Iran's Islamic Revolution

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Iran's Islamic Revolution in Comparative PerspectiveAuthor(s): Said Amir ArjomandSource: World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Apr., 1986), pp. 383-414Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2010199

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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION INCOMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVEBy SAID AMIR ARJOMAND*

THE object of this paper is to bring out the theoretical ignificanceof the Islamic Revolution n Iran by focusingon the political dy-namics of the radical change in Iran's societal structure f dominationand the moral dynamicsof reintegrationnd collective ction that ac-companyit. The political dynamicsof revolutionprimarily xplain thecollapse of the structure f domination,while the moral dynamics ofrevolutionunderlie tsteleology-i.e., its direction nd consequences. nthe analysisof the moral dynamicsand teleologyof revolution,revo-lutionary deologyassumes primary mportance.Revolution can be defined as the collapse of the politicalorder andits replacement by a new one. Modern revolutionsoccur in politicalordersdominatedbythe state. will use theterm"societal structure fdomination"to refer o theprevalent ystem f authority.t comprisesthe state,which is paramount at the time of occurrenceof modernrevolutions, ut it also includes other nstitutions nd corporateentitiesthat have some measure of autonomous authorityn the religious, u-diciary,or economic spheres.The most important f these other insti-tutions s usuallythe hierocracy i.e., the church or itsequivalent.Modern revolutions occur not in stagnantsocieties, but in thoseundergoing considerable social change. Social change involves socialdislocation and normativedisturbance.The dislocatedgroups and in-dividuals need to be reintegratednto societalcommunity nd mayalsodemand inclusion n political ociety. he integrativeocial and politicalmovementsthatarise to meet these demands have oftenbeen a majorcontributing actor o the occurrenceof revolutions.The collapse of the societal structure f domination n revolutions scaused by two sets of factors:the structure's nternal weaknesses andvulnerabilities,nd the concerted ctionof the social groups and indi-viduals opposing it. Such groups and individualsmay have politicalmotives foropposing the regime, usually arisingin the contextof thepower struggleset in motion by the centralization f the state.They

*This paperwas completedt the nstituteorAdvanced tudy, rinceton,nd hasbenefitedrom he commentsf thefellowmembersfthe Social Sciences eminar or1984-85.Of the olleaguesnd friends hohave ommentedn earlier raftsfthis aper,I especially ish othank ewisCoser,JackGoldstone, uan inz, and James ule.


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384 WORLD POLITICSmayalso have moralmotives, hichusually equire hepreconditionsof social dislocationnd normative isturbance.n addition,heremaybe othermotives,uch as class interest. he degreeof cohesion ndsolidarity ithin ach socialgroup s a primaryeterminantf its ca-pacityfor collectivection;thepossibilityf successful evolutionaryactionusuallydepends n the formationfcoalitions mongopposingsocialgroups.All of the above factorsrovide mportantoints f ref-erenceforcomparisons egardinghe causes ndpreconditionsf theIslamicRevolutionn Iran.Revolutions an and shouldbe comparedn terms otonlyoftheircauses and preconditions,ut also of their onsequences. hose inte-grative ocialmovements hich uccessfullyuildon thepreconditionsof social dislocation nd moraldisorder o create evolutionaryove-ments o so byusing deologys an instrument.he ideologies hat ettherevolutionarytrugglen motion nd are shaped n its ourse ridgethegap between he causes nd theconsequencesf revolutions.heycannot ccount or hecollapse f the societal tructurefdominationto any significantegree.On theotherhand, hevalue-ideas hatformtheirnormative oundation,nd are oftenprogressivelyefined ndformulateduringherevolutionaryrocess,oshape hepoliticalrderinstalled ythe revolutiono a significantxtent.A comparativenalysis f the eleologyf the slamicRevolution husrequires serious ndsystematicnalysisfrevolutionarydeologies.hemodernpoliticalmyth f revolutionnd the various deologies ntowhich t has beengraftedn the pasttwo centuries aveconstitutedcausalfactornmotivatingevolutionaryppositiono the status uo,but twould be a seriousmistake ostoptheanalysis here.deologiesareofprimaryheoreticalnterestn that heir onstitutivealue-ideasdetermineheteleologiesf therespectiveevolutions.'he nature ndspecificontentf hevalue-ideas hat istinguishifferentevolutionaryideologies hereforeupply hebasicpoints f referenceor omparisonwiththeteleologyfthe slamicRevolution. hese latter omparisonsenableus toassess hedistinctignificancef ran's slamicRevolutionin worldhistory.

I. THE CAUSES AND PRECONDITIONS OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONA. THE COLLAPSE OF THE MONARCHY

The emphasis f recent cholarshipn the role of thestate, ts re-pressive apacity,nd itsability o weather erious riseshas broughtXThe logic of the analysis requiresthat exclude theunintended onsequencesof rev-


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 385out thefact hat evolutionsften we their uccessmore o the nternalbreakdown nd paralysis f the tate han o thepower f revolutionarygroups.2t has beenargued hat hedecisive actorn theoccurrence fa revolutions thefragilityf he xisting oliticalystem.3entralizationof monarchical tatesreduces he degreeof pluralism n society ndincreasestspolitical ragility.mong hepolitical egimes f hemodernworld,monarchiesre especially ragile nd vulnerable o revolutionbecause opular iscontentanbe focused n a single erson. e Tocque-ville,who consideredhathatred ftheOld Regime ominated ll otherpassions hroughoutheFrenchRevolution,lsoshowedhowthat atredbecamefatallyocused na single erson,heking: To see inhimthecommon nemywas thepassionate greementhatgrew."4 he samecan be said about heShah,whose usterwas theone common emandthat brought ogetherlmost ll of thedisparate ections f Iraniansociety. urthermore,he samepropertyfthe monarchicalystemnIran goesa long waytoward xplaininghemeteoric iseof Khomeinias anti-monarchnd the Shah'scounter-image.The type fpolitical egimewe might all "neopatrimonial"s alsocharacterizedy tsfragility.ncontrasto the deal-typefthe bsolutiststate n which heking s the first ervant f thestate, overnmentsextremelyersonalnpatrimonialtates. he chief xecutivencouragesdivisionswithin hearmy nd thepolitical lite n order o rule.Suchneopatrimonialtates re particularlyubject o collapse nd ensuingrevolutionncethe rulerbreaksdown.5 he MexicanRevolution hatwas set n motion y thedeathof Porfirio iaz in I9II, as well as theCuban and theNicaraguan evolutions,an be cited n support f thisproposition.n his regime, he Shah combined he weaknesses f theneopatrimonialtateswith heold vulnerabilitiesfmonarchy.6e hadpainstakinglyonstructedhemachineryf the tate roundhisperson;there anbe no doubt hat he ollapse fthemanprecededhecollapseof the machine. his collapsewas evident n the Shah'spervasivewa-olutions nd confine he pointsof comparison o thoseconsequences that re prefigured nthe goals of thehistorical ctorswho eventually ppropriate herevolution.

2 Charles Tilly,FromMobilization oRevolution Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 978);Theda Skocpol,States nd SocialRevolutionLondon and New York: Cambridge UniversityPress, I979); Ekkart Zimmermann,Political Violence,Crises nd Revolution Cambridge,MA: Shenkman, 983), 309-14.

3 Jean Baechler,Revolution New York: Harper & Row, I975).4 Alexis de Tocqueville, The EuropeanRevolution nd CorrespondenceithGobineanu, d.and trans.by JohnLukacs (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 959), 82, I09.5S. N. Eisenstadt,Revolution nd the Transformationf SocietiesNew York: Free Press,I978); JackA. Goldstone, The Comparative nd HistoricalStudyof Revolutions,"AnnualReviewof Sociology (i982), i96-97.6 The Shah was aware of these vulnerabilities,nd, in I978, knowing he had cancer,began trying o make the regimemore democratic" or he uccession fhis son. MohammadReza Pahlavi,Answer oHistory New York: Stein & Day, i980).


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386 WORLD POLITICSveringnd indecisionfor xample, e could not makeup hismindtoappoint primeministeror he iberal, ationalistpposition ntil twas far oo ate), nhis nconsistentombinationf rewardsndthreats,and in his highlynhibitedseofforce.7The neopatrimonialharacterf hisstatenotwithstanding,heShahdid have a disciplinednd well-equippedrmy nd policeforce.Hesimply efused ouse them ffectivelyorepressherevolutionaryove-ment.The Shahpretendedo be using hearmy.He declaredmartiallaw in some cities n late summer f I978 and installed militarygovernmentn November. utafterheBlack Fridaymassacre fSep-tember8, I978, he had muffled hearmy, o theoutrageofhis generals.This s reflectedn owcasualties,bout 50 inthe eptembermassacre,about 50 inTehran n thefollowingivemonths,nd probablyhreetimes his igureor hewhole f ran.OnDecember I, I978, thePrimeMinister, eneralAzhari-after mildheart ttacknd from isbed-complained o theAmericanmbassador f thedemoralizationfthearmywhichhe attributedo theShah'sorders orbiddinghetroops ofire xcept n theair,no matter owbadlyabusedor pressed. Youmustknowthis ndyoumust ell t toyourgovernment.his countryis lostbecause hekingcannotmakeup hismind."8Unlike the Czar's troopsn 9I7, theShah's army emainedargelyintact nd oyal ntil e departedn January6, 1979. Khomeini'seafletswere distributedmongthesoldiers. herewere nstancesffraterni-zationwith the demonstratorsnd ofdesertion;welve fficers erekilledby threerebellious oldiers f the ImperialGuard; a mutinyoccurredn Tabriz in December; nd therewerea number fotherminor ncidents. here was also persistentroublewithparamilitarytechniciansftheAirForce,known s theHomafaran. utoverall, hestrainfconfrontationith hepeople id not eriouslyffecthemoraleanddisciplinefthe rmed orces.twasonlyfter heShah'sdeparturethat heprocess fdisintegrationf thearmyunderpolitical ressureset in seriously. do not wish to assert hatthe use of thearmyformassive epression ouldhavepreventedherevolution. e will neverknowwhatwould havehappenedftheShahhad ordered isforces obe brutallyepressivenOctober ndNovember978, whentheywerenotyet ffectedytherevolutionaryurmoil.he armymight rmight

7Ibid., i68-7I; William H. Sullivan,Mission o Iran (New York: W. W. Norton, 98i),i90; JerroldJ. Green,Revolutionn Iran: The Politics f CountermobilizationNew York:Praeger, 982), 92-I24.

8 Sullivan fn.7), 2I2. The figures orTehranare takenfrom Master'sthesisforTehranUniversity upervised yDr. AhmadAshraf. amgratefulo Dr. Ashraf or his nformation.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 387not have disintegratedr split;the factremains hat t had not dis-integratedy January6, I979. And the oppositionknew it.9The army'sofficers ad a strong sense of professional dentity, utno attachment o any particular olidary ocial group or anyorganizedinterests. urthermore, he Shah had carefully hosen his top generalsto assurethey ould not act inconcert gainsthim,and he had succeededin that. The generals could have acted under him, but he did not letthem.They could not act against him,but neither could they act forthemselvesor any other group. In desperation, ome of them finallymade a deal with the clericalopposition.Tilly has correctlymphasizedthe importanceof coalitions linking revolutionary hallengersto themilitary.0Although the termcoalition would be too strong, he agree-mentworked out by Bazargan and Beheshti throughthe mediationofthe American ambassador witha number of the generalswas ofcrucialimportance n bringingabout a split in the armyand its consequentneutralization n February 979."If the Shah's regime collapsed despite the fact that his army wasintact,despitethe factthattherewas no defeat n war, and despitethefact that the state facedno financial risis nd no peasantinsurrections,where does all this leave the usual generalizationsabout revolutions?Mostly n thepits.War has been called the midwife of revolution, ndpeasant insurrections re considered indispensable n many currentlyfashionabletheoriesof revolution.12The inferenceswe can draw fromthe case of Iran are as follows: financial nd fiscal crises-or, forthatmatter, he extractive apacityof the state and heavytaxation-are notnecessaryfor the occurrenceof revolution. t is possiblefor the societalstructureof domination to collapse without the participationof thepeasantry;and a major war or defeat of the armyare not necessarypreconditionsof revolution. will show how a political order maycollapse withoutany of these conditions.For now, let us merelynotethatthe Cuban Revolution was an instanceof a revolutionwithout arebellionof the peasantry nd without major defeat n war. Skocpol,whose theory f revolutionputs a greatdeal of emphasison both theseallegedlynecessary onditions, avalierlydismissesCuba in halfa foot-note.Furthermore,hedoes not face the theoretical onsequencesof the

9Gary Sick,All Fall Down: America'sTragicEncounterwith ran (New York: RandomHouse, i985), I42-43-'0Tilly (fn.2), 20.*ISullivan (fn. 7), I99-247.12 Skocpol (fn.2), chap. 3 and p. 286; Walter L. Goldfrank, TheoriesofRevolution ndRevolutionWithoutTheory:The Case ofMexico,"TheoryndSociety (No. 3, I979), I53;Zimmermann fn.2), 3I5, 322, 336-42, 352-57.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 389between he state nd thehierocracyccurredmuch ater. hi'ismwasdeclared the statereligionof Iran in I50I, but thehierocracy emainedheteronomous nd subordinate o the statefor long time, onsolidatingits power and autonomyonly at the end of the i8th and the beginningofthe i9thcentury. he curtailment f thepowerofthe hierocracy ndthe appropriation f many of its prerogatives nd functions y the statetook place in the 20th century.The Shi'ite religious authoritieswereand remained doctrinally nd institutionallyndependentof the state,however: theyretained theirautonomousreligiousauthority s well astheir control over appreciable resources ndependent of the state bu-reaucracy.'7

The Western revolutionswere directed gainststate nd church. Thechurch had been anglicized in England, gallicized in France, and dis-established by Peter the Great in Russia; in all instances, t was anintegral part of the monarchicalregime.In the Islamic Revolution inIran, the entirebeleaguered Shi'ite hierocracyrose against the state.(This was partlydue to theShah's fatefulneptituden notsplitting heShi'itehierocracyn time;there s now evidencethatsome ofthegrandayatollahswere readyfor a compromisebythe summerof I978, and asplitdid in factoccur after he revolution.)For analyticalreasons,too, it is important o conceiveof the societalstructure f domination nmore nclusive erms.Revolutionaryituationsoccur because of the disintegration f centralauthority.With the dis-integration f the authority f the state,other elements of the societalstructure f domination assume greater mportance.Corporationsandindividuals with authority n other spheres of life can extend theirauthority o the political sphereand assume positionsof leadership.Insuch situations, hey emerge as "natural leaders" of the people. Thehierocracynd men ofreligion an use their raditional uthorityn thisfashion, nd have oftendone so-for instance, n Spanish history.'8neds., Stateand Society:A Reader n Comparative oliticalSociologyBerkeley:University fCaliforniaPress, i968); BertrandBadie and PierreBirnbaum,The Sociology f theState(Chicago: University fChicago Press, 983), 63, IIo-II.

' Said A. Arjomand,TheShadowof God and theHidden mam:Religion, oliticalOrder,andSocietalChange nShi'ite ran rom heBeginning o i890 (Chicago: University fChicagoPress, 984).i8 We encounter hiskind of situation n rebellionsn Castile in I520, where Franciscanand Dominican monks figuredprominentlymong the leaders of the Comuneros. Sim-ilarly, s thepresident f theCatalan Diputacio, thepriestPau Claris assumed theleadingposition n the rebellionof the summer of i640. When the Spanish people rose againstNapoleon in i8o8 without nyking or government,heywere led by thechurch-priestsand monks. See Gerald Brenan,TheSpanish abyrinth: n Account ftheSocial andPoliticalBackground fthe SpanishCivil War (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 943), 42;Perez Zagorin,Rebels nd Rulers, 500-i66o (New York and Cambridge:Cambridge Uni-versity ress, 982), I, pp. 266-67.


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390 WORLD POLITICSIran,manyofthe high-ranking embers f the Shi'itehierocracyedthe popular pposition o themonarch uring heConstitutional ev-olutionof 1905-I906. In I978, manygroups and individualswho wantedthe Shah out but had no interest hatsoevern a theocracycceptedAyatollah homeini's eadership.The centralizationf the statenecessitateshe concentrationf eco-nomic, oercive,nd symbolicesources.t entails ncroachmentsponlocal and provincial rivilegess well as fiscal nd constitutionalm-munities; nd it entails he dispossession f certainprivilegedocialgroups. tthus ets n motion n intensend continuousoliticaltruggle.The reactionfprivileged roups ndof autonomous entersfpoweragainst heexpansionnd centralizationfthe state s a major sourceof most fnot ll of the arlymodern uropean evolutions:'sherevoltof theComuneros f the cities f CastileagainstCharlesV in I520;the revolt f theNetherlandsn reactionothecentralizingolicies fPhilip I in the 560s; theFrenchCivilWar ofthe i6thcentury;herevolt f theCatalans nce Olivareshadconsigned heir constitutions"to the devil, nd ofPortugal n i640; the earlyphase of theEnglishRevolution;20nd theFronde ndthe ristocraticre-revolutionf 787-I788 inFrance.2 Inall these ases, statesndcorporationseactedwhentheir utonomy nd inherited rivileges ere threatened ythe state;and they sually oundmenofreligion s their llies.The dispossessedor debt-riddenobilityf theNetherlands,or nstance,ound llies nCalvinist reachersnd conoclasts.22n the ranof he 970s, thepreach-ers and the chiefdispossessedolidary roupcapableof reactionwerethe samegroup.

Threemajorprivilegedocial roupswere ictimsf he entralizationof thestateunder he Pahlavis.The first onsisted f the tribal hiefs.The pacificationampaignsfReza Khan later obecomeReza Shah)in I92I-I925 broke hepower f thetribal hiefs nd eliminatedmanyof them hysically,23venthough esistancen themost eripheralreassuch s Luristan ontinuedntil he arly 93os. The land andpropertyregistryawof 922 convertedhe urvivingribal hiefs ntobig and-19Eisenstadt fn.5); Baechler fn. 3), I39; Goldstone fn. 5), I94-95.20 By i640, theEnglishCrownhad alienated largesegment f theelitewhich ncluded,notably, heproponents f aristocraticonstitutionalismnd the rising ocal landed gentrywho resisted tsincreasinglytatist olicies. See Lawrence Stone, The CausesoftheEnglishRevolutionLondon: Routledge& Kegan Paul, I972), 30, 57, 92, I24.21 De Tocqueville (fn.4); AlfredCobban,Aspects ftheFrenchRevolutionNew York:Norton, 968); Zagorin (fn. i8).22 Ibid., I, p. 94-23 RichardTapper, Introduction o TheConflict fTribe ndState n IranandAfghanistan(London: Croom Helm, i983), 26-28.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 391lords.24s such, hey ecamemembersfthe ity-dwelling,andowningupperclass,and, as individuals,manyof them entered he Pahlavipolitical lite.

The Shi'itehierocracy as next o comeunderfierce ttackby thecentralizingahlavi tate.UnderReza Shah, he tate eprivedt ofallits udiciary unctions,liminatedtsprebendal, iscal,nd socialpriv-ileges, nd greatlyeducedtscontrolver ducationnd overreligiousendowments.n the faceof Reza Shah's determinationnd severity,tdid not react n anysignificantashion.Reza Shah had reachedan accommodation ith the class of biglandlords, the thousand amilies," ho predominatedn theIranianparliamentMajlis)until 960. It was during he first-andonlygen-uine-stage of MohammadReza Shah's andreformn i962 and i963thatthe landowning thousand amilies,"ncluding he tribal hiefs,were iquidated s a class.Once theMajliswas dissolved,he"feudal"landowninglasshad no autonomousnstitutionalasisand couldnotreact gainstts omplete oliticalndpartial conomic ispossessionythe tate. houghmany f tsmembersetainedargeholdings f andand became mechanized ommercial armers,hus oining hepetro-bourgeoisie,ndthoughmany fthem emainedn thePahlavipoliticalelite, he raditionaleasant-landlordelationship,hichwas thepowerbasis of the andowninglass and accounted or tsprominencen theMajlis,had undoubtedlyeen destroyed.25Relations etween hehierocracynd themonarchy ad improvedafter heresignationf Reza Shah-especially n thelate I940S andI950s, when the monarchy as weakand thehierocracy as alarmedbythe threat fcommunism.he state esumedtsaggressive osturein the 96os and I970s, this ime ncroachingponthereligiouspherein the strictense.26n contrast o the andowning lass,thepartiallydispossessedhi'ite lerical state id have an autonomousnstitutionalbasis. t could react o theexpansion fthestate,nd eventuallyid.In thepoliticaltruggleet n motion ythecentralizationnd mod-

24 Ann K.S. Lambton,Landlord nd Peasant n Persia Oxford:OxfordUniversity ress,1953), chap. I5-25 Ahmad Ashraf Dehqanan, Zamin va Enqelab" [The Peasantry, and and Revolution],inKitab-eAgah i982/I36), I, I I-I2; Eric Hooglund, Land and Revolutionn Iran, g60-oig80(Austin:University f Texas Press, 982), 79, 8i; Ann K.S. Lambton, Land and Revolutionin Iran" (Review Article), ranianStudies 7 (No. i, i984), 76-77. The destructionfthepeasant-landlordrelationshipwas completedin the i960s, during the second and thirdphases ofthe reform, ith theschemesfordivision f and betweenpeasants nd landlords.Though the redistributiveffect fthese phases was negligible, heir ociopolitical ffectnbreakingthe traditional inks betweenpeasants nd landlordswas profound.26 Said A. Arjomand,"Shi'ite Islam and the Revolution n Iran," Governmentnd Op-position 6 (Summer 98I), 293-3i6.


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392 WORLD POLITICSernization f the state, hedispossessedocialgroupsthatretain ninstitutionalasisforreactinggainst heexpandingtate tillneedtocreateoalitionswith therocial roupsndclassesf heyretosucceed.In theearly i96os, elementsfromthehierocracy,helandlords,and thetribal hiefsmadepoorly oordinatedttemptsoforge coalition, uttheseparate prisingsfKhomeini's ollowersnd theQashqa'i andBoyrAhmadtribesfFars n 963 wereruthlesslyuppressed.27n I978,when an effectiveoalition id come ntobeing, tcarried uta revo-lution.Because oftheir ommonhatred ftheShah,therevolutionaryo-alition f 978 included hebulkof ran'surbanpopulation. he peas-antry id notplay role n the slamicRevolution,nd neither idtheindustrial orking lass.All other egments f thepopulationctivelyopposed theShah and acceptedKhomeini's evolutionaryeadership.The two most mportantoalition artnersf themilitant lerics on-sisted f thenewmiddle lass-governmentmployees,chool eachers,the ntelligentsia,nd thewhite-collar orkers n the service ector-and thetraditionalourgeoisiefthebazaar.

The coalition etween heShi'ite lerics nd the newmiddle classwas highly nstable. t rested n fraudulentilence n thepartof theformerndon wishfulelf-delusionn thepart f the atter.t did notlast ong:having jected heShah,Khomeini ostno time nliquidatingtheWesternizedntelligentsia.The coalition etween herevolutionarylerics nd the traditionalbourgeoisie,n theotherhand,rested n moretangible rievancesnboth ides nd on a more olidhistoricalasis. thasbeenmore nduring.It is the atest nstance f theallianceof themosqueand thebazaar,and resembles healliance fthe urbanbourgeoisiend the churchnthe ith and I2th centuriesnWestern hristendom.t was forgednthe ate 970s, under he mmediatempact f theShah'sdestructionftheseminariesn Mashad and hismassive ntiprofiteeringampaignagainst he bazaarmerchantsndretailers.28Whydidthenewmiddle lass ose out?Historyouldhavegonetheotherway-as it did in thecase of Nasser'stemporaryoalitionwiththeMuslimBrothers hohadwidepopular upportndwere n somewaysmuchbetterrganized han hemullahs.n 20th-centuryran, he

27 Ann K.S. Lambton,ThePersian and ReformOxford:OxfordUniversity ress, 969),I02-I3; Tapper (fn.23), 29.28 Accordingto Bakhash, 8,ooo shopkeeperswere jailed and as manyas 250,000 finedduring thiscampaign in I975 and I976. Shaul Bakhash, The Reignof theAyatollahs:ranand the slamicRevolutionNew York: Basic Books, i984), I3. The last figure eems toohigh.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 393centralizingtatehad atomized ociety o a considerableegree. t haddetachedhe ribal hiefsnd dissolved he andowninglass; ndithadcreated n intelligentsia,bureaucraticlass, body of armyofficersand, lately, n industrial/entrepreneurialroup;all of thesewere un-attached o any solidaryocialcommunity,e ita tribe, n estate, r acorporation.n partialcontradistinctiono prerevolutionaryrance,however,hree lements f theold civil ociety ad escapedthe atom-ization of Iranian society: he Shi'ite clerical state;the bazaar andtraditional ourgeoisie;nd urban communitiesn certain lder cityquarters hatwere dominated y the previous roup.To these, neshould dd thenew urban ommunitiesreated y hainmigrationromrural reasand smalltowns ntothe arger ities. t is notsurprising,then, hat he atomizednewmiddle lassproved obe theproverbialMarxian sack ofpotatoes"while heother olidaryocialgroupsn thecoalitionwere apable fremarkablyoncertedoliticalction,nd soontookover.29The Shah had kept henew middle lassunder onstantupervisionbythe secret oliceand had not allowed t to form ssociationsr togain any political xperience.Moreover,ts ability o act was seriouslyimpairedbecausethearmyofficers ere solatedfrom he restof itselements. hus, thepolitical epresentativesf the new middle classcould noteasilyform coalitionwith hearmy,whichwas toocloselyidentifiedith heShahandhisregime. heythereforeecided o forma coalitionwith he Shi'itehierocracy.AccordingoTilly, ontenders ho re n danger f osing heir lacein a polity re especially isposed o "reactive" ollectivection.Herightlybserves hat or enturiesheprincipalorm f collectivectionfollowed "reactionary" attern-i.e., t was "reactive" nd "com-munal."Thanksto social volution, owever,hat s no longer hecase,and collectivectionhasbecomepredominantlyproactive"n moderntimes.30his conceptual istinctioneems f dubiousvalue: a whole etofrevolutionsnalyzedn this aper reboth reactive"nd"proactive."

29 It is interestingo compare the heterogeneitynd lack of cohesiveness f Iran's newmiddleclass withthe samefeaturesssociatedwith tsWestern ounterpart, hichGouldnererroneously ortrays s a new class in theMarxianschema.AlvinGouldner,The FutureofIntellectualsnd theRiseof theNew Class (New York: Seabury, 979).s CharlesTilly,"Revolutions nd CollectiveViolence"in Fred I. Greenstein nd NelsonW. Polsby,eds., Handbook of PoliticalScience, II: Macropolitical heory Reading, MA:Addison-Wesley,975), 507-I0. It is highlyrevealing hat theperiod identified yTilly asmarkingthetransition rom raditional omodernforms fcollective ction,themid-igthcentury, oincidedwith theendof theclassic ge ofrevolutions. harlesTilly,"How ProtestModernized in France, i845-i855," in William 0. Aydelotte,Allan G. Bogue, and RobertFogel, eds., The Dimensions fQuantitative esearchn HistoryPrinceton:PrincetonUni-versity ress, 972).


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394 WORLD POLITICSIn reality,ollectivection hatTillyhad typifieds "reactive" oes notlose its mportancefter hemiddle fthe 9thcentury;nd itusuallycontinueso drawoncommunal raditionalolidarities. henever hesecommunal olidaritiesre class solidarities,heypertainnot to risingbut todecliningr threatenedocialclasses.The IslamicRevolutionnIran alertsus to the undeniable mportance f reactive ction n therevolutionaryovementsf the asttwocenturies,ncludinghose hatMarx took to be revolutionsfrising lasses.Fascinatingvidence orthe mportancefreactive ction nd tra-ditional ommunal olidaritiesnrevolutionaryovements asrecentlycome tolight; tconcerns hevery roupswhoinspiredMarx with hetheory f revolutionhathas distorted urunderstandingf thephe-nomenon or ver century.hemythfthemiddle lass n theEnglishand theFrenchRevolutionsas ongbeenexploded, otably y Hexterand Cobban.Trevor-Roper'sharacterizationftheEnglishRevolutionas thedecliningmeregentry's" evolutionfdespair ontains n ele-mentof truth, ut also muchexaggeration.3'n the otherhand, wenow know that the revolutionariesf I789 were not the capitalistbourgeoisie,32ndthat herevolutionariesfthefirst ecades fthe 9thcenturynEngland nd of i848 werenotthe ndustrial orking lass.The Englishrevolutionaryorking lassof that ime n fact onsistedofthe artisans nd craftsmen ho werethreatenedy capitalistndus-trializationnd wereholding n tothememoryfthegolden ge of acommunityfsmallproducers ased on mutual ies nd cooperation.33A recenttudyfthese reactionaryadicals,"s one observeralls hem,concludes hat commitmento traditionalultural aluesand imme-diate ommunal elationsre crucial omany adicalmovements."om-munal relations re seentobe importantesources ormobilization stheynable raditionalommunitieso remainmobilized or long imeand in the face of considerable rivation.34hopkeepersnd artisanspredominatedntheFrench nsurrectionsfthe 830S.35he samegroupof rtisanseactinggainstndustrialapitalismndproletarization,ho

3' For an assessment fTrevor-Roper's dea, see J.H. Hexter,ReappraisalsnHistory, ded. (Chicago: University f Chicago Press,1979), 129-3I.32 AlfredCobban, Social Interpretationsf theFrenchRevolutionCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 964); JackA. Goldstone, Reinterpretinghe FrenchRevolution,"Theoryand Society 3 (September 984).33Krishan Kumar, "Class and Political Action in Nineteenth-Centuryngland: Theo-retical nd Comparative Perspectives," uropeanJournal fSociology 4 (No. I, 1983).34Craig J. Calhoun, "The Radicalism of Tradition: Community trength r VenerableDisguise and BorrowedLanguage?" American ournal f Sociology88 (No. 5, i983), 886,897, 908.35 Tilly (fn. 30, 1972), cited in Zimmermann fn.2), 374-75.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 395drew heir tandardsndidiom fprotestrom hepast, onstitutedhebackbone fthe i848 revolutionsnFrance and Germany.n France,the ourneymen'srotherhoods hichperpetuatedhe traditionalor-porate onsciousnessnd solidaritiesf the ncien e'gimeonstitutedheleading evolutionarylementn i848. InGermany,rtisan roupswereprominentntherevolutionaryovementf i848 while heproletariatwas the most uiescent fall socialentities.36"Reactionaryadicals," oncludes alhoun, have eldom,f ver, eenable togain supremacyn revolutions.utat the ametime, evolutionsworthyfthe name haveneverbeen made without hem."37 iththeIslamicRevolution,group freactionaryadicals nder he eadershipof the custodians ftheShi'ite radition aveat lastgained upremacyin what s theoreticallyhemost nterestingf modern evolutions.Let usmove nto consider omemovementshatMarxdidnot tudy.First, here re the peasant ebellions. enerally peaking, he slamicRevolution as this n commonwithpeasantrebellions:t drawsoncorporateolidaritiesndcommunalndkinship ies, ndconsequentlyhas manyconservativend defensive eatures.38n Mexico, herewasthemassive easant ebellionf i8io ledbyFatherHidalgoandFatherMorelos, othparishpriests.39n Spain,the Carlists' im in the i830shas been described s the "restorationf monkish emocracy': theclergyed theprosperous asqueandAragonese eomanrynrising odefend heir ocal autonomynd theirueros gainst hecentralizingpolicy fthe Bourbon overnment.40n thepresent entury,herewasthe revolt f Zapata in defense f the local autonomy f traditionalagrariancommunitiesgainstthe expandinghaciendas n Mexico.Thanks o thedevout apatistaslawsof1915 and 1917) nd toCardenas(1934-1940), the Mexican Revolution stablished he security f theejido-community-owned,nalienablendividualr communal oldingsin thevillages. t should be added thatthe outcome f theMexicanRevolution ouldhavebeenmuch ess ecularistnd more onservativeif theCristeromovement,rganizedby priests nd lay Catholics nreaction othe nticlericalolicies fcentral overnment,ith hemotto

36 William H. Sewell, Jr.,Work nd Revolution n France: The Language ofLaborfromtheOld Regime to 1848 (New York and Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 1980);BarringtonMoore,Injustice:The Social Basis ofObedience nd Revolt White Plains, NY:M. E. Sharpe, 1978), I26, 127.37Calhoun (fn- 4), 911-

38 GeorgesLefebvre, La Revolution ranqaiset les paysans The FrenchRevolution ndthe peasants], n Etudes sur la RevolutionranpaisePressesUniversitaires e France, 1954[I933]), 250, 254; Tilly (fn.30, 1975), 498; Zimmermann fn.2).39Dunn (fn. 13), 52-53-40 Brenan (fn. i8), 206-II, 213, note A. In the Second CarlistWar (I870-1876), monksand priests gain led theguerrillabands.


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396 WORLD POLITICSViva CristoRey Long liveChrist he King),had succeeded n 1927-I928.4'The perniciousdea that ascism as a movement f thepetty our-geois class has finally een laid to rest.42 he petty ourgeoisiewassomewhat verrepresentedn mostfascistmovements,nd it is un-doubtedly verrepresentedn the slamicmovementn Iran.But it isoverrepresentedn all sorts fradicalmovements.We find he "littlepeople," he menus euple,"nthereligious iots n i6th-centuryranceon both ides.43 e find hem mong he tormersf the Bastille44nd,as we have justseen,we find hem mong the i9th-centuryadicalswho, or . P.Thompson,made heEnglishworking lass.Recent tudiesclearly how thatfascist artieswere supported y elements rom llsocialgroups,butespecially hedislocated, he dispossessed,nd thedeclassed.What is more to thepoint and notdisputed) s that theleadershipf the fascistmovementsame disproportionatelyrom hedeclasse' nd the dispossessed,romdemobilized rmyofficers,romdisplaced runemployedureaucratsespeciallyhosedislocated ytheredrawing f national oundaries),nd from heoccasional ispossessedaristocrat. he Nazis also didnot failto tapthe traditionalommunalsolidaritiesf theProtestantountryside.45Europeanfascism nd the slamicmovementn Iran are similar nthat heywere ed bydispossessedlements. utthere re two mportantdifferences.irst,he ascisteaderswere heterogeneousroup,whereasKhomeini'smilitantlerics orm homogeneousolidary roup. econd,thefascisteaders idnothave xclusiveontrol ver ny ulturalssets,and had to get their deas wherethey ould findthem.The Shi'itehierocracyonsistedfthecustodians f a richreligiousradition. heconsequencesfthesedifferencesillbecome pparent resently.

4 Dunn (fn. I3), 49, 64-69; Franqois Chevalier, "The Ejido and Political Stability nMexico," in Claudio Veliz, ed., The Politics f Conformityn Latin America Oxford: OxfordUniversity ress, 967), i6i-69; Guenter Lewy, Religion nd Revolution Oxford and NewYork: Oxford University ress, 974), chap. i6; AlistairHennessy, Fascism and Populismin Latin America," n Walter Laqueur, ed., Fascism:A Reader'sGuide Berkeley:Universityof CaliforniaPress,1976), 280.42 Stein U. Larsen, Bernt Hagtvet, and Jan P. Myklebust,Who Were he Fascists? ocialRoots of European Fascism Oslo: Universitetsforlaget,980); Richard F. Hamilton, Who

Voted or Hitler? Princeton:PrincetonUniversity ress, 982).43 Natalie Z. Davis, "ReligiousRiots in Sixteenth-Centuryrance,"Past and Present 9(1973), 85-86.44George Rude, The Crowd n the FrenchRevolution Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959),cited in Zimmermann fn. ), 387.45Francis L. Carsten, "Interpretationsf Fascism," in Laqueur (fn. 1), 4i6-i9; Juan J.Linz, "Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological HistoricalPerspective," bid.,38-39; Peter H. Merkl, "Comparing the Fascist Movements," n Larsenand others fn. 2), 764, 789; Miklos Lacko, "The Social Roots of Hungarian Fascism: TheArrow Cross," ibid., 395-96; Hamilton (fn. 2), esp. 444-55.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 397C. INTEGRATIVE SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AS REACTIONS TO SOCIAL

DISLOCATIONWe can now turn o thepreconditionsf revolution-the ocialdis-location nd moraldisturbancehatfollow apid ocialchange.Let usbeginwithnormative isturbancet themost uperficialevel.The conspicuousonsumptionn thepart f ranianhigh ociety ndthe abundance fnouveaux iches roduced n acute senseof relativedeprivationmong henewmiddle-classovernmentmployees, hite-collarworkersntheprivate ector, nd schoolteachers.t times, herewas theaddeddiscomfortf absolute eprivation, hichresulted rom

an acutehousinghortage hatwas aggravated ythe nflux f a sizableforeignworkforce nd American dvisers.In this ontext,twouldbevalid ospeak fthewidespreadiscontentof1977-1978s a confirmationfDavies's J-curvefcontinuous isingexpectationsndsudden rustrations.46ran'sGNP grewby 0.3percentin 1973-1974nd bya further2 percentn 1974-1975.Then came theeconomic ebacle-despite, r rather ecause f, hemassive nregulatedinflow f oil revenue. everebottlenecksn skilledmanpowernd in-frastructurealted conomic rowthn 1976.47 he problemwas moredeep-rooted,owever.Whatunderlayhewidespread esireforrevo-lutionary hangewas a fundamentalisorientationnd anomiemorethan superficialnd short-runrustrationfmaterialxpectation. sDurkheim aspointed ut, crises fprosperity"enerate isorientationby disturbinghe collective ormative rder.48here can be no doubtabout the tremendousonfusion nd disorder reated ythemassiveinflow f petrodollars,ustas there an be littledoubt about similarconfusionsnNigeria ndMexico oday. he consequentense fmoraldisorder nd desireforthe reaffirmationf absolute tandardshouldnotbe minimized. herewas a widespreadulturalmalaise hroughoutIranian ociety,anging rom eneral onfusionnd disorientationnthepartof thenouveauxiches osharplyocusednd intense ejectionofforeignndantireligiousulturalnfluencesn thepart fthemullahsand themerchantsfthebazaar.In Europe, he ocialist nd fascistmassmovements erepartoftheextraordinaryave of masspoliticalmobilizationnd nationalntegra-tion hat wept hecontinentn theearly ecadesof the20thcentury.49

46 JamesC. Davies, "Towards a Theory of Revolution,"American ociologicalReview27(No. i, I962).47 RobertGraham, ran: The Illusionof Power London: Croom Helm, 1978).48 Emile Durkheim, Suicide: A Study n Sociology Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 95I [1897]).49Merkl (fn. 45), 760-62.


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398 WORLD POLITICSIt is easyto recognize hat hesemovementscted as vehicles ortheintegrationf therecentlymobilizedmasses ntosocietal ommunity.But one shouldnotforgethatreligiousmovements ave oftenper-formed he samefunctionnthepast.Politicalmobilizationomes boutas a result f basicsocial changewhich lsoentails onsiderableocialdislocation.ocialchange isplacesa largenumber fpersons rom hestrata ntowhich heywere born.These persons earn or nd demand nclusionn newforms f societalcommunity.eligiousmovementsndsects reage-old hannels or hereintegrationf suchdislocated ndividuals. oliticalmovements ndparties re the new channelsforsocietalreintegration.he IslamicRevolution emonstrateshat heold and thenew can combine.Urbanization nd theexpansion fhigherducation n thetwo dec-ades precedinghe revolutionre the two dimensions f rapidsocialchangemost relevant otheproblem.Between 1956and 1976,theurbanpopulation f Iran increased rom 1 percent o47 percentfrom toi6 million). ural-urban igrationccounts or substantialroportionof this shift-over one-thirdforthe decade I966-1976, the rate beingevenhigher orTehran.This decade alsowitnessed n unprecedentedexpansion f higher ducation.The number f personswithhighereducation uadrupled toabout 00,000) andtheenrollmentn univer-sities nd professionalchoolsn Iran trebledtoabout150,000). Thesefactors ontributedignificantlyo theriseof the Islamicmovement.Thousandsof religious ssociationspontaneouslyame intobeing ncities nd in universities,nd acted as the mechanism orthe socialintegrationfa significantroportionf themigrantsnto he ities ndofthefirst-generationniversitytudents.50y contrast,heShah'spar-allelattempto integratehese amegroupsntohisone-party oliticalsystem roved o be a fiasco.There is nothing ew aboutdislocated, prootedmenand womenfindingewmooringsnreligiousssociations,ects,nd revivalist ove-ments.nEngland, ornstance, anymasterless" enbecame ectariesin the i6th and i7thcenturies.5' s early s the 1570s, Presbyterianclasses were attendedby laymen,but it is in the i62os and i630s thatPuritanectureshipsookroot ntowns o an astonishingegree, o thedismay f heAnglican hurch. aymen ecame atronsndpaymastersof the Puritan ecturers,nd thecongregationslusteringroundthelatter ecame models ordeological arty rganization."52hesituation

50Arjomand (fn.26).5- Christopher ill, TheWorld urnedUpside own (Harmondsworth,ngland: Penguin,1975), 45-48.52 Stone (fn. 20), 103, 120-21.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 399stronglyesembleshegrowthf ayreligiousssociationsn Iran nthei960s and especiallythe 1970s, where the mullahs preached-at first npersonbut later,whendemand outstrippedupply, hrough assetteplayers-toavidaudiences furbanites.We find n evencloser arallelin theriseof Methodism.n the 8th nd early 9thcenturies, igrantsintothe new industrial owns f Englandflocked o the assemblies ftheMethodist reachers. ere, heperspectivef ntegrationnto ocietalcommunityrings ut he ociologicalogency fHalevy's amous hesis:theMethodistRevival ntegratedhe recently rbanizedmasses ntosocietal ommunitynd thusprevented political evolutionn Eng-land.53

Fascism, oo, acted as thevehicle f integrationf rural-urban i-grants nto ocietal ommunity.n Germany, or nstance,many f thenew urbanites ailed o complete heir ultural djustment o city ifeand instead emained uriouslyulnerable o the grarian omanticismofvdlkischdeologues."54 One-half of the top Nazi party eaders wereborn n largevillages.55LiteracyndPuritanism enthand-in-hand.he same strue fthegrowth f slamic cripturalism.slamic undamentalismpread n Ira-nianuniversitiesust as Puritanism ad spreadat Oxford nd Cam-bridge.56any of the Islamic activists f the 1970s, who currentlyormthe ay econd tratumfthe slamic egime, iscoveredthe rueslam"in universityssociations,ust as Cromwellwas reborn t Cambridge.Fascism pread tEuropean niversitiesna parallel ashion.n EasternEurope nparticular,niversitytudentsndyoung ctivistsonstitutedthecoreof thefascist artiesnd theireadership. umanian ascismsof particularnterestn thisrespect.n the early 92os, its leaders,Codreanu nd Mota,werefoundersfuniversityssociationsorChris-tian reform nd national evival n the universitiesf Iasi and Cluj,respectively.57The combinationfhigher ducation nd socialdislocations ofpar-ticularmportanceor xplaininghepoliticizationf ntegrative ove-ments.The keyto the social compositionf Islamicand university

53Elie Halevy, The Birthof Methodismn England,trans. and with an introduction yBernard Semmel (Chicago: University fChicago Press,1971).54Merkl (fn.45),757-55Linz (fn-45),50-56 Stone (fn. 20), 96-97; Michael Walzer, The Revolutions f the Saints: A Study n theOrigins fRadical oliticsCambridge:HarvardUniversity ress, i965), 140-43.57Hugh Seton-Watson, he EastEuropeanRevolution, d ed. (New York: Praeger,1956),44; Carsten fn.45), 418; Linz (fn.45), 48-50;JuanJ.Linz, "PoliticalSpace and Fascism asa Late-Comer," in Larsen and others fn. 42), i67; Zeev Barbu, "Psycho-Historical ndSociological Perspective n the IronGuard, the Fascist MovementofRomania," bid.,385-87.


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400 WORLD POLITICSactivistsf the 970s is that hey ithermovedfrommall owns o bigcities o go to universities,r theywere the first eneration rom ra-ditional owermiddle-classackgroundso attend niversities,r both.58These youngmen contributedo therevolutionaryoliticizationf theIslamic revival of the i96os and 1970s in the same way in which theeducated ountry entlemenn Englandhad contributedo therevo-lutionary oliticizationf Puritanism.he parallelwithRumanian as-cism s evenmore triking. s the ast ron Guard eader, ima,put t,"in 926-27, ouruniversitiesereflooded y bigwaveofyoung eopleof peasant origin ... who broughtwith them a robust national con-sciousnessnd were hus estroyinghe ast trongholdsfforeignpiritin ouruniversities."~5ccording o EugenWeber, legionaryeadershipcame from heprovincial, nly ust urbanized ntelligentsia:ons orgrandsonsfpeasants, choolteachers,nd priests."6oMax Weber once remarked hatwith the adventof modernmasspolitics,hecondition f clerical ominationtselfhanges. Hierocracyhasnochoicebuttoestablish party rganizationnd to usedemagogicmeans, ust ike all other arties."6' apidurbanizationnd theShah'sfailure o integrate prooted lements-especiallyhesociallymobile,newly ducated lements-intohis political ystemffered homeiniand the cornered hi'itehierocracyn unparalleled pportunityorcreating politicized evolutionaryass movement. singtheorgan-izationalnetwork f the ayreligiousssociationsnd Islamicuniversitystudents,hemullahs eriodicallyrganizedhemassive nti-Shah em-onstrationsnd closures f the bazaar whichamounted o a generalstrike funprecedenteduration.erhaps hey ould venhavebroughtdown a stronger egime;we will neverknow.What is certain s thatthe lericallyedgeneraltrike idbring own he ragileahlavi egimeand itsvacillatinguler.D. THE POLITICAL AND MORAL MOTIVES OF THE SUPPORTERS OF

REVOLUTION AND THE MINOR SIGNIFICANCE OF CLASS INTERESTPoliticalmotivemaybe defined s the motive o retain r recoverpoliticalnd institutionalssets hreatenedrexpropriated,nd togain

political owerby membershipn,andmaximally,ontrol f,politicalsociety. n thenegative ide,the moralmotive or upporting revo-58 Ahmad Ashraf nd All Banuazizi, "State and Social Classes and Modes ofMobilizationin the IranianRevolution," tate,Culture nd Society (No. 3, 1985).59Barbu (fn. 57), 392-60 Eugen Weber, "The Men of theArchangel,"Journal f Contemporaryistory (No.

I, 1966), 107.6, Max Weber (fn. 5)' II, p. 1195.


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402 WORLD POLITICStoo,were motivated y thedesireto remove hesebarriers o theirupward ocialmobility.twouldbe absurd o attributeny lass nterestto thisyoung"petty ourgeois" roup other hanthe desire to gainpowerand entryntothepolitical ystem, o moveup on the socialladder, nd to put an end to a cultural limate hey ound lien andresented eeply.The motives f the newmiddle lasswerebothpoliticalnd moral.Manyof itsmembers-includingherecentlymobilizedmiddle-classwomenwho figured rominentlyn theanti-Shah emonstrations-wanted nclusionn thepolitical ociety. heyconsideredhe Pahlaviregime yrannicalnd unjust, nd accepted he myth f revolution.tshould be noted,however, hatthepotency f thepoliticalmyth frevolutionausedthenewmiddleclass, specially hewomen, o jointhe slamic evolutionaryovementgainstheir lass nterests-indeedsuicidally.64The traditionalourgeoisie-themerchantsf thebazaar,thepettybourgeoisie f distributiverades, nd the craftsmenf the bazaarguilds-was the ne socialgroup orwhich lass nterest astheprimarymotive or verthrowingheShah.Thesegroups elt hreatenedythedevelopmentalconomic olicies fthe tatewhich,mong ther hings,excluded hem romasy ccess ocredit; hey lso feared he ncroach-ment f themodernector fthe conomyn their erritoryntheformofcompetingmachine-made oodsand new distributiveetworks fsupermarketsnd chain stores. o thismotivatinglass interestwasadded a senseof relative eprivationausedbythe tremendousainsmade bycourt-connectedndustrialists,s well as considerablemoralindignationausedby hedisregardf slam nd traditionalaluesunderforeignultural nfluence.

II. THE TELEOLOGY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONA. MORAL RIGORISM AND THE SEARCH FOR CULTURAL AUTHENTICITY

The factthat ntegrativeocial movementsre reactions o socialdislocation nd normative isorderxplains hesalience f their earchfor ulturaluthenticitynd theirmoralrigorism.64 It was neither hefirst or thelasttime that social classparticipatedn a revolutionwhich did not further ts interests.As BarringtonMoore has pointedout, peasants haveoftenbeentheprincipal ictims fmodernization rought bout bycommunist overnmentsthey helped createby theirparticipationn revolutionarymovements. ee Moore, SocialOrigins fDictatorshipnd Democracy: ordandPeasant n theMating of theModernWorld(Boston: eaconPress, 966), 428-29;also see Zimmermannfn. 2), 339-41, 356. Similarly,theoutcome of theFrenchRevolutionwas notespecially avorable o thepetitebourgeoisie,thesans-culottes, ho mostvigorously articipated n it. bid., 387,407.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 403"Fascismwas a revolution,utone which hought f tselfn cultural,not conomicerms."65he same s true fthe slamicRevolution, hichemphaticallyaw itselfn these erms-evenwhennot explicitlyo,asin the "Islamiccultural evolution"gainstWesternismnd (Eastern)atheisticommunismnaugurated ith he losing ftheuniversitiesnApril 980. Sincetherevolution,ran's ecular udiciary ytem asbeensystematicallyslamicized, heShi'ite acredLaw has beencodified orthefirstime nhistory,nd Islamicmorals nd coverage fwomen restrictlynforced y an especially reated fficial igilante orps.Disoriented nd dislocated ndividuals nd groupscannotbe suc-cessfullyntegratednto societal ommunity ithout he creation r

"revitalization"f a moral rder.66 alzer emphasizes hatPuritanismwas primarily "response o the disorder f the transition eriod."67Ranulfhas correctly nderscored he moral rigorism f Nazism andcompared t to Puritanism.68he intense nd repressivemoralism fthe slamicrevolutionariesn reaction o themoral axity nd disorderofPahlavi ran finds strict arallelnPuritanmoralismn reactionothemoral axity nd sensualityf theRenaissance ulture, nd in Nazimoralismn reaction othedecadence ftheWeimarperiod.Further-more, he parochial ejectionfcosmopolitanisms a common eatureof the slamic Revolutionnd Nazism,and especially f EasternEu-ropean fascism.69he vehement e'jection f culturalWesternismn favorof revitalizedhristianityn Rumania ndHungary inds counterpartinKhomeini's moresystematicnd successful eterminationoextirpateWestern cultural pollution by establishing n Islamic moral order.B. THE REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGY AND ITS ADOPTION BY LATECOMERS

The revolutions fearlymodernEurope were made by menforwhomrestorationwas the key word, and who "were obsessed by renovation-bythe desire to return o an old orderofsociety."The confused eleologyof these revolutions was marked by an absenceof ideology nd by acorporateor nationalconstitutionalismwhich was mainlythepreserveof the dominantsocial and vocationalgroups."7on the English Revo-65 George L. Mosse, "The GenesisofFascism,"Journal fContemporaryistory (No. i,I 966), 22.66 AnthonyF.C. Wallace, "RevitalizationMovements:Some TheoreticalConsiderationsfortheirComparativeStudy,"American nthropologist8 (April 1956).67Walzer (fn.56), 313' 315-68 Svend Ranulf,Moral Indignation nd Middle Class PsychologyNew York: Schocken,I964 [1938]).69Eugen Weber, "Rumania," in Hans Roggerand Eugen Weber, eds., The EuropeanRight:A HistoricalProfile Berkeley:University f CaliforniaPress, I965); Istvan Deak,"Hungary," bid.,394; Barbu (fn.57).70 JohnElliott,"Revolutionand Continuityn EarlyModernEurope," Past and Present

42 (I969), 42-44, 48.


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404 WORLD POLITICSlution,with henature,ource, ndgrounds fpoliticalegitimacyllup forgrabs, herewas almost nevitablygreat ffusionfclaimstolegitimacyn all sorts fgrounds, ld and new."7'Nevertheless,woelements redominaten theteleologyf theEnglishRevolution: ar-liamentarianism,ndPuritanismnd itsoffshoots.If theFrenchRevolutionnstitutednething or ll subsequent ev-olutions, t is thepresence f ideology.t gave birth o Jacobinismsthe classicform fmodern evolutionarydeology. he ideas of con-stitutionalepresentationndnational overeigntyerecoupled t thebeginning. s therevolutionrogressed,owever,hesource flegit-imacydrifted rom herepresentationfestates o thesymbolicm-bodiment fthe will ofthepeople.The claim to embody he will ofthenation s a singlehomogeneousntityouldonlybemadethroughthemanipulationf themaximalistanguage fconsensus. resumedembodimentsf the willof thepeoplebecamethesole and sufficientbasis of legitimacy.uringtheperiodofJacobinscendancy,evolu-tionaryegitimacyriumphed;nd with tstriumph,evolutionaryde-ology filled heentirephere fpower" nd "became oextensive ithgovernmenttself."72he distillationf theJacobinxperiment asthemodernpoliticalmyth frevolution.evolutionaryegitimacyecamean autonomous nd self-sufficientategory.In the i9thcentury, evolutions ecame"milestonesn humanity'sinexorablemarch oward ruefreedom nd trueuniversality."73en-inism ombinedhis onceptionf revolution ith heJacobinmyth;thas become he ustificationor he eizure fpowerbyrevolutionarieswhoproclaimhemselvesncharge frealizing henext tage fsocio-historicalevelopment.74iththeconsolidationfMarxism-Leninismin Russia,Leninist evolutionarydeology obtained ontrol vertheinterpretationfworldhistory."75t isthis ontrol hat schallenged ythefascistndthe slamic evolutionariesvenwhile heyreupholding,like theBolsheviks,hemyth frevolutions an act ofredemptionndliberation foppressedmasses ndnations.Bothfascism ndthe slamic evolutionaryovementre atecomersto themodernnternationalolitical cene.Assuch, heyhare numberof essential eatures.he foremostfthese s theappropriationfthe

7 Hexter (fn.31), 178.72 FranqoisFuret, nterpretingheFrenchRevolution,rans. yElborgForsterCambridge:CambridgeUniversity ress, 98i), esp. 29, 48-49, 70-74.73Eugen Kamenka, "The Concept of PoliticalRevolution," n Carl J. Friedrich,ed.,Revolution:NomosVIII (New York: Atherton,966), i26.74Dunn (fn. 13), 8-I I.75 JulesMonnerot, ociology nd Psychologyn CommunismBoston: Beacon Press, 1960

[1949]), 12.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 405legitimatoryoliticalmyth f revolution.he Italianfascists oasted ftheir revolutionaryntransigence,"nd theNazis contrastedheir ev-olution,herevolutionf theGermanvolk, o the"subhuman evolu-tion"of 1789.76 Similarly,ran's revolutionariesakegreatpride n thehistoricmission f the slamicRevolution."Economicswas indeedone of the east mportantascist onsider-ations."77he same is trueofthe slamicRevolution.Khomeini, e-spondingocomplaintsboutthe tate f theeconomy,nceremarked,"we did notmake the slamicRevolutiono thePersianmelonwouldbecheap.")Furthermore,ike heEuropean ascists,he slamicmilitantsaimatintegratingllclasses,ncludingheworkinglass,nto nationalcommunity.he fascistsubstitutednation" or class"anddevelopedthe oncept f "theproletarianations." lassconflict as thus eplacedby the conflict etween ations, ichagainstpoor.With the Islamicrevolutionariesn Iran,we havean identicalranspositionf thethemeofexploitationf oneclassbyanothernto heexploitationf the"dis-inherited"mustaz'af)nations ythe mperialistnes.78"The fact hat ascisms a latecomer," rites inz,"helps oexplain,in part, heessential nti-characterf its ideology nd appeal." Fur-thermore,it is paradoxical hatforeach, ejectionherewas also anincorporationf elements fwhattheyrejected."79ike fascism,heIslamic revolutionary ovement as offered new synthesisf thepoliticalreedsthas violentlyttacked. nd, ike hefascists,he slamicmilitantsreagainst emocracyecause hey onsideriberal emocracya foreignmodel thatprovidesvenuesforfree xpressionfalien in-fluencesndideas. Also ikethefascists,owever,he slamicmilitantswould not necessarilyccept he abelof "antidemocratic.")8oimilarly,bothgroups re antibourgeois,esentinghe nternationalosmopolitanorientationfthenewmiddle lass.Bothmovementsreanti-Marxist-i.e., nticommunistnd antisocialist-whileppropriatinghe deasandcertainlyheslogans f social ustice nd equality.The Islamicrevo-lutionary ovement as theconsiderabledvantage verfascism,ow-ever, fcombininghis anti-character"ith trongraditionalism.ere

76 ErnstNolte, ThreeFaces ofFascism New York: New AmericanLibrary,1969), 281;Baechler fn.3), IO, n. 15.77Mosse (fn.65), 21.78 Linz (fn. 5), i6. Once the ttempt oexport he slamicRevolution,emporarilyheckedby the setback n the Iran-Iraqwar, is resumedfully, ne mayexpectfurther esonancesof the Italian fascist deas of "an imperialism f thepoor" and "proletarianmperialism."Zeev-Sternhell, Fascist Ideology," in Laqueur (fn. i), 334-35; JosephBaglieri,"ItalianFascism and the CrisisofLiberal Hegemony: i9oi-I922," in Larsen (fn.42), 322-23.79Linz (fn.45), 5-8o Ibid., .2-:2 i.


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406 WORLD POLITICSwe can see theconsequence f thefact hat hedispossessedeaders ftheIslamicRevolutionwerenot a heterogenous ut a homogeneoussolidary roup nd,furthermore,nethat uarded heShi'itereligioustradition.n contrasto theNazi "Revolutionf Nihilism"and to thestrikingack of referenceo Japan's wn intellectualraditionn thewritingsf the eaders f thefascist ew OrderMovement f the ateI930s),8"theIslamicRevolutionombines he rejection f other lienpoliticaldeologieswith vigorousffirmationf the slamicreligiousandculturalradition.have hereforeharacterizedtas "revolutionarytraditionalism."2In addition o their ommon nti-characterndother ncidentalea-tures, ascism nd the Islamicrevolutionaryovementsoth have adistinctonstitutiveore.Racism ndanti-Semitismerethemost b-noxiousfeatures f Europeanfascism,ut,as Mosseand othershaveconvincinglyhown,not itscorecomponent.he constitutiveoreoffascismhatgoesbeyond uropeanfascismnd continueso livein avarietyfforms s a vigorousdeological orce nthethirdworld s thecombinationf nationalismnd socialism.As GeorgeValois putit in1925, "nationalism socialism fascism." he marriage f nation-alism nd socialismwas in thecards fterWorldWar 1.83This factbyfar ranscendsheparticularonditionsfanydispossessedtratum,nyEuropean ountry,r,for hatmatter,f nterwarurope. twas arrivedatbydifferentascisteaders n differenturopean ountries,nd it hasbeen arrived t independentlyymanythird-worlddeologues inceI945.An enduring eaturef fascistdeology asbeen ts nsistencen thereality f the nation nd the artificialityf class. To the emotionallyunattractivedea ofperpetual lass struggle,heFrenchfascisthinkerMarcelDeat contrastshe ppealofbelongingo a communityntaintedby divisive onflict nd fragmentation:The totalman in the totalsociety, ithno clashes,no prostration,o anarchy."84he Arabna-tionalisthinkersought o utilizetheappealof belonging o a com-munity ysimilarlyeplacinglassbynation. he advocates f slamicideology nlyneededtotake one stepfurthero replace henationbytheumma, he Muslim ommunityf believers.Thus,the emergencefan Islamicrevolutionarydeology as been

8' William M. Fletcher,The Search ora New Order: ntellectualsnd Fascism n PrewarJapan Chapel Hill: University f North Carolina Press, 982).82 Said A. Arjomand,"Traditionalism n Twentieth-Centuryran," in Arjomand,FromNationalism oRevolutionaryslam (London: Macmillan,and Albany:SUNY Press, 984).83Sternhellfn.78), 320-2I, 326, 335-37-84 Quoted, ibid., 35, 347-


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408 WORLD POLITICSideological nnovationsf Mawdudiand Qutb. t simply xtended hegeneral udiciary uthorityfthe uristfaqih),s well as someof hisvery pecific ights f gerency,o include he right o rule.86

Nevertheless,awdudi ndQutbwereread vidly,nPersian rans-lation nd/ornArabic, yKhomeini'smilitantollowers, hoadoptedthefundamentalevolutionarydea that bedience o the mpious ecularstate-in thiscase theShah's-was tantamounto idolatry. he cen-tralityf this dea is unmistakablen therevolutionarylogansandpamphleteering,ostnotablyn the pplication f theterm aghutun-godlyearthly ower) to the Pahlavi political rder. ts influence asbecomemorepronouncedincetheeliminationf the moderates ndIslamicmodernistsn 980-i98i, and is easilynoticeablen the peechesof thepolitical liteofthe slamicRepublic f ran.Furthermore,y-atollahSafihas no difficultyhatsoevern combiningheadvantagesof the ideologies f Mawdudi and Qutb with the clericalistdeas ofKhomeini. orhim, hegovernmentf he uristn behalf f heHiddenImam is the truegovernmentfGod on Earth,vowed to the mple-mentation f His Law. All other olitical egimes re ungodly rders,regimesf gnorancend of aghut.he IslamicRevolution ill ontinueuntil he overthrowf all these egimes.87C. THE OLD AND THE NEW IN REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONALISM, AND

THE TELEOLOGICAL IRRELEVANCE OF PROGRESSThe IslamicRevolutionn Iran should draw our attention o theneglected mportancefreactive nd reactionarylementsn all revo-lutions. he ideologyfproletarianevolution,s Mannheim asshown,

incorporated any f the lementsftheromantic,eactionaryritiqueof theEnlightenment.88n the otherhand,Nazism,as both ts deo-logues nd itshistoriansnotably racher) ave nsisted,ontained ev-olutionarys well as reactionarylements.89The IslamicRevolution onstitutes wry comment n the debateamonghistorianss to whether he arlymodern uropean evolutionswere conservativer liberal, eactionaryr progressive.t also dem-onstrateshatrevolutionariesften ctindefense f traditional alues.Baechlers rightwhenhenotes, contraryoappearancesndaccepted

86 Said A. Arjomand, "Ideological Revolution n Shi'ism," in Arjomand, AuthorityndPoliticalCulture n Shi'ism forthcoming,987).87Lotfollah Safi, Nezam-e Emamat va Rahbari [Regime of Imamate and Leadership](Tehran: Bonyad-e Be'that, 982/I36i), i6-i8.88 Karl Mannheim, "ConservativeThought," n Essays n Sociology nd PsychologyLon-don: Routledge& Kegan Paul, I953).89 Karl D. Bracher, The GermanDictatorshipNew York: Praeger, 970), 7-I3; Carsten(fn. 45), 428.


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 409belief, onservativeevolutionsre supportedessbythe elitethan bythepeople."90 ot surprisingly,ome mportanteleologicallementsntheclericallyed popularuprisingsuchas Carlism nd theCristeromovement' ind esonancen the slamicRevolutionn ran:repudiationof foreignnd cosmopolitannfluencesnd values, nd vehementp-positiono anticlerical olicies fmodernizing overnments,ncluding,of course, theism.Marx'sfamous dea that heFrenchrevolutionariesparodied he Romanrepublicansecause heyhad notyetdevelopedpoliticalanguage f their wn shouldnot utomaticallyegeneralized.The revolutionariesho draw on traditionalmageryan varygreatlyin their nowledgef nd professionaldentificationith radition.heAyatollahs ere heofficialustodians ftheShi'ite raditionnd knewtheirmethodologyfShi'ite urisprudence.n the pastsixyears, heyhaveproved hisbytheir ustainedffortso Islamicizeran's udiciarysystem,y nstitutionalizingubstantialolitical unctionsor heFridayprayereaders, nd bypresidingverthestrictnforcementf Islamicmorals.Islamicrevolutionaryraditionalismoeshave ts modern rappings.The Constitutionf the IslamicRepublicpays ip service o equalityand especiallyo social ustice,nd itguaranteesreedomf thepress,of he xpressionfpoliticalpinion,fpoliticalatheringsndgroups-provided, eedless o say, hat hey re not contraryothe nterestsfIslam.Finally, here s anothermodern lement hat s morethanatrapping:heMajlis,orparliament.he constitutionalismftheearly-modernEuropeanrevolutions as the idealization f practice, ndcloselyinked o the imofpreservingocal iberties.nIran, ven houghconstitutionalismntereds animportedanacea n 905-i906, themul-lahs usedthe constitutionalistdeologywhenopposing heShah.Con-sequently,heMaJliss an enduring eaturef the slamicregime. tslegislation,owever,s rigorouslyupervised ytheclerical urists fthe CouncilofGuardians.n addition, oththeruling lerics nd thelay slamic econd tratum ftheregimehavea keen nterestn tech-nology. hey ovebroadcasting,eing elevised,ndbeing nterviewedby hepress,ndtheyoveorganizingeminarsndcongressesndusingmodern-soundinghrases uchas "political-ideologicalureaus."When thenotionsf revolutionndprogressre inked, s theywerein the i9thcenturynd as they till re today, line can clearlybedrawnbetween evolutionnd counterrevolution.he evidence fferedinthis apermakes t mpossibleo draw uch line. t hasbeenpointed

90Baechler fn.3), io8. 91Hennessy fn. 1), 258.


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410 WORLD POLITICSoutthat ll revolutionsontain ounterrevolutionarylements. he ob-verse s alsotrue: ll counterrevolutionsust ncorporateevolutionaryinnovationsnorder o restore hatthey onsidero be thetraditionalorder.This is clearlyhecase with slamic evolutionaryraditionalismin Iran. As I have arguedelsewhere,t has in factbrought boutarevolutionwithin Shi'ism.92Furthermore, he Islamic Revolution hasstimulatedconsiderablegrowth n thesize ofthe state and thenumberofpersonsemployedbyit. One can legitimatelyee these factors s thecontinuation f a trend n modernization. t is, however,best treated sa universaltrendmaking forcontinuitywith the past rather than asspecific o the teleologyof this revolution s distinct romothers.D. THE TELEOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF RELIGION

Comparativeevidence not onlyrequires thatwe sever the conceptuallink between revolutionand progress,but also suggeststhat we linkrevolutionand religion.Religion was an importantfactornot only inthe Puritan Revolution,but in all early-modern uropean revolutionsexcepttheFronde.93Walzer is right n considering hePuritanMarianexiles of the I550s to be forerunners f modern revolutionarydeo-logues.94 ut thesame is true oftheclericsof theCatholicLeague thirtyyearslater.95n i640, the Puritan preacherswere calling the House ofCommons God's chosen instrument orrebuildingZion.96 n the sameyear, their Catholic counterparts n Catalonia were also engaged inrevolutionary ctivity.Here is the commander of the Spanish king'sforces n Rossello complainingof the sedition and licentiousness f theclergy:

In theconfessionalnd the pulpit hey pendtheir ntire ime rousingthepeopleand offeringhe rebels ncouragementnd advice, nducingthe ignorant o believe that rebellionwill win them the kingdomofheaven.97There are striking arallels betweenthePuritan Revolutionand theIslamic Revolution. For Cromwell as Moses, we have Khomeini asAbraham and Moses in one; for hePuritanSaints,we have themilitant

mullahs; and for the fastsermonsof I642-I649,98we had, under the92Arjomand (fn. 86). 93 Zagorin (fn. i8), I, p. 74I.94Walzer (fn. 56), 92-II3.95Roland Mousnier,Social Hierarchies, 450 to the Present, rans. by Peter Evans (NewYork: Schocken, I973), 50, 6i; Zagorin (fn. i8), II, chap. io.96 Stone (fn.20), 90.97 John Elliott,The Revoltofthe Catalans: A Study n theDecline of Spain (1598-i640)(Cambridge: Cambridge University ress, 963), 487.98 Hugh Trevor-Roper, The Fast Sermons of theLong Parliament," n Trevor-Roper,Religion, heReformationnd Social Change,2d ed. (London: Macmillan, 972).


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 411Shah,thegatheringst forty-dayntervalso commemoratehe"mar-tyrs";fterherevolution, ehavetheFriday ermonstcongregationalprayers.mportantifferences,owever,ffect heteleologies f theserespectiveevolutions.herewere trong narchic lementsn Puritan-ism-especially ndependency,hich onsideredtselfhetrueChurchwithinhecorrupthurch. uchanarchicnnerworldly illenarianre-cepts f the ndependents ilitatedgainst heir cceptance f a Pres-byterianational hurch overnment.hesepreceptsould alsolead inthe directionftheLevellers' onceptionfman as a rational eing nthe mage fGod,and hence o natural ights.he corporateolidarismof themilitant hi'ite lergy ontrastss strongly ith he factionalismofthe Puritan aints s methodologicallyroundedegalism ontrastswith heSaints'millenariandea ofChrist s theLawgiver. inally, herevolutionaryhi'ite lericalistheoryfthe overeigntyfthe urist sinsharp ontrasto the dea ofcongregationalepresentation-especiallyinPresbyterianism.99The situationsdifferentithregard othemodern evolutions;utlet us see how. De Tocquevilleknewthat he FrenchRevolution adproduced newreligion.t aimed atnothing hort fa regenerationfthewholehumanrace.... Itdevelopedinto species freligion,f singularlymperfectne, ince t was withouta God, without ritualor promise f a future ife.Nevertheless,hisstrangeeligion as, ike slam, verrun hewholeworldwith ts postles,militantsndmartyrs.'00The terms secularreligion" nd "political eligion" aveaptlybeenused to describe ommunismnd fascism.IoIModern revolutions orequirepoliticalreligions. he crucial ssue is whether here s anynecessaryncompatibilityetween eligionnd political eligion.The BolshevikRevolutionwas militantlytheistic. ut beforewedrawanyconclusions,et us think f tstotallymporteddeology ndof theexceedinglyarrow ocialbase of itspolitical lite.WhatabouttheFrenchRevolution? e Tocqueville idnot ee any ncompatibilitybetween hristianitynd thepolitical eligion f therevolution. nti-clericalismnd thecampaign gainst eligiontemmed rom he den-tificationf theChurchwith he ncien e'gime,nd notfrom nywide-

99Tai Liu,Discord nZion: ThePuritan ivines ndthePuritanRevolution640-I660 (TheHague: Nijhoff,973), 50-5I, 94-97, I46-60; Zagorin (fn. i8), II, p. i66.too lexis de Tocqueville, TheOldRegime ndtheFrenchRevolution, ew trans.byStuartGilbert New York: Doubleday Anchor, 955) I, I56.1or onnerot fn.75); Eric Voegelin, cience, oliticsnd Gnosticism: woEssays Chicago:RegneryGateway, i968). It is interesting o note that in I949 Monnerotdescribedcom-munismas "the twentieth-centuryslam."


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412 WORLD POLITICSspread nti-Christianentiment.102 hat about the fascist evolution?European fascismwas often ssociatedwith anticlericalism,ut thisassociations neither eneralnor fundamental.he Nazis glorifiedhemythical re-Christian erman raditionnd were anti-religious.hesame s trueof other ascistmovementsn Western nd Northern u-rope.At theother nd of the spectrum, owever, he Rumanian, heHungarian, he Slovak, nd the Croation ascistmovements ere em-phatically hristian nd aimed at establishing hristian orporatiststates.103Clerical eadershipnd participationn the Slovak Republic stab-lishedbyFatherHlinka'sPeople'sParty presided verbyFatherTiso)and in the Ustasha movementn Croatiaoffernterestingointsforcomparison ith ran.104 ut the most lluminatingarallel s betweenShi'ite evolutionaryraditionalismnd theRumanian ronGuards, heLegion of ArchangelMichael. Both movementsre characterized yextraordinaryults fsuffering,acrifice,ndmartydom.riests iguredprominentlyn the egionarymovement,ide by side with universitystudents.egionarymeetings ere nvariablyreceded ychurch erv-ices, nd their emonstrationsereusually ed bypriests arryingconsand religious lags.The integral hristianityf theLegionariesdif-ferentiatedhem from he Nazis and the Italian Fascists.This theyknew.As one oftheireadingntellectualsxplained,Fascismworshipsthe state,Nazism theraceand thenation.Our movement trives ot

102 It was "a spectacularbuttransient henomenon .. in no sense basic to its program."Therefore, he antireligious eatures aded as the truepolitical teleology f the revolutionunfolded. De Tocqueville (fn. Ioo), 5-7. On the vitality f religious entimentmong theinsurgentmassesduring the FrenchRevolution, ee AlbertSoboul, "Sentiment eligieux tcultespopulairespendant a revolution: aintes patriotes tmartyrs e la liberte" Religioussentiment nd popularcults during the revolution: atriotic aints nd martyrs f liberty],Archives e sociologic es religions (No. 2, I956).?3 These variations ecome ntelligiblen the ight fLinz's demonstrationhat he extentoforganizedpreemption fthepolitical pace byChristian-democraticr Catholic-conser-vative parties was a decisive factor n inhibiting he growth of fascism as in Spain andBelgium). Where such parties xisted nd had carved up electoral erritories or hemselves,fascism found a formidablerival. Fascism would also tend to be anticlerical n order todifferentiatetselffromthe rival religiousparty as were the Belgian Rex and the Nazisvis-a-vis heZentrum party). ee Linz (fn.45), i6-28, 52, 84; Linz (fn.57), I56; Hamilton(fn.45), 37-4I-Mexican fascism, heSinarquismofthe ate 930s and early 940s, also fits inz's pattern.The movementdeclined when itsmiddle-class upporters efected o the Catholic AccionNational. See Hennessy fn.41), 280-82. Linz's account of cases in which fascismwas notanticlerical ut ntensely hristian sunsatisfactory,owever; ee Linz (fn.45), i6, and Linz(fn. 7), 164, 184, n. 5i. The reverse ide of Linz's argument s well putby Merkl: "Thereis ample evidencethat religiousdecline and confrontations layed a role in fascistdevel-opment . ., creating massivereservoir fconfused uasi-religious ears nd longings pento exploitation yfascist emagogues." Merkl (fn. 45), 757.104YeshayahuJelinek, Clergy and Fascism: The Hlinka Party in Slovakia and theCroatian UstashaMovement," n Larsen and others fn.42).


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IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION 413merelyo fulfillhedestinyf theRumanian eople-we want o fulfillit long heroadto salvation."he ultimateoal ofthenation, odreanuand others mphasized,was "resurrectionnChrist."105

Finally,we must onsider razilian ntegralism,hemost mportantfascistmovementn LatinAmerica. ts founder, linioSalgado,metMussolinin I930. The meetingmadea deep impressionn him, ndhe certainlyawno incompatibilityetweenhefascist olitical eligionand Catholicism. e returnedoBrazilto "Catholicize"talianfascism.Taking advantage fan extensive etworkf ay religiousssociations,whichhad been broughtnto xistencey CardinalLeme,he foundedthe Brazilian ntegralist ctionwith heaim of creating corporatist,integralisttate. ntegralismppealed to Catholic ntellectualsecauseof tspromise fa "spiritualevolution"nd of n Integraltate whichcomesfrom hrist,s nspiredn Christ,ctsforChrist,nd goes towardChrist." algado accordinglyriticizedhe "dangerous agantendencyofHitlerism" nd lamented he ack ofa Christian asis nNazi ide-ology. 06Few wouldfind he tatementhat olitical evolutionsrea modernform f millenarianismbjectionable. ussian ommunism as the ec-ularmillenarianismfthe ThirdRome, nd Nazism was the secularmillenarianismf the Third Reich, the ThousandYear Reichof na-tionalfreedom nd social ustice."107As was the case withreligionndpolitical eligion, oliticalnd religiousmillenarianismre byno meansmutuallyxclusive. he religioushiliasticlementmay predominate,as in theTaipingRebellionwhich imedat establishinghe HeavenlyKingdom fGreatPeace;"'8 r tmayplay n importantubsidiaryole,as in the PuritanRevolutionnEngland nd the slamicRevolutionnIran.In thePuritanRevolution eencounterwoformsfmillenarianism:themilder,more nner-worldlyillenarianismfthe ndependent i-vines, nd thebetter nown, ctivist neof themen of theFifthMon-

'?5 E. Weber fns. o and 69); NicholasM. Nagy-Talavera,TheGreen hirtsndtheOthers:A History f Fascism n Hungary nd Rumania (Stanford,CA: Hoover InstitutionPress,I970), 247, 266-70-io6Stanley Hilton, "Aca6 IntegralistaBrasileira:Fascism in Brazil, I932-I938," Luso-BrazilianReview9 (No. 2, I972), i2; MargaretT. Williams,"Integralismnd theBrazilianCatholic Church," Hispanic American Historical Review 54 (No. 3, I974), 436-40. In thistypical earchfor"a thirdway,"Salgado also soughtto "Brazilianize" Italianfascism.Heconsideredthe two aspectsof his projectfully ompatible, nd declared,"My nationalismis full of God." Ibid., 434-36.

107Monnerot fn.75), chap. 3; Nicholai A. Berdiaev,TheRussianRevolutionAnn Arbor:University f Michigan Press, i96i); JamesM. Rhodes, The HitlerMovement:A ModernMillenarianRevolutionStanford, A: Hoover Institution ress, 980), 79.io8Lewy (fn.41), chap-7-


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414 WORLD POLITICSarchy. herecan be nodoubt hat evolutionaryoliticalmillenarianismplayed crucial ole nthemotivationf the ranian ntelligentsiandother roups. ut naddition,heShi'ite octrine ontains n importantmillenarianenet: hebeliefnthe ppearance f theTwelfthmam astheMahdi to redeem the world. This beliefwas as convenient orKhomeini's evolutionaryurpose s ithadbeen for hefounderftheSafavidEmpire n I50I.109 AlthoughShi'ite millenarianismplayed animportant ole in the Islamic Revolution,t did not have any of thedivisive nd anarchic onsequences fPuritanmillenarianismecausetheclericswerefirmlyn control f ts nterpretation,nd in fact artlyderived heiregal/juristicuthorityrom t.

CONCLUSIONThe success f the Islamic revolutionarydeologys the novel andteleologicallyistinctmarkof the slamicRevolutionn Iran.The ide-ology s a powerful esponse o thecontemporaryoliticized uestforauthenticity.t hasbeen constructedhroughheunacknowledgedp-

propriationf all the technical dvantages f the Western deologicalmovementsnd political eligions, ith headded-or rather,heem-phatically etained-promise fother-worldlyalvation. n a sense, thasa considerabledeological dvantage verNazism andcommunism,bothofwhichclashedwithreligion. ather hancreating new sub-stitute orreligion,s did thecommunistsnd theNazis, the slamicmilitants avefortifiedn already igorous eligion ith he deologicalarmornecessaryorbattle n the arena ofmass politics.n doing so,theyhavemade their istinct ontributionoworldhistory.

logArjomand (fn. 7), 269-70.

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Iran's Islamic Revolution

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