Is Existence a Predicate in Anselm's Argument.pdf

8/10/2019 Is Existence a Predicate in Anselm's Argument.pdf

1/8

Is Existence a Predicate in Anselm's Argument?Author(s): David M. LochheadSource: Religious Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Oct., 1966), pp. 121-127Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20004641.

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2/8

Rel. Stud.

2, pp.

12

I-I

2

7.

DAVID M.

LOCHHEAD

St. Paul s

United

College,Waterloo,

Ontario

IS

EXISTENCE A

PREDICATE

IN ANSELM S

ARGUMENT?

One

of the

most

annoying

things

to

many

a

student

of

St

Anselm s

Proslogion

is the way inwhich many philosophers assume that they can make Anselm s

argument

disappear simply by

uttering

the

incantation,

Existence is not

a

predicate .

Some recent studies of

the

argument

have tried

to

rescue it

from

Kant s

dictum

by showing

that this

criticism

does not

apply

to Anselm s

so-called

second

ontological argument.

This

argument appears

in

chapter

in

of

Proslogion

and

depends

on

a

distinction

between

necessary

existence

and

contingent existence .

Both

Malcolm

and

Hartshorne are

content,

however, to let the better known first

argument

(Proslogion,chapter ii)

rest

in

the

oblivion to which Kant

assigned

it.

Recently, in a careful and penetrating examination of Anselm s text,

M.

J. Charlesworth2 shows

that we cannot

superficially

assume thatKant has

demolished

even

the

first

argument

of Anselm.

However,

Charlesworth

bases

his defence on

the

assumption-shared

by

most critics

of the argument

-that

for

Anselm,

existence

is

a

predicate.

It

is this

interpretation

of Anselm

that

I

want

to

call

into

question.

In

Charlesworth s

interpretation

of the

argument, Anselm s

second

premise

is a

general

rule

comparing conceptual

and

real

existence: that

which

exists

in

reality is greater

than that

which exists

in

themind

alone.3My

difficulty is

that, in

reading Anselm,

I

can

find no

evidence

that

he

understood this rule

as

having general

validity. Let

us look at

Charlesworth s

own

translation of

Anselm s text:

And

surely

that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought cannot exist in

the mind

alone.

For if

it

exists solely

in the mind

even,

it

can

be thought to exist

in reality

also,

which

is

greater.

(Proslogion,

chapter

ii).

The

question is, of what

can it be said that real

existence is greater

than con

ceptual existence? Of anything? The text doesn t say. All that the text

claims is

that

it is

greater

for

that-than-which-a-greater-cannot-be-thought

to

exist

really

than

conceptually.

Anselm

does not

commit himself to the

1

Norman

Malcolm,

Anselm s

Ontological

Arguments in

Philosophical

Review,

vol.

LXIX

(1960),

pp.

4I-62. Charles

Hartshorne,

The Logic of

Perfection

Lasalle. Open

Court,

I961).

2

M. J.

Charlesworth, St Anselm s

Proslogion

(Oxford,

I965).

3

Ibid.

p.

58.

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3/8

I22

DAVID.LOCHHEAD

relative merits of

real and

imaginary pounds,

dollars,

thalers-or

even

islands. On the other hand,

ifAnselm s

second

premise

is not an application

of

a

general

rule comparing real

and imaginary existence, what

is it?What

are the other possibilities?

The

first possibility is that

Anselm understands

the principle as being

relevant only to the

concept of God; that

only in the case of God

is it intelli

gible

to compare real and conceptual

existence. I

will offer evidence later

in

the paper to support

the view

that

this

interpretation

is closest to Anselm s

intention.

The

other

possibility

is

that

there is

a

general

rule involved here, but not

the

one

that Charlesworth

supposes. According to

this interpretation

real

existence differs from conceptual

existence, but

the difference is not that

real

existence

is

greater than conceptual

existence

in abstract. Rather,

the

difference

is one of what

I shall call intensity .

Real existence intensifies

conceptual existence.

Thus

it is

greater

for

that-than-which-nothing-greater

can-be-thought

to exist

in

reality

than

to

exist

in the mind alone. The

greatness has

been intensified or-better

yet-it has been

made operative

by the

transition from conceptual

to

real

existence.

As we shall see, under

this interpretation

it is

quite problematic

whether of

anything

less

than

God

it can be said that real existence is greater than conceptual

existence.

In

order

to

clarify

this

interpretation,

let us

apply

it to the issue

in

which

its

consequences

are

decisively

different from those of

the

interpretation

advanced

by

Charlesworth:

the

existence of the devil. Charlesworth notes,

correctly,

that

if his

interpretation

is

correct,

it

implies

that thatwhich

nothing

less

great

can be

thought

cannot

possibly

exist in

reality.

If

it

existed

in

reality

it

would

be

greater

than

if

it existed

in the mind alone.

A

less

great

being

could

be

imagined;

a

being

who

existed

in

the

mind

alone.2

In a

footnote

to this

passage,

Charlesworth

objects,

with

good reason,

to

identify

ing this least great being with the devil of Christian orthodoxy. But

we

shall return

to

this

point

later.

This

argument

is not

original

with

Charlesworth,

as

indeed

he

points

out

in the same footnote.

He cites

C. K. Grant3

and A. A. Cock4

as

others

who

have called

attention

to

this

consequence

of the

ontological argument.

As

a

matter

of

fact,

A.

A. Cock

did

not

advance

an

ontological disproof

of

the

devil.

On the

contrary,

Cock

argues

in favour of an

ontological proof

of

the devil.

Cock s

article is

of

great significance

for

any

student

of

Anselm s

argument.

He approaches his subject sympathetically and with a reverence that is

rare

1

It is

also relevant

to the objection

that

existence cannot

be

a

perfection

in things like

cancer

or

slums.

Cf. ibid.p.

64.

2

Ibid.

pp. 69-70.

3

C.

K.

Grant,

The Ontological

Disproof

of the

Devil in Analysis,

vol.

I

7

(I956-I957),

pp.

71-72.

Albert A. Cock,

The

Ontological

Argument

for

the Existence

of God

in

Proceedings

f

the

Aristoteliani

ociety,

New Series,

vol.

XVIII

(1917-19I8),

pp.

363-384.



4/8

IS EXISTENCE A PREDICATE IN ANSELM S ARGUMENT?

I23

in

philosophical

studies. While his article

is

not

always clear,

it

contains

flashes

of

insight which put

Anselm s

argument

in an

entirely

new

light.

Cock

holds

that,

in Anselm s

argument,

real

existence

is

not

some sort

of

predicate

that

is

added to

a

concept. Rather,

it

is

the

fool who denies the

existence

of

God

who must subtract existence.

In

so

doing

he involves

himself

in

contradiction.

Anselm s

addition

is

apparent only, resulting

from the previous subtraction of the fool. Cock holds,

in

agreement with

my

contention,

that Anselm s second

premise

has

no

generalvalidity:

The Fool has attempted to subtract reality

in

re,

not

from

any

reality

in

intellectu,

but

from id quo

nihii

maius cogitari potest.

In

attempting

the

impossible

he

has, ipso

facto,

demonstrated the reality.

When Cock turns

to the

problem

of the

devil,

what

emerges

is

an

ontological

proof of the devil s

real

existence.

Cock defines

the

devil

as that than

which

a

lesser

(or

worse)

is

inconceivable .

The

argument proceeds:

Surely,

that than

which

a worse

is

inconceivable

cannot

exist

only

in

the under

standing.

For

if, indeed,

it

exist

only

in

the

understanding,

it

can

be

thought

to be

also

in

reality, and this

is worse than a

thought

evil

being.2

Thus, Cock argues,

if

the

ontological argument

is

valid for

God,

it

is

valid for

the devil.

It is

undeniable

that

Cock s argument

is

parallel

to

that

of

the

Proslogion.

Furthermore,

there

is

nothing in

the

Proslogion

that

would suggest

that

Cock

has

not

grasped

its

intention

correctly.

But if

Cock

is

correct, Charlesworth s

contention-that

as a

general rule,

real

existence is

greater

than

conceptual

existence-must

be

mistaken.

Roughly

speaking,

Cock s

interpretation

of

the

argument implies that real

existence must function in

such

a

way

that

it

makes goodness greater and evil worse . In other words, real existence

must function to

intensify

or make

operative

what

is

contained in the

conceptual existence of

a

thing-be

it

good

or

evil. Thus

a real

God

is

greater

than

a

conceptual

God and

a

real

devil

is

worse

than

a

conceptual

devil.

Cock does

recognise

that

the

interpretation

that Charlesworth holds

would

involve the non-existence of the devil. But he rejects it out of

hand: We

could not

say

that not

to

be is

worse than to

be, and, therefore, no devil at all,

for

it

is

clear

that

to be

a

devil isworse than

not

to be one .3

Clearly, Cock s justification of his position ismistaken. Having defined the

devil

as

that thanwhich a

worse

is

inconceivable ,

all

that can be proved from

To be a devil is worse than not to be one is that devilishness is a

quality

1

Albert A.

Cock,

The

Ontological Argument

for the

Existence

of

God

in

Proceedings

f

the

Aristotelian

Society,New Series,

vol.

xviii

(1917-19I8),

p.

365.

2

Ibid.

p. 381.

3

Ibid.

p.

381.



5/8

I24

DAVID M. LOCHHEAD

which the devil must have.

The proposition To be a devil isworse than not

to

be

one does not imply

the crucial proposition It isworse for the devil to be

than not to be unless the

ontology which Cock is trying to justify is assumed.

However, Cock s mistake

does not mitigate the fact that his proof of the

devil

seems

to

have the

same

force

as

Anselm s

proof

of God.

As

I

anticipated earlier,

Cock s position (or, rather, the ontology that I

have inferred from it) implies

that of nothing else but God can it be said

unambiguously that real

existence is greater than conceptual existence. Only

of God

can all

perfections

be predicated. The real existence

of an imperfection

isworse than its conceptual existence. Of no imperfect

being, i.e. of no being

who

is

less than

God,

can

it be said-unambiguously-that

real existence is

greater than purely conceptual existence.

However,

as

Cock has shown, this interpretation

of Anselm s argument

seems

to involve that if God exists necessarily, so does

an absolutely evil

being. This,

as

Charlesworth points out, isnot the devil

of Christian orthodoxy.

Cock s ontological proof

of the devil establishes-not a fallen angel-but a

being

on

the

same

metaphysical

level

as

God.

This is

a

kind

of dualism which

Anselm s Christian faith could

not

tolerate.

Cock s

interpretation seems to

involve Anselm

in

heresy.

In fairness toCock s interpretation itmust be said that the heresy lies in

the

presupposition of the

argument and not

in Cock s

understanding of

Anselm s

ontology.

Cock

can

only get

started in

his

proof of

the

devil

because

he assumes

that evil has

an

independent

reality. Christian theology

has

traditionally

seen

evil

as

in

some

way

parasitic

on

the good, having

no

reality

independent

of the good. Anselm could, therefore,

admit that insofar

as

something

was

imperfect,

its real

existence

was

worse

than merely con

ceptual

existence while

denying

that the

notion

of

an

absolutely

evil

being

was

an

intelligible

one.

To recapitulate: Anselm s second premise is capable of three interpreta

tions:

(i)

Real

existence is

greater

than

conceptual

existence.

This is

Charlesworth s

interpretation.

(2)

Real

existence

is

an

intensification

of

conceptual

existence.

This

interpretation

is

inferred from Cock.

(3)

The

comparison

between

real and

conceptual

existence

is

only intelligible

in

the

case of

God.

This,

I

believe,

is

how Anselm

understood

his

argument.

The evidence for

my

preference

is

entirely

circumstantial.

In

general,

I

would

simply

observe

that

Anselm shows

little

or

no awareness

of

using

a

general ontological

principle

in

his

second

premise.

This is what

really

distinguishes Anselm s proof from that of Descartes.

But,

in

addition

to

this

negative

reason,

I

think

that

interpretation

(3)

makes better

sense

of

two

textual

questions

than does

either

interpretation

(i)

or

interpretation

(2).

These

are

the

meaning

of

Anselm s

reply

to

Gaunilo s

Lost Island

criticism and

the

significance

of the

Proslogion,

chapter

v.



6/8

IS EXISTENCE

PREDICATE

N

ANSELM

ARGUMENT?

I25

In his critique

of Anselm, Gaunilo

applies

what he

understands

to be

Anselm s

logic to a Lost-but

most

excellent-Island

and concludes

that

this

Island

must

necessarily

exist. Anselm

replies:

Now,

I

truly promise that

if anyone should discover

for me

something existing

either

in

reality or

in the mind alone except

that-than-which-a-greater-cannot

be-thought -to

which

the logic

of

my argument

would

apply,

then I shall find

that

Lost Island

and give it, never more

to

be

lost,

to that person.

(Reply

to

Gaunilo,

Iii).

Charlesworth comments:

Anselm s

reply

to

Gaunilo

here, however,

needs

to

be

filled

out in

more

detail

to

be

satisfactory. Thus, for

example,

he would need

to

say

that

the notion of the

most

excellent island is

a

notion

of merely

a relative

greatest ,

for

no matter how

excellent

or

perfect

or

great

an island may

be,

it can never be

so

great

that

we

cannot

conceive

of

a

greater,

and it

will

certainly

never

be the

most

excellent

or

most

perfect

or

greatest

being absolutely

speaking.

On

St

Anselm s

premises,

of

course,

an

actually existing

island will be

greater

or more

perfect

than

one

merely

thought of,

but

this

does

not

imply

that

there is an

actually existing

island.

The

case of

that than which

nothing

greater

can

be

thought

is

different,

for

here,

so

St

Anselm claims,

we have

the

concept of something which

is

the greatest

absolutely speaking,

something

than which

it

is

not

possible

in

any way

to

think

of

a

greater.

We can

agree with

Charlesworth that

if,

for

Anselm,

an

existing island is

greater than

an

imaginary one, his argument

does need to be filled

out in

more detail

in order to be satisfactory .

Indeed it is scarcely satisfactory,

even

when

the distinction

between absolute

and relative greatness has

been

made.

If, however, Anselm did

not hold that an existing island

is greater than an

imaginary island, the

exegesis of this passage ismuch

simpler. We do not

need the distinction-unfounded in the text-between relative and

absolute

greatness.

If

we

do not assume that Anselm s

second premise is a

general rule, we do not

have

to

suppose that Anselm saw

in

his argument

or

in Gaunilo s

objections

to

it-what both Gaunilo and Charlesworth

take

for

granted.

If

Anselm

really

saw the

point

of Gaunilo s criticism, his

answer

to

Gaunilo

is

virtually incomprehensible.

Gaunilo s criticism

assumes

what Charlesworth does:

that, for Anselm,

existence

is a

perfection.

If

Gaunilo

and

Charlesworth

are correct,

Anselm

could not have

helped

seeing the point of

the Lost Island analogy. And

if he

understood the criticism, Anselm could not have avoided addressing himself

to

it;

to show

(as Charlesworth attempts

to do) why, although existence

is a

perfection,

the

perfect

island does not

exist.

Similarly,

if

Anselm did

not hold existence

to be

a

perfection, but

did see

what Gaunilo

was

getting

at,

it

would

be incumbent on Anselm

to call

Charlesworth,

op. cit. pp. 93-94.



7/8

I26 DAVID M.

LOCHHEAD

attention to Gaunilo s mistaken assumption and to contrast his own position

with it. Anselm does neither of these things.We must wonder then ifAnselm

saw Gaunilo s point at all. An indication that

Anselm

did not understand

Gaunilo s criticism is the fact that

Anselm

consistently speaks as if the force

of that

criticism lay

in

the conceivabilityof the island rather than in

its

excellence.

It must be assumed that Anselm regarded his remarks as an appropriate

reply toGaunilo s criticism. It is difficult to see how he could regard the reply

that he actually makes as appropriate

if

he really saw the force of Gaunilo s

argument. It seems best to conclude then, that Anselm did not understand

Gaunilo s objection. But if Anselm did not understand the objection, it is

impossible

to

understand how

he

could have

held

the

assumption that lies at

the

basis

of that

objection:

that existence is

a

perfection.

Anselm s misunder

standing of Gaunilo s criticism is only intelligible on the assumption that he

did

not hold the

ontology upon

which that criticism

is founded.

So much for the

Lost Island. Let us look at the second textual point: the

significance

of

chapter

v

of

the

Proslogion.

The

concept of perfection

in

Anselm

is

quite

clearly

defined.

A

perfection

iswhatever, absolutely speaking, it is better to be than not to be. Thus, for

example, justice is a perfection since it isclearly better tobe just than not tobe

just.

Anselm

recognises

relative

perfections,

but these do

not concern

us here.

Anselm s idea of perfection is developed in the Monologion, chapter

xv and

in

the

Proslogion, chapter

v.

It is Anselm s

use of the concept of perfection

in

the

Proslogion

that

is

important to our problem.

He starts from his definition: God is

that-than

which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.

From

this

definition,

he

establishes

God s perfection

in

general.

As

the

being greater

than which

nothing

can

be

conceived,

God must

be

supremely perfect.

Otherwise

a

greater

can

be

conceived. Having established God s perfection in general, Anselm proceeds

to

predicate particular

perfections (goodness, justice, etc.)

of him.

In

Charlesworth s interpretation,

real

existence

is

a

perfection.

It

is

better

to be real than

not

to be real

(i.e.

to

be

merely possible).

If

this is

the

case,

Anselm

had a

procedure already developed

in the

Monologion

with which

he

could

deal

with

it.

His

proof

could have

proceeded

as

follows: God

is

that

than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.

It

follows

that God is

supremely perfect.

A

perfection

is

whatever

is

better to

be

than not

to be.

It

is

better

to

be

real than

not to

be

real.

Therefore

God

really

exists.

But Anselm doesn t do this.Here is themajor distinction between Anselm s

argument and those

of Descartes

and Leibniz.

In

Anselm,

the idea

of

perfec

tion

is

only introduced after

God s

existence

is

established.

Anselm

(deliber

ately?) keeps

the

question

of God s

existence

separate

from

that of

his

perfection.

He shows

no

tendency

whatsoever

to

subsume

the

concept

of

1

Cf. Anselm,

Reply to Gaunilo, I,

111)

V.



8/8

IS

EXISTENCE

A

PREDICATE

IN ANSELM

S

ARGUMENT?

127

existence under

that of perfection.

In relation to

the

definition

of God,

existence occupies the

same

status

as

perfection .

Both follow directly

from

the

definition.

This is not

true

of particular perfections.

If commentators

on

the

ontological

argument

wish

to

maintain that,

for

Anselm, real

existence

is

greater

than

conceptual

existence, they

must give

us answers

to the following questions: Why

is the

perfection

of God not

established

until

chapter

v

of the Proslogion

while

the existence

of

God

is

Discussed

in

chapters

II--Iv?

Why

is God s

perfection

not discussed

first?

Real existence,

as

interpreted

by Charlesworth,

fulfilsAnselm s own criterion

for a

perfection. Why

does

Anselm show no

tendency

to

make

this

explicit?

Why

does he seem,

rather, to

resist

assimilating

the two

concepts?

To

state

my

conclusions:

(I)

Anselm

never

discusses

the

comparison

between

real

and conceptual

existence

except

in relation to

that-than

which-nothing-greater-can-be-thought .

There

is

little,

if

any,

basis for

the

claim

that,

in

general,

real existence

is

greater

than

conceptual

existence.

There

is

evidence,

as I

have tried to show,

that Anselm did

not hold the view

that

Charlesworth

attributes

to

him.

(2)

If

Anselm

does

hold

a

general

view

concerning

the nature of real existence-and

there is no

evidence

that

he

does-there

is

still no basis for

characterising

this view as Charlesworth

does.

The interpretation

inferred from

Cock s

treatment

of Anselm s argument

is

a

genuine-and

perhaps better-alternative.

The

interpretation

of

Anselm

which

Charlesworth

puts

forward is shared,

implicitly,

by almost every

commentator on

the ontological

argument.

I

have

challenged

Charlesworth

in

particular

for

two reasons.

In

the first

place,

Charlesworth

challenges

the orthodox view

of Anselm on almost

every

other

point

of

consequence. It

is

a

pity that this

point escaped him.

Secondly,

Charlesworth

is

aware

of Cock s article

and

of its relevance

to the question

of

the existence

of

the devil.

He should have

been

aware,

therefore, of the

consequences for his interpretation.

I

have attempted in this paper

neither to support

nor refute

Anselm s

argument.

This would

be the subject of

another study. I

only insist here that

before we

pontificate on

the validity of the

argument,

we

must be clear about

what the

argument

is.

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