Islam Civil Society (MA Thesis)

8/13/2019 Islam Civil Society (MA Thesis)

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UNIVER TY O HAWAI I LIBRARY

ISLAM CIVIL SOCIETY AND DEMOCRATIZATION :THE

CASEO F

MUHAMMADIY H AND NAHDLATUL ULAMAIN POST-SUHARTO INDONESIA

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE DIVISION OF THEUNIVERSITY OF HAW Al I IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT

OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ART

IN

POLITICAL SCIENCE

AUGUST 2008

By

Pramono Ubaid Tanthowi

Thesi s Committee:

Ehito Kimura ChairpersonManfred Henning senBenedict J . Kerkv liet


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We certifY thatwe have read this thesis and that n our opinion it is satisfactory n

scope and quality as a thesis for the degree o Master o Art n Political Science.

Thesis Committee:

Chairperson: Ehito Kimura

Member: Manfred Henningsen

Member: Benedict J Kerkvliet


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BSTR CT

Mnhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama NU) are two largest Islamic organizations in

Indonesia. Long active as both religious and political organizations during 1950s nd 1960s

they withdrew from formal political arena and declared their disengagement from ny political

parties in the 1970s nd 1980s that enabled them to survive under the repressive Suharto regime

and consequently develop nascent civil society movements.

This thesis examines the relation between those Muslim civil society organizations

and democratization in the post-Suharto Indonesia: how they defend their posi tions as

autonomous entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely invo lve in political arena. t

also studies their roles in the process of democratization.

The study reveals a great deal ahout their participation in the political system where

they re now an impor tant part of he political leadership and their interests are now well

represented. However the problem is that in reality there is a significant degree of overlap

between civil society and political society as well s between civil society and the state.

This study also shows the role of those Muslim civil socie ty organizations in the

democratization process. These mass-based religious organizations seemed to be

consequential in all stages of democratization: they sought to broaden the free public sphere

and combined their efforts along with other pro-democracy movements in de-legitimating

and bringing the authoritarian Suharto regime down. They also join forces in encouraging

politica l participation monitoring the elections forcing the government to be more

accountable and transparent nd spreading the ideas of religious tolerance.

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CKNOWLEDGMENT

This thesis is the product of wo years of study and research on the dynamic

relationship between Islam, civil society, and democratization in post-Suharto Indonesia. It also

flows from over a decade of my personal involvement both in discourse and activism with

Muhammadiyah, the second largest Islamic organization in Indonesia.

There are so many people who have helped me along the completion in one way or

another; they encouraged me, provided guidance, and never lost faith that I would complete this

effort. The warmth and generosity of all of those who helped me during my two years of

research and wri ting continually amazed me, and I apologize to anyone I fail to mention here.

While I cannot list all those th t I am grateful to, several deserve special recognition.

I would like to thank first of all the member of my wonderfully supportive committee:

Ehito Kimura Manfred Henningsen, and en Kerkvliet. They always gave me valuable

comments, challenged me with provoking insights, provided unique perspectives on my

research, and went above and beyond the call of duty to accommodate me in their bnsy

schedules. Thei r meticulons readings of my thesis also saved me from many errors any

remaining ones are my own responsibility). I have greatly enjoyed my interactions with my

committee, and am honored to have had the opportunity to work with them.

My study in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii t

Manoa, including my Graduate Certificate in International Cultural Studies, was made possible

by the East-West Center Graduate Degree Fellowship. I was fortunate to receive financial

support during my years of graduate study from the East-West Center, which was also greatly

instrumental to my fieldworks n Indonesia. In the East-West Center, lowe thanks to Charles

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Morison, Terry Bigalke, Mendl Djunaidy, and Stella Kolinski for their supports. My graduate

study was also supported by some other institutions and individuals. In the Asia Foundation

which provided m with additional funding during my first year low thanks to Douglas

Ramage and Robin Bush. During the second year I received additional financial support from

the American Indonesian Cultural and Educational Foundation (AICEF). I was also fortunate to

receive valuable financial supports from the Central Board ofMuhammadiyah, Pusat Studi

Agama d n Peradahan (pSAP), Kak Din Syamsuddin, Mas Jerne Geovannie, and Mas Rizal

Sukma.

Special thanks also to all who gave me their time and shared their insights in

interviews and other conversations throughout my fieldworks in Indonesia. They not only

infonned me about the political and social activities of he NU and Muhammadiyah in recent

years but also provided me with many of the crucial perspectives and interpretatious ofIslam

and civil society relations in Indonesia on which this study is based. Among those to whom I

owe particular tbanks are uya Syafii Maarif, Kak Din Syamsuddin, yai Hasyim Muzadi, Mas

Haedar Nashlr, Kyai Masdar Mas udi, A.S. Hikam, Mas Rizal Sukma, Eunsook Jung Sukidi,

Izzul Muslimin, Gunawan Hidayat, Ahmad Rofiq, Raja Jull Anthoni, Syaiful Bahri Anshori,

hmad Suaedy, Syafiq Hasyim, Adung Abdurrahman, Zuhairi Misrawi, Muhamad Ali

Achmad Ubaedillah, Saiful Umam, and Lance Nolde.

Above all, I want to th nk my parents who always supported me with their advices

and prayers. Finally, and the most importantly, an enonnous thank you to my wife Herawaty

and my son Risyad Mahdavi Tanthowi who made immense gifts oflove throughout the years I

had been leaving them and simultaneously brought me happiness on even the hardest days. It is

to my wife and my son that I dedicate this work.


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Anshor

ughat

DPR

Fatwa

Golkar

M I

Jjtihad

IMM

IRM

Istoghotsah

JPPR

GLOSS RY

The youth wing ofNU.

A tenn in Islamic law referring to rebellion against a

legitimate ruler who thus deserves the death sentence.

ewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House o Representatives).

Religious edict.

Golongan Karya (Functional Groups), the political

vehicle o he New Order Regime which was established

n 1973 and survives the reform era.

Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam The Islamic Student

Association), the Masyumi-inspired stodent organization.

Vigorous inquiry. The term is then adopted in Islamic law

referring to legal reasoning in response to the newly-

emerged problems.

Ikatan Mahasiswa Mubammadiyah (The Muhanunadiyah

Stodent Association).

Ikatan Remaja Muhammadiyah The Muhammadiyah

Adolescence Association).

A public prayer gathering which is mostly held by the NU

organization.

Jaringan Pendidikan Pernilih untuk Rakyat (the People s

Voter Education Networks).


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KAMMI

hittah

yai

Masyumi

MPR

i l l

Muktamar

P N

Parmusi

PBB

PBR

Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia The United

Action of he Indonesian Muslim Student), the newly

PKS student wing.

Original guideline.

Traditional Islamic scholar which is mostly found n the

NU community.

Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia The Consultative

Council of Indonesian Muslims), the largest Islamic par ty

in 1950s which was established in 1945 and forced to

dismiss n 1960 by Sukamo.

Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat people Consultative

Assembly)

Majelis Ulama Indonesia The Indonesian Council of

Ulemas).

National Congress which is held n the NU and

Mubammadiyah organizations once in every five years.

Partai Amanat Nasional National Mandate Party), the

party of Amien Rais which draws many of its members

from the modernist Musl im camp.

Partai Muslimin Indonesia The Indonesian Muslim

Party).

Partai Bulan Bintang The Crescent and Star Party).

Partai Bintang Reformasi The Reform Star Party)

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PD

PDI-P

esantren

PKB

PKl

PKS

PMII

PPP

Tanwir

Wali

Partai Demokrat The Democrat Party)

Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan The Indonesian

Democratic Party o Struggle).

Islamic boarding school which is mostly run and owned

by kyai ofNU.

Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa The National Awakening

Party), the party o Abdurrahman Wahid which draws

many o its members from the traditionalist Islam camp.

Partai Komunis Indonesia The Indonesian Communist

Party).

Partai Keadilan Sejahtera The Prosperous Justice Party).

Persatuan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia The Indonesian

Islamic Student Union), The NU-affiliated student

organization.

Partai Persatuan Pembangunan The Unity and

Development Party).

Annual meeting n the Muhammadiyah organization.

Protege o God saint.


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i

Politics says:

A is a friend

i s a f o e

akwah rectifies:

is a friend

B is a companion

Politics tends to break up and divide

akwah tends to invite and unite

Ahmad Syafii Maarif, 2006, p. 335)


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Muslim Civil Society and Democratization:

he Case of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul mama n Post Suharto Indonesia

Chapter I Introduction

Civil Society, Islam, and Democratization

Literature Review

Methodology

Structure of he Thesis

Chapter II NU, Mnhammadiyah, and the Origin of Civility

Introduction

The Origins ofMuh ammadiyah and NU

The Involvement ofMuhammadiyah and NU n Politics

Muhammadiyah, NU and Political Disengagement

Muslim Civil Society: Competing Discourses

Conclusion

1

8

8

20

22

4

25

29

39

44

47

Chapter l l Muslim Civil Society and Political Change: Political Development 1998-2007

Introduction 49

Muslim Civil Society, Political Parties, and the 1999 election

The Rise and Fall of President Abdurrahman Wahid

Muslim Civil Society and the 2004 Presidential Election

National Congress and Leadership Change

Musl ims Approaching the 2009 Election

Conclusion

50

60

78

99

4

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Chapter V Muslim Civil Society and Democratization

Introduction 129

The Construction o f Free Public Sphere 13

The Election Monitoring 155

The Corruption Eradication 162

The Last astion o f Civic Pluralism 169

Foreign Donor and State Capacity 189

Conclusion 196

Chapter Concluding Remarks 198

ibliography 2 7

iographical Sketch

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CHAPTER I

INTRODU TION

A. Introduction

For a long time numerous observers and experts of Indonesian affairs seemed to

believe that Islam was peripheral importance in modern Indonesian life. They were convinced

that state and society of Indonesia were thoroughly dominated by nominal Muslims (or

abangan of Javanese ethnicity. The impression was reinforced by the relative scarcity of

academic studies of Islam in Indonesia. Compared with other Muslim countries, Islam in

Indonesia has been little studied. However, since the last decade of he 2th

century, it is no

longer tenable to hold such a view. Most observers now agree that a significant change in the

Indonesian Muslim society has been undergoing. 2 They now believe that since that decade

Indonesia has been experiencing a historically unprecendented Islamic political revival. 3 Not

only do many Indonesia' s most influential Islamic leaders, such as Abdurrahman Wahid and

Amien Rais, once occupied the highest positions in Indonesia' s political system, but Islamic

parties also playa significant role in the political affairs.

Equally important is the significant roles played by Indonesian Muslims in the process

of democratization. The political development in Indonesia since the 1990s has been witnessing

that the Islamic revival and democratization have marched hand in hand under, among others,

the leadership of Muslim democrats. Recent development in Indonesia offers an even more

striking indication of Muslim interest in democracy and civic pluralism. In the final years of the

Hefner, "Introduction", 1997, p. 8.2 Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting 1994, Ch. 7, "Islam: Coming from th Cold?" ; Yatikiotis, lndonesilln

Politics Under Suharto, 1994, Ch. Y, ''Toward an Islamic Identity?"3 Tanthowi, Kebangldtan Politik awn Santri, 2005.

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Suharto dictatorship (1996-98), a powerful movement for a democratic Muslim politics took

shape. In alliance with secular Muslims and non-Muslims, the movement succeeded in May

1998 in toppling the long ruling Suharto. No less remarkable, Muslims participants in the

democracy campaign dedicated themselves to devising religious argnments in support of

pluralism, democracy, women's right, and civil society.4

Unfortunately, the general debate now concerning Muslim communities in Indonesia

has been predominantly shaped by studies on development of Islamic radicalization and

political violence. s This is largely because the glaring process of democratization was soon

blurred by a rash of sectarian violence. For instance, from 1999 to 2002, battles between

Christians and Muslims in Maluku took some eight thousand lives. 6 During roughly the same

period, the central highlands on the nearby island o f Sulawesi saw bloody skirmishes between

Muslim and Christian gangs, causing a thousand deaths. 7 Equally alarming, in the months

following Suharto's fall, radical Islamic groups sprang up in cities across Indonesia.

While political scientists and anthropologists have been much concerned with the

developing some radical Islamic movements, they have paid little attention fur the mainstream

moderate ones, as i hey have lost their standing in the Indonesian Muslim community. Although

these extremist groups have been very vocal and active, however, this concern is not relevant,

because they are small and have very little influence. Admittedly, set against the succession of

weak governments that Indonesia has had since the fall ofSuharto, these groups look very

menacing. The fact remains, however, they are insignificant in number and, without support from

4 See Refuer, Civil Islam 2000; Barton, ''The Origin ofIs1amic Liberalism," 1997; Ramage, Politics inIndonesia, 1995.

S Abuza, Political Islam nd Violence in Indonesia 2007; Hasan Laskar Jihad 2006; Eliraz, Islam InIndonesia, 2004; Barton, Indonesia s Struggle, 2004; Side , Riots Pogroms Jihad, 2006; Yunanto a t aI. MilitantIslamic Movements 2003; Marika and Wright-Neville, Terrorism and Islam in Indonesia, 2005.

6 van Klinken ''The Maluku War," 2001, p. 1-26.7 Aragon, Communal Violence in Poso, " 2001, p. 44-79.

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certain element in the army, they will not be able to go very far with their threats Therefore, rather

than studying certain groups of Indonesian Muslim which are considered as anti-democratic forces

- threatening progress and clashing with the liberal democratic ideals, this thesis nonetheless

examines other groups which are adopts a positive outlook about the role of Islam in Indonesian

society instead

y analyzing the broader phenomenon within Indonesian Muslim community, this

study indicates that the growing religiosity among Indonesia s Muslim will not lead to

significant change in their political attitudes: vast majority of them are personally tolerant and

moderate in their outlook and very few Indonesian Muslim are attracted to Islamism in the

democratic election of 1999 and 2004.

In studying Indonesian politics, the Muhammadiyah and NU organizations are

important for some reasons. They are two largest Indonesia s Islamic organizations, with

approximately 25 and 35 million members respectively. Both organizations represent very

different segments of he Indonesian Muslim population - from a sociological, theological,

socio-economic, and political perspective. In fact, the cleavage between them represents the

primary cleavage in Indonesian Islam, although not mutually exclusive. With a little

simplification, it is said that the NU represents traditional Islamic stream, which is mainly

active in the rura areas. Meanwhile, the Mubammadiyah represents modernist Islamic stream,

which plays their roles in urban areas. Given their strong and overarching organizational

structures, the NU and Mubammadiyah have been playing their important roles in society, but

they do focus primarily on their own constituencies.

The significant of the NU and Muhammadiyah also lies in their political role since

their early developments. Both organizations playa significant role in developing a sense of

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nationalism among native peoples; they also played their role as political forces during the

liberal democratic era in the 1950s: the NU once became a political party when it divorced

from the Islamic Masyumi party n 1952 (until 1984), within which the Muhammadiyah

remained one o (and subsequently became the dominant one among) its special organizational

members from 1945-1959; they also played a crucial role during the political crisis n 1965

1967; and finally both played a significant role in the political change that ended the

authoritarian Suharto regime in 1998. In sum, the Muhammadiyah and NU organization have

been, and remain, important participants in Indonesia's political affairs.

Equally surprising, in studies o civil society in Indonesia during the 1990s and early

20oos, little attention has been shown to these associations. In the growing volume o studies on

Islam and civil society, they may be mentioned in passing but seldom appear to be thought o as

part o civil society themselves, unlike say students' associations, ICMl and issue-oriented

NGOs. Although there are quite a few recent studies ofMubammadiyah and especially ofNU,

most o hese focus on their religious discourse, system o religious education, their national

leaders, or their role in national politics. There has hardly been any comprehensive inquiry on the

specific role these associations play in the intermediary entity, standing between state and society

as a whole, or their roles in the process o democratization.

This thesis presents a study o the Muhammadiyah and NU movements during the

political reform in Indonesia. To begin with, I am going to present a more thorough account on

their roles in practical politics : how they keep their relationships with political parties,

particularly the National Mandate Party (PAN) and the National Awakening Party (PKB), two

parties which not only were established by the Muhammadiyah and NU leaders respectively,

but also whose mass bases largely come from both organizations. t seems to me that both

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organizations sought to steadfastly assert their independence from both parties, at least

formally. Although both parties incorporated non-Muhammadiyah and non-NU as well as non

Muslim figures into their leaderships, many people, however, see both political parties are

invariably inseparable from both organizations.

t is also important to study how they played their roles in the 1999 and 2004 elections

as well as the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organizations. For example,

prior to and during the 2004 presidential election, NU and Mnharnmadiyah played similarly

significant roles. Out of five pairs running for presidential election, two president candidates,

Amien Rais and Harn71lh Haz came from Muhammadiyah and NU backgrounds respectively, and

two vice-president candidates, Hasyim Muzadi and Shalahuddin Wahid, came from NU

organizations. Ahead of he election, not only did both organizations provide a remarkably large

number of votes whose loyalty is relatively guaranteed, they also formed a tacit alliance wit

political parties during the election campaign. his further reflected their ambiguity between retreat

from ''practical politics and keep equal distance to all political parties.

Beside their roles during the political reform, the second aspect I would like to study

is the contribution of hese organizations in the process of democratization, a highly overlooked

subject in scholarly works of Indonesian politics. In a society where religion plays an important

role in public life, as in Indonesia, the role of religion, of religious institutions, and of social

movements that either had a religious identity or were influenced y religion was prominent

since the early democratization process.

Despite the coercive and strict control of he Suharto regime, for example, since early

in the 1990s Mnhammadiyah and NU are not predicated on the privatization of Islam and the

secularization of society, but rather on the self-organization of an autonomous Muslim public

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civil society, able to counteract and countervail state power and willing to promote and defend

a public culture of pluralism, political participation, and social justice. 8 Both also played a

predominant role in the pro-democracy movement that forced President Suharto to step down

in May 1998. While they provided a large number of students and members in mass protests,

their leaders, along with secular and non-Muslim leaders, were especially crucial in mobilizing

them for peaceful protests and demands for democratization.

After the fall of Suharto, both organizations also function to support the development

of political parties by stimulating political participation and increasing the political efficacy and

skill of democratic citizenship. Moreover, thei r young generations worked in concert, along

with other NGOs, in the People 's Voter Education Network (JPPR) not only in monitoring the

1999 and 2004 general and presidential elections in order t ensure their fairness, but also in

promoting an appreciation of the obligations as well as rights of democratic citizenship by

carrying out a massive civic education program.

n a new democracy, both organizations widen their functions to promote the more

substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and accountability of

government. From 2003 t 2006 both worked hand in hand t carry out anti-corruption

programs. As social-religious organizations, however, they do not focus on investigation and

advocacy. They systematically addressed corruption issues by emphasizing their moral

persuasion; developing theological interpretations ofQur'an and Smmah concerning anti

corruption verses; media campaigning; drafting integrity pacts for candidates running in

regional elections; increasing the awareness of regional members of parliament in pro-poor

budgeting; as well as establishing corruption watch dogs in regional level.

8 See Hefuer, A Muslim Civil Society, 1998.

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The most important one, both organizations have been working in maintaining the

pluralistic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Many studies affirmed that Indonesia's

largest Muslim social organizations are significant obstacles to the further growth of Islamism. 9

Not only are their leaders' tolerant and pluralistic views, but their broader memberships also

seemed immune to Islamism's allure. These organizations have grown from the same soil as

Indonesian Islamism, but their roots run considerably deeper, and they have in turn been

enormously successful in entrenching political moderation in Indonesia. Their strength is one

of he gre t causes for hope in Indonesian democracy.

There are two questions I would like to answer from this thesis. Firstly, how the

Mllhammadiyah and Nahdlatul m m organizations maintain their positions as autonomous

entities beyond state and simultaneously intensely involve in politics. Secondly, what role have

these two organizations been playing in the democratization process.

By ''politics'', I refer in the course of this thesis both to political society and state, that

are political parties, election campaign, and government. By democratization, I refer to the

process of political change took place in Indonesia which comprises of hree major phases:

liberalization, transition, and consolidation.

This thesis is an in-depth case study ofMuhammadiyah and NU and their relations with

political society and state in Indonesia. This is not a study about the theological discourse within the

Mllhammadiyah and NU communities. Instead it is all about the behavior, choices, policies, and

strategies adopted by the Mllhammadiyah and NU organizations in their interactions with political

society and state over a period of post-Suharto era. Therefore, this thesis offers a political-historical-

9 See Mujani and Liddle, Politics, Islam and Public Opinion, 2004.

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anthropologiCalperspective on the Muhammadiyahand NU movements: their relations with

politiCal parties and state during the reform era.

Nor is this thesis a comparative study between them; I am not going to compare the

differences and similarities between Muharnmadiyah and NU in their dealing with politics.

Instead, I am going to put them together in this study: how both have been cooperating and

competing each other, how they have been going through their tensions and fraternities, and

how they have been both dealing and instigating their rivalries and cordialities.

B. Civil Society, Islam, nd Democratization

Central to this thesis are some conceptual frameworks regarding the concept of civil

society, democratization, the relation between civil society and democratization, of Islam and

civil society, as well as of religious organization and democratization. n doing so, I may not

propose new definitions and understandings; I am rather going to borrow them from able

theorists and political scientists whose works are prevalent in the field of political science.

There are several ways in which political scientists use and define civil society since

the concept is rather ambiguous and means different things to different people. s Lehmbruch

puts it, Quite often, when 'civil society' is used in the politiCal literature or the media, it is no

longer clear what exactly the respective author has in mind. The denotations of civil society

have undergone significant changes over time and in different contexts. As a consequence, the

meaning in the contemporary discourse is franght with considerable ambiguity . 10

Despite its long intellectual and political history, in this thesis I am largely following

Larry Diamond and his colleagues in defining and distinguishing the concept of civil society. n

his seminal article published more th n a decade ago, Diamond defines the concept as ''the

1 Lehmbruch, Gennany , 2001, p. 230.

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realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, and

autonomous from the state, and bound by a legal order or set of shared rules. II n a similar

vein, according to Linz and Stepan, civil society is arena of the polity where self-organizing

and relatively autonomous groups, movements, and individuals attempt to articulate values, to

create associations and solidarities, and to advance their interests. 12

According to Diamond, civil society is distinct from "society" in general in that it

involves citizens acting collectively in a public sphere to express their interests, passions,

preferences, and ideas, to exchange infonnation, to achieve collective goals, to make demand on the

state, to improve the structure and functioning of he state, and to hold state officials accountable. 3

Similarly, it is lso important to distinct civil society from political society. According to Linz and

Stepan, political society" is an "arena in which political actors compete for the legitimate right to

exercise control over public power and the state apparatus."14

Therefore, according to Diamond, civil society is distinct from political society, which

encompasses all those organized actors whose primarily goal is to win control of the state or at

least some positions for themselves within it. 5 Organizations in civil society, according to

Diamond, may indeed form alliances with parties, but if hey become captured by parties, or

hegemonic within them, they move their primary locns of activity to political society and lose

much of their ability to perform certain unique mediating and democracy-building functions. 6

fter defining the concept of civil society, it is important to understand the concept of

democratization. n this study several terms are used in similar ways: democratization, political

II Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society, 1994, p. 3-17.2 Linz nd Stepan, ''Toward Consolidated Democracies, 1996, p. 14-33.

13 Diamond, eveloping Democracy 1999, p. 221.4 Linz and Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 1996, p. 14-33.5 Diamond, eveloping Democracy 1999, p. 221.6 Diamond, eveloping Democracy 1999, p. 221.

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change, and political reform. While many will take issue with the impreciseness o using these

terms interchangeably, what I am interested in here is the process o political change toward a

more open, accountable, fair political system, and to me this is the essence o democratization.

There are many scholarly works on democratization. The literature that has the most

relevance to this thesis are works that came out in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as scholars

offered explanations o he wave o countries undergoing democratization. 17 While terminology

often differs, there are some common elements in much o his work. n a simplest way, the

democratization process involves three processes: liberalization, transition, and consolidation.

By liberalization, refer to measures which entail a significant opening o he previous

anthoritarian regime. his process could result from either split in the authoritarian regime or

popular mobilization, or could be a result o an interaction between them. Meanwhile, by

transition, O'Donnell and Schmitter define it as the interval between one political regime and

another. 18 They go on to explain that transitions are delimited, on the one side, by the launching

o he process o dissolution o an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation o

some forms o democracy, the return to some forms o authoritarian rule, or the emergence o a

revolutionary alternative. Finally, consolidation, according to Diamond, is ''the process by which

democracy becomes so broadly aud profoundly legitimate among its citizens that it is very

unlikely to break down. 19 n a similar vein, Linz and Stepan note that consolidated democracy is

a political regime in which democracy as a complex system o nstitutions, rules, and patterned

incentives and disincentives has become, ''the only game in town. 20 It involves behavioral and

17 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitionsfrom Authoritarian Rule 1986; Huntington, The Third Wave1991; and Przeworski, Democracy and the Market 1991.

18 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 1986, p. 6.19 Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society, 1994, p. 3-17.2 Linz and Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, 1996, p. 14-33.

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institutional changes that nonnalize democratic politics and narrow its uncertainty. This

nonnalization requires the expansion of citizen access, development of democratic citizenship

and culture, broadening of leadership recruitment and training and the like.

t is important to note that there does not seem t be any logical sequence to these

processes. Democracy activists do admit that it is not inevitable that transitional countries will

move steadily on this assumed path from opening and breakthrough t consolidation.

Transitional countries, they say, can and do go backward or stagnate as well as move forward

along the path. Of the nearly 100 countries considered as transitional in recent years, even

only a relatively small number-probably fewer than 20-are clearly en route to becoming

successful, well-functioning democracies or at least have made some democratic progress and

still enjoy a positive dynamic of democratization. 2 Most of the ''transitional countries,

however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered what

Carothers calls a political gray zone. 22

Keeping these definitions of civil society and democratization in mind, the next

theoretical task is to understand the relation between both concepts. Needless to say, theories of

democratization seek to understand the factors influencing the emergence and success of the

formal properties of modem democracy in particular society. Many scholars come to a

conclnsion that the dynamics of the democratization are not just a matter of political elite. Such

theories are increasingly inclined to attribute a role in democratization to civil society,23 and

this trend is discernible in many part of the world. 24 However, this does not mean that civil

2 See Diamond, Is the Third Wave Over? 1996 p. 20-37.22 Carothers, The End of he Transition PIII8digm 2002.23 O'Donnell and Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule p. 48-56; and Diamond Developing

Democracy p. 218-260.24 Alagappa, Civil Society 2004; and Feinbergalai. (eds), Civil Society 2006

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society alone can produce democracy. Thus, what seems to be important is a balance between

civil society, political society, economic society, and the state, especially on the development

of cultures of social trust and respect for the rule oflaw Civil society, then, is just one factor in

the process of democratization.

Schmitter and Diamond theorize the role of associations in society as contributing to

or articulating the demands and interest of various sectors of the population. s n such a

position, civil society is poised to advance democracy in two generic ways: by helping to

generate a transition from authoritarian rule to electoral democracy and by deepening and

consolidating democracy once it is established.

n fact, Diamond outlines the ten democratic functions of civil society: (1), providing

the basis for the limitation of state power; (2), supplementing the role of political parties in

stimulating political participation; (3), serving as a crucial arena for the development of other

democratic attributes, such as tolerance, moderation, a willingness to compromise, and a

respect for opposing viewpoints; (4), creating channels for the articulation, aggregation, and

representation of nterests; (5), generating a wide range of interests that may cross-cut, and so

mitigate, the principal polarities of political conflict; (6), recruiting and training new political

leaders; (7), monitoring elections: deterring fraud, enhancing voter confidence, affirming the

legitimacy of he result, or demonstrating an opposition victory despite g o v e = e n t fraud; (8),

disseminating information and aiding citizens in the colIective pursuit and defense of their

interests and values; (9), supporting economic reform; and (10), strengthening the democratic

state by giving citizens respect for the state and positive engagement with it. 26

S Schmitter, Civil Society East and West, 1997; and Diamond, Rethinking Civil Society, 1994.26 Diamond, ''Rethinking Civil Society, 1994 p. 7-11.

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Given these theories o civil society, democratization, and the relation between them,

thus, what kind o cultural variation can be accommodated within the scope o civil society and

democratization? Is Islam uniquely different in its resistance to the conditions o civil society

and democratization? Islam is perhaps the prime example o a religious tradition that is widely

considered in the West to be in tension i not outright conflict with the normative tradition o

civil society,27 and contemporary perceptions are now further shaped by the events o

September 11, 2001. n his influential book, Ernest Gellner concludes that Islam is

incompatible with civil society, both normatively and empirically, since Islam is fundamentally

unsecularized. 28 Gellner understands secularization as the declining social significance o

religion. He says that in industrial or industrializing societies religion loses much o its

erstwhile hold over men and society. Where religion remains socially important, argues

Gellner, the development o individual autonomy is constrained. This in turn constrains the

development o civil society because, as Ozda1ga explains, ''individuals, who are not able to act

independently o the community o believers, cannot become the building-stones o he kind o

intermediary organizations on which civil society is built. 29

In the same token, the eminent Turkish Scholar, Serif Mardin, begins by answering ''the

question o whether the ideals o democracy and civil society are genera1isable tothe Muslim

world, with the response that civil society is a Western Dream, a historical aspiration, and as

such, does not translate into Islamic terms. 30 Therefore, in spite o he appearing o aspects o

pluricentric social organization that undexpinned the historic development o civil society in the

West elsewhere in the world, including in Muslim societies, as part o he modernization process,

27 Halliday, Islam and the Myth o Confrontation 199628 Gellner, The Condition o Liberty 1994, p. 15.29 Ozdalga Civil Society and its Enemies, 1997, p. 74.3 Mardin, ''Civil Society and Islam, 1995, p. 278-279.

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Mardin warns that Westem and Muslim "dreams" have not converged, because Muslim societies

have inherited a "collective memory of a total culture which once provided a 'civilized' life of a

tone different from that of the West.''3

There are empirical as well as conceptual reasons to believe that those arguments are

grounded in dubious assumptions. t is interesting to put here the three most relevant of four

challenges to Ge llner 's arguments proposed by David Herbert in his comprehensive study,32

Firstly Herbert argues that Muslim have generated a wide range of responses to the discourses

of democracy and civil society. Indeed, normatively, Muslims have taken up a full range of

positions on the compatibility or incompatibility of he relationship between Islam and both

democracy and civil society. Each position seeks to justify itself in relation to the primary

sources of Islamic law: the Qur an and Sunnah. This reality contradicts the simplistic integraJist

posit ion-the view that Islam insists that all aspects of life should directly governed by its

unchanging precepts-that Gellner attributes to Islam.

Secondly Herbert argues that the historical model on which Gellner bases his

argument applies only to a minority of historic Muslim societies and that the historically

predominant model of Muslim society has been characterized by institutional differentiation. t

is important to note that what is generally conceived of as the Islamic or Muslim countries in

the Arabian Peninsula is in fact home to a small minority of he ummah. Out of the more 1.3

billion Muslim population in the world today, the majority inhabit South and Southeast Asian

regions. There are also a significant number of Muslim populations in Central Asia, West and

North Africa, and, surprisingly, Europe.

3 Mardin, "Civil Society and Islam, 1995, p. 290.32 Herbert, Religion and Civil Society 2003, p. 76-79.

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Political scientists and journalists sometimes misleadingly equate Islam with Arab

culture. They then assert correctly that there are no democracies in the Islamic countries of the

Arab world, leaving the false impression there are no Muslims living under democratic

regimes. In fact, as Stepan points out, a case can be made that about half of all the world's

Muslims, over 600 million, live in democracies, near-democracies, or intermittent

democracies. 33 It seems that Gellner bases his generalization on his studies of Muslim countries

in North Africa. AI a matter of fact, what he claims about that region cannot necessarily be

generaIized to all Muslim countries.

FilUllly Herbert argues that in practice in many parts of he Muslim world today Islam

h s proven itself capable of mobiIization as a public discourse without stifling but rather

contributing to democratic pluralism. Religion, as Esposito points out has been a significant

factor in the reassertion of civil society in many Muslim societies. 34 He argues that Islamic

history provides examples of many non-state actors, institutions, and organizations that served as

intermediaries between the ruler gove=ent and the people. Meanwhile, in the contemporary

Muslim world, NGOs, professional associations, social welfare agencies, as well as educational

and financial institutions have proliferated not only in the most populous Muslim region of

Southeast Asia, 35 but lso across the Muslim world. 36

The last theoretical t sk necessary to this thesis is to understand the relationship

between religious organization and democratization. The literature of democratization mostly

focuses on the role of the middle class, labor unions, election monitoring groups, and other

33 stepan ''Religion, Democracy, 2000.34 Esposito, Islam and Civil Society, 2003 p. 70.35 Nakamura, a t al. (eds.), Islam and Civil Society In Southeast Asia 2001.36 Sajoo (ed.), Civil Society in the Muslim World 2002; Kubba, Arab nd Democracy, 2000.

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NGO institutions in the regime change. However, little attention has been paid to how religious

organizations are affecting democratization.

In is provocative book, Huntington gives primacy o place to Christianity as the

distinctive positive influence in the making o Western civilization: ''Westem Christianity, first

Catholicism and then Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important

characteristic o West em civilization. 37For Huntington, Westem culture's key contribution h s

been the separation o church and state, something th t he sees as foreign to the world's other major

religious systems (Confucianism and Islam).

In this regard, Stepan and Casanova warn us not to be trapped in major

misinterpretations. 8 Such a point o view is based on the assumption ofunivocality. We, as

Stepan notes, should beware o assuming that any religion's doctrine is univocally pro-

democratic or antidemocratic. Westem Christianity has certainly been multivocal concerning

democracy and the twin tolerations. At certain times in its history, Catholic doctrine has been

marshalled to oppose liberalism, the nation-state, tolerance, and democracy.

Secondly, such a perception falls into the fallacy o unique founding conditions.

This fallacy involves the assumption that the unique constellation o specific conditions that

were present at the birth o such phenomena as electoral democracy, a relatively independent

civil society, or the spirit o capitalism must be present in all cases i they are to thrive. To put

it differently, one can hardly make the argument that Catholicism is intrinsically, that is,

essentially , democratic or has elective affinities with democracy or with civil society.

Finally, Catholicism was not the only religion that played a positive role in civil

society formation and democratization throughout the third wave. Other religious groups

7 Huntington, The lash o/Civilizations 1996, p. 70.38 Stepan, Religion, Democracy, p. 44; Casanova, ''Civil Socie ty and Religion, 2001, p. 1042-1043.

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played equally positive roles in various places: Lutherans in East Gennany, Protestants as well

as Catholics in South Korea, Episcopalians and various other churches in South Africa, and in

Romania, a Hungarian Unitarian minister who triggered that country's revolution.

Casanova argues that religions have potential roles in civil society fonnation. e

proposes a three-step reconstruction of the transfonnation of religions that make possible their

roles in democratization. 39 Firstly, religion in general can serve as autonomous public spaces

and as a countervailing power to state power. Secondly, religions have to g ive up their

monopolistic claims and recognize religious freedom and freedom of conscience as universal

and inviolable human rights. Thirdly, not only should religions voluntarily disestablish

themselves from the state, but they also should disengage from political society proper. This

does not necessarily mean the privatization of religions. Contrarily, this relocation is the very

condition for the possibility of a modem public religion.

As shown by Cheng and Brown, some religious organizations have played a decisive

role in democratic transition in Asia, while others have been donnant, and still others have

acted in alliances with conservative politicians and business interests to block democratic

development. 4 They contend that religious doctrines do not predetermine the involvement of a

religious organization in the politics of democratization. Doctrines may constrain or inspire, but

they do not preclude or determine. They go on to say that most religions are multivioced; their

doctrines could be and have been interpreted in ways that permit, i f not encourage, political

action for the cause of democracy.

39 Casanova, Civil Society and Religion, 2001, p.1045-1047.40 Cheng and Brown, Introductioo, 2006. p. 3.

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s far as religious organizatious' involvement in the process of democratization is

concerned, according to Cheng and Brown, it is shaped and influenced by three key factors. 4

Firstly are their ties to preexisting regimes. Secondly are their ties to political opposition. And

finally is how they define (or redefine) their role in civil society. In this seuse, religious

doctrines do not explain the variations on the calculations of religious organizations about

whether to directly engage themselves in the democratization process.

c. i terature Review

Although many authors have studied political Islam and the state in Indonesia, not much

attention has been given to specific Muslim civil society organizations, namely Mllbammadiyah

and Nahdlatul Ulama and their interplay with politics and their role in the process of

democratization. Douglas Ramage gives an emphasis on the centrality of the Pancasila ideology

and the contrasting views of t in four political groupings: Abdurrabman Wahid and NU the

Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI), the armed forces and secular nationaIists. 42

Other authors have emphasized the centrality of he transformation of political ideas and practices

within Muslim communities during New Order 43 the Subarto regime's specific strategies to

structure state-Islamic relations 44 the emergence of civil pro-democratic Muslim in the process of

democratization in Indonesia, 45 and the compatibility of Islam and democratic values in Indonesian

Muslim community in the reform era.46

A large number of scholars have studied in detail particular major Islamic organizations,

including their relationship with larger political structure of he state. While studies by van

4 Cheng and Brown, Introduction, 2006, p. 14-17.42 Ramage, Politics in Indonesia 199543 Effendy, Islam and the State 200244 Porter, Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia 2002.45 Hefiter Civil Islam 2000.46 Mujani, Rellglaus Democrats 2003

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Bruinessen, Fei1lard, FeaI1y, Kadir, and Bush emphasize the centrality of he U on their studies,47

some other authors, such as AIfian, Nakamura, Peacock, and Syamsuddin emphasizethe centrality

of he Muhammadiyah in their inquiries.48

Among these scholarly wOIks, Kadir and Bush s dissertations as well as Bruinessen and

Fei1lard s books have some similarities with my own thesis, particularly in term of heir approaches

to studying NU So does Syamsuddin s dissertation on Mnharnmadiyah. Their studies, by and

large, provide extensive discussions of particular U or Mnbammadiyah s political activities

dIning the New rder and aftermath (Bush s Dissertation), despite their formal disengagements

with political parties and their foci on non-political (cultural and social) activities since the 1970s

and 1980s. They, to large extent, give their works an emphasis on elite discourse,with a special

attention to their relationships with the New Order regime (Bruinessen, Kadir, and Syarnsuddin),

the army (Feillard), and the Habibie and Wabid s presidencies Bush).

The first distinction between my thesis and these scholarly works is that none of hem

studyingboth the Mnharnmadiyah and NU. fuamining both organizations altogether, I will present

a more comprehensive picture of Indonesian Mnslims and underscore that, despite several different,

even rival, varieties of political expression within Muslim co=unity they have been working in

concert to support the democratic change in Indonesia. While one organization seems to be more

willing to submit to the state control than the other, broader picture will show us that neither is less

democratic than the other.

Secondly, some of hese scholarly works already deal with the roles played by the Islamic

community and the U particularly in the incipientprocess of political IIbera1ization (Kadir) and in

7 van Bruinessen, NU. 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara 1999; Featy, Ulama and Politics inIndonesia 1998; Kadir, Traditional Islamic Society 1999; Bush, Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia 2002.

48 Alfian, Muhammadiyah 1989; Nakamura, he Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree 1983; Peacock,Purifying the Faith 1978; Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam 1991.

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the long process of political transition in Indonesia (Refuer and Bush . However, their studies by

and large give their emphasis on the relationship between Muslim civil society and the state. While

I am also studying the relationship between the Muslim civil society organization and the state,

however, I expand my inquiry into their further contribution, as civil society movements and as

religious organizations, in the process of democratization.

Finally, as most of heir time-period coverage is the New Order era, except Bush s

dissertation which extends to 2002, there was no a comprehensive account of he involvementsof

both NU and Mllbammadiyah during the democratization era until the SBY s presidency. The

extension of he time-period coverage will in turn lead to the further interpretation of he

significance ofMllbammadiyah and NU s political activities for the full-fledge democratization, not

simply in the state-civil society relations during the liberalization and transition era

D ethodology

To address this topic, I will conduct a qualitative study. I am going to employ

ethnographic methods to explore conceptions and practices of wo Muslim civil society

associations in Indonesia: Muharnmadiyah and NU. Therefore, the first sources of data

collection are semi-structured interviews, discussions, and participant observation. I have a

close relation with both institutions. I was born into a NU family. My father is still an important

figure ofNU in my sub-district. When I studied my Islamic senior high school in Jogjakarta, I

was also involved in the NU Students Association (IPNU).When I moved to Jakarta to continue

my undergraduate study in the State Institute of Islamic Studies (lAIN, currently urN in

Jakarta, I was involved in the Muharnmadiyah Students Association (IMM). I was a vice

president of that organization in 1999-2001 and 2001-2003. I have also been the Executive

Director of he Center for the Study of Religion and Civi1ization, a research center under the

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Central Board ofMuhammadiyah in 2001-2006. This center is incorporated in the People's

Voter Education Network (JPPR), a consortium of numerous youth wings ofMuhammadiyah

and NU and other NGOs working in civic education and election monitoring. Finally, when

Muhammadiyah and NU launched anti-corruption programs in 2003, I was also appointed to

lead the Muhammadiyah Institute for Good Governance Program, the Muhammadiyah's task

force of he program. ll these activities enabled me to have a close relationship with almost all

leaders ofNU and Muhammadiyah. Such a personal background has SP3 ked my interest in

studying both Mllbammadiyah and NU, and has enabled me to have a closer look into the

"soul" and inner feeling of these organizations.

My fieldwork of study was effectively carried out during summer 2007. was

primarily based in Jakarta, where the NU and (one of) Muharnmadiyah headquarter is located.

However, was also able to attend numerous discussions held by both Mllbammadiyah and NU

organizations. Beside this fieldwork, had another fieldwork in Indonesia during December

2007-January 2008 to carry out a more detailed and extensive interviews with leaders of

Muhammadiyah and NU. These interviews ask resource persons not only the facts they knew,

but also their interpretations of those facts.

n addition, sources of data include documents, reports, resolutions, speeches,

magazines, internal publications, and other Mllbammadiyah and NU materials not available

outside Indonesia or, in many instances, not available outside both organizations. also make

extensive use oflocal Indonesian newspapers and magazines.

Finally, use secondary sources. In addition to the more genera1literature concerning

state-civil society relations and on religion and politics, this thesis draws on writings focusing

on the dynamic interplay between state and Muslim civil society organizations in Indonesia.

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The analyses of he Indonesian st te are quite extensive. So do the analyses of political Islam in

Indonesia. The existing writings on the relations between Muslim civil organizations and the

state provide a general but important background of both organizations. Finally, existing

studies of the Muhammadiyah and NU are heavily referred to throughout the thesis as a means

to provide additional historical data othexwise unavailable in the primary documentations.

E Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is organized into five chapters but is not rigidly set out in a chronological

order. My first task is to establish the theoretical and conceptual frameworks of the study.

Therefore, this chapter not only reviews the discourse of Islam, civil society, and

democratizations, but it explains the significance of this study as well. Chapter II is an

overview of he relationship between political Islam and the state during roughly fifty years of

Indonesian independence in which Mnbammadiyah and Nahdlatul illarua NU) h d been

transforming from political to civil.

Chapter l l deals with the political roles played by these two organizations during the

transition period. First of all, it presents a comprehensive account on how they keep their

relationships with political parties. This chapter also deals with the roles played by the

Muhammadiyah and NU in the 1999 and 2004 legislative and presidential elections as well as

the subsequent tensions and co-operation between both organiz.ations. t also analyzes the

leadership changes within both organizations in 2004 and 2005 respectively and their

implication for both organizations in the near future political and societal affairs. Finally, it

examines the possible roles played by Indonesian Muslim civil society organizations and their

leaders in the 2 9 election.

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Chapter IV examines the contribution of both organizations to the democratization

process. t looks first at their roles to sustain their position as independent civil organizations

during the last decade of he New Order regime and subsequently transform themselves into

movements clamoring demands for democratization. t also studies how their young members

worked in concert not only in the election monitoring but also in a massive civic education

program. Equally important it deals with how both organizations widen their functions to

promote the more substantive dimensions of democracy: increasing the transparency and

accountability of govermnent. It also studies how both organizations have been working to

maintain the plura1istic and tolerant nature of Indonesian society. Finally this chapter studies

not only the interconnection between intemational funding received y most Islamic NGOs and

the internal democratization but the state-society relation in post-Suharto period as well.

The final part of he study at one level deals with the questions of Muslim civil

society organizations and democratization as well as Muslim civil society and the state in

Indonesia. More genera11y the chapter will reflect upon larger question about the relationship

between Islam and civil society in the Muslim world.

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CHAPTER II

MUHAMMADIYAH NU, AND TH ORIGIN OF CIVILITY

A Introduction

Indonesia is a home to the world s largest Muslim populat ion of approximately 200

million people. However Indonesia is not an Islamic state. Nor Indonesia is a secular state. It is

not an Islamic state in a sense that the 1945 Constitution rejects the superiority o f any religion

over the other. t is also not a secular state in the conventional sense of relegating religion to the

private sphere, and enforcing a strict separation between religion and state. The philosophical

basis of he state, ancasila five principles) begius with a declaration of the beliefin one God,

and the state recognizes s ix major religions. AIl a matter of fact, religion in Indonesia occupies

an important, and also ambiguous, position in the public affairs

This ambiguity has in part been the result of he position of Islam in Indonesian

history and society. Having aware of heir overwhelming majority, organized Muslims have

been unwilling to limit their activities to the nonpolitical realm. This refusal sterns no t only

from adherence to doctrinal principle-there is no separation between religion and politics in

Islam-bu t also from fear of being marginalized from political arena. Unfortunately, within a

numerical majority, political Islam in Indonesia is an active minority. Therefore, political

organizations committed to explicitly Islamic goals have never been able to garner sufficient

mass support to control the goverument and establish a state based on Islamic principles.

This chapter will first present a historical overview of the origin of the ideological

pluralism within Indonesian Islam, o f which political Islam has become a minor ity within a

numerical majority. Secondly, this chapter will present an overview of several critical moments

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in the political development of Indonesian Islam during the roughly fifty years of he

independence period in which Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama NU) had been playing a

significant role. This is purported to explore the organizational precedents for non-state social

associations for civil society in the majority Mnslim nation of Indonesia.

B The Origins of Muhammadiyah and NU

Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any country. Nearly 88 percent of ts

approximately 22 million people identify themselves as Muslims. This country, along with

other Southeast Asian countries, h s long been at the center of Asian maritime trade networks.

Hence, the global connection of religious and cultural systems to Indonesia existed long before

the present stage of globalization. Since the coming of Islam to Southeast Asia, Islamic

worldwide models for religious life have combined with distinctive local Indonesian patterns,

supporting the development of vibrant regional Muslim CUltures. Today, these cultures

continually shape and are shaped by the changing conditions of life in contemporary Indonesia.

Moreover, Indonesia is also the largest archipelagic nation, spanning all or parts of five large

and thousands of smaller inhahited islands, each one ecologically and ethno-linguistically

distinct. 2 Within these diverse indigenous ethnic groups, there is a small (around 3 percent of

the population) Chinese population widely seen as non-indigenous non-pribumi), and resented

by many because of ts disproportionate ownership of middle and large-scale private enterprise,

thank to the Dutch colonial policy. In addition to its Muslim majority, there is a substantial

number of Christians, Hindus, Buddhists, and tribal animists.

Complicating matters even further, as Hefuer says, despite its Sunni majority in

theological orientation, these Muslims have been deeply divided along ethnic, regional, and

I See Hefuer, Religion: Evolving Pluralism, 1999, pp. 205-236.2 See Cn'bb, ''Nation,'' 1999, pp. 3-38; Emmerson, What Is Indonesia? 2005, pp. 7-73.

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ideologicallines. 3 The fissures are o wo main inextricably linked kinds, so far as their political

effect is concerned: one is based on the extent to which the religion itself is regarded as a valid

motive force and the other on the division between the modernist and traditionalist

interpretation o it. The spread o Islam in the archipelago, particularly in Java was uneven. The

religion went from the coast to the interior. Its spread reflected trading networks, the rivalry

between coastal and interior states, and the competition o different cultural groups. In some other

islands, the religion penetrated smoothly. Examples include Sumatera and South Sulawesi. In

there places, the spread o Islam did not contend with the cultural legacies o animism, Hinduism,

and Buddhism. Historically, therefore, many Muslims from the nation's largest ethnic group, the

Javanese, have been o syncretic or nominal Islamic persuasion abangan), as opposed to strict

Muslim santri), and thus resistant to the demands o Islamic orthodoxy.4

In the social structure o Indonesian Islam there is also an historical fault line between

two relatively distinct (though also in some ways blurry and now fading) religious-social-

economic-political orientatious, namely the modernist and traditionalist . The modernist (or

reformist) movements,S which had their inspirations from the Islamic reform n the Middle East

during the second half o he nineteenth century, were both backward and forward-looking in

that it aimed to cleanse Islam o allegedly non-Islamic accretions acquired during the centuries

since the age o the Prophet Muhammad and, at the same time, sought to demonstrate that the

Muslim faith was based on rationality and thus not in conflict with the scientific spirit o the

modern world. The influence o reformist ideas spread n Indonesia as more and more

3 Hefiler A Muslim Civil Society? 1998 p. 290.4 The variants o Javanese Islam and their social significance are descnoed n Geertz, The Religion o

Java 1960; nd Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural entral Java 1963.S The standard accowrt on the modernist movemeots n the late colonial Indonesia, see Noer, he

Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia 1900-1942 1973.

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Indonesians visited the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and Egypt) as pilgrims or students and

returned as bearers of he new approach. 6

By the beginning of the twentieth century, several modernist organizations were

established, the most influential of which was the Muhammadiyah (the followers of

Muhammad).? Founded in 1912 by Ahmad Dahlan in Yogyakarta, Java, the Muhammadiyah

soon established itself at the forefront of he movement to reorient Islam and society. Its main

principles are derived from the Koranic dictum, arnar rna 'ru nahy rnunkar (calling to do

good and refrain from evil deeds). The main impetus for its establishment was to challenge

what they perceived as the two main weaknesses in Javanese society: on the one hand they

regarded traditional Islamic education as backward and incapable of coping with the challenge

of he modem world, and on the other, they rejected the non-Islamic accretions to Islamic

practice and urged a return to the basic purity of Islam as found in the Koran and Hadith. 8

Similarly, they observed with bitterness and resentment how the Dutch had ruled over the

country and had built a colonial educational system dedicated almost entirely to the preparation of

people to work as colonial administrators and clerks 9 Facing these real challenges, The

Muhammadiyah thus concentrated its energies mainly on education, health services, and care for

the poor, and eschewed fonnal politics. For example, in contrast to traditional Islamic education,

Mnhammadiyah schools combined the model of European school and Islamic education, and thus

taught science, math, history and geography along with traditional Islamic subjects.

6 On the origin of Islamic refornrism n the Middle East and its impact on Sontheast Asian Islam, seeAzra, The Transmission o slamic Reformismt Indonesia, 1992. On the comparative study between theMubammadiyah and Abduh's ideas, see Lubis, Pemikiran Muhamnuuliyahdon Muhammad Abduh, 1993.

See Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree, 1983; Pescock, PurifYing the Faith, 1984;A1fian Muhammadiyah, 1989.

8 On the Mubammadiyah's theology and ideology, see Saleh, Modern Trends in Islamic TheologicalDiscourse, 2001; Federspiel, The Mubammadiyah, 1970, pp. 57-79; Nakamnra, The Reformist Ideology ofMubammadiyah, 1980, pp. 273-286.

9 On the encounter between Mubammadiyah and Christian mission, see Shihab, The MuhammadiyahMovements,1995.

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In response of he proliferation of the modernist, reformist organizations, more

traditionally uIama organized themselves into the Nahdlatul Ulama (the Awakening of Islamic

scholars-NU) in ast Java in 1926. 10 Challenging the modernist' s emphasis on self-study and

individual responsibility, the traditionalists defended the privileged role of religious scholars by

pointing out that religious scholars ulama) were heirs of the Prophets al-ulama waratsatul

anbiya) in that they were part of he chain ofIslamic knowledge leading back to the Prophet

Muhammad. Given their anthority on Islamic law and its classical commentaries they served,

through their pesantren (Islamic boarding schools), as centers for the dissemination of Islamic

knowledge in the interior, rura1 area of Javanese society. While the Muhammadiyah tended to

be more successful in attracting better-educated followers from urban areas, the NU generally

retained the loyalty of he network of hese religious scholars ulama) who, through their

pesantren, had great influence among the students and ordinary people of the peasantry. s

far as the organizational style i s concerned, the NU also emphasized on these relatively

autonomous and dispersed charismatic religious scholars, in contrast t o the Muhammadiyah

which developed organizations with rule-governed bureaucracies and open election.

Although the NU and Muhammadiyah have grown closer together, the tension

betwee n these two orientations h s remained a key feature of Indonesian politics and society to

this day. Despite their rivalry, however, both organizations have experienced the similar

tendencies, being a large organization. Whi le the NU established strong roots in East and

Central Java and South Kalimantan, the Mubammadiyah gradually became more of a

10 On the standard account for the NU see Anam, Pertumbuhan dan Perkembangan NahdlatulUlama1985; van Bruinessen, NU 1994; Feillard, NU Vis-a-vis Negara, 1999.

Dhofier, The Pesantren Tradition, 1999.

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nationwide organization, spread out in cities throughout the country derived its support largely

from Sumatera, South Sulawesi, West Java and the north coast of Java

Ai illustrated above, there was a ubiquitous precedence of autonomous and

independent institutions during the late colonial period. Furthermore, there was also a deep

tradition of pluralism and diversity within Indonesian society, not only between Muslims and

non-Muslim, but also between devout and nominal Muslim as well as between the modernist

and traditional Islam. The next part will examine tension and cooperation among and between

these diverse groups in the course of 50 years of Indonesian independence.

c The nvolvement of the Muhammadiyah and NU n Politics

The proclamation of Indonesian Independence in 1945 was soon followed by the

establishment of a provisional parliament and the commencement of political activities by a

large number of competing parties. Among these parties-religious secular, and even

communist-Masyumi was one of he most significant. 12 The Masyumi Majelis Syuro

Muslimin Indonesia-Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims) was created in the Japanese

period and transformed into a political party on November 7, 1945 in a Mubammadiyah's

boarding scbool in Yogyakarta 13 This party was comprised not only of ndividual members but

of corporate ones as well, namely, Muslim political, religious, social, and educational

organizations, as what so-called special members , that are NU, Muhammadiyah, and some

other smaller and regional organizations.

Therefore, Muslim politicians have had powerful positions since the early days of the

Independence period. The Masyumi was a leading member of most coalition governments

12 See Noer Partai Islam dalam Pentas Nasional 1987.13 A comprehensive account on the political relation betwee n the Masyumi nd Muhammadiyah, see

SyaifuIIah, Gerak Politik Muhammadiyah dalam Masyumi, 1997.

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during the Parliamentary Democracy period (1949-1956) and on several occasions had led the

governing coalitions. 4 Early in the revolution, in exchange for giving up their claim to an

Islamically defined state, which would have alienated Christian and other religions minorities,

Islamic groups were granted their demand for a ministry of religion. From this base, largely

controlled by the NU but sh red by a contingent ofMuhammadiyah educators, the Islamic

bureaucracy was expanded outwards throughout the archipelago.

But these gains coopted and divided political Islam. The Ministry became not a salient

but an enclave, while political competitions among Muslims, particularly between the

modernists and traditionalists, reinforced theological differences. The Masyumi, as has been

mentioned, was a federation of many organizations, each one with its own policies. Soon the

strain began to show. First, in 1948 the Partai Syarikat Islam Indonesian (pSI ) withdrew, to

campaign in its own right and under its own emblem. Then, in 1952, the NU broke away also to

campaign under its own emblem. IS This left the Masyumi to become the political vehicle of the

reformist movement, which took over the name virtually y default.

Throughout the 1950s, when political struggle was profoundly colored by ideological

battie 16 the Islamic parties and organizations, including the NU and Mubammadiyah, favored the

creation of a state based upon Islamic law. They believed in the holistic nature ofIslam as Islam

constitutes more than theological or ritual systems. Moreover, they argued, Islam does not

recognize the separation between the spiritual and temporal; rather it governs all aspects oflife.

14 n the rise and fall of he governments during this period, see Herbert Feith, The Decline oConstitutional Democracy in Indonesia 1962

" There were two reasons for the U to withdraw. Firstly, as the reformists continued their efforts todominate the federation, the U sought to get a greater role by establishing its own party. Secondly, there was adispute between Mnbammadiyah and U as to which organization would control the Ministry of Religion in thenext Masyumi-Ied coalition. For a comprehensive account for the political activities of he U during this period,see Fealy, Ulama and Politics in Indonesia 1998

16 Feith concluded that there were five major political streams involved in the political battle during thisperiod: Islamic traditionalism, Islamic modernism, socialism, oonmumism, and mdical nationalism. See Feith,"Introduction", in Feith and Castles (eds.), Indonesian Political Thinking 1970 p. 1-24.

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They also argued that Islam was the first basis on which Indonesia established a modern political

organization which attracted mass support. In this regard, they contended that Islam was the one

which first paved the way for political actions aiming at independence and which first planted the

seed o Indonesian unity. As a matter o fact many o he Muslim leaders believed that

Indonesia's nationalism should be Islamic in nature. 17 Meanwhile, nationalist and non-Islamic

parties supported the retention ofPancasila and found the concept o an Islamic state distasteful.

Only Pancasila, they affirmed, could appeal to the varied, ethnic, regional, and religious groups

that comprised Indonesia. They contended that Islam, insofar as it entered politics qua Islam, was

a divisive element. 1S Ideologically and intellectua11y this tension was paralyzing for Islam so

long as it was directly engaged politically.

In the first general election o 1955, six parties campaigned under the barmer o Islam.

They expected to win an outright electoral majority and subsequently go on to establish an

Islamic state. To the surprise o almost everyone, however, six Islamic parties took at best

43.9% o the vote for parliament, indicating clearly enough that a large number ofMus1ims had

opted for non-Islamic parties. From an electoral field o more than thirty parties, the Sukarno-

led Indonesian National Party (PNI) won 22.3 percent o the vote; Masyumi, 20.9 percent; NU,

18, 4 percent; and the Indonesian Communist Party (PIG), 16.4 percent. 19

After the 1955 elections, when Sukarno started to promote his idea o Guided

Democracy, power moved to the presidency, the army, and the PKI. 20 Other political parties

steadily lost strength, and therefore the ideological rivalries were increasing. Sukarno sought to

7 On the competing discourses between the Islamic group and nationalist group concerning the nature oIndonesian nationalism and the place o Islam during this period, see Effendy, Islam and the State in Indonesia2005, Cha pter2.

1 On the dynamics o political Islam during this period, see Boland, The Struggle o slam in ModemIndonesia 1982.

19 Feith, The Indonesian Electians o 1955 1957, pp. 58-59.20 See Feith, President Sukamo, the rmy and the Communists, 1964, pp. 969-980.

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submerge these ideological differences in a single national belief. He called it asakom

(NasionaIisme, Agama [religion], Komunisme). Unfortunately, this new country could not be

simultaneously Marxist, Islamic, and developmentaIist, except perhaps in the mind of Sukamo.

As the Guided Democracy period came in 1959, the distinct political attitudes of

Islamic parties were discernible, to some extent reflecting differences in regional-cultural

backgrounds. 21 The NU, culturally closer to the Javanese value system of he ruling elite and

following a long tradition of Sunni political conservatism, was always accommodative towards

the government of he day. To the NU, any government that allowed (and preferably facilitated)

its citizens the exercise of their religious obligations was acceptable. Its chief concrete

objective seemed to be to secure as much patronage from the government as possible. 22

Meanwhile, the Masyumi, culturally closer to the Outer islands' value system of egalitarianism

did not shy away from open confrontation with Sukamo. The Masyumi never formulated ideas

abou t a specifically Islamic political system; it basically demanded western-style parliamentary

democracy with a greater say for committed Muslims in matters of government policy.

n political terms, this meant on the part of he NU a readiness to legitimize Sukamo s

presidency, to tolerate Sukamo s increasingly radical nationalism and left-wing sympathies,

and to participate in successive coalition governments that shared his views. 23 By doing so, of

course, they ensured that they were in position of strength vis-a.-vis the reformists. The

Masyumi, on the other hand, would not compromise. It refused, on principle, to have any

association with a government that included Communist fellow travelers, and it resented

Sukamo s broad religious sympathies, his policies, and his personal lifestyles.

2 van Bruinessen, Islamic State or State Islam?, 1996, p. 22.22 For religio-political interpretation of he NO's political behavior during this period, see Haedar,

Nahdlatul Ulama dan Islam di Indanesia 1994; Fea1y Rowing in a Typhoon, 1994.23 See Federspiel, ''Sukarno and His Muslim Apologists, 1976.

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The Masyumi s political power started to wane since the outbreak of he PRRI

rebellion in 1958. Masyumi did not officially support the rebellion but three of its top leaders

joined them. Given its ambivalent attitude toward the rebellions, it was labeled the party of

separatism and revolt. 24 The Masyumi was forced to dissolve in 1960 for its supposed

complicity in the rebellion and its continuing opposition with Sukamo. Its leaders were placed

under political arrest; their supporters either joined NU or other small Islamic parties, i = e r s e d

themselves in religious or cultural activities, or remained silent. Prior to the dissolution,

Muha=adiyah dismantled its special membership to Masyumi in 1959 and devoted itseif to

educational, social, and religious activities.25

Islamic political activity during the Guided

Democracy period was therefore essentially dominated by the NU, whose freedom of action

was also circumscribed. 26 Like all other parties, the NU was forced to give uncritical support to

Sukamo while hoping his goodwill would protect its interests.

The failed Communist coup of 1965 was a watershed in modern Indonesian history. t

brought about the fall ofSukamo and his Guided Democracy idea, and in its wake caused

terrible bloodshed. 27 The PKI, the largest Communist par ty outside the Communist countries,

and its sympathizers were eliminated and the Suharto-Ied New Order regime came to power.

Both Muha=adiyah and particularly NU followers took active parts in the suppression of he

4 Lev The Transition t Guided Democracy 1966, p. 185.25 It was during that time that Mubammadiyah formulated Kepnoadian Muhammadiyah (The Character

ofMuharomadiyah) , which declared its identity as an Islantic movement whose activities revolves around

Islantic propagation dakwah) both within Muslim community and society as a whole. This concept began to bedeliberated in the 1956 Muhammadiyah Congress in PaIembang, South Swnatera, and was formaIly ratified in the35 th Muhammadiyah Congress in 1962 in Jakarta. The objective of is concept was that the Mubammadiyahsought to clear itself from any complicity in the Masyumi's political rivalry with the Sukarno, and thereforeavoided any ensuing consequent of he Masyumi's dissolntion.

26 On political Islam during the Guided Democracy period, see Maarif; Islam dan Politil< di IndonesiaPada Masa Demokrasi Terpimpin 1988.

7 There is no reliable figures exist for the number of people who were killed. A scholarly consensus hassettled on a figure of 400-500,000, but the correct figure could be half or twice as much. See, Cnob (ed.), TheIndonesian Killings 1965-1966, 1990; Cnbb, Genocide in Indonesia, 1965-1966, 2001.

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PKI (Le. in killing thousands of alleged members and activists), particularly in strongly Muslim

areas such as East Java and Aceh.

As reward for their assistance in forcing Sukarno from power and liquidating the PKI,

Muslim leaders at first expected to be welcomed into the new regime or, at very least, allowed

to play an active political role. Gradually Islamic political leaders began to feel that Islam was

the most important civil force in society, as its major antagonist, the PKI and Sukarno, had

been eliminated. Members of he Masyumi had high expectations that their party would be

rehabilitated, on the assumption that they were the very people who had adamantly resisted

Sukamo's regime. 8

s early as December 1965, a Coordinating Body of Muslim Activities

(Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) was formed, uniting 16 Islamic organizations which

worked toward a rehabilitation of he Masyumi. From June 1966 onwards, many of them, and

in the first place the Muhammadiyah, openly began to advocate the return of the Masyumi.

The political rewards they expected never materialized. The impression in the Suharto

and military regime was that, with the Communists destroyed and the nationalists discredited,

the Muslim's political opportunity would be simultaneously obstructed. Early in 1967 Suharto

made it clear that the army would not countenance the revival of the Masyumi party. The

Suharto regime did allow a formation of a Masyumi successor by the name ofParmusi (partai

Muslimin Indonesia) while refusing to allow Masyumi senior leaders to pl y leadership role

in this party.29 The party at first rejected this condition but eventually gave in and obtained

legal recognition in February 1968. Led by Djarnawi Hadikusumo (Chairman) and Lukman

Harun (General Secretary), moderate Muhammadiyah leaders, the party executive contained

many Muhammadiyah figures as well as some other representatives of various Islamic groups.

28 Samson, Islam n Indonesian Politics, 1968, p. 1004.2 J See Ward, he Fowulation o h Partai Muslimin Indonesia 1970.

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The Parmusi ran into next trouble with the army when it held its first party congress

early in November 1968 in Malang, East Java. 30 At this congress Parmusi elected Muhammad

Roem, a very senior Masyumi leader who in the 1950s had served as Foreign Minister and

Deputy Prime Minister but had not participated in the PRRI revolt, as the new party chainnan.

However, the government could not agree to the newly-selected leadership of the Pannusi.

Relations became increasingly tense in the two years after the congress. Despite a series o

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Islam Civil Society (MA Thesis)

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