ISCN
Panel Discussion 2 The International Forum on Peaceful Use of Nuclear
Energy, Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Security 29 November 2016
Hirofumi TOMIKAWA General Manager
Technology Development Promotion Office Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security
Japan Atomic Energy Agency
JAEA’s contribution to Disarmament and Potential Technologies for Nuclear
Disarmament Verification
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JAEA’s Contribution to CTBT International Verification Regime
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); • Prohibition of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion in any
spaces • Establishment of verification regime to verify that each member state adheres the treaty
ISCN JAEA’s contribution to Disposition of excess Weapon Plutonium
Cooperation by JAEA
Cooperation with Russian national laboratories to implement R&D activities; • Fabrication of MOX fuel using vibro-
packing technology • Irradiation in a Russian fast reactor (BN-
600), etc.
Dismantled warheads
MOX granules
Vibro-packing
Vi-pac fuel Vi-pac MOX fuel assemblies
Fast reactor BN-600
Process of disposition
Background • After 1996 nuclear safety summit held in Moscow, Japan, France, Canada,
Germany and other countries began cooperation with Russian Federation in order to evaluate the options and costs to dispose surplus weapon grade plutonium.
• Based on the evaluation, Japan proposed vibro-packed fuel option (burning vibro-packed MOX fuel using Russian fast reactor BN-600) at 1999 G8 Summit.
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ISCN ISCN What should be verified for nuclear disarmament?
Temporary Store
Temporary Store
Site Storage Dismantlement Building
STEP- 6~7 STEP- 8 STEP- 9~10
NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station
NM(BEFORE)
NDA
HE NM
NDA
Temporary NDA Check Point
Gate Gate
(ENTER) (EXIT)
Holding Area (AFTER)
<Datalink>
HE
Inspector's Room Control Room
Site Storage Dismantlement Building Temporary Storage
Temporary Storage
Dismantlement Station
NDA check point (After)
NDA check point (Before)
Temporary Holding Area
Inspector’s Room Control Room
(Example: Dismantlement of nuclear warhead)
: Nuclear Warhead : Monitor : CCTV Camera
: Optical Fiber Seal : In/Out Access Control : Containment Area
: Nuclear Material : Explosive Material : Non-destructive AssyNM HE NDA 3
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Tokai
Ningyo-toge
Tsuruga (Monju)
Tokyo
U Enrichment
FBR
Reprocessing MOX fabrication
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities in JAEA
Oarai Research reactors
A variety of nuclear measurement and C/S systems has been developed to meet IAEA’s SG requirements and enhance nuclear security.
Enriched monitor
U holdup counter
Dual C/S system
Vitrified Counter
Hull monitor GB assay
system Fuel Assembly assay system
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NDA Types Rough Explanation
Passive Type Detection of self-emitted radiations from NM
Active Type
Using outer sources of radiation to activate NM Detection of induced / transmitted radiations (changes of radiations)
NDA Technologies
Detecting self-emitted radiations from NM
Irradiated Radiation
Transmitted Radiation
Irrad
iatio
n So
urce
NM
Radiation Detectors
Induced Radiation
Radiation Detectors
Detecting induced/transmitted radiations (Detecting changes of radiations)
NM
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ISCN ISCN (Example) Passive type NDA
Pu Quantity
(240Pu-effective)
- PCAS [Plutonium Canister Assay System] *Counting of Spontaneous Fission Neutrons from 240Pu etc.
Pu Isotopic
Compositions
- HRGS [High Resolution Gamma-ray Spectrometer] *Counting of Self–emission Gamma-
rays from Pu isotopes HPGe-detector
Pu canister
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Fissile material Quantity
- FNDI [Fast Neutron Direct Interrogation method]
*Counting of Induced neutron interrogated by Pulsed fast neutron
Identify each
Isotope
- NRF NDA [Nuclear Resonance Fluorescence] *Counting of Induced γ-rays Interrogated by monochromatic γ-ray beam
(Example) Active type NDA
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Measurement Interrogation Neutrons
Induced Neutrons
Integrated Fission Neutrons ∝ Fissile Materials Mass
Monochromatic γ-ray beam
Container
γ-ray detector
Scattered γ-ray Nuclear
material
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Motion Direction Sensor (MDS)
ID check camera Detector Transfer Carts
01/1/23 10:01 3232±12.2 01/1/23 10:02 3216±11.8 01/1/23 10:03 3178±11.1 01/1/23 10:04 3265±12.1 01/1/23 10:05 3221±12.4
(time)
No.001
No.001
2001/1/23
No.001
No.001
2001/1/23 10:02
No.001
2001/1/23 10:01
ID data
Measurement Data
MDS data
Date Time Pu mass
Receipt Shipment
Unattended NDA system
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• Once triggered by radiation detector, ID check camera and NDA system automatically activated.
• Acquired data is transferred to data review station.
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(Example) Applicable technologies
Temporary Store
Temporary Store
Site Storage Dismantlement Building
STEP- 6~7 STEP- 8 STEP- 9~10
NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station
NM(BEFORE)
NDA
HE NM
NDA
Temporary NDA Check Point
Gate Gate
(ENTER) (EXIT)
Holding Area (AFTER)
<Datalink>
HE
Inspector's Room Control Room
Site Storage Dismantlement Building Temporary Storage
Temporary Storage
Dismantlement Station
NDA check point (After)
NDA check point (Before)
Temporary Holding Area
Inspector’s Room Control Room
Presence of NM Passive γ, n Active γ, n
Presence of NM & Isotope ratio Passive γ, n Active γ, n
Presence of HE & absence of NM
Active γ
NDA Surveillance camera
Review station Prevention of
information leakage Unattended System
Presence of HE Active γ
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• JAEA has contributed to CTBT International Verification Regime and cooperated in disposing excess weapon Pu.
• JAEA has long history of development of SG technologies in order to meet IAEA’s requirement and contribute effective/efficient SG. These are potentially applicable to nuclear disarmament verification scheme .
Conclusion
Technical Challenges; Technical features of nuclear disarmament verification, e.g.
Information Barrier, have to be taken into account. The detail design information cannot be disclosed to NNWS,
and it’s difficult to conduct computer simulation and optimize measurement system
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International collaboration including NWS and NNWS might be essential solution to overcome the challenges.