Islamic Resistance and Political Hegemony in Dagestan-2008

8/8/2019 Islamic Resistance and Political Hegemony in Dagestan-2008

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Islamic Resistance and Political Hegemony in Dagestan

Dr. Robert Bruce Ware

Department of Philosophy

Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

Edwardsville, IL 62026-1433

(618) [email protected]

Prepared for Delivery at the International Studies Association Annual Convention 2008

San Francisco, 29 March 2008
mailto:[email protected]:[email protected]


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While Moscows policies in Chechnya have attracted international attention, Russian

hegemony in the neighboring republic of Dagestan has also raised complex issues,

though these have received less attention. Located strategically at Russias southernmost

tip, and accounting for 70 percent of its Caspian Sea coast, Dagestan is Russias most

heterogeneous republic. Its two million-plus citizens are divided among more than 34

ethno-linguistic groups. Some of these groups, such as Avars, Azeris, Chechens,

Lezgins, and Nogais, are themselves divided by contentious frontiers and Dagestans

predominantly Muslim population has seen violence between Islamic traditionalists and

Islamist fundamentalists locally described as Wahhabis.

Islamism Arrives in Dagestan

Into the void created by the decline of the collapse of Soviet society in the 1990s, and

along side of the revival of traditional North Caucasian Islamic organizations, Islam

provided the basis for an expansionist political ideology. Political Islam became an

active force in the Soviet Union during perestroika when the Islamic Party of Revival

(IPR) organized in Tajikistan and immediately attracted attention with its publication of

an influential manifesto entitled Are We Muslims? A Dagestani Avar named Akhmed-

Kadji Ahktayev, who was residing in Tajikistan, became the IPR Chair. Akhtayev, who

was a trained physician and a self-taught theologian moved to Dagestan, where he

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founded a spiritual and educational institution known as Islamia, attracting activists

already involved in the Congress of the Moslems of the North Caucasus.

Chechen political leaders regarded Ahktayev as a great religious authority.

Akhtayev served as a deputy of Zelimkhan Yandarbiev in organizing the Caucasian

Conference. He was also a deputy to Movladi Udugov in his movement Islamic

Nation. On an invitation from Udugov, Akhtayev became head of the Sharia Court in

Islamic Nation. 1

The IPR was organized at the Union level in 1990 at a convention in Astrakhan,

on the authority of Akhtayev and through the efforts of leading Dagestani Islamists,

including the brothers Abbas and Bagautdin Kebedov. Bagautdin, who is also known as

Bagautdin Magomedov, rose to prominence among Dagestani fundamentalists and has

been active inside Chechnya in its conflict with Moscow. The organization was registered

in Moscow as the All-Soviet Union Moslem political organization. Among its goals were

the spiritual revival and the political awakening of Moslems, and the realization of

their rights to construct their life on the basis of the Koran. The constitutive documents of

the organization refer to the need for "the broad education of all peoples concerning the

basis of the Islamic religion, the need for training of Moslem leaders, who can understand

the essence of Islam and are capable of giving answers to the vital problems of

contemporary world."2

Members of the IPR were commonly described as Wahhabis, though they did

not refer to themselves as such. Wahhabism is a fundamentalist Sunni Islamic movement

1 Akhtayev died in Dagestan in 1998 at the age of 56.2Z. Zalimkhanov, and K. Khanbabayev, Politization of Islam in the North Caucasus: based on the exampleof Dagestan and Chechnya. Mahachkala, 2000, 51.

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founded in Arabia in the middle eighteenth century by Mohammed Abd-al-Wahhab.

Wahhabis reject the later interpretation of the Koran (after the first fourimams ). They

believe that the tariqatcult of local sheiks, and proclamations of new holy sites are

invalid. With strict adherence to the Koran, Wahhabis neither smoke nor drink, nor

shave their beards, nor do they recognize government authority. In keeping with general

usage, the IPR may be said to represent a moderate wing of Wahhabism. A somewhat

more radical wing of Wahhabism was headed by Ayub Omarov (a.k.a. Ayub

Astrakhansky) a Dagestani Avar who resided in Astrakhan, and openly described himself

a Wahhabi. In Astrakhan he was surrounded by a community of the faithful.

Throughout the 1990s, Wahhabism drew its acolytes from diverse points along

the socio-economic spectrum of the North Caucasus: First, impoverished residents of

rural villages found in it clarity and ideological simplicity, which cut through the

cumbersome, and often costly, pseudo-traditions of North Caucasian Islam (for example,

the obligatory monetary gifts that have surrounded marriage ceremonies during the last

six decades). Wahhabism dispensed with many of the rituals that distinguish local Islam,

along with the paternalism of traditional spiritual authorities. It resembled other

puritanical movements in so far as it denied the role of the sheiks, and other professional

servants of Allah in mediating the devotees relations with God.

Yet its rejection of North Caucasian customs, particularly with regard to weddings

and funerals, tended to polarize its opponents, and was, in many respects, a further

obstacle to its spread. The rigid Wahhibite puritanism and veiled Wahhabi women were

both alien and offensive to that freewheeling, hard-drinking, rough-shod egalitarianism

with which traditional North Caucasian Islamic authorities had long since learned to

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compromise. Yet Wahhabis nevertheless forced such issues through their inevitable zeal

and spiritual resolve.

Secondly, in a negative sense, the growth of Wahhabism may also be viewed as a

product of Western influences for it is a potent reaction against the excesses of

modernization. It springs from a deep disillusionment with the prospects for economic

transition, and feeds on widespread despair over the myriad forms of moral and political

decay that are rapidly overwhelming Caucasian society. The roots of this movement, in

short, may be traced to ever-deepening poverty and the prevalence of political corruption.

Whatever its virtues, Sufist introspection offered no immediate answers for the

critical social problems resulting from the current period of transition. And if the tariqat

therefore seemed irrelevant to some impoverished mountaineers, there were other reasons

why Dagestans traditional Islamic order appeared to be pernicious. These involve the

traditional cooperation between Dagestans religious and political establishments:

Disillusionment with the former increased with the corruption of the latter. Wahhabite

rejection of political authority lent them an opportunity to free themselves from the

bureaucratic constraints and political corruption of state officials. The Wahhabite

critique of moral degradation, social irresponsibility and the corruption of the religious

and political establishment consequently found an eager audience among the least

fortunate mountain villagers. Wahhabism lent dignity to the harsh austerity of their lives

and provided spiritual sanction for their desperate resentment of the regions wealthy new

leaders.

Thirdly, Wahhabism spread, through relatively prosperous villages (such as the

IslamicDjamaatbelow) which found in its puritanism an ideological incentive and

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organizational impetus for the preservation of their civic conventions and traditional

morality against degenerative influences of the media, mass culture, individualism and

liberalism.18

Fourthly, increasing travel opportunities increased foreign influence and

contributed to the growth of Wahhabite fundamentalism. As travel restrictions were

eased, more North Caucasians made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Nearly half of those who

have embarked on theHadj from the Russian Federation since independence are from

Dagestan. As religious youths increasingly were educated internationally in some of the

best Islamic universities they lost respect for the traditional North Caucasian clergy, who

tend to be elderly and, in some cases, half-educated.

Finally, Wahhabism was a refuge for that part of the intelligentsia which

abandoned its connection to traditional Islam in Soviet schools and universities, and

which subsequently found itself without ideological footing.

A series of semi-annual monitoring surveys conducted by Enver Kisriev3found

that, by March 1999, three percent of Dagestans 2.1 million people identified

themselves as Wahhabis. Most of these were living in the west-central mountains and

foothills of the republic in territories traditionally inhabited by Avars, Dargins, and

Dagestans indigenous Chechen-Akkins.

Yet the political significance of the Wahhabis was greater than their numbers

would suggest. Most Wahhabites lived in relatively small groups scattered through rural

villages. Religious schisms often occurred within a family, pitting children against

parents and brothers against brothers. Wahhabi fundamentalists challenged traditional

3 The monitoring surveys were conducted under the auspices of the Dagestan Bureau of Statistics and with

partial funding from Southern Illinois University Edwardsville.

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Muslims, polarizing village life and provoking a rural arms race. When a few villagers

espoused Wahhabism the entire village began arming itself.

Secondly, the Wahhabite critique of traditional clergy not only increased mutual

enmity, but also had a radicalizing effect upon the otherwise mild traditionalists. For

example, in 1997, the Dagestans authoritative Islamic organization, Sufist oriented

Spiritual Directorate of the Muslims of Dagestan (know locally by the acronym DUMD),

cited the Islamic prohibition against the realistic depiction of people in order

unexpectedly to demand (by unanimous vote) an end to a project to erect a monument of

Imam Shamil on the two hundredth anniversary of his birth.

21

Caught off guard, the

Dagestani government canceled its decision to construct the monument to the leader of

the emancipation movement of the Caucasian mountaineers.22

Following an influx of Wahhabi missionaries backed by extensive funding from

Persian Gulf organizations, Dagestans Wahhabis built their own mosques and controlled

14 Islamic schools. For awhile they distributed religious literature from their own

publishing house, and operated a satellite uplink in Kizilyurt through which they

communicated with one another, and with their supporters abroad. Indeed, as early as

1998 Dagestani authorities accused Islamic fundamentalist groups in Kuwait and Saudi

Arabia of launching ajihadin Dagestan.

From August 1996 to September 1999 there were numerous violent conflicts in

Dagestani villages between traditionalist Muslims and Wahhabis. In the most

notorious instance, an ethnic Dargin djamaat in Dagestans central foothills, consisting

of the villages of Karamakhi, Chabanmakhi, and Kadar, sustained an armed resistance

against Dagestani authority. In December 1997, militants from these villages joined with

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Wahhabis from Chechnya to attack the nearby 136th Motorized Russian military garrison.

Afterwards village leaders announced a the signing of a mutual defense pact with radical

Chechen groups. In May 1998, gunmen in Karamakhi commandeered the village police

station. Subsequently, they defeated a contingent of 150 Dagestani police that were sent

on a punitive exercise against them. That summer a thousand armed men gathered

outside these villages and demanded the resignation of the government of Dagestan. In

early 1999, Chechen President Aslan Maskhadov announced the adoption of a

constitution similar to that of Sudan, and the establishment ofsharia law in Chechnya.

That April, at a Grozny meeting of the Congress of the Peoples of Chechnya and

Dagestan, speakers called for the unification of Dagestan with Chechnya and an end to

Russian colonialism in the Caucasus. Toward that end, Shamil Basayev announced his

formation of an Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade. Though Khattab and several other

foreign fighters had played prominent roles in the first Chechen war, these events were

among the first indications of the expansionist nature of the Islamist agenda in the North

Caucasus. Suddenly there was rhetoric about the violent establishment of an Islamic

republic stretching from the Caspian to the Black Sea.

Wahhabism made headlines in connection with the military operations in of 1999.

On August 2, and again on September 5, Dagestan was invaded by Chechnya based

insurgents, a portion of whom were Dagestani Wahhabis. The invaders came from

bases in that were funded by international Islamist organizations based primarily in the

Persian Gulf. They were staffed, in part, by Arab mujahadeen. Some of these, such as

Amir al Khattab, had migrated to Chechnya from conflicts in Central Asia. Khattab ran a

training camp at the Chechen town of Serzhen-Yurt, not far from Urus Martan, where

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several hundred foreign fighters were based. After the first Chechen war, he had married

a woman from Karamakhi, the fortified stronghold of Wahhabism in Dagestan.

The people of Dagestan united against the invaders. They formed citizen militias

and repeatedly requested federal military assistance. When federal troops finally arrived,

Dagestani villagers welcomed them as heroes. Steeped in extremist ideology and

Chechen anarchy, the Wahhabis had failed to recognize the repugnance with which they

were viewed by the overwhelming majority of Dagestanis and other North Caucasians

who identified with Russia and looked to Moscow for security and economic

development.

During the war, the Dagestan Peoples Assembly bowed to pressure from the

DUMD and urgently prepared legislation prohibiting Wahhabism in Dagestan. It gained

considerable momentum in this regard from an Avar, named Surakat Asiyatilov.

Asiyatilov was, at once, leader of the Islamic Party in Dagestan and head of the

Assembly Committee on Civil and Religious Organizations and Affairs. He was strongly

committed to the DUMD. On 16 September, the day the war ended, and after only one

reading, the fourth session of the Peoples Assembly unanimously passed the law On the

Prohibition of Wahhabite and Other Extremist Activity on the Territory of the Republic

of Dagestan. The law specifically outlawed Wahhabism. Yet it did not specify how, and

by whom, it would be determined what does, and what does not, count as Wahhabism.

The law does, however, designate the DUMD as the dominant Islamic spiritual

organization in Dagestan. In effect, the law transforms the DUMD into a state organ for

the regulation of religious affairs for Dagestans Sunni Muslims.

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Wahhabism from a Dagestani Perspective: Survey

At the time of the invasions of Dagestan, how did Dagestani citizens view Wahhabism?

In March and April of 2000, the author led a team of investigators in a survey of 1001

respondents throughout Dagestan, followed in April and May by 40 interviews with

Makhachkala elites.4 In the population survey, respondents were asked to agree (1) or

disagree (2) with each of the following three statements: a) Wahhabis are Muslims, and

they should not be considered extremists, b) There are Wahhabis who are just simple

believers, and other Wahhabis who are religious extremists, and c) Wahhabis are

extremists that hide behind a religious facade. The results, displayed in table 1, show

that more than three quarters of Dagestanis shared their governments assessment that

Wahhabis are extremists behind a religious facade. Less than a tenth thought they are

simply a brand of Muslims, but not extremists.

Table 1: Citizens Perception of Wahhabism

Percentages ofagree (based onwhole sample)

Wahhabis areMuslims,

not extremists

Some Wahhabis arejust believers, othersare religious extremists

Wahhabis areextremistsbehind a

religious facade

(n) valid overall valid overall Valid overall

Overallmissing cases

(1001) 11.4 9.120.5

39.3 30.123.6

87.1 77.011.7

Avarsmissing cases

(279) 12.4 10.416.5

48.6 36.924.0

80.4 69.214.0

Darginsmissing cases

(172) 23.0 16.329.1

57.5 42.426.2

89.7 75.615.7

4See Robert Ware, Enver Kisriev, Werner Patzelt, Ute Roericht, Political Islam in Dagestan,Europe-Asia Studies, 55, 2, March 2003.

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Kumyksmissing cases

(134) 5.8 4.523.1

34.0 26.920.9

94.6 78.417.2

Lezginsmissing cases

(130) 7.8 6.911.5

15.6 13.116.2

91.2 87.73.8

Laks

missing cases

(50) 12.8 10.0

22.0

54.1 40.0

26.0

93.0 80.0

14.0Russians/Cscksmissing cases

(71) 2.3 2.823.9

35.7 21.140.8

98.4 85.912.7

Chechensmissing cases

(53) 14.9 13.211.3

31.3 28.39.4

54.9 52.83.8

Azerismissing cases

(39) - -38.5

18.2 10.343.6

94.6 89.75.1

Tabasaransmissing cases

(27) 4.3 3.714.8

8.7 7.414.8

100 96.33.7

Menmissing cases

(486) 10.3 8.220.2

40.9 31.922.0

83.1 72.013.4

Womenmissing cases

(515) 12.5 9.920.8

37.8 28.325.0

90.9 81.710.1

Villagemissing cases

(496) 13.4 11.315.5

40.0 33.316.9

84.1 75.89.9

Townmissing cases

(503) 9.3 7.025.4

38.5 26.830.2

90.3 78.113.5

Those Dagestanis who saw economic and political changes as being for the worse tended to have

a slightly more favorable view of Wahhabis. There was least sympathy for Wahhabism among

those Dagestanis who viewed economic and political changes as being for the better.5

To explore Dagestani views of Wahhabism in greater depth, we asked

members of the Dagestani professional, scientific, and creative intelligentsia about the

factors that had contributed to the appearance and proliferation of Wahhabism in

5 Usually, those Dagestinis who see changes for the worse, both in Dagestans economy (Spearmans Rho =

-.12) and political life (Spearmans Rho = -.15), tend slightly to agree with the statement Wahhabis areextremists behind a religious facade. This corresponds with the conviction expressed in many elite

interviews that Wahhabism emerges from Dagestans transitional problems. Exclusively among Chechens,

possibly the least integrated of Dagestans ethnic groups (See Ethnicity and Identity in Dagestan under

consideration byNations and Nationalisms), Wahhabis are regarded as extremists by those who see both

Dagestans economic situation (Spearmans Rho = .46) and social and cultural life (Spearmans Rho = -.

53) changing to the better. This suggests that even among Dagestans most alienated group, perceptions of

opportunities for economic and cultural improvement undercuts the appeal of Wahhabism.

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Dagestan. Elite opinions frequently echoed survey results, as for example, in the case of a

Chechen-Akkin employed as a high level city administrator in Makhachkala:

So far, Wahhabism is only a cover-up. Those whom we call Wahhabis

dont call themselves by this name. Thisname just covers up their real

essence banditry. They are anarchists, nihilists deep down. They are

renegades who wish to realize their secret desires. Since they want to make

it sound honorable they come forward with religious slogans. In the

present situation it was a suitable slogan. If the situation changes theyll

choose a new slogan. In the twentieth century it was the slogan of the class

struggle, expropriation of the expropriators. Both then and now active

people were of the same kind: destroyers. I doubt that among the so-called

Wahhabis there is even one person who would be able to conduct a three or

four hour discussion on religion. They dont know half of what an ordinary

Mullah should know!

In addition, opinions regarding these factors could be classified into eight categories.6

Among these, three factors stand out as being most significant:

Fifteen respondents mentioned economic problems, including a low standard of

living, unemployment, and poverty. Typical were statements similar to those of 62

year old Avar employed as a physician in a municipal hospital: Wahhabism, like any

6 Since many individuals gave long lists of causal factors, items from several responses had to be attributed

to more than one single category.

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form of extremism, is based upon poverty and haplessness. The situation in Dagestan

is staggering, so many unemployed.

Fourteen respondents mentioned alienation resulting from political problems,

including weakness, deceitfulness, corruption, and indifference to the lives of

ordinary people on the part of leaders in Moscow and Makhachkala. Often they

couched their assessments in terms like those of an Avar employed at the Dagestan

Scientific Center: The reason for the emergence of Wahhabism is the anti-ethnic

politics of Russia; corruption, and deceit of top government officials, including those

in Dagestan. And also the aspiration of people to improve their lives.

Fourteen respondents mentioned various external factors, such as missionaries from

Muslim and Western countries, their ideological pressure, and their finances. These

references often resembled the those of a Lak businessman: Wahhabis appeared

because of the money from abroad and the competition in the market of religious

service. One side called the other side Wahhabis. Additionally, it is important

that many people dont like the invasion of Western capitalism with its cult of

money. These responses are significant particularly in light of current controversy

regarding the role of outside Islamist influence and funding in the spread of political

Islam in the Northeast Caucasus. Some respondents also cited religious and

ideological pressures from the West as contributing to an extreme Islamist backlash.

For example, protestant missionaries from the West have had modest success in some

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of Dagestans cities, while attracting local attention, and raising concern about

converts drawn from Islamic faithful.

While these categories were most significant in terms of the number of responses, the

reasons disclosed in the other five additional categories are no less revealing:

Seven respondents mentioned ideological factors occurring in the spiritual vacuum

that emerged after the collapse of communism; the influx of Western ideology alien

to Dagestani society; ignorance of the masses; and spiritual search of the youth. Such

persons often argued along the lines of a Lezgin government employee: If Islam

corresponded with its role and fulfilled its functions and tasks, there wouldnt be any

Wahhabism. It just proves that religion is weak and unable to fulfill its function of

educating people regarding peace and love toward their neighbors.

Four respondents mentioned a traditionally high level of Islamization among

Dagestanis; their tradition of religious activity; and the historical role of Islam in

Dagestan.

Four respondents mentioned an attraction of Wahhabism as an ideology of a clear and

simplified Islam. One of the more complex arguments, which also includes reference

to outside Islamist influences, was offered by a Kumyk who serves as the head of an

educational institution:

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Wahhabis are unhappy with the old religious leaders. Dont forget that the

leaders from our past communist times are not the best people of this land.

... The best people got educated and ... moved to live in many parts of the

Soviet Union. ... They secretly believed in God, but didnt stay in their

high mountain villages yearning for education. .... But those who served

Allah officially were the ones who stayed in the mountains, wretched and

embittered. They earned their bread by funeral services..... The religious

renaissance began .... during (the period of) Gorbachev. .... The demand

for religious people increased. In some villages the former leaders of the

Communist Party started new careers in the Islamic business. ... All

authority had collapsed in the villages, so the religious way of solving

local problems came to the forefront. Religion replaced the Communist

Party. The people who could read the Koran in Arabic were advancing

and competing among themselves. It wasnt easy for them to be overt

social activists. ... Generally, they are deeply religious. They became firm

in their faith in times when it wasnt encouraged and held no career

prospects. Some of them are fanatics. .... Old fashioned religious leaders

didnt compromise their faith even if their new, wealthy sponsors from the

Arab countries demanded it from them. They didnt refuse financial help

and personal prosperity that came with it, and they were able to do so

many things with money. But only on the condition that Islam would stay

intact in the way they preserved it through generations in the hard

conditions of the underground. But there are always people that are ready

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for reforms. The foreign Muslims certainly dont like the arrogance of our

veteran-Muslilms,and their conviction that Islam is pure only here in

Dagestan. They dont want to acceptDagestan as thecenter of orthodox

Islam. Wahhabism is the new stream in Dagestani Islam that resists our

traditional catacomb Islam. Many young people study abroad in Islamic

universities. They are different Muslims already, not like our keepers of

the ancient traditional Islam.

Four respondents mentioned competition among religious activists leading to

ideological divisions among them. The following, from a Lak journalist, is a

representative statement, which also, once again, evokes themes of external funding,

and of simplicity:

The problem of Wahhabism was artificially created by those pseudo-

Islamists that go on the haj with money from fraud and have nothing to do

with true Islam. True Islam doesnt divide religion into Wahhabism and

pure Islam, etc. These people are far from Islam and just use it when

drunks, thieves, and criminals started pretending to be saints, to go to the

holy sites, do the haj. They dont need the true Islam; they look for its

simplified form. Pure Islam didnt satisfy them. They promoted their own

version of Islam, especially because it was generously paid for.

Finally, two respondents mentioned the Chechen factor, that is, the influence of

politico-ideological processes in the neighboring republic.

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According to Dagestani elites, therefore, Wahhabism seems to be a problem

stemming from a large variety of causes. The process of economic and political

transitions has shaken the foundations of Dagestani society18 and, by the same token,

provoked a wide range of societal pathologies. As a reaction to it, a new interest in

religion has arisen, filling the gaps of spiritual and ideological identification created by

the demise of communism. The old, ill-educated and traditional Islamic leadership was

not sufficiently able to meet these challenges, such that there was room for a new course

of Islamic revival. It came with funding from the Persian Gulf and is by no means

restricted to religious concerns, but serves as a misleading label for political and criminal

purposes as well. For Dagestan, Wahhabism is a problem with both domestic and foreign

roots. Its economic and political features suggested the need for a government response.

It is significant that fourteen respondents mentioned external factors and two

mentioned influences from Chechnya. Unlike the traditional practice of North Caucasian

Islam, Wahhabism is fundamentally expansionist. Hence, it is perceived as extending

itself into the North Caucasus from the outside, and also as extending itself between

North Caucasian republics. Its expansionist features are sometimes asserted as a

counterbalance to Western influences of the West.

Several respondents mentioned ideological factors. Some of these, once

again, had to do with an Islamist counterweight to the expansion of Western ideologies,

but most were concerned with the spiritual vacuum that emerged after the collapse of

communism.

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Yet it is significant that the majority of respondents, more than 29, identified the

spread of Wahhabism with local economic or political failures. In other words, the

Islamism is competing not only with the Russian federalism, but also with local forms of

social organization. It is not only the failure of the latter, but also of the former, that

opens new opportunities for the Islamists. The failure of local forms of social

organization includes the weaknesses that appear in traditional North Caucasian Islam

following more than 50 years of Soviet repression. When Russian centralism repressed

local organization, it inadvertently prepared the way for a subsequent Islamist expansion.

Russian Recentralization

Since the conflict in August and September of 1999 on its Western frontier, Dagestan has

rapidly moved closer to Moscow. Budgetary transfers from Moscow to Makhachkala,

Dagestans capital, have remained high, and Moscow has done much to promote and

develop Makhachkala as a hub for hydrocarbon transfers from Caspian fields to Western

markets. This trend stands in stark contrast with the transitional period that followed the

collapse of the Soviet Union, when there was minimal central influence upon events in

Dagestan. Indeed there were times in the earlier period when it seemed that the influence

and authority of Azerbaijani leader, Geydar Aliev, was stronger than that of Russian

President Boris Yeltsin.

The latitude of this transitional period was reflected in the constitution that

Dagestan ratified in on July 26, 1994. That constitution established a system of

consociational democratic political institutions that was unique in Dagestan, and indeed,

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in the world.7 Consociational systems of democracy occur in ethnically and/or

religiously segmented societies, such as Dagestan, when political elites from various

social segments cooperate through distinctive political institutions. The system was

consociational in the sense that it responded to the challenges of an ethnically segmented

society with: 1) an executive body that was designed to foster interchange, consensus,

and mutual trust among major groups; 2) ministerial appointments and legislative

elections that ensured proportional representation; 3) a concurrent veto, whereby any

legislator could veto any legislation that he deemed to be deleterious to the interests of

his group; 4) regional autonomy for traditional ethnic territories.

8

Dagestans State

Council, consisting of one representative from each of its fourteen major ethnic groups, is

the only collegial executive in the Russian Federation. Proportional representation was

guaranteed, in the legislature, by an ethnic electoral system that generally selected ethnic

representation to within a few tenths of a percentage point of a groups representation in

the broader population, and by system of packet replacement that filled multiple

ministerial positions, whenever the replacement of a single minister was required, in

order to preserve ethnic proportionality.

This system had some problems. The Chair of the State Council never rotated, as

was intended, among the Councils 14 ethnic representatives. Instead it was continuously

occupied by the ethnic Dargin representative, Magomedali Magomedov, who resorted

repeatedly to complex political maneuvers and constitutional manipulations in order to

retain the position. Nor did this system succeed in solving some of Dagestans larger

7See Robert Ware and Enver Kisriev, Ethnic Parity and Political Stability in Dagestan: A ConsociationalApproach,Europe and Asia Studies,53, 1, January 2001.8 Dagestans system conformed with standard descriptions of consociational democracy, such as that

provided by Arend Lijphart inDemocracy in Plural Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977).

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problems, including economic development, ecological depletion, infrastructural decay,

political corruption, criminality, and Islamist extremism.

Nevertheless it did provide for the stunning achievement of Dagestans principal

political objectives: peace, stability, and federal subsidies.

Following his election in March 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin sought to

centralize Russian government, and to bring the constitutions of Russias 89 federal

subjects into conformity with the federal constitution. In order to achieve this objective,

Russia was partitioned into seven federal districts, each of which was headed by a

Kremlin appointee described as a plenipotentiary representative or as an inspector.

Dagestan was included in the Southern Federal District, headed initially by Victor

Kazantsev, who gained notoriety as a general in the Chechen war. The Southern Federal

District included the North Caucasian republics of Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia,

Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, Kalmykia, and Adigea, along with

Krasnodar and Stavropol Krays, and the Rostov and Astrakhan Oblasts.

Despite the stable and surprisingly successful nature of their federal relationship,

Moscow pressured Dagestan to make fundamental changes in its constitution in order to

bring the latter into compliance with its federal counterpart, beginning in April 2000.

Kremlin officials explained that this reorganization was undertaken in order to bring the

legislation of the subjects of the Federation into line with federal legislation. It meant:

1) an annulment of previous agreements between the federal center and each of its

subjects; 2) a resumption of Moscows dominance over regional powers; 3) a cancellation

of specific rights previously accorded to several republics, including, for example, their

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capacities to conduct independent international economic activities; and 4) a diminution

of other powers previously exercised or claimed by local bodies.

All of these elements of local sovereignty were born of the confusion that

followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. The more original and innovative features of

Dagestans political system were developed during that earlier period when Dagestan was

left effectively alone to solve the problems of that it faced regarding the maintenance of

order and the avoidance of inter-ethnic confrontation, and the resulting political system

reflected the peculiarities of Dagestani society.

Officials in Moscow initially requested that the office of the Attorney General of

the Republic of Dagestan should identify all inconsistencies of the Republics

constitution with that of the Russian Federation. From among the 25 articles of the

Dagestani Constitution, 45 inconsistencies were identified. At a session of the National

Assembly of the Republic of Dagestan that convened on the 22nd of June, 2000, the

Dagestani constitution was amended in order to eliminate twelve of these inconsistencies.

On the one hand, the alterations that were made at that time were peripheral to the

internal operation of Dagestans distinctive political institutions. Changes in Dagestans

fundamental political structure could be made only by the Republics Constitutional

Assembly. Yet at the same time, the changes that were made sought to mollify Moscow,

by relinquishing relics of local sovereignty vis a vis the federal center. Following these

changes, Dagestan was formally subordinated to Moscow, and lost those elements of

autonomy that it had gained along with other subjects of the Russian Federation during

the period in which Boris Yeltsin was establishing his power.

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For example, Dagestans 1994 constitution had allowed that acts of federal law

that contradict the sovereign rights and interests of the Republic of Dagestan could be

suspended by the Republic within the boundaries of its territory and were subject to

appeal. Now these caveats were removed from the constitutional text. The 1994

constitution also had allowed that the activity in Dagestan of federal structures and

organs (was) permitted on the basis of mutual agreements. In 2000, this provision was

amended to say that it was allowed in the manner prescribed by law.

For years, Dagestani officials cleverly evaded and resisted federal pressures for

more fundamental changes that would significantly have affected it legislative and

executive branches. The summer of 2002, saw the election of Dagestans third State

Council conducted to the provisions of the 1994 constitution. However, in 2003

Dagestani officials began to yield to federal pressures for the fundamental transformation

of their political system. This transformation involved three phases: 1) the alteration of

Dagestans ethnic electoral system prior to the election of its National Assembly in

March 2003; 2) the acceptance of a new constitution in July 2003; 3) the alteration of

regional electoral practices announced by Vladimir Putin in September 2004. The phases

of this transformation have resulted in considerable dislocation in Dagestani politics, as

some institutions and procedures have been revised on multiple occasions. While the

long term consequences remain to be seen, the prognosis may not be entirely favorable.

Restructuring Russias Regional Politics

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On 13 September 2004, President Vladimir Putin announced sweeping electoral changes

in Russias 89 regions. The plan would strengthen federal control by giving the Russian

president power to nominate regional governors with the endorsement of regional

legislatures. According to the proposal, current regional leaders would serve out their

terms and term limits would be scrapped. In Dagestan this means that after Magomedali

Magomedov finishes his current term as Chair of Dagestans State Council, the SC will

be abolished but Magomedov could retain his leadership of Dagestan by appointment of

President Putin. According to Putin, these arrangements will strengthen the executive

chain of command.

At the same time, Putin expressed support for a Central Election Commission

proposal to eliminate the single mandate constituencies that currently account for half of

the seats in the Russian State Duma, thereafter requiring that all Duma representatives

should be seated from compiled national party lists. This move would effectively

eliminate independent deputies in the Duma, would strengthen party control of the body,

and would probably reduce the number of viable federal parties. At the time of the

announcement, the pro-Kremlin United Russia Party enjoyed a two-thirds majority in the

Duma, sufficient to initiate changes to the Constitution.

Proponents of these changes have argued that they will reduce local corruption,

streamline decision-making, and strengthen government control in response to threats

such as North Caucasian terrorism.9 Yet in Dagestan there are reasons for concern.

Because of Dagestans ethnically segmented, and traditionally pluralistic, political system

the appointment of any head of state by President Putin will immediately alienate 90

9 A Unitary State with A Military Bureaucracy,Nezavisimaya Gazeta , 14 September 2004.

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percent of the political elites. In the most likely scenario, some of these alienated elites

will appear to acquiesce, but will quietly begin working to sabotage the system.

Throughout the last five years, Dagestan has seen rapid a contraction in the circles

of local economic and political elites.10 These contractions have narrowed both economic

access and democratic participation. While this process of elite contraction has local

causes, it has also been exacerbated by the recentralization of Russian government that

has taken place since the beginning of Putins first term in March 2000. This

recentralization program has already given Moscow a much greater presence throughout

this region. Whereas regional elites were previously bound by their need for a local

political base, Moscows expanded influence has increasingly become the basis for their

power, and has tended to insulate local elites from local accountability. This has already

led to anger and resentment among village leaders and other activists who previously

constituted the core of local political bases, but who are now finding their roles to be

increasingly redundant.

These are among the negative trends that have contributed to a spike in terrorist

acts in Dagestan since the end of 2002.11 The implementation President Putins proposed

changes may accelerate these trends. The new system of central appointments may

eventually reduce local corruption, but it is also possible that reduced local accountability

and reduced opportunities for political access may increase corruption and economic

disparity in Dagestan and elsewhere in the North Caucasus. Whereas opposition figures

in Dagestan have previously looked to Moscow for support, a system of centralized

appointments may lead to anti-Russian sentiments among opposition figures. Some

10 Robert Ware and Enver Kisriev, A Summer of Innuendo: Contraction and Competition Among

Dagestans Political Elite, Central Asian Survey, 20, 2, June, 2001.11 Robert Ware, Renewed Terrorist Offensive in Dagestan, Central Asian Survey (forthcoming); New

Terrorist Offensive in Dagestan,Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, December 22, 2003.

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wealthy locals who find that they have reduced political access, may start contributing

financially to radical causes simply because they resent the new forms of exclusion or

suppression. If there is greater corruption and excess within a smaller circle of elites

combined with fewer channels for local political expression, more young men may feel

humiliated, angry, and disposed toward radical views. Indeed, the North Caucasus is

already full of young men, who see no prospects other than those afforded by radicalism

and violence. After a decade of economic collapse the only growth industries in the

region are law enforcement, narco-business, terrorism, and war, each of which is

interconnected with the others.

President Putin presented these changes as his response to a series of terrorist

attacks in Russia, including explosions in two passenger planes and a Moscow subway

station, and the Beslan hostage tragedy. Ironically, the electoral changes that he proposed

may increase terrorism in Dagestan and elsewhere in southern Russia.

The further implementation of national party lists in the Duma elections is also

likely to prove counterproductive. If one is prepared to overlook blatant vote buying by

all sides and occasional incidents of pre-election violence, then elections among

Dagestani candidates have tended to be free and fair.12 In these cases, electoral

irregularities have been few, and when they have occurred they generally have been

identified, protested, and investigated. However, in Dagestan, federal elections among

national political entities have evidently been characterized by massive electoral fraud.13

12Robert Ware and Enver Kisriev, Ethnic Parity and Political Stability in Dagestan: A ConsociationalApproach,Europe- Asia Studies,53, 1, January 2001; Dagestans Peoples Assembly Election,

Electoral Studies, 20, 3, June 2001; Federal Elections in Dagestan: 2003-2004,Europe-Asia Studies

(forthcoming).13

Robert Ware, Who Stole Russias Election?, Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2000;

Dagestan Demands a Recount, Moscow Times, November 12, 2000; Federal Elections in Dagestan:2003-2004,Europe-Asia Studies (forthcoming).

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I have collected anecdotal evidence concerning electoral fraud in Dagestan during

Russias 1996 presidential election. In the Duma election of 1999, I also found evidence

of electoral fraud in Dagestan.14 After the 2000 Russian presidential election, The

Moscow Times published a series claiming that Dagestani officials recorded more than

half a million fraudulent votes, and that this significantly influenced the outcome of the

election. While my own analysis suggested a lower number, there was clearly evidence

of massive electoral irregularities.15 I have also found reason to suspect significant voter

fraud in Dagestan during the Duma election of 2003 and the Russian presidential election

of 2004.

16

In the Duma election of 2003, Dagestan elected representatives from three single

mandate districts, and also participated in the election of representatives from national

party lists. Apart from blatant vote buying by all sides and violent incidents prior to the

election in one district, the three single mandate elections appeared to be fair. However,

in the party list election there was reason to suspect massive ballot stuffing in support of

United Russia, the party of power. There was also reason to suspect more limited ballot

stuffing on behalf of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.

If Dagestans federal elections have regularly been characterized by fraud, and if,

as it appears, massive irregularities have usually favored the party in power, it would be

nave to suppose that such practices have occurred simply on orders from Moscow.17

Rather it appears that federal election fraud has always served the interests of the local

elite, and has generally served the broader interests of the Dagestani electorate as well.

14 Robert Ware, Who Stole Russias Election?, Christian Science Monitor, October 18, 2000;Dagestan Demands a Recount, Moscow Times, November 12, 2000.

15 Ibid.16

Federal Elections in Dagestan: 2003-2004,Europe-Asia Studies (forthcoming).17 As did The Moscow Times in its 2000 electoral analysis.

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Dagestans federal elections may therefore be viewed as exercises in mutual

manipulation. On the one hand, Dagestani electoral irregularities have heavily favored

the federalstatus quo, whether that meant Boris Yeltsin, or Vladimir Putin, or the United

Russia Party. Yet this has also entailed a quid pro quo since Dagestani officials clearly

have expected the favor to be returned in terms of budgetary and military support from

the federal center. So indeed it has been: Dagestan has steadily received more than 80

per cent of its budget from Moscow. This percentage is unexceptional when compared

with other North Caucasian republics. Ingushetia, for example, receives 85 per cent of its

budget from the federal center and the figure tops 90 per cent in some of the republics of

the northwest Caucasus where there also have been allegations of federal electoral fraud.

Yet actual monetary transfers to Dagestan, the largest North Caucasian republic, are more

than five times higher than in any other of these republics.18

What is especially interesting in the case of Dagestan is that during the Duma

elections in 1999 and 2003 it appears that both United Russia and the Communists

benefited from an inflated count.19 In both of these elections, Dagestani officials appear

to have manipulated the totals for both of these parties in order to ensure that the

maximum number of Dagestani candidates would be seated from the party lists.

In other words, federal electoral fraud in Dagestan appears to be primarily

intended to benefit Dagestan. Our survey research has shown that majorities of

Dagestanis from all ethnic groups strongly identify themselves with Russia, wish to

remain within the Russian Federation, and desire closer relations with Russia.20

18 Dagestan is also the most populous of Russias North Caucasian Republics.19 Apparently resulting from both ballot stuffing and the alternation of electoral protocols. See Federal

Elections in Dagestan: 2003-2004,Europe-Asia Studies (forthcoming).20Dagestans indigenous Chechen-Akkins were the exception in that they cannot be said to identifystrongly with Russia; yet, by a slight margin, even they favored closer relations with the federal center.

Robert Ware, Enver Kisriev, Werner Patzelt, Ute Roericht, Russia and Chechnya from a Dagestani

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Nevertheless, there is anecdotal data suggesting that Dagestanis see their relations with

the Russian Federation in a framework of us and them. To many Dagestanis, it

makes little difference who is running Russia so long as good relations are maintained

between Moscow and Makhachkala and budgetary benefits are received.

In the context of Putins proposed electoral reforms, the point is that whereas

Dagestanis are unlikely to manipulate single mandate district races among Dagestani

candidates (where a Dagestani is certain to be seated regardless of the outcome), they are

likely to manipulate party list elections to the Duma in a manner that satisfies the

expectations of Moscow leaders and maximizes the number of representatives from

Dagestan that are seated from various lists. Hence, Putins plan to shift subsequent Duma

elections entirely away from single mandate districts, and to increase the role of party

lists, is likely to increase the degree of federal electoral fraud in Dagestan, and perhaps in

other North Caucasian republics. At least in Dagestan, these irregularities will most often

benefit the party of power. After the Russian presidential elections of 2000 and 2004

there were claims that Vladimir Putin had benefited significantly from massive electoral

fraud in the North Caucasus. If Putins electoral proposals are implemented it is likely

that these patterns will be sustained and augmented.

On the one hand, it appears that the central appointment of regional governors is

likely to exacerbate current Dagestani trends including the contraction of political elites,

increasing corruption and economic disparity, and a growing sense of alienation,

frustration, resentment, and anger. All of this seems likely to help sustain, if not increase,

radicalism and terrorism in Dagestan. On the other hand, a shift toward greater

Perspective,Post-Soviet Affairs, 18, 4, December 2002.

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dependence upon national party lists in future Duma elections is likely to increase

electoral fraud, generally favoring the party of power.

It is not difficult to imagine these two trends reinforcing each other and

congealing about their common themes of increasing corruption among a narrow elite

along with the alienation and radicalization of the broader population. It is also possible

to conceive of more optimistic scenarios involving responsible presidential appointees

who earnestly strive to reduce local corruption, including federal electoral fraud, and

address chronic problems such as economic development and organized criminality.

Potential for Decreased Stability

Since April 2000, Moscow has progressively, if not systematically, dismantled

Dagestans previous political structure, based on principles of consociational democracy.

From this point forward, Dagestani political authority will gradually diverge from its

foundation in Dagestans traditional social structure. Power in the republic will be slowly

turned away from village organizations and local elites, which have provided the

Dagestani political system with an internal dynamism and flexibility, which promoted a

constant process of corrective balancing, which prevented any segment of Dagestani

society from acquiring dominance, and which provided the inherent resilience and

stability that underwrote Dagestans fidelity to Moscow. Dagestans new constitution

will reorient its political focus from this internal force field and locate its center of

gravity outside of the republic at the federal center. Personal political power will no

longer be based upon internal political conditions, but upon the bureaucratic authority of

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official functionaries, leaning for power on higher-level administrative organs that are

connected ultimately to the Kremlin. Hence, there is a strong risk that Dagestans

political leaders will become increasingly alienated from the surrounding society.

There will be sustained efforts to preserve the appearance of ethnic parity, since

without this appearance no authority could maintain political legitimacy in Dagestan.

Yet electoral processes will shed their genuinely popular basis and will tend to function

largely as confirmation for administrative decisions. To the extent that this approximates

the old Soviet power structure, Dagestani elites will have been prepared to apply it, and

Dagestani citizens will have been conditioned to accept it. The very manner in which the

new constitution was imposed, and the manner in which the latest electoral alterations

have been proposed, suggests that nothing from that earlier period has been forgotten.

The revival of a centralized political structure is likely to deprive Dagestan of its

recent dynamism and to reintroduce elements of sociocultural, and perhaps economic,

stagnation. Elements of opposition will be muffled even as they begin to gather about

new vertices. Previously the various groups that were competing in Dagestan sought

support from Moscow, which acted as a political ballast to stabilize the republic amidst

their fluctuations. Henceforth, all that occurs in Dagestan will be directly sanctioned by

the Kremlin. Moscow will be the guarantor of Dagestans stability, instead of Dagestans

own internal social parameters. The local political elites will consider the views of

Moscow leaders ahead of local social moods and the needs of their local supporters. It is

likely that the ruling elite will become alienated from local needs and demands. Up to

now, those Dagestani elites who were offended, defeated, or otherwise aggrieved have

been seeking Moscows support and mediation. From this point forward, those who are

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aggrieved may grow in number, and may seek supporters and allies who cast themselves

in opposition to Moscow. Alternative ideological resources may be drawn from

nationalism, separatism, Islalmism, and a variety of pro-Eastern, pro-Western, and anti-

Russian outlooks.

Widespread and sustained economic development throughout the republic could

significantly off-set such trends, particularly if they were accompanied by reductions in

corruption and organized criminality. Moscow has now committed its structure of

federal administration to the economic development of the North Caucasus, and Russian

Economics Minister, German Gref, has focused particularly upon development of

Dagestans economy and the eradication of its chronic social problems. Were these

efforts successful, then they would do much to enhance local political stability and to

defuse any subsequent resentments over diminished political access and accountability.

On the other hand, if the benefits of economic development continue to be concentrated

in urban centers, and if they thereby tend to increase economic disparities in the region at

the same time that local political access and accountability are being diminished, then

destabilization will be the most likely outcome. At best, Moscow has embarked upon a

risky strategy in Dagestan. Given Dagestans strategic significance for both the Russian

Federation and the Caucasus/Caspian regions, the risks appear to be substantial.

Past as Prologue

Under President Putins program of recentralization, Russia has turned away from

strategies of compromise and accommodation in the North Caucasus. Once again, it has

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sought to construct traditional Russian hierarchies of power and subordination. Such

structures were crucial to the expansion of the medieval Russian empire. Even today a

program of government recentralization may be appropriate in some Russian regions,

where Soviet administration was replaced by semi-autonomous organizational structures

that were conducive primarily to political corruption and organized criminality.

Both of the latter are critical, and rapidly worsening, problems in the North

Caucasus, but in this particular region a revival of administrative recentralization is

unlikely to prove successful, and may prove to be disastrously counterproductive.

Throughout the last one and a half millennia, a series of hegemonic attempts to impose

hierarchical systems of organization upon this region have sooner or later failed.

More than anything else, Russias current program of recentralization in the North

Caucasus, is reminsicent of the Tsarist administrative structure in Dagestan shortly after

the beginning of the nineteenth century. Dagestani traditions of egalitarianism were then

ignored as the Russian colonial administration propped up local potentates and

subjugated the broader population.

Then as now, this strategy nourished corruption and fostered the spread of an

Islamist ideology of political resistance. In both cases, this Islamist ideology was

absolutist and expansionist, and in both cases these features brought it into conflict with

Dagestans relentless parochialism. In a manner reminiscent ofmuridism 150 years

earlier, Wahhabism is in competition with both the Russian federal system and with local

culture, including both conventional North Caucasian Islamic practices and the regions

endemic parochialism. Much like theirmuridantecedents, the regions new Islamists

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have offered a spiritual basis not only for the eradication of Russian influence, but also

for an alternatively expansionist system of socio-economic organization.

Recent events also recall the outcome of early Soviet offers to compromise with

local political and Islamic structures in Dagestan. Whereas the organization of local

soviets (or councils) were initially welcomed by Dagestanis as consistent with the

structure of their traditional djmaats, and whereas Stalin promised to recognize the

legitimacy of localsharia law in 1922, it took Moscow less than ten years to revoke the

latter and subordinate the former within an autocratic administrative framework.

Similarly, from 1994, when Dagestan ratified its democratic constitution, until 2004,

when Putin announced his plan for the appointment of regional governors, Moscow once

again compromised with Dagestans traditional political structures. Once again,

throughout that ten year period, most Dagestanis identified their aspirations with those of

their Russian neighbors. Once again this compromise has now been revoked.

Thus far, most Dagestanis have not objected because they are looking desperately

to Moscow to provide them with security and economic support. Once again, this

popular yearning recalls an earlier pattern of events: Along with their resort to autocratic

brutality, Soviet rulers sustained their cancellation of their initial compromise with North

Caucasian institutions by means of their subsequent delivery of stunning improvements

in local infrastructure (including electrification, pavement, plumbing, railroads, and

residential construction), economic development, higher education, gender equality,

healthcare, and security. The preceding discussion argued that the Soviet provision of

these critical improvements in exchange for the withdrawal of local self-rule and the

official toleration of Islamic practice, was itself a workable compromise throughout most

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of the twentieth century. While Islamic adherents and some local leaders suffered

repression, most Dagestanis were nonetheless enabled to compromise more or less

comfortably with Soviet rule.

Indeed there has already been notable economic development in urban centers

throughout the North Caucasus. In Dagestan, this growth has been most evident in the

Caspian corridor that stretches from Makhachkala to Derbent, as well as in Khasavyurt,

which has prospered as a relatively stable21venue for retail trade just across the border

from war torn Chechnya. The problem is that in so far as this development remains

concentrated in the cities, it is likely to further exacerbate economic disparities and rural

frustrations throughout the region, and may ultimately contribute less to political stability

than to its opposite.

Throughout the 1990s, the decline of Moscows influence was complimented by

the proliferation of expansionist Wahhabism, which immediately stepped in to fill

ideological and organizational voids. After the Beslan atrocity, Putin announced his plan

for the election of local governors as an immediate response to Islamist terror, and as a

strategy to counter the spread of Islamism. At the same time, Moscow has demonstrated

its capacity to compromise with moderate Islamic organizations. Putins capacity to

compromise with traditional North Caucasian Islam was illustrated most dramatically by

his appointment of Mufti Akhmad Kadyrov to head the loyalist administration in

Chechnya. The Putin administration has also certified the Islamic Party of Russia,22 and

has applied for a Russian role in the Organization of the Islamic Conference. This spirit

21 The emphasis here is on the qualification of stability. Attacks on the police, and shoot-outs between the

police and militants, are a weekly occurrence in the Khasavyurt area, and they have worsened in the last

year. Yet as compared with even worse situations in Chechnya, Khasavyurt has offered a relatively

peaceful commercial atmosphere since 2000.22 Rechristened as the True Patriots of Russia.

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of religious toleration and compromise has been generally well-conceived, even if it has

been sometimes problematic in its particulars.23 It is a potentially successful strategy for

Moscow, especially in so far as the inherent absolutism of the Wahhabis has, by contrast,

rendered them completely incapable of compromising with many of the traditional

practices of North Caucasian Islam.

Similarly, the inherent expansionism of Wahhabism has rendered it incompatible

with traditional North Caucasian parochialism. Hence, were Moscow able to support

local democratic procedures and the rule of law, while rooting out corruption, then the

advantage that it holds by way of its capacity for compromise with local religious leaders,

and by way of its capacity to provide for security and economic development, might

eventually permit the Russian ESO to triumph over its Islamist competitor.

Unfortunately, the full achievement of this program appears to be unlikely.

Conversely, Putins failure to uphold local democracy will probably alienate some

North Caucasians, and thereby inadvertently serve the purposes of Islamist recruitment.

If Wahhabis subsequently are able to depict moderate Islamic leaders as collaborating in

the hegemonic, and therefore anti-Islamic, subjugation of the region, then the former may

be able, at least partially, to off-set the disadvantages of their own absolute incapacity for

doctrinal compromise.

Clearly this has been the strategy of Islamists in the North Caucasus for the last

two years. During this period they have been focusing their attacks upon law

enforcement officials in Dagestan and Chechnya, and more recently in Ingushetia and

Kabardino-Balkaria. In direct response to these attacks, authorities in each of these

23 In particular, Akhmad Kadyrov was widely criticized for the brutality of his regime and for his fraudulent

election to the Chechen presidency in 2003. Yet he acquired some elements of legitimacy among the

Chechen population for his improvements in the security situation, and for his reintroduction or

improvement of some basic social services.

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republics have grown more repressive, thereby alienating more of the citizenry. The

perpetuation of this cycle is currently undermining stability throughout the region, even

as conditions have slowly begun to stabilize in Chechnya.

While it is too soon to predict an outcome in the current struggle of Russian

centralism and Islamist expansionism for control of the North Caucasus, Moscow is

currently in the process of forfeiting its lead. What Russia desperately needs is an act of

democratic political transformation such as that embodied in Dagestans 1994

constitution. A disciplined and sustained effort to uphold religious toleration, democratic

procedures, and the rule of law, while eliminating corruption and privilege is Moscows

shortest path regional stability in this region.

This is not to overlook the failure of Dagestans democratic leadership to resolve

problems of corruption, criminality, economic development, extremism, and the

transition of power. There can be no doubt that some measure of federal intervention in

Dagestani politics was inevitable. Yet the interests of Kremlin leaders as well as

Dagestani citizens might have been better addressed had Moscow targeted the preceding

specific problems by strengthening the democratic framework. Instead, Moscow targeted

the democratic framework, and is thereby most likely to inadvertently strengthen the

problems. By exacerbating those problems, Moscows current strategy is likely to

strengthen the cause of Islamism in the North Caucasus.

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