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Is There a Clash of Civilizations? Evidence from Patterns of International ConflictInvolvement, 1946-97Author(s): Giacomo ChiozzaSource: Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 39, No. 6 (Nov., 2002), pp. 711-734Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1555255

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R E S ? A R Ci i

? 2002JournalofPeaceResearch,vol.39, no.6, 2002, pp. 711-734SagePublications(London,ThousandOaks,CAand NewDelhi)[0022-3433(200211)39:6;711-734; 028843]

Is There a Clashof Civilizations?EvidencefromPatternsof InternationalConflictInvolvement,1946-97*GIACOMO CHIOZZADepartmentof Political Science,Duke University

This article offers an empirical test of Huntington'sthesis in The Clashof Civilizations.Huntingtonarguesthat states belonging to differentcivilizations will have a higher propensity to be involved ininternationalconflict. This effect should be more prominent in the post-Cold Warperiod.The civiliz-ation factor should also interact with membership in different Cold War blocs, border contiguity,regimetype, and levels of modernization,magnifyingor depressingthe basic effects of these variables.To test thesehypotheses,a logit specificationwith King & Zeng'ssolution for rarenessof events is usedon the Kosimodata.The Kosimo data allow for an extension of the empiricalanalysisfrom both a tem-poraland a substantivepoint of view. This study shows that state interactionsacross the civilizationaldivideare not more conflictprone.The firsteightyearsof the post-ColdWarera also fail to givesupportto Huntington'sthesis. Moreover,while the civilization factor modifies the effectsof bordercontiguityand regime type, this is not sufficient to generateconditions under which differencesin civilizationalheritageare associatedwith greaterrisksof conflict.

IntroductionSamuel Huntington's The Clashof Civiliz-ations and the Remakingof WorldOrderhassent intellectual shock waves through theinternational affairs academic and policycommunities. According to the editors ofForeignAffairs,the article that Huntington(1993a) wrote in 1993 generated morediscussion in three years than any otherarticle they had publishedsince the 1940s.And deservedly so: of all the theoretical*I would like to thank ChrisGelpi, Hein Goemans,JoeGrieco,ErrolHenderson,and RobertKeohaneforhelpfulcommentsto previousversionsof thisproject.The statisti-calanalysiswasperformedusingStata7 andKing& Zeng's(2001a,b) Relogitprogram.A replicationdatasetis avail-able at the JPR website: http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.asp.An appendixcontainingadditionalanalysesisalso availableat theJPR website.Mistakes,omissions,andotherinfelicitiesaremy own responsibility.

frameworksthat havegainedvisibilityin thefield in the last decade, Huntington's isamong the most thought-provoking andcontroversial.

In Huntington'svision, the dynamicsofinterstate interactionin the post-Cold Warperiodwill be primarilymolded by civiliza-tionalfactors.While the state continues to bethe principal actor in the internationaldomain, its identity and interests will beshapedby its civilizationalheritage.And itsbehaviorwill be affectedaccordingly:conflictbetween civilizationsand cooperationwithincivilizations is Huntington's prediction forthe future of world politics. 'In this newworld order',Huntington (1996: 28) main-tains, 'the most pervasive, important, anddangerousconflictswill not be betweensocialclasses,rich and poor,or other economically

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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?Orthodox country in civilizational terms.And this is potentially true for many inter-national crisesthat took placeacrossthe IronCurtain.Observingthat the likelihood of adisputein intercivilizationaldyadswaxesandwanes in line with the intensityof the ColdWar,as Russett, Oneal & Cox (2000: 600)do, may not be a sufficientbasis for refuta-tion of Huntington's (1996: 39) argumentabout the restrainingeffectsof the Cold Waron intercivilizationalconflict.

Third, previousstudies have not investi-gated the possibility that the civilizationfactormightinfluencetheprobabilityof con-flict by alteringthe operationof other causalvariables.The civilizationalstatusof apairofcountries might be a 'moderator'variablethat magnifiesor depressesthe effects of keypredictorsof conflict. Should that be thecase,theremight be conditions under whichcountries of different civilization mightexperiencehigher risksof militaryconfron-tation than same-civilizationcountries.

In this article, a new test is offered ofHuntington'sCofC argument,one that seeksto addressthe potentialdrawbacksattendanton earlierinvestigationsof the CofC thesis.This test introduces four specific inno-vations. First, it employs a new conflictdataset, the Kosimo dataset (Pfetsch &Rohloff, 2000), that coversa largernumberof yearsin the post-ColdWarperiodthan theMID andCOW datausedby Russett,Oneal& Cox (2000), and Henderson & Tucker(2001). This allows for an extension of thedomain of investigationby fiveyearsduringthe post-ColdWarperiod,that is from 1993to 1997.3 Second, it differentiates thepatternsof state interactionin the Cold Waracross the civilizational and ideologicaldivides, and investigateshow they interact.Third, this study evaluates whether theimpacton the probabilityof conflict of three3 The Kosimo datasetrecordsdata until 1999, but dataavailabilityon the explanatoryvariableslimits the periodunderinvestigationto 1997.

key variables, namely border contiguity,regime type, and modernization, variesacrosssame-civilizationand different-civiliz-ation dyads.This researchdesign offers anassessment of whether the civilizationalstatusof a dyadhas an indirect,but not lessimportant,effect on conflict. Finally,a newestimator- King & Zeng's (2001a,b) rareevents logit model - is used, which shouldallow for more precise estimates of therelevantparameters.The discussion below proceeds in threesteps.First,there is a specificationof a set ofhypotheses on the relationship betweencivilizationalmembershipand internationalconflict involvement. Second, researchdesignandmeasurementissuesarediscussed.The third sectionputs forwardan analysisofthe resultsand an assessmentof their impli-cationsfor the CofC hypotheses.This analysisshows that, as Huntington'scritics havesuggested,intercivilizationdyadsare in generalless likely to get involved ininternationaldisputes.This is true even inthe post-ColdWaryears,the periodin whichHuntington believes his thesis is most likelyto show its empiricalpower.Moreover,whileintercivilizationaldynamics interact with,and modify,the impactof geographicconti-guity and regime type on the probabilityofdispute involvement, these effects are notstrong enough to generate a conflict syn-dromeforcountriesof differentcivilizations.

Hypotheses on the Clash ofCivilizationsThe main thrust of Huntington's argumentis that countries belonging to differentcivilizations are more likely to find them-selvesembroiledin internationalconfronta-tions that might lead to an outburst ofviolence. What characterizesintercivilizationdyadsis the lingering presenceof conflictualinteractions. As Huntington (1996: 291)writes,'Faultline warsareintermittent;fault

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714 journal of PEACE RESEARCHline conflicts are interminable.'Conditionsexistunderwhich the use of force is deterredor a ceasefireis enforced,but none is likelytolast for long as the lack of trust, the diffi-culties in mutual understanding,and theindivisibility of the issues under disputemakejointly satisfactorysettlementsof con-troversiesimprobable. Moreover,should acrisis occur, it is likely to spiral to higherlevels of violence: '[fault line] conflicts tendto be vicious and bloody,since fundamentalissuesof identity are at stake' (Huntington,1996: 252).

This argumentmight be interpretedas aformof culturalrealism:the venerablerealisttenet of zero-sum state competition iscoupled with a new understandingof thesources of state interests.4 General values,ethnic identities,andreligiousbeliefs informthe goalsstatespursue,shapethe perceptionsthe decisionmakershold, and characterizethe patternsof friendshipand enmity in theinternational arena. Civilizations are notdeemed to replace states as the primarymovers of world politics. Their influence isindirect,but not less pervasive:civilizationsshapeastate'sfundamentalinterestsbydefin-ing its identity.In Huntington'sframework,'who areyou?'has become the centralques-tion of 21st-centuryworldpolitics.And thatquestion is increasingly answered incivilizationalterms(Huntington,1996: 125).Ideationalfactors,therefore,playa centralrole in the CofC theoretical construct.Identificationwith a civilizationis seen as anenduringand inalienablefeaturethat statescannot transcend.Those who try- Australia,Mexico, Russia,andTurkeyareHuntington's(1996: 139-154) examples- embarkthem-selves on a process that is prolonged andpoliticallycostly,and that has to date failed.In this respect, Huntington's (1996) argu-ment is reminiscent of the primordialistperspective on ethnic and nationalistic4This labelis borrowedfromHenderson(1997).Needlessto say,thisusageis differentfromJohnston's(1995).

violence thatposits thatculturalfactorsare a'given'that inevitablyset peoples apart,andonto a conflictualpath (for an overview,seeFearon & Laitin, 2000; Henderson, 1997;Mercer,1995).The behavioral implications that aredrawn from this scenario are gloomy: as anewcivilizationalawarenessemerges,discordandconflict aredeemed to be increasing.Thesources of conflict might indeed remainthose that have plagued humankind sincetime immemorial: control of people, terri-tory, and wealth (Huntington, 1996: 129).But the cultural dimension that is nowattachedto those factorsmakescompromiseunlikely,if not impossible. Given the indi-visible natureof the issues at stake, intenseconflict becomes a pervasivecharacteristicofrelationsacrossthe civilizationaldivide.Thisyields the followingcentralhypothesis:HI: Intercivilizational dyads are more

likely to be involved in internationalconflict.A second centralaspect of Huntington's

argument is that the civilization factor isbound to become a prominent element inthe redefinitionof the patternof rivalriesinthe post-Cold War era. As Huntington(1996: 125) argues,'Spurredby moderniz-ation, global politics is being reconfiguredalong culturallines ... Cultural communi-ties are replacingCold War blocs, and thefault lines betweencivilizationsarebecomingthe centrallines of conflict in global politics.'Not that the CofC perspectiveis entirelydevoid of explanatorypower in other tem-poraldomains:relationsbetween the Islamiccivilization and the West, for example,havebeen punctuatedwith tensions, incompre-hension, and ghastlyviolence for centuries(Huntington, 1996: 209-218). But if Hunt-ington's argument has decisive empiricalrelevance,it should emerge most clearlyinthe aftermathof the ColdWar,as the bipolarrivalries have started to thaw and new

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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?controversieshave come to the fore. Nolonger constrainedby the ideological con-frontationof the ColdWar,differencesin thecivilizationalheritageshould play a key rolein the emergingpatternof internationalcon-flict involvement.Thus,H2: The probability of conflict involve-ment for different-civilizationdyadshasincreasedsince the end of the Cold

War.'Wars between clans, tribes, ethnic

groups,religiouscommunities,and nations',Huntington (1996: 252) writes, 'have beenprevalentin every era and in every civiliz-ation becausethey are rooted in the identi-ties of people.'The Cold War,though, posesan exception to this pattern:ideology, notidentity,was the key factorinformingpowerpolitics in that period. Civilizationalfactorswere trumpedin the confrontationbetweenliberal democracy and communism. Evenconflicts occurring across different civiliz-ationswereusuallyviewedthroughthe prismof the ColdWar(Huntington, 1996:255). Ifthese dynamicswere at work, we should beable to observe that intercivilizationaldyadsthat belonged to the same Cold War blocshould have set aside their cultural andreligious differences and managed to keeppeaceful relations, while countries sharingthe same civilizationalmembershipshouldhave been brought into conflictual inter-actions by their contrasting ideologicalallegiances.Thus,H3: The Cold War bipolarconfrontation

dampened the propensityof conflictinvolvement for the intercivilizationdyadsthatbelongedto the same ideo-logical bloc, and increasedit for thesame-civilizationdyadsthat belongedto different blocs.

These basic hypotheses,however,shouldbe complemented in severalways. A coreaspect of the CofC argument is that

intercivilizationaldynamics might interactwith other variables and affect the proba-bility of conflict involvement indirectly.Three factorsplaya centralrole in Hunting-ton's(1996) framework,namelybordercon-tiguity,regime type, and modernization.IntercivilizationalDyadsand BorderContiguityTerritorialcontiguityis usuallya strong pre-dictorof conflict (Bremer,1992). The close-ness of interactionsis likelyto offer both theopportunityand the willingnessto engageinconflict. The issue at stake is usually somepiece of territorywith high symbolic valuefor both countries.This situationexacerbatespotentialclashes of interestsand often leadsto fault-line conflicts, the specific form ofconflictual relations between civilizations(Huntington, 1996: 252-253). In addition,the presenceof minority groups that sharecivilizational identities with the populationof bordering countries might offer strongincentives for the initiation of militarizeddisputes. In forceful words, Huntington(1996: 252) drawsattention to the appallingviolence of conflictswhosegoalis 'toconquerterritory and free it of other people byexpellingthem, killing them, or doing both,that is, by "ethniccleansing".'Yet, the sheerbrutality that characterizesthese conflictsshould not obscure the fact that they are notby any means ubiquitous(Fearon& Laitin,1996).

Indeed, this hypothesis has receivedmixed support in previousresearch.Huth's(1996: 80-85) findingsshow thatirredentistclaims and support of the right to self-determination for ethnic and linguisticminoritiesare not strong predictorsfor theinitiation of territorialdisputes. However,they have a substantialimpacton the likeli-hood of escalationin conflict levels and onthe emergenceof an enduring rivalryoverdisputed territory.The reason suggested isthat countervailing factors - such as the

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716 journal of PEACE RESEARCHpresenceof internationalnormsthatsupportthe right to self-determinationonly when itdoes not question the territorialintegrityofsovereignstates- might dampenthe proba-bility of low-level disputes. In other words,only deeply committed leaders with strongdomestic support are willing to act uponirredentistclaims and initiate militarycon-frontationoverterritory.As a consequence,ifthese conflicts erupt, they are likely to bemore violent and persist over time (Huth,1996: 100-111; Huth, 1999: 55-56).While bringing into effect importantqualifications to Huntington's argument,these tests do not addressdirectlyits centralaspects.Huth's(1996: 256-257) explanatoryvariablemeasureslinguisticand ethnic com-monality between people living within dis-puted territory,or along the border, andpeople living in the challengercountry.Yet,while ethnic and linguisticcharacteristicsaretightly tied with civilizationidentities, theydo not include religion,which is, as Hunt-ington (1996: 253) maintains,'the definingcharacteristicof civilization'.

The interactionbetween territorialconti-guityand civilizationalmembershipis also ofcentralimportancegiventhe fact that neigh-boring states are usually more likely tobelong to the same civilization. Strategiclocationand the economic valueof contigu-ous territoryare often sources of clashinginterests, no matter what the civilizationalstatusof the conflicting partiesis. That is,H4: Sharing a land border is positivelyassociatedwith conflict involvement.H5: The effect of sharinga borderon thelikelihood of conflict involvement is

magnifiedfor intercivilizationdyads.IntercivilizationalDyadsand DomesticRegimeTypeAs Levy (1988: 662) suggested in a pre-scient article, 'The absence of war betweendemocracies comes as close as anything we

have to an empirical law in internationalrelations' (Russett, 1993; Ray, 1995). Thecharacter of the democratic peace pro-position has approached that of a time-invariant, universally valid, empiricalgeneralization. But while the temporaldimension of this propositionhas been sub-jected to some criticism (Farber& Gowa,1995; for a response, see Gochman,1996/97; Thompson & Tucker, 1997), itsgeographicalcomponent has remainedvir-tually unchallenged.5The question is how far freegovernmentcan travelin time andspaceandwhether thedemocraticpeace can take root in differentcultural domains (Sartori, 1995). Insofar asliberal norms of regulated political com-petitionand of mutualrespectforadversariesconstitute the causalmechanisms that drivethe democratic peace (Maoz & Russett,1993; Owen, 1994; Dixon, 1994), then themerepresenceof electoralinstitutionsis notsufficient to guarantee the emergence ofpeace. Not only should democracyconsoli-dateand become 'theonly gamein town',butwidespreadconsensus about liberal valuesand norms shouldformamongelitesand thegeneralpublic as well.That these conditions hold - at least fornow - for most of the countries that experi-enced a democratic transitionin the ThirdWave of democratizationis, however,ques-tionable. Zakaria(1997) hasdrawnattentionto the rise of illiberaldemocracy,a regimetype in which electoralpolitics is separatedfromconstitutionalliberalism.As he argues,the ruleof law,the separationof powers,andrespectfor the basic civil libertiesare not apart of the political realitiesof many coun-trieswith electiveleaders.

Similarly,the proliferationof adjectivesused to qualify democratic rule in severalpost-authoritarian regimes shows that5 Henderson(1997, 1998) offersa firstattemptto tacklethisquestion.



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?area-studyinvestigatorsoften have a less san-guine assessmentof the natureof democraticpolitics in those countries.Democracyis notyet accomplishedif it is defined asdelegative,protected, electoral, or military-dominated(Collier& Levitsky,1997). The discrepancybetweenpolitical rightsand civil libertiesinthe FreedomHouse indicatorsis yet anothersign of the fact that asdemocracyexpandsinthe world, its liberal basis often lags behind(Diamond, 1996). A cogentexampleof thesecontradictions is offered by Iran, probablythe Middle-Easterncountrywith the liveliestparliament after Israel's,but hardly yet aliberaldemocracy(Huntington, 1997: 9).The implicationsfor the democraticpeacecannot be neglected. If- as Russett (1993:35) argues- decisionmakerstryto follow thesame norms of conflict resolutionthat char-acterize domestic political processes andexpect their foreigncounterpartsto do like-wise, then all the qualifiersand limitationsthat accompanymost non-Westerndemoc-racies bode ill for the emergenceof peaceeven among elective governments. Whatparties to a dispute might infer from thesystematicinfringementof basicliberties,thepersecutionof minorities,the suppressionofdissentis thatviolenceis stillaviableforeign-policy tool, no matter how competitiveelec-tions might be. Under these conditions,conflict remainsapossibleoutcome,eitherasa deliberategamblefrom an illiberalstate oras a pre-emptivemove from a liberalcountrythat tries to avoidbeing exploited.Moreover,as free institutions and elec-toral politics expand in non-Western coun-tries,anti-Westernelites aregivena chancetoascend to power. Their electoral platformsdeliberatelyblameany currentshortcomingson pro-Westernelites that hadbeenin powerin the 1960s and 1970s. Nativism andnationalismhave often become the electoralbannersof the ambitiouspolitician in suchcountries.As Huntington (1996: 94) argues,'democracyis inherentlya parochializingnot

a cosmopolitanizingprocess'.The existenceof religious,ethnic, or linguistic cleavages-and the formationof political partiesalongthose lines - leads to a factionalizationofcompetitive politics, narrows the space forthe democraticcompromise, and dampensthe chances of democraticconsolidation.

The externalconsequenceof thesedynam-ics is thatdemocracymakesthejuxtapositionbetween countries that do not share acommon culturalheritageeven more salient,as leaders become committed to nationalistpolicypositionsand fearelectoralretributionif they do not live up to them. The CofCthesis thus challengesthe universalcharacterof the democraticpeaceand limits itsvalidityto the Atlanticsecuritycommunity that hasemergedin the post-WWIIworld. That is,H6: The greaterthe democratic characterof the regimesin a dyad, the smallerthe probability of involvement ininternationalconflict.H7: Democratic institutions fosterconflict

involvement among countries thatbelong to differentcivilizations.

Modernizationand the ClashofCivilizationsA third factorthatmightinteractwith civiliz-ation status is socio-economic moderniz-ation. In Huntington'svision, we would bequite misled if we thought that moderniz-ation fosteredconditionsforpeace throughaprocessof homogenizationof values, norms,and identities.Difference,andnot similarity,is the consequence of the spread ofmodernizationover the civilizationaldivide.A key indicator of these dynamics is 'larevanchedeDieu', the globalreligiousrevivalthat has characterizedthe second half of thetwentieth century, and the concomitantresurgenceof indigenous identities amongthe rising elites of modernizing societies(Huntington, 1996: 95-101).This process unfolds both at the

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718 journal of PEACE RESEARCHindividualand at the societallevel (Hunting-ton, 1996: 76). At the individual level,modernizationdisruptsthe old social order,causesalienationand dislocation,and, in sodoing, creates the need for new identities.The sources of these identities are to befound not in the accomplishmentsin themarketplace,but in those common featuresthatpeople inherit from their birth and thatcannot be disrupted by the dynamics ofmodernization. Religion, ethnicity, andculture- the basiccomponentsof civilization- therefore acquire new prominence andaffectthepatternsof associationandpoliticallife. Farfrom fosteringan ineluctabletrendtowards the adoption of Western values,institutions and practices, modernizationengendersa culturalandreligiousresurgencethat exacerbatesdifferencesacross the civi-lizationaldivide.

These individual-levelprocessesbecomeall the more relevant insofar as moderniz-ation increasesthe economic, military,andpolitical powerof a country.As Huntington(1996: 78) writes, 'Modernizationstrength-ens those [non-Western] cultures, andreducesthe relativepowerof the West.'As aconsequence, these countries are likely tofind the existing hierarchyof prestige,allo-cation of resources, and territorial distri-bution in contradiction with emergentpowerrealities.'The revivalof non-Westernreligions',Huntington (1996: 101) suggests,'is the most powerfulmanifestationof anti-Westernismin non-Westernsocieties.... Itis a declaration of cultural independencefrom the West.'

The combinationof these two dynamicshasmajorimplicationsfor thepatternsof con-flict: contrary to the liberal tenets onmodernizationand war (Morse, 1970), theCofC argumentpredictsthat modernizationshouldlead to greaterbellicosityin interstaterelationsin intercivilizationaldyads.Increasedcapabilitiesandkeenercivilizationalawarenessmake conflictsof interestsmore,andnot less,

intractable.The liberalidea that moderniz-ation generatesa patternof interdependenceamong countries,in which the use of forcebecomes inconceivable(Morse, 1970; Oneal& Russett,1997), is likelyto be nullifiedinintercivilizationrelations,becausethelevelsofeconomic and socialintegrationremainshal-lowerthan is the casein countriesof the samecivilization.In these circumstances,modernintercivilizationaldyads are less likely to beable to solve their controversiesin peacefulmanners.Thus,H8: There is a negative relationshipbetween modernization and proba-

bility of conflict involvement forsame-civilizationdyads.H9: Modernizationfostersconflictinvolve-

ment among countriesthat belong todifferentcivilizations.ControlVariablesThree control variablesareincluded that arelikelyto be correlatedwith the mainexplana-toryvariables.The balanceof militaryforcesaffectspolitical leaders'decisionmakingcal-culus, tilting the odds of the use of force.Following the power preponderance tra-dition (Organski& Kugler,1980), this factormightbeexpectedto be negativelyassociatedwith dispute involvement. The secondcontrol variable is the presence of majorpowersin interstateinteractions.The expec-tation is thatmajorpowerstatusis positivelyassociatedwith disputeinvolvement.Finally,we might expectthat the probabilityof con-flict should be inverselyrelated to the dis-tance between the countries in a dyad. Allthree control variablesarelikely to be corre-lated with civilizationalmembershipas mostWesterncountriesarealsomajorpowers,andarealso endowed with preponderantmilitarycapabilities.Moreover,countries of differentcivilizationare more likely to be located atgreaterdistances.Thus,



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?H10: Conflict is morelikelyto eruptwhenthe ratio of military capabilities isbalanced.HI 1: Majorpowersaremore likely to getinvolvedin conflict.H12: Distance between countries is

inversely associated with conflictinvolvement.

Research DesignTo test these hypotheses,a datasetwas con-structedin which the unit of analysisis thedyad-year:each observationrepresentsa pairof countries in a given year.The temporaldomain under investigation is the periodfrom 1946 through 1997. This dataset con-tains about 400,000 observations. Only3,142 (.79%), however,are engaged in aninternationaldispute.Most of these dyadscomprisestatesthatare either too weak or too far apartto haveany meaningful international relationship,which swampsdisputeinteractionsin a largenumberof non-events.This raisestwo sets ofproblems. First, the quality of the data islikelyto be ratherpoor as investigatorstradeoff precision in measurement with spatialand temporal breadth. Second, standardstatisticaltechniques,such as logit or probit,generatebiased coefficientswhen appliedtofinite samples of rareevents, systematicallyunderestimating the probability of thephenomenaunderinvestigation.A new estimator,however,has recentlybeen madeavailablethat addressesand solvestheseproblems(King& Zeng,2001a,b).Thisestimatorallowsfor a selectionof all the con-flictobservationsalongwith a randomsampleof non-eventinteractions.At the sametime, itcorrectsthe biases in logit estimationof rareevents. In this way, investigatorscan studysmallersamples,improvethe qualityof theirdata,andbuild moreinformativemodels.King& Zeng's(2001a,b)methodconstitutes

an innovativeapproachin quantitativestudiesof international conflict. The traditionalapproachhas so far been that of reducingsample size to manageableproportionsbyselectingobservationson the basisof valuesofthe independentvariables.Maoz & Russett(1993), inparticular,introducedtheconceptof'politicallyrelevantdyads'- pairsof countriesthat eithercontaina majorpoweror arecon-tiguousby land- as a viableway to come totermswith the problemof the proliferationofobservations.This selection mechanism isindeedreasonable,becauseconflictis usuallyamatterformajorpowersandcontiguouscoun-tries.But sometimesit isnot,and the historicalrecordcontainsinstancesin whichodd pairs-non-contiguousminor powers- fought eachother.Casesin pointwouldindudeIraq-Israel,Turkey-Cyprus,and South Africa-Angola-politicallymeaningfuldyadsin manyrespects,despitethe lack of a sharedborderand majorpower status.Therefore,while allowing forcorrectinferences,samplingon values of theindependentvariablesfailsto accountfor someconflicteventsand limitsthegeneralizabilityofthe results.

The datasetforthis studywaspreparedintwo steps. First, a datasetwas created thatcontained the population of all dyad-yearsfor all the countries listed in the Polity IV(2000) dataset. These observations werecoded with a dummy variabledenoting thepresence/absenceof internationalconflict ina given year.Next, the conflict observationswerecombinedwith a randomsampleof thezeroobservations.The number of non-eventobservationsselectedis 10%of thoseexistingin the entire population (King & Zeng,2001b: 707).66 Particularcare was taken in trying to minimize thenumberof missingdatapoints.Once the datasamplewastaken,an extensivesearchwas conductedto collect theadditionalinformationrequiredto integratethe missingdata.While it is alwayspotentiallytrue that therearedata'out there'for all countriesand all years,workingwith asampleabout10%the size of the wholepopulationmadethis taskmoremanageableandlessdaunting.

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720 journal of PEACE RESEARCHTwo options are availableto correct forthe biasintroducedby subsamplingthe zerocases:priorcorrectionand weighting.While

both performin practicallyidenticalwaysinthe Monte Carlosimulationsrun by King &Zeng (2001a), weighting seems to besuperiorwhen the odds of model misspecifi-cation are high and efficiency is not aconcern. In line with King & Zeng'sadvice(200la: 145), thisstudyoptedforweighting,becausethis approachis morerobustagainstmodel misspecification.Huber/White stan-darderrorsare also estimated,as is requiredwith the weighting option (King & Zeng,2001a: 154), while also clustering obser-vations by dyad, as Beck & Tucker(1997:11) suggest.A second feature of the currentresearchdesign is the use of interaction effects in aregressionmodelwith a dichotomousdepen-dent variable.This modeling strategyallowsfor the testingof the differentialimpactthatgeographiccontiguity,regimetype, modern-ization, and the Cold War and post-ColdWar periods have had in same-civilizationand intercivilization dyads, as posited inhypothesesH2 throughH9.The functional form of non-linearmodels, such as logit and probit, assumesthat the effectof eachpredictoron theproba-bility of an event is dependent upon thevaluesof the remainingexplanatoryvariables(Long, 1997). These interactiveeffects bydefault, however, are not sufficient to testsubstantivehypotheses on the conditionaleffects of a set of variables(Nagler, 1994:252). Therefore,shouldwe posit that a vari-able X1 has a conditional impact on thedependentvariabledependingupon anotherpredictorX2,then thisrelationshipshouldbeexplicitlymodeled includinga termequaltothe product of X1 and X2 in the statisticalspecification(Friedrich,1982; Gill, 2001).This has a major implication for theinterpretationof the regressioncoefficients:once interaction terms are introduced in a

regression specification, coefficients nolonger representthe general impact of onevariableon the dependent variable,all elsebeing equal, but yield estimates that areconditional on the valuesof the interactingvariable- the civilization indicator in thiscase. More precisely,'if a variableinteractswith othersin the model specification,thenthe main effect coefficient is just the con-tribution of that variableassuming that allof the other interactingvariablecoefficientsequal zero' (Gill, 2001: 13). Interactionterm coefficients, on the other hand, esti-mate the changes in the regression co-efficientsassociatedwith a shift from same-civilization to different-civilization. Thisshift might either depress or magnify thebaseline effect of avariabledependinguponthe sign of the interaction term coefficient(Gill, 2001).7

Finally,this study controlsfor the effectsof the durationof the spells of peace usingBeck, Katz & Tucker's(1998) procedure.The basic intuition underlying theirapproach is that time-series cross-sectiondata with binary dependent variables areidenticalto duration data.Temporaldepen-dence is, then, detected by measuringhowlikely an event, in this case peace, is to ter-minate at a particulartime, given that itreachedthat time.

Data and MeasurementDependent variable The presence/absenceof conflict between a pair of countries in agiven yearis the dependentvariablefor thisstudy. Ongoing confrontations are alsoincludedin the dataset,consistentlywith thecoding procedure advocated by Maoz &Russett (1993). The number of conflict7This basicrationalecan also be extendedto the interpre-tation of the standarderrors.If we want to assessthe vari-abilityof a coefficientfor different-civilizationdyads,weshouldaddup therelevantstandarderrors,usingthe rulesof covariancealgebra(Friedrich,1982:810, 828-829; Gill,2001: 14).



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?dyad-yearsis 3,142 in a sample of 42,844observations.8

This variablewas coded using the set ofinterstate conflicts listed in the Kosimodataset (Pfetsch & Rohloff, 2000). Thisdataset defines conflict 'as the clashing ofoverlappinginterests(positionaldifferences)aroundnational values and issues (indepen-dence, self-determination,bordersand terri-tory,access to or distributionof domesticorinternationalpower);the conflicthas to be ofsome durationandmagnitudeof at leasttwoparties(states,groupsof states,organizationsor organizedgroups)that are determined topursue their interests and win their case'(Kosimoonline manual,www.kosimo.de).The Kosimodatasetdistinguishes amongfour levels of conflict intensity:war,violentcrisis, nonviolent crisis, and latent crisis.While the first three categories identifypatterns of conflict that are analogous tothose usually covered in the MID (Jones,Bremer & Singer, 1996) and the ICB(Brecher& Wilkenfeld, 1997) datasets,thecategory'latent crisis' broadens the empiri-cal realm under investigation to sets ofinteractions in which 'groups, parties, orstates question existing values, issues orobjectives that pertain to an issue ofnationalinterest'(Pfetsch& Rohloff, 2000:386-387). Confrontations of this kindremaincompletely nonviolent. Examplesoflatent crisesare the UK-Argentina interac-tions over the Falklands/Malvinasislandsbefore and after the 1982 war,the US-Cubarelations since the crisis of 1962, and theterritorial dispute between Spain andBritain over Gibraltar from 1964. Thedependentvariablewascoded as 1whenevera conflict of any intensity occurred. TheKosimo dataset also distinguishes betweendirect and external participants, and stateand non-state actors. Externalparticipants8A total of 383 observationsaredroppedfrom the analy-sisbecauseof missingvalues.Fourof theseobservationsareconflicts.

and non-state actors and are not consideredin this study.9Two advantagescan be obtained fromusing the Kosimo data: first, the empiricalanalysiscovers a much largerportion of thepost-ColdWarperiod.Second,by includinglatent crises, 'Kosimo tracesthe nonviolentroots of violent conflictsand checks whetherthe end of fightingwas indeedthe end of theconflict' (Kosimo online manual, www.kosimo.de). If what characterizesinter-civi-lizationalinteractionsis the lingeringsenseofan ongoingcrisisandthe difficultyof findinga definitivesolution to the conflict, then thesetof eventsincludedin theKosimodatacap-tures this dimension of the CofC thesis.Therefore,both from a temporaland fromasubstantivepoint of view,this studytakesupHuntington's (2000) rejoinder to Russett,Oneal & Cox (2000) andengagesit in a con-frontationagainstthe empiricalrecord.10Intercivilization dyad This is a dummyvariable,and is equal to 1 for all the dyadsthat contain states belonging to differentcivilizations,and equal to 0 when the dyadcomprisesstatesin the samecivilization.One of the majorchallengesof any studythat attemptsto shed empiricallight on theCofC thesis is to elaborate an operationaldefinitionof civilization.As severalreviewershave pointed out, Huntington's con-ceptualizationand selection of civilizationsisone of the most controversialelementsof hisargument (Jervis, 1997; Buzan, 1997).Katzenstein (1996: 533) makes this pointsuccinctly:'Althoughthey arereal,the defin-ing characteristicsof civilizations (history,language,culture, tradition,religion)cannotbe graspedeasily.'As a matter of fact,Hunt-ington himself is sometimes ambivalent9This studyexcludesexternalparticipantsbecause,whilethese actorshaveinfluenceon the courseof the conflict,'the externalpartyhasto refrainfromdirectparticipationin theconflicte.g. involvementin combat'(Kosimoonlinemanual,www.kosimo.de).10Forfurtherdiscussion,see web appendix.

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722 journal of PEACE RESEARCHabout the civilizational status of certaincountries. The main difficulty is that thefactors Huntington mentions in his owndefinition - religion, ethnicity, commonhistory and institutions - can yield contra-dictory country-dyadcivilizationalcodings.The Iran-Iraqwar,for example,is an intra-civilization war in Huntington's terms.However, Iranians and Iraqis belong todifferentethnic groups and speak differentlanguages.One might wonder whethertheyidentifythemselvesas membersof an encom-passing Islamic civilization.They are, afterall, members of two different subciviliza-tions, Arab and Persian,within the mainIslamiccivilization (Huntington, 1996: 45;Welch, 1997: 202-203).

Moreover,giventhe emphasison the stateas the keyplayerin the worldarena,a civiliz-ation needs to be attributed to entities thatallegedly comprise groups of differentcultural heritage. Huntington (1996: 128)glossesoverthisproblemwhen he claimsthat'narroweridentities ... do not necessarilyconflict with broaderones ... a personcanidentifyculturallywith his or herclan,ethnicgroup,nationality,religion,or civilization'.But, despite all the ambiguitiesthat sur-round the concept of civilization,Hunting-ton (1996: 26-27) meets the challenge byprovidingamapthatgroupscountrieson thebasis of their civilization.This study reliesupon Huntington's map, and the classifi-cation list that Henderson& Tucker(1999,2001) haveelaboratedfrom that map. Ninecivilizations are thereby identified: (1)African; (2) Buddhist; (3) Hindu; (4)Islamic;(5)Japanese;(6) LatinAmerican;(7)Orthodox; (8) Sinic; (9) Western. Hender-son & Tucker(1999, 2001) have createdaresidualcategoryfor a few countries that arenot clearlyplacedin any of these categories.These are mostly 'cleft countries', that is,countrieswhere largeportionsof the popu-lation belong to different civilizations: thePhilippines,Nigeria,andKenyaarethe most

prominentexamplesof this condition. Israelis also coded in the residualcategorygiventhe fact that Huntington (1996: 48) neverexplicitlydefinesJudaismas a civilization.Inmany respects,this might appearas a roughclassificationof the keyexplanatoryconcept,but it has the advantageof testingthe CofCargumenton its own terms.11Post-Cold War period This is a dummyvariablethat is coded as 1 for all the yearsafter1989, and 0 otherwise.

Different Cold War bloc This is a dummyvariablethat is coded as 1 for all the dyadsthat contain countriesthat were membersofdifferent Cold War blocs, and 0 otherwise.Post-ColdWardyad-yearsare also coded as0. Consistent with Huntington's (1996:24-25) Cold Warmap, three blocs aredis-tinguished:the FreeWorld,the Communist,and the Non-Aligned.Border This is a dummy variablethat iscoded as 1 when two countries share acommon border,and 0 otherwise.Data aretaken from the COW contiguity datasetfrom Bennett & Stam's (2001) EUGeneprogram.12Regime type This variable is measuredusingthe 21-point indicatorfrom the PolityIV (2000) dataset.To ease interpretation,itwas rescaledfrom 0 to 20. The democraticcharacterof a dyadis then measuredby thelesser of the two countries' scores on theregime type variable. The rationaleof thiscoding rule- the weak-linkassumption- islIThe civilizationindicatortakeson the valueof 1 when-everthe civilizationof bothcountriesin a dyadis codedinHenderson&Tucker's(1999, 2001) residualcategory.Theanalysiswas replicatedusing Russett, Oneal & Cox's(2000) classificationof civilizations.The results remainunchanged.See webappendix.12 The dyad-yearsafter1993, when the COW contiguitydata ends, were coded using the value the dyad had in1993.



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?that the characterof interstateinteractionsismostly determinedby the country that hasfewer domestic constraints (Oneal &Russett, 1997).Countries that are undergoing politicaltransformationsaregiven a score of +10, themid-point on the scale. That is, polities intransitionaregiven the benefit of the doubtby decisionmakers.Polities that are eitherexperiencing a period of interregnum orinterruption,on the other hand, aregiven ascoreof 0, as if theywereperfectautocracies.The rationale is that the presenceof coun-tries in these conditions affects the wholecharacter of the dyad: decisionmakersareunlikelyto grantanyconcessionor to expectany overture.In otherwords, they arelikelyto assumethe worst and behaveaccordingly.Modernization Modernizationis a multi-faceted concept encompassingsocial, econ-omic, and political dimensions that cannotbe capturedadequatelywith single-indicatorvariables(for an overview,see Przeworski&Limongi, 1997; Lipset, 1994). Therefore,inorder to have a more comprehensivemeasure, a factor analysismodel was esti-matedusingfour differentindicators:the logof energy consumption per capita, the per-centage of the total population living incities, the percentageof students enrolledinprimaryschools, and the number of radioreceiversper 10,000 inhabitants.All thesefour indicators capture important dimen-sions of modernization, namely economicactivity, urbanization, education, and thedegreeof exposureto the mass media. Theexpectationis that a modern society shouldscorehigh on all those dimensions.The resultsof the factoranalysismodel arethen used to estimate factor scales, that is,estimates of the latent modernizationcon-struct for each observation. From this, anoperationalmeasureof modernizationwasderivedthat variesfrom -2.024 to 3.688. Toeaseinterpretation,this variablewas rescaled

so that its minimum is equal to 0 and itsmaximum is equal to 1. The level ofmodernizationin a dyad is again measuredusing the weak-linkassumption.13Data on the four indicatorvariablesweretaken from severalsources:the COW capa-bility datasetfrom Bennett & Stam (2001),the OECD Statistical CompendiumCD-ROM,the World Bank 2000 WorldDevelop-ment Indicators CD-ROM, Mitchell's(1998a,b,c) InternationalHistoricalStatistics,Banks's (1976) Cross-NationalTime-Series,and various issues of the United NationsEnergy Statistical Yearbook,the UnitedNations DemographicYearbook,the UnitedNations StatisticalYearbook,and the UnescoStatisticalYearbook.14Balance of military forces This variablewas coded using a proceduredeveloped byGelpi (1999: 126). There are three indi-cators for state military capabilities: (a)numberof troops, (b) militaryexpenditures,(c) military expenditures per soldier. Foreachcountryandeachyear,these three indi-catorswere standardizedusing its respectiveglobal total. These percentageswere dis-counted using Bueno de Mesquita's(1981:105) power projectiondiscount factor.15Foreachof the threeindicators,the ratioof stateA'scapabilitiesoverthe sum of the capabili-ties of both countriesin the dyadwas com-puted. Then, the average of the threeresulting elements was taken. Finally, .50was subtracted from the averagevalue andthe absolute value of this difference wasgenerated.This procedurecreatesa variable13Dyadswithmissingvalueson eithercountryweretreatedas if the uniquevalueavailablewere the minimum.Thisaffected14 observations.14A moredetaileddiscussionof the measurementof themodernizationvariablecan be foundin the webappendix.Severalrobustnesscheckson theresultsreportedin TableIwere performed using alternativespecificationsof themodernization variable. Results remain substantivelyunchanged.Seewebappendix.15This computationwas performedfor each dyad-year.Only contiguouspairsof countrieswereexcluded.

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724 journal of PEACE RESEARCHwith values between 0 and .5: a score of 0 onthis indicator reflects a balance of militaryforces,while a score of .5 means that eitherone or the other state enjoys completemilitary superiority. In other words, thegreater the score, the larger the militarypower preponderanceof one of the countriesin the dyad.Data were taken from the COW capa-bility dataset from Bennett & Stam (2001).Missing values were integrated wheneverpossible using various issues of WorldMilitary Expendituresand Arms Transfersfrom the US Arms Control and Disarma-mentAgency.Major power This is a dummy variablethat is coded as 1 if a dyadcontains at least amajor power (as defined in the COWproject), and 0 otherwise. Data are takenfrom Bennett & Stam's (2001) EUGeneprogram.Distance This variablemeasuresthe log ofthe number of miles between the capitalcities of the countries in a dyad. Data aretaken from Bennett & Stam's (2001)EUGene program.16Interactionterms To test hypothesesH2,H3, H5, H7, and H9, the intercivilizationdummy was interactedwith (a) the post-Cold War dummy; (b) the Cold War blocdummy;(c) border;(d) regimetype;and (e)modernization.Peace years This variable counts thenumberof yearsthat have elapsedsince thelast internationalcrisis between two coun-tries. Given the fact that there is no a prioritheoretical reason for expecting a linearimpactof time on the probabilityof conflict,the co-efficients for a natural cubic spline16Thedyad-yearsafter1993, for which no datawereavail-ablefromBennett& Stam's(2001) EUGene,werecodedusingthe valuethe dyadhadin 1993.

with threeknots were included (Beck,Katz,&Tucker,1998: 1270;Tucker,1999).

Data AnalysisTableI presentsthe estimatesof two models:Model 1 is the baselinemodel which servesas a benchmarkforcomparison,whileModel2 presentsthe specificationwith the inter-action effectswhichdirectlytests thehypoth-eseselaboratedabove.17

The firstthing thatmight be noted aboutModel 1 is that the coefficient for the inter-civilization variableis negative:contrarytoH1, the civilizationalstatus of a dyad doesnot increase the likelihood of internationalconflict, but it even seemsto reduce it. Thisfinding undermines the main thrust ofHuntington's argument:international con-flict is not a pervasivefeature of all inter-actions acrossthe civilizationaldivide.Quitethe contrary,internationalconflict is associ-ated with the close connections and inter-actions that occur between countriesbelongingto the same civilization.The coefficient on the post-Cold Wardummy variableis negativeand statisticallysignificant.This shows that, in general,theyears since the end of the Cold War havewitnessed a decrease in the likelihood ofinterstate conflict. With the exception ofmodernization, the remaining variablesincluded in Model 1 behave as expected:membership in different Cold War ideo-logicalblocs and bordercontiguityareassoci-ated with an increasein the probabilityofinternationalconflict, while higher levels ofdemocracyinduce a reductionin the chanceof conflict. The coefficienton the moderniz-ation variable,on the otherhand, is positiveand significant:modern countriesare morelikelyto be involvedin internationalconflict,which contradictsthe liberal caseposited in17 Models estimatedusing the prior correctionoption,insteadof weighting,yieldsimilarresults.See web appen-dix.



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?TableI. RareEventsLogitAnalysisPredictingInvolvementin InternationalConflict

Model1 Model2Variables b se(b) p-value b se(b) p-valueIntercivilizationdyad -0.643 0.267 0.016 -2.203 0.640 0.001Post-ColdWarperiod -0.853 0.261 0.001 -0.874 0.378 0.021DifferentCold Warbloc 0.805 0.209 0.000 0.428 0.351 0.223Border 2.800 0.313 0.000 2.325 0.351 0.000Regimetype -0.056 0.016 0.000 -0.103 0.023 0.000Modernization 4.703 0.928 0.000 4.667 1.557 0.003InteractioneffectswithintercivilizationdyadPost-ColdWarperiod - - - 0.070 0.516 0.892DifferentCold Warbloc - - - 0.738 0.434 0.089Border - - - 1.160 0.469 0.013Regimetype - - - 0.094 0.029 0.001Modernization - - - 0.765 1.854 0.680TemporaldependencePeaceyears -1.741 0.094 0.000 -1.743 0.095 0.000Spline(1) -0.017 0.001 0.000 -0.017 0.001 0.000Spline(2) 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.012 0.001 0.000Spline(3) -0.004 0.0004 0.000 -0.004 0.0004 0.000ControlvariablesBalanceof militaryforces -1.498 0.595 0.012 -1.625 0.583 0.005Majorpower 2.679 0.225 0.000 2.690 0.231 0.000Distance -0.310 0.130 0.017 -0.258 0.132 0.050Constant -0.963 1.064 0.365 -0.612 1.123 0.586Numberof observations 42,461 42,461ParametersestimatedusingKing&Zeng's(2001a,b)Relogitprogram.Weightingoptionusedwithrobuststandarderrorsandclusteringbydyad.Alltestsaretwo-tailed.hypothesisH8. All the parametersfor tem-poraldependenceturn out to be statisticallysignificantas well. From a substantivepointof view,the coefficientson the four variablesaddressingtemporaldependenceimply that,as the years since the previous conflictualconfrontationgo by, the probabilityof con-flict decreases. The results on the threecontrol variables are consistent with theexpectationselaboratedin hypothesesH10,H 11,andH 12:countriesthat areunequalinmilitary power and countries separatedbylarge distances are less prone to conflictinvolvement,while the opposite is true fordyadsthat contain at leastone major power.

A more comprehensiveassessmentof theCofC thesis can be obtained from Model 2.The coefficient on the intercivilizationdummy variable continues to be negativeand significant.But we can also notice thatthe temporal pattern of intercivilizationalconflict depicted in the CofC thesis is notborne out in the empirical realm. Thecoefficient on the interaction between thepost-Cold War and the intercivilizationdummy indicatorsis positive,but of no sub-stantive size and statisticallyundistinguish-able from zero. If we combine the maineffect and the interactioneffect coefficients,we obtain a parameterequal to -.804 (se(b)

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726 journal of PEACE RESEARCH= .357, p-value < .026). That is, both fordifferent and same-civilization dyads thetransition to the post-Cold War period isassociatedwith a reductionin the likelihoodof conflict.The firsteight yearsof the post-Cold Warperiod, therefore,reveala patternof state interactions that is at odds withCofC hypothesisH2.The coefficienton the different-ColdWarbloc variable is positive, but statisticallyinsignificant, while the interaction termbetweenthe different-ColdWarbloc and theintercivilizationdummy indicators is alsopositive,and significantat the .09 level in atwo-tailedtest.This meansthat,for the statesof differentcivilization,being on opposingideologicalsides entailed greaterchancesofconflict duringthe Cold War.This is hardlysurprising if we think that the principalrivalryof the Cold War - the US-USSRdyad- is of that kind.

Turningto the otherexplanatoryvariablesin Model 2, we observethat sharinga landborderagainturnsout to be a strongpredic-tor of conflict.Territorialcontiguityis associ-ated with an increased propensity forconflictual interactions among states, ashypothesisH4 posits.Differentcivilizationalstatus in a dyad magnifies this effect: thecoefficient associated with the interactionterm between the intercivilizationdummyand bordercontiguityis positiveandstatisti-callysignificant.This findingis indeedconsistentwith theCofC argument, but it is not by itselfsufficient to establishthat borderinginter-civilizationdyadsaremore conflictualin allcircumstances.A cursory analysis of theresultsin Model 2 showsthat the sum of allthe relevant coefficients - that for inter-civilizationdyad, that for border,and theirinteractionterm- is about 1.282, a numbersmallerthan that of the estimatedeffect forborderingcountries from the same civiliz-ation. To clarify the interactive effects ofcivilizational status, Table II presents the

estimates of the predicted probabilitiesofinternationalconflict under different con-figurationsof the explanatoryvariables(Gill,2001: 13).18The focus in TableII is on the temporalpatternof conflictinvolvementfor same- anddifferent-civilizationdyads, and on bordercontiguity,while setting the level of regimetype at 10 - the mid-point on the regimetypescale- andthe level of modernizationatits mean value. In other words, Table IIidentifiesa set of scenariosand presentsthecounterfactualestimatesof the probabilityofconflict involvement based upon the co-efficientsof Model 2.

Hypothesis H predicts that different-civilization dyads should be more conflictproneno matterwhat the valuesof the othervariablesmight be. But that is only the casewhen countriesshareda border.And eveninthatcase,thereis only one scenarioin whichthe impact is substantial,that is, when thecountriesin the dyad belonged to opposingideological blocs during the Cold War.Otherwise, state interactions across civiliz-ations were either more peacefulor as con-flict prone as they werewithin civilizations.It is worthnoting that this resultalsoobtainsin the firsteight yearsof the post-ColdWarperiod: the probability of conflict fordifferent-civilizationdyads was practicallyzero when countries did not have a landborderin common, and just slightly higherwhen they shared a border,a majorcontra-diction for Huntington's(1996) thesis.During the Cold War, countries ofdifferentcivilizationbut on the same side ofthe ideologicaldividewere lesslikelyto fighteachother than countriesof same civilizationbut different ideology: as Table II shows,theseprobabilitieswereequal,respectively,to.117% and .502% when there were nocommon borders, and to 3.685% and18Thesevalues,as well as thosereportedin Figure1 andFigure2, were computedusing King & Zeng's(2001a)method to accountfor estimateuncertainty.



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?TableII. Probabilitiesof ConflictInvolvement(%)

COLDWARSAME BLOC DIFF.BLOC POST-CW

0,117 0,375 0,053

0,326 0,502 0,134

COLDWARSAME BLOC DIFF.BLOC POST-CW

3,685 10,810 1,675

3,302 4,891 1,422

NO

YES -

LAND

B0RDER

Othervariablesweresetasfollows:(1) regimetype:10 (4) majorpower:1(2) modernization:mean (5) distance:mean(3) balanceof militaryforces:mean (6) peaceyears:18ValuescomputedusingKing& Zeng's(2001a,b)Relogitprogram.

4.891% when there were common borders.This result implies that, during the ColdWar,ideologicaldifferenceswere much moresalient in generatingconflict than civiliza-tional ones. Moreover,TableIIshowsthat forcountriesthat had common borders,a hypo-thetical shift from same-civilization todifferent-civilizationwas associated with a5.92% increasein the probabilityof conflictwhen countries were ideologicalopponents,but with a meager.38% increasewhen theywere in the same Cold War bloc.

This patternis indeed consistentwith theexpectation of CofC hypothesis H3. But,when we shift our attentionto the countries

thatdo not sharea border,a differentpictureemerges: countries of different civilizationwerelesslikelyto beembroiledin conflictirre-spectiveof theirCold Warallegiances.Whatunderliesthis resultis thegeneralreducedlike-lihoodof conflictamongdifferentcivilizationdyadsratherthan any constrainingeffect ofthe Cold War.Therefore,the analysisof theestimated probabilities under differentalternative scenarios shows only partialsupportfor the generaldynamicsHuntington(1996) posits with respectto the Cold Warand intercivilizationalconflict.

Turningto the coefficientsforthe regime-type variables, we see that democracy

CVvLIzATI

0N

CVLIz

ATI

0N

DIFFERENT

SAME

DIFFERENT

SAME

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728 journal of PEACE RESEARCH

dampens the probabilityof crisis involve-ment for countries that share the samecivilizationalheritage.This effect,however,isattenuatedwhen countriesin a dyadbelongto differentcivilizations:the interactiontermbetweenregimetypeandthe intercivilizationdummyvariableispositiveandsignificant,ashypothesis H7 posits. The linear combi-nationof the main effect and the interactioneffect coefficientson the regimetypevariableyieldsaparameterthat,whilestillnegative,isof much smallermagnitude,and statisticallyinsignificant(b =-.010, se(b)= .018,p-value< .598).It would seem that democracyno longerexerts its restrainingeffects on the chancesof conflict involvement when the countriesdo not share the same civilizationalstatus,

contraryto the vast literatureon the demo-craticpeace (Russett,1993; Ray,1995). Butthis findingshould be interpretedin combi-nation with the general result that inter-civilizationdyadsare less conflict prone.AsFigure1 clarifies,the probabilityof conflictinvolvementforcountriesof differentciviliz-ation remains practically constant as thedemocraticcharacterof a dyadincreases.Forsame-civilization dyads, however, regimetype makesa largedifference:as the democ-racyscoresincrease,the probabilityof con-flict drops ratherquickly.Nonetheless, thebaselineprobabilityof conflict for countriesof different civilization is much lower tobeginwith. The effectsof regimetypeon thepatternsof interstate behaviorin the inter-national arenaare of much lowermagnitude

Figure 1. Regime Type and Conflict Involvement across Civilizations

Samecivilizationdyads

Differentcivilizationdyads/

26I II I I I I I0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18Regime type

Othervariableswereset as follows:(1) post-ColdWar:1 (5) balanceof militaryforces:mean(2) differentColdWarbloc:0 (6) majorpower:1(3) border:1 (7) distance:mean(4) modernization:mean (8) peaceyears:18Rangeof variationof regimetype:5th percentile= 0; 95th percentile= 19Valuescomputedusing King& Zeng's(2001a,b)Relogitprogram.

5%-

4%-

0c

-OL

3%-

2%-

1%-

0%-



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Giacomo Chiozza Is THERE A CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS?for countries of different civilization notbecause thereis anything pathologicalaboutdemocracyin non-Westerncivilizations,butbecausecountriesof differentcivilizationaregenerallyless likely to be embroiledin inter-nationalconfrontations.

The final factor consideredin Hunting-ton's (1996) framework is modernization.Model 2 replicatesthe resultfound in Model1 with respectto modernization:dyadsthatcomprise modern countries experiencehigher risks of conflict involvement. This istrue among both same-civilization anddifferent-civilization pairs of states: thecoefficient on the interaction term betweenmodernizationand intercivilizationdummyis positive,ashypothesisH9 expects,but farfromany acceptablelevelof statisticalsignifi-cance. No matter what the civilizationalstatus of a dyad might be, as countriesdevelop economically and socially, theybecome more likely to get involved in con-flictual relationsin the international arena.The impact of the modernizationvariableemergesfromFigure2, where the probabilityof conflict involvement for same- anddifferent-civilizationdyads is plotted as afunction of modernization.The two curvesidentifying same- and different-civilizationdyadsarepracticallyundistinguishableasthemodernizationindex movesfromits 5th per-centile to its 95th.19

Finally,hypothesesH10, HI 1, and H12continue to be supportedin Model 2: con-sistently with power preponderancetheory,imbalancesof militarycapabilitiesreducetheprobability of conflict involvement, whilemajorpower status is a strong predictorofconflict. Greaterdistancesbetween countries19The effectof modernizationappearsto be substantialasthe modernizationindexgetslargerthan .5. This finding,however,shouldnot be overstated.Veryfew countriesscoreso high on that variable.The numberof datapoints onwhich the predictedprobabilitiesarecomputedis, there-fore, limited. This makes the estimated effectsstronglydependenton the featuresof the modelmore than on anyunderlyingcausalrelationship(King& Zeng,2001c).

reduce the likelihood of conflictual inter-actions.

SpecificationChecksThe findings discussed so far have shownlittle supportfor the CofC thesis. The ques-tion remains whether these resultsare con-tingent upon the specification of thestatisticalmodel, or can be generalizedto abroader set of conflict interactions.To thisend, the analysis was replicated on threealternativedependentvariablesthat identifydifferentthresholdsof conflict intensity,anddifferentparticipants.The coding of theseadditionalvariablesis based upon the ICBandthe MID data,two of the most commondatasets in quantitative InternationalRelations.20The thirdadditionaldependentvariableis coded using a subset of the con-flict events in the Kosimo dataset thatexcludesthe latent conflicts.

TableIII showsthat,regardlessof the con-flict type under investigation, dyads ofdifferent civilizationsare less conflict pronethanthose of the same civilization.Acrossallthree models, the coefficient on the inter-civilizationdummy variableis negative,andstatisticallydifferentfrom zero. But it is alsoimportantto notice that the overallpicturethat emerges from Table III bears closeresemblanceto the one obtained while ana-lyzing the Kosimo data. With the exceptionof threevariables,namelythe post-ColdWardummy, the interaction effect associatedwith it, and modernization,the signs of thecoefficientsremainunchanged.It is probablynot surprisingthat datasetsthat coverdifferentportionsof the post-ColdWar period yield slightly different resultsregardingthe incidenceof conflict since theend of the bipolar confrontation. But thenegative sign on the interaction termcoefficient for the post-Cold War period20 The datasetsemployedwere Grieco's(2001) versionofthe ICB datasetand Maoz's(2001) versionof the MIDdataset.

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730 journal of PEACE RESEARCHFigure 2. Modernization and Conflict Involvement Across Civilizations

6%-

4%-.)

002%-

Different civilization dyads

7 "Same civilization dyads

0%-.15 .20 .25 .30 .35 .40 .45 .50

Level of modernizationOthervariableswere set as follows:(1) post-ColdWar:1 (5) balanceof militaryforces:mean(2) differentCold Warbloc:0 (6) majorpower:1(3) border:1 (7) distance:mean(4) regimetype:10 (8) peaceyears:18Rangeof variationof modernization:5th percentile= .145; 95th percentile= .516Valuescomputedusing King& Zeng's(2001a,b)Relogitprogram.

variableshows that if thereis any differencein the likelihoodof conflict before and after1989, dyads of different civilizations havebecome even less prone to conflict. Themodernizationvariable,on the other hand,fares differently with different dependentvariables.The MID modelyieldsresultsthatarefairlysimilarto thoseof Model2 in TableI, the differencebeing an interactioneffectcoefficientof largermagnitude,and signifi-cant at the .1 level in a two-tailed test. TheICB model and the Kosimo modelexcludingthe latent crises, however, show thatmodernizationhasno impacton conflictforcountries of same civilization, and that itmighthave a positiveimpact- at least in theICB model - for countries of differentcivilizations.This result shows that caution

shouldbe exercisedin interpretingthe effectsof modernization across differentempiricaldomains. But, even granting these differ-ences, expandingthe class of conflict inter-actions underinvestigationdoes not altertheoverallconclusion:the evidencein supportofHuntington'sthesis remainstenuous at most.ConclusionsThree major conclusions follow from thisstudy.First, intercivilizationaldyadsare notmore likely to find themselvesembroiledininternationalconflict, not even in the post-Cold Warperiod,when civilizationalconflictdynamicsshould be more prominent.Theyare usually less conflict prone than dyadscomprisingcountriesof the samecivilization.

I I I I I I



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TableIII. AlternativeSpecificationsof the DependentVariableKosimomodel ICB model

(excludinglatentcrises) 1946-94Variables b se(b) p-value b se(b) p-value bIntercivilizationdyadPost-ColdWarperiodDifferentColdWarblocBorderRegimetypeModernization

-1.643 0.6840.353 0.3560.695 0.4332.540 0.385

-0.123 0.029-0.205 1.449

0.0160.3220.1080.0000.0000.888

-2.533-0.243

0.3812.440-0.104-0.124

0.680 0.0000.484 0.6150.347 0.2720.348 0.0000.029 0.0001.525 0.935

InteractioneffectswithintercivilizationdyadPost-ColdWarperiod -0.936 0.508DifferentCold Warbloc 0.143 0.517Border 0.339 0.570Regimetype 0.110 0.039Modernization 2.624 1.905TemporaldependencePeaceyearsSpline(l)Spline(2)Spline(3)Controlvariables

-1.454-0.0140.010-0.003

Balanceof militaryforces -0.810Majorpower 1.845Distance -0.309Constant -0.587Numberof observations 42461

0.0880.0010.0010.0004

0.6560.3010.1461.148

0.0650.7820.5520.0050.168

0.0000.0000.0000.000

0.2170.0000.0340.609

-0.6620.1210.9820.0754.415

-0.552-0.0050.004-0.001

-0.7182.063

-0.246-2.35336364

0.669 0.3230.445 0.7850.450 0.0290.037 0.0411.991 0.027

0.053 0.0000.001 0.0000.001 0.0000.0003 0.001

0.882 0.4150.323 0.0000.136 0.0691.151 0.041

Coefficientsrepresentestimatesof a rareeventslogit model. Parametersestimatedusing King& Zeng's(2001a,b) Relogitprogram.Weightingopandclusteringby dyad.All tests aretwo-tailed.

-1.1120.2030.6821.826

-0.1181.580

-0.7660.1260.2350.0642.010

-0.658-0.007

0.005-0.002

-1.8422.110

-0.5330.90335216


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732 journal of PEACE RESEARCHThis findingaddsto the systematicliteratureto date that is unsupportiveof the empiricalplausibilityof the CofC thesis: interciviliza-tion interactionsare not placedon a path toineluctableconflict.Second,thearticlemightgive special strength to the doubts in theliteratureaboutthe thesis insofaras a discon-firming patternwas identified in the post-Cold War era, that is, precisely the timeperiod in connection to which Huntingtonhimselfis most confidentthat the CofC argu-ment shouldfind evidentiarysupport.Third,while the civilization factor modifies theeffects of bordercontiguityand regimetype,these conditionaleffects are not sufficienttogenerateconditions underwhich differencesin religious,ethnic, and culturalheritageareassociatedwith greaterrisks of controversiesand conflict. At most, countriesof differentcivilizationare as conflictprone as countriesof the samecivilization.

Other conflict dimensions central toHuntington's (1996) argument, namelyintrastate violence and the breakup ofnations, have not been addressed in thisstudy.Civilizationalandreligiousdifferencesmight indeedplaya prominentrole in thosecontexts,as the sadlyfamiliareventsin manypartsof the world do not fail to remind us.Nonetheless, insofar as the CofC thesisaspiredto pinpoint the likely trajectoryofstaterelationsin the 21st century,it has notyet garneredthe empiricalsupportnecessaryto make it a basisfor foreignpolicy.This does not necessarily mean thatrelationswith China, Iran, and the Islamiccountries- a fundamentaltheme in Hunt-ington's (1996) analysis- will be rosy andsmooth. While tensions and contrastsmight arise,though, the civilizationalfactoris unlikely to be their main underlyingcause. Civilizational differences seemunlikely to become the dominant factorthat shapes the patterns of enmity andfriendshipin the internationalarenain theyearsto come.

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GIACOMO CHIOZZA, b. 1968, PhDcandidate in Political Science, Duke Uni-versity.Specializingin international relationsand political methodology.


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