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Iran's Nuclear Program: Rational or Irrational?

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Amir Abadi May 4 th , 2009 Advisors: Ron Hassner and Amy Gurowitz U.C. Berkeley, Department of Political Science, Honors Thesis Iran’s Nuclear Program: Rational or Irrational? A Case for Regime Rationality For the first time since the Iranian Revolution, the United States and Iran are beginning to talk. Despite the lofty goals of rapprochement and peace, there is a struggle within the academic and political community to define what type of country Iran is. Two prominent camps have emerged regarding Iran. One posits that Iran is a fundamentally irrational actor on the world stage, driven by ideology and deserving of the pariah-status it has attained. The other argues that Iran, like other countries, is a shrewd rational actor, a product of over two thousand years of empire and statecraft. This debate is not black and white; most thinkers on the issue lean to either side of the argument. But radical elements on both sides have caused the debate to grow particularly venomous – as extremists in both camps accuse the entire spectrum of the other to be working for a foreign power or interest. The task at hand, then, is to determine if Iran is rational or irrational by analyzing the centerpiece of the debate – Iran’s nuclear program. This paper argues that Iran’s stance on their nuclear program is rational. It is the best course to fulfill Iran’s goals of maintaining security (both for the nation and for the regime), establishing an Iranian sphere of influence in the Middle East, and achieving independence and equal status in the world community. The nuclear program acts as a means to these ends. Furthermore, the aspects of the program that have been argued to be most irrational – Iran’s economic position and its stance on domestic enrichment – are not irrational in the long term. With this in mind, the Obama administration must open talks with Iran knowing they seek to overcome important and rational reasons for an Iranian nuclear program.
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Page 1: Iran's Nuclear Program: Rational or Irrational?

Amir Abadi May 4th, 2009

Advisors: Ron Hassner and Amy Gurowitz U.C. Berkeley, Department of Political Science, Honors Thesis

Iran’s Nuclear Program: Rational or Irrational? A Case for Regime Rationality

For the first time since the Iranian Revolution, the United States and Iran are beginning to talk. Despite the lofty goals of rapprochement and peace, there is a struggle within the academic and political community to define what type of country Iran is. Two prominent camps have emerged regarding Iran. One posits that Iran is a fundamentally irrational actor on the world stage, driven by ideology and deserving of the pariah-status it has attained. The other argues that Iran, like other countries, is a shrewd rational actor, a product of over two thousand years of empire and statecraft. This debate is not black and white; most thinkers on the issue lean to either side of the argument. But radical elements on both sides have caused the debate to grow particularly venomous – as extremists in both camps accuse the entire spectrum of the other to be working for a foreign power or interest. The task at hand, then, is to determine if Iran is rational or irrational by analyzing the centerpiece of the debate – Iran’s nuclear program.

This paper argues that Iran’s stance on their nuclear program is rational. It is the best

course to fulfill Iran’s goals of maintaining security (both for the nation and for the regime), establishing an Iranian sphere of influence in the Middle East, and achieving independence and equal status in the world community. The nuclear program acts as a means to these ends. Furthermore, the aspects of the program that have been argued to be most irrational – Iran’s economic position and its stance on domestic enrichment – are not irrational in the long term. With this in mind, the Obama administration must open talks with Iran knowing they seek to overcome important and rational reasons for an Iranian nuclear program.

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…I would like to speak clearly to Iran’s leaders. We have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community. This process will not be advanced by threats. We seek instead engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect. You, too, have a choice. The United States wants the Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations. You have that right – but it comes with real responsibilities, and that place cannot be reached through terror or arms, but rather through peaceful actions that demonstrate the true greatness of the Iranian people and civilization. And the measure of that greatness is not the capacity to destroy, it is your demonstrated ability to build and create.

- President Barack Hussein Obama1 It is time to talk to Iran. With a global recession, the threat of international terrorism, and

two wars in the Middle East, the current presidential administration has seemingly come to the

conclusion that years of isolating Iran over its nuclear program have borne little fruit. In his

personal message to Iranians on the occasion of Persian New Year, Barack Hussein Obama made

it clear that the United States will approach Iran with the rhetoric of diplomacy rather than

aggression. As his vice president, Joseph Biden, put it; “this much is clear: We will be willing to

talk.”2

The road to this decision has been arduous. For the past several years, whispers of war

were on everyone’s lips. President George W. Bush declared that Iran could not be “trusted to

enrich uranium” based on his firm belief that Iran wanted “to have a nuclear weapon to destroy

people.” 3 He went on to accuse Iran of supplying Iraqi insurgents with weapons, and pushed for

1 2009. “Video Taped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz.” Whitehouse.gov, March 20th. http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Videotaped-Remarks-by-The-President-in-Celebration-of-Nowruz/ 2 Jeff Seldin. 2009. “US Vice President Offers Iran a Chance and a Choice.” Voice of America News, Feb 7th. 3 William Branigin. 2008. “Bush Vows to Prevent Iran from Acquiring Nuclear Arms.” Washington Post, Mar 20th.

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the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to be designated as a terrorist organization.4 Meanwhile

on the campaign trail, American presidential candidate John McCain famously hummed a Beach

Boys tune to the words “bomb, bomb, bomb, bomb Iran.” Shaul Mofaz, a deputy to Ehud

Olmert, was much more blunt, stating that if “Iran continues with its program for developing

nuclear weapons, we [Israel] will attack it.” 5 The saber rattling, however, proved ineffective.

Amid all of the bellicose talk and threats towards Iran, the Iranian nuclear program actually

accelerated. 6 This left officials like Sir John Sawers, Britain's UN envoy, to conclude that the

threats of regime change or military strikes against Iran on the part of the United States and its

allies had not “produced any movement whatsoever.”7

As these tactics continued to fail to produce results, those inclined towards a more

peaceful solution started to gain ground. Condoleezza Rice gave President Bush a dose of Real

Politik when she told him, “I don’t think you can invade another Muslim country… even for the

best of reasons.”8 President Bush seemed to come around to Rice’s position when he refused the

Israelis permission to fly over Iraqi airspace in order to attack Iranian nuclear facilities.9 The

message was a simple one: the United States would not go along with a war on Iran.

At the same time, new views on Iran began to circulate within academia and government

agencies. Trita Parsi, an Iranian scholar, argued that Washington was following a broken policy

in the Middle East that contradicted “the natural balance by seeking to contain and isolate Iran,

4 Juan Cole. 2009. Engaging the Muslim World. Palgrave Macmillian. New York. 196. 5 Ian Black. 2008. “Israeli Threat to Attack Iran over Nuclear Weapons.” The Guardian, Jun 7th. 6 Bridget Kendall. 2009. “Iran in ‘Backroom Offers’ to West.” BBC.com. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7901101.stm 7 Ibid. 8 David Sanger. 2008. The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power. Harmony Press. 9 David E. Sanger. 2009. “US Rejected Aid for Israeli Raid on Iranian Nuclear Site.” The New York Times, Jan 11th.

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one of the most powerful countries in the region.”10 According to Parsi, it is necessary for Iran to

be integrated into the security structure of the region – a hard pill to swallow for some in the

West. In a commentary that ran in Time Magazine, Peter Beinart concurred with Parsi, writing:

Persuading [Iran] to give up its quest for a nuclear bomb – will require abandoning our efforts at regime change, muting our human-rights concerns and accepting an Iranian sphere of influence in the Persian Gulf. Obama’s opponents will probably depict that kind of deal as defeatist, an admission of the limits of American power in the Middle East. But those limits already exist; the U.S. just hasn’t acknowledged them.11

The Obama administration has hinted that they are receptive to this idea. U.S.

Ambassador Susan Rice vocalized her hope that Iran would become a “constructive regional

actor.”12 In that spirit, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States is

seeking Iran’s help in the future of Afghanistan, going so far as inviting them to an international

conference on the matter.13 At that conference presidential envoy Richard C. Holbrooke and an

Iranian diplomat exchanged pleasantries, while a letter was passed on to the Iranian

government.14 More telling is Obama’s own message to the Iranian people. In it he announced

that the United States welcomed Iran’s inclusion into the “community of nations.”15 Such a role

for Iran, however, would come with “real responsibilities.”16 Though Obama did not go into

specifics on what those responsibilities were, some experts speculate that they may include an

Iranian role as a regional power.

10 Trita Parsi. 2007. Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. Yale University Press. New Haven. 262. 11 Peter Beinart. 2008. “The Solvency Doctrine.” Time, Feb 2nd, 52-54. 12 Edith M. Lederer. 2009. “US Will Seek to end Iran’s Nuclear Ambition.” Reuters, Feb 26th. 13 Sue Pleming. 2009. “US to Invite Iran to Afghanistan Meeting: Clinton.” Reuters, Mar 5th. 14 Mark Lander. 2009. “Obama Administration has First Face-to-Face Contact with Iran.” New York Times, Mar 31st. 15 “Video Taped Remarks by the President in Celebration of Nowruz.” 16 Ibid.

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For their part, Iranian leaders have seemed somewhat receptive to a diplomatic

rapprochement with the United States. Hassan Ghashghavi, Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman,

stressed that his country was willing to “engage in an interaction to resolve [America’s]

concerns” as long as the United States “recognizes our legal rights.” 17 Later, Iran’s President

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad echoed Obama’s own words when he declared: “Our nation is ready to

hold talks based on mutual respect and in a fair atmosphere.”18

But the Iranians have complained that they do not know what the true intentions of the

Americans are. For every friendly gesture offered towards Iran, there is also an unfriendly one.

Recently President Obama extended economic sanctions first imposed by President Clinton for

another year because Iran “continued to pose an ‘extraordinary threat’ to the national security,

foreign policy and economy of the United States.”19 Ahmadinejad fired back, calling Obama’s

policies a “childish idea.”20 Obama has also stated that he will continue the “carrots and sticks”

tactic against Iran – offering economic incentives while threatening punishment. This phrase,

according to Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, a member of Iran's Parliament from 2000 to 2004, is

one that “many Iranians worldwide consider insulting to a 3,000-year-old civilization, as if it’s

mule to be manhandled by a foreign power.”21

Haghighatjoo notes the chilly Iranian response to the rhetoric of carrots and sticks, as

well as their effect on the overall peace process. She uses former Iranian President Hashemi

Rafsanjani’s words as an example; he complained that, “Such language is not appropriate for

17 Nazila Fathi. 2008. “Iran Urges Obama to Change Approach.” The New York Times, Dec 12th. 18 Nazila Fathi and David E. Sanger. 2009. “Iran Offers ‘Dialogue with Respect’ With US” New York Times, Feb 10th. 19 Fredrik Dahl. 2009. “Iran Dismisses Sanctions, Launches Gas Project.” Reuters, Mar 13th. 20 Ibid. 21 Dr. Fatemeh Haghighatjoo. 2009. “Expediting U.S. talks with Iran.” Boston Globe, Mar 12th.

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Obama. Iran wants neither US encouragement nor its punishment.” 22 Iran’s Speaker of

Parliament, Ali Larijani also abhorred “These comments [that] resemble those of old American

cowboys.” Larijani continued to challenge American officials when he said, “If you have

something to say about [Iran's] nuclear issue, just say so. Why wave a stick?” 23 Based on these

comments Haghighatjoo concludes, “all attempts to pursue talks, whether at the highest level,

through legislative bodies, or other diplomatic channels, will be influenced by the rhetoric of

Obama and his aides.”24

With these issues in mind, it is noteworthy that Iran's deputy foreign minister for the

Americas, Ali Reza Salari, told reporters that although American officials “are not talking with

the same tone that existed before… the signal that is reaching Iran from the United States is not a

very clear and proper one. It's a mixed signal.”25

This mixed signal is a product of an international tug-of-war that seeks to define what

type of country Iran is. Two prominent camps have emerged regarding Iran – camps that will be

labeled as ‘irrationalists’ and ‘rationalists.’ ‘Irrationalists’ posit that Iran is a fundamentally

irrational actor on the world stage, driven by ideology and deserving of the pariah-status it has

attained. The ‘rationalists’ argue that Iran, like other countries, is a shrewd rational actor, a

product of over two thousand years of empire and statecraft. This debate is not black and white;

most thinkers on the issue lean to either side of the argument. But radical elements on both sides

have caused the debate to grow particularly venomous – as extremists in both camps accuse the

entire spectrum of the other to be working for a foreign power or interest.

22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Edith M. Lederer. 2009. “US Will Seek to end Iran’s Nuclear Ambition.” Reuters, Feb 26th.

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This raging debate has had considerable impact. Caught between two opposing forces,

the Obama administration has not yet reached a consensus on what type of partner for dialogue

Iran is. Is Iran a rational actor that can sit down on the negotiating table like any other state, or is

it driven by ideology and bent on nuclear acquisition and war? Though Obama has tilted towards

talking with Iran, this struggle to define what type of country Iran is threatens to alter the course

of peace. Thus these mixed signals are troubling – with the nuclear issue hanging over the

world’s head, such signals are signs of important obstacles to clear and substantive negotiations

with Iran.

Questions and Answers

Acknowledging the importance of the rational/irrational debate, this paper seeks to

determine how rational Iran is by analyzing its nuclear stance. The question to be answered

becomes: is Iran’s current nuclear policy rational? The argument made here is that despite the

costs the nuclear policy imposes, the nuclear program is rational. The domestic economic

benefits, coupled with the strategic asset that the program presents far outweigh the costs of

international pressure.

Some theoretical groundwork must be laid to understand the argument. First and

foremost, it should be understood that the debate regarding the rationality of Iran is fairly

imprecise. It is a mishmash of definitions of what rationality is. It also fails to identify what is

being defined as rational or irrational – Iran, its leaders, its people, or the state ideology.

Precision, however, is essential in understanding Iran. Though seemingly irrational figures like

Ahmadinejad make splashes in the headlines, their importance to the central question of how

rational Iran is remains fairly moot.

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Throughout this paper, Iran has been labeled as the “actor” whose rationality is in

question. But what do we mean by Iran? For the purposes of our paper, we will be using a very

narrow definition. “Iran” is the ruling clerical establishment of Iran – namely the Supreme

Leader and those in his inner circle who advise him. This narrow definition has been taken

because the Supreme Leader is the arbiter of every policy decision of Iran.26 Every move and

every calculation on the nuclear issue either originates from him or has been approved by him.27

Furthermore, any substantive negotiation made between the United States and Iran will really be

a substantive negotiation made between the United States and the Supreme Leader.

It is quite fitting that a country as complex as Iran will elicit from this paper a similarly

complex definition of rationality. To be rational, a set of conditions will be required. Narrowly,

rationality requires that an actor perform actions that will meet their desired goal.28 This is better

known as “means to ends” rationality.29 More broadly however, rationality also requires that the

overall goal is reasonable, attainable, and beneficial for the actor.30

It is in this light that the argument of this paper can be properly understood. The

Supreme Leader has very specific overall goals. While these goals do stem in part from Iran’s

revolutionary ideology, they are reasonable, attainable, and beneficial for the Supreme Leader

and his ruling elite. They are security (both for the nation and for the regime), an Iranian sphere

of influence in the Middle East, and national/independence and equal status in the world

community. The nuclear program acts as a means to these ends. Furthermore, the aspects of the

26 Akbar Ganji. 2008. “The Latter-Day Sultan.” Foreign Affairs Magazine. November/December. 45. 27 Ibid. 28 Peter Breiner. 1996. Max Weber and Democratic Politics. Cornell University Press. 38. 29 Ibid. 30 Ron Hassner. 2009. E-mail Correspondence. Apr 18th.

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program that have been argued to be most irrational – Iran’s economic position and its stance on

domestic enrichment – are not irrational in the long term.

This paper follows a simple framework to convey this argument. First, the necessary

context surrounding the history of the nuclear program as well as the fear of Iran’s nuclear intent

will be discussed. This will be followed by an overview of the debate between ‘irrationalists’ and

‘rationalists.’ Next the goals of Iran’s ruling elite will be discussed and defined. After that, the

contention that both Iran’s economic situation, as well as its stance on domestic enrichment,

makes the program irrational will be challenged. Following that, possible weaknesses in the

argument will be discussed. Finally, my conclusions will point to specific problems and

opportunities that may arise in nuclear negotiations with Iran going forward.

History of the Nuclear Program

Iran’s nuclear program began under its former monarch, Reza Shah Pahlavi, in the

1960s.31 The country had entered into a partnership with the United States under the “Atoms for

Peace” program, which was designed to promote nuclear energy but prohibit work on nuclear

weapons.32 Iran’s first five-megawatt nuclear reactor was purchased from U.S. companies.33 Iran

also became a charter member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970.34 Iran continues to

abide by this treaty, which requires the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor

Iran’s nuclear program.35

The Iranian Revolution, the subsequent pulling out of Western resources, and the Iran-

Iraq war all put Iran’s program on hold for almost a decade. It was not until 1989, with the

31 Kenneth M. Pollack. 2004. The Persian Puzzle: the Conflict Between Iran and America. Random House. New York. 363. 32 Ibid, 366. 33 2008. “Intel says Iran Plans Secret Nuclear Experiment.” The Associated Press, Oct 30th. 34 Pollack, 363. 35 Ibid.

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election of the new Supreme Leader, that the program began anew.36 Iran both overtly and

covertly continued its drive towards a successful nuclear program with the aid of a variety of

countries, most notably Pakistan, China, Russia, and North Korea.37

In 2002, the world was shocked to find out that Iran had a heavy-water production facility

at Arak designed to extract plutonium, and a gas centrifuge plant at Natanz designed to enrich

uranium.38 With the ‘cat out of the bag,’ so to speak, Iran opened itself up to IAEA inspection,

negotiations with the Europeans, and constant threats by American and Israeli officials of

military strikes. Additionally, Iran found itself a victim of sweeping economic sanctions.39

That has not stopped top Iranian officials from making civilian nuclear energy a rallying

call for independence from Western influence. Former Iranian President Rafsanjani has defiantly

stated: “definitely we can’t stop our nuclear program and won’t stop it. You can’t take

technology away from a country already possessing it.”40 Iran’s leaders have previously

suspended enrichment, but will probably not do so again.41 The Supreme Leader of Iran, Ali

Khamenei, complained that his previous agreement to temporarily suspend enrichment, “Turned

into something sacrosanct that Iran had no right whatsoever to touch!” 42 As long as suspension

was aimed at “closing down the nuclear business altogether,” Khamenei maintained, Iran would

no longer partake in it.43

36 Ganji, 62. 37 Pollack, 364. 38 Ibid, 361. 39 The severity of which will be discussed later in the paper. 40 Kenneth R. Timmerman. 2005. Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with Iran. Crown Forum. New York. 300. 41 Ganji, 62. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid.

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Iran currently has over 7000 nuclear centrifuges44 – cylindrical machines that enrich

uranium.45 Though some Western analysts believe Iran may soon run out of raw uranium, better

known as ‘yellow cake,’ Iranian officials claim they have plenty.46 Iran is also underway in

testing its first nuclear power plant at Bushehr, a 1,000-megawatt reactor built by the Russians.47

Despite CIA attempts to both disrupt shipments of centrifuge components and convince Iran’s

nuclear scientists to leave the country, the program continues.48 According to nuclear weapons

expert Joseph Cirincione, Iran has “made more progress in the last five years than in the previous

ten.”49 Consequently, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, has called the last “five years

of U.S. and international efforts to rein in Iran’s nuclear ambitions a failure.”50 Iran’s current

policy is to continue the course of enrichment regardless of outside pressure. As one analyst

described it, Iran’s strategy is to “keep [their] head down, moving slowly and deliberately and

winning at each step” until the world accepts the program.51

More alarming for some are news reports that Iran has reached a “breakout point” in

terms of its nuclear development. The IAEA has reported that Iran has “amassed about 2,227

pounds of low-enriched, or reactor-grade, nuclear fuel.”52 This is enough material to build a

nuclear bomb, if Iran decides to “breakout” of the NPT, kick out inspectors, and further refine its

44 Nazila Fathi. 2009. “Iran Claims Gains in Nuclear Program.” The New York Times, Apr 9th. 45 Greg Miller. 2009. “U.S. now Sees Iran as Pursuing Nuclear Bomb.” The Los Angeles Times, Feb 12th. 46 2009. “Iran Says has own raw Uranium Supply.” Reuters UK, Feb 19th. 47 Thomas Erdbrink. 2009. “Iran’s First Nuclear Power Plant Set for Tests Before Launch.” Washington Post Foreign Service, Feb 23rd. 48 Miller. 49 Ibid. 50 Borzou Daraghi. 2008. “Efforts on Iran ‘a Failure.’” The Los Angeles Times, Dec 06th. 51 “Intel says Iran Plans Secret Nuclear Experiment.” 52 Borzou Daraghi. 2009. “Iran has Enough Fuel for a Nuclear Bomb, Report Says.” The Los Angeles Times, Feb 20th.

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supply.53 Israeli intelligence officials concur, and have made it clear that they believe Iran has

both the materials and the technology necessary to make a nuclear bomb.54 The Jerusalem Post

reported that the head of Military Intelligence, Major General Amos Yadlin, reported to the

Israeli Cabinet that Iran had “crossed the technological threshold,” and needed only to

incorporate “the goal of producing an atomic bomb into its strategy.”55 The Americans have been

more hesitant to make such claims. Reacting to the words of Yadlin, Dennis Blair, the new

director of national intelligence, proclaimed that the Israelis “‘take more of a worst-case

approach to these things.’”56

Towards a Nuclear Weapon?

Nevertheless, the fear persists that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapon. Much of it has to

do with the fact that the technology needed for nuclear energy is ‘dual-use’ – as in it can also be

used for nuclear weapons. The problem is that both nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are

made from the same basic material – uranium.57 Civilian and military nuclear programs both rely

on uranium that is converted into a gas and then enriched.58 Enrichment in both process are done

in centrifuges that increase the proportion of u-235 –uranium atoms that are capable of beginning

and sustaining a nuclear chain reaction.59 The difference between nuclear energy and nuclear

weapons, however, relies on how enriched the uranium becomes. Power plans need only 3%

enrichment.60 Nuclear weapons require 90% enrichment, along with more centrifuges.61

53 Ibid. 54 2009. “Israel: Iran has Mastered Bomb Technology.” United Press International, Mar 9th. 55 Ibid. 56 David E. Sanger and William J. Broad. 2009. “Allie’s Clocks Tick Differently on Iran.” The New York Times, Mar 14th. 57 Bryan Walsh. 2007. “Telling Atomic Plowshares from Nuclear Swords.” Time, Dec 17th. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid.

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Compounding the headache that this process poses to those concerned with nuclear

proliferation are specific provisions in the NPT itself. Signatories to the NPT are allowed to

complete every incremental step necessary both to nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.62 The

only thing that the NPT prevents a signatory from doing is loading fissile material into a bomb.63

This creates a situation where very little can stop a country from putting fissile material in a

bomb. In some cases, it is difficult even to know if a country has done so if they choose not to

reveal that they have.64 Pakistan, a non-signatory to the NPT, denied that it had manufactured

fissile material or loaded it into a bomb until the day it tested its first nuclear weapons.65

Former CIA agent, Robert Baer, has also pointed to shady business deals Iran has made

in the past as evidence of its intention to build nuclear weapons. According to Baer, Iran has

been buying technology integral to bomb technology. From China, Iran has purchased

electromagnetic isotope separators and a three-axis turntable, tech that “could be converted for

grinding explosive lenses for a nuclear triggering device.”66 Baer also asserts that Iran bought

bomb technology from A.Q. Khan, the notorious Pakistani nuclear scientist.67 Baer suggests,

“These were all signs that Iran planned to secretly build a bomb.”68

Most telling, however, is the American National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) report

released in 2007. In that report the consensus of the intelligence agencies in the United States

was that Iran had a nuclear weapons program but gave it up in 2003. The unclassified portion of

61 Ibid. 62 Pollack, 366. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Robert Baer. 2008. The Devil we Know: Dealing with the New Iranian Superpower. Crown Publishing. 110. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

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the report presented no evidence for that claim, but the IAEA followed up and found some

disturbing results. They concluded that Iran had researched key elements in the weaponization of

nuclear material including “the development and testing of high voltage detonator firing

equipment and the simultaneous firing of multiple explosive bridgewire detonators.”69 The IAEA

also found documents relating to the “testing of at least one full scale ‘hemispherical,

converging, explosively driven shock system’ applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device.”70

They also believe that Iran had redesigning its Shahab-3 missile to possibly house a nuclear

warhead.71 With such issues in mind, the NIE concluded, “with moderate confidence” that

“Tehran has not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid 2007.”72

Iran, however, states that its nuclear program has always been solely for peaceful

purposes.73 Due to religious rulings by Iran’s top clerics, Iran has “categorically rejected

development, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons.”74 In June of 2006, Khamenei bluntly

proclaimed to his supporters that, “We consider using nuclear weapons against Islamic rules. We

have announced this openly.”75

The Iranians have characterized all efforts to stop Iranian enrichment as “illegal and

unwarranted.”76 They point to the fact that Iran should have a right to peaceful nuclear energy

69 David Albright, Jacqueline Shire, Paul Brannan, and Andrea Scheel. 2009. “Nuclear Iran: Not Inevitable.” Institute for Science and International Security. Jan 21st. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Ibid. 73 Miller. 74 2006. “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 9. 75 Cole, 208. 76 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 8.

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under the NPT.77 They also accuse the Western world of being hypocritical. In an official

declaration to the United Nations, the Iranians bitterly complain that Israel, a country that is not a

signatory of the NPT, and in Iran’s view has “expansionist, repressive and state-terror policies

and behavior that are repeatedly recognized as the single most serious threat to regional and

international peace,” is allowed to posses nuclear weapons.78 The Iranians openly challenge “the

convoluted logic that it is OK for some to have nuclear weapons, while others are prevented

from developing nuclear energy.”79

Defining Iran as Irrational

With the facts surrounding the nuclear program made clear, the debate surrounding the

rationality of Iran can be seen in context. Alarmed by the possibility of a nuclear armed Iran, a

large contingent in the international community has emerged that labels Iran as an irrational

state. For our purposes, we will call them the ‘irrationalists.’ At it’s most extreme, the

‘irrationalist’ side of the debate argues, “Iran is an insane, fanatical, undeterrable state – the

equivalent of al-Qaida.”80 Though there exists more reasoned voices in this camp who claim that

Iran is driven by ideology, all ‘irrationalists’ have been accused of being neo-conservatives or

stooges of the Israeli lobby. They have been called war mongers and fanatics intent on bombing

Iran on behalf of Israel.

Extreme ‘irrationalists,’ like Kenneth Timmerman, joke that “the Mullahs [are] laughing

all the way to Armageddon.”81 Many government officials join in on the chorus. In a joint

session of Congress, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert warned that an irrational Iran

77 Ibid, 6. 78 Ibid, 8. 79 Ibid, 8. 80 Gary Kamiya. 2007. “Iraq Taught us Nothing.” Salon.com. http://www.salon.com/opinion/kamiya/2007/11/06/iran_war/. 81 Timmerman, 302.

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presented a threat comparable to “‘the savagery of slavery, to the horrors of World War II, [and]

the gulags of the communist bloc.”82 In this school of thought there is a particular emphasis on

comparing Iran to Nazi Germany. For instance, AIPAC Executive Director Howard Khor told

his supporters, “‘the parallels of the geo-political climate of March 5, 1933, and that of March 5,

2006, are stunning in their likeness; eerie in their implication.’”83 Because of its nuclear program

Iran is often presented as more of a threat than Nazism itself. On the eve of the 2008 American

election, David Horovitz, a columnist for the Jerusalem Post, warned:

If Iran’s genocidal regime is capable of implementing its inhumane ambitions, there will be no slow gathering of pace, no Nazi-style gradual refinement of the mass-killing process. The threat, rather, is of simple pressure applied to a nuclear trigger and vast, immediate consequences. There would be no room for the belated realization of the imperative to act that enabled the costly defeat of the Nazis. The damage would already have been done.84 Much of the Nazi rhetoric is a result of the actions of President Ahmadinejad.

‘Rationalists’ like Juan Cole, John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt all dispute that

Ahmadinejad called for Israel to be wiped off the map. Nevertheless they recognize how

troubling and upsetting his conference on the Holocaust must have been to Israelis and

‘irrationalists.”85Ahmadinejad has also targeted the United States, predicting that “the time for

the fall of the satanic power of the United States has come and the countdown to the annihilation

of the emperor of power and wealth has started.”86 Other ‘irrationalists’ are concerned by the

belligerent actions of the Revolutionary Guards, Iran’s most fearsome army unit. They contend

that the Revolutionary Guards have showed off Shahab-3 missiles during military parades with

82 John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt. 2008. The Israeli Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. New York. 299. 83 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 268. 84 David Horovitz. 2008. “Editors Note: As America Votes.” The Jerusalem Post, Oct. 30th. 85 Mearsheimer and Walt, 280-281. 86 Tom Curry. 2007. “Is Iran Irrational or Merely Hostile?” Msnbc.com. http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25442607.

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banners that have called for the destruction of Israel.87

Finding a focus on Ahmadinejad as a key figure, the ‘irrationalists’ have called him a

“madman” and have attempted to link him and Iran with a so-called “Islamofascist ideology.”88

Norman Podhoretz, author of World War IV: The Long Struggle Against Islamofascism,

describes Islamofascism as “yet another mutation of the totalitarian disease we defeated first in

the shape of Nazism and fascism and then in the shape of communism.”89 According to

Podhoretz, Islamofascism is a totally irrational line of thinking, bent on the destruction of the

West and the global dominance of Islam. In Podhertz’s worldview, Iran is the “main center of the

Islamofascist ideology against which we have been fighting since 9/11” and “its effort to build a

nuclear arsenal makes it the potentially most dangerous one of all.90

Bernard Lewis, whose work within the field of Middle Eastern studies provides an

intellectual foundation for such theories, presents us with a passage that synthesizes the fear of

an irrational and Islamofascist Iran, headed by Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, armed with nuclear

weapons. He writes:

MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the cold war. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already that [Iran’s leaders] do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. We have seen it again and again. In the final scenario, and this applies all the more strongly if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights.91

All authors who lean towards Iran being an irrational state have been lumped together

87Timmerman, 306. 88 Norman Podhoretz. 2007. “The Case for Bombing Iran.” Wall Street Journal, May 30th. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid.

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and labeled as Israeli stooges and warmongers. Scott Ritter, a ‘rationalist,’ believes that the

argument against a rational Iran is a part of a calculated strategy on the part of neo-conservatives

and Israelis in Washington. Instead of being an academic exercise, Ritter and other ‘rationalists’

argue that these groups have resorted to fear mongering to convince readers to militarily

challenge and isolate Iran. According to Scott Ritter, the “ultimate policy objective” of the

‘irrationalists’ “is war.”92 Worse yet, he believes that their work has been “born in Israel.”93 The

authors Mearsheimer and Walt agree. They argue that Israel and the Israeli lobby are the chief

forces behind the ‘irrationalists’ and have been pushing the United States to take a “strategically

unwise policy towards Iran.”94

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, an aid to former Iranian President Khatami, has described

‘irrationalists’ as partaking in a smear campaign with the specific goal of confrontation with

Iran.95 He and other authors argue that this smearing is meant to drive the Israeli and American

media into hysterics. They claim that the same strategy of media manipulation that was used

against Iraq is being used against Iran. Mark Weber, the director of the Institute for Historical

Review, points to comments made by Israeli General Oded Tira as evidence. He quotes Tira as

stating:

President Bush lacks the political power to attack Iran. As an American strike in Iran is essential for our [Israel’s] existence, we must help him pave the way by lobbying the Democratic Party and US newspaper editors. We need to do this in order to turn the Iranian issue to a bipartisan one and unrelated to the Iraq failure. We must turn to Hillary Clinton and other potential candidates in the Democratic Party so that they publicly support immediate action by Bush against Iran.96

92 Scott Ritter. 2006. Target Iran: The Truth About the White House’s Plans for Regime Change. Nation Books. New York. 201. 93 Ibid, 208. 94 Mearsheimer and Walt, 282. 95 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi. 2008. “Elusive Consensus on Iran.” Asia Times Online, Oct 23rd. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/JJ23Ak02.html 96 Ibid.

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Defining Iran as Rational

As noted in the last section, there exists a wide range of voices that are in opposition to

those who believe Iran is an irrational actor. For the purpose of this paper, we will call them the

‘rationalists.’ Much like their ‘irrationalist’ counterparts, they too have been smeared. They have

been accused of being in league with the clerics and acting as an “Iran Lobby” in the United

States.

‘Rationalists,’ like Robert Baer, believe that “nearly everything the average American has

been told about Iran is wrong.”97 They chastise the media for portraying Iran as intent on fighting

a crusade or converting Americans to Islam.98 They take pains to make clear that Iran “truly

believes that for the last thirty years, it has been fighting a straightforward war against

occupation.”99 ‘Rationalists’ also stress that Iran has historically acted pragmatically. Baer goes

so far as to contend that Iran has acted more rationally than the United States in its attempts at

gaining inroads into Palestine, Lebanon, and the Gulf States.100 He also points to the fact that

Iran has avoided confrontation with the United States in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf.101

Many others concur. Efraim Halevi, former head of the Israeli intelligence agency

Mossad, was quoted as saying, “I don’t think they are irrational, I think they are very rational. To

label them as irrational is escaping from reality and it gives you kind of an escape clause.”102

Trita Parsi adds that Iran’s past actions “reveals systematic, pragmatic and cautious maneuvering

toward a set goal: decontainment and the re-emergence of Iran as a pre-eminent power in the

97 Baer, 77. 98 Ibid. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid, 179. 101 Ibid. 102 Parsi, Treacherous Alliance, 270.

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Middle East.”103

The ‘rationalists’ also contend that for Iran, pragmatism trumps ideology. Iranian scholar

Nasser Saghafi-Ameri points out that at the beginning of the Revolution, Iran, like all early

revolutionary government, had a strong inclination towards an ideological approach to foreign

policy.104 But as revolutionary governments like Iran “mature,” Ameri contends, pragmatic

considerations take precedence over ideology.105 He argues that this is why Iran cooperated with

the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq, and why Iran remained neutral in the conflict between

Christian Armenia and Shi‘a Azerbaijan.106 Juan Cole adds that this transformation occurred

fairly early in the lifetime of the Islamic Republic. During the Iran-Iraq war, Ayatollah Khomeini

himself authorized the sale of petroleum to Israel in exchange for American spare parts that

could be used for repairs and maintenance in Iran’s air force.107

According to the ‘rationalists’ this pragmatism is not limited to foreign policy. Kenneth

M. Pollack argues that the leaders of Iran are extremely pragmatic domestically. He points to the

fact that the Iranian leadership has recently backed off on unpopular social restrictions in order to

stay in power. He describes their actions as a “brutally and radically pragmatic move.”108 Giving

up their hold on Iranian social behavior in exchange for maintaining their grasp on power proves

that the leadership is “willing to betray one of the most important principles of their ideology.”109

It is Trita Parsi, however, who highlights the most persuasive evidence for the pragmatism

103 Trita Parsi. 2007. “The Iranian Challenge.” The Nation, Nov 1st. http://www.thenation.com/doc/20071119/parsi. 104 Nasser Saghafi-Ameri. 2009. “Iranian Foreign Policy: Concurrence of Ideology and Pragmatism.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Cole, 218. 108 Pollack, 371. 109 Ibid.

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of Iran’s rulers – the words of the rulers themselves. In Iran’s former President, and now

backroom power broker, Hashemi Rafsanjani, Parsi finds a man who is wiling to change his

ideology in order to follow a pragmatic course. Rafsanjani announced in one of his Friday prayer

sermons that, “Our ideology is flexible. We can choose expediency on the basis of Islam.”110

Later Rafsanjani said that in terms of foreign policy, “To put the country in jeopardy on the

ground that we are acting on [an] Islamic basis is not at all Islamic.”111 Somewhat confusingly,

for Rafsanjani and many like him in Iran, ideology dictates pragmatism, which in turn dictates

ideology.

Iran’s former Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Maleki, may not buy that particular logic.

To him, Iran’s foreign policy is no longer ideological. He believes that any Islamic ideology

would force Iran to “have pro-Muslim policies in all of the world.” 112 Maleki points out,

however, that Iran failed to support Chechen Muslims. He contends that, “If ideology was the

first motivator for Iranian foreign policy, Iran must do that. But Iran didn’t.”113

The ‘rationalists’ also set about arguing against the different points made by the

‘irrationalists.’ They argue that the ‘irrationalists’ place far too much emphasis on

Ahmadinejad’s role in the Iranian government. Though Ahmadinejad can go on tours around the

world and make speeches, he has very limited power in terms of foreign policy. 114 As Juan Cole

humorously commented: “The idea that Iran’s cocky, diminutive president is about to change

110 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 263. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114 Parsi, “The Iranian Challenge.”

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into khakis and lead a military attack on Israel is bizarre.”115 Even if Ahmadinejad is irrational,

Cole contends, he has no outlet but his words to act on it.

Real power lies in the hands of the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, according to

the ‘rationalists.’ In Iran “the executive, the legislative, and judicial branches of government all

operate under the absolute sovereignty of the supreme leader.”116 Ayatollah Khamenei acts as

“the head of state, the commander in chief, and the top ideologue” of Iran.117 As one former

senior Iranian official put it: “If the [Supreme] Leader were to withdraw his support,

Ahmadinejad’s political future would be finished… He is scared of [Khamenei], like a dog.”118

It is true however, that Ahmadinejad’s words can have consequences. The ‘rationalists’

see in his statements regarding Israel and the Holocaust not an irrational genocidal threat, but a

calculated foreign and domestic policy move. Bidgan Nashat, yet another Iran expert, sees in this

rhetoric an attempt to “paralyze Ahmadinejad’s domestic opponents” as well as “overcome

Iran’s strategic isolation in the Middle East by extending Iran’s security perimeter to Lebanon

and the Palestinian territories.119 Mearsheimer and Walt, authors of The Israeli Lobby, expand on

this theory further, arguing that Ahmadinejad’s harsh rhetoric towards Israel along with the

endorsement of the Palestinian cause wins sympathy with the Arab world and discourages Arab

alliances against Persian Iran.120

The ‘rationalists’ do concede that many of Iran’s actions have seemed irrational. As one

author put it:

115 Cole, 204. 116 Ganji, 45. 117 Ibid. 118 2008. “Iran: Who runs it?” The Economist, Jul 26th. 119 Bidgjan Nashat. 2009. “Iran’s Tactical Foreign Policy Rhetoric.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 120 Mearsheimer and Walt, 283.

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The country’s foreign policies look erratic, too. Iran has condemned jihadist terrorism, but sheltered al-Qaeda fugitives. It has backed the government of Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, yet has abetted militias opposed to him. It champions Muslim unity but creates division by vilifying pro-Western Muslim rulers, backing Shia factions and expecting Shias everywhere to bow to Mr. Khamene’i’s authority. “Zigzagging” appears to be the hallmark of the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy.121

In this zigzagging however, the ‘rationalists’ see an echo of President Nixon. They believe that

Iran is following the “mad-man Nixon” strategy, whereby Iran pretends to be irrational so that its

“enemies will be more reluctant to attack Iran if Tehran's response can't be predicted and won't

follow a straight cost-benefit analysis.”122 The best evidence for this theory are the words of

Amir Mohebian, and influential conservative strategist in Iran. He has proclaimed that: “We

[Iran] should not be calculable and predictable to them [Iran’s enemies]. The U.S. could not mess

with Imam [Khomeini] because he wasn’t calculable… Saddam’s fall was because he was

calculable.”123

The most vocal ‘irrationalists’ see in the arguments made by the ‘rationalists’ the backing

of Iran. They accuse all those who lean towards the view that Iran is rational as tools of the “Iran

Lobby.” Hassan Daioleslam, an Iranian himself, was the first to posit this term. He argues that

the ‘rationalists’ have been waging a “disinformation campaign” that has cost American lives

and billions in taxpayer dollars. In essence, the ‘rationalists’ pose a threat to “national

security.”124

Daioleslam has a particular dislike for Trita Parsi, a ‘rationalist’ academic who has

already been referenced several times in this paper. He argues that Trita Parsi is at the head of

121 2008. The Economist, May 24-30. 122 Parsi, “The Iranian Challenge.” 123 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 271-272. 124 Hassan Dai. 2008. “Iran’s Lobby in the U.S.” Iranianlobby.com. May 8th. http://english.iranianlobby.com/page1.php?id=15&bakhsh=INTERVIEWS

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the Iran Lobby in the United States. Rather than being an academic, Parsi is just a tool of Iran’s

clerical establishment. As Daioleslam jokes, “if you listen to these ‘Iran experts,’ you should do

exactly what Trita Parsi has been trying to say for so long, that the US should accept Iran's power

in the Middle East.”125

Other ‘rationalists’ have found themselves targeted. Robert Baer is one such individual.

He is the author of The Devil we Know, another book referenced earlier in this paper. When

Jonathan Schanzer, former US Treasury intelligence analyst and the deputy executive director

for the Jewish Policy Center, reviewed Baer’s book for the Jerusalem Post, he had only scathing

and venomous words. Schanzer calls Baer “a washed-up ex-spy who has forgotten which side

he’s fighting for.”126 Baer is a man who “appears comfortable with defeat.”127 His “conclusions

seem to be based on some deadly analytical blunders.”128 In short, according to Schanzer, “The

Devil We Know is filled with misleading and apologetic assertions about Iran.”129

Government officials are neither sparred from such criticism. Mohamed ElBaradei, the

Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has gone on the record to

say that he disagrees with the description of Iran as an irrational “messianic state determined to

obtain nuclear weapons to launch a war against its archnemesis, Israel.”130 As a result, he was

labeled, both by American and Israeli officials, as “soft on Iran.”131 The Israeli newspaper

125 Jamie Glazov. 2008. “Iran’s Lobby Drooling in Washington’s Bazaar.” FrontPageMagazeine.com, Nov 17th. http://frontpagemagazine.com/Articles/Read.aspx?GUID=73802A95-D9FC-4178-8C58-A33D3170E466 126 Jonathan Schanzer. 2009. “Review of: The Devil we Know.” Jerusalem Post, Feb 6th. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 Borzou Daraghi. 2008. “Efforts on Iran ‘a Failure.’” The Los Angeles Times, Dec 06th. 131 Yossi Melman. 2009. “Israel Launches Campaign Against UN Nuke Watchdog Chief.” Haaretz, Feb 26th.

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Haaretz reported that “diplomatic and defense officials in Israel” believed that “ElBaradei was

negligent in handling all matters relating to the Iranian nuclear crisis.”132 This led the Israeli

government to launch a PR campaign against ElBaradei, wherein the Israeli Atomic Energy

Commission immediately criticized every interview ElBaradei gave.133 Things got so bad that

the Bush Administration attempted, but failed, to bar him from getting reelected to his post.134

What Does Iran Want?

While the politically venomous debate regarding Iran’s rationality rages on to this day,

we now turn to settle the matter for ourselves. In this section we seek to define Iran’s overall

goals, and argue that they are reasonable, attainable, and beneficial to Iran’s ruling elite. Robert

Baer has provided a broad outline of core Iranian interests. Three of them are of particular

importance in our discussion of the nuclear program. They are: security for the nation and the

regime, an Iranian sphere of influence in the Middle East, and national independence/equal status

in the world community.135

We will deal with security first. The ruling regime above all wants to stay in power, even

at the expense of their core values.136 In terms of security, Iran’s goals are no different and no

less rational than any other state. The ruling elite values both their grip on power as well as the

safety and stability of the Iranian nation. Any observer would be hard pressed to call such goals

irrational.

Observers would also be correct in pointing out that the ruling elite of Iran have a range

of security threats – some external and some internal. The United States Army flanks Iran by

132 Ibid. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid. 135 Baer, 245. 136 As Pollack mentioned earlier.

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occupying two of its neighbors. Iran is also particularly upset about three groups that are in

contact with American intelligence officials: the Party for the Free Life of Kurdistan, the

Mujahidin-e Khalq, and Jundallah.137 Iran is also furious about money appropriated through the

American Congress to overthrow the regime. In 1995, Newt Gingrich, passed a bill that allotted

$18 million for “covert” operations against the Islamic Republic.138 According to Seymore

Hersh, the Bush Administration increased the funding to the tune of $400 million.139

The ruling elite became so worried about U.S. plans for Iran that they offered a peace

settlement with the United States in 2003, now referred to as the “grand bargain.”140 In the

document, Iran put everything on the table – promising to battle al-Qaeda, to coordinate with the

U.S. on Iraq and Afghanistan, to end support for Palestinian and Lebanese militias, and even to

accept a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.141 In turn, the Iranian regime

wanted the United States to recognize its “legitimate security interests.”142 The United States

turned the offer down. But it showed that Iranian leaders took the security of the Iranian nation

seriously.

Iran’s second interest is far larger in scope. Iran is interested in extending its power

across the region. Much like the Shah’s imperial Iran, the Islamic Republic has begun to

subscribe to the notion “that Iran’s size, population, education level, and natural resources have

made the country destined to obtain regional preeminence and that it should play a leadership

137 Baer, 245. 138 Charles Kurzman. 2009. “The Iranian Revolution at 30: Still Unpredictable.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 139 Ibid. 140 Glenn Kessler. 2006. “In 2003, US Spurned Iran’s Offer of Dialogue.” Washington Post, Jun 18th. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid.

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role reflective of its geopolitical weight.”143 As Baer describes it, Iran has made the strategic

transition from “a revolutionary troublemaker trying to export a Shia uprising, to a statist,

Napoleonic-like conquest” with the goal of imposing order, taking ground, and expanding.144

Most notable in this quest are the inroads that Iran has made into Iraq that it wants to

protect. Almost overnight, Iraq transformed from a hostile neighbor to a friendly Shia state. Iran

now exercises a large influence over its neighbor. Robert Baer argues that Iran has “effectively

annexed” southern Iraq.145 Iran has taken control of the police, the military, some of the

intelligence services, universities, and even the political parties of Iraq.146 Iran has also made

gains throughout the Middle East. These too are important assets that Iran is interested in

protecting. The leaders of Iran won’t give up their “dominion in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, the Gulf,

and Gaza” and they “will insist on domination in the Gulf after the United States leaves.”147

Some have labeled this imperial tendency as irrational. They argue that the imperial

enterprise that Iran has entered into is too costly for a country already in financial straits. But

Iran’s aims for power projection in the region make sense. Iran has spent the last 30 years behind

a wall of containment that has isolated it economically and politically. Saddam Hussein attacked

Iran precisely because it was considered weak in the region.148 Much like the United States, Iran

argues that it will be safer if it can control the events around it. Furthermore, Iran has a lot to

gain economically by being a regional hedgemon. Take for example Iraq. By investing in the

stability of Iraq on Iranian terms, the Iranians have opened up new economic markets for

143 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 279. 144 Baer, 85. 145 Ibid, 87. 146 Ibid, 87. 147 Ibid, 246. 148 Ibid, 87.

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themselves.149 Furthermore, if Iran can continue to control southern Iraq, they have the

opportunity to control its oil markets.150 Iran is already pilfering Iraqi petroleum by the truckload

for its own needs.151 In the long term, Iran is poised to reap the same tremendous economic

benefits of controlling the Middle East that Western powers have in the past.

The third goal of Iran is recognition and equality in the world system.152 This has been

Iran’s motto since the Revolution. As R.K. Ramazani argues, pride in Iranian culture and a sense

of international victimization has created in Iran a need for independence and resistance to

domination by foreign powers.153 The New York Times wisely ascertained that “the Iranian

Revolution, at 30, has independence at its core.”154

This is of particular consequence to Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian leaders see Western

objections to their program as a way to continuously keep them down. They also see them as

hypocritical and unfair. Iran bitterly complains that the international community ignores UN

Resolution 242, which calls for Israeli withdrawal to pre-1967 borders, but insists on carrying

out UN resolutions against Iran.155 The Iranians have called this a grave “injustice.”156 Ayatollah

Khamenei echoed these feelings in a speech when he proclaimed:

We want to properly use this big country and its huge natural and human resources - the resources which have been given to this nation and its officials. We want to relieve this nation of the burden of hundreds of years of humiliation. This nation feels proud and powerful and it has every right to feel so. This nation

149 Ibid 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid. 153 R.K. Ramazani. 2009. “Understanding Iranian Foreign Policy.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 154 Roger Cohen. 2009. “Iran’s China Option.” The New York Times, Feb 8th. 155 Baer, 246. 156 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”

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is proud and powerful, but it has been kept behind. Both corrupt dictator systems and their foreign ill-willed supporters have kept Iran behind.157

Underlying all of these sentiments is a deep sense of Iranian nationalism. This

nationalism acts as a bottom up pressure that motivates the ruling establishment to continue their

nuclear policy. As Kaveh L. Afrasiabi explains, the “degree of public support for the nuclear

program, which is very much associated with national pride, is very high.”158 Because Iranians

see nuclear technology as “the most advanced technology in existence,” and because they view

Iran’s technological know how “as an indication of its place in the world,” the ruling elite of Iran

“are experiencing pressure in exactly the opposite directions from the West and the Iranian

public, and the latter is impossible to resist.”159

This is evident throughout the entire political spectrum in Iran. The rivals of the ruling

elite in Iran – the reformists – insist on Iran’s right to nuclear energy. Leading reformist

presidential candidate, Mir Hossein Mousavi, has stated that “nuclear technology for peaceful

purposes without being a threat to the world is our strategic objective” and because of popular

pressure the reformists are “obliged not to back down on this or other similar issues.”160 The

Israeli’s have extended this argument further. Ariel Sharon’s spokesperson Ranaan Gissin states

that a “a secular and democratic government in Tehran may actually be more inclined to acquire

a nuclear bomb…or, at a minimum it will be under popular pressure to continue the program at

the same pace.”161

157 2006. “Ayatollah Khamene’i Speaks on Khomeyni’s Death Anniversary.” Islamic Republic of Iran News Network Television (IRINN), Jun 4th. 158 Kaveh L. Afrasiabi. 2006. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction. BookSurge Publishing. 3. 159 Ibid. 160 2009. “Iran’s Mousavi Vows to Push Nuclear Drive.” Associated Foreign Press, Apr 5th. 161 Parsi. Treacherous Allianc, 274.

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Author Scott Sagan, a prolific writer on the logic of nuclear acquisition, would view

Iran’s attempt to gain nuclear technology based on these sentiments as rational. Iran’s attempts to

achieve nuclear status, in Sagan’s words, would “provide an important normative symbol of a

state’s modernity and identity.”162 The behavior of Iran’s leaders would not be dictated by

irrationality “but rather by deeper norms and shared beliefs about actions that are legitimate and

appropriate in international relations”163

Economics of the Program

Iran’s nuclear program has two very controversial subject areas: economics and domestic

enrichment. Those who believe Iran’s program is irrational state that Iran’s stance on these two

issues do not serve Iran’s larger goals. But when one carefully looks at the situation, it becomes

obvious that Iran’s stance on both of these issues is rational. In the long term they do in fact help

achieve Iran’s larger goals.

It must be noted however, that the international sanctions against Iran have hurt the

Iranian economy. Though expert analysis has not been able to fully grasp the impact of

international sanctions164 the IMF has come to conclude that “intensified international pressures

on Iran ha[s] negatively affected economic activity.”165 Iran has had a difficult time trading with

outside powers, and has found itself bereft of any foreign investment. 166

The Iranians are well aware of this fact. In an open letter to President Ahmadinejad, sixty

economists from around the country harshly chastised his “‘tension-seeking foreign policy,’ and

162 Scott D. Sagan. 1996 “Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb." International Security 21:3 (Winter 1996/97). 73. 163 Ibid. 164 Baer, 253. 165 Lesley Wroughton. 2008. “Sanctions Hurting Iran Economic Activity, says IMF.” Reuters, Aug 14th. 166 Ibid.

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argued that such approaches ‘deprive the country of trade and foreign investment

opportunities.’”167 They went on to complain hat “as a result of the imposition of UN Security

Council sanctions on Iran, much of the country's trade is done through middlemen, which costs

the country's foreign trade billions of dollars.”168 Even Iran’s own state-run news source

extended little sympathy, entitling their report of this event as “Economists Rake Ahmadinejad

Over Coals.”169

What makes the sanctions particularly damaging is the fact that they play out in the

background of an Iranian economy already approaching collapse. Initially Iran could weather the

impact of sanctions because the price of oil remained high for almost five years.170 Unfortunately

for Iran, the price of oil has dropped significantly as a result of the worldwide economic

downturn.171 This is of particular concern because oil profits account for 85 percent of the

government’s revenue.172 As a result, the Iranian government now faces a deficit of $44 billion

dollars.173 Inflation has risen to 24 percent, while unemployment has skyrocketed.174 Iran’s

economy is not in good shape.

But the sanctions have not been entirely successful. Robert Baer argues that “effective

sanctioning of Iran is a dream.”175 He points out that the Iranians are “still able to buy anything

they want from China and Russia” and that “some of America’s closest allies, such as Turkey

167 2008. “Economists Rake Ahmadinejad Over Coals.” Press TV, Nov 8th. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Laura Secor. 2009. “Letter from Tehran: The Rationalist.” The New Yorker, Feb 2nd. 171 2009. “Iran faces $44 Billion Deficit.” Associated Foreign Press, Feb 11th. 172 Ibid. 173 “Iran faces $44 Billion Deficit.” 174 Ibid. 175 Baer, 253.

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and Japan trade with Iran as if there were no sanctions at all.”176 Critics of the sanctions also

point out that Iran is experiencing a situation akin to what was happening in Iraq under Saddam

Hussein.177 Ordinary Iranians, especially the middle class are suffering from the sanctions

because the price of consumer and industrial goods are skyrocketing, along with real estate.178

But because the vast majority of government revenues come from the export of oil and gas,

rather than tax revenues generated by trade, the ruling elite aren’t feeling the pinch.179

More importantly, Iran continues to be protected by Russia and China. Both countries

have consistently watered down or vetoed all previous attempts at sanctions.180 Russia has

recently signaled that it will not toughen its current policy towards Iran, with its Deputy Foreign

Minister Sergei Ryabkov outright stating, “Our stance on the Iranian nuclear program has no

elements which could be interpreted as toughening of approach.”181 This stance is not surprising

considering Russia’s extensive economic ties to Iran, including its nuclear program. It is well

known that Russia is responsible for the nuclear reactor at Iran’s Bushehr plant. Though the

details of such a contract are a state secret, it is estimated to run up to $1 billion.182

The Russians claim that they have little sway over Iran, despite their Veto power in the

Security Council. According to one Russian expert, “Veto power in the security council is the

only, and very limited, means Russia has to influence Iran.”183 The Russians argue that even if

they wanted to, they could only apply limited economic pressure because they share less than $3

176 Ibid. 177 Borzou Daragahi. 2009. “IRAN: Despite Sanctions, Business as Usual.” Los Angeles Times Blog, Mar 15th. http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/03/iran-despite-sa.html 178 Ibid. 179 Ibid. 180 2009. “Russia Says They Will not Toughen Policy Toward Iran.” Associated Press, Feb 16. 181 Ibid. 182 2009. “Q+A: Russia to Start up Iran Nuclear Plant in 2009.” Reuters, Feb 5th. 183 Nabi Abdullaev. 2009. “U.S. Overestimating Russia’s Clout with Iran.” The Moscow Time, Mar 6th.

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billion in bilateral trade with Iran annually.184 This is less than countries like Germany, Italy,

China, and Japan.185 In fact Russia is not even one of Iran’s top 10 trading partners.186 But even

if they were the number one trading partner, Russian experts claim that “one cannot pressure Iran

into doing anything they don't want to, and it is impossible to buy them off.”187

The Chinese share a similar stance and have a similar economic stake in Iran. Just

recently, Iran and China announced a $3.2 billion natural gas deal.188 Apart from natural gas

however, China has a substantial interest in Iran’s oil. According to Iranian officials, Iran

supplies China with 14% of its oil.189 Economic sanctions on Iran are not in the best interest of

China, and China has always acted in its best interest on this issue. When it is caught trading

with Iran in violation of the sanctions, as it was this past April, China openly states that it

“resolutely oppose U.S. sanctions on Chinese companies citing its domestic laws.”190

Even American financial institutions are in on the deal. In New York, federal and state

prosecutors are currently investigating a “number of major Western banks” who may have

“illegally handled funds for Iran and deliberately hid Iranian transactions routed through the

U.S.”191 The South Korean’s have acted no differently, having recently completed construction

of a $2.1-billion natural-gas processing plant in Iran in despite sanctions.192 In short, different

184 Philip P. Pan and Karen DeYoung. 2009. “Russia Signaling Interest in Deal on Iran, Analysts Say – Still, Obama Effort Faces Obstacles.” Washington Post Foreign Service, Mar 18th. 185 Ibid. 186 Ibid. 187 Ibid. 188 Borzou Daraghi. 2009. “Iran Signs $3.2-Billion Natural Gas Deal with China.” The Los Angeles Times, Mar 15th. 189 Ibid. 190 2009. “China Opposes U.S. Sanctions on Company with Alleged Iran Link.” Xinhua, April 9th. 191 2009. “Fresh Clues of Iranian Nuclear Intrigue.” The Associated Press, Jan 16th. 192 Daraghi. “Iran Signs $3.2-Billion Natural Gas Deal with China.”

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players across the world, even those in the U.S., have conspired to weaken and violate the

sanctions.

Though the sanctions have an impact in the short term, Iran’s leaders have more long-

term economic considerations to contend with – they are running out of oil. There is a

persistently false notion that Iran “is a nation awash in a sea of oil and natural gas, and as such

has no legitimate claim for a nuclear energy program.”193 It is true that Iran has a large supply of

oil. In 2005 alone, half of Iran’s primary energy supply came from oil.194 Unfortunately however,

according to Robert Baer, “Iran faces an oil depletion as severe as Saudi Arabia’s, with an even

larger disparity between its real and claims reserved.”195 Baer brings up the fact that in the year

2005, Iran produced 3.94 million barrels of oil a day.196 This amount exceeds Iran’s sustainable

capacity – which is the amount Iranians can recover from existing oil fields without damaging

them – which sits at only 3.8 million barrels of oil a day.197

Compounding this problem is Iran’s ever growing domestic demand for energy. Iran’s

population today is around 70 million, but by the year 2050, that number is estimated to reach as

high as 105 million.198 In the near future, experts project, domestic demand for oil will outstrip

the supply.199 With these issues in mind, National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) officials “project

193 Baer, 202. 194 “Statistics.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 195 Baer, 142-143. 196 Ibid. 197 Ibid. 198 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 199 Roger Stern. 2007. “The Iranian Petroleum Crisis and United States National Security.” PNAS. Vol 104. No 1. Jan 2nd.

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that oil exports could go to zero within 12–19 years.”200 This is catastrophic for a country where

oil accounts for eight-five percent of government revenue.201

Adding to the tremendous financial burden is the fact that Iran is also wasting money on

refined gasoline. It is a country that is a net importer of the material.202 Iran imports more than

40% of its refined gasoline due to shortfalls in Iranian refining capacity.203 Worse yet, the

country has been subsidizing the price of gasoline to $0.34 per gallon, sparking an annual 11-

12% demand growth.204 This an economically unsound policy, as Iran imports more than $4

billion dollars in refined gas every year.205 But the Iranians claim that they have no better

alternative. As an NIOC official explained:

Given the fact that our refineries are outdated and that NIOC does not have the necessary funds to build new refineries and that the private sector does not engage in the business of construction of refineries due to the low profits involved, import of gasoline is more economically feasible than building refineries.206

These subsidizing policies that were designed to make the revolution more palatable to

the poor have fostered a dangerous expectation of cheap fuel.207 When that expectation is not

met, Iran’s internal security is threatened. For example, when Iranian officials began to ration

refined gas (because it was becoming too expensive), the people responded by rioting.208 Twelve

gas stations in Tehran were burned down, with the rioting being “so intense that fire engines

200 Ibid. 201 Secor. 202 Albright et all 203 Ibid. 204 Stern. 205 Shirzad Bozorgmehr. 2007. “Protestors Torch Iran Gas Stations.” CNN.com, Jun 28th. http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/meast/06/27/iran.fuel/ 206 Stern. 207 Ibid. 208 Bozorgmehr.

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could not reach the burning gas stations.”209 It took Iran’s Basij militia until 2 am the night of the

riot to regain order.210 This event presents a clear problem to Iranian leaders. If they do not

provide the domestic energy that Iranians need, people will take to the streets.

Nuclear energy is a part of the answer for Iran’s energy woes. As the Iranians themselves

have argued to the United Nations: “to satisfy such growing demands, Iran can’t rely exclusively

on fossil energy. Since the Iranian national economy is still dependent on oil revenue, it can’t

allow the ever increasing domestic demand affect the oil revenues from the oil export.” 211 The

Iranians also contend that the United States had made the same conclusions thirty years ago,

when they convinced the Iranians to invest in American nuclear technology.212 The Iranians

claim that they are merely trying to reach the same benchmarks outlined for them by U.S. policy

makers – benchmarks that by 2020, would “save Iran 190 million barrels of crude oil or $10

billion per year in today’s prices.”213 By diversifying their energy sources and building new

power plants, Iran extends the life of their petroleum reserves. These reserves are the lifeblood of

every activity Iran partakes in, and they will only grow more valuable over time. For Iranian

security, hegemonic ambitions, and independence – energy is key.

Domestic Enrichment

The other controversial aspect of Iran’s nuclear program is the country’s stance on

domestic enrichment. Despite many international offers to enrich the uranium oversees and ship

it to Iran, the regime has refused to give up its right to domestically enrich uranium. Iran has two

convincing reasons for not heeding international pressure in this regard. First, the rational behind

209 Ibid. 210 Ibid. 211 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 212 Ibid. 213 Ibid.

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stopping Iran from enriching uranium is blatantly unfair. Hassan Rohani, a representative of the

Supreme Leader, convincingly argues that:

The U.S. and some Europeans argue that they cannot trust Iran’s intentions. They argue that they cannot accept Iran’s promise to remain committed to its treaty obligations once it gains the capability to enrich uranium for fuel production. They ask Iran to give up its right under the NPT, and instead accept their promise to supply it with nuclear fuel. This is illogical and crudely self serving: I do not trust you, even though what you are doing is legal and can be verified to remain legal, but you must trust me when I promise to that which I have no obligation to do and cannot be enforced.214

To accept such an unfair policy would be to betray Iran’s goal of independence, equality, and

fairness under the international system.

Iran also does not want to be at the mercy of their suppliers. The Iranians argue that it

would be irrational for them to rely solely on outside powers for nuclear fuel because “such

dependence would in effect hold Iran’s multi-billion dollar investment in power plants hostage to

the political whims of suppliers in a tightly controlled market.”215 It would be disastrous for Iran

if their energy were cut off because their stance on Israel or Lebanon had infuriated a supplier

nation. This would undercut both Iran’s security and its reach as an empire.

The Supreme Leader’s rhetoric on this issue reveals a strong case for domestic

enrichment as a means to national independence. He has argued:

To say that no country has the right to have access to nuclear technology means that in twenty years’ time, all of the countries of the world will have to beg certain Western or European countries to meet their energy demand. When oil is gone we will have to beg for energy in order to run our lives. Which country, nation, or honest official is ready to take that?216 Ironically, the situation Khamenei is describing is akin to what is currently happening

between countries with oil and those without.

214 Hassan Rohani. 2006. “Iran’s Nuclear Program: The Way Out.” Time, May 09th. 215 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 216 “Ayatollah Khamene'i Speaks on Khomeyni's Death Anniversary.”

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Talk of independence and fairness is all well and good, ‘irrationalists’ contend, but they

do not outweigh the possibility of a military strike on Iran. They argue that Iran is irrational for

pursuing their present course because it invites possible attack. Israel is the figurehead in that

argument. They have made it clear that they will not accept any kind of nuclear program within

Iran because it would represent an “existential threat” to their country.217 Alarmingly, a new

conservative government has been elected in Israel, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu. In an

interview entitled “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—Or I Will,” he was quoted as saying that he

does not want “a messianic apocalyptic cult controlling atomic bombs.”218

Though the possibility of an atomic attack on Israel is very remote, Israel does have

reason to fear an Iran with enrichment capability. Immigration to the country could falter, while

others might emigrate out of fear.219 Investors might feel wary of pumping money into Israel.220

Moderates in the Middle East may feel as though they could take a harder stance on Israel – most

notably Syria.221 And groups like Hezbollah or Hamas may feel, rightly or not, more emboldened

to launch attacks against Israel.222 These are issues that may drive the Israelis to preemptively

strike Iran.

There are also rumors of a ‘decapitation’ program that seeks to kill Iranian officials and

scientists who are involved in the nuclear program.223 The London daily reported that Israel “is

217 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 268. 218 Jeffrey Goldberg. 2009. “Netanyahu to Obama: Stop Iran—Or I Will.” The Atlantic, Mar 31st. 219 Natasha Mozgovaya. 2009. “Next Ambassador to U.S. Tells AIPAC: We Won’t Let Iran get Nuclear Weapons.” Haaretz, May 3rd. 220 Ibid. 221 Ibid. 222 Ibid. 223 Herb Brandon. 2009. “US, UK, Israel, France, Target Iran Nuclear Scientists.” Israel News Agency, Feb 22nd.

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using hitmen, sabotage, front companies and double agents,” to attack Iranian scientists.224 As

one Israeli security analyst ominously put it:

From mobile phones, pens, cars and cotton shirts to food, computer laptops, juice, books and toilet paper those who are working on a nuclear programme to hit Tel Aviv, London or Paris will not finish their work…Their families will not be touched, but they will find themselves involved in work accidents that no one can save them from. If they seek the honor of finding 72 virgins and becoming a shaheed (martyr) Western agents have been in place to help them.225 Many in the international community, including those who interviewed Netanyahu,

believe that all this talk may be “a tremendous bluff… aimed at motivating President Obama and

others to grapple urgently with the problem.”226 As mentioned earlier, the Israeli government

was refused when they asked President Bush for bunker-busting bombs, permission into Iraqi

airspace, and the green light for an attack on the Natanz enrichment site.227 Many Israeli analysts

concluded that the move amounted “to nothing more than posturing to prod the West in

negotiations with the Islamic Republic.”228 And as discussed earlier, the ‘carrot and stick’

approach of incentives and disincentives espoused by President Obama has taken center stage in

the United States. With this in mind, the security threat to Iran, for the time being, has subsided.

Finally, domestic enrichment gives Iran a very powerful choice – they have the option to

create a nuclear weapon or not. The first option, creating nuclear weapons, is very risky. It would

draw international condemnation, isolation, and perhaps new sanctions. And as Trita Parsi

describes it, the “decision to weaponize would likely weaken rather than advance Iran’s strategic

224 Ibid. 225 Ibid. 226 Goldberg. 227 Fathi and Sanger. 228 Michael Bluhm. 2008. “Israeli Strike on Iran not Likely -- Local Analysts Say.” The Daily Star, Jun 28th.

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position.”229 Iran currently has “a conventional superiority vis-à-vis its neighbors because of its

size and resources,” but a decision to weaponize would spark a nuclear arms race that could

empower small countries like Kuwait and Bahrain with nuclear weapons.230 In this scenario, Iran

would “find itself at strategic parity with states less than one-twentieth its size.231 The Iranians

themselves have admitted that they have come to the same conclusion. They have told the UN

that any type of nuclear weapon “would reduce Iran’s regional influence and increase its global

vulnerabilities without providing any credible deterrence.232

The second option, however, is far more practical. As IAEA Executive Director

Mohamed ElBeradi has theorized, Iran wants to have the option to make a weapon if it so

chooses.233 The idea being that having the ability to make a bomb is deterrent enough.234 In this

scenario Iran gets everything it wants. It gets security because they have the ability to make a

bomb in a short period of time. Iran gets its empire, with the ability to keep it in place with the

threat of some day having a bomb. Iran also gets the independence and respects it craves on the

international scene.

Some would argue that this view is naïve and that nation states normally do not refrain

from producing weapons when the option presents itself. Authors like Rahman G. Bonab

disagree. In defending his view that Iran will probably not produce nuclear weapons, he points to

countries like Japan, Brazil, the Netherlands, and Argentina, who “all have uranium enrichment

capability, but have not decided to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

229 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 269. 230 Ibid. 231 Ibid. 232 “Some Facts and Materials on the Peaceful Nuclear Program of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” 233 Parsi. Treacherous Alliance, 269. 234 Ibid.

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and make bombs.”235 Even Israeli Major General Amos Yadlin leans towards this theory. While

he still maintains that Iran wants to eventually have military nuclear capability, he believes that

“Iran is working on attaining a certain amount of enriched uranium so that it will be just a few

months away from the atomic bomb without paying the heavy international cost” of actually

making one.236 While we can only speculate at this point, evidence suggests that Iran is

following this direction. As mentioned earlier, Iran has reached ‘breakout point’ – it has achieved

the ability to make a weapon.237 By all accounts, however, it has not. That is telling indeed.

More importantly, either route would be rational. While outright nuclear weaponization

would definitely be the less pragmatic approach of the two, it would not be completely irrational.

Neo-realists believe that nuclear weapons would allow Iran to be “confident of its survival in an

anarchic and unipolar post-Cold War world and a war-burdened and unstable region.”238 Having

the choice – to weaponize or not weaponize – works towards Iran’s larger interest of security and

independence.

Possible Weaknesses in the Argument

The preceding argument is by no means perfect. There are many issues that may qualify

the statements made here. First, while Khamenei and his inner circle do in fact have control over

Iran’s nuclear policy, they are not completely unified. Within their ranks there are those who are

more pragmatic, and those who are more fanatical. To date they have not yet been able to come

together and decide on a candidate they want to run for president.239

235 Rahman G. Bonab. “The Spectrum of Perceptions in Iran’s Nuclear Issue.” The Iranian Revolution at 30. The Middle East Institute. Washington D.C. 236 Haviv Rettig Gur and Jerusalem Post Staff. 2009. “MI chief: ‘Economic Crisis Could Restrain Iran.’” The Jerusalem Post, Apr 21st. 237 “Israel: Iran has Mastered Bomb Technology.” 238 Bonab. 239 Muhammad Sahimi. 2009. “Iran’s Power Struggles.” The New York Times, Apr 28th.

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There are also questions to consider regarding the overall rationality of Iran’s larger

interests. While considerable weight was put on the idea that Iran is just as rational for seeking

an empire as the United States is, there are those who would argue that it is irrational for the

United States to have one. Much like the United States, an Iranian sphere of influence would put

the whole country in danger of being targeted for reprisals for perceived slights. For example,

those who are upset about Iranian influence in Iraq recently killed 80 Iranian pilgrims in a

suicide attack.240

Others may argue that some of Iran’s greater goals are in conflict with one another. For

instance, Iran’s rational undertaking of achieve security is in conflict with a rational objective of

having a sound economy. A counter-argument can be made that Iran is merely ordering their

objectives and acting on those that are deemed more important. Nonetheless, this way of viewing

Iran as a possible irrational actor is important to note.

Another interesting point to consider is Iran’s choice of nuclear energy. Some might

accept that Iran indeed has energy needs, but they may ask if the choice of nuclear energy to

solve it is rational because of the security risks involved. What if the Iranians are wrong about

their calculations towards Israel? Is that a chance they should be willing to take? The Iranians

may respond that they have already invested in the program so heavily that it would be too costly

to go back, but then the decision to go after nuclear power would have been irrational in the first

place.

The enrichment process may also conversely challenge Iran’s desire for independence.

Even if Iran has enough uranium for say two decades, it will eventually run out.241 Then Iran will

240 Jim Muir. 2009. “Big Rise in Iraq Deaths in April.” BBC, May 1st. 241 Cole, 232.

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need to depend on someone else for the material.242 So instead of independence from the

Western economic system, Iran may well find itself in a situation mired in dependence.243

Nuclear energy presents other risks to Iran. Like other seismically unstable countries, Iran will

have to worry about earthquakes hitting their reactors.244 They could have a Chernobyl-like

reactor meltdown.245 The Iranians will also find it very hard to safely store spent nuclear fuel.246

Radioactive waste could seep into groundwater.247 Worst of all, terrorists could steal their

nuclear material.248

Finally, the situation that the Iranians say they want to avoid – a nuclear arms race in the

Middle East – may still take place whether or not Iran decides to weaponize. Just the threat of a

nuclear Iran may spur countries like Saudi Arabia or Egypt to go nuclear.249 Additionally, the

former deputy defense minister of Israel, Ephraim Sneh, has argued that Saudi Arabia has

already made a nuclear deal with Pakistan – the day Shia Iran gets a bomb, Sunni Pakistan will

sell one to the Saudis.250 Any new nuclear state in the Middle East, especially a Sunni block

opposed to Iran, will provide a threat to Iranian security.

Conclusions and Looking Forward

Even with all the possible counterfactuals, on the whole Iran’s current nuclear policy is

rational. Though it certainly has its costs, it does more to achieve Iran’s larger goals than a

reversal of the policy. Economically, the program will in the long term give the country more

security and profits with which to manage its empire. In terms of domestic enrichment, Iran’s

242 Ibid. 243 Ibid. 244 Ibid. 245 Ibid. 246 Ibid. 247 Ibid. 248 Ibid. 249 Mozgovaya. 250 Ibid.

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stance preserves the country’s independence and security. The overall goals themselves, while

controversial and sometimes risky, are on the whole rational.

Those who make the extreme case that Iran is an irrational messianic state are wrong. But

those who lean towards the Idea that Iran is motivated by ideology have their merits. Surely

many of the larger goals that have been argued to be rational have been motivated by Iranian

ideology. The argument made here then, may mirror the one argued by Rafsanjani in the past.

Iran may be a state motivated by ideology, but it is an ideology that is largely pragmatic and

rational. A perfect case study of this argument is the Iranian nuclear program.

What does this mean as we move forward and talk with Iran? It means that as Obama

looks across the negotiating table he should not see a madman. He needs to see a rational actor

who has rational reasons for wanting to continue the Iranian nuclear program. Ironically, this

may not necessarily make things any easier. Iran, like any other rational state, will cling to its

rational interests. Ultimately however, the mixed signals of calling Iran an irrational terrorist

state while attempting dialogue needs to end.

Obama may want to continue his strategy of carrots and sticks – though he should

certainly not term them as such. He will have to walk a tightrope – opening up other rational

avenues for Iran to achieve many of its goals, without looking like he is ordering the Iranians to

take that road. The European Union is experienced in dealing with Iran on similar issues, and

may have good advice for Obama. When the Europeans made it clear that trade and cooperation

agreements depended on an improved Iranian human rights record, the Iranian judiciary

temporarily put an end to stoning as a punishment for adultery.251

251 Cole, 233.

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Similarly Obama can offer the Iranians economic incentives – admission into the WTO

would be a very good start. And he definitely should look at the grand bargain of 2003, complete

with security guarantees, as a starting point for negotiations. More importantly, Obama needs to

know who his negotiating partner is – Khamenei not Ahmadinejad. Fortunately, it appears as

though Obama already understands this point, as his staff has been drafting a letter to be handed

personally to the Supreme Leader.252

Obama has made recent inroads. Planning to lift the longstanding ban on regular

diplomatic contacts with Iranian officials is a great start.253 As is his decision to join with the

Europeans as a single negotiation block and inviting Tehran to talk.254 The proposed plan of

allowing Iran a “warm shutdown,” wherein Iranian centrifuges continue to spin but no new

uranium is enriched, is a very good idea.255 The Iranians have responded favorably to these

outreaches, promising to bring a negotiating proposal to the world community.256

But significant challenges lie ahead. The Israelis continue to threaten military action,

souring the tone of the talks. At the same time, the Iranians themselves have sometimes

responded with mixed signals of their own. President Obama needs to be cognizant of the real

threat improved relations with the United States may pose to some within Iran, especially the

more radical hardliners. Political scientist Sadegh Zibakalam has warned that if a rapprochement

between Iran and the United States takes place the “hard-liners would receive a psychological

252 Robert Tait and Ewen MacAskill. 2009. “Revealed: the Letter Obama Team Hope will Heal Iran Rift.” The Guardian, Jan 29th. 253 Kim Ghattas. 2009. “US Policy Towards Iran Shaping up.” The BBC, Mar 17th. 254 David E. Sanger. 2009. “U.S. May Drop Key Condition for Talking With Iran.” The New York Times, Apr 13th. 255 Ibid. 256 Nazila Fathi. 2009. “Iran Says it Plans New Nuclear Offer.” The New York Times, Apr 15th.

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blow because they can no longer claim that Iran is waging its historical crusade or struggle

against an unjust world power.”257

More dangerous for the hard-liners is the theory that improved relations with the United

States will embolden and strengthen democratic and reformists groups in Iran, because they will

no longer be accused of presenting a national security risk.258 The hard-liners do not want some

type of “velvet-revolution” or Soviet-style implosion that may bring down the theocracy.259

They also fear that opening Iran up to foreign trade and investment will threaten the immense

economic power they have over the countries official and underground economy.260 The recent

arrest and sentencing of Iranian-American journalist Roxana Saberi by extreme radicals in the

intelligence and judiciary offices is one attempt to derail the rapprochement process.261 There

may be more in the future.

With these potential challenges comes great hope – a hope that the course of history can

be changed, and that rational actors can come together and end the nuclear deadlock. President

Obama was wise to quote the Iranian poet Saadi in his address to the Iranian people. He

reminded the world, in Saadi’s words, that peace is possible – “The children of Adam are limbs

to each other, having been created of one essence.”

257 Borzou Daragahi. 2009. “If Obama Gambit Works, Tehran’s Hard-Liners Would Suffer, Iranian Says.” The Los Angeles Times, Apr 7th. 258 Sahimi. 259 Ibid. 260 Ibid. 261 Ibid.

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