G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009

RODOLFO A. ASPILLAGA, Petitioner,vs.AURORA A. ASPILLAGA, Respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision1 dated September 9, 2005 and the Resolution2 dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179, entitled "Rodolfo A. Aspillaga v. Aurora A. Aspillaga."

The facts culled from the records are as follows:

Rodolfo Aspillaga met Aurora Apon sometime in 1977 while they were students at the Philippine Merchant Marine Academy and Lyceum of the Philippines, respectively. Rodolfo courted her and five months later, they became sweethearts. Thereafter, Aurora left for Japan to study Japanese culture, literature and language. Despite the distance, Rodolfo and Aurora maintained communication.

In 1980, after Aurora returned to the Philippines, she and Rodolfo got married. They begot two children, but Rodolfo claimed their marriage was "tumultuous." He described Aurora as domineering and frequently humiliated him even in front of his friends. He complained that Aurora was a spendthrift as she overspent the family budget and made crucial family decisions without consulting him. Rodolfo added that Aurora was tactless, suspicious, given to nagging and jealousy as evidenced by the latter’s filing against him a criminal case (concubinage) and an administrative case. He left the conjugal home, and filed on March 7, 1995, a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Aurora. He averred that Aurora failed to comply with the essential obligations of marriage.

Aurora, for her part, alleged that sometime in 1991, Rodolfo gave her a plane ticket to Japan to enable her to assume her teaching position in a university for a period of three months. In August 1991, upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine. Aurora alleged that Rodolfo’s cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and their eventual separation. In May 1992, Rodolfo abandoned their conjugal home to live with Besina. Aurora claimed custody of the children.

During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained his psychiatric evaluation of the parties as well as his recommendation that the petition be granted. In this report, he stated,

"x x x x

Psychiatric evaluation of petitioner, Rodolfo Aspillaga, showed that he is an intelligent adult male, who is egoistic and harbors an inner sense of inadequacy, helplessness and anxiety in losing agility. He, however, projects himself as dominant person, to cover his deep-seated insecurity and inadequacy. He tends to be suspicious and blames others for his mistakes. He claims for adulation, reassurance and attention from other people. These can be traced from an unhealthy familial relationship during the early maturational development specifically in the form of a domineering and protective maternal image.

Self-esteem was fragile.

Psychiatric evaluation of respondent, Aurora Apon Aspillaga, showed history of traumatic childhood experiences. Her parents separated when she was about one month old and was made to believe that she was the youngest daughter of her disciplinarian grandfather. Her surrogate sister maltreated her and imposed harsh corporal punishment for her slightest mistakes. She felt devastated when she accidentally discovered that she’d been an orphan adopted by her grandfather. Attempted incestuous desire by an uncle was reported.

Psychological test results collaborated the clinical findings of sensitivity to criticism. Tendency for self dramatization and attention getting behavior. Lapses in judgment and shallow heterosexual relationship was projected. Sign of immaturity and desire to regress to a lower level of development were likewise projected. Self-esteem was also low. Deep-seated sense of dejection, loneliness and emptiness hamper her objectivity.

In summary, both petitioner and respondent harbor psychological handicaps which could be traced from unhealthy maturational development. Both had strict, domineering, disciplinarian role models. However, respondent’s mistrust, shallow heterosexual relationships resulted in incapacitation in her ability to comply with the obligation of marriage.

It is recommended that the petition to annul their marriage be granted, on the grounds existing psychological incapacitation of both petitioner and respondent, which will hamper their capacity to comply with their marital obligations. Dissolution of the marital bond will offer both of them, peace of mind." 3

On May 31, 2000,4 the Regional Trial Court (RTC) found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated September 9, 2005, reversed and set aside the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied in a Resolution dated December 20, 2005.

Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:

[WHETHER THE APPELLATE COURT] CORRECTLY APPLIED THE DEFINITION OF "PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY" TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL CONDITIONS OF THE PARTIES DURING THE CELEBRATION OF THEIR MARRIAGE.5

Simply stated, the issue before us is whether the marriage is void on the ground of the parties’ psychological incapacity.

The petition must fail.

As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 we categorically said that:

Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.7 (Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, while the psychological examination conducted on respondent found her to be mistrustful, to possess low self-esteem, given to having shallow heterosexual relationships and immature, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that these personality traits or psychological conditions were grave or serious enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba was able to establish the parties’ personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties’ psychological disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as husband and wife. We cannot see how their personality disorder would render them unaware of the essential marital obligations or to be incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to a marriage. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper (as Dr. Maaba puts it) their performance of their marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Moreover, there is no evidence to prove that each party’s condition is so grave or is of such nature as to render said party incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. There is likewise no evidence that the claimed incapacity is incurable and permanent.

Petitioner had the burden of proving the nullity of his marriage with respondent,8 but failed to discharge it.

It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.9 The intention of the law is to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.10

Noteworthy, as aptly pointed out by the appellate court, Rodolfo and Aurora initially had a blissful marital union for several years. They married in 1982, and later affirmed the ceremony in church rites in 1983, showing love and contentment with one another after a year of marriage. The letter of petitioner dated April 1, 1990 addressed to respondent revealed the harmonious relationship of the couple continued during their marriage for about eight years from the time they married each other. From this, it can be inferred that they were able to faithfully comply with their obligations to each other and to their children. Aurora was shown to have taken care of her children and remained faithful to her husband while he was away. She even joined sales activities to augment the family income. She appeared to be a very capable woman who traveled a lot and pursued studies here and abroad. It was only when Rodolfo’s acts of infidelity were discovered that the marriage started to fail.

As to Rodolfo’s allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of one’s marriage as to make the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void.11 In the present case, petitioner’s disagreement with his wife’s handling of the family’s finances can hardly be considered as a manifestation of the kind of psychological incapacity contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters is a common, and even normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.12

At this juncture while this Court is convinced that indeed both parties were both found to have psychological disorders, nevertheless, there is nothing in the records showing that these disorders are sufficient to declare the marriage void due to psychological incapacity. We must emphasize that said disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Even assuming their acts violate the covenants of marriage, such acts do not show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which will prevent them from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. At the most, the psychiatric evaluation of the parties proved only incompatibility and irreconcilable differences, which cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.

As this Court has repeatedly declared, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. Article 36 refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. The malady must be so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.131avvph!1

As regards respondent’s claim for support, we find no basis to award the same as it was not passed upon by the trial court in view of the agreement of the parties on the issue presented for resolution, which agreement, however, was not put into writing.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision dated September 9, 2005 and Resolution dated December 20, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68179 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.G.R. No. 174451 October 13, 2009

VERONICA CABACUNGAN ALCAZAR, Petitioner,vs.

REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming the Decision dated 9 June 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Branch 85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, which dismissed petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint for the annulment of her marriage to respondent Rey C. Alcazar.

The Complaint,2 docketed as Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was filed by petitioner before the RTC on 22 August 2002. Petitioner alleged in her Complaint that she was married to respondent on 11 October 2000 by Rev. Augusto G. Pabustan (Pabustan), at the latter’s residence. After their wedding, petitioner and respondent lived for five days in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, the hometown of respondent’s parents. Thereafter, the newlyweds went back to Manila, but respondent did not live with petitioner at the latter’s abode at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23 October 2000, respondent left for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, where he worked as an upholsterer in a furniture shop. While working in Riyadh, respondent did not communicate with petitioner by phone or by letter. Petitioner tried to call respondent for five times but respondent never answered. About a year and a half after respondent left for Riyadh, a co-teacher informed petitioner that respondent was about to come home to the Philippines. Petitioner was surprised why she was not advised by respondent of his arrival.

Petitioner further averred in her Complaint that when respondent arrived in the Philippines, the latter did not go home to petitioner at 2601-C Jose Abad Santos Avenue, Tondo, Manila. Instead, respondent proceeded to his parents’ house in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon learning that respondent was in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, petitioner went to see her brother-in-law in Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila, who claimed that he was not aware of respondent’s whereabouts. Petitioner traveled to San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, where she was informed that respondent had been living with his parents since his arrival in March 2002.

Petitioner asserted that from the time respondent arrived in the Philippines, he never contacted her. Thus, petitioner concluded that respondent was physically incapable of consummating his marriage with her, providing sufficient cause for annulment of their marriage pursuant to paragraph 5, Article 45 of the Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code). There was also no more possibility of reconciliation between petitioner and respondent.

Per the Sheriff’s Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a summons, together with a copy of petitioner’s Complaint, was served upon respondent on 30 September 2002.4

On 18 November 2002, petitioner, through counsel, filed a Motion5 to direct the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation of the case pursuant to Article 48 of the Family Code.

As respondent did not file an Answer, the RTC issued on 27 November 2002 an Order6 directing the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation to ensure that no collusion existed between the parties; to submit a report thereon; and to appear in all stages of the proceedings to see to it that evidence was not fabricated or suppressed.

On 4 March 2003, Public Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de Guzman (De Guzman) submitted her Report manifesting that she had conducted an investigation of the case of petitioner and respondent in January 2003, but respondent never participated therein. Public Prosecutrix De Guzman also noted that no collusion took place between the parties, and measures were taken to prevent suppression of evidence between them. She then recommended that a full-blown trial be conducted to determine whether petitioner’s Complaint was meritorious or not.

Pre-trial was held and terminated on 20 May 2003.

On 21 May 2003, the RTC received the Notice of Appearance of the Solicitor General.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.

During trial, petitioner presented herself, her mother Lolita Cabacungan (Cabacungan), and clinical psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Tayag) as witnesses.

Petitioner first took the witness stand and elaborated on the allegations in her Complaint. Cabacungan corroborated petitioner’s testimony.

Petitioner’s third witness, Tayag, presented the following psychological evaluation of petitioner and respondent:

After meticulous scrutiny and careful analysis of the collected data, petitioner is found to be free from any underlying personality aberration neither (sic) of any serious psychopathological traits, which may possibly impede her normal functioning (sic) of marriage. On the other hand, the undersigned arrived to (sic) a firm opinion that the sudden breakdown of marital life between petitioner and respondent was clearly due to the diagnosed personality disorder that the respondent is harboring, making him psychologically incapacitated to properly assume and comply [with] essential roles (sic) of obligations as a married man.

The pattern of behaviors displayed by the respondent satisfies the diagnostic criteria of a disorder clinically classified as Narcissistic Personality Disorder, a condition deemed to be grave, severe, long lasting in proportion and incurable by any treatment.

People suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder are known to have a pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following:

1. has a grandiose of self-importance (e.g. exaggerates achievements and talents, expect to be recognized as superior without commensurate achievements)

2. is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, brilliance, beauty or ideal love

3. believes that he or she is "special" and unique and can only be understood by, or should associate with, other special or high status people (institutions)

4. requires excessive admiration

5. has sense of entitlement, i.e., unreasonable expectations of especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or her expectations

6. is interpersonally exploitative, i.e., takes advantage of others to achieve his or her own ends

7. lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of others

8. is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of him or her

9. shows arrogant, haughty behavior or attitudes.

The root cause of respondent’s personality disorder can be attributed to his early childhood years with predisposing psychosocial factors that influence[d] his development. It was recounted that respondent is the first child of his mother’s second family. Obviously, unhealthy familial constellation composed his immediate environment in his growing up years. Respondent had undergone a severe longing for attention from his father who had been unfaithful to them and had died early in life, that he was left alone to fend for the family needs. More so that they were coping against poverty, his caregivers failed to validate his needs, wishes or responses and overlooked the love and attention he yearned which led to develop a pathological need for self-object to help him maintain a cohesive sense of self-such so great that everything other people

offer is "consumed." Hence, he is unable to develop relationship with other (sic) beyond this need. There is no capacity for empathy sharing, or loving others.

The psychological incapacity of the respondent is characterized by juridical antecedence as it already existed long before he entered into marriage. Since it already started early in life, it is deeply engrained within his system and becomes a[n] integral part of his personality structure, thereby rendering such to be permanent and incurable.7

Tayag concluded in the end that:

As such, their marriage is already beyond repair, considering the fact that it has long been (sic) ceased to exist and have their different life priorities. Reconciliation between them is regarded to be (sic). The essential obligations of love, trust, respect, fidelity, authentic cohabitation as husband and wife, mutual help and support, and commitment, did not and will no lon[g]er exist between them. With due consideration of the above-mentioned findings, the undersigned recommends, the declaration of nullity of marriage between petitioner and respondent.8

On 18 February 2004, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of Evidence. Public Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa (Lagrosa), who replaced Public Prosecutrix De Guzman, interposed no objection to the admission of petitioner’s evidence and manifested that she would no longer present evidence for the State.

On 9 June 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying petitioner’s Complaint for annulment of her marriage to respondent, holding in substance that:

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the acts of the respondent in not communicating with petitioner and not living with the latter the moment he returned home from Saudi Arabia despite their marriage do (sic) not lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already present at the inception of their marriage or that these are incurable.

That being the case, the Court resolves to deny the instant petition.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Annulment of Marriage is hereby DENIED.9

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration10 but it was denied by the RTC in an Order11 dated 19 August 2004.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 84471. In a Decision12 dated 24 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision dated 9 June 2004. The Court of Appeals ruled that the RTC did not err in finding that petitioner failed to prove respondent’s psychological incapacity. Other than petitioner’s bare allegations, no other evidence was presented to prove respondent’s personality disorder that made him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state. Citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,13 the appellate court ruled that the evidence should be able to establish that at least one of the spouses was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that said person could not have known the marital obligations to be assumed; or knowing the marital obligations, could not have validly assumed the same. At most, respondent’s abandonment of petitioner could be a ground for legal separation under Article 5 of the Family Code.1avvphi1

Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution14 dated 28 August 2008.

Hence, this Petition raising the sole issue of:

WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15

At the outset, it must be noted that the Complaint originally filed by petitioner before the RTC was for annulment of marriage based on Article 45, paragraph 5 of the Family Code, which reads:

ART. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes, existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x

(5) That either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other, and such incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; x x x.

Article 45(5) of the Family Code refers to lack of power to copulate.16 Incapacity to consummate denotes the permanent inability on the part of the spouses to perform the complete act of sexual intercourse.17 Non-consummation of a marriage may be on the part of the husband or of the wife and may be caused by a physical or structural defect in the anatomy of one of the parties or it may be due to chronic illness and inhibitions or fears arising in whole or in part from psychophysical conditions. It may be caused by psychogenic causes, where such mental block or disturbance has the result of making the spouse physically incapable of performing the marriage act.18

No evidence was presented in the case at bar to establish that respondent was in any way physically incapable to consummate his marriage with petitioner. Petitioner even admitted during her cross-examination that she and respondent had sexual intercourse after their wedding and before respondent left for abroad. There obviously being no physical incapacity on respondent’s part, then, there is no ground for annulling petitioner’s marriage to respondent. Petitioner’s Complaint was, therefore, rightfully dismissed.

One curious thing, though, caught this Court’s attention. As can be gleaned from the evidence presented by petitioner and the observations of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, it appears that petitioner was actually seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage to respondent based on the latter’s psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligations of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.

Petitioner attributes the filing of the erroneous Complaint before the RTC to her former counsel’s mistake or gross ignorance.19 But even said reason cannot save petitioner’s Complaint from dismissal. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of the counsel in the realm of procedural technique.20 Although this rule is not a hard and fast one and admits of exceptions, such as where the mistake of counsel is so gross, palpable and inexcusable as to result in the violation of his client’s substantive rights,21 petitioner failed to convince us that such exceptional circumstances exist herein.

Assuming for the sake of argument that we can treat the Complaint as one for declaration of nullity based on Article 36 of the Family Code, we will still dismiss the Complaint for lack of merit, consistent with the evidence presented by petitioner during the trial.

Article 36 of the Family Code provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

In Santos v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared that "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.23

The Court laid down the guidelines in resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,24 to wit:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be

resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be a) medically or clinically identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. x x x.

Being accordingly guided by the aforequoted pronouncements in Republic v. Court of Appeals, we scrutinized the totality of evidence presented by petitioner and found that the same was not enough to sustain a finding that respondent was psychologically incapacitated.

Petitioner’s evidence, particularly her and her mother’s testimonies, merely established that respondent left petitioner soon after their wedding to work in Saudi Arabia; that when respondent returned to the Philippines a year and a half later, he directly went to live with his parents in San Jose, Occidental

Mindoro, and not with petitioner in Tondo, Manila; and that respondent also did not contact petitioner at all since leaving for abroad. These testimonies though do not give us much insight into respondent’s psychological state.

Tayag’s psychological report leaves much to be desired and hardly helps petitioner’s cause. It must be noted that Tayag was not able to personally examine respondent. Respondent did not appear for examination despite Tayag’s invitation.25 Tayag, in evaluating respondent’s psychological state, had to rely on information provided by petitioner. Hence, we expect Tayag to have been more prudent and thorough in her evaluation of respondent’s psychological condition, since her source of information, namely, petitioner, was hardly impartial.

Tayag concluded in her report that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder, traceable to the latter’s experiences during his childhood. Yet, the report is totally bereft of the basis for the said conclusion. Tayag did not particularly describe the "pattern of behavior" that showed that respondent indeed had a Narcissistic Personality Disorder. Tayag likewise failed to explain how such a personality disorder made respondent psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband. We emphasize that the burden falls upon petitioner, not just to prove that respondent suffers from a psychological disorder, but also that such psychological disorder renders him "truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."26 Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty," a "refusal," or a "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations.

In this instance, we have been allowed, through the evidence adduced, to peek into petitioner’s marital life and, as a result, we perceive a simple case of a married couple being apart too long, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband falling out of love and distancing or detaching himself as much as possible from his wife.

To be tired and give up on one’s situation and on one’s spouse are not necessarily signs of psychological illness; neither can falling out of love be so labeled. When these happen, the remedy for some is to cut the marital knot to allow the parties to go their separate ways. This simple remedy, however, is not available to us under our laws. Ours is a limited remedy that addresses only a very specific situation – a relationship where no marriage could have validly been concluded because the parties; or where one of them, by reason of a grave and incurable psychological illness existing when the marriage was celebrated, did not appreciate the obligations of marital life and, thus, could not have validly entered into a marriage.271avvphi1

An unsatisfactory marriage is not a null and void marriage. As we stated in Marcos v. Marcos28]:

Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. x x x.

Resultantly, we have held in the past that mere "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitute psychological incapacity.29

As a last-ditch effort to have her marriage to respondent declared null, petitioner pleads abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondent. In a Manifestation and Motion30 dated 21 August 2007 filed before us, petitioner claims that she was informed by one Jacinto Fordonez, who is residing in the same barangay as respondent in Occidental Mindoro, that respondent is living-in with another woman named "Sally."

Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Again, petitioner must be able to establish that respondent’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.31

It remains settled that the State has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Hence, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.32 Presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.33 In the case at bar, petitioner failed to persuade us that respondent’s failure to communicate with petitioner since leaving for Saudi Arabia to work, and to live with petitioner after returning to the country, are grave psychological maladies that are keeping him from knowing and/or complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

We are not downplaying petitioner’s frustration and misery in finding herself shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working. Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The 24 May 2006 Decision and 28 August 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 84471, which affirmed the 9 June 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos City, Branch 85, dismissing petitioner Veronica Cabacungan Alcazar’s Complaint in Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 147824. August 2, 2007.]ROSA YAP PARAS, petitioner, vs. JUSTO J. PARAS, respondent.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p:This case presents another occasion to reiterate this Court's ruling that the Guidelines set forth in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Ronidel Olaviano Molina 1 "do not require that a physician should examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. What is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition." 2 Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, are the (a) Decision 3 dated December 8, 2000 and (b) Resolution 4 dated April 5, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915, entitled "Rosa Yap-Paras, Plaintiff-Appellant vs. Justo J. Paras, Defendant-Appellee." EDcICTOn May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (+), Cindy Rose (+), Dahlia, and Reuel. HIAESCTwenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993, Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo, under Article 36 of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances: HcDATC(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction;(b) he lived with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and(d) he has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. CaEISTTo substantiate her charges, Rosa offered documentary and testimonial evidence. AIcECSThis is her story. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. 5 He courted her, frequently spending time at her "Botica." 6 Eventually, in 1964, convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. 7 EHSAaDAfter the wedding, she and Justo spent one (1) week in Davao for their honeymoon. 8 Upon returning to Bindoy, they resided at her parents' house. It was their residence for three (3) years until they were able to build a house of their own. 9 For the first five (5) years of their marriage, Justo did not support her and their children because he shouldered his sister's schooling. 10 Consequently, she was the one who spent for all their family needs, using the income from her "Botica" and store. 11 CSTEHIJusto lived the life of a bachelor. 12 His usual routine was to spend time with his "barkadas" until the wee hours of the morning. Oftentimes, he would scold her when she sent for him during lunchtime. 13 He also failed to provide for their children's well-being. 14 Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was

electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. 15 To cope with the death of the children, the entire family went to the United States. Her sisters supported them throughout their two-year stay there. However, after three months, Justo abandoned them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica" and other businesses heavy in debt. She then realized Justo was a profligate. At one time, he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. 16 At other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of charge. DaACIHShe endured all of Justo's shortcomings, but his act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after her (Rosa) and Justo's deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras. 17 As expected, Justo has a different version of the story. ADECcIHe met Rosa upon his return to Bindoy after taking the bar examinations in Manila. 18 He frequently spent time in her store. 19 Believing he loved her, he courted her and later on, they became sweethearts. In 1963, they decided to get married. However, it was postponed because her family demanded a dowry. Their marriage took place in 1964 upon his mother's signing a deed of conveyance involving 28 hectares of coconut land in favor of Rosa. 20 AICTcEHe blamed the subsequent dissipation of their assets from the slump of the price of sugar and not to his alleged profligacy. 21 Due to his business ventures, he and Rosa were able to acquire a 10-room family house, expand their store, establish their gasoline station, and purchase several properties. He also denied forging her signature in one mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank's authorized employee. 22 ATHCDaAs to their marital relationship, he noticed the change in Rosa's attitude after her return from the United States. She became detached, cold, uncaring, and overly focused on the family's businesses. 23 He tried to reach her but Rosa was steadfast in her "new attitudinal outlook." Before other people, he merely pretended that their relationship was blissful. 24 ICTacDHe did not abandon his family in the United States. It happened that they only had tourist visas. When they were there, their children's tourist visas were converted into study visas, permitting them to stay longer. For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he immediately returned to the Philippines. 25 CAETcHHe spent for his children's education. At first, he resented supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give them financial support because of his lack of income. 26 CScaDHWhat caused the inevitable family break-out was Rosa's act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him of her lack of concern. 27 This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area. 28 IcESDAAs to the charge of concubinage, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching Leccioness is not his daughter. cSHIaAAfter trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; 29 (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; 30 and (c) the charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. 31 The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the celebration of their marriage. 32 And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage. 33 TAcSaCJusto interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals. CAcDTIIn the interim, Rosa filed with this Court a petition for disbarment against Justo, docketed as A.C. No. 5333, premised on the same charges alleged in her complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage. On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa's signature in bank

documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of law, thus: ITEcADIn the light of the foregoing, respondent is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of falsifying his wife's signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1) YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondent's record as an attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned. HTCAEDSO ORDERED.On December 8, 2000 or nearly two months after this Court promulgated the Decision in A.C. No. 5333, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that "the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of marriage." It ruled that Justo's alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the evidence," thus: SICaDACertainly, we cannot ignore what is extant on the record — first, the income which supported their children came from the earnings of their conjugal properties and not singularly from Rosa's industry; second, Justo gave his share of the support to his children in the form of allowances, albeit smaller than that derived from the conjugal property; third, he was booted out from their conjugal dwelling after he lost his bid for re-election and as such did not voluntarily abandon his home; and fourth, although unjustifiable in the eyes of the law and morality, Justo's alleged infidelity came after he was driven out of his house by Rosa. . . . aSADICThe Court of Appeals likewise held that Rosa's inability to offer the testimony of a psychologist is fatal to her case, being in violation of the tenets laid down by this Court in Molina. 34 Thus, she failed to substantiate her allegation that Justo is psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. 35 CacISARosa filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari. EHSIcTRosa contends that this Court's factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings. Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May 1993, well before this Court's pronouncement in Molina relied upon by the Court of Appeals. She states that she could have presented an expert to prove the root cause of Justo's psychological incapacity had she been required to do so. For relief, she prays that her marriage with Justo be annulled on the bases of the Court's conclusive factual findings in A.C. No. 5333; or in the alternative, remand this case to the court a quo for reception of expert testimony in the interest of due process. ADECcIIn his comment on the petition, Justo asserts that the present case is a "new matter completely foreign and removed" from A.C. No. 5333; hence, the factual findings of this Court therein are not conclusive on this case. Besides, no hearing was conducted in A.C. No. 5333 as it was decided merely on the bases of pleadings and documents. HIETAcThe parties' opposing contentions lead us to the following three (3) vital issues: ACTISEfirst, whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case; SaCIDTsecond, whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of Justo's alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and AaITCHthird, whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo. DSAICaThe petition is bereft of merit.IWhether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case.Rosa, sad to say, had made much ado about nothing. A reading of the Court of Appeals' Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. The pertinent portion of the Decision reads: HIaTCcApplying these parameters to the sifted evidence, we find that even if we assume Justo's alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are true, such traits are at best

indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father. However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he was truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, they do not necessarily show 'incurability', such that while his acts violated the covenants of marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage in the future. 36 HEacDAThe Court of Appeals pointed this out in its Resolution denying Rosa's motion for reconsideration, thus: HEASaCEven as we are fully cognizant of the findings of the Supreme Court in the disbarment case appellant filed against her husband, namely, appellee's falsification of documents to obtain loans and his infidelity, these facts, by themselves, do not conclusively establish appellee's psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the Family Code. In fact, we already went as far as to presume the existence of such seeming depravities in appellee's character in our earlier judgment. However, as we emphasized in our Decision, the existence of such eventualities is not necessarily conclusive of an inherent incapacity on the part of appellee to discern and perform the rudiments of marital obligations as required under Article 36. 37 ITCcADClearly, Rosa's insistence that the factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 be considered "conclusive" on the present case is unmeritorious. The Court of Appeals already "went as far as to presume the existence" of Justo's depravities, however, even doing so could not bring about her (Rosa's) desired result. As Rosa's prayer for relief suggests, what she wants is for this Court to annul her marriage on the bases of its findings in A.C. No. 5333. 38 Obviously, she is of the impression that since her charges in A.C. No. 5333 were found to be true, justifying the suspension of Justo from the practice of law, the same charges are also sufficient to prove his psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations. ScaATDHer premise is of course non-sequitur. TAIDHaJurisprudence abounds that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. 39 The Court's exposition in In re Almacen 40 is instructive, thus: cdasia. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor. CHIaTcAccordingly, one's unfitness as a lawyer does not automatically mean one's unfitness as a husband or vice versa. 41 The yardsticks for such roles are simply different. This is why the disposition in a disbarment case cannot be conclusive on an action for declaration of nullity of marriage. While Rosa's charges sufficiently proved Justo's unfitness as a lawyer, however, they may not establish that he is psychologically incapacitated to perform his duties as a husband. In the disbarment case, "the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such." Its purpose is "to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court." On the other hand, in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage based on the ground of psychological incapacity, the question for determination is whether the guilty party suffers a grave, incurable, and pre-existing mental incapacity that renders him truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants. Its purpose is to free the innocent party from a meaningless marriage. In this case, as will be seen in the following discussion, Justo's acts are not sufficient to conclude that he is psychologically incapacitated, albeit such acts really fall short of what is expected from a lawyer.

IIWhether a remand of this case to theRTC is necessary.The presentation of an expert witness to prove psychological incapacity has its origin in Molina. 42 One of the Guidelines set forth therein states: EcICSA(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. HCTaASIn the 2000 case of Marcos v. Marcos, 43 the Court clarified that the above Guideline does not require that the respondent should be examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of the nullity of marriage. What is important is "the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition." cAECSTInterestingly, in the same year (2000) that Marcos was decided, the Court backtracked a bit when it held in Republic v. Dagdag 44 that, "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts" and this requirement was not deemed complied with where no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified on the alleged psychological incapacity of one party. EITcaHSignificantly, the New Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 45 promulgated by this Court on March 15, 2003, geared towards the relaxation of the requirement of expert opinion. Section 2, paragraph (d) states: cEHSTC(d) What to allege. — A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its celebration. aIcDCAThe complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged. HSIaATIn Barcelona v. Court of Appeals, 46 this Court categorically explained that under the New Rules, a petition for declaration of nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code need not allege expert opinion on the psychological incapacity or on its root cause. What must be alleged are the physical manifestations indicative of said incapacity. The Court further held that the New Rules, being procedural in nature, apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their adoption. EaHcDSLater, in 2005, the Court reiterated the Marcos doctrine in Republic v. Iyoy. 47 Thus: SETaHCA later case, Marcos v. Marcos, further clarified that there is no requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer necessary to allege expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Such psychological incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence presented during the trial. prcdSignificantly, the present case is exactly akin to Pesca v. Pesca. 48 Pesca stemmed from a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 filed by a battered wife sometime in April 1994. The trial court, in its Decision dated November 15, 1995, decreed the marriage void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of the husband. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's Decision, applying the Guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals 49 and Molina. 50 When the matter was brought to this Court, the wife argued that Santos and Molina should not have retroactive application, the Guidelines being merely advisory and not mandatory in nature. She submitted that the proper application of Santos and Molina warranted only a remand of her case to the trial court for further proceedings, not a dismissal. The Court declined to remand Pesca 51 on the premise that the Santos and Molina Guidelines "constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted," thus: cASTEDThe 'doctrine of stare decisis,' ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the

settled legal maxim — 'legis interpretado legis vim obtinet' that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The interpretation or construction placed by the courts establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law. The latter as so interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of 'lex prospicit, non replicit.' HEITADThe Court then opted to examine the evidence. It affirmed that the wife failed, both in her allegations in the complaint and in her evidence, to make out a case of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. The Court then concluded that "emotional immaturity and irresponsibility" cannot be equated with psychological incapacity. CDAHITApplying the foregoing cases, Marcos, Barcelona, Iyoy, and Pesca, to the instant case, there is no reason to remand it to the trial court. The records clearly show that there is sufficient evidence to establish the psychological condition of Justo. cESDCaIIIWhether the totality of evidence in the caseshows psychological incapacity on the part of Justoas to justify the declaration of nullity of marriage.The last issue left for this Court's consideration is whether the totality of the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity on the part of Justo so as to justify the dissolution of the marriage in question. DaTICEAt this juncture, it is imperative that the parties be reminded of the State's policy on marriage. Article XV of the Constitution mandates that: TIADCcSEC. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development. AaSHEDSEC. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. acSECTThis State policy on the inviolability of marriage has been enshrined in Article 1 of the Family Code which states that: AaEcDSART. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union, between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law, and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. IcDHaTGiven the foregoing provisions of constitutional and statutory law, this Court has held fast to the position that any doubt as to the validity of a marriage is to be resolved in favor of its validity. 52 Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. ACTISEOf course, the law recognizes that not all marriages are made in heaven. Imperfect humans more often than not create imperfect unions. Thus, when the imperfection is psychological in nature and renders a person incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, the State provides refuge to the aggrieved spouse under Article 36 of the Family Code which reads: HSTCcDART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. SECATHIn Molina, 53 the Court laid down the Guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36, thus: DAcaIE(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. . . . . AaCTcI(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under

the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists. SCIcTD(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. cDaEAS(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage. DTSaIc(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage. cDCaTH(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision. cADSCT(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. EACTSH(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. IASEcaThe foregoing Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements mandated by the Court in Santos, 54 to reiterate: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. CacEIDA review of the complaint, as well as the testimonial and documentary evidence, shows that Rosa's main grounds in seeking the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Justo are his infidelity, profligacy which includes the falsification of her signature in one of the loan documents, failure to support the children, and abandonment of the family. Both the courts below found the charges unsubstantiated and untrue. However, this Court, in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment, found the evidence sufficient to support Rosa's charges of sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, and abandonment of family, thus: cDAEIHON THE CHARGE OF FALSIFICATION OF COMPLAINANT'S SIGNATUREThe handwriting examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation on the signatures of complainant Rosa Yap Paras and respondent Justo de Jesus Paras vis-à-vis the questioned signature "Rosa Y. Paras" appearing in the questioned bank loan documents, contracts of mortgage and other related instrument, yielded the following results: SaCIDTCONCLUSION:1. The questioned and the standard sample signatures JUSTO J. PARAS were written by one and the same person.2. The questioned and the standard sample signatures ROSA YAP PARAS were not written by one and the same person. (Annex "B", Rollo, p. 26, emphasis ours;) TCHEDAThe NBI did not make a categorical statement that respondent forged the signatures of complainant. However, an analysis of the above findings lead to no other conclusion than that the questioned or falsified signatures of complainant Rosa Y. Paras were authored by respondent as said falsified signatures were the

same as the sample signatures of respondent. IAcDETTo explain this anomaly, respondent presented a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) executed in his favor by complainant to negotiate for an agricultural or crop loan from the Bais Rural Bank of Bais City. Instead of exculpating respondent, the presence of the SPA places him in hot water. For if he was so authorized to obtain loans from the banks, then why did he have to falsify his wife's signatures in the bank loan documents? The purpose of an SPA is to especially authorize the attorney-in-fact to sign for and on behalf of the principal using his own name. ACcHIaON THE CHARGE OF IMMORALITY AND CONCUBINAGEThe evidence against respondent is overwhelming. The affidavit-statements of his children and three other persons who used to work with him and have witnessed the acts indicative of his infidelity more than satisfy this Court that respondent has strayed from the marital path. The baptismal certificate of Cyndee Rose Paras where respondent was named as the father of the child (Annex "J", Rollo, p. 108); his naming the child after his deceased first-born daughter Cyndee Rose; and his allowing Jocelyn Ching and the child to live in their house in Dumaguete City bolster the allegation that respondent is carrying on an illicit affair with Ms. Ching, the mother of his illegitimate child. SDEITCWhile this Court is convinced that the charges hurled against Justo by Rosa, such as sexual infidelity, falsification of her signature, abandonment and inadequate support of children, are true, nonetheless, there is nothing in the records showing that they were caused by a psychological disorder on his part. In other words, the totality of the evidence is not sufficient to show that Justo is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. ECcaDTThe records indicate that the marriage between the parties had a good start, resulting in the birth of their four (4) children. The early days of their cohabitation were blissful and harmonious. Justo was deeply in love with Rosa, even persuading his mother to give her a dowry. They were able to build a 10-room family home and acquire several properties, thus, proving themselves to be responsible couple. Even Rosa admitted that Justo took care of their children when they were young. Unfortunately, the passage of time appeared to have taken its toll on their relationship. The acts committed by Justo appeared to have been the result of irreconcilable differences between them caused by the death of their two (2) children and financial difficulties due to his failure to win the mayoralty election and to sustain his law practice. Furthermore, the superior business acumen of Rosa, as well as the insolent attitude of her family towards Justo, busted his ego and lowered his self-esteem. SECHIAThere is no evidence that Justo's "defects" were present at the inception of the marriage. His "defects" surfaced only in the latter years when these events took place; their two children died; he lost in the election; he failed in his business ventures and law practice; and felt the disdain of his wife and her family. Surely, these circumstances explain why Rosa filed the present case only after almost 30 years of their marriage. HTSIEaEqually important is that records fail to indicate that Justo's "defects" are incurable or grave. EScaITThe following catena of cases provides an adequate basis why the marriage between Justo and Rosa should not be annulled. TEcHCAIn Dedel v. Court of Appeals 55 which involved a promiscuous wife who left her family to live with one of her many paramours, this Court ruled that the acts of sexual infidelity and abandonment do not constitute psychological incapacity absent a showing of the presence of such promiscuity at the inception of the marriage, thus: DSCIEa. . . In this case, respondent's sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or physically ill to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. It appears that respondent's promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is, in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed in church rites, and which produced four children. CaDSHERespondent's sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. HADTECIn Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, 56 the wife's inability to conceive led her husband to other women so he could fulfill his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. This Court ruled that this is not a manifestation of psychological incapacity in the contemplation of the Family Code. In Choa v. Choa, 57

this Court declared that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity. And, again, in Iyoy, 58 a Filipina left her husband, married an American and had a family by him, which she flaunted to her former husband. This Court ruled that these acts, while embarrassing and hurting to the latter, did not satisfactorily establish a serious or grave psychological or mental defect of an incurable nature present at the time of marriage; and that irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity, and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment per se do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36. SECATHWhat is clear in this case is a husband who has gone astray from the path of marriage because of a conflicting relationship with his wife and her family and repeated life's setbacks. While these do not justify his sins, they are not sufficient to establish that he is psychologically incapacitated. CDcHSaIt is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and assume the basic marital obligations, not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. 59 As this Court repeatedly declares, Article 36 of the Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes thereof manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code. 60 ESDcIANeither should Article 36 be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, sexual infidelity, and abandonment, and the like. At best the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void. 61 cSEDTCIn sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals. While this Court commiserates with Rosa's plight, however, it has no choice but to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex.WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 49915 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. aIAEcDSO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 167523. June 27, 2008.]NILDA V. NAVALES, petitioner, vs. REYNALDO NAVALES, respondent. *

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 which affirmed the Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 dated January 2, 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of Reynaldo and Nilda Navales on the ground of psychological incapacity. CIAHaTThe facts are as follows:Reynaldo Navales (Reynaldo) and Nilda Navales (Nilda) met in 1986 in a local bar where Nilda worked as a waitress. The two became lovers and Nilda quit her job, managed a boarding house owned by her uncle and studied Health Aide financed by Reynaldo. Upon learning that Nilda's uncle was prodding her to marry an American, Reynaldo, not wanting to lose her, asked her to marry him. This, despite his knowledge that Nilda was writing her penpals and was asking money from them and that she had an illegitimate son by a man whose identity she did not reveal to him. 3 The two got married on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Trial Court Judge of San Fernando, Cebu. 4 Reynaldo claims that during the first year of their marriage, their relationship went well. Problems arose, however, when Nilda started selling RTWs and cosmetics, since she could no longer take care of him and attend to household chores. 5 Things worsened when she started working as an aerobics instructor at the YMCA, where, according to Reynaldo, Nilda's flirtatiousness and promiscuity recurred. She wore tight-fitting outfits, allowed male clients to touch her body, and introduced herself as single. Reynaldo received phone calls from different men looking for Nilda. There was also a time when Nilda chose to ride with another man instead of Reynaldo; and another when Nilda went home late, riding in the car of the man who kissed her. Reynaldo also claims that Nilda refused to have a child with him, as it would destroy her figure. 6 On June 18, 1992, Reynaldo left Nilda and never reconciled with her again. 7 DISTcHOn August 30, 1999, Reynaldo filed a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage and

Damages before the RTC, Toledo City, Cebu, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799 claiming that his marriage with Nilda did not cure Nilda's flirtatiousness and sexual promiscuity, and that her behavior indicates her lack of understanding and appreciation of the meaning of marriage, rendering the same void under Article 36 of the Family Code. 8 Reynaldo testified in support of his petition and presented telephone directories showing that Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" instead of "Navales". 9 Reynaldo also presented Josefino Ramos, who testified that he was with Reynaldo when Reynaldo first met Nilda at the bar called "Appetizer", and that he (Ramos) himself was attracted to Nilda since she was sexy, beautiful, and jolly to talk with. 10 Reynaldo also presented Violeta Abales, his cousin, who testified that she was a vendor at the YMCA where Nilda worked and was known by her maiden name; that she knows Nilda is sexy and wears tight fitting clothes; that her companions are mostly males and she flirts with them; and that there was one time that Reynaldo fetched Nilda at YMCA but Nilda went with another man, which angered Reynaldo. 11 Finally, Reynaldo presented Leticia Vatanagul, a Clinical Psychologist and Social Worker who drafted a Psychological Assessment of Marriage dated March 28, 2001. 12 In said Assessment, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from anti-social personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nilda's psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. 13 Nilda, for her part, claims that Reynaldo knew that she had a child before she met him, yet Reynaldo continued courting her; thus, their eventual marriage. 14 She claims that it was actually Reynaldo who was linked with several women, who went home very late, kept his earnings for himself, and subjected her to physical harm whenever she called his attention to his vices. She worked at the YMCA to cope with the needs of life, and she taught only female students. Reynaldo abandoned her for other women, the latest of whom was Liberty Lim whom she charged, together with Reynaldo, with concubinage. 15 Nilda presented a certification from the YMCA dated October 17, 2001 stating that she was an aerobics instructress for a program that was exclusively for ladies, 16 as well as a statement of accounts from PLDT showing that she used her married name, Nilda B. Navales. 17 EaHcDSOn January 2, 2002, the RTC rendered its Decision disposing as follows:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in the above-entitled case declaring defendant Nilda B. Navales as psychologically incapacitated to fulfill her marital obligations with plaintiff Reynaldo V. Navales and further declaring their marriage contracted on December 29, 1988, before the Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of San Fernando, Cebu, as null and void. 18 The RTC held that:. . . From the testimonies and evidences . . . adduced, it was clearly established that the defendant had no full understanding of [the] effects of marriage and had no appreciation of [the] consequences of marriage as shown by her . . . act of concealing her marital status by using her maiden name "Nilda T. Bacon", augmenting her pretense of being still single through the telephone directories; by her refusal to accompany with [sic] her husband despite of the latter's insistence, but rather opted to ride other man's jeep, whose name her husband did not even know; by her act of allowing a man other than her husband to touch her legs even in her husband's presence; by allowing another man to kiss her even in the full view of her husband; by preferring to loss [sic] her husband rather than losing her job as aerobic instructress and on top of all, by refusing to bear a child fathered by her husband because it will destroy her figure, is a clear indication of the herein defendant's psychological incapacity. 19 Nilda filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the RTC denied on April 10, 2002. 20 The CA dismissed Nilda's appeal, ruling that the RTC correctly held that Nilda concealed her marital status, as shown by the telephone listings in which Nilda used her maiden name; that nymphomania, the condition which the expert said Nilda was afflicted with, was a ground for psychological incapacity; and that the RTC correctly gave weight to the four pieces of testimonial evidence presented by Reynaldo vis-à-vis the lone testimony of Nilda. 21 CSTcEINilda now comes before the Court alleging that:IThe petitioner is not psychologically incapacitated to comply [with] her marital obligations as a wife.IIPsychological incapacity, if ever existing, of the wife is NOT PERMANENT or INCURABLE and was NEVER EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE CELEBRATION OF MARRIAGE.IIIThe petitioner is not a nymphomaniac.

IVThe effort of herein petitioner into the case shows that she is consciously and nobly preserving and continue to believe that marriage is inviolable rather [sic].VThe guidelines of Molina case in the application of Article 36 of the New Family Code has not been strictly complied with. 22 Nilda claims that she did not fail in her duty to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity; that she never had any illicit relationship with any man; that no case for inchastity was initiated by Reynaldo against her, and that it was actually Reynaldo who had a pending case for concubinage. 23 She questions the lower courts' finding that she is a nymphomaniac, since she was never interviewed by the expert witness to verify the truth of Reynaldo's allegations. There is also not a single evidence to show that she had sexual intercourse with a man other than her husband while they were still living together. 24 IHTASaNilda also avers that the guidelines in Republic of the Philippines. v. Molina 25 were not complied with. The RTC resolved the doubt on her motive for using her maiden name in the telephone directory in favor of the dissolution of the marriage instead of its preservation. The expert opinion was given weight, even though it was baseless to establish that petitioner had psychological incapacity to comply with her marital obligations as a wife; and that, assuming that such incapacity existed, it was already existing at the time of the marriage; and that such incapacity was incurable and grave enough to bring about the disability of the wife to assume the essential obligations of marriage. 26 Reynaldo, for his part, argues that while the petition is captioned as one under Rule 45, it is actually a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, since it impleads the CA as respondent and alleges that the CA acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. 27 Reynaldo also claims that the issues raised by Nilda necessarily require a review of the factual findings of the lower courts, which matters have already been decided and passed upon, and factual findings of the courts a quo are binding on this Court; that only questions of law may be raised before this Court; that the RTC, in reaching its decision, complied with the requirements of Molina; that the Solicitor General was represented by the City Prosecutor of Toledo City; and that Reynaldo discharged the burden of proof to show the nullity of his marriage to Nilda.Reynaldo further averred that he testified on his behalf; presented corroborating witnesses, one of whom is an expert clinical psychologist, as well as documentary evidence in support of his cause of action; that Molina did not require that the psychologist examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated; that Nilda did not rebut the psychologist's findings and did not present her own expert to disprove the findings of Vatanagul; that Nilda's psychological incapacity, caused by nymphomania, was duly proven to have been existing prior to and at the time of her marriage to Reynaldo and to have become manifest during her marriage, based on the testimonies of Reynaldo and his witnesses; and that such incapacity was proven to be incurable, as shown by the report of Vatanagul. 28 cDAITSNilda filed a Reply, and both parties filed their respective memoranda reiterating their arguments. 29 Simply stated, the issue posed before the Court is whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nilda's psychological incapacity.The answer, contrary to the findings of the RTC and the CA, is in the negative.Preliminarily, let it be stressed that it is the policy of our Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the family. 30 The Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. 31 The Family Code under Article 48 32 therefore requires courts to order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned, in cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, to appear on behalf of the State in order to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Indeed, only the active participation of the Public Prosecutor or the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) will ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment and declarations of nullity of marriage by preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence. 33 While the guidelines in Molina requiring the OSG to issue a certification on whether or not it is agreeing or objecting to the petition for annulment has been dispensed with by A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, 34 still, Article 48 mandates the appearance and active participation of the State through the fiscal or the prosecuting attorney. 35 DTCSHAIn this case, contrary to the assertion of the RTC that the OSG actively participated in the case through the

Office of the City Prosecutor, records show that the State's participation consists only of the Report dated November 29, 1999 by Assistant City Prosecutor Gabriel L. Trocio, Jr. stating that no collusion exists between the parties; 36 the OSG's Opposition to the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated June 2, 2000; 37 and the cross-examination conducted by Prosecutor Trocio on Reynaldo 38 and his witness Abales. 39 There were no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. Considering the interest sought to be protected by the aforestated rules, the Court finds the State's participation in this case to be wanting. 40 But even on the merits, the Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by Reynaldo, contrary to its appreciation by the RTC and the CA, is insufficient to sustain a finding that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated.Generally, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the CA, are binding on this Court. Such principle however is not absolute, such as when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case; run contrary to the admissions of the parties; fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts. 41 Such is the case at bar.Psychological incapacity, in order to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 42 of the Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady that is so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated traits associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intention of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 43 TacSAEIn Santos v. Court of Appeals, 44 the Court held that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. 45 In Republic of the Philippines v. Molina, 46 the Court further set forth guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, thus:1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. . . .2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestation and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known that obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's". The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto. EDcICT4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. . . . .5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations

essential to marriage.6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. . . . . 47 In this case, Reynaldo and his witnesses sought to establish that Nilda was a flirt before the marriage, which flirtatiousness recurred when she started working as an aerobics instructress. The instances alleged by Reynaldo, i.e., the occasion when Nilda chose to ride home with another man instead of him, that he saw Nilda being kissed by another man while in a car, and that Nilda allowed other men to touch her body, if true, would understandably hurt and embarrass him. Still, these acts by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. TIADCcArticle 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. 48 Mere "difficulty", "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of marital obligations or "ill will" on the part of the spouse is different from "incapacity" rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. 49 Indeed, irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. 50 As admitted by Reynaldo, his marriage with Nilda was not all that bad; in fact, it went well in the first year of their marriage. As in other cases, an admission of a good and harmonious relationship during the early part of the marriage weakens the assertion of psychological defect existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage which deprived the party of the ability to assume the essential duties of marriage and its concomitant responsibilities. 51 In determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, the same must be read in conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from, Articles 35, 52 37, 53 38 54 and 41 55 of the Family Code that would likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio; or Article 45 that would make the marriage merely voidable; or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. 56 These various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter. 57 Indeed, Article 36 should not be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like. 58 Reynaldo presented telephone directories in which Nilda used her maiden name "Bacon" to prove that Nilda represented herself as single. As noted by the CA, however, the telephone listings presented by Reynaldo were for the years 1993 to 1995, 59 after Reynaldo admittedly left Nilda on June 18, 1992. Apart from Reynaldo and Abalales's testimony, therefore, Reynaldo has no proof that Nilda represented herself as single while they were still living together. The Court cannot agree with the RTC, therefore, that said telephone listings show that Nilda represented herself to be single, which in turn manifests her lack of understanding of the consequences of marriage. CIaHDcReynaldo also presented Clinical Psychologist Vatanagul to bolster his claim that Nilda is psychologically incapacitated. While it is true that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality, 60 and that there is no requirement that the defendant spouse be personally examined by a physician or psychologist before the nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity may be declared, 61 still, the root cause of the psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness, its incapacitating nature fully explained, 62 and said incapacity established by the totality of the evidence presented during trial. 63 The Court finds that the psychological report presented in this case is insufficient to establish Nilda's psychological incapacity. In her report, Vatanagul concluded that Nilda is a nymphomaniac, an emotionally immature individual, has a borderline personality, has strong sexual urges which are incurable, has complete denial of her actual role as a wife, has a very weak conscience or superego, emotionally immature, a social deviant, not a good wife as seen in her infidelity on several occasions, an alcoholic, suffers from anti-social personality disorder, fails to conform to social norms, deceitful, impulsive, irritable and aggresive, irresponsible and vain. 64 She further defined "nymphomia" as a psychiatric disorder that

involves a disturbance in motor behavior as shown by her sexual relationship with various men other than her husband. 65 The report failed to specify, however, the names of the men Nilda had sexual relationship with or the circumstances surrounding the same. As pointed out by Nilda, there is not even a single proof that she was ever involved in an illicit relationship with a man other than her husband. Vatanagul claims, during her testimony, that in coming out with the report, she interviewed not only Reynaldo but also Jojo Caballes, Dorothy and Lesley who were Reynaldo's sister-in-law and sister, respectively, a certain Marvin and a certain Susan. 66 Vatanagul however, did not specify the identities of these persons, which information were supplied by whom, and how they came upon their respective informations. Indeed, the conclusions drawn by the report are vague, sweeping and lack sufficient factual bases. As the report lacked specificity, it failed to show the root cause of Nilda's psychological incapacity; and failed to demonstrate that there was a "natal or supervening disabling factor" or an "adverse integral element" in Nilda's character that effectively incapacitated her from accepting, and thereby complying with, the essential marital obligations, and that her psychological or mental malady existed even before the marriage. 67 Hence, the Court cannot give weight to said assessment.The standards used by the Court in assessing the sufficiency of psychological reports may be deemed very strict, but that is only proper in view of the principle that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital vinculum. 68 cCSEaAReynaldo also claims that Nilda does not want to get pregnant which allegation was upheld by the trial court. A review of the records shows, however, that apart from the testimony of Reynaldo, no other proof was presented to support such claim. Mere allegation and nothing more is insufficient to support such proposition. As petitioner before the trial court, it devolves upon Reynaldo to discharge the burden of establishing the grounds that would justify the nullification of the marriage. 69 While Reynaldo and Nilda's marriage failed and appears to be without hope of reconciliation, the remedy, however, is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. A marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is not a null and void marriage. 70 And this Court, even as the highest one, can only apply the letter and spirit of the law, no matter how harsh it may be. 71 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76624 promulgated on February 16, 2005 and the Decision dated January 2, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59 of Toledo City, in Civil Case No. T-799 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage and damages, docketed as Civil Case No. T-799, is DISMISSED. Costs against respondent. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997.]REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J p:The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code. Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, 3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.The FactsThis case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition

alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church 4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:"1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife."Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.The IssueIn his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is anathema to our culture."In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied 5 5a heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added its own opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family rights . . .." It concluded that:"As a ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychological incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made."Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the

marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."The Court's RulingThe petition is meritorious.In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila, 7 Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness.The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could not get along with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified: 8 "COURTQ It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?A Yes, Your Honor.Q There is no hope for the marriage?A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other parties?A Yes, Your Honor.Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions."In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part and of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectation is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved. lexlibDuring its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts in interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz, 9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution

at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature." 14 Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi

contemplated under Canon 1095.In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000.]IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled. nullified or terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter, respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy Invoking the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal vs. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated December 29, 1998. 1 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied. TAcDHSHence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code. 2 The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein. 3 It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. 4 It must appear not only that the civil crime involves facts upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal case. 5 Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether or not the latter action may proceed. 6 Its two essential elements are: 7 (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit. AHDaETArticle 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. 8 Whether or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided all its elements concur — two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material time of the first marriage. 9 In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his

cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of the absence of a requisite — usually the marriage license and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova: 10 (P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. SEIaHTRespondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and wife for at least five years. 11 The issue in this case is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds." 12 Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists. 13 No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova, 14 he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial question. 15 This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistence of a marriage. TIcAaHIgnorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse. 16 The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code. 17 The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage was contracted rests upon the defense, 18 but that is a matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his, criminal prosecution. As has been discussed above, this cannot be done.In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the second marriage will also be void. 19 The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he contracted his second marriage with petitioner. 20 Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first

marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him. 21 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611. IcDCaTSO ORDERED.