ism. As shown in igure 2, 41 percent o the
respondents in the 2000 survey believed that
parental approval was the basis or marriage,while this value dropped to 24 percent in 2005.
The percentage o the respondents who men-
tioned love as the basis or marriage, however,
increased rom 49 to 54 percent between the
two surveys. In the 2005 survey, some respon-
dents volunteered their own views on marriage
instead o choosing between love and parental
approval. These included both love and paren-
tal approval (4 percent), having similar ideas/
goals/aith (15 percent), and having similar
social backgrounds (3 percent). Again, amongthese responses, the largest group (15 percent)
reerred to actors that are related to individu-
ality having similar ideas/goals/aith and
to personal choice in the selection o a spouse.
I this group is added to those who considered
love as the basis or marriage, one may conclude
that 69 percent o the respondents considered
individual attributes love or having similar
ideas/goals/aith as the most important cri-
teria in selecting a spouse. The steep drop in
support or parental approval over the survey
period, coupled with the sharp rise in support
or individual choice, suggest that Iranians may
be approaching their own Romeo and Juliet
revolution.
Economic individualism is measured by
three indicator variables as outlined below: atti-
tudes toward private versus government owner-ship o businesses and industry, attitudes toward
individual versus governmental responsibility,
and attitudes toward merit pay.
How would you place your views on this scale? 1
means you agree completely with the statement on the
let; 10 means you agree completely with the state-
ment on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in
between, you can choose any number in between.
1. Government ownership of business
and industry should be increased (1)versus private ownership of business
and industry should be increased (10).
(Privatization)
Figure 1. Percentage
of Iranians in
2000 and 2005
mentioning
favorable qualities
for children
11. The expression Romeo and Juliet revolution is
used in recognition of the freedom of the individual
to choose a spouse, which has as it s basis the human-
ism movement in Europe during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries that gave priority to individual
choice over religious dogma and tradition. S ee W. Karl
Deutsch, On Nationalism, World Regions and the Na-
ture of the West, in Mobilization, Center-Periphery
Structures and Nation Building, ed. Per Torsvik (Ber-
gen, Norway: Universitetsvorlaget, 1981), 5193.
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2. The government should take more
responsibility to ensure that everyone is
provided for (1) versus people should take
the responsibility to provide for themselves
(10). (Individual responsibility)
Imagine two secretaries, of the same age, doing practi-
cally the same job. One fnds out that the other earns
considerably more than she does. The better-paid sec-
retary, however, is quicker, more efcient, and more
reliable at her job. In your opinion, is it air or not
air that one secre tar y is paid more than the other?
(Merit pay)
1. Fair2. Not fair
Figure 3 summarizes the changes in at-
titudes toward privatization and individual re-
sponsibility between the 2000 and 2005 surveys.
On average, Iranian attitudes toward privatiza-
tion increased negligibly in this period (rom
5.34 to 5.42), while their attitudes toward indi-
vidual versus governmental responsibi lity de -
clined signicantly (rom 5.24 to 3.92). The lat-
ter change in particular may indicate a decline
in support or economic individualism among
Iranians.
The correlation coecient between privat-
ization and individual responsibility is signi-
cant and positive: r= .274 or the 2000 survey
and r= .091 or the 2005. That is, the more a-
vorable attitudes the respondents have toward
privatization, the stronger their support is or
the view that people should take responsibility
to provide or themselves. Because these two ac-
tors are positively correlated, although the cor-
relation coecients are relatively weak (particu-
larly in the 2005 data), one may argue that they
have a degree o validity in measuring economic
individualism. Nonetheless, one may argue that
given the countrys speciic conditions, the
stress on government responsibility may in act
be associated with avorable attitudes toward in-
dividualism. That is, given the situation that theIslamic government has extensive ownership o
businesses and industry, a rise in the expecta-
tion that the government should do more or
its people may refect a growing sense o indi-
vidual rights to the ruits o these enterprises.
This contrasts to Western countries, where an
expansion in government-sponsored social wel-
are would mean higher taxation. Thus people
may support economic individualism, at least in
part, to avoid higher taxes.
A better measure o economic individual-ism would be the commitment to merit as the
basis or the distribution o reward in society
and the belie that people ought to work hard to
provide or themselves. Figure 4 summarizes
attitudes toward merit pay. The percentage o
Figure 2. Attitudes
among Iranians
in 2000 and 2005
toward parental
approval versus
love as the basis
for marriage
(percentage)
12. Stanley Feldman and John Zaller, The Political
Culture of Ambivalence: Ideological Responses to the
Welfare State,American Jo urnal of Po litical Sci ence
36 (1992): 268307; Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril,
The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public
Opinion (New York: Simon and Shuster, 1968).
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T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s
respondents who indicated that it is air or the
more ecient secretary to receive a higher wage
declined rom 73 to 71 percent and the percent-
age o those who said that it is unair went up
rom 19 to 23 percent. Although small, these
changes are statistically signicant.
On the whole, one may thus conclude that
while Iranians have displayed a sizable shit to-
ward socia l indiv idualism, economically, they
have become less individualistic.
Gender Relations and Democracy
The change in attitudes toward political indi-
vidualism and liberal politics may be measured
in terms o attitudes toward democracy and gen-
der equality. Iranians were asked the ollowing:
For the ollowing statements, can you tel l me how
strongly you agree or disagree with each. Do you
strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree?
1. On the whole, men make better political
leaders than women do
2. A university education is more important
for boys than for girls
3. A wife must always obey her husband
4. Democracy may have problems, but it is
better than any other form of government
Attitudes toward the veil as a measure o
political individualism have also been included.
To be sure, wearing the veil may be an indi-vidual preerence or refection o social mores
among the Islamic publics in general and may
not be connected to social or political individu-
alism. Nonetheless, within the context o the
cultural policies o the Islamic Republic in Iran,
the veil is elevated to a major political and cul-
tural issue, and attitudes avorable toward the
veil have become a signier o support or the
regime and attitudes against it an indication o
Figure 3. Attitudes
among Iranians
in 2000 and
2005 toward
privatization
and individual
responsibility
Figure 4. Attitudes
among Iranians
in 2000 and 2005
toward merit pay
(percentage)
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support or personal choice and political ree-
dom. Respondents were asked:
In your opinion, how important is it as a trait or a
woman to wear a veil in public places?
1. Very important
2. Important
3. Somewhat important
4. Not very important
5. Not important at all
Figures 5 and 6 show the change in the
respondents attitudes toward these issues be-
tween 2000 and 2005. According to gure 5,
signicant declines occurred in the proportion
o Iranians who strongly agreed with the ol-
lowing statements: men make better political
leaders (rom 28 percent in 2000 to 22 percent
in 2005); university education is more impor-
tant or boys than or girls (rom 19 percent to
13 percent); and a wie must always obey her
husband (rom 24 percent to 17 percent). In
addition, the percentage o the respondentswho strongly agreed that democracy may have
problems, but it is better than any other orm o
government increased rom 20 percent in 2000
to 31 percent in 2005. These changes evidence
remarkable shits in attitudes toward liberal de-
mocracy and gender equality between the two
surveys.
Corresponding to these changes are
changes in attitudes toward the veil between
the two surveys, as shown in gure 6. Accord-
ing to this igure, in 2000, 70 percent o therespondents indicated that it is very important
or a woman to wear the veil in public places. In
2005, this value dropped to 34 percent. Within
the context o the Islamic regime in Tehran,
this dramatic decline is interpreted as indicative
o the shit in peoples attitudes away rom the
values o the regime and toward disregarding
veil wearing as a avorable trait in women.
Figure 6. Percentage of Iranians
in 2000 and 2005 expressing
that it is very important for
a woman to wear the veil in
public places
Figure 5. Attitudes
among Iranians
in 2000 and 2005
toward women
and democracy
(percentage who
strongly agree)
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MansoorMoaddel
T h e R i s e o f L i b e r a l V a l u e s
National Identity
Another key component o political values is
how people identiy themselves. More speci-
cally, whether they base their identity on reli-
gion, ethnicity, or nationality. The change in
the basis o identity may imply a shit in peoples
political attitudes toward the government and
their perception o international and regional
politics. To measure this change, Iranians were
asked:
Which of the following best describes you?
1. I am a Muslim, above all
2. I am an Iranian, above all
3. Other (I am an Arab, Kurd, Turk, etc.,
above all)
Figure 7 shows the change in the respon-
dents conception o identity between 2000
and 2005. The percentage o respondents who
identied themselves as Iranian, above all in-
creased rom 34 to 42 percent, and the percent-
age who selected Muslim, above all declined
rom 61 to 50 percent. These changes may
imply that religion plays a less important role in
shaping Iranian political attitudes, while secular
actors related to Iran as a nation are gaining
signicance in shaping their orientation toward
outsiders.
Despite Iran having a religious regime,
these data indicate that Iranians appear to be
less religious than are the publics rom other
Islamic countries and that, in the time between
the two surveys, their political values have
changed in avor o social individualism, de-
mocracy, gender equality, and national identity.
They also expressed less support or the veil in
2005 than they did in 2000. This trend was not
refected, however, in economic terms, as Irani-
ans placed greater emphasis on the government
to provide or them and were less supportive o
merit pay in 2005 than in 2000.
Conclusion:
Religious Regimes and Liberal Politics
Findings rom the values surveys in Iran have
provided evidence indicating a shit in the pub-
lics value orientations toward liberal democracy
and secularism. More specically, this shit was
toward social individualism, liberal democracy,
gender equality, and nationalism. A trend away
rom economic individualism was also notedamong Iranians between 2000 and 2005, with
an increasing raction agreeing that the state
should take more responsibility or meeting citi-
zens needs. This latter shit may also be related
to the act that the Islamic Republic has exten-
sive ownership and control over the national
economy. As a result, Iranians are demanding
more that the regime provide or them.
I argue that this trend has been shaped
in reaction to the ideology and policies o an
increasingly illegitimate state. Because o theauthoritarian nature o the Iranian regime,
trends in peoples religious and political values
are shaped in oppositional relation to its ideol-
ogy and the values it has attempted to promote
in the postrevolutionary period. The ndings
provided evidence o this process: a low level
o mosque attendance in Iran as compared to
other Islamic countries and an increasing sup-
port or individual choice in marriage, gender
Figure 7. Percentage
of Iranians in 2000
and 2005 describing
themselves as
Iranian, Muslim, or
other (Arab, Kurd,
Turk, etc.), above all
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Comp
arative
Studie
sof
South
Asia,
Africa
andthe
MiddleE
ast
equality, democracy, and national identity.
There was also a decline in the importance Ira-
nians attached to the veil.
These ndings have implications or un-
derstanding not only the impact o the revolu-
tion on Iranian attitudes toward liberal values
and the uture o culture under the Islamic
regime but also the conditions or secularism.
Considering the relatively lower mosque atten-
dance among Iranians than among the publics
in other Islamic countries and the change in
Iranian attitudes toward liberal and secular val-
ues, one may reasonably conclude that the revo-
lution has ailed to engineer an Islamic order
based on the values and political attitudes pro-
jected by the ruling cler ics. To be sure, Irani-
ans have maintained a strong commitment to
undamental religious values such as a belie in
God and the existence o the soul, heaven, and
hell. Nonetheless, they increasingly have shown
little interest in the type o religious and cul-
tural values promoted by the regime. It may not
be too ar-etched to claim that the current and
uture sociopolitical and cultural movements in
Iran will be shaped largely by modern values.
The ndings also support the view that the
rise o secularism and liberal values is not auto-
matically connected to the process o economic
development and other objective changes such
as the development o new social classes and
the ormation o the modern state. Rather, theypoint to the signicance o social processes in
promoting such values and the role o histori-
cally specic conditions in shaping those social
processes. In act, historical conjunctures may
unction as countercultural liberators, tran-
scending cultural constraints on the rise o sec-
ular discourse/values and bringing into relie a
new historical pattern.
The connection between social processes
and values change is established, I believe,
through the resolution o sociopolitical issuesin response to immediate ideological targets.
In Iran, this target is an authoritarian religious
regime that has been promoting the values o
clerical absolutism, Islamic identity, and patri-
monial domination. In oppositional response to
this target, Iranians have arrived at modernity;
absolutism popularizes the values o democracy,
stresses on the Islamic identity o the public have
triggered nationalist awareness, and the promo-
tion o the institution o male domination has
encouraged the values and desirability o gen-
der equality, particularly among women.
In general, I argue that ideological tar-
gets orm the proximate conditions or the rise
o di erent sociopolitical discourses. These
targets may take the orms o governmental
regimes, religious institutions, social policies,
oreign occupation, or other monolithic social
orces. And resolutions may shit values along a
number o scales toward religious or secular
government, Islamic universalism/undamen-
talism or territorial nationalism, individual-
ism or collectivism, democracy or patrimonial
domination, and gender equality or a gendered
social hierarchy. Iranian intellectual leaders in
the early twentieth century, despite their coun-
trys much lower level o industrial and commer-
cial development as compared to that o Egypt
and Turkey in the same period, managed to
launch a successul constitutional revolution.
In this eort, the nature o their ideological
target ulema obstructionism and monarchi-
cal absolutism prompted them to resolve the
countrys political problem in an oppositional
(constitutional) direction. Today, Iranians are
acing a similar target the obstructionism o
clerical absolutism brought about by the revolu-
tion o 1979, and the data suggest they are mov-
ing in a similar oppositional direction, in this
case toward liberal democracy.