ISPL 2

Rules of statutory interpretation NOVEMBER,2010

Table of contents

List of cases 02

Introduction 04

Literal interpretation 06

The mischief rule 11

Golden Rule 14

INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION 18

EXTERNAL AID TO INTERPRETATION 22

PRESUMPTIONS 25

Conclusion 27

Bibliography 29

List of cases

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Maunsell v Olins,(1975) AC 373 at 291.

Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar,(1940) AC 1014.

Whiteley v Chappell,(1868-9) 4 LRQB 147.

Black-Qawson Int. Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG,(1975) 1 A11ER 810, 836.

Re Racal Communications Ltd, (1980)2 All ER 634.

Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School (1979) QB 56, 70.

Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green (1981) 1 All ER 153.

London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946) 1 AC 278.

Fisher v Bell (1961) 1 QB 394.

Heydon’s Case (1584) 3 Co Rep (7a).

Smith v Hughes (1960) 1 WLR 830.

Elliot v Grey (1960) 1 QB 367.

Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981) 1 AER 545.

Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries (1940) AC 1014, 1022.

River Wear Commissioners v A damson, (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 764.

Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh, AIR 1954 SC 749.

Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay, (1953) S.C.R. 730.

Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd2003) 2 SC 111.

Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, AIR 1975 SC 428.

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Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, AIR 1965 SC 458.

Re Kerala Education bill, 1997 (1) SC 112.

Manohar Lal v State of Punjab (1951) S.C.R. 671.

Kashi Prasad v State, AIR 1955 All. 749.

Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera ,AIR 2008 SC 32.

Ramchand textiles v sales tax officer, AIR 1961 SC 1506.

Dhulabhai v State of MP1968) 3 S.C.R. 662.

R v Medical Appeal Tribunal (1994) Imm AR 513.

Heathstar properties Ltd (1958) S.C.R. 595.

State of UP v Mohammed Nooh ,(1966) 1 WLR 993.

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Introduction

"Statutory language, like all language, is capable of an almost infinite gradation of 'register' -

i.e. it will be used at the semantic level appropriate to the subject matter and to the audience

addressed (the man in the street, lawyers, merchants, etc). It is the duty of a court of construction

to tune in to such register and so to interpret the statutory language as to give to it the primary

meaning which is appropriate in that register (unless it is clear that some other meaning must be

given in order to carry out the statutory purpose or to avoid injustice, anomaly, absurdity or

contradiction). In other words statutory language must always be given presumptively the most

natural and ordinary meaning which is appropriate in the circumstances.1

The term interpretation means “To give meaning to”. Governmental power has been divided into

three wings namely the legislature, the executive and the judiciary. Interpretation of statues to

render justice is the primary function of the judiciary. It is the duty of the Court to interpret the

Act and give meaning to each word of the Statute. Thus it was also stated:

"Legislation is the cornerstone of the modern legal system." 2

Although Parliament creates the texts, it says nothing about how they are to be interpreted. The

so-called Interpretational Acts are no more than devices for shortening language. This was

admitted in the long title of the first of them. As Lord Scarman said in 1980:

'It has been axiomatic among lawyers and, indeed, in our legal professional thinking for a very

long time that the interpretation of statutes is a matter for the judges; it is not a matter for

legislation’.3

1 Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 at 291.

2 Honourable Justice McHugh ,High Court of Australia

3 House of Lords Deb, 13 February 1980, col. 276. Page | 4


Yet the judges are denied by the nature of their function the opportunity of drawing up

satisfactory rules. The court's duty is to apply the law in the case before it. A judge cannot easily

essay general principles when anxious litigants, looking no further than their own case, stand

before him. Fragmentary obiter dicta are the best he can manage. Some judges have given up

altogether. Lord Wilberforce says that:

Statutory interpretation is what is nowadays popularly called a non-subject.4

But it is not a non-subject. There are mainly three rules for interpretation of statutes:

The literal rule,

The golden rule and

The mischief rule,

And that the Courts invoke whichever of them is believed to do justice in the particular case. But

the most common rule of interpretation is that every part of the statute must be understood in a

harmonious manner by reading and construing every part of it together.

The maxim “A Verbis legis non est recedendum” means that you must not vary the words of the

statute while interpreting it. The object of interpretation of statutes is to determine the intention

of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used.

In Santi swarup Sarkar v pradeep kumar sarkar,5 the Supreme Court held that if two

interpretations are possible of the same statute, the one which validates the statute must be

preferred. Besides these, there present internal and external aids to construction together with

presumptions for the said purpose of interpretation. In this project paper all these topics are dealt

with thoroughly, but the main emphasis is upon the three rules.

4 House of Lords Deb, 16 November 1966, col 12945 (1940) AC 1014

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Literal interpretation

The literal rule states that if the words of the legislative text are plain they must be followed,

wherever that may lead: 'If the words of the statute are in them precise and unambiguous, natural

and ordinary sense. The words themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention of

the lawgiver’

Giving words their ordinary and natural meaning is known as literal interpretation or litera legis.

It is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and

unambiguous, effect should be given to the provisions of a statute whatever may be the

consequence. The idea behind such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law

making body must know what it intends in the words of the statute. Literal interpretation has

been called the safest rule because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the

language through which it has expressed itself.

The bare words of the Act must be construed to get the meaning of the statute and one need not

probe into the intention of the legislature. The elementary rule of construction is that the

language must be construed in its grammatical and literal sense and hence it is termed as litera

legis or litera script. It is also commented about this rule that

“The Literal rule has been the dominant rule, whereby the ordinary, plain, literal meaning of the

word is adopted.

Lord Esher stated in 1892 that

“… if the words of an act are clear, you must follow them, even though they lead to manifest

absurdity…”

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There are, however, a number of disadvantages in using this rule. It is often called the ‘dictionary

rule’, but dictionary definitions can attribute several meanings to one word. It also restricts

judicial creativity and holds back development of the law in keeping with changing social

conditions. With the literal rule- it must be remembered that in extreme cases the statute may be

carelessly drafted where certain words in isolation can have several meanings. The Law

Commission 1969 was very critical of the literal rule as it assumed that Acts of Parliament were

perfectly worded.

The Law Commission in an instructive and provocative report on the subject of statutory

interpretation said of this rule that ‘to place undue emphasis on the literal meaning of the words

of a provision is to assume an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship’.

The rule, when in operation, does not always achieve the obvious object and purpose of the

statue. A classic example is Whiteley v Chappell (1868-9)6. In this case a statute concerned with

electoral malpractices made it an offence to personate ‘any person entitled to vote’ at an election.

The defendant was accused of personating a deceased voter and the court, using the literal rule,

found that there was no offence. A dead person was not entitled to vote or do anything else for

that matter. A deceased person did not exist and could therefore have no rights. It will be seen,

however, that the literal rule produced in that case a result which was clearly contrary to the

object of Parliament.

It is, says the literal rule, for parliament, and not the judges, to change the law if it leads to

absurdity and Predictable construction. The citizen (or in practice his adviser) should be able to

rely on the plain meaning. As Lord Diplock has put it, confirming Sir William Graham

Harrison's playful point mentioned above:

'The acceptance of the rule of law as a constitutional principle requires that a citizen, before

committing himself to any course of action, should be able to know in advance what are the legal

consequences that will flow from it. Where those consequences are regulated by a statute the

6 (1868-9) 4 LRQB 147Page | 7


source of that knowledge is what the statute says. In construing it the court must give effect to

what the words of the statute would be reasonably understood to mean by those whose conduct it

regulates'.7

This vital principle could not be more clearly expressed. It may be referred to as the principle of

predictable construction. Two cases illustrate the importance attached by the House of Lords to

observing the principle.

The cases are briefly described below.

Re Racal Communications Ltd 8

Here concerned the interpretation of s 441 of the Companies Act 1948. This authorizes the

Director of Public Prosecutions (among others) to apply ex parte to a High Court judge for an

order for inspection and production of a company's books. It ends by saying that the judge's

decision 'shall not be appealable'. As Lord Diplock said, what could be plainer than that? Yet the

DPP, faced by Vinelott J's refusal to make an order, defied these words and appealed. In the

Court of Appeal, Lord Denning and his colleagues, relying on Lord Denning's remarkable

dictum in Pearlman v Keepers and Governors of Harrow School 9 that no court has jurisdiction

to make an error of law, upheld the DPP's appeal. Unanimously, the House of Lords asserted the

predictability principle and reversed this.

Midland Trust Co Ltd v Green.10

Here for £1 a father gave his son an option to purchase the legal estate in a farm at a considerable

undervalues. The option was registrable under the Land Charges Act 1925 as a class C land

charge. But before the option was registered by the son, the father conveyed the legal estate in

the farm to his wife Evelyne for £500, also a considerable undervalue. The money was actually

7 Black-Qawson International Ltd v Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschaffenburg AG, (1975) 1 A11ER 810, 8368 (1980)2 All ER 6349 (1979) QB 56, 7010 (1981) 1 All ER 153

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paid over, and the legal title passed. The transaction was not a sham, and there was no fraud

(though there was breach of contract by the father). Section 13(2) of the Land Charges Act 1925

deals with such a situation in language which could scarcely be plainer. It says that a class C land

charge is void against a 'purchaser' of a legal estate for money or money's worth unless the land

charge is registered before completion of the purchase. Section 20(8) defines 'purchaser' as a

person who, for valuable consideration, takes any interest in land.

How could it be denied that the son's option was void against Evelyne?

She took the legal estate and she gave valuable consideration in money. Yet because the merits

were against her, Lord Denning found arguments for departing from the literal meaning. To do

this was described by Lord Wilberforce as 'muddying clear waters'. Delivering the only speech in

a unanimous reversal of the Court of Appeal's majority decision, he set out the point at issue, and

then said:

'Thus the case appears to be a plain one ... In my opinion this appearance is also the reality. The

case is plain; the Act is clear and definite. Intended as it was to provide a simple and

understandable system for the protection of title to land, it should not be read down or glossed;

to do so would destroy the usefulness of the Act.'

The predictability principle is important, but it does not amount to a rule that the literal meaning

must always be followed. The idea of such a rule has become increasingly discredited. In

introducing his 1980 Interpretation Bill, Lord Scar man said that the old habit of sticking to the

literal meaning 'is still lurking in the back corridors of the legal system, and must be

exterminated'11. The Law Commission argues that to place undue emphasis on literal meaning

assumes an unattainable perfection in draftsmanship and ignores the limitations of language

Professor Zander is particularly hard on the literal rule:

11 House of Lords Deb, 13 February 1980, Col 279Page | 9


'The approach is mechanical, divorced both from the realities of the use of language and from

the expectations and aspirations of the human beings concerned and, in that sense, it is

irresponsible'

Elsewhere Zander calls the literal rule 'defeatist and lazy'. It is, he rather mysteriously says, the

intellectual equivalent of deciding the case by tossing a coin .These latter remarks were called

forth by the decision in Whiteley v Chappell 12. A statute aimed at electoral malpractice made it

an offence to personate 'any person entitled to vote' at an election. The accused was charged with

personating a deceased voter. The court, with reluctance, found there was no offence. The

personating was not of a person entitled to vote because a dead man is not entitled to vote or do

anything else. He does not exist, and therefore can have no rights. It is a casus omissus. The

draftsman has gone narrower than the object.

Further case involved

London & North Eastern Railway Co v Berriman (1946)13

where a railway worker was killed doing maintenance work and his widow tried to claim

compensation as the company had not complied with the Fatal Accidents Act which states that a

look-out man must be supplied for men working on or near the railway line ‘for the purpose of

relaying or repairing’ it, the court decided this did not include maintaining in its literal meaning

so the widow should not receive compensation for her husband’s death. Professor Michael

Zander has criticised the rule for being too rigid and detached from the realities of language.

Fisher v Bell (1961) 14

12 (1868-9) 4 LRQB 14713 (1946) 1 AC 27814 (1961) 1 QB 394

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This is a case concerning the requirements of offer and acceptance in the formation of a contract.

The case established that, where goods are displayed in a shop together with a price label, such

display is treated as an invitation to treat by the seller, and not an offer. The offer is instead made

when the customer presents the item to the cashier together with payment. Acceptance occurs at

the point the cashier takes payment.

The mischief rule

The so-called mischief rule is otherwise known as the rule in Heydon’s Case15. The court held

that four factors must be considered:

What was the common law before the making of the Act?

What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide?

What remedy has parliament appointed to cure the mischief and defect?

What is the true reason of the remedy?

The ruling continued and then the office of all the Judges is always to make such construction as

shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and

evasions for continuance of the mischief, and ... to add force and life to the cure and remedy,

according to the true intent of the makers of the Act . . .'.

After nearly four centuries, the ruling continues to be cited because it is a succinct statement of

the general interpretative process. The references to the common law should now be widened to

include statute law, but otherwise the language stands. Its importance lies in the fact that it

requires the interpreter to look beyond the legislative text itself. In the absence of a preamble or

purpose clause, the text will not fully reveal either the ‘mischief or defect' or the 'true reason of

15 (1584) 3 Co Rep (7a)Page | 11

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Invitation_to_treat

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Contract

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Offer_and_acceptance


the remedy'. The extent to which a court may look beyond the text is a question of vital

importance, to which we return.

A modern legacy of the final part of the ruling in Haydon’s Case is found in many

Commonwealth Interpretation Acts (though not in the new British Act). It forms a minor

exception to the principle stated in the opening sentence of this chapter.

As adopted in New Zealand it reads:

'Every Act . . . shall be deemed remedial, whether its immediate purport is to direct the doing of

anything Parliament deems to be for the public good, or to prevent or punish the doing of

anything it deems contrary to the public good, and shall accordingly receive such fair, large and

liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the

Act . . . according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.'

A similar, though briefer, provision is contained as s 11 in the Interpretation Act 1967-68 of

Canada. The New Zealand provision, which originated in an Act of 1888, has been

acknowledged to be a failure. It merely creates confusion. The problems of statutory

interpretation are far too complex to be solved, or even assisted, by formulas of this kind. In

truncated form the New Zealand provision found favor with the British Law Commissions. The

draft bill on interpretation put forward by the Commissions in 1969 contained the statement that

the principles to be applied should include the following: 'that a construction which would

promote the general legislative purpose underlying the provision in question is to be preferred to

a construction which would not'.

The Commissions explained that they did not use the word 'mischief because they preferred to

avoid words which for the layman have an archaic ring. Laymen do not however read

Interpretation Acts; and the term is well understood by lawyers.

Smith v Hughes (1960)16

16 (1960) 1 WLR 830Page | 12


Section 1(1) of the Street Offences Act 1959 said "it shall be an offence for a common prostitute

to loiter or solicit in a street or public place for the purposes of prostitution." The court

considered appeals by six different women who had been on a balcony or at the windows of

ground floor rooms. In each case, the women were attracting men by calling to them or tapping

on a window. They argued they were not guilty since they were not in the street. The court

decided they were guilty.

Lord Parker saying:

"For my part I approach the matter by considering what is the mischief aimed at by this Act.

Everybody knows this was an Act to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along the

streets without being molested or solicited by common prostitutes. Viewed in this way it can

matter little whether the prostitute is standing in the street or in the doorway or on the balcony,

or at a window, or whether the window is shut or open or half open."

Elliot v Grey (1960)17

The defendant's car was parked on the road. It was jacked up and had its battery removed. He

was charged with an offence under the Road Traffic Act 1930 of using an uninsured vehicle on

the road. The defendant argued he was not 'using' the car on the road as clearly it was not

drivable. The court applied the mischief rule and held that the car was being used on the road as

it represented a hazard and therefore insurance would be required in the event of an incident. The

statute was aimed at ensuring people were compensated when injured due to the hazards created

by others.

Royal College of Nursing v DHSS (1981)18

The Royal College of Nursing brought an action challenging the legality of the involvement of

nurses in carrying out abortions. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861 makes it an offence

17 [1960] 1 QB 367.18 (1981) 1 AER 545

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for any person to carry out an abortion. The Abortion Act 1967 provided that it would be an

absolute defense for a medically registered practitioner (i.e. a doctor) to carry out abortions

provided certain conditions were satisfied. Advances in medical science meant surgical abortions

were largely replaced with hormonal abortions and it was common for these to be administered

by nurses. It was legal for nurses to carry out such abortions. The Act was aimed at doing away

with back street abortions where no medical care was available. The actions of the nurses were

therefore outside the mischief of the Act of 1861 and within the contemplate defense in the 1967

Act

Golden Rule

The Golden Rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning.

This interpretation is supreme and is called the golden rule of interpretation. The rule in

Heydon's Case19 has been criticized for failing to reflect the importance of the text. It dates from

a period when there was no science of exact drafting and judges were expected to use a wide

discretion in moulding the law. As parliament's attention to detail grew, the judge gradually

assumed his present role of textual interpreter.

Legislative texts were still frequently defective however, and this fact had to be allowed for.

Accordingly there grew up what has been misleadingly called the golden rule. The name is

ascribed to the following classic passage from a judgment by Lord Blackburn:

'I believe it is not disputed that what Lord Wensleydale used to call the golden rule is right, viz,

that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all together giving the words their

ordinary signification, unless when so applied they produce an inconsistency, or an absurdity or

inconvenience so great as to convince the Court that the intention could not have been to use

them in their ordinary signification, and to justify the Court in putting on them some other

signification, which, though less proper, is one which the Court thinks the words will bear'20

19 For the mischief rule20 River Wear Commissioners v A damson, (1877) 2 App Cas 743, 764.

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It is pretty clear that what might be termed the auriferous part of this statement was intended to

be the first part, the phrase beginning 'unless when so applied' being a limiting provision akin to

a proviso. The golden rule is that we are to take the whole statute together, and construe it all

together, giving the words their ordinary signification. In other words, it is a rule of literal

construction.

Nokes v Doncaster Amalgamated Collieries,21

Here in this case, for example, Lord Simon said: 'The golden rule is that the words of a statute

must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning'. In other words the name 'golden rule' is

ambiguous. Indeed a third meaning has been suggested for it by Max Radin, namely that it is to

the effect that the legislator's intent governs the meaning of an enactment. Sir William Graham

Harrison, a former First Parliamentary Counsel, playfully suggested a fourth meaning: 'the

golden rule for the interpreter of Acts that they were not intended to mean what, to the plain man,

they would appear to say'. It is plainly ridiculous that the name given to a rule of statutory

interpretation should itself have several different meanings. All we can do now is discarding this

unsatisfactory name, and adopt Shaw's wise conclusion that the golden rule is that there are no

golden rules.

It has been contended that in this connection the term 'absurdity' should be widened to include

all the defects Lord Blackburn mentions, and indeed others. Thus Cross argues that such words

as 'repugnancy', 'inconsistency', 'anomaly' and 'contradiction' can be properly subsumed under it.

If this is so it would be better to refer to the so-called 'golden rule' as the absurdity rule. The only

thing that distinguishes it from the literal rule is that it allows the literal meaning to be departed

from where to follow it would produce absurdity.

Ramanjaya Singh v Baijnath Singh 22

21 (1940) AC 1014, 102222 AIR 1954 SC 749

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Here the Election tribunal set aside the election of the appellant under s 123(7) of the

Representation of People’s Act, 1951 on the grounds that the appellant had employed more

persons than prescribed for electioneering purpose. The appellant contended that the excess

employees were paid by his father and hence were not employed by him. The Supreme Court

followed the grammatical interpretation of S 123(7) and termed the excess employees as

volunteers.

Maqbool Hussain v State of Bombay 23

Here the appellant, a citizen of India, on arrival at an airport did not declare that he brought gold

with him. Gold, found in his possession during search in violation of government notification,

was confiscated under S 167 (8) Sea Customs Act, 1878. He was charged under s 8 of the

Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. The appellant pleaded that his trial under the Act was

violative of Art 20(2) of the constitution relating to double jeopardy as he was already punished

for his act by way of confiscation of the gold. It was held by the Supreme Court that the sea

customs authority is not a court or a judicial tribunal and the confiscation is not a penalty.

Consequently his trial was valid under the Act of 1947.

Bhavnagar University v Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd, 24

Here it was held that according to the fundamental principles of construction the statute should

be read as a whole, then chapter by chapter, section by section and then word by word.

23 (1953) S.C.R. 73024 (2003) 2 SC 111

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Municipal board v State transport authority, Rajasthan, 25

Here an application against the change of location of a bus stand could be made within 30 days

of receipt of order of regional transport authority according to s 64 A of the Motor vehicles Act,

1939. The application was moved after 30 days on the contention that statute must be read as “30

days from the knowledge of the order” The Supreme Court held that literal interpretation must be

made and hence rejected the application as invalid.

Raghunandan Saran v M/s Peary Lal workshop Pvt Ltd, 26

Here the Supreme Court validated 14 (2) of the Delhi Rent Control Act 1958 and provided the

benefit of eviction on account of nonpayment of rent. The Supreme Court adopted grammatical

interpretation.

Exceptions to the rule of literal interpretation

Generally a statute must be interpreted in its grammatical sense but under the following

circumstances it is not possible:-

Logical defects

A) ambiguity

B) inconsistency

C) incompleteness or lacunae

D) Unreasonableness.

25 AIR 1965 SC 45826 AIR 1975 SC 428

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INTERNAL AID OF INTERPRETATION

Statute generally means the law or the Act of the legislature authority. The general rule of the

interpretation is that statutes must prima facie be given this ordinary meaning. If the words are

clear, free from ambiguity there is no need to refer to other means of interpretation. But if the

words are vague and ambiguous then internal aid may be sought for interpretation.

Following are the internal aids:

Context

If the words of a statute are ambiguous then the context must be taken into consideration. The

context includes other provisions of the statute, its preamble, the existing state of law and other

legal provisions. The intention behind the meaning of the words and the circumstances under

which they are framed must be considered.

Title

Title is not part of enactment. So it cannot be legally used to restrict the plain meaning of the

words in an enactment.

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Long title

The heading of the statute is the long title and the general purpose is described in it. E.g.

Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the long title reads as follows “An Act to make

provisions for the prevention of adulteration of food”. In Re Kerala Education bill27, the

Supreme Court held that the policy and purpose may be deduced from the long title and the

preamble. In Manohar Lal v State of Punjab28, Long title of the Act is relied as a guide to decide

the scope of the Act.

Short Title

The short title of the Act is purely for reference only. The short title is merely for convenience.

E.g. The Indian Penal Code, 1860.

Preamble

The Act Starts with a preamble and is generally small. The main objective and purpose of the

Act are found in the Preamble of the Statute. “Preamble is the Act in a nutshell. It is a

preparatory statement. It contains the recitals showing the reason for enactment of the Act. If the

language of the Act is clear the preamble must be ignored. The preamble is an intrinsic aid in the

interpretation of an ambiguous act. In Kashi Prasad v State 29 , the court held that even though the

preamble cannot be used to defeat the enacting clauses of a statute, it can be treated as a key for

the interpretation of the statute.

Headings

A group of Sections are given under a heading which act as their preamble. Sometimes a single

section might have a preamble. S.378-441 of IPC is “Offences against property”. Headings are

27 1997 (1) SC 112.28 (1951)S.C.R. 67129 AIR 1955 All. 749

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prefixed to sections. They are treated as preambles. If there is ambiguity in the words of a statute,

headings can be referred. In Durga Thathera v Narain Thathera 30 , the court held that the

headings are like a preamble which helps as a key to the mind of the legislature but do not

control the substantive section of the enactment.

Marginal notes

Marginal notes are the notes that are printed at the side of the section in an Act and it

summarizes the effect of the section. They are not part of the statute. So they must not be

considered. But if there is any ambiguity they may be referred only as an internal aid to the

construction. In Wilkes v Goodwin, the Court held that the side notes are not part of the Act and

hence marginal notes cannot be referred.

Proviso

A proviso merely carves out something from the section itself. A proviso is a subsidiary to the

main section and has to be construed in the light of the section itself. Ordinarily, a proviso is

intended to be part of the section and not an addendum to the main provisions. A proviso should

receive strict construction. The court is not entitled to add words to a proviso with a view to

enlarge the scope.

Definition/ Interpretation clause

The legislature can lay down legal definitions of its own language, if such definitions are

embodied in the statute itself, it becomes binding on the courts. When the act itself provides a

dictionary for the words used, the court must first look into that dictionary for interpretation. In

Mayor of Portsmouth v Smith, the court observed “The introduction of interpretation clause is a

novelty.”

Conjunctive and Disjunctive words

30 Air 2008 SC 32Page | 20


The word “and” is conjunctive and the word “or” is disjunctive. These words are often

interchangeable. The word ‘and’ can be read as ‘or’ and ‘or’ can be read as ‘and’.

Gender

Words’ using the masculine gender is deemed to include females too.

Punctuation

Punctuation is disregarded in the construction of a statute. Generally there was no punctuation in

the statutes framed in England before 1849. Punctuation cannot control, vary or modify the plain

and simple meaning of the language of the statute.

Explanations

In certain provisions of an Act explanations may be needed when doubts arise as to the meaning

of the particular section. Explanations are given at the end of each section and it is part and

parcel of the enactment.

Exceptions and savings clause

To exempt certain clauses from the preview of the main provisions, and exception clause is

provided. The things which are not exempted fall within the purview of the main enactment. The

saving clause is also added in cases of repeal and re-enactment of a statute.

Schedules

Schedules form part of a statute. They are at the end and contain minute details for working out

the provisions of the express enactment. The expression in the schedule cannot override the

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provisions of the express enactment. Inconsistency between schedule and the Act, the Act

prevails. 31

Illustrations

Illustrations in enactment provided by the legislature are valuable aids in the understanding the

real scope.

Meaning of the words

The definition of the words given must be construed in the popular sense. Internal aid to

construction is important for interpretation.

EXTERNAL AID TO INTERPRETATION

Other than the internal aid to interpretation which are part of a statute itself there are other aids

which are not part of the statute. These are known as external aid to interpretation. The court can

consider recourse outside the Act such as historical settings, objects and reasons, bills, debates,

text books, dictionaries etc. Recourse to external aid is justified only to well-recognized limits.

Historical settings

The surrounding circumstances and situations which led to the passing of the Act can be

considered for the purpose of construing a statute.

Objects and reason

The statements and object cannot be used as an aid to construction. The statements of object and

reason are not only admissible as an aid to construction of a statute. Objects and reasons of a

31 Ramchand textiles v sales tax officer, AIR 1961 SC 1506Page | 22


statute is to be looked into as an extrinsic aid to find out the legislative intent, only when the

language is obscure or ambiguous.

Text books and dictionaries

The use of dictionaries is limited to circumstances where the judges and Counsels use different

words. In such cases the court may make use of standard authors and well known authoritative

dictionaries. Text books may also be refereed to for assistance in finding out the true

construction of a statute.

International Conventions

International conventions are generally not resorted to for the purpose of interpretation, but it

helps as an external aid for the purpose of resolving ambiguities in the language.

Government publications

They are:-

Reports of commissioner or committee

Other documents.

Only if the above documents are expressly referred to in the statute, they can be looked at for the

purpose of construction.

Select Committee Report

To ascertain the legislative intent of a doubtful meaning of a statute, report of legislative

committee of the proposed law can be referred. The report of the Select committee can be looked

into from an historical angle to find out what was the previous law, before and at the time of

enacting the statute.

Debate and proceedings of the legislature

A speech made in the course of a debate on a bill could be referred to find out the intent of the

speaker. Speeches made in the parliament can also be referred.

Page | 23


History of legislation

The history of legislation usually denotes the course of events which give rise to enactments. The

court may refer historical facts if it is necessary to understand the subject matter.

Extemporaneous exposition

In interpreting old statutes, the construction by the judges who lived at the time of the enactment

could be referred as 9it is best to understand the intentions of the makers of the statute.

Judicial interpretation of words

It is an accepted principle of law that if a word has received clear judicial interpretation, then the

word is interpreted according to the judicial meaning. E.g. Rule in Ryland v Fletcher, absolute

liability has become a fixed and standing rule. If definition is not given, popular meaning must

be construed.

Previous English law

It is not legal and correct to apply decisions of English acts to the construction of an Indian

statute. Others external aids include interpretation by the executive, foreign decisions which

include policy of the legislature and government policy, purpose of the Act conventions and

practices.

Spirit and reason of law.

The purpose of a statute is the reason of enactment, but the spirit or reason of law is connected

with the legislative intent.

Page | 24


Acts in Pari material

When a statute is ambiguous, the intention of the legislature may be gathered from statutes

relating to same subject. The definitions cannot be generally imported. Other external aids

include interpretation of later Acts with the help of

PRESUMPTIONS

The general presumption is that ordinary courts of law namely the civil courts, criminal courts,

high courts and Supreme Court have jurisdiction over people. Any statute which takes away the

jurisdiction of ordinary courts must be rarely resorted to, as people have the right to have free

access to all the courts.

Jurisdiction of civil courts

The basic presumption of law is that all civil courts are empowered to decide all suits of civil

nature. The basis of this presumption is that civil and criminal court have general jurisdiction

over people and they have right to have free access to both civil and criminal court.

Page | 25


Section 9 of CPC

It was emphasized by the Supreme Court that the rule prescribed by section 9 of CPC is that the

court shall, subject to provisions contained in the code, have jurisdiction to try al suits of civil

nature excepting suits in which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. The law

further presumes that a remedy in the ordinary civil courts must always be available to citizens.

Legal provisions excluding jurisdiction of civil courts and conferring jurisdiction to tribunals

must strictly interpreted in such a way that as far as possible, the jurisdiction of civil court are

not taken away. If the statute contains two interpretations, then the one conferring jurisdiction

will prevail. Exclusion of jurisdiction must be expressed or clearly implied.

Jurisdiction of other courts

The general presumption is that a statute should not be given such an interpretation as to take

away the jurisdiction of the court unless the language of the statute is unambiguous and clear.

Since jurisdiction has been given to court by legislation, it is the legislation alone which can take

away the jurisdiction.If any statute provides for an express bar of jurisdiction of a civil or other

court, then the scheme of the particular Act must provide adequate alternative remedies. If the

constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, the writ of certiorari is the only recourse.

There is no sympathy for legislative provisions which oust jurisdiction of courts, because of the

fact that the subjects are deprived of a remedy. If jurisdiction is conferred to a tribunal, the

intention of the parliament is presumed to have jurisdiction to correct the decision of inferior

tribunal.

Finality clause

Many modern statutes contain provisions which attempt to take away the jurisdiction of courts

by making the decision of the tribunal final or conclusive. The remedy by certiorari is never to be

taken away by any statute except by the most explicit and clear words. The word final means

without an appeal. It does not mean without recourse to the writ of certiorari. It makes the

Page | 26


decision final on fact but not on law.In Dhulabhai v State of MP 32 , the Supreme court held that if

a statute gives finality to the orders of a special tribunal, the jurisdiction of civil court must be

held to excluded only if there is an adequate alternate remedy similar to what civil remedy would

be. In R v Medical Appeal Tribunal 33 , Lord Denning said the word ‘final’ only means’ without

appeal’ and the remedy of certiorari cannot be taken away because it is not an appeal.

Creating new and enlarging existing jurisdiction

It is presumed that a statute does not create new jurisdiction or enlarge existing jurisdiction.

Express language is required if an Act is to be so interpreted, as to create new jurisdiction or

enlarge existing jurisdiction.In Heathstar properties Ltd 34 , A statute giving power to grant relief

‘on being satisfied’ on certain facts, does not confer on it any power to grant interim relief until

such fact had been fully ascertained. In State of UP v Mohammed Nooh 35 , Ina departmental

enquiry against the constable, the person holding the trial offered to be a witness and prosecuted

the constable. There was a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The court held that

it can issue a certiorari.

Conclusion

What practical rules are available now to assist the courts in statutory interpretation? We first

need to understand that we are in a situation different from that in which many of the dicta

shaping existing rules were delivered.

The main difference lies in the nature and quality of modern type legislative texts. These are

composed in a highly sophisticated way. They are drafted by skilled people, whose aim is to

spell out in a logical and consistent manner the full detail of the legislative scheme. The

32(1968) 3 S.C.R. 66233 [1994] Imm AR 51334 (1966) 1 WLR 99335 (1958) S.C.R. 595

Page | 27


common-law draftsman of today works under the literal view of interpretation. He aims to

provide a text which contains the answers and can be obeyed as it stands.

It follows that the general rules and presumptions we have been discussing are now of little

value. Either the meaning is plain or it is not. If it is not, then there is a doubt situation. The

doubt cannot be resolved by a general rule. We have left behind the era when the answer about

any oddness was the letting of blood, and the leech was always the convenient instrument.

What is first needed now is a skilled diagnosis.

What is the nature of the doubt?

Exactly how does it arise?

What is its cause?

What principles apply to the resolution of doubts of that nature?

We shall find in this project work that there are answers to these questions. We have moved from

the general to the particular. But we recognize that each particular rule must sub serve the

generality of the predictability principle that answers should lay in the text, and not in the

opinion of a judge or official.

The main body of the law is to be found in statues, together with the relevant statutory

instruments, and in a case of law as enunciated by judges in the courts. But the judges not only

have the duty of declaring the common law, they are also frequently called upon to settle

disputes as to the meaning of words or clauses in a statute.

Parliament is the supreme law-maker, and the judges must follow statutes. Nevertheless there is a

considerable amount of case law which gathers round Acts of Parliament and delegated

legislation since the wording sometimes turns out to be obscure. However, the rules relating to

the interpretation of statutes are so numerous, have so many exceptions, and several are so flatly

contradictory, that some writers hold view that there are in effect no rules at all.

Page | 28


Statutes are extremely complex legal documents and no parliamentary draughtsman can

anticipate future contingencies; neither can they always accommodate the natural ambiguities of

our language. As a result, judges are often called upon to interpret a word or phrase which can be

crucial to the outcome of a case.

Bibliography

Books referred

AB Kafaltiya, “Interpretation of Statute”, 2008, Universal Law Publishing Company,

Page | 29


Justice G.P. Singh, “Principles of Statutory Interpretation”, 11 Edition, 2008, LexisNexis

Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur.

Avtar Singh, “Introduction to Interpretation of Statutes”, 2nd Edition, Reprint 2008,

LexisNexis Butterworths Wadhwa, Nagpur, 2008

Websites Referred

http://www.gdrc.org

http://www.ifad.org

http://indiabudget.nic.in

http://www.wikipedia.com

http://practicalaction.org

http://www.undp.org

http://www.unpei.org

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