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o RECT)oBAL NSTITUTION
5
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2012
STEVEN INGRAM,
Appellant,
v. Case No. 5D1.2-2666
STATE OF FLORIDA,
Appellee.
/
Opinion filed November 30, 2012
3.850 Appeakfrom the Circuit Courtfor Marion County,Scott Polodna, Judge.
Steve Craig Ingram, Bushnell, pro se.
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, AssistantAttorney General, Daytona Beach, forAppellee.
PER CURIAM.
We issued a Spencer1 show cause order directing Steven Ingram to demonstrate
"why he should not be prohibited from filing any appeal, petition, pleading or motion
pertaining to the conviction and sentence rendered in Case No.1997-CF-870." Having
carefully considered Ingram's response, we conclude that he is abusing the judicial
process and should be barred from further pro se filings.
1 State v. Spencer, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALSTATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT
STEVE CRAIG INGRAM,Appellant,
v. CASE NUMBER: 97-CF-870
STATE OF FLORIDA,Appellee.
APP.EAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURTNINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
INITIAL BRIEF
Counsel for AppellantSteve Craig IngramSumter Correctional Institution9544 CR 476BBushnell, FL 33513
TABLEOFCONTENTSPAGE (S)
Table of Contents ......................................................................................................ii
Table of Citations.....................................................................................................iii
Preliminary Statement............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Case and Facts ............................................................................... I
Summary of Argument...........................................................................................4-5
ARGUMENT
ISSUE ONE:DID THE POST CONVICTION COURT FOLLOWING WITHOUTAN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAWIN DENYING APPELANT S 3.850 CLAIM THAT HIS TRIALCOUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKEOBJECTION TO INFORMATION WHICH FAILED TO ALLEGEELEMENTS OF SECTION 777.06 AND 777.011 FLORIDASTATUTES.....................................................................................................6
ISSUE TWO:DID THE POST CONVICTION COURT FOLLOWING WITHOUTAN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS A MATTER OF LAWIN DENYING APPELANT'S 3.850 CLAIM THAT TRIALCOURT'S ERROR WHICH IT ALOWED HIS CO-DEFENDANTOUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS TO BE ADMITTED AT TRIALWHEN NO CONSPIRACY EXIST............................................................. 13
Conclusion................................................................................................................16
Certificate of Service............................................................................................... I 6
11
TABLE OF CITATIONS
CASE LAW PAGES
Baker v. State, 34 Fla. Law Weekly D526,.D527(Fla. 4* DCA March 10, 2009)......................................................................... 11, 12
Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1" DCA 1982)............................................... 14
Bedford v. State, 970 So.2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4* DCA 2008)..........................:......... 10
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971)................................................... 9
Bruno v. State, 807 So.2d 55, 63-64 (Fla. 2001) ...................................................... 4
Burgess v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 140-141 (Fla. 2002)............................................... 5
Burnside v. State 656 So.2d 241.2.45 (Fla. 5* DCA 1995)............................. 13, 15
Calvert v. State, 730 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 5* DCA 1999)............................... 13, 15
Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1986).................................................. 8
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. I96, 201 (l948).......................................................... 10
Ford v. State, 802 So.2d I 121, 1 30 (F a. 2001).................................................... I
Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1996)............................................................. 5
Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla. 1997)............................................... 13
Frew v. State, 947 So.2d 1275, 1276 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2007)...................................... 9
Garrett v. Morris Kirschmann & Co., 336 So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 976)................... 5
Gray v. State, 435 So.2d 816, 818 (Fla. 1983)........................................................ 0
Haliburton v. State, 7 So.3d 60 l, 606 (Fla. 4* DCA 2009)............ ................... 5
Health Options. Inc. v. Agencyfòr Health Care Admin,889 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 1" DCA 2004) .................................................................. 7
Hodges v. State, 22 So.3d 338, 336 (F a. 2004)............................... ............... 3, 5
Hughes v. State, 22 So.3d 132, 133 (F a.2"d DCA 2009)......................................... 3
Ingrarn v. State, 748 So.2d 283 (Fla. 5* DCA 1991)................................................ 1
Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002)........................................ 3, 4
Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (Fla. 1983)................................................. 14, 15
Kneale v. Kneale, 67 So.2d 233 (Fla. 1953)............................................................. 1
Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 424 (Fla. 2002).................................................. 7
111 -
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Appellant, Ingram, was the Defendant in the trial court; this appellate review
will refer to the Appellant as such, Defendant, or by proper name.·Appellee, the
State of Florida, was the prosecution below; the Appellate Review will refer to
Appellee as such, the prosecutor, or the State.
The record on appellate review consists of the charging information, and this
court should take judicial notice of this issue in transcripts in this District Court
files. See, Ingram v. State, 748 So.2d 283 (Fla. 5 DCA 1999). Section 90.201-
204, Fla. Stat. (2012).
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS
The Appellant considers the statement of the issues and the statement of the
case and facts in appellate reviews to be inextricably intertwined and to be critical
to the proper argument and resolution of such appellate review'.
Statements of issues should be concise, accurate, and scrupulously fair. They
should incorporate the standards of review, including preservation or non-
preservation of the issue in the trial court, and be neutrally cast to present only the
appellate question to be resolved.
Statements of the case and facts should focus on the issues presented and
See, Kneale v. Kneale, 67 So.2d 233 (1953); Phillip J. Padovano, FloridaAppellate Practice (2"d Edition 1997)
should not include distracting or irrelevant material unrelated to those issues. The
facts should be presented in a non-argumentative manner consistent with the
standards of review and presumptions of correctness afforded to trial court
judgments, including recitation on whether the issue and arguments presented were
properly reviewed below.
The appellant declines to accept statements of the issue or of the case and
facts which do not meet the above criteria. Trial court and state's statement omits
facts critical to the issue presented and the applicable standard of appellate review
it i.s-accepted subject to the following relevant facts:
1. At the trial court, on May 10 2012, without evidentiary hearing; appellant
former trial court ruled as follows:
In the instant motion, the defendant alleges two grounds for relief. The court
will address each ground separately.
GROUND ONE:
THE DEFENDANT ALLEGES THAT COUNSEL WASINEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE CHARGINGAFFIDAVIT
[w]hich failed to allege the elements of trafficking in cocaine. The court
finds that this claim is procedurally barred. Rule 3.850 states, in pertinent part
"Time limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided
by law may be filed at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered
pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence
become final in a non capital case..." Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5*
DCA 2002) (emphasis in decision), citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(b) The Defendant's
mandate was issued on January 7, 2000. See, Mandate; The Court finds that the
Defendant has failed to establish facts that demonstrate that his claim was unknown
or could have not been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, the
Court finds that the Defendant should have raised this claim in his first Motion for
Postconviction Relief or prior to the expiration of his two year time limitation.
Consequently, this claim is denied.
GROUND TWO:
THE DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT TRIAL COURTCOMMITTED FUNDAMENTAL ERROR WHEN IT ALLOWEDHIS CO-DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS TO BEADMITTED AT TRIAL.
A claim of trial court error is not cognizable in a motion for post conviction
relief. See, Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629 (Fla.. l'" DCA 2008) (Holding that
claims of trial court error should be raised on direct appeal , not in a rule 3.850
motion (citing, Hodges v. State, 885. So.2d 338, 366 (Fla. 2004)). Furthermore, it is
a "common misconception among prisoners the 'fundamental error' can be
reviewed in a post conviction proceeding at any time." Hughes v State, 22 So.3d
132, 133 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2009). If the is were truly a matter of fundamental erroi·, it
could have and should have been raised on direct appeal. Id. at 135. Therefore, this
claim is denied. Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ordered and
adjudged that the defendant's motion for post conviction relief is denied.
SUMARYOFARGUMENT
ISSUE ONE:
Appellee concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
procedurally barred. Citing Johnson v. State, 814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002).
Appellant asserts that the trial court conclusion is misplaced. See, Bruno v. State,
807 So.2d 55, 63-64 (Fla. 200]). ("[W]hereas the main question on direct appeal is
whether the trial court erred, the main question in a Strickland claim is whether
trial counsel was ineffective. Both claims may arise from the same underlying
facts, but the claims themselves are distinct and . . . of necessity . . . have different
remedies: A claim of trial court error generally can be raised on direct appeal but
not in a Rule 3.850 Motion, and a claim of ineffectiveness generally can be raised
in a Rule 3.850 but not on direct appeal. A defendant thus has little choice: as a
rule, he or she can only raise an ineffectiveness claim via Rule 3.850 Motion, even
if the same underlying facts also supported, or could have supported, a claim of
error on direct appeal. Thus, the trial court erred in concluding that Bruno's claim
4
was procedurally barred.") See Also, Wuornos v. State, 676 So.2d 972, 974 (Fla.
1996). Id. at 64.
ISSUE TWO:
Appellee concluded that a claim of trial court erred is not cognizable in a
Motion for Postconviction Relief. Citing: Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629 (Fla. 1"
DCA 2008) and Hodges v State, 22 So.3d 338, 336 (Fla. 2004). Appellant asserts
that the trial court order summary denying Appellant's claim does not set forth
sufficient reasons for its denial, and further fails to address the "manifest injustice"
exception, where Appellant shows over-whelming evidence in the police arrest
reports of his innocence. See, Section 90.803(18), Florida Statutes (1997); Burgess
v. State, 831 So.2d 137, 140-141 (Fla. 2002); See also, McCrap v. State, 919 So.2d
647, 649 (Fla. 1" DCA 2006), Citing Garrett v. Morris Kirschrnan & Co., 336
So.2d 566, 569 (Fla. 1976)). See, Haliburton v. State, 7 So.3d 601, 606 (Fla. 4
DCA 2009); See also, State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d 835, 840 (Fla. 2007) ("[I]f an
illegal conviction is not well within the concept of exceptional circumstances and
manifest injustice requiring .a relaxation of the law of the case of the law of the
case, it is not easy to imagine what would be "); Sigler v. State, 881 So.2d 14, 17
(Fla. 4* DCA 2004). Therefore, this District Court must respectfully granted relief
and quash trial court order.
GROUND ONE
DID THE POSTCONVICTION COURT FOLLOWINGWITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS AMATTER OF LAW IN DENYING APPELLANT'S 3.850CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WASINEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MAKE OBJECTIONTO INFORMATION WHICH FAILED TO ALLEGEELEMENTS OF SECTION 777.03 AND 777.011FLORIDA STATUTES
Appellee concluded that this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
procedurally bai:red, because Rule 3.850 time limitation. No other motion shall be
filed or considered pursuant to this rule if filed more than 2 years after the
judgment and sentence become final in a noncapital case. Appellant asserts that
this trial court conclusion is misplaced, and he asserts that the Trafficking in
Cocaine conviction should be reversed on this appeal and that the Appellant can
institute a 3.850 Motion predicatèd on the ineffective assistance of his counsel as
evidences by his counsel's failure to argue on his motion for judgment of acquittal
that there was no evidence that Appellant was a principals, aides and abettors, and
accessories before or after the fact to trafficking or conspiracy trafficking in
cocame.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"When reviewing an order denying a motion for Postconviction Relief
asserting ineffective assistance of trial counsel, the Appellant must defer to a trial
court's factual findings which are supported by competent, substantial evidence.
6
The legal conclusions may be reviewed de novo." Marta-Rodriguez v. State, 811
So.2d 819 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2002); See, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698,
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, (1984); Stephens v. State 748 So.2d 1028 (Fla.
1999).
A trial courts "finding of fact . . . will be sustained on review if supported by
competent substantial evidence." Marquard v. State, 850 So.2d 417, 424 (Fla.
2002). However, under the de novo standard of review, the appellate court pays no
deference to the trial court's ruling. Rather, the. appellate court makes its own
determination of the legal ISSUE. See, Health Options, Inc. v. Agency for Health
Care Admin., 889 So.2d 849, 851 (Fla. 14 DCA 2004).
BURDEN OF PERSUASION
Appellant bears the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error. §924.051(7),
Florida Statute (2005), provides:
In a direct appeal . . . the party challenging the judgment or orderof the trial court has the burden of demonstrating that a prejudicialerror occurred in the trial court. A conviction or sentence may notbe reversed absent an express finding that a prejudicial erroroccurred in the trial court.
PRESERVATION
In this first issue, Appellee contends that the trial court correctly denying
Appellant Post conviction claim that his trial counsel, rendered constitutionally
ineffective by failing to argue on a motion for judgment of acquittal or object to the
7
bill of particulars that the information by which Appellant was charged, which
correctly specified trafficking or conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, did not
adequately inform appellant, he would be subject to convictions on trafficking and
conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, when the inforrnation did not allege the
elements of the offenses as set out in §777.03 and 777.011, Florida Statutes, which
identifies the offenses allegedly committed by the principle or accessory before and
after the fact, was procedurally barred. Appellant asserts that the trial court
concluded that this claim was barred because it either was, or could have been,
raised on direct appeal; this was error.
In discussing how this procedural gap arises, the Defendant asserts that Rule
3.850(f) specifically permits a defendant to file a second or successive Rule 3.850
Motion, which can be denied as successive only, "if the judge finds that it fails to
allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the
merits . . ." See, Spera v. State, 971 So.2d 754, 758 (Fla. 2007) Quoting
Christopher v. State, 489 So.2d 22, 24 (Fla. 1986); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(f).
therefore, "[a] trial court may not summarily dismiss a successive motion for
postconviction relief that raises issues that were either summarily denied or
dismissed for legal insufficiency in the initial motion." Id, 489 So.2d at 24; See
also, McCrae v. State, 437 So.2d 1388, 1390 (Fla. 1983) Stating that the
prohibition against successive motions applies "only when the grounds raised were
8
previously adjudicated on their merits, and not where previous motion was
summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency."); Frew v. State, 947 So.2d
1275, 1276 (Fla. 2"d DCA 2007) Stating that the circuit court's discretion to
dismiss a motion as successive under Rule 3.850(f) "does not apply when the
previous motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency.")
Therefore, a defendant whose post conviction claim is denied as facially
insufficient has the right under rule 3:850 (F) to file successive2 motion raising the
same or new claim but remedying the insufficiency.
This provision of Florida's Declaration of Rights Article I, §l6(a), together
with a nearly identical provision in the United States Constitution Sixth
Amendment, establishes one of the cornerstones of western jurisprudence, that
those against whom the state wishes to exercise its power and authority be
accorded due process of law. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 968 So.2d 108, 110 (Fla. 3"'
DCA 2007) Noting: due process consists of "adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard 'at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'", (Quoting, Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971); Ray v State, 403 So.2d 956, 959. (Fla.
1981) "No principle of procedural due process is more clearly established than that
Appellant recognized that the word "successive" often carries negativeconnotation in the postconviction arena. However, the word appears to be used inRule 3.850(f) to mean a "second or sequential" motion with no intended negativegloss.
9
notice of the specific charge, and a chance to be heard in a trial of the issues raised
by that charge, if desire, are among the constitutional rights of every accused in a
criminal proceeding in all courts, state and federal.'; (Quoting: Cole v. Arkansas,
333 U.S. I96, 201 (1948) and Bedford v. State, 970 So.2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4* DCA
2008) "Generally it is a denial of due process to convict on a crime not charged . .
." as the courts suggest, such error is fundamental in our constitutional system and
compels redress.
Although it is doubtful that a showing of prejudice is required in cases such
as this, where the error is structural in nature. See, e..g., Price v. State, 995 So.2d
401, 405 (Fla. 2008); Gray v. State, 435 So.2d 815, 818 (Fla. 1983); (holding that
where the charging instrument completely fails to charge a crime, the conviction
violates due process), it nevertheless is clear the trial counsel's failure to object on
the day of trial prejudiced the appellant in this instant case.' See also, McMillan v.
State, 832 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. 5* DCA 2002) (This rule is designed to
"[d]iscourage defendants from waiting until after a trial id over before contesting
deficiencies in charging documents which could have easily been corrected if thev
This is so even though defense counsel almost certainly knew, or at least had theability to know through discovery provided by the state, that the co-defendant wasthe one that purchased and possessed the cocaine at the time of the offense. In anycriminal case, facts creating the elements of additional uncharged crimes mightarise during discovery, but the state ultimately chooses not to charge those crimes.It is apodictic that discovery supplied by the state or actual knowledge by defensecounsel can not function as a substitute for constitutionally required notice.
10
had been pointed out before .trial."); Ford v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1130 (Fla.
2001); Baker v. State, 34 Fla.L.Weekly D526, D527 (Fla. 1" DCA, March 10
2009).
In Baker, appellant seeks review of his conviction, following a jury trial, for
accessory after the fact to second-degree murder with a firearm, in violation of
§777.03(1)(3)(c), Florida Statues (2005). Appellant contends that; (1) the
information was fundamentally defective because it did not include either the
essential elements of the second-degree murder to which he was allegedly an
accessory after the fact or a reference to the statute that proscribes that offense. Id.
at D526. At no time, either before or after his trial, did appellant complain that he
believed the information to be defective. Instead, for the first time on appeal,
appellant now complains that the information is fundamentally defective because it
failed to allege a criminal offense and failed adequately to allege the charge against
him, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due process of law. His argument is
that, although the information essentially tracked §777.03(i ). it was fundamentally
flawed because it failed also either to allege the elements of the offense allegedly
committed by the principal (second-degree murder with a firearm) or to make
reference to the statute that proscribes that offense, (i.e., ß782.04(2), Florida
Statutes). /d, at D526. The District Court per curiam affirmed, but certifies to our
Supreme Court the matter of great public importance.
I I
Here in the instant case, unlike Baker, the trial counsel failed to object to the
information did "wholly [ ] to allege one or more of the elements of the crimes" of
principal, accessory before or after the fact. On the contrary, the state alleged in the
instant case that appellant purchased and possessed cocaine of the elements of
trafficking and conspiracy to trafficking in cocaine, essentially - did not track the
language of §777.03(1) and §777.011(1), Florida Statutes. Appellant asserts that
the trial counsel failed to make an objection to the information fundamentally
defective, prejudiced appellant by being convicted of a crime he did not commit.
See, Williams v. State, 516 So.2d 975, 977-978 (Fla. f DCA 1987); "[I]t would be
grossly unjust to reject Williams' appeal and affirm his wrongful conviction of
robbery and keep him in prison for a crime that never occurred.") As this District
Court held in Williams, regardless of the procedural technicalities that the criminal
justice system imposes upon itself, that system has but one product - - justice - -
and it is unjust for a defendant to be in prison for a crime that never occurred. Id, at
978.
Therefore, this District Court should respectfully grant this issue, either grant
appellant and evidentiary hearing or deem entitlement to appellant for immediate
relief from a wrongful conviction.
12
GROUND TWO
DID THE POSTCONVICTION COURT FOLLOWINGWITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ERROR AS AMATTER OF LAW IN DENYING APPELANT'S 3.850CLAIM THAT TRIAL COURT ERR WHEN IT ALLOWEDHIS CO-DEFENDANT'S OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTSTO BE ADMITTED TO TRIAL WHEN NO CONSPIRACYEXIST
Appellee contends that a trial court eiTor is not cognizable in a Motion for
Postconviction Relief. Appellant asserts that the trial court conclusion is misplaced.
Out-of-court statements made by co-defendant to admit evidence under co-
conspirator exception to hearsay rule, state must establish; (1) that conspiracy
existed; (2) that co-conspirator and appellant against whom statements are offered
were members of conspiracy; and (3) that statements were made during course and .
in furtherance of conspiracy.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Trial court admission of codefendant's statements to witness and officer
after trafficking in cocaine were not admissible under co-conspirator exception to
hearsay rule, in absence of evidence demonstrating that statements were made
during continuation of conspiracy and agreement it encompassed. See, e.g., Calvert
v. State, 730 So.2d 316, 319 (Fla. 5* DCA 1999); Burnside v. State, 656 So.2d 241,
245 (fla. 5* DCA 1995); See also, Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332, 1335 (Fla.
13
1997) Finding that codefendant's confession was substantially incriminating to
defendant and that the circumstances of codefendant's confession did not
demonstrate the particularized guarantee of trustworthiness sufficient to overcome
the presumption of unreliability that attaches to accomplices' hearsay confessions
implicating the defendant.
PRESERVATION
In this second issue, Appellee contends that the co-defendant's statements
were properly admitted as staten1ents of a co-conspirator under §9Ó.803(3) and
90.803(18)(e); which is not cognizable in a motion for postconviction relief as
trial court error. The appellant asserts that "statements made which tend to shield
co-conspirators' after the objective of the conspiracy is completed do not give rise
to an additional conspiracy to cover up the original crime." See, We//s v. State, 492
So.2d 712, 719 (Fla. 1" DCA 1986); Bailey v. State, 419 So.2d 721 (Fla. 1" DCA
1982) Stating that statements by a victim are not admissible to prove subsequent
acts of a Defendant; See also, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577 (fla.1983).
therefore, Rule 90.803(3) also renders codefendant's statements inadmissible to
prove appellant's intent and motive. See, e.g., SanDoval v. State, 689 So.2d 1258,
1259 (Fla. 3M DCA 1997), the defendant sought to introduce her codefendant's
statements to show the defendant's state of mind and to explain her actions. The
14
trial court sustained the state's objection to the introduction of the evidence. On
appeal, the Third District agreed with the trial court and held:
"§90.803(3) permits the admission of a defendant's statementsto prove the declarant's state of mind or explain the declarant'ssubsequent conduct. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 440 So.2d 570, 577(Fla. 1983). The declarant here, is the codefendant and notSandoval."
Id, as 1259. As in Sandoval, the trial court here should not have allowed
codefendant's statement to be used against appellant to establish motive, absent
any evidence of a conspiracy at the time the statements were made.
Appellant also asserts that to qualify under the co-conspirator exception of
§90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes, a statement must be made during the course of the
conspiracy and in furtherance of it. See, §90.803(18)(e), Florida Statutes (1997).
Moore v. State, 503 So.2d 923, 924 (Fla. 5* DCA 1987); Burnside, 656 So.2d as
245; Calvert, 730 So.2d as 319; Usher v. State, 642 So.2d 29, 31 (Fla. 2* DCA
1994); See also, Foster v. State, 679 So.2d 747 (Fla. 1996). There is simply no
recorded evidence suggesting that at. the time most of the above statement were
made any conspiracy existed. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary and
demonstrated that if any conspiracy existed it was formed shortly before the
trafficking, or purchasing the cocaine. See, Walker v. State, 707 So.2d 300 310
(Fla. 1997); See also, Williamson v. United State, 512 U.S. 594, 604 (1994), 114
S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed 2"d 476 (1994) (Rule 804(b)(3)).
15
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, the reasons stated above, this District Court of Appeal must
respectfully grant relief and quash the trial court summarily denying appellant
Postconviction Motion, and grant evidentiary hearing or new trial with direction to
exclude codefendants statements.
Respectfully submitted,
STEVE CRAI INGRAM
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Initial
Brief has been furnished to Attorney General's Office: Honorable Pamela Jo
Bondi, Sea Breeze Blvd., Fifth Floor, Daytona Beach, Florida 32844, via U.S. Mail
on this // day of ßf 2012.
STEVE CRAIG dÑGRAM
16
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT
STEVE CRAIG INGRAM,Appellant,
V.Case No. 5D12-2666
STATE OF FLORIDA,Appellee.
RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF FILED ON APPEAL FROMSUMMARY DENIAL OF COLLATERAL MOTION
Appellee, the State of Florida, pursuant to Florida Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9 . 141 (b) , f iles this response to Appellant ' s
initial brief and states:
Appellant appeals from the summary denial of a Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3 . 80 0 (a) · or 3 . 850 motion. The S tate declines to
file an answer brief in this cause, unless this ·Court so requests.
See Ketion v. State, 548 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989); Toler v.
State, 493 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).
Respectfully Submitted,
PAMELA JO BONDIATTO EY GENE
WESLEY HEIDTAssistant Attorney GeneralFla. Bar #0773026444 Seabreeze BoulevardFifth Floor
.Daytona Beach, FL 32118(386) 238-4990(Telephone)(386) 238-4997 (Fax)wesley.heidt@myfloridalegal . com
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THEN1NTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT, IN ANDFOR OSCEOLA COUNTY, FLORIDA
CASE NO: 1997-CF-870STATE OF FLORIDA, DIVISION: 11-A
Plaintiffv.
STEVEN CRAIG 1NGRAM,Defendant.
/
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
THIS MATTER came before. the Court upon the Defendant's pro se "Motion for
Postconviction Relief," filed on May 4, 2012, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.800(a). The Court having reviewed the Motion, the court file, and being otherwise fully
advised of the premises, finds as follows:
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 16, 1998, the Defendant was convicted of trafficking in 400 grams or more
of cocaine. On June 8, 1998, he was sentenced as a habitual felony offender to life in the
Department of Corrections, with credit for 136 days time served. The Fifth District Court of
Appealper curiam affirmed. Ingram v. State, 748 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999).
Meanwhile, the Defendant filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was granted
on November 30, 1999 and the case was set for resentencing. On December 14, 1999, the State
filed a Motioi1 to Vacate Court's Order Granting Motion to Correct Sentence, and on December
28, 1999, the State filed a Motion to Strike Defendant's Motion to Correct Sentence. On April 6,
2000, the Court issued an Order granting the Motion to Vacate, vacating its prior order, and
denying the Motion to Strike.
On September 29, 2000, he filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion for Postconviction
Relief, and on February 15, ,2001, a pleading titled "Motion to Correct Sentence and
Supplemental Heggs." Both motions were denied on April 25, 2001. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed. Ingram v. State, 951 So. 2d 854 (Fla (belated appeal).
On December 27, 2005, he filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied
on April 10, 2007. The Fifth District Court ofAppeal affirmed. Ingram v. State, 968 So. 2d 579
(Fla. 5th DCA 2007). On December 17, 2007, he filed a Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence,
which was denied on May 1, 2008. He did not appeal. On June 30, 2008, he filed a Motion to
Correct Illegal Sentence, which was denied on January 22, 2009. The Fifth District Court of
Appeal per curiam affinned. Ingram v. State, 29 So. 3d 1135 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010). On June 3,
2009, he filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Fifth District of Appeal, which was
transferred to this Court as a Motion for Postconviction Relief. However, this Court denied this
Motion on November 25, 2009.
ANALYSIS AND RULING
In the instant Motion, the Defendant alleges two grounds for relief. The Court will
address each ground separately.
Ground One: The Defendant alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to
the charging affidavit, which failed to allege the elements of trafficking in cocaine. The Court
finds that this claim is procedurally barred. Rule 3.850 states, in pertinent part: "Time
Limitations. A motion to vacate a sentence that exceeds the limits provided by law may be filed
at any time. No other motion shall be filed or considered pursuant to this rule iffìled more than
2 years after the judgment and sentence become fìnal in a noncapital case..." Johnson v. State,
814 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) (emphasis in decision), citing Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850(b). The
Defendant's Mandate was issued on January 7, 2000. See Mandate. The Court finds that the
Defendant has failed to establish facts that demonstrate that his claim was unknown or could
have not been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Therefore, the Court finds that the
Defendant should have raised this claim in his first Motion for Postconviction Relief or prior to
the expiration ofhis two-year time limitation. Consequently, this claim is denied.
Ground Two: The Defendant asserts that trial court committed fundamental error when
it allowed his codefendant's out-of-court statements to be admitted at trial. A claim of trial court
error is not cognizable in a inotion for postconviction relief. See Swanson v. State, 984 So.2d 629
(Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (holding that claims of trial court error should be raised on direct appeal,
not in a rule 3.850 motion (citing Hodges v. State, 885 So.2d 338, 366 (Fla. 2004)). Furthermore,
it is a "common misconception among prisoners that 'fundamental error' can be reviewed in a
postconviction proceeding at any time." Hughes v. State, 22 So.3d 132, 133 (Fla. 2nd DCA
2
2009). If the issue were truly a matter of fundamental error, it could have and should have been
raised on direct appeal. Id at 135. Therefore, this claim is denied.
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED
that:
(1) The Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
(2) The following portion of the record is attached to tbis Order and incorporated by
reference: Mandate.
(3) The Defendant is advised that he may file a Notice of Appeal in writing within thirty
(30) days of the date of rendition of this Order.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers, in Osceola County, Kissimmee, Florida, this
day ofMay, 2012. /S/ Scott Polodna
SCOTT POLODNACircuit Court Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Order has been provided via interoffice mail
or by U.S. Mail to: Steven C. Ingram, DC# 339162, Sumter Correctional Institution, 9544
County Road 476B, Bushnell, Florida 33513-0667; and the Postconviction Felony Unit-Office
of the State Attorney, 2 Courthouse Square, Suite 3500, Kissimmee, Florida 34741 this
day ofMay, 2012.
Judicial Assistant
3
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE NINTH JUDICIALCIRCUIT IN AND FOR OSCEOLA COUNT, FLORIDA
CRIMINAL DIVISION
STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM,Defendant,
Case No: CR 97-870Vs.STATE OF FLORIDA,
Plaintiff
MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF
COMES NOW, The defendant, pursuant to Florida rule of criminal
procedure 3.850(b)(1)(2)(3), moves this circuit court to granted this motion for
Postconviction relief pursuant to trial counsel ineffective assistance of counsel for
failure to object or being to the attention of the court before trial and before states
rests its case to challenge propriety of information of trafficking in cocaine must
show that information is so fundamentally defective that it cannot support
judgment of conviction; (2) Trial court erred when it allowed the state over trial
counsel objection to admits out-of-court statements made by codefendant, who was
one purchase the cocaine, and not defendant, evidencing codefendant's motive,
plan, and intent to purchasing cocaine, were not admissible under co-conspirator
exception to hearsay rule, in absence of evidence suggesting that at time most of
statement were made any conspiracy ever existed. The defendant states the
follows:
1). The trial by judge was located in and for Osceola County, Florida, on
February 16, 1998.
2). The judge that presided over this proceedings was Honorable Anthony H.
Johnson.
3). The represented for the state of Florida was Phillip Townes, esquire.
4). The represented for the Defendant was Robert J. Nesmith, esquire.
5). Defendant was tried and convicted on February 16, 1998, of trafficking
in cocaine of two hundred grams or more. (R. 66). Defendant was sentenced as an
habitual offender, to a term of life imprisonment, on June 8, 1998. (R. 120-140).
6). Defendant filed and timely notice of appeal and the Fifth District Court
of Appeals, per curiam affirmed.
7). Defendant has filed numerous of motions on his judgment and sentence,
and this court has ruled on the issues, but not on the merits of the cause of actions.
8). Defendant does only have one motion to correct sentencing errors, in this
trial court, and there is no other motions, petitions or applications pending in the
Federal or state couits.
I. DEFENDANT ASSERTS THAT THESE TWO ISSUESARE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED BECAUSEDEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED FOR CRIME WHICHDID NOT TAKE PLACE IS A FUNDAMENTAL ERRORWHICH TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS SHOULDHAVE CORRECT EVEN WHEN NO TIMELYOBJECTION OR MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL WAS
MADE AT TRIAL AND WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL FAILEDTO PROVIDED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSELBEFORE TRIAL HAD STATED AND AFTER OR BEFORESTATE RESTS IT'S CASE IS A MANIFEST INJUSTICERESULT WHEN DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED OFTRAFFICKING IN COCAINE FOR WHICH HE DID NOTCOMMIT.
Defendant raised a total of two claims: 1) Ineffective assistance of counsel
failed to object or bring attention to the trial court that charging information did not
allege the elements of the Trafficking in cocaine offense allegedly committed by
the principal or accessory before and after the fact, did set out in section 777.03 or
90.803(18)(e), Florida statutes (1997); and 2) Trial court erred when it allowed the
state over trial counsel objection to admits out-of court statements made by
codefendant, who was one purchase the cocaine, and not defendant, evidencing
codefendant's motive, plan, and intent to purchasing cocaine, were not admissible
under co-conspirator exception to hear-say rule, in absence of evidence suggesting
that at time most of statements were made any conspiracy ever existed.
Defendant find that this successive motion is governed by Florida Rule of
Criminal Procedure 3.850(f), which allows a trial court to dismiss a successive
petition if it fails to allege new or different grounds and the prior determination
was on the merits; or if new and different grounds are alleged, the trial court finds
the failure to assert those grounds in a prior motion constituted an abuse of the
procedures governed by the rule. A second or successive motion for Postconviction
Relief can be denied on the ground that it is an abuse of process if there is no
reason for failing to raise the issues in the previous motion. See, Pope v. state, 702
So.2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1997). Although claims that could have been raised in a prior
Postconviction motion are procedurally barred, these Florida courts has held issues
which have previously been addressed by the court may be reconsidered where
there have developed material changes in the evidence or where reliance on the
prior decision would result in manifest injustice. See, State v. Sigler, 967 So.2d
835, 840 (Fla. 2007); Henry v. State, 649 So.2d 1361, 1364 (Fla. 1994)(citing
Preston v. State, 444 So.2d 939, 942 (Fla. 1984); Strazzulla v Hendrick, 177 So.2d
1,3-4 (Fla. 1965)(quoting Beverly Beach Properties v. Nelson, 68 So.2d 604 (Fla.
1953)); See also, Williams v. State, 516 So.2d 975, 977-78 (Fla. 5* DCA
1987)("[I]t would be grossly unjust to reject Williams appeal and affirm .his
wrongful conviction of robbery and keep him in prison for a crime that never
occurred."); Miller v. State, 988 So.2d 138, 139-40 (Fla. lf DCA 2008); Bruno v.
State, 807 So.2d 55, 63 (Fla. 2001). In order to overcome a procedural bar, a
defendant must show that a trial court could not convict him, and that this crime of
a similar nature had been committed by another person. See, Rivera v. State, 561
So.2d 536, 539 (Fla. 1990)(quoting Moreno v. State, 418 So.2d 1223, 1225 (Fla.
3d DCA 1982)). Reconsideration is warranted because of exceptional
circumstances and where reliance injustice. Therefore, this court must respectfully
granted acquitted, are any relief deemed lawful.
IL TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCEOF COUNSEL FOR FAILURE TO OBJECT OR BEINGATTENTION TO COURT BEFORE TRIAL OR BEFORESTATE RESTS ITS CASE THAT INFORMATION FAILSTO ALLEGE ELEMENTS IN TRAFFICKING IN COCATNEOFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED PRTNCIPAL ORACCESSORY BEFORE OR AFTER FACT DID SET OUT INSECTIONS 777.03 AND 90.803 (18)(E) FLORIDASTATUTES (1997)
Defendant asserts that the incident occurred on April 24, 1997, which the
trial counsel was ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to object or bring to
trial court attention that the information failed to allege the elements of the
trafficking in cocaine offence allegedly committed by the principal or accessory
before or after the fact set out in section's 777.03 or 90.803(18)(e), Florida statutes
(1997), in which there was insufficient evidence to establish that defendant had an
agreement with co-defendant Mr. Sebastien, to purchase three (3) kilo of cocaine
from undercover Federal Agents, on April 24, 1997.
Before April 24, 1997, the evidence at trial established that an agent with the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Metropolitan
Bureau of Investigation (MBI) was contacted by a federal agency to assist in
undercover capacity drug case. The agent was told that he would be meeting with
codefendant Mr. Sebastien regarding a sale of cocaine that had been prearranged
by a confidential informant.
Mr. Sebastien asked defendant to ride with him to Tampa, Florida, from the
Orange County, Florida area. After a telephone conversation between the agent and
codefendant Mr. Sebastien and to arrange a meeting, the confidential informant,
Mr. Sebastien and defendant met at a business location. The federal agent was
wearing a concealed microphone and much of the events were recorded on a DVD
by a nearby surveillance team. The negotiations were conducted by the agent and
codefendant Mr. Sebastien while defendant v/ere seating in the passenger side of
the vehicle, in which the owner of the vehicle was codefendant Mr. Sebastien. At
trial, the co-defendant testified that during his negotiations, he indicated that "they"
were there to purchase three (3) kilo of cocaine. At know time did defendant exits
the vehicle to talk with the agent, and defendant were never know by the
confidential information or the federal agents until defendant were stop on the
highway by MBI and State Trooper Perkins and Santemasir and his K-9 Zorro of
the Florida Highway Patrol.
When codefendant Mr. Sebastien and defendant left the area in Tampa,
Florida, and started going back to the Orange County, Florida area, they were stop
by Florida Highway Patrol Officers with assist of MBI agents Charles Moore, in
which the federal agency advised agent Moore that a 1992 Nissan Sentra (maroon
6
in color) bearing Florida tag (LBY06R) that would be leaving the Tampa area
within the hour with three (3) kilo's of powder cocaine in the trunk. Agent Moore
was also advised that the vehicle would be occupied by two black males whose
identity was unknown at that time. Agent Moore was advised that the three (3)
kilo's of power cocaine would be in a blue duffle bag with red stripping.
The Florida Highway Trooper initiated a traffic stop on the 1992 maroon
Nissan Sentra and Trooper ran a check of the Florida tag and driver license of the
driver which came back as codefendant Mr. Sebastien was the owner of the
vehicle, and Sgt. Berke asked for consent to search the vehicle and Codefendant
denied consent. Trooper Santemaria and his K-9 Zorro walked around the vehicle
and Zorro alerted to the left rear quarter panel of the trunk in which the officers
located the powder cocaine, and a .25 caliber pistol with six (6) additional rounds
in the magazine; both Codefendant and Defendant were placed under arrest for
armed trafficking in cocaine on April 24, 1997. (See information and amended
information).
On May 27, 1997, Defendant was charged with an amended information of Count
one: Possession Of A Firearm By A Convicted Felon. The state later dismissed
count two; and Defendant went to trial on Count one of the information. (See
Exhibit A). Trial counsel was ineffective for failure to object before trial by jury,
and before the state's rests its case, that the information was fundamentally
7
defective, because it fails to alleged that the defendant did unlawful maintain or
assist Andre N. Sebastien before or after the fact, or gave the offender any other
aid, knowingly that Andre N. Sebastine had committed the felony of purchase or
trafficking in cocaine, with the intent that Andre N. Sebastien should avoid or
escape detection, arrest, to the offender in violation of section 777.03 and 90.803
(18)(e), Florida statues (1997). Defendant was charged by information as follows:
COUNTONE
CHARGE: STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, ON THE 24" DAYOF APRIL, 1997, IN SAID COUNTY AND STATE, DID, INVIOLATION OF FLORIDA STATUE 893.135 (1)(-B)(1)(C),KNOWINGLY POSSESS, SELL, PURCHASE,MANUFACTURE, DELIVER OR BRING INTO THESTATE OF FLORIDA, FOUR HUNDRED (400) GRAMS OROF COCAINE OR OF A MIXTURE CONTAININGCOCAINE, A SUBSTANCE CONTROLLED BY FLORIDASTATUTE 893.03(2)(A)(4).
(See exhibit A).
At no time, either before or before the state rests its case, or after trial, did
trial counsel tried to preserve this fundamental error, that the i.nformation to be
defective; because it failed to allege a criminal offense and failed adequately to
allege the charge against defendant, resulting in a deprivation of his right to due
process of law. Trial counsel should have argued that, the information fails to
essentially tracked the elements of section 777.03 (1), its failure to either object or
bring this constitution violation to trial court's attention, that the state failed to
8
allege the elements of the offense allegedly committed by the principal
(Trafficking in Cocaine) or to make reference to the statute that proscribes that
offense (i.e., sections 777.03 (1) and 893.135 (1)(b)(1)(c), Florida Statutes).
Because trial counsel failed to object or bring this non-preserve issue by
raising it and securing a ruling in the trial court, counsel's deficient performance,
prejudice defendant from receiving an judgment of acquittal to the offense of
trafficking in cocaine and if it had been preserved it would have constitutes
"Fundamental Error". See, Mcmillan v.State, 832 So.2d 946, 948 (Fla. 5th DCA
2002) ("[T]his rule is designed to discourage defendants from waiting until after a
trial is over before contesting deficiencies in charging documents which could have
easily been corrected if they had been pointed out before trial."); Ford v. State, 802
So.2d 1121, 1130 (Fla. 2001); See also, Mosely v,State, 688 So.2d 999(Fla. 2d
DCA 1997). Defendant has demonstrate the two prongs in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. et. 2052, 80 L. ed. 2d 674 (1984).
A claim of ineffectiveness in failing to present important exculpatory
evidence cannot be resolved on the basis of the mere existence of conflicting
evidence in the record. "Rather, the record must 'conclusivelv' rebut the claim if
the claim is to be resolved without a hearing'." Jacobs v. State, 880 So. 2d 548,
555 (Fla. 2004); See also, Florida Rule ofCriminal Procedure 3.850(d). Therefore,
this court must respectfully grant relief.
H. TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWEDSTATE OVER TRIAL COUNSEL OBJECTION TOADMITS OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS MADE BYCODEFENDANT WHO WAS ONE PURCHASECOCAINE AND NOT DEFENDANT EVIDENCINGCODEFENDANT'S MOTIVE, PLAN, AND INTENT TOPURCHASING COCAINE WERE NOT ADMISSIBLEUNDER CO-CONSPIRATOR EXCEPTION TOHEARSAY RULE IN ABSENCE OF EVIDENCESUGGESTING THAT AT TIME MOST OFSTATEMENTS WERE MADE ANY CONSPIRACYEVER EXISTED.
Defendant asserts that the trial court violated Florida statutes 90.803(3) and
90.803(18)(e), when Codefendant's statements to officer after trafficking in
cocaine were not admissible under Coconspirator exception to hearsay rule.
The trial court allowed Codefendant testimony at trial as an exception to the
hearsay rule under section 90.803(3), Florida statutes (1997), which provides an
exception for evidence of the state of mind of the maker of the statements when
such state of mind is relevant to an issue at trial. Defendant asserts that this error
because a statement admitted to show state of mind is only allowed to prove the
state of mind or subsequent act of the declarant, not of a Defendant. Here,
Defendant asserts that the trial court erred in allowing the state to introduce these
statements directly against Defendant to show that Codefendant traveled to Tampa,
10
Florida with Defendant on April 24, 1997 to purchase three (3) kilo's of powder
cocame.
Hearsay is defined as a "statement, other than one made by the defendant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Section 90.801(1)(c), Fla. stat. (1997). Section 90.803 provides
an exception to the hearsay rule and that the following are not inadmissible as
evidence, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
(3) Then-existing mental, •emotional, or physicalcondition.--
(a) A statement of the declarant's4hen-ex-isting state ofmind, emotional, or physical sensation, including astatement of intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling,pain, or bodily health, when such evidence is offered to:
1. Prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, orphysical sensation at that time or any other time when suchstate is an issue in the action.
2. Prove or explain acts of subsequent conduct of thedeclarant.
Section 90.803(3), Fla. stat. (1997).
Under this exception, however,. a Declarant's statement of intent under
section 90.803(3) is only admissible to infer the future act of the Declarant, nofthe
future act of another person. See, Bailey v. State, 419 So. 2d 721 (Fla. l* DCA
1982) (stating that statements by a victim are not admissible to prove subsequent
acts of a defendant). Further, Ordinarily, a victim's state of mind is not a material
issue, nor is it probative of a material issue in a murder of trafficking case. See.
11
DECLARATION
Under the penalties of perjury, I declare that I have read this post-conviction
motion and states that it is true and correct. Executed under section 92.525(2),
Florida statues (2012).
teven Crai n
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true arid correct copy has been furnished to state
attorney office: Lawson Lamar, 20 South Rose Avenue, Suite 2 , Kissimmee,
Florida, 34743, by via U.S. mail on this day of 30 , 2012.
Steves Craig InSumter correctional institution9544 county road 476bBushnell, 11 33513-0667
14
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT JULY TERM 2012
NOT FINAL UNTIL THE TIME EXPIRES,TO FILE REHEARING MOTiON, AND,
STEVEN INGRAM, IF FILED, DISPOSED OF. -
Appellant,
v. Oase No. 5D12-2666
STATE OF FLORIDAr -- - - - -
Appellee.
Decision filed September 4, 2012
3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Courtfor Osceola County,Scott Polodna, Judge.
Steve Craig Ingram, Bushnell, pro se.
.Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General,Tallahassee, and Wesley Heidt, AssistantAttorney General, Daytona Beach,for Appellee.
PER CURIAM.
AFFIRMED.
TORPY, EVANDER and JACOBUS, JJ., concur.
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDAFIFTH DISTRICT
STEVEN INGRAM ,
Appellant,
v. CASE NO. SD12-2666
STATE OF FLORIDA ,
Appellee.I
DATE: September 05, 2012
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Apnellant, Steven Ingram, continues to appeal orders denying successive
and meritiess postconviction motions. Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that Appellant shall file with this Court and show cause, within
thirty (30) days of the date of this order, why he should not be prohibited from filing any
appeal, petition, pleading or motion pertaining to the conviction and sentence rendered
in Case No. 1997-CF-870, unless reviewed and signed by an attorney licensed to
practice in the State of Florida. See Spencer v. State, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999).
I hereby certify that the foregoing is(a true copy of) the original Court order.
PAMELA R. MASTERS CLENK no
cc:
Office Of Attorney General Steven Ingram
IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF OSCEOLA COUNTY, STATE OF FLORIDA
AMENDEDTHE STATE OF FLORIDA INFORMATION # CR97-870
VS.
STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM 1. TRAFFICKING IN 400 GRAMS ORMORE OF COCAINE (MinimumMandatory) (F1-L9)
. POSSESSION OF A FIREARM BY ACONVICTED FELON (F2-L5)
IN THE NAME AND BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA:
LAWSON LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit
prosecuting for the State of Flor'ida in Osceola County, OR LAWSON
LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit prosecuting for
the State of Florida in Osceola County, by and through the undersigned
Designated Assistant. State Attorney, under oath, CHARGES that
STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, on the 24th day of April, 1997, in said County
and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute 893.135 (1) (b) (1) (c) ,
knowingly possess sell, purchase, manufacture, deliver or bring
into the State of Florida, four hundred (400) grams or more of
cocaine or of a mixture containing cocaine, a substance controlled
by Florida Statute 893.03(2) (a) (4).
Page 1 of 2 Pages S.T. 10/15/97
COUNT TWO
LAWSON LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit
prosecuting for the State of Florida in Osceola County, OR LAWSON
LAMAR, State Attorney of the Ninth Judicial Circuit prosecuting for
the State of Florida.in Osceola County, by and through the undersigned
Designated Assistant State Attorney, under oath, CHARGES that
STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM, on the 24th day of April, 1997, in said County
and State, did, in violation of Florida Statute 790.23, unlawfully
possess a firearm, to-wit: a handgun, STEVEN CRAIG INGRAM having
been prior thereto, on the 8th day of January, 1996, convicted in
the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida of a
felony, to-wit: Possession of a Firearm by a Convicted Felon, or,
having been prior thereto, on the 1st day of June, 1992, convicted
in the Circuit Court of the Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida of a
felony, to wit: Possession of Cocaine With Intent to Sell.
T s a gngmga eN e ac d
e a n rm t
STATE OF FLORIDACOUNTY OF ORANGE LAWSON LAMAR, State torneyAs s all p et Ninth Judicial Circuit of Florida
cu a e sSe rece veO t s mony 6 th
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o em n sŸst y w Ol/ the Designated Assi tan g g Attorneypersona y nown to me an e sai oath. O f a
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MELISSA D. DOWLINGNotary Public, State of Florida Bond $2 5 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 HE/HE
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Bonded thru Ashton Agency, Inc.