Isand Drilling HSE Case Nov 08 Rev A02l

The copyright in this document is vested in Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company NV. ("Agip KCO"), as delegated Operator, for and on behalf of the Contracting Companies under the North Caspian Production Sharing Agreement dated 18th November 1997, as amended and supplemented. All rights reserved. Neither the whole nor any part of this document may be reproduced, stored in any retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means (electronic, mechanical, reprographic, recording or otherwise) without the prior written consent of Agip KCO.

KASHAGAN DEVELOPMENT EXPERIMENTAL PROGRAM

AND FULL FIELD DEVELOPMENT

D-ISLAND DRILLING OPERATIONS HSE CASE

KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000

REVISION A02

OCTOBER 2008

ABSTRACT The D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case is intended to ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Governments legislation and demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling completions and commissioning (Perforations and Stimulations) program. It demonstrates to Agip KCO, stakeholders, staff, shareholders, the regulator and the public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from rig and Island drilling operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Revision Record

A02 10/08 Issued for Approval D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni P02 08/08 Issued for Review D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni A01 07/08 Issued for Approval D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni P01 05/08 Issued comment D Pashley W Riizzi B Maggioni Rev. Date Reason for Issue Responsible Accountable Endorsed

NOTE: When editing this document, as it contains various automatic fields / links, please ensure that the instructions in AK Templates User Guide (GE00.KST.K61.GL.0001.000) are followed.

Agip KCO KE01.DHS.H00.MA.0001.000 Rev. A02 October 2008 Page 2 of 310

D-Island Drilling Operations HSE Case

Document Verification

RACIE Record

R esponsible: Name: D Pashley Job Title: : Head of Safety

Signed:

Date:

A ccountable: Name: W alter Rizzi Job Title: HSE & SD Director

Signed:

Date:

C onsulted: See distribution list on Page iii

I nformed: See distribution list on Page iii

E ndorsed: Name: Bruno Maggioni Job Title: Operations Director

Signed:

Date:

RACIE Terms R Responsible The person who actually produces the document. A Accountable The person who has the answer for success or failure of the quality and timeliness of the document. C Consulted Those who must be consulted before the document is published. I Informed Those who must be informed after the document is published. E Endorsed Those who must approve the document before publication.

Hold Record Marked Page Number (e.g. if there are hold paragraphs in pages 4 and 6 specify 4, 6)



Document Distribution Consulted Distribution List

Date Format (1) Addressee / Job Title Company Location (2)

09/08 EC D Island OIM AKCO AT

09/08 EC D island Drilling Superintendant AKCO AT

09/08 EC D Island HSE Coordinator AKCO AT

09/08 EC Well Completions and Intervention Superintendant AT

09/08 EC Well Operations Senior HSE Advisor AKCO AT 09/08 EC Drilling Projects Engineer AKCO AT 09/08 EC Drilling Superintendant (AT) AKCO AT 09/08 EC District Logistics Manager AKCO AT 09/08 EC NCS OIM AKCO AT 09/08 EC Medical Response & Audit Coordinator AKCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Safety AKCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Emergency Response AKCO AT

Informed Distribution List

Date Format (1) Addressee / Job Title Company Location (2)

09/08 EC Operations Director Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC HSE & SD Director Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Well Operations Manager Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Well Construction Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Head of Well Operations Engineering Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Geosciences Manager Agip KCO DH 09/08 EC EP HSE Manager Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Kashagan Safety & Risk Manager Agip KCO LN 09/08 EC Health Services Manager Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC SIMOPS Cordinator Agip KCO AT 09/08 EC Francesco Doberti Drilling Project Manager Saipem AT 09/08 EC Serik Jumagaleyev HSE Coordinator Saipem AT

NOTE: (1) OHC Original Hard Copy / ECElectronic Copy / HC Hard Copy / EDMSElectronic Document Management System (2) AL-Almaty / AS-Astana / AT-Atyrau / BT-Bautino / DH-The Hague / LN-London / MI-Milan

Revision Tracking Rev. Date Description of Revision P01 05/08 Issued for comment A01 07/08 Issued for approval P02 09/08 Updated and Issued for Review A02 10/08 Issued For Approval



ACRONYMS

Abbreviation Meaning ACV Air Cushion Vehicle AEGL-2 Acute Exposure Guidelines Level 2 Agip KCO Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable API American Petroleum Institution

Arktos Amphibious tracked escape vehicle ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers AUEB Alberta Energy and Utilities Board BA Breathing Apparatus BEPO Best Environmental Practical Option BOD Basis Of Design BOP Blow-Out Preventer Bopd/BOPD Barrels (US) of Oil per Day BOPDe Barrels of Oil Per Day equivalent CAC Central Asia Centre CALPUFF California Puff Model (air quality dispersion model) CAM Congestion Assessment Method CEP Caspian Environmental Programme CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics CMS Corporate Management System CHCD Closed Hole Circulation Drilling CONOP Combined Operations CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium CT Coiled Tubing DCS Distributed Control System DeMS Development Management System DEP Design Engineering Procedures E&P Exploration & Production EC Emergency Coordinator EER Escape Evacuation and Rescue EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EP Experimental Programme ERT Emergency Response Team ERZ Emergency Response Zone ESD Emergency Shut-Down ESMP Environmental, Social migration and Monitoring Plan



FEED Front End Engineering Design FERA Fire & Explosion Risk Assessment FFD Full Field Development FID Final Investment Decision

GBS Gravity Based Structure GU State Enterprise H&ER Hazard & Effect Register HAZID HAZard IDentification study HAZOP HAZard and OPerability study HEMP Hazard and Effect Management Process HF Human Factors

HFE Human Factors Engineering HIA Health Impact Assessment HRO Human Resources Organisation HRA Health Risk Assessment

HSE & SD Health, Safety, Environmental and Sustainable Development HSE-MS HSE Management System HTHP High Temperature High Pressure IA Impact Assessment IB Ice Breaker

IBSV Ice Breaking Supply Vessel IBSSV Ice Breaking Supply Standby Vessel IALA International Association of Lighthouse Authorities IBEEV Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel IDLH Immediately Dangerous to Health and Life I,HUC Installation, Hook-Up and Commissioning ILO International Labour Organisation IPF Instrument Protective System IRPA Individual Risk Per Annum IVB Independent Verification Body LQ Living Quarters M-NC Makat North Caucasus MAC Manual Alarm Callpoint MAH Major Accident Hazard MAEF Major Accident Event Frequency MANCOM Management Committee MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MOPO Manual Of Permitted Operations



MPC Maximum Permitted Concentration MSL Mean Sea Level OGP Oil & Gas Producers organisation OIM Offshore Installation Manager OMCC Offshore Marine Control Centre OPCOM Operations Committee OPDS Opportunity and Project Development System OSC On Scene Commander PEM Physical Effects Modelling PEP Project Execution Plan PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and Emergency Response PFP Passive Fire Protection

PMS Project Management system PSA Production Sharing Agreement PSD Process Shutdown System PPE Personal Protective Equipment PTD Permanent Total Disability PTW Permit To Work

QRA Quantitative Risk Assessment RAM Risk Assessment Matrix

RCH Rotating Control Head RoK Republic of Kazakhstan RTJ Ring Type Joint SAFOP SAFe OPerating procedures SBV Standby Vessel SCBA Self Contained Breathing Apparatus SCE Safety Critical Element SD Sustainable Development SDT Shallow Draft Tug SEP Stakeholder Engagement Plan SIA Strategic Impact Assessment SIL Safety Integrity Level SIMOPs SIMultaneous OPerations SOLAS Safety Of Life At Sea SPZ Sanitary Protection Zone TCP Tubing Conveyed Perforating TEMPSC Totally Enclosed Motor Propelled Survival Craft TMS Technology management System



TPD Technical Project Documentation TR Temporary Refuge TRIC Toolbox Talk Risk Identification Card TRIF Temporary Refuge Impairment Frequency TWA Time Weighted Average VOC Volatile Organic Compound VMS Value Management System WES Well Examination Scheme WSE Written Scheme of Examination



MANAGEMENT SUMMARY Background On behalf of seven companies and under the North Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement), Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO) is the Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD) via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing Agip KCO operations are stated in the EP Statement of Requirements. The EP Statement of Requirements describes those requirement considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning, Operations and Logistics for A and D Blocks. The document addresses the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical requirements, in order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated approach for all EP Offshore related activities. The EP phase includes the development of D-Island drilling, production, and processing facilities, which are located 70 km south-south east of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial island in the north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and utilities facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges, is currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well commissioning programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be completed late in 2009. The program will not include well testing. Therefore reservoir fluids are not expected at the surface unless there were to be a problem with well control e.g. a kick. Saipem has been contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island drilling program using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made drilling island. The rigs have been designed and built by National Oilwell Varco (NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling at D-Island. SCOPE OF HSE CASE The focus of this HSE Case is to present an integrated approach to HSE management. This HSE Case covers drilling and completions on D-Island, the accommodation barges, third party equipment, other activities where they interface with D-Island activities, and marine (excluding those associated with construction activities) and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. All other activities required for the exploration program i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation, construction, aviation and marine operations outside the 500m zone and supply base operations, are also excluded. This Drilling Operations HSE case supersedes previous versions of the case and is complemented by HSE Execution Plans for the Installation, Hook-Up and Commissioning programmes. This Drilling Operations HSE case will be maintained as a live document and revised as appropriate during the development/operation of D-Island. OBJECTIVES OF HSE Case The main objectives of the HSE Case are as follows: 1. To ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Governments legislation and demonstrate an

integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling operations programme. 2. To ensure that all HSE inputs are provided at all stages of the decision making process. 3. To provide the means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCOs HSE policies and, in so doing,

demonstrate compliance with them. 4. To establish a common understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness of these

requirements. 5. To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and staff, contractors, shareholders, the regulator and the

public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE Case.



Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot work, electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit to Work (PTW) system, toolbox meetings and pre-job safety meetings and other safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE Management System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard analysis. Environmental effects arising from the normal and abnormal operations will be controlled through operational, environmental and waste management procedures. These effects and their controls are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed in detail. METHOD USED TO PREPARE HSE CASE This Drilling Operations HSE Case documents HAZIDs, Hazard and Effects Registers, and Bowtie analyses for major HSE risks. The Hazard and Effects Register and Bowtie diagrams have been reviewed as part of the HEMP activities for the development of this Drilling Operations HSE Case and additional items identified at the HAZIDs and HAZOP from the Perforation and Stimulations activities have also been incorporated. Structured risk reviews have been performed by multidisciplinary teams with representation from Agip-KCO and the Drilling Contractor Saipem and other Service Companies (Halliburton, Schlumberger & Baker-Oil Tools). The reviews used a hazard checklist approach as a basis for the identification of potential HSE hazards that met the requirements of the Agip-KCO HEMP Standard. The studies determined whether adequate safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were required to be put in place. Those hazards with the potential to cause multiple fatalities or a major environmental effect were, where appropriate, further analysed by constructing hazard bow-tie diagrams to highlight the preventive and recovery measures. Of the major HSE risks identified, the release of reservoir fluids, (blowout), at D-Island presents the greatest societal HSE risk. The risk of blowout has been the subject of a large number of additional risk assessments and studies as well as the bowtie review mentioned above. A SIMOPs review of concurrent Rig 401 and 402 drilling activities has been completed. All possible sources of environmental impact were identified and their significance assessed, to ensure the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures. All occupational health hazards that may arise during normal operations were also identified, together with their associated controls. HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM This HSE Management System describes the system and arrangements in place for managing the HSE risks associated with drilling operations on D-Island. The HSE-MS ensures the identification and assessment of hazards throughout rig operations; that all reasonably practicable measures have been or are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards; that audits are conducted to provide the assurance that the HSE-MS is being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in or contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way. IDENTIFIED MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS The hazard identification process identified all potential HSE hazards and effects and recorded them in the Hazard and Effects Register. Ten of these hazards were ranked as major HSE risks requiring ALARP demonstration:

Hydrocarbons in reservoir (Release of reservoir fluids); Persons at height (Fall of personnel to a lower level); Explosion (Damage to well bore); Explosion (Injury to personnel); Overhead equipment (Loss of control / dropped object); On water transport (Loss of control); On land transport (Loss of load); Helicopter transport (Helicopter impact / ditching); Asphyxiates (Loss of O2 atmosphere);



Toxic gas (Release of hydrogen sulphide from neighbouring facility); and Health Hazards (Exposure to food and water borne bacteria); and Lifting operations.

IDENTIFIED SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS No residual environmental effects from normal operations were assessed as significant. Three significant residual environmental effects from accidental events were identified:

Blowout

Hazardous material spill Spill as a consequence of fire

ACHIEVEMENT OF OBJECTIVES The primary objective of the HSE Case has been broken down into four specific objectives and assessed against defined acceptance criteria, as follows: 1. Demonstrate that suitable HSE studies have been undertaken and suitable HSE management

arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling operations, well services, local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation:

Industry standard frameworks were used to review the operations HSE management arrangements against the essential requirements of an effective HSE-MS. The operations HSE-MS has been structured as a series of expectations and demonstrates how Agip KCO will meet these expectations through its management, policies and operational procedures. Where such essential arrangements are either not in place or of the required standard, then corrective actions have been identified in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). All arrangements will be subject to continuous performance monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded that, on completion of the identified Remedial Action items, suitable HSE management arrangements will be in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling operations, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation. 2. Demonstrate that all foreseeable and credible HSE hazards, including Major Accident Hazards,

have been identified, assessed and are suitably controlled such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP:

Nine major accident risks have been identified, based on comparisons with industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by experienced specialists, and the major hazard register is considered to be complete. Sufficient risk reduction measures in the form of independent and effective threat barriers, recovery preparedness measures and escalation factor controls have been identified to meet the acceptance criteria for hazards, where it is practicable to do so. The HSE-critical tasks identified as essential to provide or maintain these barriers and controls have been or will be included in appropriate written operating procedures, job safety analyses, working practices, job task lists or training standards. A Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) has been prepared which defines the limits of concurrent drilling operations and simultaneous construction operations. For less severe, workplace health and safety hazards, reference has been made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the arrangements in place to manage these hazards. For less severe environmental effects arising from normal and abnormal operations, reference has been made in Parts 3 and 4 of the HSE Case to the controls and procedures in place to manage them. It is concluded that all credible and foreseeable major accident hazards have been identified and, subject to the completion of the Remedial Action Plan, suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in place such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP. 3. Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and safe sheltering, escape, evacuation,

rescue and recovery of all personnel to a place of safety in the event of a major accident:



Hydrocarbon related hazards (blowout during drilling) and toxic gas hazards (hydrogen sulphide release from A-Island) were evaluated as requiring sheltering of personnel and, in the worst case, evacuation. Sufficient provisions and arrangements have been identified for the sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of personnel to a place of safety. Where certain areas identified require confirmation of detailed issues, then corrective actions have been provided in the Remedial Action Plan (Part 6). It is concluded that subject to the completion of the Remedial Action Plan there will be adequate provision to assure a high probability of successfully achieving safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all personnel in the event of a major accident. 4. Demonstrate that continuous improvement in the management of HSE hazards will occur in the

workplace: Effective application of the HSE-MS arrangements will be required to enable continuous improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects at the workplace. The management of workplace hazards must be subject to continuous performance monitoring, regular auditing and periodic management review to assure that practice meets the agreed standards. It is concluded that provided that the HSE-MS is effectively implemented continuous improvement in the management of all HSE hazards and effects will occur in the workplace. CONCLUSION The methods used to develop the HSE Case provide a systematic and thorough assessment of the potential hazards associated with D-Island drilling and completions operations. Competent multi-disciplinary personnel were involved throughout the process, supported by independent HSE specialists. The HSE Case demonstrates that, to the extent possible, all relevant hazards and effects, particularly those with the potential to cause a Major Accident Hazard, have been identified and assessed, and suitable and sufficient controls will be in place, together with plans for recovery in the event that control is lost. There are no action items identified in the Remedial Action Plan which prevent operations continuing although these actions should be completed as soon as practicable. The objectives of the HSE Case are considered as to be met and, therefore, the drilling and completions operations are safe to continue.



TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 INTRODUCTION 20 1.1 GENERAL 20 1.2 HOLDER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE 20 1.3 BACKGROUND 20 1.4 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 21 1.4.1 Scope 21 1.4.2 Main Objectives 21 1.4.3 Detailed Objectives 21 1.4.4 Demonstrating Achievement of the Objectives 22 1.5 APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE 22 1.5.1 Project HSE Management System 22 1.5.2 Formal HSE Assessment 22 1.5.3 Outstanding Actions 23 1.6 STRUCTURE 23 1.7 USES 24 1.8 REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES 25 2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES 27 2.1 INTRODUCTION 27 2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 27 2.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 29 2.3.1 Geographical Location 29 2.3.2 Safety Zone 30 2.3.3 Geo-technical Information 30 2.3.4 Meteorological Conditions 30 2.4 WELLS CHARACTERIZATION 31 2.4.1 Post-Salt Section 31 2.4.2 Salt Section 31 2.4.3 Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section) 31 2.5 DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME 32 2.5.1 Drilling Methodology 32 2.6 COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY 34 2.7 COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY 35 2.7.1 Perforation System 35 2.7.2 Stimulation System 35 2.8 INSTALLATION LAYOUT 35 2.8.1 Island/LQ Orientation 35 2.8.2 Main Dimensions 36 2.8.3 Island Layout 36 2.9 ISLAND STABILITY AND INTEGRITY 37 2.9.1 Well Design 37 2.10 DRILLING RIGS 38 2.10.1 Drillers Cabin and Control Panel 38 2.10.2 Rotary equipment 39 2.10.3 Pipe Handling System 39 2.10.4 Drill Floor 39 2.10.5 High Pressure Mud System 40 2.10.6 Mud Treatment System 40 2.10.7 Pressure Control System 42 2.10.8 Choke Manifold and Mud-Gas Separator 43 2.10.9 Trip Tank 44 2.10.10 Cementing System 44 2.11 INSTRUMENTATION AND CONTROL 44



2.12 POWER GENERATION AND UTILITIES 45 2.12.1 Main Power Generation System Island 45 2.12.2 Emergency Power and Lighting Systems 46 2.12.3 Uninterruptible Power Supplies (UPS) 46 2.12.4 Lighting And Small Power Requirements 47 2.13 TELECOMMUNICATION AND INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 47 2.13.1 Navigation Aids 47 2.13.2 Communication Systems 47 2.13.3 External Communications 48 2.14 FIRE & GAS I EMERGENCY SHUT DOWN 49 2.14.1 Fire and Gas Detection 49 2.14.2 Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) 50 2.14.3 Hazardous Area Classification 50 2.14.4 Active Fire Protection Systems 50 2.15 WASTE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 52 2.15.1 Liquid waste 52 2.15.2 Drains 52 2.15.3 Solid Wastes 52 2.15.4 Sewage System 52 2.15.5 Spillage Management 53 2.15.6 Airborne Emissions 53 2.16 UTILITY SYSTEMS AND PIPING REQUIREMENTS 53 2.16.1 Diesel Oil Filling and Transfer System 53 2.16.2 Water Systems 54 2.16.3 Rig Air System 55 2.17 COMMON SYSTEMS 55 2.17.1 Mud Mixing System 55 2.17.2 Barite Storage 56 2.17.3 Bulk Storage 56 2.17.4 Drum and Sack Storage 57 2.17.5 Island Paint Store 57 2.17.6 Island Explosives and Radioactive materials store 57 2.18 EMERGENCY EVACUATION AND RESCUE 57 2.19 PERSONNEL SAFETY AND HEALTH 57 2.19.1 Safety Showers and Eyewash Stations 57 2.19.2 Personal Protective Equipment 57 2.20 SYSTEMS AND EQUIPMENT IDENTIFIED AS HSE CRITICAL 57 2.21 SHAPAGAT LIVING QUARTERS (LQ/TR) BARGE 58 2.21.1 Shapagat Particulars 58 2.21.2 Power systems 59 2.21.3 Emergency Power 59 2.21.4 Escape Lighting 59 2.21.5 CCTV 59 2.21.6 F&G detection system 59 2.21.7 Active Fire Fighting 60 2.21.8 Passive fire protection system 60 2.21.9 Helideck 60 2.21.10 Temporary Refuge (TR) 60 2.21.11 Shapagat Sanitation and Drains 60 2.21.12 Diesel systems 61 2.21.13 Seawater system 61 2.21.14 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System 61 2.21.15 Potable Water System 61 2.21.16 Ballast System 62 2.21.17 Breathing Air 62 2.22 KARLYGASH LQ/TR BARGE 62 2.22.1 Karlygash Particulars 62



2.22.2 Power systems 63 2.22.3 Emergency Power 63 2.22.4 Escape Lighting 63 2.22.5 CCTV 63 2.22.6 F&G detection system 63 2.22.7 Active Fire Fighting 64 2.22.8 Passive fire protection system 64 2.22.9 Helideck 64 2.22.10 Temporary Refuge (TR) 64 2.22.11 Diesel systems 65 2.22.12 Seawater system 65 2.22.13 Liquid Waste Management System 65 2.22.14 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning (HVAC) System 65 2.22.15 Potable Water System 65 2.22.16 Breathing Air 65 2.22.17 Medical Facilities - Hospital 66 2.22.18 Telecommunications 66 2.22.19 Public Address and General Alarm System 67 2.23 ICE BREAKING EMERGENCY EVACUATION VESSEL (IBEEV) 67 2.23.1 IBEEV Particulars 67 2.23.2 Power distribution systems 68 2.23.3 Combustion air System 68 2.23.4 Emergency Breathing air system 68 2.23.5 Active Fire Fighting 68 2.23.6 Passive fire protection system 69 2.23.7 Diesel Engine Exhaust Cooling system 69 3 HSE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 90 3.1 INTRODUCTION 90 3.1.1 Agip KCO HSE MS Model 90 3.2 POLICY AND STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES 93 3.2.1 Policy 93 3.2.2 HSE Strategic Objectives for D-Island 93 3.3 RESOURCES, ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 95 3.3.1 Resources 95 3.3.2 Roles and Responsibilities 95 3.3.3 Management of Personnel 96 3.3.4 HSE Advisor 96 3.3.5 Organisational Structure and Responsibilities 96 3.4 HSE SPECIFIC PROCESS 99 3.4.1 HSE Cases 99 3.4.2 Hazard and Effect Management 100 3.4.3 Emergency Preparedness & Response (ER) 104 3.4.4 Incident, Investigation and Reporting (IIR) 106 3.5 PLANNING (PLAN) 107 3.5.1 Objectives, Targets and Programmes 107 3.5.2 HSE Planning 107 3.5.3 Legal & Other Requirements 108 3.6 IMPLEMENTATION AND OPERATION (DO) 109 3.6.1 Contractor Management 109 3.6.2 Training 110 3.6.3 Communication 111 3.6.4 Control of documents 113 3.6.5 Procedures 114 3.6.6 HSE At The Workplace 115 3.6.7 Medical Fitness 115 3.6.8 Maintenance and Inspection 115 3.6.9 Waste Management 116



3.6.10 Security Management 116 3.6.11 Simultaneous Operations 116 3.7 CHECKING (CHECK) 118 3.7.1 Evaluation of Compliance 118 3.7.2 Asset Integrity 118 3.7.3 Drilling Operational Monitoring 119 3.7.4 Management of Change 120 3.7.5 Nonconformity, Corrective & Preventative Action 120 3.7.6 Control of Records 121 3.7.7 Internal Audit 122 3.8 MANAGEMENT REVIEW (ACT) 123 4 HAZARD AND EFFECTS MANAGEMENT PROCESS 125 4.1 OVERVIEW OF HEMP PROCESS 125 4.2 HEMP DURING DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 125 4.3 HEMP ACTIVITIES DURING PREVIOUS OPERATIONAL PHASES 127 4.4 HEMP ACTIVITIES FOR DRILLING ACTIVITIES 127 4.4.1 Identification of Potential Hazards 127 4.4.2 Risk Assessment 127 4.4.3 Hazard and Effects Register 131 4.5 IDENTIFIED MAJOR HSE RISKS 131 4.5.1 Control of Major HSE Risks 132 4.5.2 HSE Critical Tasks 133 4.5.3 Technical Integrity 133 4.5.4 Release of Reservoir Fluids at D-Island 135 4.6 WORK PLACE HAZARDS 139 4.7 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE WORKPLACE 139 4.8 DEMONSTRATION OF ALARP 140 4.8.1 ALARP Concept 140 4.8.2 ALARP Principles 140 4.8.3 Good HSE Practice in Design and Implementation 141 4.8.4 Good HSE Practice in Operations 141 4.8.5 Assessment of ALARP 142 4.8.6 Continuous Improvement 143 5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE 145 5.1 EER FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT 145 5.1.1 Escape 145 5.1.2 Temporary Refuge(s) 147 5.1.3 Medical facilities 148 5.1.4 Evacuation 149 5.2 RESCUE AND RECOVERY 149 5.3 ESCAPE, EVACUATION, RESCUE AND RECOVERY (EERR) PROCEDURES 150 5.3.1 EERR Philosophy 150 5.3.2 Emergency Response Plan (ERP) 150 5.3.3 ERP Responsibilities of Personnel 151 5.3.4 Medical Evacuation 152 5.4 MAJOR EERR SCENARIOS 152 5.4.1 Toxic Gas Release from Neighbouring Facility 152 5.4.2 Shallow Gas Blowout 153 5.4.3 Helicopter Crash / Ditching within 500m Zone 153 5.4.4 Marine Incident within 500m Zone 153 5.4.5 Man Overboard 153 5.4.6 Food Poisoning 153 5.5 EERR SYSTEMS PERFORMANCE AGAINST GOALS 154 5.5.1 Communication 154



5.5.2 Escape Routes 156 5.5.3 Temporary Refuge 156 5.5.4 Evacuation 157 5.5.5 Rescue 157 6 REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN 178 6.1 INTRODUCTION 178 6.2 REMEDIAL ACTIONS 178 7 CONCLUSION & STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONS 184 7.1 INTRODUCTION 184 7.2 CONCLUSIONS 184 7.2.1 Operations HSE Management System 184 7.2.2 Major Accident Hazard Identification and Assessment 184 7.2.3 Temporary Refuge, Escape, Evacuation, Rescue and Recovery 184 7.2.4 Workplace Hazard Management 185 7.2.5 Leadership and Commitment 185 7.2.6 Authorization 186 7.3 STATEMENT OF JUSTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONS 187 8 REFERENCES 188 TABLES Table 2.1 : Drill Rig Dimensions 38 Table 2.2 : Systems Monitored by Rig SCADA system 45 Table 2.3 : UPS Endurance Times 46 Table 2.4 : Fire Extinguisher Provision on the Island 51 Table 2.5 : Main Island Storage Tanks 56 Table 3.1 : Incident Investigation Authority Matrix 106 Table 3.2 : D-Island HSE Meeting Schedule 113 Table 4.1 : Design HAZID Documents 125 Table 4.2 : Design Consequence Modelling / Risk Assessment Documents 126 Table 4.3 : Design HAZOP Documents 126 Table 4.4 : Frequency Definitions 127 Table 4.5 : Detail definitions of Consequence Severity 130 Table 4.6 : Major HSE Risks Identified Requiring ALARP Demonstration 131 Table 4.7 : Summary of HSE Critical Elements 133 Table 4.8 : Estimated Blowout Frequencies 136 Table 4.9 : Summary of Toxic Dispersion Modelling from Well Release and Blowouts 137 Table 4.10 : Radius of Radiation Flux End Points (m) for Vertical Jets 138 Table 4.11 : Qualitative ALARP Scoring 142 Table 6.1 : Remedial Action List 179 FIGURES Figure 2.1 : D-Island General Arrangement 28 Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of the Caspian Sea 29 Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location 29 Figure 2.4 : Windrose for the field 31



Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC Drilling 33 Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional and CHC Drilling 34 Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the Installation 36 Figure 2.8 : Karlygash Liquid Waste Management System 65 Figure 2.9 : Casing & Liner Profile Schematic 70 Figure 2.10 : Simplified Completion Schematic 71 Figure 2.11 : D-Island Drilling Programme (August 2008) 72 Figure 2.12 : DES and DSM layout West elevation 73 Figure 2.13 : Feeding DSM with Pipe 74 Figure 2.14 : Assembling pipe stands on DSM 75 Figure 2.15 : Hoisting Pipe to Pipe Rack 76 Figure 2.16 : Drill-pipe Deployment 77 Figure 2.17 : Common Area lighting System 78 Figure 2.18 : DES Hazardous Zone Layout 79 Figure 2.19 : DSM Hazardous Zone Layout 80 Figure 2.20 : Hazardous Area Overview 81 Figure 2.21 : Shapagat LQ Barge 82 Figure 2.22 : Karlygash Barge Lower Deck 83 Figure 2.23 : Karlygash Barge Main (Level 1) Deck 84 Figure 2.24 : Karlygash Barge Level 2 Deck 85 Figure 2.25 : Karlygash Barge Level 3 Deck 86 Figure 2.26 : Ice Breaking Emergency Evacuation Vessel 87 Figure 2.27 : IBEEV General Arrangement 88 Figure 3.1 : The PDCA Cycle 90 Figure 3.2 : Structure of Agip KCO HSE-MS 92 Figure 3.3 : Agip KCO HSEQ Policy Statement 94 Figure 3.4 : Agip KCO Organisation Chart for Drilling Operations on D-Island 97 Figure 3.5 : Drilling Team 98 Figure 3.6 : Agip KCO Risk Assessment Matrix 102 Figure 4.1 : HEMP High Level Process 125 Figure 4.2 : Agip KCO Risk Matrix 128 Figure 4.3 : Example Major HSE Risk Diagram 132 Figure 4.4 : ALARP Solution Matrix 143 Figure 5.1 : D-Island Station Bill (an example) 159 Figure 5.2 : Location of LQ and TR facilities 160 Figure 5.3 : Escape Routes from Drilling Area to Muster Stations 161 Figure 5.4 : D-Island Fire Fighting Equipment 162 Figure 5.5 : Layout of Common Services Area 163 Figure 5.6 : Common Area Escape Routes 164 Figure 5.7 : DSM Level 1 Layout 165



Figure 5.8 : DSM Level 2 Layout 166 Figure 5.9 : DSM Level 3 Layout 167 Figure 5.10 : DSM Level 3 Layout 168 Figure 5.11 : DSM Level 4 Layout 169 Figure 5.12 : DSM Level 5 Layout 170 Figure 5.13 : DES Level 0 Drill Floor Layout 171 Figure 5.14 : DES Level 1 Layout 172 Figure 5.15 : DES Level 2 Layout 173 Figure 5.16 : DES Drill Floor Layout 174 Figure 5.17 : DES Drill Floor Roof Layout 175 Figure 5.18 : Mast Escape Route 176 APPENDICES Appendix A Hazard Checklist Appendix B Hazard and Effects Register Appendix C Safety Critical Task Catalogue Appendix D MOPO Appendix E Major Accident Bowtie Diagrams



PART 1 INTRODUCTION



1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 GENERAL

This HSE Case, prepared by Agip Kazakhstan North Caspian Operating Company N.V. (Agip KCO), is intended to demonstrate the highest level of Health, Safety and Environmental (HSE) attention during the drilling phase at D-Island. Agip KCOs aim is to:

HAVE AN HSE PERFORMANCE TO BE PROUD OF; AND EARN THE CONFIDENCE OF CUSTOMERS, STAKEHOLDERS AND SOCIETY AT LARGE.

In the context of this document, the focus of risk is on the potential loss of life and environmental damage. The HSE Case also establishes the manner in which Agip KCO demonstrates compliance with:

LEGISLATION, THE REQUIREMENTS OF AGIP KCO AND ITS COMPANY SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (SMS) AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY.

More specifically it establishes a common understanding of the hierarchy of the HSE-MS for the drilling phase of operations, and identifies the goals and objectives that have been set, the risks that are present, and the systems in place to achieve a high standard of HSE performance. The HSE Case reflects the current status of the equipment and systems, HSE studies, and understanding of the hazards associated with D-Island during drilling operations This Drilling Operations HSE case covers the in drilling programme that started in 2006 and that will be completed during 2009. The Drilling operations HSE case is being maintained as a live document and revised as appropriate during the development/operation of D-Island.

1.2 HOLDER AND ADMINISTRATOR OF THE HSE CASE Holder The Holder is ultimately responsible for the HSE management of the operations covered by the Case and is the final approval authority for the contents of the Case. The Holder is responsible for issuing the Statement of Justification for Operations, thus accepting accountability for the HSE management of the operations and declaring that all known major HSE hazards that could occur have been identified and are under control, subject to the close-out of the outstanding actions in the Remedial Action Plan. The Holder is Agip KCOs Operations Director. Administrator The Administrator is responsible to the Holder for management of the HSE Case. The Administrator is responsible for initiating the appropriate programmes to ensure awareness and proper use of the Case by the project. The Administrator is responsible for the technical accuracy of the contents of the HSE Case and for ensuring that revisions and updates are prepared when necessary. The Administrator is responsible for ensuring that distribution of the Case and its revisions and updates are adequately controlled. The administrator is Agip KCOs HSE & SD Director

1.3 BACKGROUND On behalf of seven companies and under the North Caspian Sea PSA (Production Sharing Agreement), Agip KCO is the Operator of the appraisal and development operations in the Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian Sea. Successful exploration of the Kashagan Field, will lead to Full Field Development (FFD) via the Experimental Program (EP) phase. The principles governing Agip KCO operations are stated in the EP Statement of Requirements [1]. The EP Statement of Requirements describes those requirements considered essential to ensure Safe and Efficient operations during the Construction, Drilling, Installation, Hook-Up, Commissioning, Operations and Logistics for A and D Blocks. The document addresses the minimum requirements to achieve the above i.e. transportation of offshore personnel, provision of temporary living quarters barges, temporary refuge systems, escape craft and logistical requirements, in



order to ensure a safe, co-ordinated, cohesive and integrated approach for all EP offshore related activities.

The EP phase includes the development of D-Island drilling, production, and processing facilities, which are located 70 km south-south east of Atyrau on a 225m long and 221m wide artificial island in the north Caspian Sea. Construction of processing and utilities facilities, on barges connected to D-Island by bridges, is currently underway. A drilling, completions, and well commissioning programme commenced in 2006 and is scheduled to be completed late in 2009. The program will not include well testing. Saipem has been contracted by Agip KCO to undertake the D-Island drilling program using the rigs 401 and 402 located on the man-made drilling island. The rigs were designed and built by National Oilwell Varco (NOV) to meet the specific requirements of drilling at D-Island.

1.4 SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES 1.4.1 Scope

The focus of this HSE Case is to present an integrated approach to HSE management. It is a Drilling Operations HSE Case covering the HSE risks arising from the drilling operations for the D-Island drilling rigs, LQ arrangements, and the marine and helicopter operations associated with the drilling operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. The HSE Case excludes passenger and freight loading at the heliport or marine base and in-transit transportation of personnel; transport of materials and equipment; and heliport, marine base and supply base activities.

1.4.2 Main Objectives The main objectives of the HSE Case are as follows: 1. To ensure compliance with the Republic of Kazakhstan Governments legislation and

demonstrate an integrated approach to HSE management for the D-Island drilling programme. 2. To ensure that all HSE inputs are provided at all stages of the decision making process. 3. To provide the means for ensuring adherence to Agip KCOs HSE policies and, in doing so,

demonstrate compliance with them. 4. To establish a common understanding of specific HSE requirements, and ensure awareness of

these requirements. 5. To demonstrate to Agip KCO management and staff, Contractors, shareholders, the regulator

and the public that essential controls are in place such that the major HSE hazards & risks arising from Rig and Island operations are both tolerable and reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

Major HSE risks are defined as those associated with major accident hazards which have the potential to cause multiple fatalities or massive environmental or socio-cultural effect. These consequences are intolerable and all possible causes need to be analysed and controlled and suitably documented in the HSE Case. Workplace hazards arising from hazardous activities, e.g. hot work, electrical grinding, etc. are controlled through the Permit to Work (PTW) system, toolbox talks and pre-job safety meetings and other safe working practices defined by the Agip KCO HSE Management System and are not assessed in the detailed hazard analysis. Environmental effects arising from the normal and abnormal operations will be controlled through operational, environmental and waste management procedures. These effects and their controls are identified in the HSE Case but are not assessed in detail.

1.4.3 Detailed Objectives More specifically, the objectives of the Case are to: Demonstrate that suitable HSE studies have been undertaken and suitable HSE management

arrangements are in place to ensure that the specification and conduct of the drilling, LQ



arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations are fit for purpose and safe for operation.

Demonstrate that all foreseeable and credible HSE hazards, including major accident hazards, have been identified and that suitable and sufficient barriers and controls will be in place such that risks to people and the environment are ALARP.

Demonstrate that there is adequate provision for the full and safe sheltering, escape, evacuation, rescue and recovery of all personnel in the event of a major accident.

Demonstrate that HSE management arrangements are in place to define responsibilities for procedures to ensure the control of, and continuous improvement in the management of, all HSE hazards and effects at the workplace.

1.4.4 Demonstrating Achievement of the Objectives The criteria used to determine whether each of the HSE Case objectives has been met are as follows: 1. HSE Management Arrangements - Agreement between Agip KCO and contractors, on the

required standards of design and operation (as per the agreed Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging Document); and the commitment of all parties to meeting these standards.

2. Major Hazards - The acceptance criteria used, to determine whether all foreseeable and credible major accident hazards have been identified, are industry hazard checklists and formal reviews by experienced specialists.

3. Sheltering and Evacuation - Identification of major accident risks requiring temporary refuge and evacuation of D-Island, and suitable and sufficient recovery preparedness measures in accordance with the major hazards acceptance criteria.

4. Workplace Hazards - Agreement between Agip KCO, and contractors, (as per the Combined/Simultaneous Operations Bridging Document) of the required standards for continuous improvement in the management of workplace HSE hazards and effects; and the commitment of all parties to meeting these standards.

1.5 APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT OF HSE CASE 1.5.1 Project HSE Management System

The Agip KCO Corporate Management System (CMS) is supported by an HSE Management System Execution Strategy which defines how the CMS is implemented at the operational level with respect to HSE. An EP Offshore HSE Plan [58] has been developed to set out the activities necessary to implement the HSE-MS for the Kashagan EP phase including D-Island drilling and to ensure that appropriate Contractor HSE Plans have been developed. An assessment was carried out of existing Agip KCO HSE procedures against the operational requirements of the project to identify any missing procedures that needed to be developed. Additionally, the HSE-MS interfacing arrangements for key areas of the project (e.g. training and competence, permit to work, well control, emergency response, etc.) were reviewed to ensure that the HSE responsibilities of Agip KCO and contractors were fully understood and that the associated procedures were adequate. The HSE-critical tasks that put in place or maintain controls for the identified major accident hazards have been defined and included in operational procedures as appropriate. Finally, a comprehensive site audit will be undertaken to verify that all controls exist in reality and that the HSE-critical tasks are accurate and assigned to the correct responsible party.

1.5.2 Formal HSE Assessment A hazard identification study was undertaken to systematically examine the proposed rig layout and operations with the purpose of identifying any hazards or operability problems that could result in either injury to personnel, environmental pollution, release of hydrocarbons or damage to equipment/structures. The study determined whether adequate safeguards/mitigating measures were in place, or were required to be put in place.



Those hazards with the potential to cause fatalities or a major environmental effect were further analysed, where appropriate, by constructing hazard bow-tie diagrams to highlight the preventive and recovery measures. An assessment of the hazards associated with the uncontrolled release of reservoir fluids from D-Island and neighbouring facilities was undertaken to estimate the hazard distances, analyse the mitigation measures and make recommendations for design improvements. A review of the sheltering, evacuation, escape, rescue and recovery arrangements was also undertaken to assess the adequacy of the arrangements for toxic gas hazards that would require evacuation, and make recommendations for design improvements. All possible sources of environmental impact were identified and their significance assessed, to ensure the adequacy of the control and mitigation measures. All occupational health hazards that may arise during normal operations were also identified, together with their associated controls. Finally, a Matrix of Permitted Operations (MOPO) was distilled from the hazard analyses to define limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions.

1.5.3 Outstanding Actions Any outstanding actions not resolved during the project design and construction phase or issues identified during the preparation of this HSE case are included in the Remedial Action Plan with responsibilities and target completion dates assigned.

1.6 STRUCTURE The HSE Case is contained in a single volume with the following sections Management Summary The Management Summary provides a brief overview of the major findings during the preparation of the HSE Case, a summary of the areas for improvement and the conclusions. Part 1 - Introduction The Introduction describes the scope, objectives and structure of the HSE Case, including a brief explanation of the contents of each part of the HSE Case. Part 2 - Description of Operations and Facilities The description provides sufficient information to enable a clear understanding of the drilling, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter, with an emphasis on aspects relevant to HSE. Design HSE features are documented, including the merits of the HSE configurations, systems and components. The main barriers and controls mentioned in the Hazard and Effects Register are described. External circumstances are also described, such as meteorological conditions. This information promotes an understanding of how major hazards and effects could affect the operations and the facilities. Part 3 - HSE-Management System This describes the system and arrangements in place for managing the HSE risks associated with drilling operations at D-Island. The HSE-MS ensures the identification and assessment of hazards throughout rig operations; that all reasonably practicable measures have been or are being taken to prevent, control or mitigate these hazards; that audits are conducted to provide the assurance that the HSE-MS is being adhered to; and that all activities, engaged in or contracted to other companies, are managed in a comparable way. Part 4 - Hazard Identification and Assessment The hazard assessment demonstrates that all potential major hazards have been identified, the risk from the hazards has been evaluated and is understood, and the controls to manage the causes and consequences are in place. The Hazards and Effects Register presents, in a clear and concise form, the results of the analysis made of each hazard and effect associated with the operations. Bowtie diagrams are used, where appropriate, for the identified major risks and



illustrate that suitable and sufficient barriers, and controls are in place to reduce the risks to people and the environment to ALARP. The Manual of Permitted Operations (MOPO) defines limitations on activities during periods of abnormal operating conditions, e.g. during concurrent high risk activities or unavailability of critical safety systems. Those HSE-Critical Tasks identified as essential to provide or maintain the necessary controls and recovery preparedness measures for hazards to meet the objectives of the HSE Case are described in this part of the HSE case. The tasks may be design, inspection and maintenance, operational, administrative or training tasks. This part also specifies who is responsible for the tasks, the inputs required to carry out each task and how it is verified that each task has been undertaken properly. Part 5 - Emergency Response Summary This part of the HSE Case describes the Emergency Response systems, plans and arrangement in place for the drilling operations at D-Island. Agip KCO has developed formal procedures which detail appropriate emergency actions in response to incidents associated with D-Island activities. To supplement these emergency response procedures, there are a number of pre-incident plans which cover specific identified emergency scenarios. Part 6 - Remedial Action Plan This provides a plan to resolve any shortfalls, deficiencies or outstanding actions identified and thereby improve the HSE performance of the operations. It includes priorities, responsibilities for ensuring completion and target completion dates. Part 7 - Conclusion and Statement of Justification for Operations This states the conclusion reached on achieving the HSE Case objectives and states the justification that conditions are satisfactory for continued operations.

1.7 USES The HSE Case is a living document, in that it will be reviewed, updated and used as part of the primary reference and guidance source for a number of activities essential for the HSE management of activities in the D-Island drilling program, as follows: A basis for assuring a common and consistent approach to the HSE management of

operations by Agip KCO and contractors. A means for improving the project HSE management and performance. A systematic framework to enable management to assure themselves formally that the major

accident hazards arising from the drilling, LQ arrangements, and local marine and helicopter operations within 500m of the island are adequately controlled.

A baseline for the systematic assessment of the risk associated with any future changes to the operations.

A guide for managers and supervisors in preparing hazard awareness training, handbooks, etc for the workforce.

A guide for all new personnel at all levels involved in the operations, whether with Agip KCO or contractors, to provide rapid familiarisation with the HSE-MS, the hazards and the associated technical and procedural controls used for managing them.

A framework upon which HSE and system compliance audits may be developed and programmed.

A reference for incident investigation, reporting and follow-up. The HSE-Critical Tasks listing provides a reference for managers and supervisors of the HSE-

critical tasks to be undertaken, who is responsible for them, the inputs required to carry out each task and how they will verify that each task has been undertaken properly.

An input to the contracts and design specifications of the HSE-critical issues to be addressed by contractors.



A framework for demonstrating to the Republic of Kazakhstan Regulatory bodies that major HSE risks are being managed.

The Remedial Action Plan assigns corrective actions to individuals. 1.8 REVIEW PERIODS AND UPDATES

Activities necessary to maintain the HSE Case will be implemented and co-ordinated by the Administrator, under the direction and authorisation of the Holder. These include: Assignment of the HSE-critical Tasks lists and the Hazard and Effects Register to relevant Agip

KCO and contractor company personnel. They are charged with the task of verifying the relevance, currency and accuracy of their designated tasks.

Management review of the HSE Case document following completion of modifications. Re-issuing updated parts of the document as necessary, for example, after any major changes. All signatory pages will require re-endorsement should the signatories change. Following incident reviews/accident investigations, in accordance with Agip KCO requirements. The Administrator will incorporate any deficiencies noted during the above maintenance

activities into a revised version of the Remedial Action Plan. In this way the Remedial Action Plan is continuously updated with new actions and deficiencies, and closed-out actions removed.

.



PART 2 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES AND OPERATIONS



2 DESCRIPTION OF OPERATIONS AND FACILITIES 2.1 INTRODUCTION

D-Island is an artificial island which will act as a hub for drilling and production operations for the Experimental Programme (EP) project. During the drilling phase of the project two drilling rigs (Rigs 401 and 402) will operate on the island, with living quarters on adjacent barges. The two drilling rigs can operate simultaneously with a total of 38 slots available (closest approach will be 13 slots [2]). It is currently planned to use 12 slots as per the drilling programme (see Section 2.5). Each rig is serviced by an adjacent mobile mud module containing five generators and mud processing. Pipe handling equipment is installed on the roof of the module. Common utilities are housed to the south of the island and include diesel and base oil storage (SE corner), mud conditioning, power generation (including emergency generator) and steam boilers (for winterisation). Accommodation is provided on grounded living quarters barges; the Shapagat (POB 120) and the Karlygash (POB 180), with integral TRs. Evacuation from the island will be by helicopter or IBEEV. The layout of the completed D-Island installation is presented in Figure 2.1 Specific operations covered by this case This HSE Case covers drilling and completions on D-Island, the accommodation barges, third party equipment, other activities where they interface with drilling activities, and marine (excluding those associated with construction activities) and helicopter operations within a 500m zone of the artificial island. All other activities required for the exploration program i.e. rig mobilisation/demobilisation, construction, aviation and marine operations outside the 500m zone and supply base operations, are also excluded.

2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS The northern zone of the Caspian Sea was designated as a nature reserve by the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Kazakhstan in 1974, and modified by the decree of 1991 permitting oil exploration. In order to protect and conserve the natural environment, including flora, fauna and marine life, Agip KCO ensures that all of its operations cause minimal impact to the environment, being conducted in accordance with Agip KCOs Environmental Strategy zero spillage and minimum discharge. This strategy requires that all liquid waste materials containing substances which may be harmful to aquatic life or wildlife, or injurious to life or property, are treated to avoid disposal of harmful substances into the sea. Drilling fluids are collected and shipped to shore for further treatment and disposal or re-use, and drilling cuttings, sand and other solids are not disposed of into the sea. Mud and mud chemicals containers (sacks, bags, pallets etc.) and other solid wastes are compacted and incinerated or transported ashore for disposal or recycling. Major accident events, such as blowouts or major oil spills, would pose a serious threat to the environment. These events are assessed in detail in Part 4 of this HSE Case, where specific controls to prevent their occurrence or mitigate their consequences are identified. Detailed assessment of the effects of such events on the surrounding environment is documented in the Environmental Impact Assessment [[3] and [4]].



Figure 2.1 : D-Island General Arrangement



2.3 GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION, GEOLOGY AND METEOROLOGICAL CONDITIONS 2.3.1 Geographical Location

The area of operation is the Kazakhstan sector of the north east Caspian Sea (Figure 2.2), which is characterised by shallow waters between 1 and 9m in depth with an average water depth of 6.2 m.

Figure 2.2 : Kazakhstan Sector of the Caspian Sea The artificial island is located approximately 70 km south east of Atyrau, in the north Caspian Sea at location latitude 46 deg. 22 north and longitude 52 deg. 81 east, in a nominal water depth of about two metres (Figure 2.3). Due to its position on the surge plain of the eastern side of the North Caspian, water levels are subject to both seasonal variations and weather-induced short-term up- and down-surges. The down-surges may reduce the water level sufficiently to prevent logistical operations for short periods. The shallow water location of the island is sited away from normal shipping lanes.

Figure 2.3 : D-Island Location



2.3.2 Safety Zone A Safety Exclusion Zone has been defined around the facility, the boundary of the Safety Exclusion Zone being 500 metres from the outer edge of any berm in its current configuration. The Agip Onshore Operations Manager is responsible for ensuring that systems are in place such that no vessels or any other parties, which are not invited or belonging to the Agip KCO operation, enter the Safety Zone without authorisation. The D-Island OIM is responsible for vessel entry; lawful or non lawful. Monitoring of vessels approaching the island is carried out by the Radio Operator in the living quarters, who is responsible for warning any unauthorised vessels that may encroach. EP Offshore Logistics will provide for marine vessel control in the form of the Offshore Marine Control Centre (OMCC). Marine Superintendents, Co-ordinators and Vessel Tracking specialist at the OMCC monitor and control project vessel movements. This is currently being developed.

2.3.3 Geo-technical Information The artificial island was constructed by placing a rock core on to the seabed with an impermeable 2 mm geo-membrane, placed between sand layers on top of this, and then approximately 1 m depth of further rock and compacted soil above this. The geo-membrane was included to prevent spill and contamination migration. The island surface was graded using gravel and prefabricated concrete slabs and foundations laid, the topside facilities then being installed, their foundations typically being made from pre-fabricated concrete slabs. A full survey of sea bottom conditions, and vulnerability to seismic events was carried out prior to construction of the artificial island. The carboniferous limestone formation targeted for the wells is approximately 3,800 m below the surface. An expected total drilling depth of 5,000 m is estimated.

2.3.4 Meteorological Conditions The average air temperature in the north Caspian Sea is 8-10C. The mean air temperature in January is between -7 and -10C, falling to a possible -30C with the arrival of the Arctic air masses. During the summer months of July and August the mean air temperature for the entire Caspian Sea is 24-26C, with a possible maximum of 42-44C. Water temperatures are subject to similar extreme variability. During the summer months, the shallows can exceed 26C. From November, the area starts to freeze over in the shallowest north-eastern parts and, as the winter proceeds, the extent of ice cover increases and spreads westwards until most of the sea is frozen. The pack ice can be up to 0.9 m thick, with an average thickness of approximately 0.5 m. During severe winters, the ice period can last up to 170 days. Ice cover generally persists through to April. Winds tend to cause the ice to move northwards (mainly January), which, in some areas, creates ice ridges measuring one to two metres in height. This height has been allowed for in the design of the island height. The average wind speed is 4 6 m/s over the waters of the north east Caspian. Strong winds and storms occur mainly in springtime, with a frequency over the year of 30-40 days. Wind speeds can reach 25 m/s, with extremes of 30 m/s. These stronger winds can create storm surges, which are non-periodic fluctuations in sea level, lasting an average of 5 days. They occur most frequently between September and March, with a maximum rise in water level of 3-4m observed in the shallow areas of the north Caspian Sea. The wind rose for D-Island is illustrated in Figure 2.4 [6]. The characteristics of the wind-generated waves in the north Caspian Sea are strongly influenced by the shallow depths of the area and wave heights of up to 2 to 3 m can occur.



Figure 2.4 : Windrose for the field

2.4 WELLS CHARACTERIZATION Drilling of the Kashagan wells can be broadly characterized in accordance with the following sections classification:

2.4.1 Post-Salt Section Between the salt diapirs and the surface lie normally pressured sedimentary rocks of Recent to Permian age. The bulk of these formations are composed of shales and sandstones which are not expected to give rise to significant drilling problems. Interbedded limestones are encountered in the Upper Cretaceous and Upper Jurassic intervals and while they may slow penetration rates significantly, they are not expected to give drilling problems.

2.4.2 Salt Section The salt layer overlying the carbonate reservoir varies considerably in thickness across the Kashagan field and even within the range of wells to be drilled from the Block A location. Characteristic salt diapir features generate salt intervals of up to 2,000 m, while salt withdrawal in other areas results in intervals of only a few tens of metres. To date, only minor problems from salt mobility have been encountered during drilling operations and analysis of samples has, so far, revealed an absence of the highly mobile potassium and magnesium based salts in preference for the less mobile halites with traces of the immobile anhydrites and carbonates. It is possible within the salt that rafted and perhaps over-pressured sediments could be encountered although only interbeds of anhydrite have been seen during drilling operations to date.

2.4.3 Pre-Salt Section (Reservoir Section) The reservoir is composed of Carboniferous sediments with the Artinskian sediments form the reservoir seal for Kashagan. The limestone reservoir section is encountered below the Artinskian Shale. Areas around the rim of the reservoir are expected to have secondary porosity in the form of karsts and fractures. According to current data it is possible that some parts of the Platform Interior may also exhibit some of these secondary porosity features but these areas will likely be limited in their extent. D-Island wells target Platform Interior.



2.5 DRILLING AND COMPLETIONS PROGRAMME The D-Island drilling and completions programme from 2006 to 2009 is illustrated in Figure 2.11. It should be noted that operational requirements may lead to the programme being revised.

2.5.1 Drilling Methodology The traditional drilling technique involving overbalanced drilling mud circulated through the drill string and up the annulus while drilling the well is the main drilling approach through all well sections at D-Island. In principle, the mud column is the first barrier and the BOP is the second barrier [19]. However, drilling with overbalanced drilling mud through highly potential loss zones increases the possibility for loss of the primary barrier i.e. the mud column. For this reason a contingency has been made for the use of closed hole circulation drilling, (CHCD) at D-Island in cases of severe losses that might impair the safety of operation. In traditional drilling techniques mud returns to the surface and the pressure of the mud column is maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient in the open hole section. The CHCD approach requires no return of mud to the surface as this technique consists of pumping a sacrificial fluid, (for D-Island this is seawater), through the drill string into the formation in the open hole section. During this operation the upper part the annulus is filled with mud heavier than seawater. The mud cap is pumped through the kill/choke lines with one of the mud pumps. The exerting pressure from the sacrificial fluid and the mud cap is maintained above the fracture pressure during actual drilling, but between pore pressure and fracture gradient during tripping and when making connections i.e. similar to traditional drilling approach. In order to prevent mud being returned to surface from the annulus during actual drilling a rotating circulation head (RCH) is installed on top of the BOP. The mud pump system consists of three mud pumps (see Section 2.10.5). While drilling with the traditional drilling method approach, two pumps will be used to pump drilling mud through the drill string and one will be kept in reserve. Whereas in the CHCD approach one pump will be used to pump sacrificial fluid through the drill string and one to pump mud cap mud through the kill/choke line to annulus, and one mud pump will be kept as reserve. The RCH is dynamic pressure rated to 2,500 psi and static pressure rated to 5,000 psi, while the BOP is rated to 15,000 psi. The CHCD approach can be compared with the well kill technique "bull heading" where kill mud is pumped through the drill string and the annulus in order to prevent formation fluid reaching the surface and to kill the well. One characterization of the CHCD approach is a continuous bullhead technique for drilling purposes, in a safe manner. Primary Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling, only the drilling fluid can be defined as the primary well barrier. As long as the exerting (static) pressure from the mud column is maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient in the open hole section, the first barrier is intact regardless of equipment failure on the rig. Drilling with overbalanced drilling mud through highly potential loss zones increases the possibility for loss of the primary barrier i.e. the mud column, the CHCD approach has been introduced. During mud cap drilling with the CHCD technique, several components can be defined as the primary well barrier. It is the exerting (dynamic) pressure from the pumped fluid (sacrificial fluid and mud cap) that constitutes the main part of the barrier. However, there are several components on which the exerting pressure depends: Pumps for mud and sacrificial fluid; Power system for pumps; Sealing capability of rotating circulating head (RCH); Supply of mud and sacrificial fluid; Kill/choke line for mud cap; and



Kill/choke valves. If any of the above components fail, the exerting pressure in the open hole section will be impaired, possibly causing formation fluid inflow into the well (see Figure 2.5). To prevent this, the secondary well barrier has to be activated in order to continue a safe operation. During tripping and when making connections in the CHCD mode, the well fluid will be in a static condition to prevent well fluid release on the drill floor. This implies that the exerting pressure from the well fluid in the open hole section must be maintained between pore pressure and fracture gradient. During these sub-activities in the CHCD mode, the primary well barrier is the same as the system for the traditional overbalanced drilling mode.

Figure 2.5 : Primary Well Barrier for Conventional and CHC Drilling

Secondary Well Barriers During overbalanced drilling and CHCD (see Figure 2.6), the following components can be defined as the secondary well barriers: Casing shoe; Casing; Wellhead seal; Kill/choke valves; and BOP. Given failures of the primary well barrier, failure of any of these components will result in a blowout. When drilling in High Pressure High Temperature (HPHT) conditions, utilizing traditional over-balanced drilling method, the first barrier, the mud column, is found to be highly unreliable, due to tight pressure margins. In HTHP wells, an average of one kick experienced per well drilled is not



uncommon. The expected tight pressure margin conditions at the Kashagan field can be compared to these conditions while drilling HTHP wells. Using CHCD, the mud column is less critical because drilling can commence while fluid is pumped in to the well. In case the equipment related to CHCD should fail, the BOP will have to be closed. This is similar to drilling utilizing traditional drilling methods.

Figure 2.6 : Secondary Well Barriers for Conventional and CHC Drilling 2.6 COMPLETIONS METHODOLOGY

The six main steps in a completion operation [64] include: 1) Displace the drilling mud with seawater for casing qualification; 2) Displace well with a heavy completion fluid; 3) Run completion string; 4) Nipple down BOP and install the X-mas tree; 5) Displace Base Oil with Completion Fluid; and 6) Set the production packer For the D-Island wells two methods have been used for carrying out the completions and are as follows;

Overbalance using Micromax; and Overbalance using a Caesium Formate completion fluid

In all cases two confirmed safety critical barriers must be maintained at all times between the formation hydrocarbons and the surface environment. In all cases the cemented casing and liner provides the primary barrier against the fluids in formation. The secondary barrier is provide by the hydrostatic head of the well completions fluid. (Figure 2.9) details the Casing and Liner profile and Figure 2.10 shows a schematic of the D-Island completions arrangement.



2.7 COMMISSIONING METHODOLOGY Two operations will be performed as part of the commissioning programme, perforation and stimulation, and involve third party temporary equipment being located in the wellhead area and are described below. It is not intended to conduct well testing during the 2008/2009 winter period.

2.7.1 Perforation System Perforations are carried out using Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns run downhole using coiled tubing (CT) through a specially designed BOP stack (two triple BOPs). The guns will be 22ft and 28ft lengths and run in by individual length using an AutoLatch system. As each section is lowered the top set of rams open and allow the CT and gun to be lowered whilst a lower set of rams remain closed around the CT providing a seal. The rig BOP will be fully open during this procedure but the lubricator valve (located further downhole) will be closed. An E-Line cable is run inside the CT to log depth and the charges are fired through a shielded electrical cable thus avoiding the need for radio silence. When perforations are taking place the well is slightly overbalanced, squeezing any fluids back into the formation with Base oil. The gun design eliminates the possibility of well fluids being brought to the surface on retrieval however the guns are flushed with 10bls of base oil before breaking out the guns. The used base oil is sent to surge tanks and any gas that may have accumulated is sent to the burner system operated by Schlumberger. The perforation equipment is operated by Halliburton and a HAZID and HAZOP were conducted for the perforation operation [69].

2.7.2 Stimulation System The stimulation system mixes and pumps hydrochloric acid into the formation once the wellbore has been perforated using Tubing Conveyed Perforating (TCP) guns. The acid is run from the wellhead down-hole using Coiled Tubing (CT) for the first stage stimulation and then via 4 pipe during Bullheading. Stimulation activities are carried out under the control and supervision of Halliburton. Stimulation equipment consists of the following items: 2 x 6k High Pressure pumps on the acid tanks 15 x 2000gal acid tanks 2 x 32m3 Mixers

1 x 80m3 Mixer

1 x 80m3 Base oil storage tank Various containers of additives and corrosion inhibitors All of the above system is in a bunded area with the tanks also having drip trays and additional absorbent material lining the trays. The 4 line is secured with Grey locks and is chained down. A HAZID was conducted for the stimulation operation [70], the temporary location of the stimulation equipment in shown in Figure 2.7.

2.8 INSTALLATION LAYOUT 2.8.1 Island/LQ Orientation

The orientation of the island and principal components of the installation are shown in Figure 2.7.



Figure 2.7 : Principal Components of the Installation The artificial island provides the base from which drilling operations are conducted. The accommodation and TR barges are moored on the south side of the island provide Living Quarters (LQ) and Temporary Refuge (TR) facilities.

2.8.2 Main Dimensions

The overall dimensions of the rectangular island are 225 m long and 221 m wide and its surface is approximately 3.5 m above current sea level. The island has vertical sides protected by sheet piling and, on the north-west and south-west sides, there is a wall extending some 2 m above ground level, providing protection against wind and waves.

2.8.3 Island Layout Areas of the island are grouped according to function, and located with respect to each other according to hazard potential (see Figure 2.7), the principal areas being: Drilling rig and associated systems, situated at the centre of the island:



Drilling rig (including draw works, wire line unit, mud logging, winches, rotary table, Drillers control panel);

Mud and cuttings handling (including mud gas separator, trip tank, degassers, choke/kill manifold, shale shakers, centrifuges);

Power generation, distribution and utilities; Pipe handling; and Cuttings storage.

Ancillary equipment and systems, around the perimeter of the island, including: Cement unit; Stimulation equipment Diesel and lube oil storage; Water storage; Workshops and shelters; and Cargo laydown areas.

2.9 ISLAND STABILITY AND INTEGRITY In the summertime, the environmental loads are generated by the wind, in combination with wave action and sea level surges. In the winter, when the Caspian Sea is frozen, moving ice sheets are generated, which build up as rubble ice around the island. Calculations by the island designers and engineers demonstrate that the artificial island, the rig and equipment on the island, are capable of withstanding the predicted operational, weather, environmental loads and temperatures imposed. The principal hazards associated with rig foundations or instability on the island arise from: Under scour of the island, causing the island to fail; Wind and wave induced side forces in excess of the maximum design limit, causing damage to

the islands structure; and Ice induced side forces in excess of the maximum design limit, causing damage to the islands

structure.

The island is subject to inspection monthly in accordance with Agip KCO procedures. Any deterioration detected during these inspections will be referred to specialist Civil Engineers for an assessment of the island integrity. In the event of forces in excess of the predicted maximum, which result in structural damage (or predicted structural damage), which could cause the integrity of the island (or major piece(s) of equipment) to fail, the D-Island OIM will decide whether to cease operations and evacuate the island, in accordance with the requirements of the Emergency Response Plan [8]. Monitoring of sliding ice and lateral ice hazards on the island during the winter is described in detail in the Agip KCO ice management guideline [61].

2.9.1 Well Design Well design is performed by Agip KCO and is described in the Kashagan Field Drilling Manual [11]. A schematic of the well design and casing and liner profile is shown in Figure 2.9. A simplified completion schematic is shown in Figure 2.10



2.10 DRILLING RIGS The two identical drilling rigs, 401 and 402, were constructed by National Oilwell Varco (NOV), and consist of the Drilling Equipment Set (DES) and the Drilling Support Module (DSM). In addition a Common Area (CA) Module will be used by both rigs for various operations 13]. Rigs 401 and 402 are identical; reference to the DES and DSM will therefore refer to both rigs. The DES will be positioned on the northern part of the island. The DES consists of the skid base, substructure, drill floor, and Bootstrap mast. The north skid base is elevated 43 higher than the south skid base. There are 38 wells on the island but only 12 will be drilled, the DES and DSM skid East-West on a Lift & Roll System. The DES consists of 4 skid bases, substructure, drill floor and bootstrap mast and equipment for drilling including the Draw-works, Top drive, BOP Stacks, Rotary table, Drillers cabin, Hydraulic Power Unit and BOP Accumulator Unit. The DSM is located directly south of the DES. The module consists of 24 individual modules and 8 skid bases. The DSM, like the DES, skids East-West on a Lift & Roll System. The DSM consists of the Solids Control Equipment, Electrical Module, Casing and Drill Pipe Handling Equipment, Mud Pumps, Generators, and other various pieces of equipment. The overall dimensions for the drilling systems are presented in Table 2.1 and the DES and DSM are illustrated in Figure 2.12.

Table 2.1 : Drill Rig Dimensions

DES Overall Dimensions

Length (North-South) Width (West-East) Height Skid base (4 sections) 3.66 m 9.14 m 1.83 m

Note: Top of steel of the North Skid base at 1.3 m (4.3 ft) higher Length (North-South) Width (West-East) Height Substructure 16.15 m 14. 63 m Drill Floor 24.11 m 14.63 m

17.17 m (Overall Height Of Substructure incl.

Drill floor)

Base Height

Mast 9.14 m X 9.14 m 48.77 m (Clear Working Height) DSM Overall Dimensions

Length (North-South) Width (West-East Height 44.12 m 35.94 m 15.55 m CA Overall Dimensions Length (North-South) Width (West-East Height 40 m 150 m 18 m

2.10.1 Drillers Cabin and Control Panel Prime considerations for the design of the Drillers cabin and control panel has been: Good communications with derrick (monkey board), drill floor and pipe deck personnel; Excellent visual capabilities under a variety of weather and operating conditions; Proper information availability without information overload; and a



Safe working environment, including the provision of safety glass with mesh where required. 2.10.2 Rotary equipment

The top-drive has an integrated travelling block and hook, rated load capacity 680 tonnes and is fitted with two Internal BOPs (IBOP) and a mud saver sub, and provides for wireline access. The top-drive pipe-handler link tilt shall is capable of full access to the mousehole and to latch on the pipe from the pipe chute to pick-up or lay-down of pipe. A 37 bore rotary table is provided, rated at 590 tonne to support the load of the drill string or casing and to rotate the string during Kelly drilling (as back-up for the top-drive system). The 37 minimum bore shall ensure that the 30 conductor and any required wellhead spools may pass through.

2.10.3 Pipe Handling System The system is design to meet the following requirement: Handling, loading and manipulating 3 and 5 7/8 drill-pipe and tubing or casing (2 3/8 up

to 20 on the pipe rack / catwalk assembly; Handling of casing up to 14 of 100 ppf from make up to feeding the drill floor hoisting

equipment; Make-up and brake-out 3- 5 7/8 R3 drill-pipe of line; Transfer of drill pipe, tubing and casing from V-door, to and from the rotary / top drive area

or the mousehole; and Remote make-up / break-out of drill pipe in the rotary / top drive or the mousehole. An Iron Roughneck is provided capable of handling a stand of drill pipe every minute (60 per hr). It is capable of accessing the rotary table and is situated so that the operator has a full view of jaws during operation. Remote operated air actuated slips, controlled from Drillers console and locally, are provided for the full range of drill pipe anticipated. A hydraulic Cathead, with a line pull of 30,000 lbs, is located on the rig floor such that the tongs can be used safely and efficiently. Pipe doping is not carried out on the drill floor but before the pipe is lifted in the racks. The pipe handling system is illustrated in Figure 2.13 to Figure 2.16. The pipe loading and handling systems on Rigs 401 & 402 is currently not operational and an alternative method of carry out pipe handling operations is being used. A 110 tonne crawler crane is used to load pipe from the ground to the catwalk system, where an operator disconnects the pipe from the slinging equipment. In order to carry out this task the whole side of pipe deck has been removed to improve the visibility of the crane operator. The Bucking machine designed to make up and break out drill pipe is not being used as it does not function as required.

2.10.4 Drill Floor

The drill floor layout allows for all required operations to be performed in a safe and efficient manner and, as far as possible, provide the maximum unobstructed working area. The drill floor has the following specification: A set-back area with a minimum capacity of 350 tonnes; Set-back area is flush with rig-floor, incorporating a surface non-damaging to tool joints; Ability to withstand drop impact of a 9- drill collar (3.1 tonnes), from a height of 1.0 m; Fully sealed with drainage system, capable of handling all mud spillages (zero discharge); Approved non-slip oil resistant rubber type work surface in the area adjacent to the rotary

table; Pad-eye for a lower logging sheave rated to 22,480 lb (10,000 kg), recessed into the rig-

floor and the recess provided with a cover; Two access / egress ways with clear pathway leading from the drill floor;



Personnel elevator with proper certification and classification from ground level to drill floor level with intermediate stop at the BOP deck;

Rigid gates to close off the top of all ramps; Mouse-hole, designed for easy removal and safe efficient make up of drill pipe; Rat-hole as back-up provision for Kelly drilling; Three utility winches, two 5 tonne SWL on the drill floor and one (5 tonne SWL) on the BOP

deck; Two certified 500 kg SWL man-rider winches; when required by the drilling operations; Doghouse, mounted on the North side of the drill floor; Drilling console, equipped with all required instrumentation for control and monitoring of

operations; BOP control panel; Choke control panel; and Cascade breathing air distribution system and Self Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA).

2.10.5 High Pressure Mud System Primary control of well pressure, whilst drilling, is provided by the hydrostatic head o

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