Israel: the First Hundred Years VOL 2 From War to Peace

ISRAEL:THEFIRSTHUNDREDYEARS

IsraeliHistory,PoliticsandSocietySeriesEditor:EfraimKarsh,King'sCollegeLondon

ISSN1368-4795

Providingamultidisciplinaryexamination inall aspects, this series servesasameansofcommunicationbetweenthevariouscommunities interestedinIsrael:academics,policy-makers,practitioners,journalistsandtheinformedpublic.

Otherbooksintheseries:

PeaceintheMiddleEast:TheChallengeforIsraeleditedbyEfraimKarsh

TheShapingofIsraeliIdentity:Myth,MemoryandTraumaeditedbyRobertWistrichandDavidOhanaBetweenWarandPeace:DilemmasofIsraeliSecurityeditedbyEfraimKarsh

U.S.—IsraeliRelationsattheCrossroadseditedbyGabrielSheffer

FromRabintoNetanyahu:Israel'sTroubledAgendaeditedbyEfraimKarsh

IsraelatthePolls1996editedbyDanielJ.ElazarandShmuelSandler

InSearchofIdentity:JewishAspectsinIsraeliCultureedited byDanUrian and EfraimKarsh Israel: TheDynamics of Change andContinuityeditedbyDavidLevi-Faur,GabrielShefferandDavidVogelRevisitingtheYomKippurWareditedbyP.R.Kumaraswamy

PeacemakinginIsraelafterRabin

editedbySassonSofer

Parties, Elections and Cleavages: Israel in Comparative and TheoreticalPerspectiveeditedbyReuvenY.HazanandMosheMaor

Israel:TheFirstHundredYears

VolumeIIFromWartoPeace?

EditorEfraimKarsh

Firstpublishedin2000byFRANKCASSPUBLISHERS

Thiseditionpublished2013byRoutledge2ParkSquare,MiltonPark,Abingdon,OxonOX144RN

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RoutledgeisanimprintoftheTaylor&FrancisGroup,aninformabusiness

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Israel:thefirsthundredyearsVol.2:Fromwartopeace?-(Israelihistory,politicsandsociety)1.Jews-Palestine-History-20thcentury2.Palestine-History-20thcenturyI.Karsh,Efraim

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ISBN0714649627(cloth)ISBN0714680230(paper)

ISSN1368-4795

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ThisgroupofpapersfirstappearedinaSpecialDoubleIssueofIsraelAffairs6/3—4(Spring/Summer2000),'Israel:FromWartoPeace?'ISSN1353-7121

publishedbyFrankCass.

Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthxispublicationmaybereproduced,storedinorintroducedintoaretrievalsystemortransmittedinanyformorbyanymeans,

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ContentsPARTI:FROMWARTOWARTheForgottenWar:Jewish-PalestinianStrifeinMandatoryPalestine,December1947-May1948 DavidTal

ShallWeGotoWar?AndIfWeDo,When?TheGenesisoftheInternalDebateinIsraelontheRoadtotheSinaiWar

MottiGolani

The1956SinaiCampaign:DavidBen-Gurion'sPolicyonGaza,theArmisticeAgreementandFrenchMediation

MordechaiGazit

The'TranquilDecade'Re-examined:Arab-IsraeliRelationsDuringtheYears1957-67

MenachemKlein

Israel'sNuclearProgramme,theSixDayWarandItsRamifications ShlomoAronson

PARTII:CHANGINGPERSPECTIVESONNATIONALSECURITY

TowardsaParadigmShiftinIsrael'sNationalSecurityConception UriBar-Joseph

PatternsofWarInitiationintheArab-IsraeliConflict:ANoteontheMilitaryDimension

DavidRodman

Israel'sNuclearHistory EdwinS.Cochran

PARTIII:TOWARDSPEACE

Jewish-Non-Palestinian-ArabNegotiations:TheFirstPhase EliezerTauber

TransitionfromConflict:TheImportanceofPre-NegotiationsintheOsloPeaceProcess

IlanG.Gewurz

UnambiguousAmbiguity:TheOpacityoftheOsloPeaceProcess NadavMorag

TheNetanyahuEra:FromCrisistoCrisis,1996-99 NeillLochery

Jerusalem:PartitionPlansforaHolyCity ElishaEfrat

Arab-IsraeliCoexistence:TheCauses,AchievementsandLimitations

EfraimInbar

AbstractsIndextoVolume6

PartI:FromWartoWar

TheForgottenWar:Jewish—PalestinianStrifeinMandatoryPalestine,December

1947—May1948DAVIDTAL

For quite some time the historiography of the 1948Arab-Israeliwar has beensubjected toavehementacademicandpublicdebate in Israel.Thedebatewastriggeredbyagroupofacademicscallingthemselvesthe 'NewHistorians'whoclaimed to have uncovered new archival evidence relating to the creation ofIsraelanditsfirstwarwithitsArabneighbours.Oddlyenough,theactualstateofresearchonthe1948Warlagsfarbehindthedebateonthesubject,notleastwithregardtotheinitialstageofthewar,namelytheJewish-PalestinianstruggleprecedingtheArabinvasionofMay1948.Thereisnocomprehensivestudyofthatconflictandtheliteratureonthesubjectcanbedividedintotwoschoolsofthought.Israelihistorianstendtoconcentrateonthewar'sorganizationalaspects,depicting the period as a preparatory stage of the Jewish state's War ofIndependence.1Yet theyhavehardly touched the political thinkingunderlyingthe strategic planning and military actions of the Jewish armed forces in thestrugglewiththePalestinians.Theotherhistoriographicalschoolofthought,articulatedbyPalestiniansand

writerssympathetictotheircause,depictsJewishactionsaspartofadeliberateand vicious attempt to take over the country and disinherit its indigenouspopulation.CommentingonWalidKhalidi'swriting in thisvein, theAmericanhistorian William Roger Louis expects that 'further detailed research willprobablysubstantiateratherthanalter'suchconclusionsandinterpretation.2

Whatisglaringlymissingfromthelatternarrativeisthewaritself.Nothingissaidabouttheparties'warplanningortheirconductandactionsinthecourseofhostilities.TheoutcomeoftheJewish-Palestinianstrifeisdetached,accordingtothis school of thought, from the historical process that produced it.Moreover,historians of both persuasions have downplayed, or ignored altogether, the

Jewish-Palestinianwar.Mostimportantly,theyfailtoexplainhowisitthatthePalestineArabcommunity,whichwas twice thesizeof theJewishcommunity(about1,200,000Arabscomparedto600,000Jews)andostensiblyenjoyedthesupportofthesurroundingArabstates,stillsufferedsuchadevastatingblowatthehandsoftheJews.Thisessayseekstofillthislacunaandtoshednewlightonaconflictcovered

bylayersofideologicalpolemicaimedatjustifyingone'sownviewsandpoliticsandnegating contending approaches.Bywayofdoing so, itwill describe andanalyse the sources, developments and turning points in the political andstrategic thinking of both belligerents, and will offer an explanation for thePalestiniandefeat.Morespecifically, itwillbeshown that theJewishacceptanceof theUnited

NationsPartitionResolutionof29November1947was translated into thewarstrategy that was executed during the initial stages of the conflict. ThePalestinians,fortheirpart,determinedtopreventsuchaneventuality,optedforawarforwhichtheywereunpreparedandillequipped.Rivenbyinternalconflictsand in discordwith theArabgovernments, theywerenomatch for thehighlymotivated,well-organizedandunifiedJews.

JewishPreparations

Despite theviolentnatureof theZionist-Palestinianconflict fromits inception,themajorbattlefieldfortheJews,atleastuntilthesecondhalfofthe1940s,wasthe political arena. For a while, the British and international pledges of a'NationalHome' for the Jews inPalestine, set forth in theBalfourDeclarationand the League of Nations Mandatory charter, enabled the tiny JewishcommunityinPalestine(knownastheYishuv)togrowandflourish,despitethehostileattitudeof the localArabpopulation.TheJewsconcentratedmainlyondeveloping defensive capabilities against Arab harassment, co-operating asmuchaspossiblewith theMandatorygovernment.Theiraimwas toclaim thecountry through hard work and political activity. On the Jewish-Palestinianfront, the Yishuv leadership had to cope with day-today security problems,

mainly random raids and attacks by Palestinians against Jews. But the veryexistence of the Yishuv seemed secure, as long as British forces were in thecountry.3

Untilthelate1940s,therewasnoseriousconsiderationofthepossibilitythatthe confrontation with the local Arab community might become a full-scaleintercommunal war. Military planning to secure the existence of the Jewishcommunity underestimated the Palestinian-Arab threat. Such were Plan B ofSeptember 1945 and the May 1946 Plan. The latter plan was based on theassumptionthatanymilitaryconfrontationbetweenPalestine'sJewishandArabcommunitieswouldbesimilar topasthostilities,when theBritishwerestill inthecountry.ItassumedthattheArabswouldbebetterequippedandorganized,yet suggested that they would confine themselves to local terror acts againstindustrial and economic targets. The Hagana reaction, according to the plan,shouldbetoprotectthosetargetsandtakemeasurestoquelltheterrorcampaign.Countermeasures would be restricted to retaliation attacks against politicalleaders ('personal terror'), public sites, vital Arab economic and industrialfacilities,etc.4ItwasadefensiveplanthatsetnooffensivemissionsorgoalsfortheHagana.Nothingwassaidabout thepossibilityof seizing territoryheldbytheArabs,forexample,nottomentionafull-scaleassaultagainstthePalestiniancommunityorthetake-overofthecountry.It was British policy that predominated the Yishuv's post-war military

thinking,astheJewsweredisappointedbythecontinuedadherenceofthenewlyelectedLabourgovernmenttothe1939WhitePaperpolicy,contrarytopromisesgiven by Labour spokesmen before the July 1945 elections. The Mandatoryauthoritiescontinued to restrict Jewish immigration toPalestineandprohibitedthesaleoflandtoJews.TheYishuvleadershiplaunchedapoliticalandmilitarycampaigntoinducetheBritishtorevisethispolicy,anditsstruggleagainsttheBritishpolicylasteduntiltheendof1947.5

The turning point in the Hagana's strategic thinking occurred in December1946,whenDavidBenGurion,HeadoftheJewishAgency,assumedthedefenceportfolio. The act was meaningful in itself, as it signified the importanceBenGurion now attached to securitymatters a subject he had hardly botheredwith until then. In a speech delivered in December 1946 to the politicalcommittee of the 22nd Zionist Congress, BenGurion outlined a new strategic

directionfortheYishuvandtheHagana.Theshiftstemmedfromthequestion:whowastheenemy?Uptothatmoment,Haganastrategicthinkingassumedthattherewere two enemies: the localPalestinians and theBritish authorities.TheformerwereconsideredmoreofahindrancethanarealthreattotheYishuv;asto the latter, the Hagana supported and facilitated the political campaignorganizedbytheJewishleadership,whichsoughttoputpressureontheBritishtoabandontheirantiZionistpolicy,manifestedbythe1939WhitePaper.6

BenGurionnowmaintainedthatthestruggleagainsttheBritish,inwhichtheHagana had been engaged since 1945, was by and large over following theBritish surrender of the Palestine problem to the United Nations. Now, heclaimed, the Arabs had become the enemy that posed the foremost threat toJewishnationalaspirations:'Weshouldexpect'aninvasionbythearmedforcesof the neighbouring Arab states.7 The shift in BenGurion's threat perceptionconcernedonly the externaldangerposedby the armiesofneighbouringArabstates.AstothelocalPalestinianthreat,heheldthat'anattackbythePalestinianArabswillnotjeopardizetheYishuv'.8

This view was shared by the Hagana Command; some of its foremostmembersbelievedthatthepossibilityofwarwiththeregularArabarmiesshouldbe seriously considered.9 As to the Palestine Arabs, their capabilities wereunderestimatedbytheHaganawhichviewedthemasposingnoseriousmilitarychallenge to theYishuv.10 This strategic appraisal remained in force until thecommunalwarinPalestinewasalreadyinanadvancedstage.11

Aspart of his conception,BenGurionordered amajor reorganizationof theHaganainordertocreatearegularmilitaryforcethatwouldbeabletoresistaninvasionbytheregularArabarmies.12Suchadrasticmovewasmoreeasilysaidthandone.DuringthefirstmonthsoftheconflictmostoftheHagana'spersonnelwere only semimobilized, and were confined to a specific territory. Only thePalmah, theHagana's strike arm, consisted of full-timemobilized combatants,readytocarryoutordersonanationalscale.Inlate1947-early1948theHaganaunderwent amajor structural change, aimed at transforming its semimobilizedbrigades into fullymobilized forces. The shiftwas articulated in theOrder ofNational Structure, issued by the Hagana Command in November 1947,stipulatingfor the transformationof theHaganaintoanationalarmy,basedoncompulsorymobilizationoftheJewishpopulationandchargedwithconfronting

regular armed forces. Though the Order yet again played down the militarycapabilitiesof thePalestinians, thishad littleeffecton theactualcourseof thefighting, as the implementation of the Order was an arduous task which wascompleted only after the end of the intercommunal strife among thePalestinians.13

AstothePalestinianthreat,BenGuriondidnotthinkintermsofacommunalwar.Heshared thedismissiveviewsthatheheardabout thecapabilitiesof thelocal Palestinian forces. When he summed up in his diary the quantitativeassessmentsof themilitarystrengthof theforeignArabarmies,he ignored themilitarypotentialofthelocalArabpopulation.14

PalestinianPreparations

Twodetermining factorsunderlay thePalestinian response to theUNPartitionResolution:therefusaloftheArabgovernmentstoletthePalestiniansfighttheirownwar;andtheirlackofanationalpoliticalandmilitaryleadership,resultingin their overwhelming dependence on the assistance of the Arab states. ThePalestinians emerged from the 1936-39 Revolt with a broken leadership andwithout national institutions or political andmilitary power. TheArabHigherCommittee (AHC) which was under Husseini's sway, was recognized by theArabLeagueandtheBritishMandatorygovernmentastherepresentativebodyofthePalestineArabs,but itwastornbybitter internecinestrifeandremainedvoidofinfluence.There-emergenceoftheformerJerusalemMufti,HajjAminalHusseini,asheadoftheAHCduring1946effectednodramaticchangeinitsstatus. The Arab leaders, particularly in Syria, Transjordan and Iraq, wereunwillingtoallowtheMuftitoleadthestruggleforPalestine:hewasnotinvitedto attend the official Arab League meetings, even those dedicated to thePalestine crisis, and the Transjordanian and Iraqi prime ministers led theoppositiontohisdemandtoestablishaprovisionalPalestiniangovernment.15InOctober and December 1947, in summit meetings in Alei and in Cairo,representatives of the Arab states decided to place the military campaign inPalestine in the hands of the Arab League's military committee, under the

commandof theIraqiGeneralIsmailSafwat.ItwasdecidedtoprovidemoneyandriflestothePalestineArabs,buttoentrust theirdistributiontothemilitarycommittee,nottotheAHCortheMufti.16

Internally,HusseiniwasunabletounitethePalestiniansunderhisleadership,andthePalestiniancampfounditselfindisarray.TheMuftididnotbalkatusingviolence to impose his authority, including the use of terror against politicalrivals, which had been so damaging to the Palestinians during the 1936-39Revolt. Thus the Palestinians entered the crucial stage in the struggle forPalestine internally divided and with little influence on the inter-Arab andinternational arenas.17 The Palestinians' military organization - or moreaccurately,thelackofsuch-reflectedtheseshortcomings:theywereincapableofmountingasustainedmilitarycampaignagainsttheorganizedJewishforces.Ironically, the progress made during 1946 in the international diplomatic

effortstoresolvethePalestinequestion,whichmadeitappearincreasinglylikelythataJewishstatewouldbeestablished,heightenedthegeneralperceptionthatthe struggle over Palestine would be determined on the battlefield. The AHCvehemently opposed the plan submitted by the Arab League at the Londonconference (September 1946) stipulating the establishment of a unitaryindependentstateinPalestine.AccordingtotheLeague'splan,PalestinewouldbecomeafundamentallyArabstate,with theJewishminorityrecognizedasanautonomous religious faction and granted no more than one-third of therepresentationonthelegislativecouncil.Incontrast,theAHCdemandedthattheJewish presence in the national institutions be only one-sixth, accuratelyreflectingtheproportionoftheJewishpopulationinPalestinebefore1918.Theimplicationwas thatpost-1918 Jewish immigrantswouldnotbe recognizedascitizens.AnotherAHC conditionwas a ban on additional Jewish immigrationandaprohibitiononthesaleoflandtoJewsbyArabs.18

ThesedemandswererejectedbytheArabLeague,andtheAHCproceededtopromote the military option. At the meeting of the Arab League Council inBludan(Syria)inJune1946,arankingmemberoftheAHC,JamalalHusseini,pressured the participants to providemilitary aid to enable the Palestinians tothwartanimposedAnglo-AmericansolutionentailingthepartitionofPalestine.AccordingtoHusseini,theAHChadalreadyrecruited30,000Palestinians,whoneeded only arms and financial and political support from the Arab

governments. Husseini was confident that the Palestine Arabs would easilyoverpower the Jews,19 but there were no grounds for his optimism. ThePalestinians' only combat personnel were the al-Najada paramilitary group,numberingafewthousandmembers,whosesporadicmilitarytrainingdidnotgobeyond the use of a rifle. In fact, al-Najada was caught up in internal powerstrugglesandgraduallyfadedintooblivionupontheeruptionofthehostilitiesinPalestineafter29November1947.20

ThevisitoftheUnitedNationsSpecialCommissiononPalestine(UNSCOP)inthecountry,inJune1947,furtherincreasedthefeelingamongthePalestiniansthat a violent resolution was inevitable. However, apart from manpowerproblems, the Palestinians suffered from severe arms shortage. Their arsenalconsistedofobsolete rifles,andeven thosewerescarce. Itwasagain theArabLeague that dominated the Palestinians' military preparations. In September1947, the League's political committeemet at Sofar (Lebanon) to formulate areaction to UNSCOP's majority recommendation to establish two states inPalestine,oneJewishandoneArab.ThecommitteeurgedtheArabgovernmentsto assist the Palestinians with arms, money and manpower. In addition, apermanent technical committee was established with the role of defining themilitaryneedsforthedefenceofPalestineandtocoordinateandorganizeinter-Arabassistance.Inthefinalaccount,though,theimplicationsofthedecisiontoestablishwhatwouldafterwardsbecometheArabLeague'sMilitaryCommandforthePalestineconflictwastodivest thePalestiniansofresponsibilityfor thefighting.True, theAHChadarepresentativeonthemilitarycommittee,buthewasoneamongeight.21Anotherstepinthisdirectionwastheestablishmentofthesemi-militaryArabLiberationArmy(ALA),amoveinstigatedbySyriawithaviewtoabortingKingAbdallah'splanstotakeoverPalestineasthefirststeptowards the implementationofhisGreaterSyriavision.Bywayofcontrollingthenewforce, theSyriansappointedFawzial-Qawuqjias itscommander.TheMufti, who had been on bad terms with Qawuqji, had hoped to install hisnephew, Abd al-Qadir alHusseini, as commander, to no avail.22 The Mufti'sdisappointmentwas twofold:notonlywashedeniedcommandof a force thatwasrelativelywellorganized,trainedandequipped,buttheestablishmentoftheArab Liberation Army neutralized the Arab League's decision to assist thePalestinians, as armsand fundswere transferred to theALA rather thangiven

directlytothePalestinians.23

CommunalWarinPalestine

TheJewishandPalestinianreactionstotheUnitedNationsPartitionResolutionwere, naturally, very different. Ideological aspirations notwithstanding, theJewishleadershipmadeaclearandunequivocalpoliticaldecision:toaccepttheideaofpartition.ThiswasthecasewhenUNSCOPmembersintroducedtheideato the Jewish leadership, and yet again when the committee's majorityrecommendationforpartitionwasannounced.AstheJewishAgencyExecutiveput it in an internal discussion: 'Ourpositionwill be thatwewere andwearereadytoreachacompromise, i.e.aviablestate inpartof thecountry'.24WhenthePartitionResolutionwasadoptedbytheUNGeneralAssembly, theJewishleadership,notablyBenGurion,welcomeditenthusiasticallyasamajorsuccessfor the Zionists.25 This is not to say that the Jewish leadership regarded thepartitionlinesasthebestpossiblelines.Onthecontrary.MosheShertok,Headof the Jewish Agency's Political Department called the Zionist acceptance ofpartition a major compromise,26 and the Jews eventually extended theboundaries set by the UN Partition Resolution. However, this happened onlyafter amajor shift in the political and strategic situation, following theArabs'refusaltoacceptthePartitionResolutionandtheirattackonthenascentJewishstate.That the initial Jewish acceptance of the PartitionResolutionwas notmere

rhetoric was also evidenced by the strategic planning of the war against thePalestinians.Thus,forexample,fromthatmomentonwards,thediscussionsonthesecurityofJewishsettlementsintheWesternGalileewereconductedontheassumptionthattheywouldberesidentsoftheprospectivePalestinianstate.27

Similarly, the Hagana's military preparations from late November 1947 tomid-May1948wouldseemtonegatethepopularconspiracytheoryofaJewish-Transjordanian collusion to divide Mandatory Palestine among themselves.28

Not only did the Zionist leadership invest great efforts to evict Transjordan'sBritish-ledArabLegion fromPalestineupon theexpiryof theMandate, ifnot

earlier,but followingameetingon11May1948betweenGoldaMeir,ActingHeadoftheJewishAgency'sPoliticalDepartment,andKingAbdallah,inwhichthelatterproposedtoforgotheestablishmentofaJewishstate inreturnforanautonomous Jewish province in his kingdom, BenGurion summoned theHagana'sHighCommandersandordered themtoregard theJordanianfrontasan active war zone. Consequently, five Hagana brigades, out of ten, and twobattalions from a brigade facing the Egyptian front, were deployed along theeasternfront.29

Bethatasitmay,warwiththePalestiniansbrokeoutonthedayaftertheUNresolution. The AHC retained its defiant attitude towards the PartitionResolution, and theMufti rejected the compromise ideas put forward byArabpoliticians, insisting that the only solution was the creation of a unitaryPalestinian state with an Arab majority and a minority representation for theJews in the national institutions. The only way to achieve this, the Muftimaintained,was through amilitary confrontation, inwhich hewas certain thePalestinianswouldhavetheupperhand.On 30 November 1947, the Palestinians declared a three-day strike

accompanied by a flare-up of violence against Jewish targets. ThesedevelopmentsvindicatedtheunderlyingassumptionsoftheHagana'sMay1946Plan,whichenvisagedmajorunrestwhiletheBritishwerestillinthecountry.30

Accordingly, the Jewish reaction to the outbreak of hostilities was theimplementationoftheMay1946Plan.TheYishuvleadershiphadassumedthatthePalestinianswouldeventuallyaccepttheUNresolutionandthatasharpanddecisive, yet localized response to Arab attacks would prevent escalation andwould eventually drive the Arab leadership into moderation.31 HaganaintelligenceexpertsclaimedthatthemajorityofthePalestinianshadnotjoinedinthefighting,hencenothingshouldbedonetoprovokethem.ThiscautionarynotewaswidelyacceptedbytheYishuv'smilitaryandpoliticalleadership.32

The Hagana's assessment that most Palestinians would be reluctant to takepart in the fighting proved correct. One reason for this was the widespreadoppositiontotheMufti'sleadership.SomePalestinianoppositionleaders,mainlyinthecities,criticaloftheMuftiforinvolvingthePalestiniansinawarwithoutmaking the necessary preparations, actively supported the refusal ofSyria andthe Arab League to allow the Mufti to conduct the war. Others opposed his

leadershipoverthePalestinians,recallinghisbrutalattemptstoimposehimselfonthePalestiniansduringthe1936-39Revolt.NotablesfromBeersheba,HebronandGazareportedlypreferredtobepartofTransjordanratherthancomeunderthe Mufti's rule.33 Another problem was the silent opposition of manyPalestinians to the war. In various places, Palestinian notables negotiatedceasefireagreementswiththeirJewishneighboursonalocalbasis,andseveralvillages signedpeace agreementswith Jewish leaders at the local andnationallevel.ThistendencygrewwiththesetbackssufferedbythePalestiniansduringDecember 1947-January 1948 at the hands of the Jewish forces. RapidlymountingfinanciallossesalsopromptedthePalestinianstotryandreachatrucewiththeJews,asinthecaseofHaifa.34ManyofthePalestinianswhodidfightdidsoona localbasis,35andwereoftensplit intovariousgroups,somebetterorganized than others. Inmany places around the country, young Palestiniansunderwentbriefmilitarytraining,usuallyintheuseofsmallarms-butthiswasoflittlemilitaryvalue.ThisinternalfragmentationwasexacerbatedbythepoliciesoftheArabstates.

Theirpromisedmilitaryand financialassistancearrived in smalldroves,whiletheir governments refused to allow theMufti to run thewar. Itwasonly afterlaborious negotiations that the Arab League's political committee agreed toassign limited responsibility to the Mufti's loyalists: Abd al-Qadir alHusseiniwas appointed commander of the Ramallah-Jerusalem-Hebron sector, andHassanSalamewasplaced inchargeof theLydda-Ramlesector.Qawuqjiwasassignedtothenorthernfront,whichincludedtheGalileeandSamaria,whilenodecisionwasmade about the commanderof the southern sector.TheLeague'scompromisesolution led to thecreationof tworivalpowercentres,one ledbyQawuqji, theotherby theMufti.The inherentdisharmonyof thesituationwasfurtheraggravatedwheneachman tried to increasehis influence in theother'sterritory.36

WhiletheMufticontrolledtheNationalCommitteesthatwereestablishedinmostPalestinian towns,andmore significantly in ruralareas, theorganization,recruitment and arming of the population proceeded slowly, hampered by theinternecinestrife.TheMuftifounditdifficulttoimposehisauthoritybeyondhislimited circle of followers, his attempt to set the pace and character of thePalestinian reaction being unsuccessful. His plan was first to organize forces

loyaltohim,whichinturnrequiredaninitialdefensivestagebeforemovingonto the offensive. In practice, however, young Palestinians defied the Mufti'sorders, aswell as those of theNationalCommittees, and attacked Jewish andBritishtargetsattheirowninitiative.37TheforcesloyaltotheMufti,underthecommandofAbdal-QadiralHusseiniandHassanSalame,consistedofrecruitsandarmedvillagerswhowereusuallyassembledonanadhocbasisforspecificmissions,andofseveralhundredPalestinianswhoreceivedmilitary trainingattheSyrian facility inQatana.38Twoother local commanders loyal toHusseiniestablishedtheirbaseintheGalilee.ThedivisionbetweentheforcesloyaltotheMufti and those acting independently on a local basiswasmanifested in theirdifferentmodus operandi: the former took the offensive,while the latterwereengagedmainlyindefensiveoperations.39

The Palestinians'military inferioritywas particularly striking in comparisonwith the better-organized Hagana, which was the armed branch of a politicalentity, taking orders from a central command. The chances of the localPalestiniansseemedpoor,andthiswastheassessmentoftheYishuvleadership.'IfwehadtodealonlywiththePalestineArabs,Ithinkwecouldhavealreadywon the war', BenGurion asserted in January 1948, and the Hagana expertsagreed, repeating theiropinion inMarch.40Hence,adherence to theMay1946Plan was the natural result of the Yishuv leadership's political and militaryperceptionofthestateofaffairsinPalestine,andthecontinuationofthefightingdidnotchangetheJewishapproachorstrategy.By the second week of December 1947 it was clear that the militant

Palestinians would not lay down their arms.41 The Hagana responded inaccordancewith theMay1946Plan, intensifying the scale and ferocity of thecounterattacks,whichwereanimportantcomponentoftheplan.Thesamewastruewith regard toPalestinianattacksagainst Jewish transportation throughoutthe country, which nearly brought it to a halt. Measures were devised andimplementedtorelievethepressure,allinaccordancewiththeprinciplesoftheMay1946Plan.TheHighCommissionerwasurgedtouseBritishforcesinorderto secure transportation routes in Arab-controlled areas;42 suggestions wereraised to attack Arab transportation so severely that attacks on Jewishtransportation would stop;43 and new roads were built to bypass regionscontrolled by thePalestinians.44By the endofDecember, a new solutionwas

worked out. Jewish transportation in sensitive areas proceeded in convoysprotected by armed Hagana members, and the vehicles were plated witharmour.45ThesesolutionstemporarilyrelievedthepressureontheHaganaand,even though Jewish-Palestinian hostilities continued, in January 1948BenGurionrecounted'thecurrentphaseofthewar'asasuccess.46TheHagana'soperational strategyofhittingselected targets remainedunchanged, though theoperationsbecamebolderandmoreferocious.Still,noterritorywasseized,andfieldforcesdidnotinitiatedecisivecampaigns,orattempttobreakthebackboneof Palestinian military power. BenGurion responded to complaints from thenorthernpartofPalestinethatthesituationhaddeterioratedbyinsistingthatthelocalforcesshouldandcouldstandfirmandrepulseArabattacks.47

TowardsPlanDalet

Two developments that took place in March led to the shift in the Hagana'sstrategy: the blows the Palestinians inflicted on the convoys system, and thegraduatedBritishdeparturefromPalestinewhichbeganearlierthanexpected.AsthewarwiththePalestinianscontinued,theHaganaCommandmadeplans

todealwiththeanticipatedevacuationofthecountrybytheBritish,whichwastobecompletedby15May1948.Actingontheassumptionthatthedepartureofthe British would be followed by an invasion of Arab forces, the HaganaCommandissuedPlanDaletinMarch1948.This plan was interpreted by the Palestinian scholar Walid Khalidi, and

adoptedbyotheracademics, asa Jewishmaster-plan for theoccupationof theterritorieswhichwould eventually come to comprise the Israelof1949, at theexpense of the Palestinians, and for the deportation of the Palestinians fromtheseterritories.48

Howeverintriguing,thisthesisisfundamentallymisconceived,notleastsinceit is predicated on a combination of a tendentious interpretation of amilitarydocumentandareadingofhistoryfromtheendtothebeginning,asifthefinalstageweretheinevitableresultofearlierevents.The existing evidence shows that the concept underlying Plan Dalet was

shapedduringdiscussionsheldbyBenGurionwiththeHagana'sGeneralStaffinFebruary1948,withaviewtoD-Day-asBenGuriontermedtheimminentArabinvasionofPalestine.49Acarefulscrutinyoftheplanshowsthatitsconceptualframeworkwas still grounded in theUNPartitionResolution and that its aimwas to place the Jews in the best possible strategic position in the face of animminent Arab invasion. The Hagana brigades were ordered to take overevacuated government installations, capture Arabpopulated areas within thewould-beJewishstate,andtakeovervitalstrategicpointsinborderareas.AstoJewishenclavesintheprospectivePalestinianstate,theywereorderedtoguard,nottoseizethem.50Astotheaccusationsthattheplansettheguidelinesforthemassive deportation of the Palestinians, one could note Ben Gurion'sastonishment, in May, at the flight of Haifa's Palestinians: 'How did tens ofthousands flee in such haste with no justifiable reason?What was the cause?Onlyordersfromabove?...onlyfear?'.51

Plan Dalet's working assumption was that the Hagana should facilitate theestablishmentofaJewishstateinaccordancewiththeUNresolution,andsecureitsexistenceagainsthostileforces.AsfortheforcestheHaganacouldexpecttoencounteraftertheBritishleft,thesewerelikelytoconsistofacombinationofthe local Palestinian forces, irregulars who were already operating in thecountry,andtheregularArabarmiesthatwereexpectedtojointhefightingafterthe British withdrawal - 'all acting simultaneously, according to one commonoperativeplan'.PlanDalet'spointofdeparturewas that theenemy's 'presumedoperational targets'wouldbe 'tocutoff,andifpossible toconquer, theGalileeand theNegev, a deep invasion into the heart of the country, isolation of thethreemajorcities(TelAviv,JerusalemandHaifa),andthecutting-offofsupplylines and vital facilities such as water, electricity etc'. Consequently, theHagana's operational aims would be to secure the areas where the invadingforces could bemet and repulsed; to ensure freedom ofmovement across thecountrythroughtheoccupationofvitalstrategicsites;todisabletheoperationalarm of the (local) enemy by capturing its bases within the designated Jewishstate.TheplanorderedseizureofPalestinian territory in strategicareason theborders of the Jewish state. As to the Jewish enclaves, left by the PartitionResolution in Palestinian territory, the Hagana brigades were instructed 'todefend'them.52

PlanDaletwasscarcely,then,whatKhalidihasreadintoit.Rather, itwasaresponse to developments on the military and political fronts the ongoingfightingwith the Palestinians and the expected invasion of theArab armies -whilethetimetablewassetbythepaceoftheBritishevacuation.Hencetheshiftto the offensive by theHagana corresponded to theBritish evacuation of anygivenareaof theprospectiveJewishstate:wherever theBritish forces left, theHaganatookover,byforceifnecessary.Haganaforcesthusgainedcontrol,stepby step, over themixed towns aswell as the rural areas, stabilizing a line ofdefenceagainst theexpected invasionalong thePartitionResolution linesplusareasacrosstheborderinsidetheterritoryallocatedtotheArabs.53

ItisimportanttostressthattheimplementationofPlanDaletwastheresultofthecontinuousPalestinianhostilities.TheoriginalintentionandhopeoftheJewswere to carry out the Partition Resolution, alongside the Palestinians, in theirUN-assigned territories. Itwasonlywhen itbecameclear that thePalestinianswouldnotacceptthePartitionResolution,andinlightoftheimpendinginvasionoftheArabarmies,thattheHaganaturnedtotheoffensive.PlanDalet'sdepictionofthePalestiniansas'enemy'wasareflectionofagiven

situationofanintenseintercommunalwarinwhichitwasextremelydifficulttodrawacleardividing linebetweencombatantsandnon-combatants.Moreover,the planwas devised as a strategy against an invasion, rather than against thePalestinians, but the developments on the Jewish-Palestinian front made itrelevantthereaswell.DuringMarchthetideinthestrugglewiththePalestiniansbegantochange.WorriedbyPalestinianfailuresandtheprospectthatJerusalemwould fall to the Jews - or evenworse, toKingAbdallah of Transjordan, theMuftiinFebruary1948instructedHassanSalameandAbdal-QadiralHusseini,tofightanall-outwarfortheroadtothecity.54The'waroftheroads'hadbeenunderway since December 1947, but the Palestinians lacked sufficient trainedand committed fighterswho could stop the convoys to Jerusalem altogether.55

Notonlythefailuretostoptheconvoys,butalsotheabortiveattackinJanuary1948ontheJewishsettlementssouthofJerusalem(GushEtzion),inthemidstofanArabpopulatedarea,madeitcleartotheMuftithathisforceswerenomatchfortheJews.Torectifythesituation,SalameandHusseinisetuptrainingcampsnear Jerusalem inJanuary-February1948,and inearlyFebruary theMuftiandhis two senior commanders travelled toDamascus,where theymet theSyrian

President,Shukrial-Quwaitly.AtthemeetingthedivisionoflabourinPalestinewas reaffirmed, and it was agreed that the Mufti would receive financialassistancetopaythewagesoflocalandforeign'volunteers'.56

As the Palestinians were reorganizing their ranks, Hagana Commanderswarnedthatachangeinstrategywasrequired.ThePalestinians, theysaid,hadregainedtheinitiativeandweredictatingthetermsandpaceofthefighting-andthatmustbedenied to them.TheHaganaHighCommandthereforedecided inFebruary1948thatitsoperationalaimsshouldbethe 'takingover[ofterritory]inside the [Jewish] state, and [setting up] defence along its borders'. Toaccomplish this itwould be necessary to increase theHagana forces, enhancetheirmobility,andimprovetheircombatabilityagainstthePalestinians.57Thiswas easier said thandone.The Jews took a step in this directionbygraduallyadopting a policy of occupying sections of the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road inadvanceoftheconvoys.58ButinFebruarytheHaganaCommandstillthoughtinterms of prevention and deterrence by attacking selective Palestinian targets,withitsChiefofOperationsinvokingtheMay1946Plan,withitslimitedaims.59

By March, the Mufti's campaign against the Jewish convoys provedsuccessful, for a number of reasons. To beginwith, the Palestinian campwasstrengthenedbythearrivalofseveralhundredtrainedfightersrecruitedbyAbdal-QadiralHusseiniandHassanSalameinSyria.Togetherwithseveralhundredlocal Palestinians whom Husseini had trained and whose wages he paid, andassistedbyPalestinianswholivedinvillagesalongtheroadandwhocouldbemusteredwheneveraconvoypassedby, thiswasa formidable force,probablynumbering some 3,000 guerrillas. Moreover, the Palestinians could act freelysince February 1948, when the British decided to avoid the problematic TelAviv-Jerusalem road and instead to use the Latrun-Ramalla route to enter orleavelerusalem.60

GeographyalsoprovidedthePalestinianforceswithanadvantage,whichtheyexploited well: the eastern part of the road ran through a mountainous anddenselypopulatedArabarea,dominatedbysteepridges.InlateMarchandearlyApril, the Palestinians succeeded in closing the road to Jerusalem.61 Indeed,throughout thecountry theconvoysystemcameunderseverepressure.Duringone week inMarch five convoys were destroyed and more than 100 Haganafighterskilled.62

Thefailuresinthe 'struggleovertheroads'convincedtheHaganaCommandthat the May 1946 Plan did not provide an adequate response to the newsituation.The convoy system seemed to be no longer viable.The roots of theproblemweretheHagana'sfailuretoappreciatetheabilityofthePalestinianstomuster forceswhenaconvoyapproached, and its relianceonamilitaryescortforconvoys insteadofseizing territory inanticipationof theconvoy's journey.Moreover, the reactive strategy stipulated by the May 1946 Plan led to thedispersion of Hagana forces in protective missions all over the country. Notleast,therecruitmentofnewsoldierstotheHaganaproceededataslowerpacethan expected, and the organization was not able to amass its troops and usethemasastrikeforce.Thisstateofaffairswassufficient toprevent thefallofJewish settlements, but it was inadequate for coping with the vigorousPalestiniancampaignagainstJewishtransportation.63

PlanDaletofferedadirectiontowardsasolutionbysettingguidelinesfortheseizure of strategic positions, thereby improving theHagana's defence lines inthe face of the impending invasion. Thiswas the logic behind the firstmajoroffensiveoperationoftheHagana,whichsoughttoopentheroadtoJerusalem.InApril 1948 Jerusalemwas under siege imposed by the Palestinians, cut offfrom themain Jewish body in the coastal plain. BenGurion, seeing the gravesituation in the city and the despair among its Jewish residents, feared thatJerusalemwould fall.He therefore decided to commit the bulk of theHaganafieldforcestoopentheroadtothecity.64TheoutcomewasOperationNahshon(5-20April)inwhichforthefirsttimetheHaganaassembledthreebrigadestofight Abd al-Qadir alHusseini's forces along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road.During the operation, in which Husseini himself was killed, Hagana forcesseized the hills and ridges controlling the road and captured several Arabvillages,insomeofthemexpellingtheresidentsanddemolishingtheirhomes.65

TheroadtoJerusalemwastemporarilyopenedandsupplyconvoysrushedtothebesiegedcity.TheHagana'ssuccessesinAprilmarkedachangeinitsstrategy,asindeedin

the whole thrust of the war with the Palestinians. Abandoning the defensivestrategy articulated in May 1946, the Hagana now seized the initiative. ThePalestinianswereunable tomountaviable response. If theMufti'sattempts toorganizehisforcesduringFebruary-Marchwerecrownedwithacertainsuccess,

thesituationwas reversed inApril.ThePalestinians lost thebackboneof theircommand with the death of Abd al-Qadir alHusseini and Hassan Salame's'disgraceful'escapefollowingaraidonhisheadquartersinRamiebyaHaganacommando unit in conjunction with the Nahshon operation.66 The Palestiniansetback was exacerbated by the Dir Yassin massacre, in which some 100villagerswerekilledby 'dissident'Jewishforces.Themassacrewasabreakingpoint for the Palestinians, who fled in increasing numbers in the face of theJewishmilitaryforces.67ThefailureoftheattackbytheArabLiberationArmyagainst thenorthernJewishkibbutzofMishmarHa-emek,whichwaslaunchedon4Aprilandendedtendayslaterinignominiousdefeat,wasanotherblowtoPalestinianmoraleandbolsteredtheHagana'sself-confidence.68

Bynow thePalestinianshad lost all hopeofwithstanding the Jewson theirownandlookedtoassistancefromanArabinterventionforce.NotonlyAmmanbutTelAvivaswellknewofthePalestinians'desperateplight,andtheHagana'snextmoveswereinfluencedbythedefeatistmoodinthePalestiniancamp.69Itnow moved to the offensive against the Palestinians, who were 'untrained,disorganized and short of equipment',70 targeting the mixed towns first andexecutingPlanDalet.By15MaytheJewshadgainedfullcontrolofthemixedtowns thatwerewithin thepartition lines(notablyHaifaandTiberias).Furtherterritoriesweregainedinyetanotherroundofoperationsafterthatdate.AstheArab states attacked the newly born state of Israel, Palestinian defeat wascomplete.71

Conclusion

For the past century, Jewish and Palestinian history has been entwined in theterritory of Palestine. The outcome of the 1947-48 War reflects that tragicentanglement,inthesensethattheadvantagesthataccruedtoonesidewerethemirror imageof the setbacks sufferedby theother. Inotherwords, the factorsthatenabled theJews towin thewarwereprecisely those that thePalestinianslacked.TheJewshadacentralpoliticalleadership,recognizedbythemajorityofthe Jewishpopulation,whichcontrolledaunifiednational armedorganization;

the national resources were subordinate to the goals defined by the nationalleadership,whichpossessedtheorganizationalcapabilitiestorealizethem.ThePalestinians,on theotherhand,weresorelydivided.Theyhadneithernationalinstitutionsnoranationalleadership;adeepgulfexistedbetweentheruralandurbanpopulations, aswell asbetween tribesand families.The self-proclaimedleaderwasnotacceptedbymanyandwasconsequentlyunabletomobilizethemajority of thePalestinians to pursue thegoals hehad set.Even among thosewhofought,manyactedindependently.Andasiftheinternaldivisionswerenotenough,theArabgovernmentsdidnotrecognizetheMufti'sclaimtoleadershipandrenegedontheirpledgesofassistance.Theendoftheconfrontationwasthusinherent in its beginning, reflecting the situation of the two communities: onefundamentally leaderless and deeply divided, the other highly motivated andinternallycohesive.

DavidTalisLecturerinMilitaryHistoryatTelAvivUniversity.

Notes

1. See, for example, Zehava Ostfeld, Tsava Nolad, Tel Aviv, 1994, Vol. I, pp.67-8;Meir Pail,Mitt

Hahagana Le-tsvaHahagana, TelAviv, 1979, pp.278, 291 ff;YoavGelber,Gar'in Letsava Ivri

Sadir,TelAviv,1986,Ch.2.

AvrahamSelaoffersarareexception to thisrule.However,heconcentratesalmostexclusivelyonthe

Arabside,andhisaccount isasocial, rather thanmilitaryorpoliticalhistory.SeeAvrahamSela,

'The Palestine Arabs in the 1948 War', in Moshe Maoz and B.Z. Kedar (eds), The Palestinian

NationalMovement:FromConfrontationtoReconciliation?.TelAviv,1996(Hebrew).

2See,forexample,WalidKhalidi,'PlanDalet:MasterPlanfortheConquestofPalestine'.MiddleEast

Forum,November1961;HanPappe,TheMakingoftheArab-IsraeliConflict,1947-1951,London,

1992, pp.89-93; Uri Ben Eliezer,Derekh Ha-kavenet: Hivatsrutc shel Ha-militarism Ha-Israeli,

1936-1956,TelAviv,1995,pp.253-5;NurMasalha,ExpulsionofthePalestinians,WashingtonDC,

1992,pp.177-8;WilliamRogerLouis,TheBritishEmpireintheMiddleEast,1945-1951,Oxford,

1984,p.576.

3.DavidBenGurion,Zikhronot,TelAviv,1969,Vol.Ill,pp.42,123,128,135,167-8,222-3.

4. Plan B explicitly assumed that 'following the policy conducted by the [Mandate] government, a

[Jewish-Arab]warwillnotexceedthelevelof"smallwar"'. 'PlanB'.September1945,theHagana

Archives,TelAviv,Israel,73/100(hereinafterHA).Seealso'TheMay1946Plan',ibid.,73/140.

5.AlanBullock,Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary, 1945-1951, London, 1983, pp.47-8, 164-8.On the

Yishuv's struggle against the BritishWhite Paper policy see Yehuda Slutski et al., Sefer Toldot

Hahagana,TelAviv,1954-73,Vol.3/3,annexes32-6,pp.1921-34.

6. David BenGurion, Ba-ma'arakha, Tel Aviv, 1951, Vol. 5, pp.135-6; idem, Medinat Israel Ha-

mehudeshet,TelAviv,1969,p.68;SeferHahagana,Vol.3/3,pp.1901-14,1921-34.YoavGelber

claims thatBenGurionpaidno attention to thedaily securityproblemsdealt by theHagana even

afterassumingthedefenceportfolio;yethefailstoelaborateonthemeaningofthisneglect.Gelber,

Gar'inLetsavaIvri,pp.20-21.

7. 'Instructions to theHaganaCommand', 18 June 1947, inDavidBenGurion,Be-hilahem Israel, Tel

Aviv, 1975, pp.13-18. BenGurion repeated his warning that a full-scale war was imminent at a

meetingoftheMapaiPoliticalCommitteeon8January1948.SeeLabourPartyArchives,BeitBerl,

Israel(henceforthLPA),25/48.

8. David BenGurion's speech at the Jewish Congress's political committee, 18 December 1946,

BenGurion,Ba-ma'arakha,Vol.5,pp.135-6.

9.BenGurionheardthisfromIsraelGalili,HeadoftheHagana'sNationalCommand,fromaveteranof

theSovietRedArmy,ZalmanLivon,andfromoneofhisintelligenceadvisers,JosephKarkovi.See

David BenGurion War Diaries (BGWD), entries for 3, 8, and 9 April 1947. The references to

BenGurion's Diary during March-November 1947 are taken from Meir Avizohar (editor and

annotator),DavidBenGurion,PaameiMedina,TelAviv,1994.

10.SeecommentsbyMosheZelitski(Carmel),JosephRohel(Avidar),andIsraelGalili inBGWD,17,

25,30April1947.Seealsoentryfor10April1947.

11.See,forexample,BenGurion'sspeechattheSecurityCommittee,8June1947,inAvizohar,Paamei

Medina,p.295.

12.'InstructionstotheHaganaCommand',BenGurion,Be-hilahemIsrael,pp.16-17;BenGurion'sspeech

attheSecurityCommittee,8June1947,Avizohar,PaameiMedina,p.295.Ontheresponsetothe

localArabthreat,seeibid.pp.297-8;ontheresponsetoexternalthreatseeibid,pp.298-301.

13. 'OrderofNationalStructure',November1947,HA,73/140;Pail,MinHahagana,pp.161-74,274-7,

282-91; Dov Tamari, 'Hashiva Estrategit Be-irgun Hahagana, 1936-1947', MA thesis, Tel Aviv

University,1995,pp.162-3.

14.BenGurion,MedinatIsraelHa-mehudeshet,pp.70-71;BenGurion'sspeechattheSecurityCommittee,

8June1947,Avizohar,PaameiMedina,pp.295-8.SeealsoBGWD,27June1947,andhisanalysis

in the protocol of the meeting of the defence committee on 19 October 1947, Central Zionist

Archives,Jerusalem,Israel(hereinafterCZA).

15.FromBeiruttoForeignOffice,12October1947,FO371/61530/E9951;Sela,'ThePalestineArabsin

the1948War',pp.143-4.

16.Behind the Curtain: A Report by an Iraqi Parliamentary Committee on the Palestine War, tr. S.

Sabag,TelAviv,1954,pp.54,55-6.

17.RecordofConversation[BetweenaBritishOfficeroftheArabLegionandaVisitorfromtheHebron

District],28January1948,PublicRecordOffice(PRO),FO816/116;Sela,'ThePalestineArabsin

the1948War',pp.130-35.

18. See a report of an interviewwith theMufti: BritishMiddle East Office (BMEO), Cairo, to BAB

Burrows, Foreign Office, London, 2 October 1947, FO 371/61836/E9097; Sela, 'The Palestine

Arabsinthe1948War',pp.132-3.

19.Sela,'ThePalestineArabsinthe1948War',pp.133-4.

20. Sela, 'The Palestine Arabs in the 1948 War', pp.136-7. See also Haim Levenberg, The Military

PreparationoftheArabCommunityinPalestine,1945-1948,London,1993,pp.126-54,239—40.

21. From Amman to Foreign Office, 24 September 1947, FO 371/61529/E8873; Sabag, Behind the

Curtain,pp.51-2;Sela,'ThePalestineArabsinthe1948War',p.140.

22. FromAmman to Foreign Office, 20 December 1947, FO 371/61583/E12129; Sela, 'The Palestine

Arabsinthe1948War',pp.148-9.

23.FromAmmantoForeignOffice,21December1947,FO371/61583/E12132.

24. Protocol of Jewish Agency Executive meeting, 18 June 1947, CZA, S/100/52b. This decision

reiteratedearlierresolutions.See,forexample,protocolsofJewishAgencyExecutivemeetingson

21March, 26May and 8 June 1947. See alsoThe Jewish Plan for Palestine -Memoranda and

StatementsPresentedbytheJewishAgencyforPalestinetotheUNSCOP,Jerusalem,1947,pp.67-9,

331-2,354-5;DavidBenGurion'slettertoPaulaBenGurion,2September1947,Avizohar,Paamei

Medina,pp.349-52;MeetingoftheZionistExecutiveCommittee,Zurich,2September1947,ibid.,

p.352;BGD,18September1947,ibid.,pp.363—4.

25.ProtocoloftheJewishAgencyExecutivemeeting,30November1947,CZA,S/100/53b;BenGurion

to the High Commissioner, Avizohar, Paamei Medina, p. 13, entry for 1 December 1947;

BenGurion's speech to the Histadrut Executive Committee, 3 December 1947, ibid., pp.20-21;

BenGurion'sspeechtotheMapaiCentre,3December1947,LPA,25/47.

26.ReplyoftheGovernmentofIsraeltotheProposalsoftheUNmediator,CountF.Bernadotte,5July

1948,IsraelStateArchives,FO2451/1.

27.DavidBenGurion(G.RivlinandE.Oren(eds)),YomanHa-milhama,TelAviv,1982,Vol. I,p.15,

entryfor2December1947(hereinafterBGWD).

28.ThisclaimwasfirstmadebyIsraelBeer,aformerIDFLieutenantColonel,imprisonedinthe1950s

fortreason,andadoptedbyagroupof'revisionist'Israelihistorians.SeeIsraelBeer,BithonIsrael:

Etmol,Ha-yom,Mahar,TelAviv,1966,pp.125-6.

29.OperationsBranch/GeneralHQ, 'Modification of PlanDalet, 11May 1948', IsraelDefence Forces

Archives(hereinafterIDFA),922/75/1206;BGWD,Vol.I,p.411,entryfor12May1948.

30.TheHaganaCommand stated explicitly inmid-December 1947 that 'the strategic assumptions that

were articulated in the May 1946, were vindicated'. GHQ/Operations Branch: 'Summary of the

EnemyOrganizationinLightof theRecentDisturbances',19December1947,IDFA,922/75/595;

SeferHahagana,Vol.3/2,pp.1360-63.

31. Galili at a meeting of the Yishuv Security Committee, 13 November 1947, CZA, S25/9343;

BenGurion atmeetings ofMapai PoliticalCommittee on 9December 1947 and 8 January 1948,

LPA,25/47,25/48;YitzhakBen-ZviatameetingofMapaiPoliticalCommittee,11October1947,

inMeirAvizohar(ed.),AkhshavOLe-olamLo,BeitBerl,1989,p.183;BenGuriononequalrights

for the Arab citizens of the Jewish state at a Keren Ha-yesod convention, 29 October 1947, in

Avizohar,PaameiMedina,p.438.

32. Protocol of a Meeting on Arab Affairs, 1-2 January 1948, HA, 80/50/21; Israel Galili in Sefer

Hapalmah, Vol.2, January 1948, pp.xx-xxii, February 1948, pp.xxii-iv; BenGurion's letter toM.

ShertokandGoldaMeyerson,14March1948,MemorandaFiles,BenGurionResearchCentre,Sde

BokerCampus,Israel(hereinafter:BGA).

33.RecordofConversation[BetweenaBritishOfficeroftheArabLegionandavisitorfromtheHebron

District], 28 January 1948, FO 816/116; British Legation in Amman, 'Monthly Report on

Transjordanfor theMonthofJanuary',3February1948,FO371/68845;fromAmmantoForeign

Office,18March1948,No.304,FO816/117;Sela,'ThePalestineArabsinthe1948War',pp.146,

149-50.

34.Thefollowingisapartiallistofintelligencereportsonagreementsnegotiatedandconcludedbetween

JewsandArabs:amodusvivendiunderstandingbetweenkibbutzMa'aleHa-hamishaandtheArab

Katanavillage,23December1947;peaceagreementbetweentheArabpopulationofEmeqHefer

andtheirJewishneighbours,31December1947;negotiationsonpeaceinHaifa,18January1948;

peacetalksbetweentheJewishheadofBenShemenandthemayoroftheArabLydda,7January

1948; agreementbetween theArabvillageofAqir and JewishEqron,9February1948; ceasefire

negotiatedtostopthemutualshootingonJewishandArabtransportationinAcre,6February1948;

trucesignedbetweenMagdielandBirAdas,9March1948;theresidentsofArabTanturadecidedto

surrendertotheJewsbutaskedthat thistakeplaceafteranostensibleJewishattackuponthem,3

May1948.AllinHA,105/54/2.SeealsoGeneralSirA.CunninghamtotheSecretaryofStatefor

theColonies,'WeeklyIntelligenceAppreciation',1February1948,CO537/3869.

35.HAFile105/148, forexample,containsmany intelligencereportson thevarious localArabgroups

who acted on their own initiative against the Jews in their neighbourhood, and on the military

trainingundertakenbyPalestiniansinvariousplacesacrossthecountry.

36.Sela,'ThePalestineArabsinthe1948War',pp.154,156,158.

37.CunninghamtoSecretaryofState,'WeeklyIntelligenceAppreciation',3January1948,CO537/3869.

Onesuch instancewasanattackon theJewishsettlementsofGushEtzion inJanuary.Theattack

failed, and it was stopped under the Mufti's orders, who did not approve it in the first place.

Cunningham to Secretary of State, 'Weekly Intelligence Appreciation', 16 January 1948, CO

537/3869.

38.Abdal-QadiralHusseiniopenedatrainingbaseinTsurif,nearJerusalem,'TeneIntelligenceReport',1

January1948,HA,105/148;'TeneInformationReport',28December1947,ibid.

39.Sela,'ThePalestineArabsinthe1948War',pp.162-3.

40.'GuidelinesforPlansinCaseof[British]Evacuation',unsigneddocumentfromlateDecember1947,

IDFA,922/75/595;BenGurionspeechinMapaiCentre,8January1948,LPA,25/48;seealsoEzra

Danin's assessment, protocol of a meeting on Arab affairs, 1-2 January 1948, HA, 80/50/21;

BenGuriontoShertokandMeyerson,14March1948,MemorandaFiles,BGA.

41.'ListofPeoplewounded[from1December1947to25February1948]',GeneralMemoranda,BGA;

seealsoLevenberg,TheMilitaryPreparation,p.179.

42.Meeting betweenDavidBenGurion and SirA.Cunningham, 1December 1947, IsraelDocuments

1948, State of Israel, Israel Sate Archive, Political and Diplomatic Documents, 12/47-4/48 (ed.

GedalyaYogev),Jerusalem,1979,p.16;BGWD,p.18,entryfor2December1947;ibid.,p.43,entry

for 13 December 1947; ibid., pp.49-50, entry for 16 December 1947; ibid., p.72, entry for 25

December1947.

43.GHQ/OperationsBranch, 'Summary of theEnemyOrganization inLight of theRecentEvents', 19

December1947,IDFA,922/75/595;BGWD,p.15,entryfor2December1947;ibid.,pp.37-8,entry

for11December1947.

44. 'Summary of the Enemy Organization in Light of the Recent Events'; BGWD, p.63, entry for 22

December1947;ibid.,pp.71-2,entryfor25December1947;ibid.,pp.92,94,entryfor31December

1947.

45.'SummaryoftheEnemyOrganizationinLightoftheRecentEvents';BGWD,pp.77,79,entryfor28

December1947;ibid.,p.82,entryfor29December1947;ibid.,p.94,entryfor31December1947.

OntheconvoyssystemseeSeferHahagana,Vol.3/2,pp.1442-56;SeferHapalmah,Vol.2,pp.91-

105;AmiadBrezner,NitzaneyShirion,TelAviv,1995,Chapter2.

46.'OnDefenceandSecurityProblems',21(or27)January1948,inBenGurion,Be-hilahemIsrael,p.43;

BGWD,pp.183-5,entryfor25January1948.

47.BGWD,p.151,entryfor15January1948;seealsovariousspeechesbyBenGurionon15January,21

February,1,6and7March1948,inBe-hilahemIsrael,pp.34-74.

48.Seenote2above.

49.BGWD,pp.216,270,entriesfor8and29February1948.Theplan'sprincipleswerepresentedbythe

headoftheHaganaNationalCommand.SeeIsraelGalili,SeferHapalmah,Vol.2,pp.xxxiii-iv.

50.GHQ/OperationsBranch, 'PlanDalet',10March1948,IDFA,922/75/595;GHQ/OperationsBranch,

'APropositionforShapingoftheBordersandEstablishingBorderStrongholds',11May1948,HA,

80/50/25.ItwasonlyinregardtoJerusalemthattheplanexceededthePartitionlines,stipulatingfor

theseizureofthecityanditsaccessroads.

51.BGWD,Vol.I,p.381,entryfor1May1948.

52. David BenGurion at a Mapai Centre meeting on 6 February 1948, LPA, 25/48; GHQ/Operations

Branch,'PlanDalet',I.Galili'sreport,4April1948,HA,80/50/18.

53.OnHaganaoperationsduringApril-May1948seeSeferHahagana,Vol.3/2,Chapter78.

54.Cablefrom'Max',4February1948,CZA,S/25/9007.

55.Recordsof the convoysplying road from theCoastalPlain to Jerusalem, and reports of attackson

convoysalloverthecountryreachedtheHaganaCommandonadailybasisfromDecember1947.

These reports aredeposited in IDFA,464/54/2.See also report by 'Benjamin', 26February1948,

HA,80/50/21.

56.Cableto'Sasha'(Y.Allon)fromY.Yadin,January1948,IDFA,661/69/36;cablefromE.DanintoE.

Shiloah,13January1948,CZA,S/25/9007;CunninghamtoSecretaryofState,'WeeklyIntelligence

Appreciation',16January1948,CO537/3869;cable from 'Adina' to 'Hilel' (I.Galili),3February

1948, IDFA, 464/54/2; fromAmman to ForeignOffice, 9 February 1948, FO 371/68366/E1889;

ArabLiberationArmy [unsigned paper], 13 February 1948,CZA, S25/3999;Cunningham to the

Secretary of State, 'Weekly Intelligence Appreciation', 14 February 1948, FO 816/116. On the

training programme and the 'volunteers' who have undertaken it see J. Palmon's report of 26

February1948,HA,80/50/21;Yavne toTene, 'Thevolunteers in Jerusalem', 3March1948,HA,

105/216/1;YavnetoTene:'TheArabforceinJerusalem',16March1948,ibid.;BehindtheCurtain,

pp.82—4;YitzhakLevi(Levitse),Tish'aKabin,TelAviv,1986,pp.354-5.

57.GHQ/OperationsBranch:'AnalysisoftheStrategicSituationandConclusionsastotheDistributionof

the Hagana Forces', February 1948, IDFA, 922/75/595; I. Galili's notes, 29 February 1948, HA,

80/50/28;I.Galili'sreport,4April1948,HA,80/50/18.TheHagana'sintentiontomoveontothe

offensivewasnotedbytheBritishHighCommissioner.See,forexample,CunninghamtoSecretary

ofState,'WeeklyIntelligenceAppreciation',23February1948,FO816/116.

58. BGWD, p.327, entry for 30 March 1948; 1. Galili's report, 4 April 1948, HA, 80/50/18; Sefer

Hapalmah,Vol.II,pp.99-101.

59.Y.Yadin'sreport,26February1948,HA,80/50/21.

60. 'Palestine: Withdrawal of British Administration', C.R (48) 40, 4 February 1948, Cabinet Files

(CAB)/129; cable from the 'Moatsa' to the 'Knesset', 24 February 1948, IDFA, 464/54/2;

Cunningham to the Secretary of State, 'Weekly Intelligence Appreciation', 27 March 1948, CO

537/3869;HMMinister,AmmantoSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs,21April1948,No.237,

FO816/117.

61.Cablefrom'Max'totheJewishAgency,2February1948,CZA,S/25/9007;SeferHahagana,Vol.2,

pp.1446-7.ConstantintelligenceinformationontheplannedcampaigntocuttheroadtoJerusalem

reached the Hagana during February-March, and is deposited in IDFA, 661/69/36. See also

'SummaryoftheSituationintheBattlefield',1April1948,IDFA,922/75/595.

62.SeferHahagana,Vol.3/2,pp.1452-6.

63.'SummaryoftheMilitarySituation',1April1948,IDFA,922/75/595;I.Galili'sreport,4April1948,

HA,80/50/18;Tamari,'HashivaEstrategit',pp.162-3.

64. See the urgent letters sent toBenGurion on the serious situation in the city: fromDavid Shealtiel

(Jerusalem'smilitarycommander),28March1948,HA,80/50/25;fromLeoKohen,29March1948,

GeneralMemoranda,BGA.

65.NahshonHQ,'OperationalInstructions',April1948,inMa'arachot,No.263-4,June1978,pp.29-30;

IDFHistoryBranch, 'StudyonPlanDalet', July1963, p.13, IDFA,922/75/595;SeferHahagana,

Vol.3/2,pp.1562-4.

66. Cunningham to the Secretary of State, 'Weekly Intelligence Appreciation', 10 April 1948, CO

537/3869.

67.CunninghamtotheSecretaryofState,13April1948,No.956,FO816/117;HMMinister,Ammanto

theSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairs,21April1948,No.234,ibid.;B.Morris,TheBirthofthe

PalestinianRefugeeProblem,1947-1949,Cambridge,1987,pp.113-15.

68.TheEgyptianMinisterforForeignAffairsaskedforBritishassistancetorescueQawuqji'sforcesin

MishmarHa-emek,otherwisethey'wouldundoubtedlybewipedout'.SeeCairotoForeignOffice,

15April1948,No.467,CO537/3904.Onthe 'generalcollapseof[Palestinian]Arabmorale',see

HM Minister, Amman, to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 16 April 1948, No. 227, FO

816/117.

69.KingAbdallahreferredtothismatterinhislettertotheSecretary-GeneraloftheArabLeague,quoted

inAmman toForeignOffice, 21April 1948,No. 237,FO371/68852;EliyahuSasson's report to

BenGurion,BGWD,Vol.I,pp.357-8,entryfor20April1948.

70.AmmantoForeignOffice,21April1948,No.237,FO371/68852.

71. On the impact of the Jewish military successes on the Palestinian Arab population see Tene

intelligence reports, 24April 1948,HA, 105/98; Cunningham to the Secretary of State, 'Weekly

IntelligenceAppreciation',1May1948,CO537/3869.

ShallWeGotoWar?AndIfWeDo,When?TheGenesisoftheInternal

DebateinIsraelontheRoadtotheSinaiWar

MOTTIGOLANI

On29October1956,IsraelattackedEgypt.Forty-eighthourslater,BritainandFrancejoinedtheoffensive.Likeanyotherwar,thisonedidnoteruptoutoftheblue.Onabroader level, the rootsof theSinaiWar canbe tracedback to theconclusion of Israel's War of Independence. This essay, however, seeks topinpointthegenesisoftheconsciousprocessthateventuallymadeIsraeloneofthe initiators of thiswar.More specifically, it will attempt to ascertainwhichmajor figures in Israel's security establishment spearheaded this move, whichhadoriginatedintheideaathat'secondround'againsttheArabstateswasboundtooccursoonerorlater.Aswillbe shownbelow, the run-up to the 'warof choice' in1956 revolved

aroundthreepersonalities:DavidBenGurion,thePrimeMinisterandMinisterofDefence fromMay 1948 to January 1954 and from November 1955 to June1963,andalsoMinisterofDefenceintheinterimperiod,fromFebruary1955toNovember1955;MosheSharett,whowasForeignMinister fromMay1948 toJune1956andalsoPrimeMinisterfromJanuary1954toNovember1955;andMoshe Dayan, the Chiefof-Staff of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) fromDecember1953toJanuary1958.InDecember1953,BenGurionresigned.Thedepartureofthe'foundingfather'

oftheJewishstateshockedtheentirenation.Severalpoliticianstriedtofillthevacuumcreated by the resignation. Someof themost prominent among them,such as Pinhas Lavon, the new Minister of Defence, faded quickly intoobscurity.Others became strong enough to threatenBenGurion's standing, notleastthenewPrimeMinister,Sharett.Stillotherscameintotheirownafterthe

departure of the 'Old Man' and remained solidly entrenched in the upperechelonsoftheestablishmentuntilBenGurion'sreturnafteramere14monthsofretirement.MostnotableamongthesewasMosheDayan.As the IDF's fourthChiefof-Staff,Dayan had an extraordinary influence on

the Israeli government,whose decisions hewas supposed to carry out.DayanwashardlyananonymousofficerwhenBenGurionappointedhimtothearmy'stopspoton6December1953,onedaybeforegoingintovoluntarypoliticalexileintheNegevkibbutzSdeBoker.Alreadyin1949DayanhaddisplayedpoliticalacumenasJerusalem'sMilitaryCommander,whenthetruceagreementsbetweenIsraelandJordanweredrawnup-firstinthecityitselfandtheninthearmisticetalks at Rhodes. As hismilitary career progressed - hewas head of SouthernCommand, Northern Command, and of the General Staff Branch beforebecomingChiefof-Staff-Dayanmadenosecretofhisviewsonquestionswhichwentbeyondhismilitarypreoccupations.1

DayanwasaquintessentialcreationoftheLabourmovement.ShmuelDayan,his father, was a member of the Knesset on behalf ofMapai (Land of IsraelWorkers' Party)which in various incarnations ruled Israel from1948 to 1977.DayanhimselfwasachosencandidateofthepartyforthefirstKnessetelectionsbefore officers in active service were forbidden to be members of electedpolitical bodies. But he remained an active participant, albeit not a formalmember,ofcertainpartybodies.Hisactivistapproachtosecuritywasnosecreteither.ItwasthisbackgroundthatledBenGuriontoappointDayanChiefof-Staffontheeveofhisdepartureforaremotedesertkibbutz.2

Dayan, then, was imposed on BenGurion's successor, Moshe Sharett, whoviewedthenewChiefof-StaffasapoliticalfigurewhowouldpoliticizetheIDF.Moreover,Sharettbelieved-quiterightlythatDayanwasBenGurion'stool.ButtherealproblemwasthatSharetthadnofaithinDayanandindeedfearedhim.TheChiefof-Staff'sultraactivism,asSharett saw it,posedaconcretedanger tothecountry.IfhecouldnotremoveDayan,Sharettwantedatleasttotightenthesupervision over his decisions and actions. But a 'legacy of BenGurion's' wasinviolableinthepoliticalrealityofmid-1950sIsrael.UntilFebruary1955,SharetthadtocopewithDayanonhisown.Butfromthe

day,inthatmonth,onwhichBenGurionreturnedfromhisself-imposedexiletobecome Minister of Defence, Sharett was confronted with the seemingly

impossible task of rebuffing pressure from both the Chiefof-Staff and thecountry'sseniorfigure,DefenceMinisterBenGurion.3

OnthedayofDayan'sappointmentasChiefof-Staff,BenGurionalsocarriedoutanotherdecision,namingShimonPeresDirector-GeneraloftheMinistryofDefence.Thetwo'youngsters'playedamajorroleinkeepingBenGurionabreastof political-security developments at his home in the remote Negev. The twoconsultedregularlywithBenGurion,and their impact (togetherandseparately)ontheeventsthatfollowedwasimmense.4

TheChiefof-StaffSteerstheCountryTowardsWar

BenGurion and Dayan disagreed vehemendy with Sharett's policy and weredisinclined to accept his authority as Prime Minister. BenGurion wasstrengthened in his objections to Sharett's security policy and encouraged toformulateanewpolicyofhisownbytwofactors:theobjectivesecuritysituationandDayan'sactions.5

Dayanfoundthe interrelationsat the top levelsofgovernmentusefulforhispurposes. The antagonistic relations between theMinister of Defence and thePrimeMinistermeantthattheChiefof-StaffoftenbecametheeffectiveMinisterof Defence, particularly in 1954, when Lavon served in that capacity. At thesame time, the tiesbetweenDayanandBenGurion,still inSdeBoker,becameextremelyclose,somuchsothatSharett thoughttheChiefof-Staffwasmakingefforts to remove him and engineer BenGurion's return as PrimeMinister. Inearly1955,SharettwroteinhisdiarythatZalmanAranne(theministerinchargeof 'information')hadtoldhimthatDayanhadsuggestedtoanumberofpeoplethattheyorganizeakindofalliancetoreplacetheleadershipoftheparty,oftheHistadrut Federation of Labour, and of the government. Severalmonths later,whenBenGurionhadreassumedhispostasMinisterofDefence,SharettaskedhimwhetherheknewabouttheseappearancesbytheChiefof-Staffandwhatheintended to do to restrain him. In his account, 'B-G was embarrassed andmumbledsomethingunclear'.6

In 1954, Sharett repeatedly thwarted Dayan's activist initiatives, which the

PrimeMinisterbelievedoftentranscendedthewishtoretaliatefirmlyagainsttherobberies andmurders perpetrated by PalestinianArabswho infiltrated acrosstheborder into Israel.Dayanobjected toSharett'sapproach,which inhisviewboiled down to 'anything but war'. His attitude was different: 'Anything butforgoing Israel's vital goals, even at the price of war'. If Israel's right ofnavigation in the Red Sea or its plan to divert the Jordan River were vitalinterests,theymustnotbeceded,eveniftheArabsresortedtowar.InthatcaseIsraelshouldbeabletopre-empttheenemyandattackfirst.Thesamewastruewith regard to the reprisals: they had to be painful, even at a risk ofwar, forotherwisetheywouldbeineffectual.Dayan's concept of 'basic security'wasmixed inextricablywith his view of

'routinesecurity'.HebelievedthatIsrael's trueproblemhadalwaysbeeninthesphereofbasicsecurityandthateverything,includingroutinesecurity,hadtobesubordinated to it.Dayandidnot speak explicitly about an IsraeliinitiatedwarbeforeApril 1955, though thatwas the real thrust of his approach. In off-the-record conversations he nevertheless admitted that he preferred war over a'peace'thatwouldnotguaranteeIsrael'ssecurity.Inthisview,astatusquobasedonthe1949ArmisticeAccords,intheabsenceofdefensiblebordersoraccesstotheRedSea,andwithIsrael'sdeterrentcapabilitydecliningbytheyeardidnotamount to real peace. Although Dayan believed that the Arab-Israeli conflictcouldnotbesolvedbymilitarymeans,he thought that Israelneededa 'secondround' against theArabs in order to be able to negotiate future peace treatiesfromapositionof strength.Theprimary targetofhiswar aimwasEgypt, theleading Arab country. Some in Israel dismissed this approach as sheeradventurism,butotherssupportedit,aswewillsee.7

Dayan,asBenGurionsawhim,was'daringalmosttothepointoflunacy,[butthiswas]balancedbydeep-reachingtacticalandstrategicjudgment'.NordidtheChiefof-Staffhidehisviewsfromforeignofficials.VisitingtheUnitedStatesinthesummerof1954,heexplainedtoCIADirectorAllenDullesthatIsraelhadvery good reasons towant awar: inconvenient borders and the rapidmilitarybuild-upof theArabstates.However,hewasquick toadd(remaining loyal tothe government's line), that Israel was not conducting a policy aimed atfomentingawar.8

WithSharettasPrimeMinister,Dayanfoundit impossible to implementhis

policy. The Chiefof-Staff did not disobey orders, though he floated threats toresign -whichwere ineffective, sinceSharettwould have liked nothing betterthan to see him go. Dayan, then, longed for BenGurion's return to thegovernment, and the sooner the better. But he soon found out that evenBenGurion,asof1954,wasnotanadvocateofactivismtothepointofwar.In1954, Israel's founding father thought that the country needed 'people notterritories'.HedeeplyfearedthereactionofthegreatpowerstoanIsraeliactofaggression,andhisgeneralargumentwasthat 'thereisnolastbattleforIsrael',and that theconflictwith theArabsmustultimatelybesettledbynegotiations.Untilthen,Israelmustmanagetheconflict,howeverlengthyitturnedouttobe,in a manner that would cause it minimal damage. So, from Dayan's point ofview,BenGurionneededconvincing.9

Dayan launched his efforts towin overBenGurionmonths before the latterreturned to the Ministry of Defence in February 1955. On 8 June 1954, theChiefof-Staffmadeoneofhis frequentconsultationvisits toBenGurion.TheirconversationonthisoccasiontookplaceatTelHa-shomerhospital,nexttoTelAviv, where BenGurion was then convalescing. The following is Dayan'saccountoftheirtalk:'AndwhenItoldhimthatIaspiretoamoreactivistpolicyhe began crossexaminingme: "What is activism?What do youwant -war?'".Dayan replied cautiously: 'I am not for initiating a war. But I am againstconcessions in any area, even if adamancy bringswar.AnArab threat ofwarshouldnotpreventanyaction[deemednecessary]byus'.10

BenGurion did not react directly, but probably took Dayan's remarks as arequest-madenotforthefirsttime-thathereturntothegovernmentinordertosupport theChiefof-Staff'spolicy.Heexplained toDayan thathewould returnonly if hewere able to convince the party to adopt his ideas on changing theelectionsystem;otherwisehewould leavepolitics.Hewas fedup,BenGurionsaid.At this stage, then,Dayan's predilection forwarwas not enough to lureBenGurionbacktothegovernment.On20August1954,BenGurionwasvisitedatSdeBokerbyTeddyKollek,

the Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, and Abba Eban, Israel'sambassadortotheUnitedStatesandtheUnitedNations.Eban,whowasworkingvigorouslyforanAmerican-Israelialliance,reportedtoBenGuriononhistalkswithSecretaryofStateJohnFosterDulles, inwhichquestionsrelatingtoarms

suppliesandadefencepacthadbeenraised.BenGurionarguedthatanallianceshould be concluded only if therewere no other choice. Such an alliance, heexplained,withanodtowardsDayan'swarambitions,wouldresultinawarofexpansion,whichheopposed:'OurproblemtodayisJews,notterritory,atleastinthepresentperiod'.11

TwoAgainstOne

BenGurion returned to the Ministry of Defence on 21 February 1955. BothDayanandPereswereinstrumentalinthisdevelopment,becauseofthepositionstheyheldandbecauseoftheirclosepersonalrelationswiththeold/newMinisterofDefence.Backinoffice,BenGurionsetupaforumofthree-himself,DayanandPeres-whichcametobeknownasthe'SmallStaff'.Onceaweek(usuallyonThursdays)BenGurionconvenedthegroup,withothersinvitedaccordingtothe subject under discussion. Here Dayan and Peres could bring systematic,persistent pressure to bear on BenGurion to reconsider the option of anIsraeliinitiatedwar.12

On 27 February, the Sharett government decided on a large-scale reprisaloperationnorthofGaza('OperationBlackArrow').Althoughitwasnotthefirstraidof itskind, itsunusualscaleand the largenumberofEgyptianskilled (38soldiers)generatedwidespreadreverberations.AtthetimeoftheraidBenGurionwasnotyetfullyabreastofaffairsintheministry.Nevertheless,theoperationinGazawasafittingbackdropforhisreturntothegovernmentandaharbingerofeventstocome.Immediately after the Gaza raid the first flickering of BenGurion's new

approachcouldbediscerned.Citingtheimpressivethoughunplannedresultsofthe operation, BenGurion noted that 'it is important to display our militarysuperiorityoverthestrongestArabstate[Egypt]'.13

InMarch 1955, the domestic political atmosphere in Israel was ripe for anabout turn in security policy. The opportunity came towards the end of themonth.On the night of 24-25March, awedding took place inPatish, a smallmoshav in southern Israel. As the guests crowded in one of the rooms in the

privatehomewherethecelebrationwasbeingheld,handgrenadeswerethrownintothewell-litroomandshotswerefired.Between15and20people,someofthemchildren,werewounded.Oneoftheguests,ayoung22-year-oldvolunteernamedVardaFriedman,whowasworkingwith themoshav'snew immigrants,was killed. The perpetrators' tracks led to the Gaza Strip. The country wasshocked,perhapsmoredeeplythanaftersimilareventsinthepast.14

BenGurion's reaction to the Patish attackwas unusual, both in terms of the'levelofretaliation'andinitsclearlatentpotentialtotriggerawar.Hisproposalwas, simply, to drive theEgyptians out of theGazaStrip - in otherwords, tocapturethisterritory.BeforeputtinghisideatoSharettandthecabinet,however,BenGurionaskedDayanthreequestionswhichimpliedthathewasfullyawareoftheimplicationsofsuchanaction.HowlongwouldittaketocaptureGaza?Was the IDF ready for awar againstEgypt?Was the IDFprepared for awaragainstalltheArabstates?ThereisnoevidencetoshowthattheChiefof-StafftriedtodissuadeBenGurionfromsubmittinghisplantothecabinetforapproval-onthecontrary.15

For the first time since reassuming the defence portfolio, BenGurionresponded to a terrorist attack with an operative proposal of his own. On 25February 1955, when a bicycle rider wasmurdered near Rehovot, BenGurionhadbeenbackinofficeforonlythreedaysandtheChiefof-StaffwasreadywiththeBlackArrowplan.On19March,amemberofkibbutzJezreelwaskilledbymarauders from Jordan.As far as is known, that incident brought no concretereaction from the defence establishment.But by the end ofMarchBenGurionwas in full control. Did he want to utilize the reprisal for Patish to strike atEgypt,whichheconsideredthemainconfrontationstate?Itwouldseemso.HeadmittedthathewantedtotaketheopportunitytorepaytheEgyptianPresident,Gamal Abdul Nasser, both for Egypt's repeated violations of the ArmisticeAgreementandforinfringingonIsrael'srightofpassageintheGulfofEilatandinSuezCanal.16

FollowingthePatishincident,incontrasttothepast,theMinisterofDefencenotonlyputforwardaninitiativeforamilitaryresponse,buthealsodefineditsgoalandtarget.TheusualpracticewasforthearmytosubmitaplanofactiontotheMinisterofDefence,whowouldeitherapproveitandreferittothecabinet,orrejectitoutofhand.BenGurion'sproposalspokeforthefirsttimeinconcrete

terms of an Israeliinitiated war. Even at the time this trend was clear: theargument in the cabinet following the Patish murder revolved around thequestionofwhetherIsraelhadareasonablecasusbelliandnotaroundtheissueof reprisalperse. In theevent, itwasnowobvious thatBenGurionhad joinedDayaninthestruggleagainstSharettoveranIsraeli-launchedwar.

'AGuaranteedMinority'

BenGurion acted quickly. Already on Friday 25 March, he convened aconsultationathisresidenceinTelAviv.Thenextday-theSabbathfollowingan additional consultation with the Mapai leadership (again at his home) thecabinetmetforanextraordinarysession.InthemeetingSharettclashedsharplywith BenGurion. No decision was taken, and the discussion continued at theregularweeklycabinetmeetingthenextday.Again,therewasnofinaldecisionbut BenGurion did not relent. On 28March he visited Patish and a day laterrequestedanotherdiscussionbythecabinet,onlyforhismotiontobedefeatedbyonevote.OpposinghimwerePrimeMinisterSharett,threeMapaiministers,andallcoalitionmembersfromotherparties.17

BenGurionknewfromtheoutsetthathewouldnotbeeasilyabletomusteramajority in the cabinet.What thenmade him persist?On 30March,with thediscussion at its height, he ordered Dayan to call off the army's preparationsbecause he had a 'guaranteed minority', as he put it, in the cabinet. Can thecontinuationofthediscussionbeexplainedsolelyintermsofBenGurion'swishtopithisapproachagainstthePrimeMinister's?WhatwouldhavehappenedhadBenGurionbeenvictorious?Indeed,theoutcomeinSharett'sfavourwasnotasselfevidentasBenGurionclaimed.Itwasnotapoliticaldebateovertheparty'splatformoraboutbasicprinciplesforfutureaction.Thecabinetwasconvenedtodecide whether to execute a political-strategic plan. BenGurion's aim was tochangeIsrael'sbasicsecuritypolicy.Heplacedonthecabinet'sagenda,forthefirsttime,thepossibilityofanIsraeliinitiatedlimitedwaraspartofasolutiontothe country's security problems. Following the vote Sharett summed up: 'Weweresparedadisasterwhichmighthavehadincalculableresults'.18

TheDebateOvertheWayandtheDebateOverthePace

ThedebateoverBenGurion'sandDayan'sproposaltocapturetheGazaStrip,inthe wake of the Patish incident, had the effect of sharpening positions. InSharett'saccountofthemeeting,hearguedthatcapturingtheGazaStripwouldnotsolvethesecurityproblem.BoththePalestinianswhowouldfleeandthosewhowouldremaininplacewouldcontinuetomountattacksagainstIsrael,andwithgreaterferocity.WhatwouldIsraelgainbymakingabriefconquestwhichwould only produce an argument over whether to withdraw? Sharett believedthatwarwouldenable Israel todefeat theArabs -butnot tomakepeacewiththem.TheonlywayforIsraeltoimposepeaceontheArabs,hemaintained,wasbyconqueringCairo,DamascusandAmman.19

BenGurion, withDayan's backing, retorted that Israel's strength lay in self-reliance and independence of action. Only this way could it wield politicalinfluence. International factors took second place, while Egypt was bent onexpansion - not peace-seeking. Only a daring act, before the opportunity waslost,couldcontainCairo.TheArabworldwassplitandwouldnotassistEgypt.Even Nasser might choose not to respond to the capture of Gaza, since hiscertaindefeatbyIsraelwaslikelytorockhisregime.NorwouldtheWesternpowerstakeaction,sinceEgypthadnodefencepact

witheitherofthem.DomesticpublicopinionwouldpreventtheAmericansfromintervening.AsforBritain,ifitweretoinvadetheNegev,'wewillthrowitout[ofthere]indisgrace'.Inthesamematter-of-factwayBenGurionalsodismissedthe economic boycott that Israel was likely to face following the proposedoperation.'Shouldtherebeaneconomicboycott',hesaid,'wewillsuffer,butwewill endure'. The danger to the country's morale in the case of inaction,especially in the border settlements, must also be taken into account, theMinisterofDefenceadded.Inshort,BenGurionseemedtothink,atleastinlateMarch 1955, that with one war Israel could solve a large proportion of itssecurityproblems.20

Inthespringof1955, then,BenGurionnolongerseemedtosubscribetohisapproachof ayear earlierwhereby 'peopleare important tous,not territories'.

Yet,ashasoftenbeenthecasewithBenGurion,thechangewasnotunequivocal.Hiscommentabouta'guaranteedminority'andtheserioushesitationshewoulddisplay in the followingmonths reflected the continuing equivocation, distressand even fear that characterized BenGurion's behaviour in the run-up to andduringtheSinaiWar.21

BenGurion-evenBenGurion-neededsupport,evenafterhispositiononthequestionofanIsraeliinitiatedwarwasacceptedatalaterstage.ThebulkofthatsupportcamefromDayanwhoasChief-ofStaffwasevenmoreconvincedthanBenGurion of the benefits of an initiatedwar. In themonths to come the twowouldplayoutarivetingdiscourse,withBenGuriontakingtheroleofinhibitorand asking the difficult questions andDayan acting as the accelerator, drivingaheadontheroadtowar.Therolesweretailor-madeforthepersonality,ageandpositions of the two protagonists as they were then. Still, their interactiondepended on basic agreement between them on the need for Israel to attack.Their argument with Sharett was over the road, while between them theydisagreedaboutthepace.Even if BenGurion wanted to test and pressure Sharett and undermine his

authority,hemusthaverealizedthathisdemandforamovethatmight leadtowar might be implemented. More important, the seed was sown: anIsraeliinitiated(limited)warwasnolongerjustaprivateideaofDayan.Itwasaconcrete possibility that had the support of senior cabinetmembers, includingleadersofMapaisuchasBenGurionhimself,LeviEshkolandGoldaMeyerson(Meir). A policy which only yesterday seemed wild and irresponsible hadsuddenlybecomeareasonableproposition.DayanandBenGurion lostno time in takingadvantageof their success.On

thedaytheMinisterofDefence'sproposalwasnarrowlydefeatedinthecabinet,kibbutzNahalOz,adjacenttoGaza,wasshelled.Itwasthefirstincidentofitskind since the 1948War of Independence. In another incident that day in thesamearea,twoIsraelisoldierswerekilledwhentheirpatrolhitalandmine.22

BenGuriondemandedanothercabinetmeeting,whichwasheldthenextday.He brought Dayan to the meeting (a highly unusual move at the time), whopaintedagrimpicturewherebythecontinuationofpatrolsalongtheGazaStripwas tantamount to suicide for the soldiers, whereas their suspension wouldjeopardizetheIsraelisettlementsinthearea.Dayanstoppedshortofdrawingthe

unavoidable conclusion, but at once added details about the Egyptian army'sdeploymentintheGazaStrip.Thehintwasclear.Sharett,forone,immediatelygraspedDayan'sdrift.Dayan then left themeeting and BenGurion took the floor. Yet he did not

propose what Sharett had expected - an explicit military strike - after havingfailed tomuster a cabinetmajority thepreviousday. Insteadhe suggested thatIsrael declare theArmisticeAgreement null and void due to Egypt's repeatedviolationsoftheagreement.YetagainSharettwontheday,butbythenarrowestpossiblemargin.Thevotewasatie,whichmeantthattheproposalwasneitheracceptednorrejected.ThiswasaseverewarningtothePrimeMinister.Thenewsecurity policy espoused by BenGurion and Dayan was accepted by half thecabinet. Is it still arguable, at this stage, that BenGurion merely wanted toweakenSharett'spositioninthecabinet?23

'WeHaveNotAvengedtheBlood'

BenGurion's new approach following the Patish incident resulted in animmediate change in Dayan's orders to the army. The Chiefof-Staff had longbeen ripe for this reorientation.24 His opinion about a necessary revision insecurity policy is better seen in his deeds than in his words. The minutes ofGeneralStaffmeetingsreveallittleabouttheChiefoftheGeneralStaff'sviewofgovernmentpolicy.TheGeneralStaffrarelyaddressedplanningquestions,evenatthelevelofstrategy.Forthemostpartthegeneralsdiscussedsubjectsrelatedto the IDF's work plan replenishment, training, conditions of service, and soforth.DayandidnotusuallysharewiththeGeneralStaffhisqualmsaboutpolicyorplanning, but at thebeginningof everymeetinghe supplied anupdate.Hiscommentssuggestedthespiritwhichhesoughttoimbueinthecommanders.Incontrast tohisrelativerestraintbeforethePatishmurder, immediatelyafter theincidentheexplainedEgypt's responsibility to theGeneralStaff.Stating that itwasessentialtoreact,andonalargescale,headded:'Idon'tknowwhetherthis[the murder and sabotage raids] is happening with the knowledge of theEgyptianarmy-toacertaindegreeitdoesn'tmatter'.25

A clear expression of the change can be found in the orders concerningroutine securitywhichwere issued immediately after themurder atPatish andtheshellingofNahalOz (which reinforced theview that force shouldbeusedagainsttheEgyptians).Alreadyon3April,aftertheattackonNahalOzandtheemergencycabinetmeetinginitswake,DayanaskedBenGuriontoapproveIDFartilleryfireandthecaptureofEgyptianoutpostsintheeventofharassmentofIDFpatrols.BenGurion gave the go-ahead, andDayan issued an order statingthat ifanIDFpatrolwerefiredupon, theenemywastobeshelledwith81mmmortars.Ifcomplicationsarose,thearmywastocrosstheborderandcapturethenearestEgyptianoutpost.On17May1955,inaconsultationheldwiththeIDFleadership at the Prime Minister's residence, Dayan reported on a series ofborderincidentswhichhadbeensparkedattheinitiativeofIDFunits.26

Although one should not necessarily ascribe moderate intentions to theEgyptians or a desire to calm the situation along the border with Israel, it isdifficult to ascertain what motivated the Egyptian activity - consisting ofirregularfiringandlayingmines-alongtheborderoftheGazaStripfromApriltoJune1955.PresidentNasserclaimedthathistroopsandotherforces,feelingthemselves threatened by the IDF's operations in Gaza, frequently reacted byopening fire. He told the head of the United Nations Truce SupervisionOrganization (UNTSO) that he could not order his troops to desist from suchactions.27 The IDF's reactions along the borderwith Egypt became especiallyaggressive at beginning of the spring of 1955. What is important for ourpurposesisthatthereactionswerepromptedbymorethanthedesireforsingle-pointreprisals.Dayanhada largely freehandon routinesecurity. Insomeareashedidnot

seek BenGurion's approval, notably in operational planning and mountingimmediate reactions toborder incidents.On11April1955,Dayanordered theOperationsBranch of theGeneral Staff to plan, as instantaneous responses toeveryEgyptianattack,aseriesofpunitiveraidsonmilitaryandciviliantargetsdeepinsidetheGazaStripwhichwouldinflictcasualtiesanddestroythetargets.Asfarasisknown,thiswasthefirsttimesincethe1948Warthatsuchanorderhadbeenissued.However,therelativequietwhichdescendedonthesectoraftertheNahalOz

incident at thebeginningofApril until themiddleofMaydidnot allow for a

seriousoperation.Thefewborderincidents,someoftheminitiatedbyIsrael,didnot result in casualties, which were so often the trigger of Israeli reprisals.Sharettwelcomedthesituation,thoughhealsoinstructedAbbaEbantoapprisethe United Nations, in the spirit of BenGurion's proposal of 3 April, thatcontinuationoftheshootingandmine-layingalongtheborderwouldbringaboutasituationinwhichthearmisticewoulddefactoceasetoexist.AlthoughSharetthimself did not support the actions of BenGurion and Dayan, he thought itadvantageous to make use of their policy in order to pressure the UN andEgypt.28

ForhispartDayankeptBenGurioninformedaboutincidentsonthebordersina constant effort to prompt him to act. Surprisingly, perhaps, theMinister ofDefencewas less perturbed about routine security at this time than either theChiefof-Staff or the Prime Minister. The latter two seemed to be far morepreoccupiedwiththepossibleescalationthatmightensue.Sharettsawtherisks,Dayantheopportunities,andBenGurionencouragedDayantogoonpressinghisviewsonSharett.AfterthreeIDFofficerswerekilledon17May1955whentheirvehiclehita

mineon the patrol roadnear kibbutzKissufim, near theGazaStrip, a reprisaloperationwasapproved- thefirstsince theGazaraid-code-namedOperationPleshet.TheEgyptian armywasblamed for themining, andDayanwanted totaketheopportunitytoattackEgyptianforces.29

ItwasDayanwhoinitiatedtheoperation.AfterBenGurionapprovedDayan'sideas,the'ForumofFive'oftheMapai(therulingparty)leadershipmet-abodyauthorized by theMapai Secretariat to decide on questions of reprisal beforethey were brought to the cabinet. Unlike the situation in the cabinet, Sharettfound himself in a minority in this forum, facing BenGurion, Meyerson andEshkol,whowereinfavouroftheoperation(thefifthmember,ZalmanAranne,was not present). Since the debate following the Patish incident at the end ofMarch, Sharett had scrupulously convened the Forum of Five for preparatorydiscussions on reprisals. The Prime Minister was anxious to co-ordinatepositionsinordertoavoidasituationinwhichhewouldhavetodecideagainsthispartycolleaguesinthecabinet,drawingonthesupportoftheotherpartiesinthecoalition.30

Dayan, who took part in the discussion and guided it, did not conceal the

possibilitythatanaggressivemilitaryresponse,howeverlimited,mightassumeproportionsexceedingtheoriginalplan.Beyondthequestionof theoperation'seffectiveness as a reprisal, the discussionwas at bottom a continuation of thedebateoveranIsraeliinitiatedwar.BenGurionrepeatedtheviewthathewouldprefer to expel the Egyptians from the Gaza Strip and annul the ArmisticeAgreement(astepthatwouldprobablymeanwar).HedidmostoftheworkfortheChief-ofStaffinthisinstance.Itwasclearthatthetwoagreedabouttheneedtoheatuptheborder.Intheabsenceofacabinetmajority,BenGurionexplained,hewouldmake dowith a small-scale operation. Sharett, though, continued torejectboth awideroperation and theproposed reprisal raid,whichhe thoughtdisproportionate.31

Onthenightof18-19May,acompany-sizeIDFforceattackedtheEgyptianarmy'sbaseoppositekibbutzKissufim.The IDFalsomined roads in the area.Noonewaskilledoneithersideintheoperation,whichwasonascalesimilartothatof theGazaraid.However, theveryfact that theraidwasapprovedwasavictoryfortheactivistapproachofBenGurionandDayan.WhileSharettthoughtthathecouldmusteracabinetmajorityagainsttheoperation,hedidnotwanttoutilize that majority against his party associates this time. He took someconsolation in thefact thatnoonehadbeenkilled in theraid.Butbecause theEgyptianshadescapedwithout losses, 'thereareundoubtedlysomeamongstuswhoaregrittingtheirteeth-afterall,wehadnotavengedtheblood'.32

As for the IDF, an order appended to the reprisal raid (Pleshet 1) by theOperationsBranchoftheGeneralStaffinstructedallbranchesofthearmytogoonalerttodealwithapossibleEgyptianreactiontotheattack.Theorderadded:'Youmust be ready to capture theGaza Strip'. Itwas obviously an order thatcouldmeanonlywar.Fromthis time,beforeevery reprisal raid thepossibilitywouldbeexaminedofdraggingEgyptintoawar.33

The Operations Branch soon also circulated an order of principle on thissubject. Operational order David of 24 May contained clear directives forcapturingtheGazaStrip'onthenightfollowinganEgyptianattack'.TheroadtowarisdescribedhereinIDFvernacular,buttheunderlyingconceptionisreadilydiscernible: 'As a result of an aggressive Egyptian action' - that is, a borderincidentofsomekind-'asituationisliabletoemergeinwhichtheIDFwillhaveto react swiftly by executing a potentmilitary operation' -meaning a reprisal

raid.Nowcametheinnovativeprinciple(whichhadbeenadducedaweekearlierinOperation Pleshet): 'Following the execution [of the reprisal raid] a furtherdevelopmentshouldbeexpected,inthewakeofwhichtheIDFwillcapturetheentire Gaza Strip'. The relevant IDF units were ordered to submit plans forapprovalwithintwodays.Theorderalsoincludeddetailedplanningguidelines,suchasthemethodofexecutionandatableofforcesadmissions.Theorderwastobecirculatedallthewaydowntothecompanycommanderlevel-proofthatitwas intended for immediate implementation, if and when the cause shouldarise.34

The new orders reflected Dayan's approach. The Chiefof-Staff consideredIsrael's inability to maintain normal life along its borders the equivalent offailureinwar.Ensuringnormallife,DayanexplainedinaninternalIDFlecture,is worth even the price of war.35 Sharett called this policy (propounded, hebelieved,byBenGurionandDayan) 'amethodof irritation for itsownsake inorder to push matters to a volatile crisis which will supposedly culminate indeliverance'. The debate over Pleshet strengthened Sharett in his view thatBenGurionsupportedDayanunreservedly.InthiscaseSharettwasright.WouldDayanhimself,who tooknomajor actionwithoutBenGurion's approval, havedrawnuporderswhichcouldonlymeanthateffortsshouldbemadetoescalateborderincidentsattheriskofwar?36

APuzzlingQuiet

The Egyptian response to Pleshet came on 30May. Two kibbutzim, Ein Ela-shlosha and Nirim, were shelled; two civilians were killed and four seriouslywounded.The IDF repliedwith artillery fire.There is nodoubt that from thistime the border with Egypt was no longer perceived solely in terms ofinfiltrations. The road to war had been shortened, though war was not yetinevitable.ThefactthattheEgyptianshadnotgonebeyondshellingmeantthatDayandidnothaveacausetodemandanattackontheGazaStrip.37

Near the end of June, Nasser, who had not long before refused to commithimself to quiet on the border, directedColonel SalahGohar, the head of the

PalestinianDeskintheEgyptianMinistryofWar,toholdtalkswithIsraelonalocalsettlementalongtheborderwhichwouldputanendtotheincidents.ThereasonmayhavebeenEgypt'sexpectationofanarmsdealwithCzechoslovakia.The 'Gaza talks', which continued until the middle of August, contributed bytheirveryexistencetocalmalongtheborder.Thedynamics(knownatthetimeas 'localcommanders'agreements')weremoreimportantthantheresultsofthetalks,whichwereinconsequential.Onefactisirrefutable:whilethetalkslastedtherewasnotoneattempt,eitherbyEgyptorbyIsrael,toheatuptheborder.38

Thereisnocertaintythatthequietalongthefrontierwasduetothefactthatthe Israeli political leadershipwas thenpreoccupiedwith apolitical crisis (theSharettgovernmentfellattheendofJuneandSharettformedanewgovernmentbased on a smaller coalition, and impending elections). Still, a review of theeventsuntilthenshowsthatthedomesticpoliticalsituationinIsraelhadaroleinensuring the relative quiet of those months. The fairly frequent incidentsbetween the IDF and theEgyptian army inApril-May 1955were in no smallmeasuretheresultofdeliberateIsraelipolicy.Thecurbingofthatpolicy,andnotnecessarilyforsecurityreasons,contributedsubstantiallytobringingaboutquietontheborder.39

This conclusion does not eliminate the need to examine Egypt's role in thetensionofApril-May1955and thecalmof July-August.True,Nasserhadputforwardideasforalocalbordersettlement,butatthesametimehekeptuphisbellicose rhetoric, and activated terrorist and intelligence squads from JordanandLebanon.The international situation also played a part inmaintaining therelativequiet of thosemonths.TheGaza talkshad the support of theWesternpowers,whichencouragedanysettlementthatwouldpacifytheregion.40

DidthecalminthefirstpartofthatsummerreflectachangeinBenGurion'sandDayan'spolicy,orhadtheirpolicyperhapsfailed?Notnecessarily.EveninthisperiodDayancontinuedtopressBenGuriontoapproveheightenedactivity,and also to persuade him to reassume the premiership. Despite his ostensiblynon-politicalpositionascommanderofthearmy,Dayanexpressedhisopinion-in the midst of the election campaign for the Third Knesset - that areorganizationoftheMapaileadershipwasneeded.41

BenGurion, while supporting Dayan's approach, consistently rejected hisproposals. The reason for BenGurion's restraint was the election campaign,

which temporarily moderated Israel's reprisal policy and by the same tokenreducedtheprospectofdraggingEgyptintoawarbymeansofincidentsrelatedtoroutinesecurity.Inanyevent,BenGurionheadedMapai'slist intheelectioncampaign,andassuchwastheparty'scandidatetoserveasPrimeMinister.AlthoughMapai's strengthwas reduced in theThirdKnesset, thepossibility

loomed of a more activist coalition in which the 'Sharett School of thought'wouldnolongercommandamajority.InthisspiritBenGurionbegantoconductnegotiationsinearlyAugust1955withpossiblepartnersforagovernmentunderhisleadership.42

AnotherStageintheDeterioratingBorderSituation

InIsraelthepoliticalsituationbegantoemergemoreclearly.Ashetoiledtoputtogetherthenewcoalition,BenGurionintimatedthatIsraelisecuritypolicywasabouttochange.AseriesofinternalstatementsandanopenclashwithSharettatameetingof theMapaiCentreon8August1955 suggest thatBenGurionhadgivenDayanthego-aheadtoresumehis'policyofdeterioration'towardswar.43

OneoftheclearestexpressionsofBenGurion'sthrustinthisdirectioncanbeseenintheintensiveefforttoconcludeanIsraeli-Americandefencepact.SharettandBenGurionagreedthatasecurityagreementwiththeUnitedStateswasanurgentnecessity.TheForeignMinistry and the Israeli embassy inWashingtonthoughtthatsuchatreatycouldbesignedinthenearfuture-wereIsraelnottosabotage it with its own hands, particularly by its security operations. ThequestionsofIsrael'srelationswiththeUnitedStatesingeneral,andofasecuritytreatyinparticular,wereatthecentreofthecoalition'snegotiationswiththeleft-wing parties, which opposed American policy and objected to a securityagreement.Asaresultofthis,atleastasSharettandhisloyalistsintheForeignMinistry saw it, Israeli restraintwasnowmoreessential thanever.ApparentlytheForeignMinistryhadnotyetgraspedtheconnectionwhichBenGurionsawbetween an Israeliinitiated war and the urgent need for an alliance with theUnitedStates.44

FromthemiddleofAugustthesecurityconceptionadvocatedbyBenGurion

andDayanfacedatestofunprecedentedgravity.EventsintherealmofroutinesecuritybroughtEgypt and Israel to thebrinkof hostilities.By the endof themonthitappearedthatDayan'sconceptionofthelinkbetweenbasicsecurityandroutinesecurityhadasolidfoundationtostandon.Onthemorningof22August1955,Egyptianarmyoutpostsopenedfireonan

IDFpatrolnearkibbutzMefalsim. In reaction, thepatrol's commandercrossedtheborderandtogetherwithreinforcementscapturedtheEgyptianOutpostNo.41. The Egyptians responded by shelling the area of the outpost and kibbutzNahalOzforseveralhours.ThattheEgyptianswereresponsiblefortherenewalof tensions along the border of the Gaza Strip seemed clear. Sharett, afterlengthy agonizing, accepted this conclusion and approved a reprisal raid (seebelow).Whathedidnotknow,however,wasthatonthepreviousnight,20-21August, an IDF unit had been sent to attack an Egyptian military camp nearRafah.The raidwasunsuccessful.Although there isnodefiniteevidence, it isreasonabletoassumethattheEgyptianfire,afteralengthyperiodoftotalquiet,cameinresponsetotheabortiveattackonthecamp.45

Israel'spartintheescalationoflateAugustwasalsoillustratedbythereactionofthepatrolthatwasattackednearMefalsim.InstormingtheEgyptianoutpostthepatrol'scommanderwasfollowingtheguidelineswhichDayanhadsoughttoinstilsincehistenureasheadofOperationsBranch,certainlyfromthetimehebecame Chiefof-Staff, and with greater intensity since April 1955. It will berecalledthatDayanhadstatedatameetingoftheGeneralStaffinApril:'Intheevent of firing on a patrol ... if complications arise, to cross the border, ifnecessary,andtocapturethenearestEgyptianoutpost'.InthefirstGeneralStaffmeetingafter theAugust incident,Dayanwas critical of thehastydecisionbythe patrol commander to cross the border, but of course praised him for theexecution.TheEgyptians reactedharshly to theMefalsim incident.Between25and30

August, 16 Israeliswere killed along theEgyptian border and in the southernpart of the country. The Egyptians resorted to shelling, light-arms fire,ambushes,andminingroadsneartheborder;theyalsocapturedtwohillsinsideIsrael,atSabha,southofNitzana-farfromtheGazaStrip.ForthefirsttimetheEgyptiansemployedanorganized forceof terror squadswhichwere sentdeepinto Israel, especially around the Nes-Tsiona-Rehovot area. Egyptian planes

penetratedIsraeliairspaceandoneofthemwasshotdown.46

To the IDF, neither the Egyptian army's response nor the terrorist attacksfollowing the Mefalsim incident came as a surprise. Indeed, the Israeli HighCommandseemedtohaveanticipatedthistypeofreaction.TheheadofMilitaryIntelligence, Yehoshafat Harkabi, explained to the General Staff that theEgyptians were aware of the Israeli policy underlying the incidents: 'TheEgyptians see our actions on the 22nd as having originated from above.Theystated already after theGaza [operation] that theywould give tit for tat. Andtherewillbepressureonthepolitical-militaryleveltoadoptthatline.Theyarebeefinguptheirforceintheregionandclaimingthattheyarepreparingforwar.Theydonot fearwarbut incidents'.Harkabi added that 'the tension ishelpingNasserunitetheranksinthe[Arab]Leagueandwithaviewtowardsthemeetingof the [UN General] Assembly. Nasser is exploiting the current tension forpoliticalpurposes'.TheIDF,then,haddecidedtoresorttopreventiveoperationsevenbeforetheMefalsimincident inorder toprotect thecivilianpopulationintheinteriorofthecountry.Alreadyon21August,thedaybeforeMefalsim,theOperations Branch had issued the order for Operation Catch - to apprehendEgyptianintelligencescoutswhowereoperatinginsouthernIsrael.47

On26AugustDayanorderedthearmynottopermitanyEgyptianmovement,includingcivilianmovement,neartheGazaStripborder.TheIDFshould'snipealongtheline'.ImmediatelyafterwardshecalledBenGurionoutofthecoalitionnegotiationsinordertoproposeanoperationintheGazaStrip.Dayanassumedthat a large-scale attackwouldnot be approved, instead suggesting a series ofsmalloperationstobecarriedoutsimultaneously.BenGurionmetthatsameday(Friday) with Sharett, who was still the head of the transition government.SharettorderedtheIDFnottoactbuttoawaitdevelopments;thesubjectwouldbe brought to the cabinet at its regular Sundaymeeting. Thus, on 28August,Dayan outlined his plan to the cabinet. The ministers were not enthusiastic,Dayanlaterwrote inhisautobiography.Sharettwasthusable tosnipeawayatthealreadyreducedplan.Afew'retailraids'weredecidedon:fourorfivesmallsquads, which would operate during two or three nights. Dayan ordered theparatroopstoactimmediately,buttheywerenotreadyuntilthefollowingnight,29-30August1955.48

Sharett'sLineorBenGurion'sLine

Nosoonerhad theapprovalbeengiven thanSharett changedhismind - ashehadonmorethanoneoccasioninthepast(notablyinOperationPleshet)-andtried to get the raid called off. Only two days earlier US Secretary of StateDulleshadmadepublictheAnglo-AmericanAlphaPlanforresolvingtheArab-Israeli conflict. Dulles's declaration included assurances that Israel had longwanted to hear: a guarantee of its borders and assistance in obtaining aninternational loan in order to pay compensation to the Arab refugees. In thebackground,thetalksonanIsraeli-Americansecuritypactcontinued.49

Sharett feared that an Israeli military operation would scuttle all thesedevelopments.Thepretextforcallingofftheoperationwasfoundinthepersonoftheself-appointedmediatorElmerJackson,anAmericanQuaker,whoknewNasserpersonallyandhadarrivedintheregiontotryhishandatresolvingtheconflict.JacksonarrivedinIsraelinmid-AugustandthenwentontoEgypt.InIsrael he apparently asked Sharett to ensure that the escalation would notcontinue,soasnottoharmhischances.50

The result was that at 1.00 am on 30 August, after the Israeli squads hadalready set out on their mission, Colonel Nehemiah Argov, the Minister ofDefence's adjutant, arrived at Dayan's forward command post in kibbutz NirYitzhakwithSharett'sorder (andBenGurion'sassent)not toexecute the raids.Dayanobeyedandorderedthesquadsback.51

TheChiefof-Staff then rushed to Jerusalem,gaveBenGuriona reportof theevents,andhandedhimaletterofresignation:

Minister ofDefence, thediscrepancybetween the security policywhichhas recently been set by thegovernmentandthesecuritypolicywhichseemstomeessential, isdeprivingmeofthepossibilityofbearing the responsibility required from the Chief of the General Staff. I therefore submit myresignationfrommycurrentpositionandrequestthatyoubringthisforthecabinet'sapproval...

Havingreadthemessage,BenGuriondemandedareneweddiscussionbythecabinet.TheChiefof-Staff'sresignationbroughtBenGurion,forthesecondtimesince the elections (the first had been in the 8 August meeting of theMapaiCentre), into an open confrontation with Sharett: 'Either Sharett's line orBenGurion's line'. Pursuing each alternately, he argued, had only caused

damage.ImmediatelyafterreceivingDayan'sresignation,BenGurionconvenedtheMapaiministers in the cabinet, apprised themof theChiefof-Staff'smove,and disappeared from sight for 24 hours, even though the State President hadalreadyformallychargedhimwiththetaskofformingthegovernment.ThejointprotestoftheMinisterofDefenceandtheChiefof-Staffhadtheintendedeffect.Sharettaccepted,throughArgov,Dayan'sfirstproposal(of26August)tomountamajoroperationintheGazaStrip.Inthemeantime,theEgyptianarmyandtheterrorist squadswhich operated under its auspiceswere involved in additionalactions,whichonlystrengthenedtheviewthatareprisalwasnecessary.Alreadyon 30August the cabinet (withoutBenGurion's presence) approvedOperationElkayaminKhanYunis,theIDF'slargestreprisalraiduntilthen.52

On31August,theIDFblewupthefrontoftheKhanYunispolicestationandanearbygasstation,sabotagedahospitalaswellasbuildings in thevillageofIbsan,andattackedanEgyptianmilitaryposition.Seventy-twoEgyptiansoldierswerekilledand58wounded.Theraidingforcesufferedonesoldierkilledand17wounded.BenGurionreappearedasmysteriouslyashehadvanishedandDayanwithdrewhisletterofresignation.53

InearlySeptember1955,followingtheKhanYunisattack, IsraelandEgyptbegan tomass forces along their common border. The two armies were soonexchangingartillerybarrages.Warseemedimminent.However,Nasser'sEgyptwas in the midst of an arms deal of unprecedented scope - and far-reachingimplications-withCzechoslovakia,whileBenGurionwasabouttoreassumethepremiership and apparently did not yet feel sufficiently prepared forwar. Theresultwas that both leaders acceded to theUN's call for a ceasefire.Warwasaverted,atleastforthetimebeing.54

Wasthisyetanotherinternalpoliticalexercise?Probablynot.BenGurionwasbusyputtingtogetherhisnextgovernmentatthetime.Nothingstoodinthewayofhisreturntopower.Theoperationwasafullyfledgedstatementofpoliticalintentions.Henceforththeinternalbalanceofforceswouldbeclear.ThesecurityconceptofBenGurionandDayanhadbecometheleadingapproach.Theirlong-runningdisputewithSharettwasnotoverthegoal-acknowledgedbyalltobepeace - but over how to reach it. Sharett favoured an approach that wouldmoderatetheconflict,whereasBenGurionandDayanbelievedinescalationasameans to achieve better results in future peace negotiations. Incidentally, the

events of early September 1955 also exposed a disagreement betweenBenGurionandDayan-notoverthegoalandnotoverthewaytoachieveit,butoverthepaceandthetimingofanIsraeliinitiatedwar.55

In retrospect, itwouldappear that the foundations for anew Israeli securitypolicywerelaidinthespring-summerof1955:aninitiatedwarasarealisticandindeed preferred option. That policy bore no relation to the Suez crisiswhicheruptedayearlater.Nevertheless,thecrisisoverSuezinthesummer-autumnof1956foundIsraelpreparedforwar.

MottiGolaniisaLecturerattheDepartmentofEretzIsraelStudiesatHaifaUniversity.

Notes

1.MosheDayan,AvneiDerekh,TelAviv,1976,p.24.

2.Ibid.;ShabtaiTeveth,MosheDayan,TelAviv,1972.

3. See, for example, Sharett's conclusions from theOlshan-Dori Commission (which investigated the

'SecurityMishap'):'DayancannotremainasChiefof-Staff',inMosheSharett,YomanIshi,TelAviv,

1978,Vol.III,p.666.OnSharett'sfearsofDayan,ibid.,p.699.

4.On the centralplaceofDayanandPeres in Israel'spreparations forwarduring thisperiod, seeM.

Golani,'DayanLeadstoWar',lyunitn,4,1994.

5.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,p.657;ibid.,Vol.IV,p.1006.

6.Ibid.,Vol.IV,p.1048.

7.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,pp.125,143-5;Sharett,Yoman,Vol.II,p.591.Theterm'basicsecurity'refersto

aconfrontation in the formofwaragainstoneormoreArabstates; 'routinesecurity' refers to the

efforttopreventthepenetrationofthestatebyhostileelements,particularlyPalestinians.Thetwo

termswereusedbythedefenceestablishmentfromthemid-1950s.See,forexample,Memorandum

byLt.Col.YuvalNe'eman,HeadofStrategicPlanningDepartmentinOperationsBranch,6January

1955,IsraelDefenceFocesArchives,637/56/29(hereinafterIDFA).

8.Teveth,MosheDayan,p.413;Dayan,AvneiDerekh,p.129.

9.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,p.639;DavidBenGurion'sDiary,BenGurionArchives,SdeBoker,February-

June1954(hereinafterBGD).

10.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,pp.122-3,125.

11.BGD,20August1954.

12.Ibid.,2March1955;IDFA,WeeklyMeetingFiles,Nos822-97.

13.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,pp.816,894.Foradetailedanalysisof theGazaoperationanditspolitical

context, seemy article, 'Israel and theGazaOperation -Continuity orChange?', inMottiGolani

(ed.),BlackArrow:TheGazaOperationandIsrael'sReprisalPolicyinthe1950s,TelAviv,1994,

pp.23-34(Hebrew).

14.On the reaction to the Patish terrorist attack see Sharett,Yoman, Vol. III, pp.861-6;Dayan,Avnei

Derekh,p.143;NathanAlterman'spoem'OnaFlowerNamedAfterVarda',inBrachaHabas,Tnuah

LeloShem,TelAviv,1964,p.189.

15.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,p.143.

16.On themurder of themember ofKibbutz Jezreel, see 'Report onRoutineSecurity for 1955-1956',

HistoryBranch,IDF,1957(hereinafterRSReport);GeneralStaffmeeting,21March1955,IDFA,

847/62/29;Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,p.865.

17.OnthecourseofeventsfollowingthemurderatPatish,seeSharett,Yoman,Vol.III,pp.861-99;BGD,

25,27-28March1955.

18.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,p.143;Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,p.894.

19.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,pp.873-4.

20.BGD,6April1955;Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,pp.874-5.Itwasinthecabinetdiscussionoftheevents

relatingtoPatishthatBenGurion,forthefirsttime,asfarasisknown,usedthefamousexpression

'UMShmoom'.

21.Actionsmotivatedbyfearwerenot foreign toBenGurion,andhedidnotdisavowhis fears.On14

December 1949, after Jerusalem had been annexed to Israel and declared its capital, BenGurion

wrote inhisdiary: 'Idonotalwaysexpressallmy fears -because I amafraid Iwill frightenour

comrades and the movement [the party] too much; and out of fear I favour violating the UN

resolutionimmediatelyandbyactions'.

22.RSReport.

23.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.III,pp.896-9.

24.AnechoofthechangecanbefoundintheRulesofEngagementissuedbyOperationsBranch:'Orders

toCentralCommand',29April,11May1955,IDFA,637/56/14.

25.GeneralStaffMeeting,openingremarksbytheChiefof-Staff,28March1955,IDFA,847/62/29.

26.Dayan'slettertoBenGurion,andtoHeadofOperationsBranch,4April1955,IDFA,847/62/29.

27. This was probably the spirit of Nasser's conversation with Burns, the head of the UN's Truce

SupervisionObserversstaff, though therecordwent throughseveral filters.Burnsreportedon the

conversationtoSharetton7June.YosefTekoah,theIsraelirepresentativeoftheForeignMinistry

totheArmisticeCommission,whowaspresentattheSharett-Burnsmeeting,conveyeditscontents

to theChiefof-Staff on 9 June. SeeDayan,AvneiDerekh, p.145. Sharett described the talkwith

Burnsinhisdiary,Sharett,Yomati,Vol.IV,pp.1047-8.Thesesourcesareinsufficienttounderstand

Nasser's motives during this period. For our purposes what is important is the information that

reachedIsrael.

28.SharetttoEban,6April1955,IsraelStateArchives,2454/6(hereinafterISA);Sharett,Yomati,Vol.

IV,pp.999-1000.

29. 'Survey of Routine Security 1951-1956', History Department Archives (hereinafter HDA), 64/2.

Subsequent reference: RS Survey; 'Operational Activity of the IDF 1955-1956', HDA, 64/2

(hereinafterOperationalActivity).

30.OntheprivatereprisalperpetratedbyMeirHar-Tsionandhisfriends,seeSharett,Yomati,Vol.IV,17

April1955,pp.941-2;andtheconsultationontheeveofOperationPleshet,ibid.,17May1955,pp.

1000-1003.

31.Sharett,Yomati,Vol.IV,pp.1006,1009;RSSurvey.

32.BGD,17May1955;Sharett,Yomati,Vol.IV,19May1955,p.1009.

33.'AppendixtoOperationPleshet-Pleshet1',OperationsBranch,24May1955,IDFA,637/56/14.

34.Sharett,Yomati,Vol. IV,meetingonPleshet,17May1955,pp.1000-1008;directiveonoperational

orderDavid,oralapprovalofdirective,OperationsBranch,24May1955,IDFA,637/56/14.

35.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,13June1955,p.145.

36.Sharett,Yomati,Vol.IV,11April1955,pp.920,1007.

37.RSSurvey.

38. RS Survey. On the 'Gaza talks' see 'TekoahMemorandum', 6 September 1955, ISA, 2454/7; and

memoirsofE.L.M.Burns,BetweenArabandIsraeli,London,1962,pp.69-84.

39. Even though the connection between the internal political arena and a state's external reactions is

natural,itisgivenlittleexplicitverbalexpression.Mysuppositionstemsfromasummationofthe

relevantevents.

40. See M.B. Oren, 'Escalation to Suez: The Egypt-Israel Border War 1949-1956', Journal of

ContemporaryHistory,Vol.24,1989,pp.359-60.

41.Sharett,Yoman,Vol. IV,pp.1037,1048;Dayan'scommentson thissubjectcanbefound inDayan,

AvneiDerekh,pp.143-4.

42.BGD,31July1955.AseriesofmeetingswasheldwiththeleadersofAhdutHa-avodaandMapam,

neitherofwhichparticipatedinthepreviousgovernment,aspartofthenegotiationstoformanew

government:conversationwithMapamleadersMeirYaariandYaacovHazan,7August1955,and

conversationwithAhdutHa-avodaleadersIsraelGalili,YigalAllon,andMosheAram,12August

1955,BenGurionArchives,SdeBoker(BGA)Recordsofmeetings.

43. BGD, 31 July 1955. On the discussion in theMapai Centre on 8 August seeMichael BarZohar,

BenGurion,Vol.III,TelAviv,1978,pp.1144-5;Sharett,Yoman,Vol.IV,pp.1116-18;andseealso

theprotestletterbyYavnieli,apartyveteran,toBenGurionagainsthisfierceattackonSharettatthe

MapaiCentremeeting,11August1955,BGACorrespondence.

44. On the discussion with the Left on the question of a security treaty with the United States, see

BenGurion'smeetingswiththeleadersofMapamandAhdutHa-avodaduringAugust,seenote42.

45.Foradescriptionoftheincident,seeGeneralStaffmeeting,29August1955,IDFA,847/62/30.The

head of the Operations Department, Colonel Narkiss, described what took place there. See also

'EventsReportofCentralCommand',26August1955,IDFA,637/56/15.OntheoperationatRafah,

see summation report on routine security whichwas drawn up as preparation for a book on the

'reprisaloperations'(unpublished),HDA,64/9.

46.GeneralStaffmeetings,18April1955,IDFA,847/62/29;29August1955,IDFA,847/62/30.

47. Remarks by Colonel Harkabi, Head ofMilitary Intelligence, at General Staff meeting, 29 August

1955, IDFA, 847/62/30; see 'Operation Catch' for apprehending intelligence scouts operating in

southernIsrael,OperationsBranch,21August1955,IDFA,637/56/15.

48.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,pp.150-51;GeneralStaffmeeting,29August1955,IDFA,847/62/30.

49.EliyahuElath,ThroughtheMistsofTime,Jerusalem,1986,p.69(Hebrew).

50.Sharett,Toman,Vol.IV,p.1131;BarZohar,BenGurion,Vol.III,pp.1146-8.

51. Mordechai Gur, a company commander in the Paratroops Battalion, claimed that his force

neverthelesscarriedoutitsmissionthatnight.Mordechai(Motta)Gur,CompanyD,TelAviv,1966,

pp.9-14.

52.Dayan,AvneiDerekh,26-31August1956,pp.150-52.

53.OperationElkayam-TheBattle for theKhanYunisPoliceStationandOutpost132,GeneralStaff,

HDA,H-381-1-1956.

54. See, on this, thememorandum byYosef Tekoah, Israeli ForeignMinistry liaison to theArmistice

CommissionswiththeneighbouringArabstates,6September1955,ISA,2454/7.

55.Sharett,Yoman,Vol.II,31January1954,p.332.

The1956SinaiCampaign:DavidBenGurion'sPolicyonGaza,theArmisticeAgreementandFrench

MediationMORDECHAIGAZIT

Themanybooksandmonographsdevotedtothe1956SinaiCampaign(MivtzaKadesh)seemtojustifytheconclusionthateverythingconcerningthiseventhasbeen thoroughly studied and is well known. Further research, however, stillmanagestohighlightnewfacets,threeofwhichwillbediscussedhere.ThefirstpertainstoDavidBenGurion'sattitudetotheGazaStrip.Contraryto

the received wisdom, including the views of some of his closest associates,BenGuriondidnotviewtheStripassomethingwhichIsraelshouldbewaryofholdingonto.PracticallyalltherelevantdocumentsarenowavailableanditisclearthattherewerevariousphasesinBenGurion'sposition.In1949hedeclaredhiswillingnesstoincorporatetheGazaStripintoIsraelandtointegrateitsentireArab population, both refugees and permanent residents. In 1956, after thecapture of this territory, BenGurion's position becamemore realistic. He nowinsisted onmaintaining a hold over the Gaza Strip without annexing it. Howimportant this territorywas to BenGurion can be inferred from his protracteddiplomatic struggle to keep it. The PrimeMinister was ready to settle for defactoIsraelicontrolanddispensewiththetrappingsofsovereignty,andeventotolerate aUnitedNations (UN) presence inGaza.Unlike his attitude in 1949,BenGurion now recoiled from assuming responsibility for all the PalestinianrefugeesinGaza.Evenso,hewaspreparedtopayaconsiderablepricebygivingacommitmenttoraisethestandardoflivingofthepermanent,nonrefugeeGazainhabitants (then estimated at 60,000) and also to absorb some of the GazarefugeesinIsraelintheframeworkofaUNplantoresolvetherefugeeproblemasawhole(therefugeepopulationinGazawasthenestimatedat260,000).On

oneoccasionBenGurionwentsofarastosaythateveninternationalsanctionswouldnotdeterIsraelfromholdingontoGaza.WhatspurredhiminhiseffortstomaintainthispositionwastheissueofIsrael'ssecurityanddefence.Hefearedthat an Egyptian return to the Strip, coupled with renewed terrorist raids byPalestinianrefugees,wouldactuallyputIsraelinjeopardy,beingconvincedthatonly Israel's presence there could obviate this danger. In the end BenGurionfailed to achieve this goal and was forced into ordering a complete IsraeliwithdrawalfromtheGazaStrip.The second observation, almost as surprising as the first, concerns the role

whichthe1949ArmisticeAgreementwasdestinedtoplayinthe'Understanding'of1March1957endingthecrisiscausedbythemilitarycampaign.ScrutinyofBenGurion'smoves in theperiod fromNovember1956 toMarch1957 revealshow crucial his new stand on the seven-year-old Armistice Agreement withEgypt was to become. He seems to have been genuinely convinced that hisNovember 1956 declaration in theKnesset that theArmisticeAgreementwas'dead'wasunassailable.Still, it is difficult to imagine thatBenGurion actuallybelieved that by releasing himself unilaterally from the Agreement he wouldsucceed in spiriting away the legal contention of both theUN and theUnitedStates that Egypt's right to be in the Strip was embedded in the ArmisticeAgreement. Furthermore, BenGurion did not foresee that the UN and the USwouldeventuallyfindawayoutof thecrisis,basedontheveryAgreementhehaddenounced.TheUSSecretaryofState,JohnFosterDulles,wastocontendthat if the Armistice Agreement was invalidated, then the US had nothing tolatch on to in order to give Israel even a semblance of assurance tomake itswithdrawal from Sharm alSheikh and Gaza less risky. BenGurion had alsodeclared thatwith theAgreement's 'demise', theoldarmisticedemarcation linehadbeenerased, therebyenablingIsrael to incorporate theStrip. It isunlikely,however, that he thought that this kind of argument would carry weight withDulles and the UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, both strong-willedand able personalities. The two of them insisted that there was no juridicalalternative to the Armistice Agreement, on which a future understanding forendingthecrisiscouldbebased.HadIsrael,inearlyDecember1956,heededtheadviceofRalphBunche,the

UNUnder-Secretary-Generalandrecipientof theNobelPrizefor fathering the

1949ArmisticeAgreement,andformallyrepudiatedtheAgreementthroughtheUN,thentheUNandtheUSmightperhapshavebeenpersuadedtofindalegaldeviceother thantheArmisticeAgreement.Toassist theminthiseffort, Israelwould have had to launch a vigorous diplomatic campaign to convince thirdpartiestoacquiesceinthesuspensionoftheAgreement.ThisadvicewasgivenbyBunchewhenGazawasstilllowonthelistofUNSecretariatpriorities.MorethanonceinDecember1956theIsraelirepresentativesintheUNtoldJerusalemthattheUNhadnotyetcomeupwithaGazapolicy.ThismighthavebeentherightmomentforIsraeltoseizetheinitiativeandtrytowinHammarskjoldoverby agreeing to have the newly createdUN international force,UNEF (UnitedNationsEmergencyForces),stationedintheGazaStrip,withIsraelremainingincharge of security and civilian matters. Israel, however, did not act uponBunche's advice.Thewindowofopportunitywasclosed, if indeed it hadeverexisted,andHammarskjoldwouldsoongraspatthehesitanthintsofMahmoudFawzi,theEgyptianForeignMinister,totheeffectthatifEgyptwereallowedtoreturntotheStrip,itmightbereadytoconsidersomechangesinitsGazapolicy.WhatmighthavehelpedIsraeltopersuadetheUNtofindasubstituteforthe

ArmisticeAgreementwasPresidentEisenhower'sattitude.TheUSPresidenthadpointed out to Dulles on several occasions that Gaza had never been part ofEgypt.HeopinedthatsincetheUNhadbeenbehindthe1949Agreement,itwasnotunreasonabletoassumethatitcouldadmit,perhapseveninitiate,changesintheArmisticeAgreement.Events would show, however, that Dulles got his way. In the last week of

February1957heproposedan'Understanding'whichwouldconsistofunilateralstatements made by Israel, the US, France and others in the UN GeneralAssembly. These statements would express certain 'hopes and expectations',withoutanyonedemurring.Thiswastheagreedupondiplomaticscenario.The third new facet about the 1956 Campaign concerns French mediation

effortsontheeveoftheUNGeneralAssemblymeetingof1March1957whenthe'Understanding'wasabouttobeannounced.Americandocumentsshowthatthe French efforts, though highly valued by the Israeli participants, wereeffectivelynothingbutamatterofcleverorchestrationonthepartofDulles.TheForeignSecretaryknewthatIsraelwouldonlyagreetoleavetheGazaStripinreturn for anAmerican assurance that should the 'Understanding' collapse and

Gazabecomeyetagainathreat,Israelwouldhavetherighttotakemeasurestodefend its interests (inaccordancewithArticle51of theUNCharter)with theUS indicating comprehension. Dulles thought that such an Israeli expectationwas perfectly justified and said so to Eisenhower and Hammarskjold. All thesame, he decided that American interests in the Arab countries obliged theUnitedStatestowithholdthenecessaryassurancetoIsraelonGaza.Instead, Dulles manipulated matters so as to have the French include a

passageintheirstatementintheUNGeneralAssemblytotheeffectthatIsraelmightbe forced toact 'if the"Understanding"brokedown'.HealsopersuadedHammarskjoldnottotakeexceptiontoeithertheFrenchortheIsraelistatementsvoicing such warnings. Clearly, had Hammarskjold expressed dissatisfactionwith the French and Israeli statements, he would have endangered the whole'Understanding'. By making sure that Hammarskjold would go along, Dullesclinched thematter. Understandably, BenGurion was pleased with the Frenchstatement, but he told theUS ambassador in Israel that this did not lessen hisdisappointment.Hehadexpected tohear from theAmericanswhat theFrenchhadsaid.

TheStructuretoKeepGaza

WhatwasthepositiontakenbyBenGuriononincorporatingtheGazaStripintoIsrael?SomeofthosewhoworkedcloselywiththePrimeMinisteraffirmthathehadseriousmisgivingsaboutsuchapossibility.Toprove theirpoint, theyciteremarksmadeorwrittenbyBenGurion.AbbaEban,forexample,recountsthaton one occasion BenGurion burst out: 'Gaza as part of Israel could be like acancer.InreturnforasmallsliverofterritorywewouldtakeresponsibilityforsometwohundredandfiftythousandArabs...OurinterestinGazaissecurity.TotakeasmallterritorywithavastArabpopulationwouldbetheworstpossibleexchange'.1

BenGurionhimselfconfidedtohisdiaryon10March1957that:

Gaza,initself,isapainintheneck,inallcircumstances.BeitunderEgyptianrule,Israelirule,UNruleorcombinedrule.Egyptianrulewouldbetheworstthing.ItwouldbesomewhatlessdangerousifIsraelaloneruledthere.Thedangerwouldbeoftwokinds:material-howcanwesupport260,000permanent

inhabitants.Thepoliticaldangerisevengreater.Therecanbenodoubtthattherefugeesandotherswillperpetrateactsofterror.CanwecrushthemliketheBritishdidinCyprusortheFrenchinAlgeria?...TheGaza Strip is a curse and a danger under all circumstances and on its accountwe ought not toendangeroursecurityinthefutureandbecomeoutcastsintheworld...2

Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthisentryofBenGurion'swasmadeafterhehadordered the Israeliwithdrawal fromGaza. In fact,BenGurion'sattitudeonGazaunderwentchangesanditslaterversionwasdifferentfromtheearlierone.MordechaiBar-OncallsBenGurion'sattitude 'ambivalent',3but thisdescriptiondoes not properly describeBenGurion's position.On twooccasions before theSinaiCampaign,hehadexpressedreadinesstoannextheGazaStrip.HedidsoinApril1949,committinghimselftoabsorballGazarefugeesintoIsraelproper.This commitment, initially an oral one, was soon to become a formalwrittencommitment to the UN Palestine Conciliation Commission, given on 29May1949.4 The US evinced much interest,5 and had Egypt not immediately anddiscourteously rejected this proposal, the US would have arranged a meetingbetween Egyptian and Israeli representatives. Preparations for such ameetingwerealreadyunderway.Sixyears later, inMarch1955,BenGurionbrought aproposal to the Israeli

government to order the Israeli army to expel the Egyptians from the Strip.BenGurion was then Minister of Defence in Moshe Sharett's cabinet, shortlyafter his return from his voluntary exile in Sde Boker. His proposal wassupportedbyonlyfourministersbesidesBenGurionhimself.Tothosewhowerealarmed by the prospect of absorbing so big an Arab minority into Israel,BenGurion said that it would be possible to open two corridors for the GazaArabswhosochosetoleaveandgotoEgyptorJordan.6

The third occasionwhere BenGurion evincedwillingness to keep theGazaStripwasafteritwastakenbytheIsraeliarmyintheSinaiCampaignof1956.FromtheearliestdaysaftertheendoffightingthePrimeMinisterstressedthatwhile the Strip had been 'liberated', the Sinai Peninsula had simply been'conquered'. In his reply to President Eisenhower's communication of 8November1956,BenGurionexpressedreadinesstoorderthewithdrawaloftheIsraeli forces from 'Egypt'.Heused theword 'Egypt' advisedly inorder to saythatwithdrawalfromSinaiposednoproblemsinceitwasEgyptianterritoryineverysense,butthiswasnotthecasewithGaza.BenGurionwouldstrenuously

oppose the idea of giving up the Israeli hold on the Strip which 'was notEgyptianandhasneverbeenso'.Thedeterminedstrugglecarriedonby Israel for fourmonths tomaintain its

control over the Strip, if only de facto, does not leave a shred of doubt thatBenGurion had kept his assessment from the days of Israel's War ofIndependencethatEgyptianpresenceinGazawasoneofthegreatestfiascosofthatwarandadangertoIsrael'ssecurity.HeconsideredtheUStobethemainculpritforthis,remindingtheUSambassadortoIsrael(on31December1956)thatin1948,whenIsraeliforceswereabouttoexpeltheEgyptiansfromGaza,theUSadministration intervened andprevented this fromhappening.7Hewasthinking of the sharply worded demand of President Truman (31 December1948)toendthefightingandwithdrawtheIsraeliforcesfromal-ArishinSinai.The objective of the Israeli forces was to occupy Gaza after completing itsencirclement from the south. BenGurion told the American ambassador thatunlikein1948thistimehehadmadeuphismindthatGazawasnottoreverttoEgypt.UN support forGaza's return to Egyptwould be a 'fatalmistake'. TheEgyptianpresenceinGazawas,hesaid,a'politicalanomalywhichhasnomoralvalidity'.It is not irrelevant to mention here that proof of BenGurion's consistent

interest in controlling Gaza resurfaced a decade after the Sinai Campaign. In1967, BenGurion, then already retired, again expressed his opinion that Gazawas a problem that Israel ought to confront squarely and courageously. In adetailed declaration on 19 June 1967 regarding the future of the territoriesoccupiedintheSixDayWar,hestated:'TheGazaStripwillremainintheStateof Israel and Israelwillmake efforts to settle the refugees on theWestBank,whichwillbeautonomous,orinanyotherArabcountry,withtheconsentoftherefugeesandthe...assistanceoftheStateofIsrael'.HeofferedtogivetheWestBankers an outlet to the sea in Haifa, Ashdod or Gaza. He also offered theKingdomofJordananoutlet'ofthekindgrantedtotheWestBank'.8ItisquiteclearthatBenGurionwouldnothaveproposedGazaasanoutlettotheseajustasheproposedHaifaandAshdodtothePalestiniansandJordanians,hadhenotseenitasaterritorywhichIsraelcoulddisposeoffreely.On 2 August 1967 BenGurion told students that Gaza was part of Israel.9

Whenhesaidsomewhatlaterthatinreturnforrealpeacehewouldbereadyto

give back all the occupied territories, except for Jerusalem and the GolanHeights, it is an open question whether he meant to include Gaza. What iscertain is that by 1972he hadmadeuphismind in favour of Israel's keepingconsiderably more than just Jerusalem and the Golan. He explained that fiveyearshadelapsedsincethewar,and'iftheArabswerenotreadytomakepeace,we are not committed to giving back [the territories].We cannot take it uponourselvestoretainallwehaveoccupied,butthereareterritorieswherethis(i.e.,keeping them) is possible'.10 In his interview he did not mention Gazaspecifically, but it is quite certain that having to give backGaza in 1957 stillrankledwithBenGurionforyears,andundoubtedlyuntil1972.11

On2November 1956 theGazaStripwas taken.Five days laterBenGuriondeclaredintheKnessetthatsofarasIsraelwasconcerned,the1949ArmisticeAgreementwithEgyptwas 'dead andwould not come to life again'.With thedeathoftheArmisticeAgreement,headded,thearmisticedemarcationlineshadalso breathed their last breath.12 Henceforth the line dividing the Strip fromIsraelwasnolongerinexistence.ThisiswhatBenGurionwastellingPresidentEisenhowerindirectlyon8NovemberwhenhesaidthatIsraeldidnotintendtoannex Sinai. In putting it this way, he was implying that while Israel's non-annexationist intentions towardsSinaiwereclear,Gazawasawhollydifferentissue.SeveraldayslaterthePrimeMinisterrecalledintheKnessetaspeechhehadmadetosoldiersinwhichhesaidthatoneoftheobjectivesofthewarwasto'liberatethispieceofourhomeland[moledetinHebrew]seizedbytheinvader'.TheallusiontoGazawasunmistakable.13SoonthereafterBenGurionwasevenmoreexplicit: 'IsraelwouldonnoaccountagreetoEgyptianinvadersreturningto the Gaza Strip'.14 This formulation was carefully chosen. BenGurion hadchanged his mind since 1949, when he proposed to annex the Strip and itsinhabitants.Hehadnowreachedtheconclusionthatstraightannexation,withallthat went with it, was undesirable andmight prove dangerous. Instead, Israelshould insist on remaining in effective control ofGaza and on not letting theEgyptians return. Nor could he permit the entry into the Strip of the newlyestablishedUNforce (UNEF); further, the Israeli civilianadministrationoughttobemaintainedandthepoliceshouldbeunderIsraelicontrol.IsraelwouldnotassumeresponsibilityfortheupkeepandresettlementoftheGazarefugees.TheIsraeli administrationwould, however, improve the economic condition of the

60,000permanentGaza residents.15Thegeneralquestionof theArab refugeeswould have to be dealt with by the UN. The Knesset approved BenGurion'sstatement.16

EarlyinNovember1956theUSandtheUNwerealreadyrequestingIsraeltoleaveGaza. This was a firm demand, presentedwith a tone of finality. On 2November the UN General Assembly, with US support, adopted a resolutiondemandingIsraeltowithdraw.IsraelconsentedandbeganagradualwithdrawalofitsforcesfromSinai,butnotfromGaza.DuringthefirstweeksIsraelieffortsfocused on the question of the freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba(Eilat). In theUNSecretariat,aswellas inWashington, theissueofGazawasstill dormant. At one of the meetings between the Israeli representatives andDulles, the formerunderstood theUSSecretaryas saying thatGazahadneverbeenpartofEgyptandthathedidnotknowwhatfuturearrangementswouldbemade there. This pleased BenGurion who expressed his delight to the USambassadorinIsrael.Washington,however,wasquicktoputthingsright.True,DulleshadsaidthatGazahadneverbeenEgyptian,buthehadalsosaidthatithadneverbeenontheIsraelisideofthedemarcationline.Thematteroffuturearrangementswasindeedopen,buttheUSsupportedtheUNGeneralAssemblyresolutionwhichurgedIsraeltowithdrawfromGaza.17

TheUSadministrationdidnotenterintomoredetailedtalkswithIsraeluntilFebruary1957;andwhen itdidso, thiswasapparentlybecauseCongressionalandpublicopinionhadbecome sympathetic to the Israeli case.18ParallelwithIsrael'stalkswithDulles,itsdiplomatsalsoconductednegotiationswiththeUNSecretary-General. It emerged that even the UN Secretariat was then lessconcernedwith theGaza question thanwith the issue ofmaritime freedomofpassage.RalphBunche, one ofHammarskjold's deputies, toldAbbaEban, theIsraeli ambassador to theUN and theUS, that opinions in theUNSecretariatweredividedastowhethertheorganizationshouldassumedirectresponsibilityfor Gaza. The Secretariat wanted to preserve UN rights on Gaza but withouthaving to exercise them. The UN was concerned that if it assumed fullresponsibility, itwouldhave tocarry it foreverwith theUShaving to foot thebill, a difficult proposition at a time when the US Congress was reluctant toassume additional financial burdens. Eban reported to Jerusalem, possiblybecauseBunchehadtoldhimso,thatifIsraelshoweditselfwillingtoabsorba

considerable number of theGaza refugees, it would thereby 'make it possible[for theUN] to acquiesce in our [Israel's] stayingon [inGaza]'.19TwoweekslaterBunchetoldEbanthathehadsomeideasconcerningGaza'sfuture,butinthemeantimeitwasdesirablethatthepresent'nebuloussituation'continue.20

BenGurionhimselfunwaveringlyadheredtohispositionthatIsraelmustnotleaveGaza.On25DecemberhecabledEbanthat'undernocircumstancesshallwelettheEgyptiansreturntoGaza.Inmyview,weshouldnotannextheStripformally,butoursecurityrequiresthatnoEgyptianorUNforcebeintheStrip...WeshallgladlydiscusswiththeUShowtosolvethegeneralrefugeequestionand that of Gaza'.21 This position was endorsed by the government on 31December.BenGurion's strong determination to control Gaza was expressed in yet

another cable to Eban inwhich he said that Israel would not leaveGaza andSharmalSheikheveniftheUSweretoimposesanctionsontheJewishstate.22

In themeantime, theUNSecretariat continued towaver.On10 JanuaryEbanreported that Hammarskjold 'still had no inkling on how to resolve the Gazaquestion'.23BythesecondweekofJanuary1957Bunchehadmadeuphismind.HetoldanIsraelidiplomatthatIsraelmustevacuateGazaandletUNEFreplaceit.Israelcouldannounceitswithdrawal,coupledwithastatementthatitwouldre-enter the Strip if the Egyptian army or an Egyptian civilian administrationentered; if UNEF left before appropriate arrangements had been made; or ifUNEFfailed toprevent infiltration.24 In less thansixweeksBunche'sproposalbecame the basis for the 'Understanding' that made the Israeli withdrawalpossible, butBunchegot no credit for the idea. Instead, the creditwent to theAmericansandtheFrench.Meanwhile, exchanges between Hammarskjold and Israeli representatives

began to be short tempered. The Secretary-General was unbending: the UNcouldnot'acceptapresenceofIsraelisecurityforcesinGaza'.Israel'sinsistenceon remaining in Gaza would be resisted. It was incumbent on him, as UNSecretary-General,toreporttotheUNGeneralAssemblytotheeffectthatunderthe existing circumstances in Gaza the UN could no longer maintain its aidprogrammefortherefugeesthere.ForhispartBunchepointedoutthattheUNcouldnotco-operatewithIsraelinGazaanymorebecausetherewasnosupportfordoingsoamongUNmembers.25

On 3 February, Eisenhower sent BenGurion a strongly worded message:'Continuedignoringofthejudgementofthenations...wouldalmostsurelyleadtoinvokingoffurtherUNprocedureswhichcouldseriouslydisturbtherelationsbetween Israel and other member nations, including the United States'.26

Although the hint at sanctions was clear, BenGurion remained defiant: IsraelwouldnotpermitEgypttoreturntoGaza,Israel'sadministrationwouldcontinuethere in co-operation with the UN and the local population. Israel expressedreadiness to discussmodalities. In lieuof theArmisticeAgreement, no longerrelevant from Israel's point of view, it was necessary to negotiate anonaggressionorpeaceagreement.27Eban'sprotestationstoBenGurionwereofno avail. He remained unmoved.28 In his reply to Eisenhower, the PrimeMinister commentedon the implied threatof sanctions,pointingout thatnonewere 'ever invoked against Egypt which, for eight years past, has violatedresolutions of the Security Council and provisions of the Charter'. By theSecurityCouncilresolution,hemeanttheSeptember1951UNrulingthatIsraelhadtherighttofreepassageintheGulfofEilatandtheSuezCanal.29

While these exchangeswere taking place, theUSwas busyworking out itsposition in detail.Dulles toldEisenhower that he and his advisers did not see'howwecanatthistimecommitourselvesoranybodytorewritetheArmisticeAgreement.Under it, theGazaStrip is turnedover toEgypt foradministrationand policing'. Even the stationing ofUNEF there had 'to beworked out on avoluntarybasis'(thatis,Egyptwouldhavetogiveitsconsentfreely).WhattheUScoulddofor itspartwas togiveIsraelanassurance 'outside thecontextofthe UN'. Such assurance would refer to the question of freedom of maritimepassage.Morespecifically,theUSwas'thinkingofgivinganassurancethatweand a group of maritime nations will assert the view that [the Gulf] is aninternational waterway ... and if it is blocked we would consider it an act ofaggression'.30 This assurancewould take care of theGulf problem, but not ofGaza.Dulles then outlined the American position in a special aide-memoire (11

February)31whichconstituteda turningpoint in theUS-Israelidialogue.All itsaidwithrespecttoGaza,however,wasthattheUNGeneralAssemblyhad'noauthority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantialmodification of theArmistice Agreement' which gave Egypt 'the right and responsibility of

occupation'.IsraelshouldpromptlywithdrawfromGazawhosefutureshouldbe'worked out through the efforts and good offices of the UN'. The US aide-mémoire urged theUN tomoveUNEF intoGaza 'and to be on the boundarybetweenIsraelandtheGazaStrip'.32

BenGurionwelcomedtheAmericaninitiativebutfounditwanting;Israelwasready to withdraw its military forces from Gaza but insisted that its civilianadministrationandpoliceremain.HesuggestedthataspecialIsrael-USworkinggroupconsideraplanfortheadministrationofGazaafterIsrael'sevacuation.33

TheUSrejected thisproposal.TheAmericansfelt that Israel tendedto 'chargethe US with responsibility for every knotty problem the UN encountered'.34

Dulles toldEisenhower that Israel assumed that theUS 'was acting for all theworldandallthey[theIsraelis]havetodoistositdownandnegotiatewithus'.35

ThisUSreactionmakes it impossible toknowwhatdirectionUSpolicymighthave taken on Gaza had Hammarskjold not suddenly discovered that theEgyptian Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Fawzi, was ready to consider a UNadministration in Gaza 'at the right time'.36 The Egyptians had stated theirconcessioninveiledterms,butitsufficedtoprompttheDepartmentofStatetotell its embassies around the world that the US favoured immediate Israeliwithdrawal from the Strip and aUN take-over. The future status of theGazaStripwouldbe left to theUN.37 Israel'sdetailed reply (on15February) to theAmericanaide-mémoireof 11 February left theUS position unchanged. Eventhe Israelioffernotonly topaycompensation to theArab refugeesbutalso tomakeacontributiontoaUNprogrammeforsolvingtheGazarefugeeproblemthroughthe'settlementofapartoftherefugeepopulationofGaza[inIsrael]'38

hadnoeffect.Dulleswas disappointed by the Israeli reply.He toldEban that theUShad

already made its policy clear in its aide-mémoire and would not enter intoseparate consultations with Israel over an arrangement that would then besubmittedtotheUN.Suchanapproachwasnotonly'unacceptable'butwouldbe'deeply and properly resented by the UN'.39 BenGurion did not give in. HecabledEban:'TheEgyptiansmustnotbepermittedtoreturntoGaza'.40Hetookthis strong line in full awareness of its consequences at the UN GeneralAssembly,whichwasabouttoconveneagain,andwheresanctionsagainstIsrael

were to be discussed. On 20 February Eisenhower made a broadcast to theAmerican nation,warning that theUNhad no choice but to exert pressure onIsraeltocomplywiththewithdrawalresolution.41HespeltoutthiswarninginacommunicationtoBenGurionsayingthatifIsraeldidnotimmediatelywithdrawtherecouldbe'noassurancethatthenextdecisionssoontobetakenbytheUNwillnotinvolveseriousimplications.He,Eisenhower,wouldgreatlydeplorethenecessityof theUS takingpositions in theUNandof theUN itselfhaving toadopt measures which might have far-reaching effects upon Israel's relationsthroughouttheworld'.42

Well awareof the seriousnessof the situation,BenGurionwas reassuredbyprivatemessagesfromanAmericanpersonalityclosetoEisenhowertellinghimthat the US assurance as made known to Israel amounted to a firm moralcommitment by the US administration, one which Israel could trust.43 On 21February the Israeli cabinetdecided to request theUS to agree to separate theGulfandtheGazaissues.Israelurgedthatthefreedomofnavigationassurancebecomeoperativeimmediately,withthefutureofaGazaarrangementleftopenforfurthernegotiation.IsraelstatedagainthattheEgyptiansmustbepreventedfrom returning toGazadirectlyor indirectly.44AmeetingbetweenDulles andEban took place on 22 February. The Israeli and American reports on thismeeting are not quite identical. According to the American report, the Israelirepresentativeshad informed themthat Israelhadchanged itspositionandhadagreedtowithdrawitsarmyandletUNEFin,eventhoughtheUNwasunabletopromise that UNEF would remain on 'Egyptian soil until peace had beenestablished'.ThisreporthasDullessayingthattheUNGeneralAssemblycouldnot 'rewrite' the Armistice Agreement which constituted the basis for Egypt'srights in Gaza. In seeking to deny Egyptian rights under the ArmisticeAgreement,'IsraelwasaskingformorethantheUNcouldgive'.45

The Israeli account, prepared by Eban and his deputy Reuven Shiloah,described Dulles's position in less negative terms. It said that the ForeignSecretaryagreedthatafterIsrael'smilitaryevacuationofGaza,aninternationaladministration would be established without Egypt's participation, while theIsraelicivilianauthoritywouldcontinue. It ispossible that theIsraelismistookDulles'sremarkthathebelievedthat'Egyptwouldacquiesceinsomechange'forimplying acquiescence in the Israeli demands.Theywere likewise encouraged

byDulles'sstatingthat'itisimpossibletopersuadeEgypttorenounceitsrights,but it is possible to persuade it not to insist on their implementation inpractice'.46

BenGurion was much upset by the statement of his representatives inWashingtontotheeffectthatIsraelwasreadytowithdrawitsarmyandpermittheentryofUNEF.Hecabledimmediatelytosaythatthecabinethadnotagreedto UNEF's entry 'not before and not after the arrival of the working group[proposedbyIsrael].Itwasonlyagreedthatwewoulddiscusseverything[withtheworkinggroup]'.47Hecontinuedtoinsistonseparationbetweentheissuesoffree passage in the Gulf and Gaza, confiding to his diary that 'Eban did notconveythecabinetinstructionstoDulles.Theconversation[Eban-Dulles]shookme. AE [Abba Eban] conveyed to them a message of his own, undoubtedlywithoutevilintent'.48JerusalemfirstinstructedEbantotellDullesthatamistakehadbeenmadeinconveyingthecabinet'sdecision,butthendecidedtoleavethematteratthat.49

TheshockfeltbyBenGurionwhenhewastoldaboutthemistakenmessagetoDullesindicatesthathewasstillsetonkeepingGazaevenat this latemomentandinspiteoftheharshAmericanwarnings.Israelwasreadyfornomorethanatokenconcession:toletsomeUNobservers,butnotUNEF,intoGaza.Thiswasnot good enough forDulles andHammarskjold. The Secretary-Generalwould'dohisbest'toensurequietintheregionafterIsrael'swithdrawal,buthisactionwouldbebasedentirelyontheassumptionofEgypt'sreturntoGaza.Againstthisbackdrop,thetalkswithDullesandHammarskjoldwerelikelyto

havereachedadeadlockhadDullesnotproposedon26FebruarytoinvolvetheFrench in theefforts topersuade Israel toevacuate theStrip.Hediscussed theideawithEisenhower,with the French -who immediately agreed - and lastlywith the Israelis.50 The French involvement was useful in inducing Israel toleaveGaza,buttheFrenchrolewasinfactconsiderablymoremodestthansomeIsraeli participants assumed. It wasDulles who pulled the strings without theFrenchandIsraelisrealizingit.

BenGurionandtheArmisticeAgreement

On7November1956,shortlyafterthefightinginSinaihadended,BenGuriontold the Knesset that the Armistice Agreement with Egypt (signed on 24February1949)'wasdeadandburiedandwouldnotcometolifeagain'.WiththeAgreement,saidBenGurion,thearmisticedemarcationlinesbetweenIsraelandEgypthadbreathedtheir last.Heexplainedthat the 'Egyptiandictator[Nasser]had for many years ridden roughshod over the Agreement ... violated UNSecurity Council resolutions and the UN Charter. Furthermore, the EgyptianPresident'sinnumerabledeclarationsthatastateofbelligerencyexistedbetweenEgyptandIsrael,haddistortedtheessenceoftheAgreement'.51

BenGurion may have chosen his words advisedly when he announced the'deathandburial'oftheAgreement,butthefactofthematteristhathedidnotmakea formal, legal statement to theeffect that theGovernmentof Israelhaddecided to cancel theArmisticeAgreement because theEgyptianshadgrosslyviolateditsprovisions.Intheend,aswillbeshownshortly,hisunilateralnon-formaldeclaration stoodhim ingood stead.Atoneof the talksbetweenEbanandHammarskjoldinDecember1956,Bunche,whowaspresent,toldEbanthatin his view Israel for its own good should 'formalize' its declaration on therepudiation of the Armistice Agreement. The way to do this was to ask theSecretary-General to convene a meeting between Israeli and EgyptianrepresentativesasprovidedforbyArticle12oftheAgreement.Thisarticlelaiddownthateitherofthetwopartieshadtherighttorequesttheconveningofthepartiesataconferenceforthepurposeofconsideringchangesinorsuspensionofanyofitsprovisions.Itwasincumbentonbothpartiestoparticipateinsuchameeting.Israelcoulddeclarethatitrequestedthemeetinginordertorepudiatethe Agreement. Should Egypt refuse the Secretary-General's invitation, Israelcouldthenstate that ithadexhaustedallproceduralpossibilitiesopento itandconsidered itself no longerboundby theAgreement. It is evident thatBunchewas sure that his advicewas sound since he repeated it on several occasions,arguingthatIsraelstoodtogainifitactedinthisvein.Bunche'sideawasdiscussedatameetingwithGoldaMeirinNewYork.The

participants were in favour of following his advice and not leaving thesuspensionoftheAgreementindoubt.Theydidnotthink,however,thatIsraelshouldrefertoArticle12asBunchehadrecommended,sincefromitspointofview that articlewas in an agreement that Israel no longer accepted.Another

wayshouldbefound.No action, however, followed this meeting. The legal adviser to the Israel

MinistryforForeignAffairsconsideredBunche'sideaa'trap'designedtorevivethe Agreement, since it suggested having recourse to Article 12.52

Hammarskjold'sattitudewasfirmandperfectlyclearfromthestart,inspiredasitwas by theUNGeneralAssembly resolution of 2November 1956 urging theparties to observe the Armistice Agreement. Hammarskjold referred to thearmistice demarcation lines in his report of 22 February 1957, in which hepointed out how the crisis should be resolved. He outlined Egypt's position,sayingthat:

...theGovernmentofEgypt,recognizingthepresentspecialproblemsandcomplexitiesoftheGazaareaandthelong-standingmajorresponsibilityoftheUNthere...andhavinginmindalsotheobjectionsandobligationsoftheArmisticeAgreement,hasthewillingnessandreadinesstomakespecialandhelpfularrangementswiththeUNandsomeofitsauxiliarybodies...[including]UNEF...ThearrangementfortheuseofUNEFintheareawouldensureitsdeploymentonthearmisticelineattheGazaStripandtheeffectiveinterpositionoftheForcebetweenthearmedforcesofEgyptandIsrael.53

ThereportmadeitcrystalclearthatHammarskjoldpreferredtheEgyptiancaseto the Israeli case presented by BenGurion in his Knesset statements.54 IsraelrepeatedlyputforwarditscontentionthatEgypthadsystematicallyviolatedtheAgreement. The quintessence of the Agreement was the end of the state ofbelligerency between the two states and the call for action towards achievingpeace.Egypt,however,claimedthattheAgreementcouldexistsidebysidewithastateofwar.Israelcompletelyrejectedthisinterpretationwhichitconsideredtohavebroughtabout thedeathof theAgreement.Anewkindof relationshipwas needed. Israel also denied having asserted that there was a state ofbelligerencybetweenitandEgypt.TherelationsbetweenIsraelandEgypt,evenin the absence of the Armistice Agreement, were based on the UN Charter,whichdeniedtheexistenceofastateofbelligerencybetweenUNmembers.Hammarskjold did not go along with this argument. He told Eban that not

onlyEgyptbutIsraelaswellhadviolatedtheAgreement.Despiterecentevents,he viewed the Agreement as an asset not to be ignored in any effort to re-establishsatisfactoryrelationsbetweenthetwocountries.55InanothertalkwithEban several days later, Hammarskjold said that 'the UN cannot put awayanythingon theshelfofhistoryunless this isdone legally; this iswhytheUN

believesthatitiscommittedtotheArmisticeAgreement'.56

TheUSviewwasidentical.On9February1957,justbeforetheUSsetoutitspositioninaspecialaide-mémoire(dated11February),constitutinginmorethanonesenseaturningpoint,DullestoldEisenhowerthathecouldnotcommittheUSoranybody to 'rewrite' theArmisticeAgreement.Under its terms theGazaStripwas'turnedovertoEgyptforadministrationandpolicing'.TheUSwantedUNEF tocontrolGaza,but thathad 'tobeworkedoutonavoluntarybasis'.57

DulleswasclearlyconvincedthatbecauseoftheArmisticeAgreementhishandsweretiedwithrespecttoGaza.TheUSaide-mémoirestatedthattheUNGeneralAssembly 'has no authority to require of either Egypt or Israel a substantialmodificationoftheArmisticeAgreement'.TheAgreement'givesEgypttherightandresponsibilityofoccupation[ofGaza]...webelievethatIsraeliwithdrawalfromGazashouldbepromptandunconditional, leaving thefutureof theGazaStriptobeworkedoutthroughtheeffortsandgoodofficesoftheUN'.58

Israel's reply to the US aide-mémoire disappointed Dulles.59 It agreed towithdrawitsarmybutnotitscivilianauthorityandpolice.NordidIsraelagreetoletUNEFin.ItproposedthesettingupofaworkinggroupwhichwouldcometoGaza to study the problem andmake recommendations to theUNGeneralAssembly.Dulles,however,insistedthattheArmisticeAgreementcouldnotbeignored.60

On 14 February, in an almost desperate effort to make the US change itsposition,IsraelagreedtoUNEF'sentryintotheStrip,butcontinuedtoinsistonits civilian administration and police staying there. It also demanded that freenavigationforIsraelintheGulfbecomeoperativeimmediately,evenwhiletheGazaissuewasstillbeingnegotiated.Israeli legalexpertsarguedthatoncetheIsraeli armywas no longer inGaza andUNEF had taken over, no one couldcontend that the state of belligerency between Israel and Egypt remained inforce.UNEFwasthebestguarantorthat therewouldbenomorefighting.TheStateDepartment'slegalexpertsacceptedthesoundnessoftheIsraeliargument,namely that once UNEF had entered the Strip, the Israeli civilian authorities'would be at the behest of the United Nations' force ... [and] would have nopowerexceptthatderivedfromtheUN.IftheIsraeliadministrationweresimplycarryingoutinstructionsofUNEF,itwouldseemthattherewouldnolongerbeaquestionofmilitaryoccupationortheexerciseofbelligerency'.However,the

US experts added that Israel was wrong in assuming that its civilianadministrationintheStripdidnotrequireUNapproval.AsDullessawit,Israelcouldnot 'stipulatenoEgyptianparticipation [in theStrip]'.Hesaidagain thattheUN could not rewrite theArmisticeAgreement, 'certainly notwithout theconcurrenceofbothparties'.61

WhenDullesreportedtoEisenhowerwhatIsraelinsistedonandwhyhehadto refuse, Eisenhower said that the armistice had been proposed by the UNwhich therefore had some leeway. Dulles countered by pointing out that theArmistice Agreement had been agreed upon by both states and thus the UNcouldnot 'unilaterallydissolveit,itwasaquestionofnationalpride'.62Hedid,however,givesomegroundwhenhetoldEisenhowerthatIsraelcouldgetsomeofwhatitwantedonthebasisofEgyptianacquiescence.Eisenhowerstucktohisgunssayingthat'GazahasneverbeencededtoEgyptandhasneverbeenpartofit,so[itis]notthesameaslowerSinai'.63

Obviously, Eisenhower had been persuaded by BenGurion's argument thatGazawaslegallyquitedistinctfromSinai.However,inDulles'smemorandumtoEisenhower of 26 February 1957, which constituted the basis of the'Understanding' announced threedays later, he stated that 'under theArmisticeAgreementEgypthasarightofoccupancyandthereisnowayinwhichtheUNor Israel can take this right awaywithoutEgypt's consent andEgypt does notconsent, although it acquiesces in the exercise of administrative functionsthroughaUnitedNationsCommission ...'.64 In talkswithEban,DulleswarnedIsraelthattherewasa 'definitelinkbetweenGazaandtheGulfofAqaba'.TheUS would feel able 'to give assurance with respect to Aqaba only if Israelcomplied with UN resolutions relating to Gaza and did not assert rightsincompatible with the terms of the Armistice Agreement'. The US legalargumentwentasfollows:iftheArmisticeAgreementwereabolished,thestateofbelligerencywouldbeinforceagainandthiswouldspelltheendoftheGulfofAqabaarrangement.In1951theUNSecurityCouncilruledthattheEgyptianinterferencewithIsraelishippingmuststopbecausethereexistedtheArmisticeAgreementwhichputanendtothestateofbelligerencybetweenthetwostates.ThustheaffirmationbytheUNoftheabsenceofbelligerencyformedtheonlylegal basis for the Gulf arrangement. Israel could not obtain freedom ofnavigationwithout leavingGazaand letting theEgyptians return there, aswas

theirrightundertheArmisticeAgreement.Dulles and his advisers rejected the Israeli argument that the UN Charter

bannedthestateofbelligerencyandthereforetheArmisticeAgreementwasnotneeded to obtain this result. Dulles claimed that without the ArmisticeAgreement 'chaos'wouldensue.TheUSand Israelwouldbeonan 'unchartedsea'.TheassurancestheUSwaspreparedtogiveIsraelwereconditionalonitscomplete withdrawal and were based on the premise that the ArmisticeAgreementwasvalid,andalongwithit,thelegalframeworkthatitprovided.65

As a general rule, the US did not think that it was wise to repudiateagreements evenwhen theywere not satisfactorily implemented.Koreawas acase in point; violations by the North Koreans had not induced the US torepudiatetheagreement.Theveryexistenceofanagreement,evenifviolationscontinued, had a restraining influence. InKorea the agreement established thedemarcationlineandothermattersofimportance,whichsurvivedtheviolations.ThiswaswhytheUSwouldnotsupportapositioninfavourofrepudiatingtheEgyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement. On the contrary, the US would try torehabilitateitandwouldexpectEgypttoco-operate.The US legal adviser, Herman Phleger, argued that renunciation of the

ArmisticeAgreementmightboomerang.SinceIsraelwasactuallyobservingthemain principles of theArmisticeAgreement, it should also be able to benefitfrom its rights under it. Those countries that were ready to support Israel alladhered to the legal doctrine based on theArmisticeAgreement and the 1951UNSecurityCouncilresolution.Israelshould,therefore,donothingthatwouldmakeitdifficultfortheUSandotherstoidentifywithit.66

Dulles took the same position in talking to the French Foreign Minister,Christian Pineau,who arrived inWashington: if Israel insisted on consideringtheArmisticeAgreementnullandvoid,'aseriousproblemwouldariseinthatitwouldrevive[thestateofbelligerency]tofullvigouranditwouldbedifficulttoassertrightsofinnocentpassageintotheStraitsofAqaba'.67

In its statement in theUN,on1March1957,after Israelhadannounced itsreadiness towithdraw, theUS referred to theArmisticeAgreement and urgedEgypt and Israel to base their relations on 'full observance of the ArmisticeAgreement ... so that the Agreement will become fully operative'.68 Clearly,therefore,intheendIsraelacceptedtheUSscenario,oratleastacquiescedinit

thoughitrevivedtheArmisticeAgreementwhichBenGurionhaddeclareddeadonly threemonths earlier. In return, as a trade-off, theUS supported some ofIsrael'smostvitalpolicy interests. Ina longexchangebetweenBenGurionandHammarskjold in Jerusalem two months later (May 1957), with Meir andBunchealsopresent, thePrimeMinisterexpoundedhispositionagain.By thattime the Egyptians had already returned to Gaza. BenGurion asserted that hecontinuedtoconsidertheArmisticeAgreement'dead',butnotitsprinciples.HecouldnotunderstandwhytheUNhadpermittedtheEgyptianstoreturntoGaza,andwaspuzzledwhytheinternationalorganizationhadnotfirstinsistedthattheEgyptiansabideby theirobligationsunder theArmisticeAgreement.Since theUN, unlike him, viewed theAgreement as valid, arguedBenGurion, it shouldnothaveexemptedEgyptfromdeclaringanendtobelligerencyandacceptanceofthe1951SecurityCouncilresolutionconcerningnavigation.Inreply,Bunchepointed out that that resolution itself was based on the Armistice Agreementwhich BenGurion no longer recognized as binding. BenGurion said that theresolution clearly rejected the Egyptian allegation that there was a state ofbelligerencybetweenEgyptandIsrael.TheEgyptianshadnoright toreturntoGazaaslongastheyclungtothatinterpretation.BunchesaidthatEgypt'srightto be in Gaza derived from the Armistice Agreement which Israel had neverformallyrepudiated.InsayingthisBunchewasinessenceechoingwhathehadrepeatedly toldEban inDecember 1956, namely, that Israel ought to give theUNformalnoticethatitwishedtorepudiatetheArmisticeAgreement.69

WhileitisimpossibletostatewithanycertaintythatIsraelerredinnotgivingformal notification to theUN that it considered theArmisticeAgreement nullandvoid,itwouldappearthatthisIsraeliomissionmadeiteasierfortheUNtoignore BenGurion's Knesset statement and to act throughout the negotiationperiodasiftheArmisticeAgreementremainedinforceasbefore.

Last-MinuteFrenchMediation

AsthecrisisbetweenIsraelandtheUS-UNreacheditsclimaxinthelastweekof February 1957, it became clear that Dag Hammarskjold was not going to

budge. In his 22 February report to the General Assembly, he outlined theelementswhichwouldprovide thebasis for ending thecrisis, andas far ashewasconcernedthiswashisfinalwordonthesubject.HefirmlyrejectedIsrael'sdemand thatEgypt shouldnot return toGaza,arguing thatEgypt's rightswerebasedontheArmisticeAgreement.Hence,theUNeffortstoensurequietintheregionafterIsrael'swithdrawalwouldbemadeinamannerfullyconsistentwiththesafeguardingofEgypt'srights.70

Israelobjected.Itwouldcompromiseononepointonly,namelyagreementtosomeUNobserversbeingposted inGaza.ThestationingofUNEFwasoutofthequestion.Israelwould,however,bepreparedtoreportregularlytotheUNonits administration of the Strip.71 Israel also expressed readiness to withdrawimmediately from Sharm alSheikh, the last place in Sinai it still held, oncondition that the principle of freedom of navigation be implementedconcurrentlywithitswithdrawal.TheunresolvedGazaissuewouldgoonbeingdiscussed. Dulles rejected the Israeli proposal but, at the same time, advisedEban, almost pleaded with him, to meet with the French Foreign Minister,Christian Pineau. Pineau and France's PrimeMinister, GuyMollet, were thenvisitingWashington.BywayofexplanationDullesaddedthatPineau'hadsomeideaswhichmightbehelpful ... [and]commended themselves to thePresidentandtoM.Mollet'.72

WhatisknownabouttheFrenchroleinthelastdaysorFebruary(justbeforethe'Understanding'wastobeannouncedon1March)isgleanedfromtheIsraeliandAmericandocuments, theFrenchdocumentsbeingstillclassified.Pineau'sbookofmemoirsontheSuezCampaignaddslittletowhatisknownabouttheFrench role.73 Still it does perhaps provide a clue to the question as to whyDulles asked the French to play a part. According to Pineau, the ForeignSecretary asked him to find a suitable formula in consultation withHammarskjold, acceptable to both Egypt and Israel. Dulles explained that hewasaskingthisofFrancebecausehisownhandsweretied,havingtotakeArabinterestsintoaccount.PineaudoesnotaddanythingbeyondthatonhistalkwithDulles.Hedoesnotevenmentionthehigh-levelEisenhower-Molletmeetingof28February,inwhichheandDullestookpart.PineautalkedtoHammarskjoldimmediatelythereafter,tellinghimthatitwas

vitalthatUNEF'sdeploymentinGazaandSharmbeforanunlimitedduration.

When Hammarskjold asked whether this would satisfy Israel, Pineau said itwould not since Israel would fear that Egypt might demand the removal ofUNEFatanytime.Hammarskjoldthenasked:'andwhatifEgyptagrees?'.SincePineaudoesnotexplainwhatitwasthatEgypthadtoagreeto,itwouldappearthatHammarskjoldwanted to findoutwhat the positions ofFrance and Israelwould be if Egypt were to give a clear undertaking not to demand UNEF'sdeparture.Itis,however,mostunlikelythatHammarskjoldwouldbepreparedatthislatestage(26-27February)toaskCairoforsuchacommitment.Ashesawit, everythinghad alreadybeen settled.Fawzi andNasserhadgiven their tacitagreement to letUNEFdeploy inGazaandSharmwith theunderstanding thatUNEFwouldbetoldtoleaveonlyaftergivingapriorwarning.Thisbeingthecase, it isnotatallclearwhatPineauachievedinhis talkwithHammarskjold,except perhaps a secret meeting with Fawzi, arranged by the UN Secretary-Generalatthelatter'sresidence.Pineaunarratesthatthemeetingwasrecordedintheformofaproces-verbal (memorandumofconversation)signedbyall threepresent.Unfortunately,hedoesnotsaywhatwasinthememorandum.SomuchforPineau'saccount.Brian Urquhart, an assistant of the UN Secretary-General, published a

biography on Hammarskjold which makes extensive use of classified UNmaterial.Urquhartmentions themeetingbetweenPineauandFawzi,hostedbyHammarskjold, apparently without attaching much importance to it. Thememorandum of conversation between PineauFawzi-Hammarskjold is notmentioned at all.Urquhart says thatHammarskjold showedPineau the text ofthe 'Understanding' reached by Dulles and Golda Meir the previous day.AccordingtoUrquhart,HammarskjoldwasreferringtothetextofthestatementwhichMeirwasabouttomakeattheUNGeneralAssemblyon1March.Afterreadingthetext,PineausaidthatthethrustofMeir'sstatementwasthatEgyptianforceswerenot to return toGaza.Hammarskjold reacted,saying thathecouldnotget apromiseof sucha thing fromCairo.Hehoped thatEgyptwouldnotinsist on restoring the Egyptian administration in Gaza but he could not becertain.HeestimatedthatEgyptwouldnotwanttoseeitspresencereducedtoamere token.74 According to Urquhart, Pineau did not remonstrate withHammarskjoldonbeinggiven this information. Ifweare tobelieveUrquhart'saccount,andtherearesoundreasonsfordoingso,itemergesthatPineauwasin

fact unable to get anything at all out ofHammarskjold.ToHammarskjold theunderstanding between the UN and Egypt was already a fait accompliannouncedon22February,andthatwasthat.What indeedwas the roleDulles envisaged for France?TheUS documents

provide a clear answer. When Israel informed the US that it had reached adeadlockinitstalkson25FebruarywithHammarskjold,Dulleslostnotime.Hetalked to Eisenhower and suggested that he persuade Prime Minister Mollet,whomhewasabouttoseeon26February,toexert'someFrenchpressureontheIsraelis towithdraw',75 in accordancewith the jointUS-UNposition onGaza.DullesattachedconsiderableimportancetoFrance'stalkingtoIsrael.FrancewasacountrywhichhadstoodbyIsraelbefore,duringandaftertheSinaiCampaign.He saw clearly, however, that France would not succeed in persuading IsraelunlessitcouldofferitsomethingtheUScouldnot.Thiswouldhavetotaketheform of a US public acknowledgement that Israel had the right to defend itsinterests in theGazaStrip, if thearrangementsmadeby theUNwere tobreakdownorifEgyptweretoencourageraidsfromtheStripintoIsrael.TheUSdocumentsalsorevealthatEisenhowerandDullesagreedthatIsraeli

scepticism about what Hammarskjold had obtained from the Egyptians wasperfectlynatural.Aswehaveseen,EisenhowertoldDullesthatGazahad'neverbeencededtoEgypt'.76

Dulles, for his part, immediately told Hammarskjold that BenGurion wasindeedjustifiablyconcernedovertheUN'sinabilitytogiveafirmpromisethatconditions inGazawould not revert towhat they had been.Consequently, hetoldHammarskjoldthatheought toconvinceIsrael that, thoughitmustacceptwhathehadproposedinhis22Februaryreport,theSecretary-GeneralwouldletIsrael'sannouncementofreadinesstowithdrawcontainacaveat'[that]ifit[thearrangement]didnotworkout...[the]Israeliswouldreservetheirrightssotheywould not be any worse off'. Dulles also told Hammarskjold that whileBenGurion could not 'get what he wants exactly, he can get [a] practicalassurance'.Hammarskjoldpromisedtohelp.77

TheimportanceofthisAmericandocumentisinitsdemonstrationthatitwastheUSandnotFrancewhoproposedthatIsraelshouldannounceitswithdrawaldecisiontogetherwithaclearwarningastowhatitwoulddoiftheGazaStriparrangementbrokedown.TheAmericansknew that thisproposal removed the

laststumblingblock,theSharmalSheikhissuehavingbeensettledbythemtwoweeksbefore.TheUShadtakenaveryfirmpositiononthisissuebystatingthatitconsideredtheGulfofAqabainternationalwatersandthatnonationhadtherighttopreventpassagethereandthroughthestraitsgivingaccesstotheGulf.Thus Dulles resolved the tricky Gaza issue by letting France acknowledge

Israel's right to act in thedefenceof its interests inGaza,namely, the right toinvoke Article 51 of the UN Charter. The French acknowledgement wouldachievetwopurposes.First,itwouldcarrygreatweightwithIsrael,andsecond,itwouldobviatetheneedfortheUStotakeasimilarpublicstandonIsrael'ssideon Gaza. Dulles felt that the public support that the US had given Israel onSharm alSheikh had come close to exhausting America's credit in Egypt. Hecould do no more publicly. Quietly, however, he not only talked toHammarskjold but also asked theUS ambassador at theUN,CabotLodge, tocoverthesamegroundwithHammarskjold.LikethefirstAmericanconversationwithHammarskjold,thesecondonealso

took place before Dulles's meeting with Pineau. Lodge was instructed to askHammarskjold to tellEban specifically that 'neither IsraelnorEgyptwouldbegiving up any rights by agreeing to the type of arrangement forGaza he [theSecretary-General]hadinmind.Israelcouldstillassertwhateverrightstheyhadif the arrangements there turned out to be unsatisfactory'. AlthoughHammarskjoldpromisedto'tryhisbestwithEban'78heapparentlydidnotdoso.However, what is of interest here is not whether Hammarskjold didaccommodate theUSonthis,but thatDulleswasalmostdesperatelysearchingfor third parties to tell Israel what he himself was unwilling to tell it. On 26February,inamemorandumtoEisenhowerhesaidthatIsraelcontinuedtoinsiston 'guarantees' (thequotes areDulles's) that 'Egyptwill never return toGaza'.Thememorandum also said that Israel should withdraw on the basis of whatHammarskjold had been able to get from the Egyptians, including theiracquiescencetotherebeinginGazaa'UNadministrationwhichforanundefinedperiod of time will be designed to provide solid protection and civilianadministration...'.But[inreturn]Israelwouldhave'acaseforseekingreliefbyitsownaction'shouldsomethinggowrongwiththeGazaarrangement.79

It isonthebasisof thismemorandumthatDulles talkedtoEisenhower, justbeforehismeetingwithGuyMollet,suggestingthatheinviteFrench 'pressure'

onIsrael.FifteenminutesafterhistalkwithEisenhower,DullesmetwithPineauandlethimreadhismemorandumtotheUSPresident,butwasquicktotakeitback (the US document states: 'This copy [of the memorandum] wassubsequentlyreturnedtotheSecretarybyMr.PineauattheSecretary'srequest'.)DullestoldPineauthattheIsraelisinsistedthatitshouldbemadeclearthattheUN would indeed take on the Egyptian role in Gaza, but he also told himtruthfullythatthisIsraeliconditioncouldnotbefulfilled.Dullesexplained:'theUN could not substitute itself for the Armistice Agreements ..., anyadministration in Gaza required the acquiescence of Egypt'. He admitted thattheoretically, as Israel justifiably feared, Egypt's acquiescence could bewithdrawn at any time. In those circumstancesDulles saw only oneway out,namely tourgeIsrael to 'takeachance'on thearrangementdespite its inherentweakness. If the arrangement collapsed Israel would have 'world sympathybehind her'.At this point Pineau askedDulles if thiswould satisfy Israel andwhetheraclarificationcouldbeaddedtothewithdrawalstatementtotheeffectthatIsraelreserveditsrightswhichitwouldexerciseifsomethingwentwrong.DullesmusthavebeenquietlypleasedwiththisquestionbecauseitshowedthatPineausaweyetoeyewithhim.TheFrenchmanthensummedupwhatweretobecalledthe'Frenchsuggestions':(1)UNEFandaUNadministrationshouldbeestablished for an indefinite duration, with the tacit acquiescence of Egypt (asuggestionwhichwas identicalwith theUS-UNline); (2) Israelwouldreserveits rightswithregard to the terminationof thisarrangement (again, thiswas inline with the Dullesmemorandum to Eisenhower); (3) Other countries wouldtakenoteofthisarrangementwithoutapprovingordisapprovingit(itwasDulleswho proposed this point by saying that it was important that some othercountriesshouldstate theirhopethat theUNadministrationshouldgoonuntiltheconclusionofapeacesettlementandthatifEgyptreturnedtotheGazaStripearlierthiswouldcreateanewsituationcallingforconsultation).Thedetailed,four-page-longreportoftheDulles-Pineaumeeting,seeninthe

contextoftheUSposition,wrappedupasitwasontheeveofthisconversation,leads almost inevitably to the conclusion that Dulles succeeded in cleverlysteeringPineau towardsaccepting, in effect endorsing, theAmerican line.TheAmericandocumentsdonotrevealthatDulleskeptonevitalpointhiddenfromPineau,namelythattheUSitselfwouldnotstatepubliclywhatiturgedFrance

tostate:recognitionofIsrael'srightstotakeindependentmilitaryactionshouldthe Gaza arrangement break down. Since Dulles let Pineau read thememorandum to the President, Pineau might have thought that the US, too,would announce support for Israel if such a contingency arose. After all, thememorandumstatedsoexplicitly('...Israelwillhaveacaseforseekingreliefbyitsownaction').ThisimpressionofPineau'smustcertainlyhavebeenreinforcedbyDullestellinghimthatitwasnotgoodenough,asPineausuggested,merelyto state that 'other countries take note of this [theGaza] arrangement,withoutapprovingordisapprovingit',suggestinginsteadthat thispointbeamplifiedtosaythatothercountries'shouldalsoexpressthehopethattheUNadministrationshouldlastuntilconclusionofapeacesettlement',etc.In talking with Eban, after seeing Pineau, Dulles took the same line. He

approvedthedraftoftheIsraelistatementinwhichthelatterreserveditsrighttotakemilitaryactionifthearrangementcollapsed,butdidnotrevealtohisIsraeliinterlocutorthattheUSitselfwouldnotsupportpubliclythispartoftheIsraelideclaration.DullesletEbanglancequicklythroughthestatementtheUSwoulddeliverattheUNGeneralAssembly,80butdidnotgivehimacopyforthoroughperusal.81 There was no reason for Eban to suspect that Dulles had ulteriormotivesinnotgivinghimacopyoftheUSstatement.TheSecretaryofStatehadbeenanactiveparticipantinthedraftingoftheIsraelistatementasawhole,thelanguage Israel used on Gaza was unequivocal and agreed to by Dulles: 'ifconditions are created in the Gaza Strip which indicate the return to theconditions of deterioration which existed previously, Israel would reserve itsfreedomtoacttodefenditsrights'.82

A State Department circular telegram sent to a number of US diplomaticmissions on 28 February stated as amatter of fact that 'Israel will alsomakeclearthat,inwithdrawing,itreservesitsrightunderArticle51oftheChartertodefenditsinterestreanypossiblefutureincursionsfromGazaInaconversationwithDulles just hours before Israelmade its statement, the Secretary of Statereferredto'aplanthatwepreparedtogetherwithMolletandPineauintendedtopreventthereturnofEgypttoGaza,bothmilitarilyandinaciviliancapacity'.83

Theuseoftheword 'plan'(accordcommunastheFrenchcalledit) todescribewhat theUS had agreedwith France could only strengthen Eban's belief thatthereexistednodifferencebetweentheFrenchandtheAmericanpositions.

Clearly, therefore,Dulleswas less thancandidwith IsraelandFrance.Ebanhad reported confidentially to Jerusalem that 'on thewhole,Dulles accepts' allPineau'spositions.84AsforPineau,hewasconvincedthatDullesandhewereincomplete agreement on Gaza. He was naturally disappointed with the USstatementintheGeneralAssemblyon1MarchwhichomittedanyreferencetoIsrael'srightsinGaza.InareceptioninNewYork,adaylater,PineauaccusedtheUSambassadorat theUN,CabotLodge,ofchanging theagreedstatementandsaidthatheviewedthisas'thekindofthingwhichmadeFranco-Americanrelationsbad'.85

Ofcourse,BenGurion,forhispart,wasalsoupsetbytheAmericanstatement.Even after anothermessage fromEisenhower (2March), designed to reassurehim,hetoldtheUSambassadorinIsraelthathewouldliketoreceivefromtheUS'alittlemoreonGaza'.He,too,wascertainthattherehadbeenlast-minutechangesintheUSstatementandwassorrythat'itwastheFrenchwhosaidwhatI had hoped to hear fromyou'.86Dulles, however, refused to give any furtherclarification.ThistimehewasfrankinexplainingtobothPineauandEbanthatthereinfactexisted'adifferenceofopinionregardingGaza'.HesaidhesawnouseinspreadingthatdifferenceontherecordaswouldhavetobedoneiftheUSundertooktocontinuetheexchange.87

Dulles derivedwhatever benefit he could from this refusal. TheAmericanscould now truthfully tell the Arabs that no secret US undertaking to Israelexisted.Everythingwaspart of the public record.CabotLodge assuredFawzithattheUSpositionwasidenticalwithEgypt's,basedasitwasontheArmisticeAgreement.88 On 1March Dulles met with diplomats from nine Arab states,tellingthemthatIsrael'hadendeavouredtoobtainmoreextensivecommitmentsfromtheUS,butwehaddeclinedtogivethem'.89

InfairnesstoDullesitshouldbeaddedthathedidtellEbanthattheUSdidnotaltogetherexcludethepossibilitythatincertaincircumstancesIsraelwouldhavetherighttouseforcetooustEgyptfromGaza(3March).Thedifficultyashesawit,however,wasnottorecognizethisrightinprinciplebuttodetermine'howlongIsraelwouldhavetowaitafterthereturnofEgyptandhowimminentthedangermustbe,before[invoking]therightofdefence'.90

On6MarchDulleswrote toCabotLodge: 'Wenaturallycouldnotobject toIsraelinthefutureexercisingits"rights",butwerefusedtoagreeinadvanceas

towhatitsrightsmightbeundervarioushypotheticalconditions'.91

Inconclusion, itmaybearguedinDulles'sdefencethat throughout thetalkshehadmadeitunmistakablyclearthattheUSsupportedEgypt'srighttoreturntoGazaeventhoughtheUSwouldmuchpreferitifEgyptdidnotavailitselfofthatright.Dulleswould,however,haveincurredlessFrenchandIsraelicriticismhadheforewarnedthemadayortwobeforetheGeneralAssemblymeetingastowhattheUSwouldsayonGazainitsstatementandwhathewouldrefrainfromsaying.

Mordechai Gazit, a former Director-General of the Prime Minister's Office, is a Senior Research

FellowattheTrumanInstituteforPeaceStudiesattheHebrewUniversityinJerusalem.

Notes

1.AbbaEban,AnAutobiography,Jerusalem,1977,pp.245-6.

2. David BenGurion's Diary, entry for 10March 1957, BenGurion Archives, Sde Boker (hereinafter

BGD).

3.MordechaiBar-On,Sha'areiAza,TelAviv,1992,p.372.

4.MordechaiGazit, 'BenGurion's1949Proposal to Incorporate theGazaStripwith Israel',Studies in

Zionism,Vol.8,No.2(1987).

5.MosheSharett,YomanIshi,TelAviv,1978,pp.872,874,875,878;BGD,entryfor3April1955.The

votetookplaceonthesamedate.

6.MichaelBar-Zohar,BenGurion,TelAviv,1981,Vol.Ill,p.1140(Hebrew).

7.ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates(hereinafterFRUS),Washington,DC,1955-57,Vol.XVII,p.5.

8.Ha-aretz,19June1967(reprintedinibid.,10June1988).

9.Maariv,2August1967.

10.Ibid.,21January1971and3May1972.

11.Ha-aretz,8September1972,interviewedbyR.Priester.

12.DivreiHa-Knesset,Vol.21,7November1956.

13.Ibid.,14November1956,p.260.

14.Ibid.,17-19December1956,p.513.

15.Ibid.,p.829ff.

16.Ibid.,p.851.

17.FRUS,1955-57,Vol.XVII,p.5ff.

18.IsraelStateArchives(hereafterISA),ForeignMinistry(FM)/2448;selecteddocumentsonexchanges

betweentheIsraeliGovernmentandtheUS,theNationalDefenseCollege.

19.FM/2448,EbanintelegramtoHerzog,6December1956.Ebanwasgivensimilaradvicebydelegates

fromvarious(other)nations(ibid.,EbantoHerzog,13December).

20.Ibid.,EbantoBenGurion,19December1956.

21.Ibid.,12December1956.Inatelegramof24DecembertoNahumGoldmannBenGurionsaid'Iam

surprised...inparticularbecauseyouquotemeasbeingreadytoleaveGaza'.

22.Ibid.,BenGuriontoEban,7January1957.

23.Ibid.,EbantoGolda,10January1957.

24.Ibid.,M.KidrontoHerzog,13January1957.

25. Ibid., Eban to Jerusalem, 14 January 1957; Kidron to Herzog, 21 January; Rafael to Herzog, 21

January.

26.FRUS,1955-57,Vol.XVII,pp.82-4.

27.ISA,BenGuriontoIsraeliForeignMinisterGoldaMeir,8February1957.

28.Ibid.,10February1957.

29.FRUS,1955-57,pp.109-112.

30.Ibid.,pp.115-16.

31.Ibid.,pp.132—4.Thetextwasreleasedon17February.

32.Ibid.,pp.132-3.

33.BenGurion'stelegramof12February1957,ISA,FM/2459;FRUS,1955-57,p.135.

34.FRUS,1955-57,p.148.

35.Ibid.,p.157.

36.Ibid.,p.149.

37.Ibid.,p.152.

38.Ibid.,pp.168-9.

39.Ibid.,p.162.SeealsoHerzog'stelegramstoMeirandEbanof15and16February,ISA,FM/2459.

40.Ibid.,BenGuriontoEban,18February1957.

41.M.Medzini(ed.),IsraeliForeignRelations,SelectedDocuments1947-1974,Jerusalem,1976,p.596.

42.FRUS,1955-57,pp.226-7.

43.ISA,FM/2459,21February1957.TheAmericaninvolvedwasGeneralWalterBedellSmith.

44.Ibid.,telegramcontainingthecabinetinstructionsof22February1957.

45.FRUS,1955-57,p.264.

46.ISA,FM/2459,telegramsof25February.

47.BenGurion'stelegrams,ibid.;HZ/2459,HerzogtelegramtoEbanof25February.

48.BGD,entryfor25February1957.

49.ISA,FM/2459.Herzogsaidinoneofthetelegramsof26Februarythat'thereisnoneedtoconveyto

Dullesthemessageconcerningthemistakethathadoccurred'.

50.FRUS,1955-57,pp.283-4,285,289,293.

51.DivreiHa-Knesset,Vol.21,11November1956,p.l97ff.

52.ISA,FM/2448/8,7December1956.

53.FRUS,1955-57,pp.243-4.

54.OneofthemostdetailedoneswereinDivreiHa-Knesset,Vol.21,23January1957,pp.827-9.

55.ISA,FM/2448,Eban-Hammarskjoldconversation,25January1957.

56.Ibid.,4February1957.

57.FRUS,1955-57,p.115.

58.Thetextoftheaide-mémoireisinFRUS,1955-57,pp.132-4.

59.Ibid.,pp.163-8.

60.Ibid.,pp.158-65.TheIsraeliresponsecanbefoundthere,pp.165-70.

61.Ibid.,pp.254-67.

62.Ibid.,p.268.

63.Ibid.,pp.272-3.

64.Ibid.,pp.282-3.

65.Ibid.,pp.291-5.

66.ISA,FM/2448/8,EbantoJerusalem,9March1957.

67.FRUS,1955-57,p.296.

68.Ibid.,pp.327-9.

69.ISA,FM/2448/11,May1957.

70.Ibid.,EbantoJerusalem,26February1957.

71.Ibid.,telegramfromJerusalemtoGoldaMeirandEban,26February.

72.FRUS,1955-57,p.293;ISA,FM/2459,EbantoJerusalem,26February.

73.ChristianPineau,1956,Suez,Paris,1976,pp.209-32.

74.BrianUrquhart,Hammarskjold,NewYork,1972,p.212.

75.FRUS,1955-57,pp.283-5andeditor'sfootnote,p.285.

76.Ibid.,pp.272-3.

77.Ibid.,pp.274-5.

78.Ibid.,p.278.

79.Ibid.,pp.282-3.

80.Ibid.,pp.285-9.

81.Ibid.,p.312.

82.Ibid.,p.316.

83. ISA,FM/2459/3.Atameetingat theIsraelEmbassy inWashingtonon9MarchEbansaid that the

paragraphonGazaintheIsraelistatementwaswrittenbytheFrench.Fiecouldnotknowthenthata

daybeforethearrivaloftheFrenchonthescene,DulleshadreceivedEisenhower'sblessingforthe

movesthatweretofollow.

84.ISA,FM/2459,3March1957.

85.FRUS,1955-57,p.339.

86.Ibid.,pp.348-9.

87.Ibid.,p.357.

88.Ibid.,p.360.

89.Ibid.,p.332.

90.Ibid.,p.353.

91.Ibid.,pp.375-6.

The'TranquilDecade'Re-examined:Arab—IsraeliRelationsDuringthe

Years1957-67MENACHEMKLEIN

Theviewthat relationsbetweenIsraeland theArabstateswere tranquil in thedecade that separated the second and third rounds of wars was developed byIsraelifigureswhoplayedakeyrole in the1956Warandremainsapervasiveargument in the conventional Israeli discourse. In the words of DavidBenGurion, Israel's first Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, the SinaiCampaign'hasenhancedsecurityonthebordersandforsometimehasdeterredourneighboursfromchallengingIsrael'.1GiventhisviewitisnotsurprisingthatBenGurion, in his history of Israel, titled the study of the decade 1957-67 as'YearsofPeace'.2

Similarly,MosheDayan, the IsraeliChief-of-Staffduring the1956Warhasargued that 'the main change in the situation achieved by Israel ... wasmanifestedamongherArabneighbours.Israel'sreadinesstotaketotheswordtosecureherrightsatseaandhersafetyonland,andthecapacityofherarmytodefeat theEgyptian forces, deterred theArab rulers in the years that followedfrom renewing their acts of hostility'.3 Mordechai Bar-On, who served at thetimeasDayan'sdirectorofoffice,notedasimilarviewinhiswardiary:'SecurityissueswillnotdisappearfromIsrael'spolicyagendaduringtheupcomingyears,but the Sinai Campaign has temporarily removed them from the top of thecountry's list of urgent priorities, and hasmoved them to the periphery of thestate matters'.4 For Shimon Peres, then Director-General of the Ministry ofDefenceunderBenGurion,thisevaluationremainedtrueformorethan30years,stating in 1990 that 'we got rid of the fedayeen; we had eleven years oftranquillity; theStraitsofTiranwereopened; thebrillianceof the Israeli armyandofDayanemergedandreceivedworldrecognition'.5

Toacertainextent,Israeliacademicwritingonthisperiodismorecautious.InhisdoctoraldissertationBar-Onreflected: 'Themainaccomplishmentof the1956WarintheSinaiwastherespiteitafforded.Fortenyearsfollowing1956Israel enjoyed a period of relative calm'.6 This view has been reiterated byItamarRabinovichwhohasconcludedthat'intheArab-IsraeliconflicttheSinaiCampaignproducedelevenyearsofrelativecalm.'7

Thisessaytakesissuewiththisview.Itclaimsthepost-Sinaidecadewasnotquiet at all. To the contrary, in theminds of the country's policymaking elite,apprehensions of renewed conflict heightened in the years following the 1956War. The change of leadership which ensued after 1964, when Levi EshkolreplacedBenGurion, led to a new, seeminglymore relaxed, perception of theconflict. The new elite did not believe that the danger of war was imminent.Still, inactual fact, theArab-Israeli conflictbecamemore intenseduring thesefewyearspriortotheoutbreakofthe1967War.Byway of substantiating this claim, this essaywill focus on the twomain

arenasinwhichconflictbetweenIsraelandtheArabstatesoccurredthroughoutthisperiod:inrelationsbetweenIsraelandSyria,andbetweenIsraelandEgypt.Itwillconcludewithapossibleexplanationastowhytheviewofaquietdecadecametoprevailintheacademicandpoliticaldiscourse.

Israel'sConflictwithSyria

ThedecisiveIsraelivictoryoverEgyptinthe1956WarhadalmostnoeffectontheIsraeli-Syrianfront.ConflictbetweenthetwocountriesensuedwithinayearoftheterminationoftheSinaiWar.InAugust1957,theUnitedStatesandIsraelbegan toworry about pro-Soviet encroachments on Syria. Their apprehensionwas due to several developments: the increasing instability in Syria; thecontinuing hostility between the Communist and Ba'th parties; the growingSovietinterventioninthearea;andthenumberofborderskirmisheswithIsrael.8

IsraelaccededtoanAmericanrequestnottorespondtoSyriaregardingthesedevelopments.Atthesametime,however,IsraelpressuredtheUnitedStatestocarry out an anti-Syrian plan by means of some third, pro-Western, party.

According to the American plan, Turkish or Iraqi forces concentrating alongSyria'sborders,wouldinstigateaSyrianresponse.This,inturn,wouldleadtoaTurkish or Iraqi invasion of Syria that would result in a change of regime inDamascus.ThoughIsraelwasnotmeanttotakepartinsuchaninvasion,itdidconcentratetroopsalongitsborderwithSyria,apparentlyintheexpectationthatsuchfavourablesequenceofeventswouldoccur.9

Syriaat thetimewasrivenbynumerouscoupattempts,andIsraelsought toexploit the situation by supporting a group of Syrian officers affiliated to thecountry's former President Adib Shishakli, then exiled in Paris. Workingindependently, the intelligenceservicesof Israeland theUnitedStateswere incontactwith Shishakli. They encouraged him to lead this group of officers intheirattempttoregaincontrolofSyria.ThisplancametonoughtassomeoftheofficersleakedinformationtoSyria'sintelligenceservice.10

TheconflictwithSyriawasnotshortlived.Alreadyatthestartofthe1950s,theissueofcultivatinglandsinthedemilitarizedzonescontrolledbyIsraelwasamatterofcontentioninIsraeli-Syrianrelations.Israelviewedthedemilitarizedzonesasareasunderitssovereignty.Syriacontended,however,thatthesewereownerlessareascontrolledbytheUnitedNations,andassuchitsystematicallydisruptedIsrael'sattemptstodevelopthemasUnitedNationseffortstosettlethisdisputeconsistentlyfailed.Also,duringthe1960s,skirmishesinvolvingsniperfirebecamesteadilymore

serious. On 30 January 1960, for example, in response to Syrian fire, Israeltroops fought Syrian forces in the village of Tawfiq; on 17March 1962, theIsraelDefenceForces(IDF)clashedwithSyriantroopsinthevillageofNuqeib;andon13November1964, Israel'sAirForce (IAF)becameembroiled for thefirst time in this theatre.By 1965 the question of the demilitarized zones hadbecome connected to two other areas of controversy which caused conflictbetween Syria and Israel: the Arab attempts to divert the Jordan River, andcollaborationbetweenSyriaandFatah.In1959 theArabstates initiatedaplan todivert the resourcesof theJordan

RiverinresponsetoanIsraelidecisionunilaterallytoimplementtheJohnstoneProgramme, which had been drafted in 1955 for a planned, joint use of theresourcesoftheJordanRiverbySyria,Lebanon,JordanandIsrael.Israelbeganin1964todrawwaterfromtheSeaofGalilee inaccordancewith thisplan; in

retaliation Syria, the main power behind the Arab plan, began to divert theJordan'sresources,inthehopeofcausingtherivertorundrythusdenyingIsraelof this precious water source. At the beginning of 1965 an argument aboutwhether,andhow,torespondtotheSyrianactionsintensifiedinIsrael.MosheDayan (then amember of the Knesset) andGoldaMeir, the thenMinister ofForeignAffairs,contendedthatIsraeloughttoseizecontrolofthosepartsoftheGolanHeights inwhichSyria's efforts to divert the Jordanwere concentrated,evenattheriskofawiderconfrontationwithSyria.Nevertheless,PrimeMinisterandMinisterofDefenceLeviEshkol, together

withtheIDF'sChief-of-StaffYitzhakRabin,MossadDirectorMeirAmitandtheMinistersYigalAllonandIsraelGalili,believedthatIsraelshouldnotbedrawninto armed conflict, especially in view of the likely American and Britishopposition to suchactions.ActingonRabin'sadvice, thepoliticalandsecurityleadership opted to attack theSyrian equipment bymeans of tank fire and airattacksratherthanthrougharmedcaptureofterritory.11

The second source of Syrian-Israeli tension, namely, the former'scollaborationwithFatah,derivedfromacommoninterest in the intensificationof the conflict with Israel. While Syria wanted to damage Israel's use ofresources and water in the Israeli parts of the Jordan and the Sea of Galilee,Fatah (founded in 1959) intended to bring about a general war as early aspossible, so as to liberate Palestine in the short term. By the mid-1960s,however, this Palestinian position was not perceived in Israel as a new,distinctivefactorinthedispute.Instead,intheIsraeliviewFatahwasapuppetorganization of Syria in amanner that recalled the Egyptian-backed fedayeenorganizationsof the1950s.12The 'RabinDoctrine' of1965 thus constitutedanattempttoresolvethemountingSyrianandPalestinianactsofhostilities,withoutleading toa full-scalewar.Rabinargued that Israel shouldattackmilitaryandstrategictargetsinSyriasincetheSyrianregimewasresponsibleforbothFatahraidsandtheencroachmentsonwaterresourcesandthecultivationoflands.Atthesametime,RabinrejectedattacksagainstLebanonandJordan,ashebelievedtheysoughttorestrainFatah'sactions,thoughhedidnotruleoutstrikesagainstspecifictargetsinsidethesecountrieswhichassistedFatah.The Rabin Doctrine became the focal point of a heated debate, with the

DirectoroftheMossad,MeirAmit,arguingthatIsrael'sresponsestoSyriawere

excessive. Still, he and the head of the Intelligence Branch, Major GeneralAharonYariv,weretheonlyseniorofficialscallingforamoremoderateIsraeliresponse.Most opponents of theRabinDoctrine, such asMajorGeneral EzerWeizman,thenheadoftheIDFStaffBranch,tooktheoppositetack.This ongoing security debate was compounded by uncertainty as to how

EgyptwouldrespondtoIsraelifitpersistedintheimplementationoftheRabinDoctrine.RabinarguedthatEgyptwouldnotbecomeembroiledinaconflict,aviewcontradictedbyYarivwhoargued thatEgyptwouldnotbeable to standaside,were Israel to initiate sustainedactionsagainstSyria.13 Inanyevent,allparties to the debate reasoned that Fatahwas not an independent factor in theconflict; nor were the Palestinians seen as an explosive element whichmightdetonateandcauseastrugglebetweenIsraelandSyriatobetransformedintoaregionalconfrontation.ThedebateovertheRabinDoctrinewasnotconfinedtosecuritycircles,but

spilledoverintothepoliticalarena.AfterBenGurion'ssecessionfromMapaiin1963,partiessplitovertheissue:RafiandGahaljoinedforcesontheonehand,andontheothersideMapaiandAhdutHa-avodasupportedeachother.Thiswasalsoapoliticalstruggleinwhichthenewpolitical-securityeliteclashedwiththeoldestablishment.Thenewleadersofthe1960s,Eshkol,togetherwithministerGalili and Allon,Mossad DirectorMeir Amit and IDF Chief-ofStaff YitzhakRabin,disagreedwithformerPrimeMinisterandDefenceMinisterBenGurion,andhisyoungdisciplesMosheDayanandShimonPeres.ThisgroupformedtheRafi Party and found itself disillusioned, marginalized and removed from thecentres of influence and power. But they nevertheless set out to opposewhattheytermed'securityimpasses',acodewordfortheviewsandactionsofthenewleadership.TheRafi leadershipused its experienceand reputation to criticize (evende-

legitimize) the Rabin Doctrine, using Israeli casualties caused by Fatah topromote an atmosphere of insecurity in the country. For its part, the newleadership, anxious to establish its credentials, was acutely sensitive to suchcharges.This shift in Israel'spolitical landscape,aswellas thedivisivenessofthe debate about military policy, provides the backdrop for the importanceattributed by Israel to border skirmishes with Syria and to Fatah infiltrations.Between January1965 and the June1967War, 14 Israeliswerekilled and72

werewoundedduetoFatahoperations.14

FromMaytoJune1966andthroughouttheyearwhichprecededtheSixDayWar,Israelpreparedaseriesofwide-rangingretaliationactsagainstSyriawhichhadescalateditsattacksagainstIsraeliciviliantargets.Thoughtheseplanswerenotimplemented,itisdoubtfulwhethertheywouldhavecurbedtheescalationinthe conflict with Syria during October-November 1966. As shall be shownbelow, the matter was transformed from a two-sided dispute into a regionalconfrontation.InOctober1966,Rabindescribedhispolicyvis-a-vistheSyriansas follows: 'The response to Syria's actions should be targeted against theterrorist operations and against the regime ... in essence, the Syrian probleminvolves clashes with the ruling power. In this sense, the situation can becomparedtorelationswhichobtainedbetweenIsraelandEgyptin1955-56'.15

Accordingly, in October the Israeli Chief-of-Staff attempted to gain hisgovernment'sapprovalforalimitedbutvigorousairoperationagainstSyriathatwas to involve the deployment of 80 planes, the targeting of primary Syrianheadquartersandartillerybases,andthecaptureofanumberoffortificationsonSyria's front line.All thiswas to be achievedwithin a 24-hour period.A fewweeks later, the objectives of this operation were amplified. The goal nowbecamethecaptureofalargeportionoftheGolanHeights,andthestationingoftheIDFthereforanunspecifiedperiod.Rabin'splan,however,wasputonhold,asEshkoldecidedtoattemptapoliticalresolution.16

Following thekillingof threesoldiersbyamine laidbyFatahoperatives,alargeIDFcontingentretaliatedindaylightagainstthevillageofSamuinJordan,whichwaslocatedneartheminezone.Propertydamageandinjuriestocivilianswere considerable; also, a Jordan Legion force was surprised by an Israeliambushandsustainedheavylosses(14dead,37wounded,threeprisoners),andaplanewasshotdown.This Israeli operation was conducted despite pleas for restraint by King

Hussein,whopromisedtopursuetheFatahcontingentresponsibleforthestrike.Rabin and Eshkol rejected this appeal. They declared publicly that Husseinlackedtheabilitytoimposelawandorder,andsoIsraelwasforcedtoactasitdid.17TheoperationrupturedHussein'scontactswithIsrael,andalsoencouragedSyriaandFatahtopersistintheirmilitantpolicies,astheywatchedIsraelpunisharegimeforwhichtheyhadnothingbutcontempt.

Astringofpro-PalestineLiberationOrganizationdemonstrationseruptedontheWestBank,andHusseinlaunchedacampaignofinvectiveagainstEgyptforfailing to come to his aid and for hiding behind United Nations EmergencyForcesinSinai(UNEF).TheEgyptianposition,itshouldberecalled,wasindeedformulatedbyPresidentGamalAbdelNasser;stilltherewerehighofficersintheEgyptian army who thought differently, and who wanted to heed Hussein'sentreaty.Abdal-HakimAmer,theheadofthearmy,onhiswaytoPakistanfromavisittotheSovietUnion,calleduponNassertoremoveUNEFfromtheSinai,to seize and close the Straits of Tiran, and to brace Egypt for a defensiveoperation on the eastern part of the Sinai.18 In November-December 1966,Nasserrejectedthesemeasures.InMay1967,asiswellknown,hedidpreciselythat,therebyleadingtowarthefollowingmonth.In short, the Samu operation sealed a process by which the Israel-Syria

disputewasconvertedintoaregionalconflict.Anexaminationofthisconflictintheperiodbetweenthe1956and1967warsrevealsthatuntil1965thestruggleontheSyrian-Israeliborderwascontinuous,ifgenerallysporadic.Latentinthisstrugglewas its possible transformation into a general confrontation; this tooksometimeandinactualrealityoccurredratherlate.YetinthemindsofIsrael'sleaders,thefearofsuchanescalationhadexistedalreadyin1963.Between1965and theSixDayWar the Israel-Syria strugglebecameespecially sensitiveandcontentious,asthesporadiclocaloutbreaksofarmedviolencebecamefrequent,planned initiatives often spreading over a wide stretch of land whichencompassedmostoftheIsraeli-Syrianborder.

TheConflictBetweenIsraelandEgypt

From1955IsraelviewedNasser'sEgyptasitsmainenemy.ThefollowingyearitjoinedforceswithBritainandFranceinacombinedwareffortwiththeaimoftopplinghisregime.19AspartofthearrangementswhichbroughtaboutIsrael'swithdrawal after thewar, Egypt consented that commercial agents and Israel-bound shipswould have free passage in the Suez Canal. This agreement wasupheld in the two years betweenApril 1957 andMarch 1959; but afterwards,

andthroughOctober1959,severalboatswhosedestinationorportoforiginwasIsrael were detained. Israel was unsuccessful in its bid to get UN forces toenforcetheagreementandmakeEgyptliveuptoitsobligation;andthefaithofIsraelileadersinagreementsthatwerebuiltuponhopesandexpectations,ratherthan formal and contractual rules, was shattered. This development especiallyinfluencedForeignMinisterMeir'sattitudeandapproachtoconflictresolution.When she led a failed struggle in theUnitedNations in 1956-57 to prevent awithdrawal from the Sinai, Meir suffered from feelings of isolation andrejection. These feelings encouraged a view of the Arab-Israeli conflict as astrugglebetweenaforceoflightwhichseekspeace,andaforceofdarknessthatrebuffshandsoutstretchedinhopesofpeaceableagreement.TheaddedpoliticalfailurestrengthenedthisbleakperceptionandMeirwentsofarastoclaimthatshehadbeeninformedbyanArableaderthatnoArableaderhadinhisheartanymeasureofreadinesstomakepeacewithIsrael.20

The Israeli fears were further exacerbated by the establishment of theEgyptian-SyrianUnitedArabRepublic (UAR) in1958.Allofa sudden, IsraelstartedtofearthatperhapsthegrimprospectofArabpincersencroachingfromthenorthandsouthmightbecomeafact.TheentireMiddleEastseemedtobefalling intoNasser's lap. Israel viewedAbd alKarimQassem's coup in Iraq inJuly 1958 as a gain forNasser, andBenGurionmademanifest these anxietieswhenhestatedthatthecouprepresentedoneofthegravesttragediesinthepost-warworld.21

Intheaftermathof thecoup, IsraelaskedtheUnitedStates to influenceIranand Turkey to intervene to try to restore the pro-Western regime and theBaghdadPactinIraq.22Attheendof1958theUnitedStatesfearedthatQassemwouldeffectaturnaboutandjoinforceswiththeCommunists;andsoAmericabegantoplanacounter-revolt.BynowIsraelhadchangeditspositionclaimingthatthenewregimeshouldbeleftstanding,sinceitformulatedaneutralpolicytowardsNasser.23

Still more worrying to Israel than the internal affairs of Iraq was thepossibilityofapro-NassercoupinJordan.Israelprepareditselfatleasttwicein1958-63forthepossibilityofcapturingeithertheWestBankasawholeorsomeportion of it in response to such a development. The first such state of alertoccurredinJuly1958,oneweekaftertheoverthrowofthemonarchyinIraq.24

Thesecond instanceoccurred in1963, in thewakeof theBa'thcoups inSyria(February) and in Iraq (March), and the signing of an accord between thesestatesandEgyptinApril.DebatesandpreparationsinIsraeldifferedinfocusfromthediscussionsthat

ensuedin theUnitedStatesandBritain.InsteadofcontemplatinghowHusseinmight be saved, the Israeliswondered how they should respond onceHusseinwasremovedfrompower,orfellintoNasser'shands.IntelligencedataarrivinginIsraelwasinterpretedasthoughHusseinwouldimminentlylosepowerorbesweptup in thewaveofunitywhichwaswashingover theentireArabworld.The infiltration of Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian forces into Jordan was alreadyenvisaged by Israeli leaders and they planned for a scenario whereby EgyptusurpedtheJordanianLegion.ThenightmareoftotalEgyptianencirclementofIsraelappearedtobeonthe

brink of realization. BenGurion attempted to obtain authorization for someresponse from theUnited States and France; but theAmericans evaluated thesituation differently, judging that Hussein's position was stable and that theUnited States was ultimately responsible for the stability of the HashemiteKingdom.TheUnitedStatesaskedIsraelthatevenintheeventofawidespreadpro-NassermovementtakingholdinJordan, therewastobenointerventionintheinternalaffairsofitsneighbour.25

Israel's response to theeventsof1958and1963derived from theexcessivegravity it attributed to each sign of Arab unity shown subsequent to theformation of the United Arab Republic. Israeli leaders viewed the UAR as astable,structurallysoundunit.Theywerenotawareof the internaldissentandcomplicationswhich split thebody. Israel's fearbecamegreater afterFebruary1960whenEgyptsecretlymoved500tanksandtwoinfantrydivisionsintotheSinai(theRotemalert),inviolationofUNresolutionsondemilitarization.IsraellearnedabouttheEgyptianentryfromAmericanintelligencesourcesonlyaftersix days. Even after the collapse of the UAR in 1961, BenGurion and otherleadersactedasthoughtheadventofArabunitywasstillareality,thoughatthispoint,Israeliintelligencereasonedthatsuchunitydidnotconstitutearealthreat.Similarly,while the formation of a union betweenEgypt, Syria and Iraq in

April 1963 was in actual fact a paper agreement not destined to last anysignificantperiodoftime,theIsraelisviewedthepactasthoughitweregeared

towards the destruction of Israel. Responding to the creation of the union,BenGurionsenturgentcablesto60headsofstatearoundtheworld,demandingthat they guarantee Israel's security and that they sever all aid to any countrywhichrefusedtoacknowledgetheexistenceofitsneighbour.Beyond this, while President Kennedy did not accept BenGurion's grim

evaluationof the situation, the Israeli leaderpressed theWhiteHouse tobringabout the demilitarization of the West Bank and to sign a treaty with Israelwhich would insure the latter against the possibility that Hussein would bedeposedorjoinforceswiththeUAR.26

In the 1957-63 period, Israel's leadership developed a longtermviewwhichaccompanied its short-term responses to immediate threats and perceivedsituations.Thenecessityfortheevolutionofthislongtermpolicyderivedfromthe fear that as the years passed Israel would not be able to stand up to itsenemies, due to the demographic asymmetry between them. Acting in theinternationalsphere,BenGurionrepeatedlyattemptedtoextractfromtheUnitedStates both a formal commitment towards Israel's security, and a bilateralagreement against pro-Soviet Arab states, especially Egypt and Syria.BenGurion also asked theUnitedStates for a supply of top-rate, sophisticatedweaponry,andheevencalledforIsrael'sentryintoNATO.TheseeffortscametonothingasWashingtontendedtoisolatetheArab-Israeli

dispute and to dealwith it at some remove from the superpower conflict.TheAmericans simplydidnotperceive the threats to Israelwith thegravitywhichBenGurion attributed to them; and the United States tried to strengthen itspositionintheMiddleEastnotbymakingapactwiththeIsraelis,butratherbyusingitsleveragetoeffectapro-WesternblocintheArabworld.27

ThenewlongtermIsraelipolicyalsoconcernedactivityintheregionalsphere.The Israelis sought collaborative, anti-Nasserist agreements with moderatecountries which were also believed to be threatened and targeted in schemeshatchedbytheEgyptians-namely,Jordan,Morocco,Lebanon,Sudan,TunisiaandeventheQassemregimeinIraqandtheSaudiregime.Tacitco-operationofsorts was sought separately with each of these states. Essentially they weredesigned toallowIsrael to supportanyattempts to liquidate signsofNasseristencroachment, as well as to facilitate Jewish emigration to Israel. Because oftheir common borders with Israel, in the cases of Jordan and Lebanon, these

collaborativeagreementsalsoprovidedforadhocsolutionstobilateralproblemsthat arose along the ceasefire zones.28 To supplement these collaborativearrangements, in 1957-58 Israel prepared what it termed 'an alliance with theperipheralstates'-Turkey,Iran,Ethiopia-thatis,non-Arab,pro-WesternstateswhichborderedtheArabMiddleEast. Inactualfact,afull-blownalliancewasnot the object of Israeli policy. Instead, the Israelis sought anti-Nasseristcollaboration with each one of these states in intelligence, operational andpoliticalspheres.ThedevelopmentofnuclearcapabilitieswasanotherpolicyIsraelfollowedin

ordertocopewiththethreatposedbyNasser.CommonfearssharedbyFranceandIsraelledtothesigningofanagreementinOctober1957bywhichFranceprovidedIsraelwithanuclearreactor.ThiswasanoveltwistintheIsraeli-Arabdispute, asBenGurionhadoriginally opposed adding a nuclear element to theconflict.Thisresistancedissipatedattheendofthe1950sandthebeginningofthe 1960s as his fears about the nature of the conflict, and about the policyresponsesoftheUnitedStates,mounted.In particular, in this period he became a proponent of an Israeli nuclear

programme,owing tohis evaluationbothofNasser'sgrowing strength, andofthelopsidedimbalanceofpowerthatobtainedbetweenIsraelanditsmanyArabneighbours and enemies. BenGurion decided that only a nuclear capabilitywouldguarantee the futureexistenceof thestate,as IsraelwouldotherwisebeengulfedbyanabundanceofmanpowerandcapitalintheArabworld,aswellasby the advanceof certainArab states in scientific andmilitary spheres. Israel,BenGurionreasoned,couldnotkeeppaceover the longhaul inaconventionalarms racewith thesepowers.The fact thatBenGurionactuallymanoeuvred todeflectAmerican attempts to restrain Israel's nuclear armsbuild-up testifies totheseriousnesswithwhichIsrael'selderstatesmenviewedtheArabthreat.29

With BenGurion's departure from politics and the formation of a newgovernmentinIsraelattheendof1963,Israel'spolicyaltered.Astheybegantoview theArab threat in somewhatdifferent terms, and towork towards anewpolicy orientation in relations with France and the United States, Israel'sstatesmen determined to compensate a slow-down in the nation's new nucleararms policywith an accelerated build-up of the country's strength in terms ofconventionalweaponry.ThischangedidnotalleviatetheanxietiesofallIsraeli

leaders.As early as BenGurion's last days in office, the Egyptian response toIsrael'snewnuclearpolicy-thedevelopmentofsurface-to-surfacemissilesthatcould be capped with biological, chemical and radiological warheads worriedIsrael'spolicymakers.In1962-63IsraelattemptedtoderailEgypt'sattempt todevelopthemissiles

bysendingMossadagents to trackdownGermanscientistswhowereworkingontheproject.Israel'sendeavourswereonlypartiallysuccessfulatbest;andtheMossadestimated in1966 that theEgyptianmissileprogrammewas, as far asIsraelwasconcerned,approachingadangerouslevel.ThiswasthebackgroundtoYigalAllon's threat inApril1966 todamage thedamsof theNileand thusfloodEgypt.30

The policy directives and inclinations outlined above indicate that Israelistatesmen were guided by a particular view of the Egyptian ruler. Indeed,throughoutthe1950sandintothe1960s,IsraelileadersviewedNasserasthoughhe were a demonic force. On more than one occasion, BenGurion comparedNasser to Hitler, and he made a habit of calling Nasser the Egyptian tyrant.BenGurion thoughtNasser to be a strongman and politician, and a patriot ofsorts;andheviewedNasserasadangerousforce,andasthemosttroublesomeofIsrael'senemies.31GoldaMeir'sapproachwasnolessriddledwithpessimism.SheviewedNasserasafearsome,monstrousfigurewhowouldneverbewillingtocometotermswithIsrael.DuringaconversationwithPresidentKennedy,sheexpressed the fear that Nasser would recapitulate his threat to perpetrate aHolocaust, emphasizing that Nasser and his ambitions undermined all Israeliefforts toestablisha sovereignstate.Meirargued thatNasserwasharmfulnotonlytoIsraelbutalsotoEgyptastheEgyptianpeoplemustreallyhavelongedforapeacefulsettlementwithIsraelsoastodealwiththeirownweightyinternalproblems.32ThisviewwassharedbyMajorGeneralYehoshafatHarkabi,headof IDF Intelligence 1954-59, who viewed Nasser as the 'source of evil' andarguedthat:

WereNassertodie,thiswouldonlybenefitIsrael...NasserreasonedthatIsraelmustbeannihilatedsothat1956wouldnotrepeatitself,andIbelievedthathewasturninghiseyestowardsthedestructionofIsrael. His speeches struck inme a chord of fear. Imyselfwas astonished by him, by his powerfulcharismaandabilitytoelectrifytheArabworld,andIthought-intheend,allofthiswouldbeturnedagainstIsrael.33

Israel's military leadership occasionally discussed the idea of sponsoringNasser'sassassination.Intheend,however,nothingcameoutofsuchthoughts.As Peres's biographer reflected: 'Many Israelis believed honestly that if theywere rid of the militant, nationalist President, all of their problems would beover'. It would seem that the obstacle that thwarted this plan was political innature,andnotanissueofprinciple;moreprecisely,itwasimpossibletocarryoutsuchadeedwithoutbeingheldculpablefortheactbeforetheinternationalcommunity.34

AchangeinIsrael'sperceptionofNasserwasbroughtaboutbytheshiftinthecountry's leadership in 1963. Throughout the 1957-64 period, Rabin viewedNasser as a triumphant ruler; after 1964, however, he saw the Egyptian as astrickenleaderwhosesuccesseswerealreadybehindhimduetothecollapseoftheUARin1961andEgypt'smilitaryinvolvementsince1962inthecivilwarinYemen.35EshkolsawNasserasanambiguousfigure,36whileAharonYariv,thedirector of the intelligence branch since 1963, saw Nasser as 'enemy numberone, and the only individual capable of forming an effective front, despite hisentanglementinYemen,anddespitethefailureoftheunificationtalksin1963.Thoughhistimetableshavebeenthrownoutofsynch,thisdangerousmanwillbereadyby1970'.37Tobesure,Yariv'sestimateofNasserwasmorepessimisticthanthatofRabinandEshkol;nevertheless,healsodidnotperceiveNasserasanactual,presentthreat.Incontrasttotheestimationsofitspredecessor,thenewpolitical-securityestablishmentinIsraeldidnotsearchforawaytoharmNasserdirectly.AsMeirAmithassaid:'Ididnotreckonthatthewaytoridoneselfofaproblemwastoliquidateaperson.Ididnotfollowthislineofthought;norwasIreallysearchingforthissortofsolution,thoughwedidreasonthatifheweretodescendfromthestage,oursituationwouldimprove'.38

Amit and Eshkol thus operated on two different levels. First, they did notrefrain from aiding other forces which were intent upon harming Nasser.Second,theytookadvantageofthethreatNasserposedtomoderateArabstates;they endeavoured to strengthen Israel's ties with these states, as well as withIran,TurkeyandEthiopia.Inotherwords,throughoutthetenureofEshkolandAmit, Israel changed a basic foreign policy approach, ceasing any directinterventionintheinternalaffairsoftheArabstates.InpolicysituationswhereIsraelmightbe asked to lend support, and in caseswhere it hadan interest in

helpingaforeignrulermaintaincontrol,Israel'sagentsdidnotthemselvesstrikeagainstoppositionelements.Atthesametime,theygaveindirectsupporttotheeliminationofunwantedforcesbyprovidingintelligenceinformation.EffortsbyIsrael'sleaderstofindawaytodiscussmatterswiththeEgyptians

peaceably also reflect perceptions of their neighbours and assumptions thatmotivated policy directives. In other words, the character of discussions heldbetweentheIsraelisandtheEgyptiansinthe1957-67periodisameasureofthecharacteroftheconflict.BenGurion,itwillberecalled,viewedthethreatposedbytheArabsandNassertobeespeciallyominous,andhethusmaintainedthattheArabsmustundergoaradicaltransformationiftheyweretoseekpeacewithIsrael. They must, he believed, relinquish any belief in the possibility ofexterminating Israel. This view led BenGurion to demand a meeting betweenhimself andNasser.At the same time, he did not predicate such an encounterupon the momentous transformation he expected as a precondition of peace.Throughout the years 1961-63,BenGurion turned tomediators such asO-Nu,Prime Minister of Burma, Tito, the President of Yugoslavia and the SundayTimes journalist James Hamilton in an attempt to arrange a meeting withNasser.39 Second, BenGurion did not offer the Arabs any sort of positivereinforcement. As a matter of fact, he tendered only forms of negativereinforcementsoastopressuretheArabstowardfrustrationanddespair.HethusspurnedYigalAllon'spolicyproposal,setoutin1959,thatinterimarrangementsoughttobesoughtwiththeEgyptians,fortheshort-termpurposeofpreventingmisunderstandings which could lead to an escalation of tension and war, andwhichwouldinthelongertermleadtobonafidesecurityarrangements.40

Allon'spolicyviewwas,foritstime,utterlyradicalintermsofitsprojectionofathawinEgyptian-Israelirelations;withrespecttothebalanceandsymmetryinpowerrelationsbetweenthetwocountrieswhichitenvisaged;andintermsofthe fact that it endorsed theuseofpositive incentives.AsBenGurionvirtuallydictatedIsrael'spositiontothecountry'spowerelite,Allon'splanwasscrapped,andremainedanentirelyacademicnotion.TheeffortstoinitiatedialoguebetweenIsraelandEgyptwereinfluencedonly

inlimitedmeasurebytheformationofEshkol'sgovernment,andthechangesintheperceptionoftheArabthreatwhichaccompaniedit.DuringEshkol'stenure,theMossadwas entrustedwith the responsibility ofmaintaining contactswith

stateswhichdidnothaveformaldiplomatictieswithIsrael;certainoverturestoNasserwerepartof thisMossadeffort,yetduring the1963-67period theydidnot achievemuch. The change in policy brought about by the new leadershipwasnotcomprehensive,asIsrael's leadersdoubtedthatthebasicArabpositionhad changed. Still influenced byBenGurion's doctrine, they continued towaitforaradicaltransformationoftheArabview.While the new elite believed that the danger posed by Nasser was latent,

rather than a present emergency, thismoremoderate view did not stimulate apolitical breakthrough. In this context, the most conspicuous failure was thebreakdownofcontactswithEgyptin1965.GeneralIsamal-DinHalil,oneofthesenior advisers toMarshal Amer, the EgyptianMinister ofWar, mediated inParis between the director of the Mossad, Amit and Deputy Minister of theTreasuryZviDinstein,andtheEgyptianMinister.ItwouldseemthatissuessuchasEgypt'seconomicandsocialillsduringthisperiod,alongwithAmit'sdesiretoslowdownthearmsracewere topicsofdiscussionduringthismeeting;andafter the discussion, the two were invited to Cairo for a meeting with Amerhimself. Yet Eshkol decided to veto the trip as Amit and Isar Harel, hispredecessor (and rival) at the head of theMossad, believed that the invitationwasanEgyptiantrap.41

Conclusion

Thisessayhasargued that thedecadewhichstretchedbetween thesecondandthe thirdArab-Israeli wars was far from tranquil in character. To be sure, nogeneralwar between Israel and its neighbours ensued in this period. Still, thechasmbetweenthisandadefinitionof theeraasa 'tranquildecade' iswide.Ifthis is the case, thenwhyhas such a conception of the period becomewidelyaccepted?BeyondthetendencytoevaluatetheArab-Israeliconflictintermsofconsecutiveoutbreaksof full-blownwar, thenotionof a 'tranquil decade'maywellhaveevolvedasacoverforIsrael'sfailuretoattainitslongtermobjectivesin 1956. By claiming that the 1956War led to an easing of the Arab-Israeliconflict for ten years, Israeli leaders sought to portray the war as a limited

operation aimed mainly at stopping the string of Egyptian-based fedayeenattacks against Israel's civilian population and at securing free passage in thestraitsofTiran,atatimewhenthewar'sreallongtermobjectivewasthetopplingofNasser'sregime.

MenachemKleinisSeniorLecturerinPoliticalStudiesatBar-IlanUniversity.

Notes

1.DavidBenGurion,Israel:YearsofChallenge,London1963,p.189.

2.DavidBenGurion,Israel-APersonalHistory,NewYork,1971,p.445.Similarly,MichaelBar-Zohar,

oneofBenGurion'sbiographers,wrotethat'theSinaiCampaignbroughtIsraelrichdividends,first

and foremost ten years of peace. One after another, her borders fell silent'. See BenGurion: A

Biography,NewYork,1977,p.258.

3.MosheDayan,DiaryoftheSinaiCampaign,NewYork,1967,p.207.SeealsohisStoryofMyLife,

NewYork,1976,p.259.

4.MordechaiBar-On,EtgarVe-tigra:Ha-derechLe-sinai1956,Beersheba,1991,p.331.

5.ShimonPeres,'TheRoadtoSevres:Franco-IsraeliStrategicCooperation',inHanS.TroenandMoshe

Shemesh(eds),TheSuez-SinaiCrisis,London,1990,pp.148-9.Theterm'tranquildecade'wasalso

usedbyMeirAmit, theIDF'sheadoftheStaffBranchinthe1956War, ina1986interview.See

YosefEvron,Suez1956Be-mabatHadash,TelAviv,1986,p.177.SeealsoDavivShaham,Israel

40 Hashanim, Tel Aviv, 1991, pp.147, 158; Chaim Herzog, 'The Suez-Sinai Campaign:

Background',inTroenandShemesh,TheSuez-SinaiCrisis,pp.3-14;andYitzhakRabin,'TheSinai

CampaignandtheLimitsofPower',ibid.,pp.238-48.

6.MordechaiBar-On,Sha'areiAza:MediniyutHa-huzVeha-bitahonShelIsrael1955-1957,TelAviv,

1992,p.382.

7.ItamarRabinovich,'TheSuez-SinaiCampaign:TheRegionalDimension',inTroenandShemesh,The

Suez-SinaiCrisis,p.170.

8. Meir Avidan, Hebetim lqaryyim Be-yahasei Israel Ve-artzot Ha-brit Bi-shnot Ha-hamishim,

Jerusalem,1982,pp.83-4.

9.DavidEishenhower,WagingPeace1956-1961,NewYork,1965,pp.119-20,200,286-93;Townsend

Hoopes,TheDevil and John FosterDulles, Boston, 1973, pp.119-20;Moshe Zak, 'ZalafimMul

Mazilim',Maariv,28October1983;PatrickSeale,TheStruggleforSyria,London,1966.Seealso

MuhammadHeikal'sweeklycolumninal-Ahram,12June1965.

10.NadavSafran,MedinatIsraelVe-yahasehaImArtzotHa-brit,TelAviv,1979,p.326;GideonRaphael,

Be-sodLeumim,TelAviv,1981,p.75;MichaelBar-Zohar,BenGurion,TelAviv,1977,p.1318.The

noteshereandbelowrelatetothelongerHebrewversionofBar-Zohar'sbiographyofBenGurion.

11.SeeHa-aretzandMaariv,March-April1965;YitzhakRabin,PinqasSherut,TelAviv,1979,pp.121-

9;DivreiHaKnesset,Vol.45(1966),p.1020.

12.Or asMosheDayan called them in theKnesset, 'a few dozen bandits'.DivreiHaKnesset,Vol. 47

(1967),p.32.

13.Author'sinterviewswithAharonYariv,MeirAmit,andYitzhakRabinin1982.

14.YehoshafatHarkabi,FatahBa-estrategiaHa-arvit,TelAviv,1969,pp.66-7.

15.MosheGilboa,SheshShanimShishaYamim,TelAviv,1969,p.60.

16. Amir Oren, 'Dog-fight Ve-underdog Ve-lo Od Dog-matim', Davar, 19 February 1993, p.9; Jon

Kimche,'ZahalBeinHa-dergHa-mediniVeha-tzvai',Maariv,18February1983,p.15.

17. SeeDivrei HaKnesset, Vol. 47 (1967), pp.290-93; David Kimche and Dan Bavli, Sufat Ha-esh:

MilhemetSheshetHa-yamtm,MeqorotehaVe-tozoteha,TelAviv,1968,p.72.

18.Gilboa,Shesh Shanim, p.76;RichardB.Parker,ThePolitics ofMiscalculation in theMiddleEast,

Bloomington,1993,p.91.

19.J.A.Sellers,'MilitaryLessons:TheBritishPerspective',inTroenandShemesh,TheSuez-SinaiCrisis,

pp.17-53;JulianAmery,'TheSuezGroup:ARetrospectiveonSuez',ibid.,pp.306-9.

20. GoldaMeir,Hayyai, Tel Aviv, 1975, pp.220-25;Divrei HaKnesset, Vol. 28 (1960), p.176; Brian

Urqhart,Hammarskjold, NewYork, 1972, pp.303-6; author's interviewwithMordechai Gazit in

1982.

21.Divrei HaKnesset, Vol. 26 (1958), p.2341. On Israel's readiness in December 1958 to attack the

SyrianandEgyptianair forcesfollowing theheighteningof tensionon theIsrael-Syriabordersee

AmirOren, 'NifgeuBi-teunat Imunim',Davar, 4 June1993,p.9;MosheSharett,Yoman Isbi,Tel

Aviv,1978,p.2309.

22.Israel'spoliciesduringthefirststageofQassem'scoupwerefoundeduponfaultyintelligencereports

overestimating the power of the pro-Nasserist section among the rebels. American intelligence

discernedthatQassemhaddefeatedthepro-Nasserfactioninhiscamp,butIsraeliintelligencewas

oblivious to this. The author's interview with Yehoshafat Harkabi, 1982; Eishenhower,Waging

Peace1956-1961,pp.270-71,288.

23.Author'sinterviewwithHarkabiandYehudaTagarin1982;Avidan,HebetimIqaryyim,pp.90-92.

24.Bar-Zohar,BenGurion,1333-4,1342;UziNarkis,AhatYerushalaim,TelAviv,1975,pp.28-31,51-3.

25.Moshe Zak, 'Ha-sibuchimBa-derech Le-rabatAmmon',Maariv, 11 July 1980, p.21, and 'KolHa-

pgishot Im Hussein', Maariv, 31 March 1980, p. 19, and 'Ha-misdaron Le-aza Hifrid Bein

BenGurionLa-melechAbdallah',Maariv,17October1986,pp.22-3.

26.YehoshafatHarkabiandMordechaiGazitinaninterviewwithauthor,1982;DivreiHaKnesset,Vol.

40(1963),p.1268;Bar-Zohar,BenGurion,pp.1550-52.TheAmericanintelligenceassessmentwas

comparable to that of the Israeli intelligence. See Mordechai Gazit, President Kennedy's Policy

TowardstheArabStatesandIsrael,AnalysisandDocuments,TelAviv,1983,pp.49-52,120-21.

27.DivreiHaKnesset,Vol.22(1957),pp.2039-41;Bar-Zohar,BenGurion,pp.1319-41.

28. Gazit, President Kennedy's Policy, pp.92, 109; Menachem Klein, Praqim Beyacbasey Israel v-

Ha'aravimBeinHashanim1957-1967,TrumanInstitute,TheHebrewUniversity, Jerusalem,1986,

pp.69-71;AvnerYaniv,PoliticaVe-estrategiyaBe-Israel,TelAviv,1994,pp.164-7,172-8;Yaron

Tzur, 'Ha-nasih,Ha-diplomatVeha-iska,Ha-aretz,18November1994;AvrahamPeleg, 'Mumhim

YardenimBiqruBe-IsraelLe-diyunalTochniyotYamHamelach',Maariv,27May1983,p.19.For

astudyofthecontactsmadebyIsraelwithmoderateoppositiongroupsinradicalizedAlgeria,see

Raphael,BesodLeumim,pp.75-6,78-81.OntheMossadandtheIsraeliembassyinPariscontacts

with theTunisianregimein1961seeDavidAriel toYaacovKaroz,24February1961andDavid

ArieltotheIsraeliEmbassy,Paris,17February1961,IsraelStateArchives,3759/2.

29. American pressure in this regard began in 1960 when the existence of the Dimona reactor was

exposed, and theUS even sent jets to gather intelligence about the reactor. SeeMaariv,21 July

1963.

30.Amit'sinterviewwiththeauthor,1982;YigalAllon, 'KochotHa-magenHa-israelimMehaetmolLa-

machar',Ma'aracbot,No.174-5(March-April1966),p.79.

31.Gazit,PresidentKennedy'sPolicy,pp.125-9;Bar-Zohar,BenGurion,pp.1524,1553.

32.Author'sinterviewwithHarkabiin1982.

33.Ibid.

34.MattiGolan,Peres,TelAviv,1982,p.122.ForadescriptionofplansdrawnupbyFrenchandIsraeli

intelligence officers to assassinate Nasser immediately after the 1957 withdrawal from the Suez

Canal,seeOdedGranot, 'QtzineiModi'inIsraelimVetzorphatimTichnenuLe-hitnaqeshBe-Abdel

Nasser',Maariv,24October1986,p.16.

35.Rabinina1982interviewwiththeauthor.

36.DivreiHaKnesset,Vol.41(1965),pp.2-3.

37.Yarivina1982interviewwiththeauthor.

38.Amitinaninterviewwiththeauthor,1982.

39.Bar-Zohar,BenGurion,pp.1525-6;Gilboa,ShesbShanim,p.31;Golan,Peres,pp.121-2.

40.YigalAllon,MasachShelHol,TelAviv,1960,pp.355-6.

41.UriDan,Mivtz'aGome,TelAviv,1981,pp.16-17;MeirAmitinaninterviewwiththeauthor,1982,

andalsoinaninterviewpublishedinYediotAharonot,11May1979.

Israel'sNuclearProgramme,theSixDayWarandItsRamifications

SHLOMOARONSON

Themainthesisofthisessayisthat,ironicallyenough,duringthe1967MiddleEastcrisis,theIsraelicabinetbelievedthecountry'snuclearprogrammetofiguremostprominentlyontheArablistofIsraelitargets.Theironyliesobviouslyinthe fact that Israel's initialeffort toacquire theultimatedeterrenthadaimedatdrivingtheArabstoaccepttheJewishstatewithinits1949boundaries.Butthisstrategy, initiated by Prime Minister David BenGurion, was contested bymembers of the Israeli elite for several reasons, including fear of Americanpressure and/or Soviet reaction. Parallel to BenGurion's nuclear endeavour, astrategy of conventional pre-emption was developed already during his owntenure,latertobeestablishedasadoctrinebyhispoliticalrival,YigalAllon,andimplemented during the May 1967 crisis. The Israeli cabinet deliberatedbeforehand whether the Egyptian challenge at the time was not aimed at itsnuclear project, hence an Israeli pre-emptivewarmight in fact play intoArabhandsseekingtodestroyitsnuclearoption.Following the Israeli conventional pre-emptive operations in June 1967, the

Arabs adopted conventional war aims leading to the 1973 YomKippurWar.Israel'snuclearoption(whichsurvivedthe1967crisisunscathed),togetherwiththe peace negotiations between Israel and its neighbours following the 1973War, the active regional role played by theUnited States, and changes in theArab world and in the former Soviet Union, may explain the current peaceprocess in the region, and some domestic Israeli difficulties in this regardanchoredintheresultsoftheSixDayWar.

DavidBenGurionandtheBomb

TheattentiongivenbyIsrael'sfoundingfather,DavidBenGurion,totheatomicbombwasgrounded in threeobservations.First, that the JewsofEuropeweretrappedbetweenHitler,whohaddestroyedthem,andtheAllies,whocouldnotrescuethemorrefusedtoabsorbthemowingtovariouspoliticalreasons,someof them legitimate. Second, that in the nuclear age, at the height of the ColdWar,similar reasons led theWest torefuse todoIsrael's fightingfor it.Third,Israel'sWarofIndependence(1948—49)establishedthenewlybornstatewithinimprovedArmisticeDemarcationLines(ADLs)inapartitionedPalestine,whichmust remain partitioned in principle, however constrained its borders were,whiletheconventionalvariables(manpowerratio,Arabterritorial,politicalandeconomic potential)would prevent theArabs from accepting Israel unless thebombwas acquired by Israel first, while pan-Arab leaders of the time wouldseekthebombanyway.Hence the bomb was perceived by BenGurion as a must, which had to be

acquired before the Arabs developed a means of mass destruction or won aseries of conventional rounds which they could afford thanks to theirconventionalpolitical-economicsuperiority.Atthesametime,theacquisitionofthe bomb by Israel would allow the Arabs to retreat from their conventionalpoliticalobligationtoobliteratetheJewishislandinthemidstoftheArabocean.SinceIsraelenjoyedanedgeovertheArabsintermsoftechnologicalknow-howandconnectionsabroad,andsincetherewerenoestablishedinternationalmeansofenforcementsuchastheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency(IAEA)andtheNon-ProliferationTreaty(NPT)atthetime,Israelhadawindowofopportunitytojointheclubthiswavortheother.The moral-political justification of such an unprecedented endeavour was

anchored in the asymmetrical character of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and inhistorical-culturalgivensintheArab-Muslimcoalition.Theasymmetrywasnotjust amatterofArabnumbers,vast territories, economicmuscle, and strategicimportanceat theheightof theColdWar.ItwasalsoamatterofofficialArabpolicyandthedeclaredArabaimtodestroyIsrael,whereasIsraeldidnotwanttodestroytheArabstates.TheArabsobviouslyhadtheirgenuinefears,politicalcalculations,domesticnecessitiesandtheneedforsupportfromthePalestinianDiaspora. If the Arabs wanted to destroy Israel, then the Jewish state wasjustifiedinseekingtodeterthemthroughthethreatofinsufferabledamage.This

asymmetrywouldstillpersistiftheArabsacquiredthebomborothermeansofmass destruction - because for Israel the only objective would be nationalsurvivalwhereasforArabstheobliterationofIsrael-bywhatevermeans-mightmeanaseriesofunmitigateddisastersinthenuclearage.Moreover, Arab-Muslim political culture and its ensuing behaviour - or

several patterns of behaviour - were viewed by BenGurion as removed fromWestern traditions of mass-industrial war fighting. True, the Arabs had verygood reasons not to accept Israel and to try to obliterate it; but this did notnecessarily mean preparedness on their part for enormous damage to theirearthlyexistencesforthesakeoftranscendentalgoalsorvalues.Arabinterests,ArabrightsandArabhonourwereatstakesinceIsrael'sbirthandbefore,butthepoliticalstrategicmeansaimedat(re)gainingthemwereconventionalnotonlyintermsofnumbersandpoliticalmusclebutalsointheconceptualsense.Hence,reasoned BenGurion, the bombmight give them the ladder for a climb-downfrom their commitment to the destruction of an unconventional Israel: notmerely because of its immense power of destruction but because of itsrevolutionary nature, which could justify Arab concessions without beingviewed as surrender to Jewish (conventional) sword. This required Israel tobehaveprudentlywithregardtoseveralconventionalissuessuchasboundaries(partitionofWesternPalestine),ruleoveroccupiedArabs(none),andtheuseofconventionalforce(retaliatoryacts).Obviously,itisarguablethatsuchaworldviewcouldonlyencouragetheArabstoacquire,oreventousethebomb.Norcould Israel ignore the American interest in maintaining the nuclear club asclosedaspossible,giventhatthiswastheonlyweaponwhichcouldconceivablythreatenasuperpowerespeciallywhenacquiredbysmallandcontestedentities.Also,theSovietwrathinthisregard,sinceIsraelwasviewedaseffectivelypartof theWest,wasexpected tocomplicatesuperpower relationsstill further.ForitspartBritaintookapositionsimilartothatoftheUnitedStates.

The1956SuezCampaign

France'ssituationwasuniqueatthetime,becauseitfounditselfinconfrontation

withtheArabmajorityinAlgeria,supportedbyotherArabfactorsspearheadedbyEgypt'span-ArabPresidentGamalAbdelNasser.InEurope,Francetriedtoretain its strategic-political edge over West Germany by building a nuclearinfrastructure,but the typical infightingbetween thenumerouspoliticalpartiesoftheFourthRepublicdidnotallowafinaldecisiontoacquireanindependentnuclearmilitaryforce,orsharesuchaneffortwithotherEuropeanpowers,ortoagree with them on the establishment of a European Common Market. Suchdecisions, and the decision to give Israelwhat premierGuyMollet called 'theroyal gift', namely, a complete nuclear infrastructure, resulted from the 1956SuezCampaign,orratherfromitsfailure.TheinitialnegotiationsonFrench-IsraelimilitarycollaborationagainstEgypt

entailedaFrenchpromiseinthenuclearsphere,sinceBenGurionwasnotreadytojointheAnglo-FrenchcoalitioninitsbidtorecovertheSuezCanalandthuspre-emptEgypt'sgrowingconventionalthreatonly.Yetthecampaign'scompletefiascoasfarasthetwoEuropeanpowerswereconcerned,leadingtoUS-Sovietco-operation against both of them (and Israel), including American economicpressure and public Soviet threat to use nuclear weapons against Paris andLondon (while threatening Israel's very survival), triggered a string ofconsequentFrenchdecisions.The first such decision was the creation of the European Atomic Energy

CommunityTreaty(Euratom)asafirststep towardsestablishingEuropeanco-operation in this area, in the face of superpower monopoly and BritishdependenceontheUnitedStatesdespiteLondon'spossessionofitsownnuclearforce;andthecreationoftheEuropeanEconomicCommunity(EEC)bysigningtheTreatyofRomeof1957.Anotherdecisionwas tocreateaFrenchmilitarynuclearforce;andwhile thefoundationsofsuchaforcewerealreadyinplace,theFrenchSocialistPartyneededtheSuezCampaign-andGaullistsupport-toundertake this initiative. Finally, inOctober 1957Mollet's socialists and theirradicalpartnerssignedacontractwithIsraelgivingtheJewishstateacompletenuclearinfrastructure.Thedomesticandforeignpoliticalreasonsforthismovewereprobablyrootedinsocialist-radicaldesiretolegitimizetheirowndecisionto'gonuclear',bymakingIsrael-asocialistallydesertedbyFranceinthewakeof the Suez Campaign, isolated and threatened by a triumphant Nasser - anuclear partner. It was hoped that Israel would emerge soon as a powerful

French ally in its struggle over Algeria. Besides, France's European partner,WestGermany,wasmorallyobligedtoIsrael, refusingtocutoff its reparationpaymentstotheJewishstateunderAmericanpressure,followingtheoccupationofSinaiandGazabyIsraelin1956.Israel thus had some breathing space until both territories were returned to

Egyptinearly1957andUNforceswereplacedalongtheADLinGazaandintheRedSeastraitsleadingtoEilat.Americanpromisestokeepthestraitsopenwere also given, but the presenceof theUN force in the straits and along theGazaStripdependedoncontinuingEgyptiangoodwill.

TheAmericanIntervention:PhaseOne

ThenucleartreatyofOctober1957betweenIsraelandFranceremainedsecret,ofcourse,andwashonoured-atfirst-byGeneralCharlesdeGaullewhenheassumed power in 1958. The General, however, who rejected any foreignsharing in an independent French nuclear power, first killed Euratom, thenmanoeuvred to make West Germany his own ally, while reaching his initialdecisionstoleaveAlgeriainduecourse(1962).DeGaulle'snuclearprogrammebenefited in themeantime from theFrench-

Israeli connection, since Israel's Weizmann Institute was reported to havecalculated the parameters of the French bomb using American computingsystemswhichweredeniedfromFranceatthetime.Soonafterhehadhisownbomb,deGaullefrozethenucleartreatywithIsrael,claimingthatthesecrethadbeenexposedandthattheWesternpresswouldmakeitpublicsoon.DeGaulle'smainmotive, inmy opinion, was his fear that the Israeli and Frenchmilitaryestablishments,whichatthetimeworkedcloselytogether,andwhichviewedtheSaharaasatestinggroundfornuclearweaponsandFrance'searlygenerationofmissiles,mightendangerhisdecision towithdraw fromAlgeria.Late in1960,followingthegeneralelectionsintheUnitedStates,BenGurionannouncedintheKnessetthatanuclearreactorforpeacefulusewasbeingbuiltatDimona,intheNegev desert, thus resolving the issue of secrecy and declaring the project'speacefulpurpose.ThisinturnallowedtheresumptionoftheFrenchroleinthe

reactor'sconstruction,butdeGaullewasreportedtohaverefusedtodeliverthemost vital part needed to build bombs: a plutonium separation plant. If Israelwanted the reactor to be completed, it should conduct itselfwith restraint andrefuseanyco-operationwith rebelliouselements in theFrencharmy regardingAlgeria.Thiswasindeeddonein1962,andtheDimonareactorwasreportedtohave been completed in 1963. Even the separation plant was supplied, eitherbehind the General's back or with his tacit consent. At that stage DavidBenGurion resigned from both his offices (Prime Minister and Minister ofDefence)underheavyAmericanpressure,directlyrelatedtoDimona.TheAmerican efforts in this regard succeeded at first inmaking the Israeli

nuclearprogrammelookpubliclyasifithadnomilitaryramifications.Butthishappened in 1960, while the Dimona reactor was still under construction. Toensure itspeacefuluse, theUnitedStatesdemanded fromBenGurionadequatesafeguards (such as IAEA inspections, which were promptly refused) orAmerican inspection visits, especially when the reactor was reported to havebeencompletedin1963.Thisdemand,however,waslinkedbytheAmericanstoEgyptian concessions pertaining to Nasser's own efforts to produce missilesarmed with unconventional warheads with the help of German and Austrianscientists.TheEgyptianmissileeffortprovedinthemeantimetohavebeenbothcostlyand ineffective,henceBenGurioncouldhaveexpected themainbulkoftheAmericanpressuretofalluponIsrael'sshoulders.HavinglosthiscentralroleinhisownpoliticalpartyMapai, since1960,due toavarietyofdomesticandforeign political reasons, BenGurion refused to risk a confrontation with theUnitedStateson theDimona issue,once theKennedyadministrationproducedanEgyptianconcession -by itselfmeaningless -on themissile issue.He triedhard to legitimize Dimona vis-à-vis the Kennedy administration by quotingalarming developments in the Arab world, but resigned his post when thedomesticcrisisseemedtobecoupledwithirresistibleAmericanpressureontheDimonaissue.

TheAmericanIntervention:PhaseTwo

It is not known whether Kennedy's efforts were also prompted by Sovietintervention,atleastbehindthescenes,tocurbtheIsraelinuclearprojectalreadyduringBenGurion'stime.ThatthismighthavewellbeenthecaseisindicatedbyBenGurion'slettersurgingthesuperpowerstoguaranteeIsrael'sexistenceinthefaceofgrowingArabhostilityandcompetitionbetweenthepan-ArabregimesinDamascusandCairo,withIraqinvolvedinbothcountries.Havingfailedtosecureeitherobjective-thereactor'slegitimacyinAmerican

eyes, or superpower guarantees - BenGurion resigned his offices as PrimeMinister andMinister of Defence. The premiership was assumed by the thenMinister of Finance, Levi Eshkol, with Golda Meir as his Foreign Minister.Meir, BenGurion's domestic rival, and Eshkol, a compromiser by reputation,whose main interest lay in Israel's economic development, quickly becameAmerican targets regarding thenuclearprogramme,andweregivenassurancesabout theUSguarantee to Israel'sADLs, inorder to freeze thenuclearprojectafterBenGurion'sdeparture.But while he was seeking Egypt's concessions with regard to its own

unconventional programme, President Kennedy was assassinated and hissuccessor, Lindon B. Johnson, was less interested in the Israeli endeavour.Johnson,however,retainedKennedy'snationalsecuritystaff,whichinmyviewslowlydroveIsraeltotheSixDayWar,withouteitherrealizingthisprocessoradmittingitatalaterstage,tothisveryday.Thecomponentsofthepackageleadingtothewarwereasfollows:

Earlyinhisfirsttenure,Eshkol'scabinetnotonlycontinuedtheDimonaproject, but ordered two dozen intermediate range ballistic missiles(IRBMs) in France, as well as a number of short-range missiles. Themissiles were to be developed first, with the delivery date reportedlybeing1967,but theUSadministrationput enormouspressureon Israelnottodeploythem.EshkoltriedhardtolegitimizeDimonainhistalkswiththeAmericansin1964, arguing that although American security guarantees werewelcomed the United States might be involved elsewhere in times ofemergency for Israel (as was indeed the case with Vietnam). Eshkol'sarguments, includingapromisenot toexpose Israel'smissilecapability

for the timebeing,werereported to theAmericanmissionsallover theArabworld,toMoscowandtotheIAEAinVienna.TwoArab summit conferences were convened - for the first time - in1964andin1965,todealwithvariousissuesconcerningIsrael.Thefirstsuch issue was the Israeli Negev irrigation project, based on divertedwater from the Sea of Galilee. Countermeasures were agreed upon in1964, and at the same time a Palestine LiberationOrganization (PLO)wassetupunderEgyptianauspices(withAhmadShuqairiaschairman)to compete with the Fatah guerrilla organization based in Syria underYasser Arafat. Having thus created a (competing) Palestinian guerrillaoutfit to fight Israel under the nuclear threshold, as the Syrians andArafatperceivedtheAlgerianandtheVietnamwarsagainstthenuclearFrench and American powers, and the Egyptian-controlled PLO, theArab leadersdealtwith the Israelinuclear threat thoroughly inaclosedsummit in 1965. Following the latter summit Egypt, and other Arabstates,madetheIsraeliatomicprogrammeanofficialcasusbelli,shouldIsraelactually'gonuclear'.TheAmericanambassadorinEgypt,JohnS.Badeau, had come close to justifying this casus belli already in 1964,when he cabledWashington thatNasser did not intend to attack Israel(notwithstanding his public rhetoric) unless it became clear that Israelhadorwas shortly toobtainnuclearweapons.Nasser'sobjectivesweredescribed as the destruction solely of the Dimona reactor, leading toimmediatewithdrawalbehind theEgyptian line.TheCIA'sor theStateDepartment'sanalystssawintheIsraelinuclear threatanditsremoval-an utmost Egyptian national interest, since the obvious target of theIsraelibombwouldbe theAswanHighDam,whosedestructionwouldonly be possible by using a nuclear warhead, while Egypt could notretaliatebyusingthesamedevicebecauseofIsrael'speculiarboundaries.Thesemade Israel less vulnerable to a nuclear attack, even onewhichmight cause terrible harm to itsArabneighbours.TheEgyptian threatsthustriggeredanongoingAmericanefforttopreventthethreatenedwarbyremovingitsallegedcause-whichatthesametimewasnotreadyyet(missiles included) - and which was viewed by Israel as the ultimatereasonforEgyptnottowagewarsaltogetheranymore.

At this stage - 1965 - the Americans intervened by offering Israelconventional aid, and by demonstrating to Egypt their own involvement as asafeguarding power at Dimona. By so doing, the United States gave Egypt acasus belli if it could prove, at least to itself, or to the Soviets or if it werechargedbyotherArabsofnegligenceinthisregard-thatIsraelhadindeedgonenuclear.ThedirectsuppliesofAmericanjetsandtanks-whichtheUnitedStateshad

hitherto avoided giving to Israel - promised in 1965, were linked to Israel'sconcessions in the nuclear sphere. However, the Israeli government allowedAmerican inspection visits only at Dimona and thus could hardly satisfy theEgyptiansorotherArab leaders; thisat thesame timeangeredBenGurionandhisyoungeraidesMosheDayanandShimonPeres.In1965BenGurionresortedtoageneralcampaignagainstLeviEshkol, foracombinationofdomesticandpoliticalstrategic reasons, including theAmerican inspection deal later on, andEshkol'sstrainedrelationswithdeGaulle'sFrance,thewould-besupplieroftheIsraeli IRBMs. It is still unclear whether Eshkol had indeed yielded to theAmericanpressurenottoreceiveordeploytheIRBMswhenready,inexchangefor the promisedAmerican hardware, butBenGurion blamed himpublicly formajorincompetencewithregardtoanessentialsecurityissue.AtaboutthesametimeBenGurionalsocreatedhisownpartywhichremained inoppositionafterthe1965elections,andwhichhelpedimmenselytodamageEshkol'sreputationinsecuritymattersfromthentothecrisisofMay1967.

TheRoadtoWar:PhaseOne

Egypt'scasusbelliregardingDimonasince1965remainedahollowthreat,orsoit seemed toknowledgeable Israelis (the threat itself remainedcensoredby themilitary),mainlybecausesince1962theEgyptianarmyhadfounditselfboggeddown in a civil war in Yemen, thus severely limiting its freedom of actionelsewhere. However, the war in Yemen also strained Nasser politically,exacerbated his relationswithSaudiArabia and Jordan,while in early 1966 amoreradicalversionof theBa'thpan-ArabpartyassumedpowerinDamascus.

The Syrians allowed Arafat's Fatah to launch guerrilla raids into Israel (viaJordan), and engaged it in series of directmilitary actions along the commonADL,pertainingtotheArabwaterdiversionoperationandtoIsrael'scultivationofdemilitarizedzonesinthevicinityoftheADL.ForitspartEgypt'shandsweretied by the presence of the UN buffer force which had effectively sealed thebordersince1957.IsraelthusexchangedblowswithSyria,andinearly1966itwas reported by theNewYorkTimes that it had ordered nuclear IRBMs fromFrance.ThereportcoincidedwithavisitbytheEgyptianChiefofStaff,AbdelHakimAmer,toFrance,inwhichhewastoldthattheIsraelishadobtainedthebomb. But did they obtain credible delivery means? Or did they possess acrediblearsenalatthisstage?Notyet,buttheymightobtainthemissileslaterin1967, asonemayconcludeboth from theNewYorkTimes report, and fromapublicstatementquotingtheSovietMinisterofDefence,AndreiGrechko,whohad reportedly 'pledgedprotection' toEgypt followingavisit to thecountry inlate1966,whenandifIsraelbuiltoracquirednuclearweapons.It ishard toassess the impactof this 'nuclearguarantee'on Israelidecision-

makers,but the 'conventionalists'among themsuchasYigalAllonmighthavefeltthattheirownstrategyofconventionaldeterrenceandpre-emptionhadnowproved to be far more justified than before. Conventional deterrence requiredaction, and thus in November 1966 Israel launched a major retaliatory actagainst the Jordanian village of Samu (in the south of theWestBank),whereFatah guerrillas had encamped on their way from Syria to Israel. The Samuoperation was unprecedented in scope, compared to BenGurion's times.Launched in daylight, it involved armour and eventually aircraft. They foughtthe Jordanian army, which came to support the Palestinians, causing heavyJordaniancasualtiesandaPalestinianuprisingintheWestBank.KingHusseinwas forced to crush the rebellion bymilitarymeans, but at the same time hebitterly blamed Egypt for hiding behind the UN buffer and doing nothing tomakegoodNasser'sownthreatsagainsttheJewishstate.InthemeantimetheSyrian-Israeliclashesescalatedfurther,withtheIsraeliair

forceintervening,pursuingSyrianaircraftintoDamascusitself,wheretwowereshotdown.Early in1967LieutenantGeneralYitzhakRabin, the IsraeliChief-of-Staff,appearedtohavethreatenedtheSyrianregimeinpublic.HerewasnewevidencetosuggestperhapsthatRabinandseveralministersinEshkol'scabinet,

notably Allon, did plan a major operation against Syria, the main (and only)sourceoftroubleintheregion,asEgyptwasviewedbytheIDF(IsraeliDefenceForces)tobetotallyimmersedinYemenandhencenotreadyforwar.True, the PLO organs and Chairman Shuqairi personally publicly urged

Nasser to go to war at once, before Israel went nuclear. But the EgyptianPresidenthadrepeatedlywarnedeveryoneintheArabworldthathewouldnotfightbeforehewasready-awarningwhichtheIsraelisinterpretedintermsofhis involvement in Yemen - only to be forced to weigh it afresh in terms ofSovietsupport,whichhemighthavegainedinMay1967.Otherwise themarching of Egyptian troops into Sinai sincemid-May 1967

couldhavebeeninterpretedasashowofforcetorelievetheIsraelipressureoverSyria.Butsoonenoughall thepartieslostcontroloveraprocessofescalation,whichtheyhadhopedtobeabletocontrol.

TheRoadtoWar:PhaseTwo

ThemanningofEgypt'sfortifiedpositionsalongtheIsraeliADLinSinai,whichhadremainedemptysince1956,andtheappearanceofthePalestinianLiberationArmy(PLA),underEgyptiancommand,intheGazaStripalarmedtheIsraelis.YetthemainsourceoftheiranxietywasthereconnaissanceflightsbyEgyptianaircraft over the Dimona reactor on 17 May, which coincided with Nasser'sdecision to remove theUNbuffer fromtheADLalong theGazaStripand theUN presence in the Red Sea straits. All of a sudden, Israeli decision-makerswere reminded of the 1965 casus belli regarding Dimona, while they had nocredibledeliverymeansforwhatever limitednuclearweaponstheymighthavehad possessed at the time, except a number of subsonic French-made, lightbombers.HenceChief-of-StaffRabinwasgivenpermissiontocallupreserves,atleast

tosealoff theopenboundaryintheNegev.Oncethereservesweremobilized,andtheEgyptiansremovedtheUNbuffer,anuncontrolledwaveofenthusiasmengulfed the Arab world, and Nasser seemed to have recovered his mythicalgraspoveritsmasses.HethenescalatedthecrisisbyclosingtheRedSeastraits,

defyingadeclaredIsraelicasusbellisince1957.FortheIDFthismeantthefailureofIsrael'sconventionaldeterrenceposture,

requiring immediate action. But the political level was divided, expecting theJohnson administration to open the straits owing to the obligations madefollowingtheSuezCampaign,toEshkol's'specialrelations'withtheAmericans,basedontheDimonainspectiontours,andpossiblytoIsrael'sacceptanceoftheAmericandemandsprohibitingthedeploymentoftheFrenchIRBMs,ifready.ThusthepoliticalechelonsdecidedtowaituntiltheAmericansintervenedto

openthestraits,onlytohearNasserproclaimingthecomingextinctionofIsraelnow that the 1956 status quowas reestablished. The Israelis had now to planhow to pre-empt such Egyptian actions as a direct limited attack from Sinai,PLAraidsfromGaza,ortheclosureofthestraitstoIsraelishipping,thatwouldstillfallshortofageneralwar.YetanIsraeliresorttoashootingwarinresponsetothesedevelopmentsmightgiveNasserwhatheactuallywanted:aprolongedbattlealongtheEgyptianfortificationlineinSinaiuntilthepoliticalinterventionof theEasternBlockand thenon-alignednationswould stop thewar, coupledwiththefreedomtoattackDimona-afarreachingstepwhichmightbejustified,possiblywithSovietbacking,onlyifIsraelattackedEgyptfirst.Atanyrate,noone would shed many tears - except Israel itself - if its nuclear reactordisappeared,sotheonlycourse,whichshouldhavebeenpursuedbyIsrael,wasthe removal of the Red Sea blockade, to which Washington was formallycommitted.WhiletheJohnsonadministrationwascontemplatingifandhowtodothat,at

theheightof theVietnamWar,arapidescalationof tensionintheArabworldseemed to dictate Israeli pre-emption sooner rather than later, at a timewhenalmost theentireIsraeli reservearmyhadbeencalledup.KingHusseinburiedthehatchetandjoinedNasser,placinghisarmyunderEgyptiancommand,andan Iraqi expeditionary force entered Jordan - indefianceof yet another Israelicasus belli.While the IDF'sHighCommand pressed for action now, Eshkol'sgovernment still waited for American help, thus rapidly losing its publicstanding.Under heavy pressure to yield the Defence Ministry - which he held in

personalunionwithhisofficeasPrimeMinister-tosomebodyelsenowthatawar seemed inevitable, Eshkolwas facedwith public and partisan pressure to

recallBenGurion, or at least appointMosheDayanMinister ofDefencewhilecreatingabroadgovernmentofnationalunity.Dayanwasfinallyappointed,andindefianceofBenGurion'sviewsoptedforwarearlyinJune1967.

TheWar:ImmediateandLong-RangeImplications

Eshkol's refusal to allow BenGurion's return to the Ministry of Defence wasanchored,on topof thepersonal rivalrybetween the two, inhisargument thatBenGurion,becauseofhisindependentnuclearpolicy,wasnotacceptabletotheAmericans-whoowedEshkolseveralthingsregardingDimona;henceEshkol'sreadiness to go on waiting and to forgo pre-emption. Paradoxically, Eshkol'spolicywasratherclosetothatofhisnemesis,asBenGurionwouldnotpre-emptif thisendangered thenuclearprogramme,ran theriskofmanycasualties,andinvolvednopriorunderstandingwithagreatpowerasin1956.DayanandPeres,however,realizedthattheirmentor'soptionwasdead,andhencemanoeuvredtouse his political party to negotiate with Eshkol their own participation in aproposed government of national unity,whichwas created in early June,withtheparticipationofMenachemBegin,thehithertoostracizedleaderoftheIsraeliRight.BenGurionwas infactdesertedbyhisyounger lieutenants,wholater in1968hadhisparty-withouthim-alignitselfwithEshkol'sMapaiandAllon'snationalist Left in the framework of Israel's Labour Party. This was just oneresultoftheSixDayWar-launchedagainstEgypton5June1967,withDayanplayingadecisiverole,butexpandinglatertoJerusalem,theWestBank,andtheGolanHeights.TheSyrians,ironicallyenough,wereprettycautiousduringthewar,limiting

themselvestothe 'usual'shellingfromtheGolanandsomeairactivity.Eshkol,however,andthenDayan,decidedtoremovetheSyrianthreattonorthernIsraelfromtheGolanHeights,whichweresubsequentlyoccupiedinthefinalstageofthe 1967War, thus givingDamascus concretewar aims - as theSinai did forEgyptinthe1973YomKippurWar.The Israeli nuclear option, however, survived the 1967War, and had to be

reckonedwithin1973.BythistimeIsraelhadlostitsFrenchconnectionandhad

torelyonaircraft tocarryitsgrowingarsenal.Hence,in1973theArabscouldwagealimitedwaraimedattherecoveryofoccupiedterritory,onceSovietanti-aircraftgunsandmissileseffectivelyneutralizedtheIsraeliairforce-andtheirwaraimswereshortofthedestructionofIsrael.ThepainfuleffectsonIsraelof the1973War,however,bolstered theIsraeli

relianceonnucleardeterrence,IRBMsincluded,thusexplaining-amongotherreasons - the active American involvement in the peace negotiations whichstarted after the Yom Kippur War, leading to the Israeli-Egyptian peaceagreementof1979,basedonthecompletereturnofSinaitoEgypt.ThecaseofJerusalem,theWestBankandtheGazaStrip,alsooccupiedinthe

1967 War, has remained the core of the conflict, especially following therestructuringofthePLOin1968withYasserArafatasitschairman.Until1967Arafat and others had been speaking for the dispersed Palestinians. Theoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 made them, during a longprocess which started then, the main spokesmen of the Palestinians in theoccupied territories as well, thus creating two different foci in Palestinianpolitics. The exiled Palestinians,whose primary interestwas to return to theirhomes in pre1967 Israel, and the occupied Palestinians, were effectively twodifferentgroupsintermsoftheirimmediateinterests;and,followingtheintifadaof the 1980s, Arafat was finally able to speak on the latter's behalf with theIsraelis.Arafat'sfinaldecisiontorecognizeIsraelandnegotiateasettlementwithitwasdictated,interalia,byhispreviousdecisiontosupportSaddamHusseininhis1991Kuwaitimisadventure.Asaresult,ArafatfoundhimselftotallyisolatedintheArabworld,withoutaidfromthedisintegratingUSSR,andhadtochangecourse,alsoregardingIsrael.Iraq'snuclearprogrammewasoneofthecausesoftheKuwaitimisadventure,

andalsoamain targetof theWesternalliesduring theensuingGulfWar.TheIraqi nuclear programme had first been contemplated in 1968, possibly as aresponse to theNPT,which came into being then,while using the treaty as ashieldforitsownviolation;possiblyasIraq'slong-rangeresponsetotheIsraelinuclearchallenge,facingapotential,similar,Iranianchallenge.TheendingoftheGulfWarwithoutclearresultsregardingIraq'sreturntothe

nuclearpath, and Iran's growingnuclear infrastructure thus threaten the Israelinuclearmonopoly,which seemed tohavebeen secured following theSixDay

War.Butitsfoundingfathers,BenGurionandPeres,hadalwayscalculatedthatanAraborMuslimbombwouldemergeoneday,themainissueforthembeingthefundamentalasymmetryoftheconflict.For some theoreticians there is no way to make such adversaries behave

'rationally'oncetheIsraelinuclearmonopolyisbroken,becausethenatureoftheconflict was, and will always be, a 'given' and at a high level indeed. ForBenGurion, however, such viewswere pure sophistry, andmisconceived. Thenuclear issue was not theoretical, but was rather anchored in the culture andhistory of the entities involved. The level of the conflict was dictated byconventionalvariables,andwasthereforenotconstant;norweresuicideattackssponsored by Arab leaders inevitable if Israel maintained the partition ofPalestine,refusedtoruleoverPalestinians,andsecuredenoughsupportamongthird parties. Ironically, the results of the SixDayWarmade several of thesepreconditionshardtomeetinIsraelitself.

ShlomoAronsonisProfessorofPoliticalScienceattheHebrewUniversityinJerusalem.

Notes

This article is a shorter and slightly revised version of a monograph, published in 1999 by the

MediterraneanStudiesProgrammeatKing'sCollegeLondon.Readerswishingtoinformthemselves

aboutmyprimaryandsecondarysourcesareadvisedtoconsulttheoriginalwork.

PartII:ChangingPerspectivesonNationalSecurity

TowardsaParadigmShiftinIsrael'sNationalSecurityConception

URIBAR-JOSEPH

The concept of 'national security' refers, traditionally, to the protection of theterritorialandpoliticalintegrityofthestateanditsnationalinterestsfromtheuseof forceby an adversary.Thenational security conception1 of any state is theproductofthegivenrealityofexternalenvironmentandinternalresources(the'operationalmilieu')asperceivedandprocessedinthemindsofherpoliticalandmilitary elite (the 'psychological milieu'). Consequently, revisions in nationalsecurity conception can be the result of changes in the operationalmilieu, thepsychologicalmilieu,orboth.2

Zionism was born without any national security conception. It started toformulate such a theory only in the 1920s, following the firstmilitary clashesbetween the pre-state Yishuv and the Arab community in Palestine, and thiscrystallized into (what I will later term as) the Zionist national securityparadigm,duringthe1930sand1940s.Since then no fundamental changes have taken place in the psychological

milieu of Israel's national security. Its operational milieu went through oneradical shift, in 1948,when the conflict ceased to be a local struggle betweenJewsandArabsinPalestineandbecameaconflictbetweentheIsraelistateandtheArabworld.Consequently, Israel's present national security conception is, to a large

extent, the product of the psychological and operationalmilieus of the JewishYishuv and the war of 1948. During the last decade, however, certain crackshave appeared in these two environments. This essay discusses these changesandtheirimplicationsforIsrael'snationalsecurityconception.Two arguments stand at the core of this essay: (a) that Israel is nearing the

stage where its present national security conception will become obsoletebecauseofradicalchangesinitsoperationalmilieu;(b)recentchangesinIsrael's

national security's psychologicalmilieu facilitate the build-up of a new theorywhichwillbettersuitthenewstrategicenvironment.Consequently,thefirstpartof this essay, which focuses on the operational milieu, briefly describes theexisting national security conception and then elaborates on themain shifts inIsrael'sstrategicenvironmentwhichcallintoquestionthevalidityofthepresenttheory.Thesecondpartstartswithadescriptionof thedominantbeliefswhichmakeupthecoreofthepsychologicalmilieuandthenanalyseshowtheyhavechanged in recent years. Finally I will outline possible implications, themostimportant of which is the likely transformation of the Israeli Defence Forces(IDF)fromaconscripttoaprofessionalall-volunteerarmy.

TheOperationalMilieuofIsrael'sNationalSecurityConception

TheTraditionalConception

ThefollowingelementsareatthecoreoftheIsraelinationalsecurityconception,andhavebeensincetheearly1950s:3

1. ThemassivedisproportionbetweenIsraeliandArabnationalresources(chiefly in terms of territory, manpower and gross national product(GNP)) prevents Israel from ending the conflict by military means,whileallowing theArabs todoso.Consequently, Israel isa territorialandpoliticalstatusquopowerandtheonlygoaloftheIDF,asimpliedbyitsname,istodefendthecountryagainstanaggressiveArabworld.4

2. Themost fundamental and dangerous threat to Israel's existence is anall-out co-ordinatedArab surprise attack.Hence, Israel should alwaysmaintain the ability to defend itself under the conditions of such aworst-casescenario,knownasmikrehha-kol(theall-outcase).

3. As derived from the above, Israeli national security doctrine rests onthree pillars: deterrence (as implied by the defensive goals of itsnational security conception); strategic warning (on any development

whichmightendangeritsnationalexistence);anddecision(themilitaryabilitytowinadecisivevictoryifdeterrencefails).

There are two primary operational implications of this doctrine. First, thebuild-upofthecapabilityneededtoprovideahigh-qualitystrategicwarningandaquickresponsetoexternalthreats.ThisexplainswhytheMilitaryIntelligencebranch (DMI), theAir Force (IAF) and theNavy are regular forceswhile thegroundforcesarebasedonreservemanpower.Second,acapabilitytomaintainoperationalinitiativeinwarscenariosandinthebattlefield,inordertobeabletowinadecisivevictorywithinashortperiodoftime.

TheChangesintheInternationalSystemanditsImplications

Thecracks in theoperational settingof the Israelinational securityconceptionare,primarily, theproductofpoliticalchangesat theinternationalandregionallevels. In addition, it is influenced by certain developments in militarytechnology and the proliferation of non-conventional weapon systems to theregion.TheendoftheColdWar,thecollapseoftheSovietUnion,andthetransition

oftheinternationalsystemfromabipolartoaunipolarsystemunderAmericanhegemony,havechangedsignificantlytheoperationalmilieuofIsrael'snationalsecurity.After1955,whentheUSSRbecameanactiveparticipantintheArab-Israeli conflict, Arab military ability to launch a war against Israel increasedsignificantly,andapoliticalsolutiontotheconflictbecamefarmoredifficult.The disappearance of the USSR from the scene has had the following

implications for Israel's national security: first, the superpower political andmilitaryumbrella,underwhichSovietregionalclientscouldhaveshelteredfromthe risks involved in initiating a crisis and even a war with Israel, hasdisappeared.Indeed,from1956theSovietshadactedtolimitIsrael'sfreedomofaction— either through verbal warnings or by actualmilitary intervention intheirclient'sfavour—ineachoftheArab-Israeliwars.5

This is most true of Syria, the Soviets' closest regional ally since themid-1960s.WithouttheSovietsafetynetanySyrianmilitarymoveagainstIsraelwillinvolve considerable threats to Syrian strategic assets, first and foremost, the

capitalDamascuswhichiswithinIsraelimilitaryreach.Hence,SyrianabilitytoinitiatesuchawaragainstIsraelhasdecreasedsignificantlysincetheendoftheSovietUnion.Secondly, from 1955, for almost four decades, the USSR was the main

supplier of arms andmilitary instruction and advice to Israel's chief enemies.The collapse of the SovietUnion does notmean an immediate cease of armstransferstotheArabs.However,becauseofincreasingeconomicconstraints,theRussianmilitary-industrialcomplexisconstantlylosingitsabilitytodevelopandproducethenextgeneration'sweaponsystems.Consequently,traditionalSovietclients, andSyria is themost important case from the Israeli perspective,willhavetochooseincomingyearsbetweenoneofthreeoptions:(a)tocontinuetorely on outdated Russian or Chinese military supplies and thus to increasefurther their technological inferiority vis-à-vis the IDF; (b) to make atransformation to sophisticated (and expensive) Western, primarily Americanweapons,withthepoliticalconcessionsinvolvedandtheriskofbeingmilitarilyvulnerableduringthetransitionperiodwhichmaylastmorethanadecade;and(c) to give up the conventional military build-up and concentrate on thedevelopmentofanon-conventionalcapabilityasameanstodeterIsrael.Notably,eachoftheseoptionswillleaveformerregionalclientsoftheUSSR

conventionally farweaker than Israel in the foreseeable future asArab clientssum up the lost political, diplomatic, economic and scientific support whichenabledthemtobearthecostinvolvedintheirenduringrivalrywithIsrael.

RegionalChangesandtheirImplications

Since1990theMiddleEasthasexperiencedtwomaindevelopmentswhichare,tosomeextent, theproductof thesystemicchangesdiscussedearlier.Thefirstdevelopment was the 1991 Gulf War. The second is the Arab-Israeli peaceprocesswhichhasyielded,sofar,aJordanian-Israelipeaceagreement,anumberofPalestinian-Israeli partial agreements, thebeginningof formalSyrian-Israelinegotiations, and amajor improvement in Israel's relationshipwithmost otherArabstates.ThemainimplicationsofthesedevelopmentsforIsraelinationalsecurityhave

been:

A sharp decrease in the magnitude of the Iraqi conventional threat,becauseofIraq's(forthetimebeingunrecoverable)militarylossesinthewar; thepeace treatywith Jordanwhichhampers advancementof Iraqiforces towards Israel; and Iraqi apprehension of rising threats from itsown neighbours, primarily Iran, which decreases the likelihood of anIraqimilitaryinitiativeagainstIsraelintheforeseeablefuture.A decrease in other Arab states' motivation to initiate a war againstIsrael,primarilybecausethepoliticaloptionprovidesthemwithamorerealistic alternative to attain an acceptable status quo. Notably, Israel'sstrategic deterrence, its ability to persuade the opponent to avoidlaunchingawar,havefailedonlytwicethroughouttheconflictwiththeArabs:in1969withtheEgyptianinitiationoftheWarofAttritionandin1973atthestartoftheYomKippurWar.Sinceinbothcasesthebalanceof forceswas clearly in favour of Israel,while the balance of interestsfavoured the Arabs, one can conclude that an acceptable politicalsolution makes Israeli deterrence more likely to work than a relativeincreaseinitsmilitarypower.A growing Arab willingness to accept Israel as a legitimate actor inregionalpolitics is anothernew factor.Though Israelwasan importantactorintheregionalarenasinceitsbirth,ithadalwayshadtoactlatentlysincenoArabstatewasreadytobeitsopenally.ThisnormwasbrokentosomeextentduringtheGulfWar,whenSaudifightersparticipatedinIsrael'sdefenceagainstScudattacks,andothertraditionalenemiessuchasSyriajoinedacoalitioninwhichIsraelwasalatentparticipator.

AsIsraelhasnormalizeditsrelationshipwithagrowingnumberofArabstatesinrecentyearsthisprocesshasgainedmomentum.ThoughtheArabs,primarilyEgypt, havemade it clear that theywill reject Israeli attempts to become thedominant regionalactor, theyhavealso left the impression that theyacceptanIsraeliroleaslegitimatenotonlyintheregionaleconomicarenabutalsointhepoliticalandmilitaryspheresaswell.

ModernMilitaryTechnologyandtheProliferationofNon-

ModernMilitaryTechnologyandtheProliferationofNon-conventionalWeapons

Twodevelopmentsconcerningarms,whichhaveoccurredinrecentdecades,arealso significant. The first involves the military technology revolution (theRevolution in Military Affairs (RMA)) and the introduction of sophisticatedconventional weapon systems into the region. The second is the rapidproliferationofnon-conventionalweaponsby regional actors, especially in theaftermathoftheGulfWar.Fromthemilitarytechnologyperspective,sophisticatedconventionalwarsof

the future will rely, primarily, on 'the combination and integration of high-quality target intelligence and acquisition methods, on effective and rapidcommandandcontrol,andonhigh-killprobabilityprecisionfirepowercapableofdestroyingtargets,onland,atseaorintheair,eitherbydayoratnight'.6

Oneexampleoftheimpactofthistechnologicalrevolutiononthewaywarsofthe futuremaybe conducted is the complete destructionofSyrian air defencebatteries in theBeqavalleyduringtheJune1982warinLebanon,withoutanylosses to the IAF. Another is the Gulf War, where the Iraqi ground forcesenjoyedanumericalsuperioritybut theUS-ledcoalition forceshadsuperbair,ground and navalweapon systems. The combination of this technological andhumansuperiorityledtoanunprecedented,intermsoflossratio,Iraqidefeat.7

Therapidproliferationofnon-conventionalweaponryintheregionrevolves,primarily, around the Syrian acquisition of ballistic missiles armed withconventionalandchemicalwarheads,Iraniannuclearefforts,andIraq'sattemptstomaintainitsnon-conventionalcapabilitiesdespiteAmericanandinternationalpressures.As indicated, such efforts show that these regional powers seem tobelieve that thenextwar in theMiddleEastwillnotbeaclassicconventionalconfrontationbetweenlargescalegroundforcessupportedbyairpower.Insteadtheyconsidernon-conventionalweaponsasthemosteffectiveanswertothedirestrategic situation in which they have found themselves in the wake of thecollapseoftheUSSR,thesecondGulfWarandtheArab-Israelipeaceprocess.The development of such capabilities makes the recurrence of largescale

conventionalwarsfarlesslikely.Andwhileitisprobablytruethatthemaingoalof thisnon-conventionalpotential is todeterIsraelfromexploitingitsstrategic

superiorityifwarerupts,itisimportanttonotethatsuchacquisitionswilllimitIsrael's freedomofmanoeuvrability inany futureconflict, as theycanbeusedforoffensivepurposesaswell.

ImplicationsforIsraeliSecurity

FromIsrael'sperspectivetherearethreemainconclusionstobederivedfromthediscussionsofar:

1. Becauseoftheglobalandregionalchangesofthelastdecade,theArabpoliticalmotivationandmilitarycapabilitytolaunchaconventionalwaragainstIsraelhasdiminishedsignificantly.Consequently,thetraditionalthreat to Israel'sexistence—the 'all-outcase'ofco-ordinatedsurpriseattack by the neighbouring Arab countries, which dominated Israelistrategicthinkingfromtheearly1950s—hasalmostdisappeared.

2. The source of the main threat to Israel's existence in the foreseeablefuture will be the non-conventional arsenals held by regional powersthat do not participate in the peace process. If one of these statessucceedsinobtaininganoperationalnuclearcapability,Israelwillface,forthefirsttimesince1948,thethreatofannihilation.

3. ThesourceofthemainthreattoIsrael'sexistenceinthefuturewillnotcome from Egypt and Syria, its traditional enemies, but from thesecond-circle Arab states (primarily Iraq and Libya) or third-circlestates(Iranand,perhaps,Sudan).

ThePsychologicalMilieu:TheZionistNationalSecurityParadigm

TheZionistNationalSecurityParadigm8

The realization that the fulfilment of the Zionist goals involved dealing with

individualandcollectivesecuritychallengesbeganduringtheSecondAliyaandgainedmomentumaftertheBritishoccupationofPalestine,primarilyduringthe1921-22 clashes between the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. Thepractical responsewas theestablishmentof theHagana,which,combinedwithBritish assistance, was aimed at providing Jews protection against Arabviolence.More interesting, in the contextof this essay, is thepsychologicalmilieuof

Jewish national security in Palestine which crystallized in response to risingsecurity threats. The consolidation of a set of beliefs on Jewish security inPalestine gained momentum during the 1936-39 'disturbances'9 and maturedduring the three decades that follow, reaching its most explicit and extreme('ideal type') formbetween1967and1973.At thecentreof thispsychologicalmilieustandthreefundamentalbeliefs.

ThePrimacyofSecurity

Thisbelief,whichbecameespeciallydominantaftertheestablishmentofIsrael,holds that almost every national problem is a security problem, or at leastinvolves security aspects. Its primeproponentwas Israel's firstPrimeMinisterDavidBen-Gurion.ForBen-Gurion,immigrationabsorptionandthebuild-upofsettlements were security issues, so too was his famous aspiration that Israelshouldbecome'alightuntothenations'.Asheexplainedit,besidesitsmoralisticvalue, Israel as a beacon for other nations had an important security function,providing as it did external support which was so essential to ensure itsexistence.10

Such subordination of all private and collective aspects of life to securitydemandsborderedon 'securityBolshevism' and is typical of theSecondAliyageneration. Nevertheless, since Ben-Gurion was well aware that moral,economicorsocialvalueswereveryimportantinensuringIsrael'sexistence,hedidautomaticallyrankvaluesofphysicalsecurityaboveothervalues.Consequently, when security considerations collided with the rule of law

principle(forexample,theTobianskyaffair),Ben-Gurionsupportedthelatter.11

Similarly,despitebeingsoidentifiedwithIsrael'ssecuritydemands,underBen-

GurionthedefencebudgetalmostneverexceededtenpercentofIsrael'sGNP.OnlyafterhewasreplacedbyLeviEshkoldidthedefencebudgetriseabovethislevel.12

Anotheraspectof thetendencytovieweverynationalchallengethroughthesecurity prism is the inclination to focus on the security dimension of everyproblem as the prime justification to solve it. A typical example is the'integration of the exiles' — one of the most basic and desired goals of theZionistethos.Alreadyinthe1940s,securityframeworkswereusedtopromotethisgoalwhensociallyandeconomicallyweakyoungstersofSephardicoriginwererecruitedtoservewithelitistAshkenaziyouthinthePalmach.Similarly,inthe1950sthejustificationforcompulsoryservicereliednotonly

on security needs but also on the belief that the armywas themost effectivevehicletointegratenewimmigrantswithlongerestablishedIsraelis.13

ResorttoForceasaPanaceatoSecurityProblems

Some sections of the Zionist movement were always aware that militarysolutionshadtheirownlimitations.Otherideologicalstreams—especiallytheactivistonesontherightandtheleft—tendedtoviewtheuseofforceasalmosttheonlymeanstosolveallsortsofsecurityproblems.Thebeliefthatforceisapanacea,andthattheuseofbruteforcealonecould

and should solve all security problems was dominant especially in the early1950s andafter the1967War, andcoincidedwith thebelief in 'self-help' (seebelow).Atypicalexampleofthiswayofthinking,anditsoutcome,canbeseeninthecaseknownas'theUnfortunateBusiness'.In 1954 Britain and Egypt reached an agreement on the evacuation of the

British army from its camps in theSuezCanal zone.The accord reflected therealitiesofthepost-1945internationalsystemandwasonestageinanhistoricalprocess that resulted in the dismantling of the British Empire. Since it wasperceivedtoweakenIsrael'sbalanceofforcesvis-à-visEgypt,BenyaminGivli,thechiefofMilitary Intelligence (withpost factum approval from theDefenceMinisterPinhasLavon),decided toconduct sabotageacts inEgypt tohalt thisprocessofwithdrawal.

TheresultwasthetotalfiascothatlatercametobeknownastheLavonaffair.Theimportantpoint,intermsofthisessay,istheabsurdwayofthinkingwhichbroughtabout sucha fiasco.AsYehoshafatHarkabi,whobecame thechiefofMilitaryIntelligenceintheaftermathofthisfailure,wrote,'thegapbetweenthenetwork[ability]andthemission itwas toachievewasshuddering ...The twowereintwodifferentlevels,withoutanylinkagebetweenthem'.14

Others,suchasPrimeMinisterMosheSharettthoughtsotoo.ButsinceGivli'sframe ofmind focused only on activeways to stop the British evacuation heoptedforactiondespiteitspoorchanceofsuccess.Thetechnologicalpanaceaisalsoanotheraspectofthiswayofthinkingasthe

riseofnewthreats,suchastheintroductionofballisticmissilesarmedwithnon-conventionalwarheads, result in thedemand tousenewmilitary technologies.TheArrow (Hetz) anti-ballistic-missiledefence system is agoodexampleof atechnologicalanswertoamajornewchallenge.Incontrast,theKatyushathreattonorthernIsraelconstitutesatypicalterrorist

challenge, namely a minimal military threat with a maximum psychologicaleffect. But in the name of the drive for total security (see below), Israel hasdeveloped,withAmericanaid,highlysophisticatedandcostlyweaponsystemswhichwillshootdownKatyushasontheirwaytoIsrael.Mostexpertsagreethatthe solution to Israel's security problems in the north is political — acomprehensiveagreementwithSyriawhichwillalsoincludeLebanon.Butsuchasolution(assumingthatSyriaisseriousaboutpeaceinthefirstplace)involvesdifficultpoliticaldecisions,includingthehandingoftheGolanHeightstoSyria.Hence, lookingunder the 'technological light' isafarmoreconvenient(thoughprobably ineffective)solution,especially ifonebelieves thatsecurityproblemscanbesolvedbymilitarymeansalone.

Self-Help

Theprincipleof'self-help'standsatthecentreoftherealistandneorealistschoolin international relations. The premise underlying this approach is that in ananarchicinternationalsystem,wherethereisnoformalpowerthatcanensurethestate'sexistence,stateswilltendtorelyontheirownmilitarypowerratherthan

onexternalguaranteessuchaspeaceagreements,defencepactsorarmscontrolregimes,toensuretheirsurvival.Suchatendencyleads,however,tothe'securitydilemma'; that is, the condition in which states, unsure of one another'sintentions,armforthesakeofinsecurityandindoingsosetaviciouscircleinmotion.Having armed for the sakeof security, states feel less secure andbuymore armsbecause themeans to anyone's security is a threat to someone elsewhointurnrespondsbyarming.15

Although the tendency towards 'self-help' is of universal nature, it becameextremelydominantintheZionistnationalsecurityparadigm.AthousandyearsofJewishtraumatichistoryintheDiaspora,culminatingintheNaziHolocaust,createdasiegementalityandafundamentalmistrustofGentiles.Duringitsshorthistory of existence, Israel had gone through a number of traumatic eventsincluding theArab invasion of 1948, theMay-June 1967 crisis, and the 1973Yom Kippur surprise, which magnified further this sense of insecurity.16 AsHenryKissingerhasnoted,

Israel's margin of survival is so narrow that its leaders distrust the great gesture or the stunningdiplomaticdeparture;theyidentifysurvivalwithprecisecalculation,whichcanappeartooutsiders(andsometimes is) pettifogging obstinacy. Evenwhen Israeli leaders accept a peace proposal, they resistfiercely, which serves the purpose of showing that they are not pushovers and thereby discouragesfurther demands for Israeli concessions. And their acceptance is usually accompanied by endlessrequestsforreassurances,memorandaofunderstanding,andsecretexplanations-alldesignedtolimitthefreedomofactionofarathervolatileallyfivethousandmilesawaythatsuppliesitsarms,sustainsitseconomy,sheltersitsdiplomacy,andhasaseeminglylimitlesscompulsiontoofferpeaceplans.17

The suspicion of others has had amajor impact on the Israeli reluctance togiveupterritoriesdeemedessentialforthestate'ssecurity,solongastheArabswerenotseentohaveabandonedtheiraimofsubvertingtheJewishstate.Underthesecircumstances,endingtheconflictonthebasisofthe'territoriesforpeaceformula', which became increasingly feasible after 1967, turned out to be farmoredifficult.Anadditional25yearsof conflict andviolencewereneeded toconvincemostIsraelis thatpeace,evenat thecostofrelinquishingelementsof'self-help'isamoreeffectivewaytogetoutofthe'securitydilemma'.

TheImpactoftheZionistRevolutionContext

Thethreebeliefsdiscussedaboveareheightenedbytheclassiccharacteristicofeveryrevolution,thatranksthecollectiveratherthantheindividual'sgoodatthecentre of the individual and collective being. Zionism, as a revolutionarynational movement, had never argued (as the nineteenth-century national—romantic Europeanmovements did) that the individual's ultimate fulfilment isthrough sacrificing himself to promote national goals. But as a nationalmovementwhichfacedexistentialthreatsitadoptedelementsofself-sacrifice,asexpressed by Yossef Trumpeldor's last words — 'it is good to die for ourcountry' on which generations of youngsters were educated. And in thisideologicalatmosphere the tendency tostick to the threebeliefs thatconstitutethecoreoftheZionistnationalsecurityparadigmwasenhanced.

TheChangesintheCollectiveBeliefSystem

AlthoughtheZionistrevolutionisnotyetover, therearemanyindicationsthatIsrael isnearing the third stage in thehistoryof theZionist enterprise, a stagetermed by some as the post-Zionist era.18 The goal of the first stage of theZionistenterprise—tobuildaJewishstate—wasachievedin1948.Thegoalofthesecondstagewastoensurethesafetyofthatstate.AfterfivedecadesofconflictwiththeArabworld,apeaceagreementwithSyria,whichispossibleintheforeseeablefuture,willbringthesecondstageoftheZionistrevolutiontoasuccessfulconclusionaswell.ThiswillmeantheopeningofthethirdstageofIsrael'shistory,whichwillbe

characterizedbyasignificantreductioninexternalthreatsandanormalizationofrelationsbetweenIsraelandmostArabstates.We have already discussed the main changes in the operational milieu of

Israel's national security which indicate the probable emergence of the thirdstage.Nowit is time todiscuss thechangeswhichannounce itscoming in thepsychologicalmilieu.

ThePrimacyofSecurity

It will be recalled that the primacy of security in Israeli life has stood at the

centreofthetraditionalnationalsecurityparadigm.Thisbeliefhasgonethroughconsiderable changes during the last two decades. Though still dominant,securitydemandsareconsideredtodayasone—andnotautomaticallysuperior—ofanumberofsocietalvalues.Onedimensionof thischange is thecreation, throughanumberofSupreme

Court rulings, of a newbalance in the triangular relationshipbetween securityneeds, the rule of law and the public's right for information. The principaldecision which established the new balance was taken in 1988 when theSupremeCourtoverruledthebanningofanewspaperarticlewhichcriticizedthedirectoroftheMossad.19

Thisprecedentlessenedthemilitarycensor'stendencytousehisauthoritytobanthepublicationofsimilarinformation.20ThenewbalanceofforcesbetweenthecensorsandthemediawasofficiallyrecognizedinMay1996,whenthetwosignedanew,andfarmoreliberalagreement,inwhichthecensorgaveupsomeofitsdraconianpowers,includingitsrighttoclosedownapaper,andthemediagainedtherighttoappealtotheSupremeCourttooverrulecensorialdecisions.21

Anotherdimensionistheopeningofsecurityorganstoexternaloversight.AgoodexampleistherecentchangeinthestatusoftheGeneralSecurityService(SHABAK). Until the mid-1980s SHABAK's supervision was, almostexclusively, in the hands of the Prime Minister's Office. Since then, thelegislativeandjudicialbrancheshavebecomefarmoreactiveinitssupervisionand so have the media and human rights organizations. The Law of theSHABAK,whichwas presented to the public in early 1996,22 will frame theservice's legal status, subordination and activities, within a well-defined legalsetting.Despitethesechanges,itisimportanttonotethatpollsshowthatthemajority

oftheIsraelipublic,23andlargesegmentsofthepoliticalelite,24stillbelieveintheprimacyofsecurity.Butwithapeaceprocesswhichisexpectedtodecreasethesecurityburden,andifthenewbalancebetweensecuritydemandsandothersocietal valuesproves to benefit both security and society, it is quite probablethatpublicbeliefintheprimacyofsecuritywillalsochange.

ResorttoForceasaPanaceaforSecurityProblems

In the quarter of a century since their brilliant victory in the Six Day War,Israelishaveundergonethetraumaticexperiencesof theYomKippurWarandtheLebanonWar,thefailuretostoptheintifadabymilitarymeansortheIraqiScuds from landing during the GulfWar. These events have certainly taughtIsraelisthelimitsofmilitarypowerinsolvingsecurityproblems.Agoodexpressionofthisarethepublicopinionpollswhichshowagrowing

popular support for political solutions to Israel's most fundamental securityproblems.In1986,30percentofIsraelisbelievedthatIsraelshouldgiveuptheterritories as long as Israel's security was provided for. In 1991, 51 per centfavouredthissolution,andin1993thefigurewas54percent.Atthesametime,thepercentageofIsraeliswhosupportedtheannexationof

theterritoriesfellfrom34percentin1986to15percentin1993.Similarly,in1987,33percentof the Israelipublic favourednegotiationswith thePalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)while66percentwereopposed.In1994,60percent were in favour of such negotiations and only 40 per cent were against.Finally, in 1987, 53 per cent of Israelis supported the idea of an internationalpeace conference, while 48 per cent were opposed. In 1993, 89 per centsupportedthisidea,whileonly11percentwereagainst.25

The reduction in the belief that the use of force is a panacea for securityproblemsisalsoevidencedinIsrael'ssecuritypolicy.Forexample,incontrasttopastpracticewheretheobjectiveofIsraeliforcewastocoercetheArabsidetoreturn to the previous ceasefire regime, Israel's political goals in the struggleagainstHizbullahinLebanonarefarlessambitiousandareaimedatlimitingthewar to Lebanese territory and preventing further escalation. Given the lossesIsraelhassuffered,eveninattemptingtoachievetheselimitedgoals,aunilateralwithdrawal from Lebanon has become the most feasible option. Similarly,restraint has been shown by both Labour and Likud governments in theirresponsestoPalestinianprovocationsince1992-93.

Self-Help

Along with the growing awareness that military force is not a panacea forsecurity problems, and as a logical result of this view, the Israeli public have

beguntochangetheirviewsontherelationshipbetweenIsraelandtherestoftheworld.ThebeliefthatthewholeworldopposedIsraelbegantofadeawaywiththe collapse of the Soviet Union. This view gainedmomentum following the1993 and1995 accordswith thePLO,when a numberofArab states initiateddiplomatic, economic and tourist connections with Israel, thus minimizingIsrael'ssenseofisolationintheregion.Atypicalexpressionofthepublic'schangeofmindwasgiveninapollwhich

showedthat, in1991,49percentofIsraelisbelievedthat theArabs'finalgoalwas to destroy Israel and its Jewish population. In 1996 this constituency hadfallen to 28 per cent.26 Another indication is public attitude towards theestablishment of a Palestinian state in the occupied territories. In 1987 onlyabout21percentsupportedsuchasolution.27In1996,beforetheMayelections,48percentsupportedit.

TheEndoftheZionistRevolution

The last, and perhaps most important, change involves Israel's new order ofpriorities,whichreflectsthenotionthattheIsraelipublicisbecomingreadyforthe post-Zionist stage in the nation's life. At the centre of this change is therelationship between the collective and the individual. The days when theindividualwassubordinatetothecollectiveareover.Instead,thereisagrowingtendencyinIsraelisocietytorankthegoodoftheindividualhigherthanthatofthecollective.Themainimplicationofthischangeistheincreasingreluctancetoserveinthearmy,especiallyinfrontlineunits.This tendencyisexpressed inanumberofways.The1996annualreportby

the State Comptroller assessed the indicators for motivation for service inregular and reserve army units. It revealed that there was an increase in thenumber of recruitment refusals; a decrease in the readiness of individuals tovolunteer for frontlineunits; a change in the sourcesofmotivation to serve ineliteunits—away frompatriotismand towards an individualsdesire for self-fulfilment;andageneraldecreaseinreservistsmotivationtoserve.28

This change in priorities finds a vivid expression also in current securitypolicy.ShortlyafterMosheDayanbecameChief-of-Staff in1953heissuedan

orderthatanycommanderwhoseunitfailedtoreachitsoperationalgoalwithoutsufferingatleast50percentcasualtieswaslikelytoseehismilitarycareercometoanend.29 Incontrast, theemphasis in IDFoperationalactivities inSouthernLebanoninrecentyearswasonlossavoidance,evenat thecostofafailure toobtainoperationalgoals.Similarly,the'GrapesofWrath'operationofspring1996didnotstartwitha

brilliant militarymove in the best Israeli tradition, but rather with an orderlyevacuationof thecivilianpopulationfromtheUpperGalilee.Thiscare for theindividualstandsinclearcontrasttotheclassicZionistethoswhichopposedtheevacuationofsettlementsincombatzonesevenwhenunderphysicalattack(forexample,GushEtzionandJewishsettlementsintheNegevin1948).

Implications

Shortlybeforehedied in1980,MosheDayan suggestedanewconception forIsraelinationalsecurity:adecreaseintheconflict'sintensity(throughterritorialconcessions) added to a valid deterrence against a decisive war (namely anuclear capability) plus conventional forces sufficient to fight a limitedconventionalwar.This,Dayan argued,would provide reasonable security at areasonable cost.30 Adding to this formula onemore factor— anAmerican—Israeli defence pact — gives a fair indication of the probable conception ofIsraelinationalsecurityafteritachievespeaceagreementswithSyria,LebanonandthePalestinians.Thecompletionofthepeaceprocesswithallneighbouringstateswillcreatea

newoperationalmilieuforIsrael'snationalsecurity.Thereare likely tobe twomainchanges.Thefirstwillbeatotaldisappearanceoftheclassicconventionalthreat—amassive,ArabattackagainsttheJewishstate.Thischangewillbetheoutcome of a reduction inArabmotivation to initiatewar against Israel (as aresultofanewandacceptedstatusquofollowingthesigningofpeacetreaties);an effective Israeli deterrent whichwill rely on a perceived (perhaps even anopen) nuclear arsenal; a defence pact with the United States; and an Arabinability tosurpriseIsraelstrategicallybecauseofdemilitarizedzonesinEgypt

(Sinai)andbetweentheSyrianandIsraeliarmies.Thesecond factorwillbe thecontinuation,perhapsevenescalation,ofnon-

conventional threats from second-and third-circle states which, at present,includeIraq,IranandLibya.Ifthepresenttrendcontinues,atleastoneofthesestateswillbeabletothreatenIsraelwithaneffectivearsenalofballisticmissilesarmed with non-conventional (in the case of Iraq and Iran probably nuclear)warheads,withinthenextdecade.Thechanges in theoperationalmilieunecessitateaparadigmshift inIsrael's

nationalsecurityconception.Thechangesinherpsychologicalmilieumaketheadaptationtothesenewrealitiespossible.Consequently,thecombinationofthetwoislikelytoyieldaparadigmshift,thefirstofitskind,intheZionistnationalsecurityconception.Themostradicalelement in thisshiftwillprobablybe the transformationof

the IDF from a conscript army to a volunteer professional army. The logicbehindsuchachangeiscompellingasIsrael'spresentmilitaryforces(artillery,tanks,soldiers)constituteaformidableandcostlybodythatispreparedtofightconventionalthreatsthatareceasingtoexist.31Theseresourcescanbedivertedinto Israel's economy to make it stronger, but are quite useless against themenace of ballistic missiles carrying non-conventional warheads. As such, asmaller,more sophisticated andmore professional army is the prerequisite forsuccessfullymeetingthenewchallengesofthefuture.

UriBar-JosephisLecturerinPoliticalScienceatHaifaUniversity.

Notes

1.Iprefertousetheterm'conception'heresinceitencompassesawiderviewofwhatnationalsecurity

is all about. Alternative terminology routinely used in this connection, such as 'strategy' (which

refersmainlytothemilitaryaspectsofnationalsecurity),or'doctrine'(whichreferstoanumberof

principleswhichstandatthecoreofnationalsecurity),istoonarrowandtechnicalforthispurpose.

2.Theterms'operational'and'psychological'milieuwereofferedalreadyinthe1950s.See,Haroldand

Margaret Sprout,Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics,

Princeton,1956andidem'EnvironmentalFactorsintheStudyofInternationalPolities',Journalof

Conflict Resolution, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1957), pp.309-28. For a classic discussion of the impact of

perceptions in relations between states, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in

InternationalPolitics,Princeton,1976.

3.SomeoftheworksonIsrael'snationalsecurityconceptionavailableinEnglishareMichaelI.Handel,

Israel'sPolitical-MilitaryDoctrine,Cambridge, 1973;YoavBen-Horin andBarry Posen, Israel's

StrategicDoctrine,SantaMonica,1981;AvnerYaniv,DeterrenceWithouttheBomb:ThePolitics

ofIsraeliStrategy,Lexington,1987.

4. The onlymajor exception to this rule is Israel's 1982 initiative in Lebanon.As is clear today, the

strategicresultsofthisinitiativemakeitfarlesslikelythatasimilarundertakingwilloccurinthe

future.

5.ForadiscussionofthisSovietrolein1956,1967,1969-70,1973and1982,seeamongothers,JohnD.

Glassman,ArmsfortheArabs,Baltimore,1975;EfraimKarsh,TheCautiousBear:SovietMilitary

EngagementinMiddleEasternWarsinthePost-1967Era,Boulder,1985;andUriBar-Josephand

John Hanna, 'Intervention Threats in Short Arab-Israeli Wars: An Analysis of Soviet Crisis

Behaviour',JournalofStrategicStudies,Vol.11,No.4 (December1988),pp.437-67.Fora first-

hand(andfirst-time)accountofSovietactionduringthe1973WarseeVictorIsraelyan,Insidethe

KremlinDuringtheYomKippurWar,UniversityPark,Pennsylvania,1995.

6. Zeev Bonen, 'Sophisticated ConventionalWar', inAdvanced Technology and FutureWarfare, Tel

Aviv,1996,p.19.

7.Forashortdiscussionof the roleofsophisticatedmilitary technologies in Israel'smilitarydoctrine,

seeSaadiaAmiel, 'DeterrencebyConventionalForces',Survival,Vol.20,No.2(1978),pp.58-62;

AmnonYogev,ModelBitkhoniAtidiLe-medinatIsrael,TelAviv,1986.Forathoroughdiscussion

of the impactofAmerican technologicalsuperiority in theGulfWar,seeDepartmentofDefense,

Conduct of the Persian Gulf War, Final Report to Congress, Washington DC, 1992; Edward

Luttwak,'AirPowerinUSMilitaryStrategy',inRichardH.ShultzandRobertPfaltzgraff(eds),The

FutureofAirPowerintheAftermathoftheGulfWar,Maxwell,1992,pp.17-38;EliotCohen,Gulf

WarAirPowerSurvey,WashingtonDC,1993.

8. A paradigm is 'a set of rules, standards, and examples of scientific practice which is shared by a

coherent group of scientists, the commitment to which and consensus produced by it being

prerequisites to the genesis and continuation of a research tradition'. See Christopher Lloyd,

ExplanationinSocialHistory,Oxford,1986,p.75.Inthecontextofthispaperthistermreferstoa

setofprincipalbeliefsonIsraelinationalsecurity.Whileitistruethatthissetislesscoherentand

crystallizedthanaparadigminthehardsciences,Ineverthelesspreferitsusehereforthreereasons:

(a) it encompasses the beliefs, historical lessons and rules of behaviour shared by all thosewho

definethemselvesasZionists;(b)itisanecessaryconditionfortheconstructionofacollectiveand

consensualconceptionofnationalsecurity;and(c)changesinIsrael'snationalsecurityoperational

andpsychologicalmilieuscastdoubt,verymuchlikeKuhn's'puzzles',onthevalidityoftheexisting

paradigm and indicate the rise of a new one, i.e., a paradigm shift. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The

StructureofScientificRevolutions,Chicago,1970.

Twomorepointsareappropriatehere.First,Iusetheterm'Zionist'ratherthan'Israeli'nationalsecurity

paradigmsincethesetunderdiscussionwasbornbefore1948.Second,thebeliefsIintroducebelow

are presented in a sort of a Clausewitzian 'ideal type'mode. In reality, of course, there aremay

nuancestoeachofthesebeliefs.Presentingtheminarathersimplisticandabstractform,however,

willmakethediscussionofthechangesinthesebeliefsfarmoreclearlyexplicit.Foradiscussionof

the use of this methodology by Clausewitz, see Michael Handel, Masters of War: Sun Tzu,

ClausewitzandJomini,London,1992,pp.25-6.

9.Foran interesting thoughsomewhatproblematic thesison thissubject,seeUriBen-Eliezer,Derekh

Ha-kavenet:HivazrutoShelHa-militarizmHa-israeli,1936-1956,TelAviv,1995.

10.DavidBen-Gurion,YihudVe-yeud,TelAviv,1971,pp.162,263.

11. Shabtai Teveth, Kitat Yorim Be-bet-Jiz, Tel Aviv, 1992, pp.67-71; Yechiel Gutman, Taltela Ba-

SFLABAK: Ha-yoetz Ha-mishpati Neged Ha-memshala Mi-marashat Tobianski ad Parasht Kav

300,TelAviv,1995,p.163.

12.ZviOfferandAviKobber(eds),MehirHa-bitahon,TelAviv,1984,p.172.

13.ForacritiqueofthisbeliefseeVictorAzaryaandBaruchKimmerling,'NewImmigrantsasaSpecial

Group in the Israeli Armed Forces', in Moshe Lissak (ed), Israeli Society and Its Defence

Establishment,London,1984,pp.128-48.

14.YehoshafatHarkabi,EdutIshit:'Ha-parash'Mi-nkudatReuiti,TelAviv,1994,p.27.

15.KennethN.Waltz,TheoryofInternationalPolitics,NewYork,1979,p.186.

16. For a good discussion of this subject seeMichael Handel, The Evolution of Israeli Strategy: The

PsychologyofInsecurityandtheQuestforAbsoluteSecurity', inWilliamsonMurray,MacGregor

KnoxandAlvinBernstein(eds),TheMakingofStrategy:Rulers,StatesandWar,NewYork,1994,

pp.542-4.

17HenryKissinger,WhiteHouseYears,Boston,1979,pp.583-84.

18.Forsomeofthemeaningsofpost-ZionismseeUriRam,TheChangingAgendaofIsraeliSociology:

Theory, Ideologyand Identity,NewYork,1995andAmosElon, 'Israel and theEndofZionism',

NewYorkReviewofBooks,19December1996,pp.22-30.

19.VSchnitzer,TheChiefMilitaryCensor,BGZ88/680,P.D.42(4)617.

20.MosheNegbi,HofeshHa-itonutBe-Israel:Ha-hebetHa-huki,Jerusalem,1995,pp.45-6.

21.Ha-aretz,23May1996.

22.Ha-aretz,24January1996.

23.AsherArian,Security Threatened: Surveying IsraeliOpinion inPlace andWar,Cambridge, 1995,

pp.234,278.

24.MichalShamir,'PoliticalIntoleranceamongMassesandElitesinIsrael:ARe-evaluationoftheElitist

TheoryofDemocracy',JournalofPolitics,Vol.53,No.4(1991),p.1036.

25.Arian,SecurityThreatened,pp.274-8.

26.AsherArian,DaatQahalBe-IsraelBe-noseiBitahon,TelAviv,1996,p.9.

27.AsherArian, 'OpinionShiftinIsrael:Long-TermPatternsandEffectsofSecurityEvents',inDaniel

Bar-Tal, Dan Jacobson and Aharon Klieman (eds),Concerned with Security: Learning from the

ExperienceoftheIsraeliSoldier(forthcoming),p.17.

28.StateComptroller,DockShnati46(AnnualReport46),Jerusalem,1996,pp.843-51.

29.MosheDayan,StoryofMyLife,London,1976,pp.182-3.

30.Ha-aretz,22August1980.

31.EphraimKam(ed.),TheMiddleEastMilitaryBalance:1994-1995,TelAviv,1996,pp.250-51.

PatternsofWarInitiationintheArab—IsraeliConflict:ANoteontheMilitary

DimensionDAVIDRODMAN

TheArab-Israeliconflicthasspawnedmoreepisodesofviolencethananyotherenduringconflictinthepost-SecondWorldWarera.1Overthepasthalf-century,thisconflicthasregularlygivenrisetointercommunalunrest, terrorism,borderskirmishesandwar.Whilemostof theconflict'sepisodesofviolence fallwellshort of war on the violence spectrum, war itself has not been uncommon.Indeed,ArabsandIsraelishavefoughta totalofsixwars: the1948-49WarofIndependence;the1956SuezWar;the1967SixDayWar;the1969-70WarofAttrition;the1973YomKippurWar;andthe1982LebanonWar.2

Thesewarshavenot lackedtheirchroniclers.Militaryhistorianshavetracedtheirbattlefieldhistories,addressingsuchissuesasthenature,scopeandresultsof the fighting, while diplomatic historians have probed their politicalbackgroundsandconsequences.Althoughsomeoftheseworks,especiallythoseofcertainmilitaryhistorians,arecomprehensiveinthesensethattheycoveralloftheArab-Israeliwars, theyarenotcomparativeinthesensethat theysearchforpatternsthatholdacrossthesewars.3Onlyarelativehandfulofworkslookexplicitlyforsuchpatterns.4

PerhapstheprimaryreasonforthedearthofcomparativeanalysesisthattheArab-Israeli wars are quite different from each other in a number of readilyapparent respects. Not only do their particular diplomatic backgrounds andconsequencesvary,but theyalsodisplayevidentdissimilaritieswith respect todurationand intensity.The1956,1967and1973wars lasteda relatively shortperiodof time, from justa fewdays toa fewweeks. Incontrast, the1948-49,1969-70and1982warsdraggedonforarelativelylongperiodoftime,fromafewmonths to over a year. The 1956, 1967 and 1973wars resulted in heavy

lossesinmenandequipmentonadailybasis,especiallyamongtheArabs.The1948-49,1969-70and1982wars certainlyhad their shareofdestructivedays,butlossesinmenandequipmentonadailybasisprovedtobeconsiderablylesssevere.A comparative analysis of these wars, however, can yield insights that

improvethestateofknowledgeabouttheArab-Israeliconflict.Oneofthemostobviousobservations toemerge fromacomparativeanalysis is thatArabsandIsraelishaveeach initiated threewars.TheArabsbegan the1948-49,1969-70and 1973wars, while the Israelis began the 1956, 1967 and 1982wars. ThisobservationraisesafewimportantquestionsaboutArabandIsraelidecisionstoinitiatewar.HaveArabdecisionstoinitiatewarbeenpredicatedonaparticularmilitarystrategy?Likewise,haveIsraelidecisionstoinitiatewarbeenpredicatedonaparticularmilitarystrategy?Andhavethesestrategiesbeensimilar to-ordifferentfrom-eachother?The purpose of this essay is to propose answers to these questions. One

caveat,though,mustbeborneclearlyinmind:acountry'sdecisiontoinitiateawarisatleastasmuchinfluencedbypoliticalasbymilitaryconsiderations-thatis, such a decision is also based on domestic, regional and global politicalvariables. Indeed, a compelling set of political circumstances must emergebeforeacountrythinksseriouslyaboutwarinitiation.Toputitanotherway,themere existence of conditions that, from a military viewpoint, favour warinitiationisnotbyitselfsufficienttoleadtowarinitiation.In1967,forexample,IsraelileaderswouldnothavethoughtaboutwarinitiationifanumberofArabcountries had not first engaged in a series of very provocative actions thatdirectly threatened Israel's security. Similarly, in 1973, Egyptian and Syrianleaderswouldnothavethoughtaboutwarinitiationiftheyhadnotbeendeeplydisturbed by the prevailing territorial and diplomatic status quo. In short, acountry'sdecision to initiateawar isalwayscomplex,andwhat follows isnotintendedtodenythisreality.Whatever the political variables that influence such a decision may be,

however, theyfallbeyondthepurviewofthisarticle,whichexaminesonlythemilitaryaspectofArabandIsraelidecisionstoinitiatewar.5Tothisend,thefirstpartoftheessaydefineswarandwarinitiationinthecontextoftheArab-Israeliconflict. The second part proceeds to discuss the general concept of military

strategy, including brief sketches ofArab and Israeli strategies. The third partthen demonstrates how these Arab and Israeli strategies influenced nationaldecisionstoinitiatespecificwars.Finally,thelastpartoftheessaysummarizespatternsofArabandIsraeliwarinitiationbehaviour.

WarandWarInitiation

HedleyBull captured the fundamental essence of the concept ofwarwhen hewrotethat, 'Warisorganizedviolencecarriedonbypoliticalunitsagainsteachother'.6Violencemaycertainlybedisorganizedandmaycertainlybecarriedonbyentitiesotherthanpoliticalunits,butsuchviolencedoesnotamounttowar.Nevertheless, his definition leaves open the question of how to distinguishbetweenwarandotherformsof'organizedviolencecarriedonbypoliticalunits'.Terrorist incidents and border skirmishes, for example, also satisfy Bull'sdefinitionofwar,eventhoughthesesortsofepisodesareclearlyquitedifferentfromwar.Warmaybedistinguishedfromother typesofordered,politicallymotivated

violence in twoways.First, it canbedifferentiated from themon thebasisofobjective, measurable criteria, such as the amount of force employed by thecombatants, the size of themilitary units deployed by the combatants and thenumberofdeaths sufferedbymembersof thoseunits.Awar involvesamuchgreateruseofforceandmuchheaviercasualtiesthan,say,aterroristincidentora border skirmish.7 Second, war may be distinguished from other forms oforganizedpoliticalviolenceonsubjectivegroundsaswell.Disagreementsaboutisolatedcasesnotwithstanding,knowledgeableobserversofwarfare-historians,political scientists, anthropologists and so on - have been able to achieve aremarkabledegreeofconsensusaboutwhichepisodesofviolencequalifyaswar-andwhichdonotacrossdifferenttemporalandspatialdomains.With respect to theArab-Israeli conflict, the1948-49,1956,1967,1969-70,

1973and1982warscomprisethecompleteuniverseofArab-Israeliwars.TheseepisodesofviolencedifferfromothersintheArab-Israeliconflictonthebasisofobjective criteria, such as the amount of force employed in them by the

combatants and the number of deaths suffered in them by members of theirarmed forces. Furthermore, knowledgeable observers agree that these episodesof violence are different from other episodes, such as terrorist incidents andborderskirmishes.Theconceptofwarinitiation,liketheconceptofwar,isnotasstraightforward

asitmayfirstappear.Itcanbedefinedinanumberofways.Apoliticalunit—in themodernworld,generallyacountry—whoseaction,even ifnon-violentitself,beginsachainofeventsthateventuallyleadstowarcouldbelabelledastheinitiatorofwar.Similarly,apoliticalunitwhoseaction,evenifnon-violent,constitutes a casus belli under international law could also be labelled as theinitiator ofwar. Egypt is frequently cited as the initiator of the SixDayWarbecauseitsblockadeoftheStraitsofTiraninmid-May1967constitutedacasusbelliunderinternationallaw.8Inthisessay,however,warinitiationisdefinedintermsoftheactualuseofforce.9Simplyput,thepoliticalunitthat'firedthefirstshot'inawarisdefinedastheinitiatorofthatwar.Hence,sincetheArabsfiredthe first shots in1948—49,1969-70and1973, they initiated these threewars.SincetheIsraelisfiredthefirstshotsin1956,1967and1982,theyinitiatedthesethreewars.

ArabandIsraeliMilitaryStrategies

Broadlyspeaking,attritionandmanoeuvreconstitutethetwomostbasictypesofmilitary strategy.10 An attrition strategy is based on the principle of defeatingdecisively an opponent by engaging it in a static or slowmoving campaign inwhich its armed forces are gradually whittled away to the point of completedestruction.AsJohnMearsheimersays: 'Littleemphasisisplacedonachievingthebattlefieldequivalentofaknockoutpunch.Instead,victoryfollowsaseriesof set-piecebattles and is not expected tobequick.Theprocess is protracted,and success ultimately comeswhen the [opponent] can no longer continue tofight'.11 Conversely, a manoeuvre, or a 'blitzkrieg', strategy is based on theprinciple of defeating decisively an opponent by effecting a deep penetrationintoitsrearareasinafast-movingcampaigninwhichitsarmedforcesarerouted

ratherthandestroyed.AsMearsheimerremarks:

The concept of blitzkrieg stands in marked contrast to the view of war as a series of 'bloody anddestructive'battles thatgrantvictory to thesidewith thegreatest 'physicalandmoralstrength' ...Theblitzkrieg's ultimate success results from the paralysis of the [opponent]. Large elements of the[opponent] forces may still be intact at the conflict's end, but the [opponent] is no longer able tocoordinatethemandthusto[fight].12

While knowledgeable observers of warfare have correctly noted that pureattritionandpuremanoeuvrestrategiesare ideal types thatdonotoccur in therealworld,itisstillpossibletoclassifystrategiesaseitherprimarilyattritionorprimarilymanoeuvre.13TwoexamplesdrawnfromtheSecondWorldWarwillsuffice to illustrate this truism. The Allied campaigns in North Africa andWesternEurope fall into thecategoryofattritionwarfare, since theirprincipalmodusoperandiwas toexploit theAllies'superiority inmenandequipment toengageanddestroyGerman (andGerman-allied) forces in slowmoving 'battlesof annihilation', even though on certain occasions the Allies attempted (withlimitedsuccess)toengageinmanoeuvrewarfare.Ontheotherhand,theGermanattacks on France and the Soviet Union fall into the category of manoeuvrewarfare,sincetheirprincipalmodusoperandiwas todrivedeepbehindFrenchandSoviet lines in order to bring about the collapse of theFrench andSovietarmies, even though the Germans occasionally engaged in massive battles ofannihilationagainstFrenchandSovietforces.Attrition andmanoeuvre strategies result in different costs. Specifically, an

attrition strategy is amoreexpensiveproposition for a country's armed forces,involvingasitdoesthehigherhumanandmaterialcostsassociatedwithamoreprotractedanddestructivemilitarycampaign.For this reason, itmay safelybeassumed that, ideally, a country's armed forces would prefer to adopt amanoeuvre strategy; however, realitymaypush a country to adopt an attritionstrategy.First,noteverycountrynecessarilyhastheoptiontoadoptamanoeuvrestrategy,whichisnoteasytoemploy,since itdependsupontheavailabilityofhighqualityhumanandmaterialresources.Second,acountrymightsimplycometo the conclusion that its capabilities and attributes, relative to those of itsopponent,make an attrition strategy attractive to it.A combination of internaland external variables, in short, may influence a country to adopt an attritionstrategy.

ArabMilitaryStrategy

Israel'sArabopponentsareanexcellentcaseinpoint.AcombinationofinternalandexternalvariablesledArableaderstoadoptanattritionstrategy,andithasconvincedthemtomaintainthisstrategyeversincethattime.14Internally,theseleaders early on reasoned that, since theArab countrieswould always have amuchgreaterreservoirofmanpowerthantheirIsraeliopponent,attritionwarfarewould effectivelywear down Israel's ability to fight. TheArabs could simplyafford to absorb many more casualties than the Israelis. Later, after directexperience of the superiority of Israeli manpower, Arab leaders would citeanothervirtueofattritionwarfare:Becauseattritionwarfare,with its emphasison set-piece battles, ismuch less dependent thanmanoeuvrewarfare,with itsemphasis on the 'fluid battlefield', on highquality manpower capable ofindependent and rapid initiative, it would serve to reduce the impact of theconsiderablequalitativesuperiorityofIsraelimanpower.ThelongstandingArabquantitative superiority in equipment, according toArab leaders, has favouredattritionwarfareaswell.NotonlywouldArabcountriesbeinabetterpositionthanIsraeltosustainthehighlossesofaircraft,armouredvehicles,artillerytubesand soon that are the inevitableproductof attritionwarfare, but thismodeofwarfarewouldalso reduce the impactofwhateverqualitativeadvantageswereenjoyed by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF).15 Furthermore, Arab leadersreckoned that their societies would be in a better position than Israel's towithstandthepsychologicalandeconomicstrainsofattritionwarfare.WiththeJewish people's extreme sensitivity to casualties, attrition warfare would sapIsrael's will to fight to a much greater extent than it would the will of Arabsocieties. Additionally, since a mobilized IDF, always dependent on reserveforces,wouldbring the Israelieconomy toavirtual standstill,attritionwarfareheld out the prospect of eventually destroying the Israeli economy. Arabeconomies, largely independentof themobilizationof thearmedforces,wouldnot be similarly affected by such extended warfare. Externally, Arab leadersconcluded,attritionwarfarewouldprovidetheArabworldwithopportunitiestoincreaseforeignsupportforitself-andtoweakenforeignsupportforIsrael-bybringingitsmuchgreater(incomparisontoIsrael)economicandpoliticalpowertobearonvitalforeigncountries.Swiftermanoeuvrewarfarewouldnotpermit

theseeconomicandpoliticalpressurestobuilduponforeigncountries.Insum,accordingtoArableaders,attritionwarfarehasofferedabetteralternativetotheArabsthanmanoeuvrewarfare.

IsraeliMilitaryStrategy

Israel'smilitarystrategyhasconstitutedamirror imageofArabstrategy.Israeladopted a manoeuvre strategy based largely on the same set of internal andexternal variables that led the Arabs to adopt an attrition strategy, and it hasstuck to this strategy since that time as a consequence of these variables.16

Internally, Israeli leaders early on arrived at the conclusion that the IDF'squantitative inferiority in manpower necessitated a manoeuvre strategy. Israelwould simply be less able than the Arabs to absorb the heavier casualtiesproduced by attritionwarfare.Moreover, an attrition strategywouldminimizetheimpactofthequalitativesuperiorityofIsraelimanpower,whileamanoeuvrestrategywouldmaximizethisimpact.Likewise,theIDF'squantitativeinferiorityin equipment would place Israel in a worse position to absorb the heaviermaterial losses associated with attrition warfare; and whatever technologicaladvantages the IDF possessed over Arab forces would also be minimized byemployinganattritionstrategy,whiletheywouldbemaximizedbyemployingamanoeuvrestrategy.Fromasocietalperspectiveaswell,Israelileadersreasonedthat the IDFshouldadoptamanoeuvrestrategy.First, the lowerhuman lossesassociated with manoeuvre warfare would cushion, to some extent, anypsychologicalblowtoIsraelisocietycausedbywar.Second,thelessprotractednatureofthistypeofwarfarewouldmeanthattheIsraelieconomycouldstarttofunctionnormallyagainmorequickly.Geography,too,hadamajorinfluenceonIsrael'schoiceofamanoeuvrestrategy.Thecountry'slackofdefensiblefrontiersandterritorialdepthinitsfirstdecadesconvincedIsraelileadersthatbattlesmustnotbefoughtonIsraelisoil.Instead,fightingmustoccuronArabterritory.Thebestwaytoaccomplishthisendwouldbetoembracemanoeuvrewarfare,whichwould permit the IDF to carry the war deep into Arab territory. Externally,Israel's lack of alliance partners, coupled with the Arab world's considerableinfluence on the international community, convinced Israeli leaders that wars

must be short. The longer anArab-Israeli war dragged on, they assumed, themore likely that outside powers would intervene to the detriment of Israeliinterests.Insum,accordingtoIsraeli leaders,manoeuvrewarfarehasofferedabetteralternativetoIsraelthanattritionwarfare.

TheArab—IsraeliWars

Whichever strategy a country adopts, it may be hypothesized that it is morelikely to initiate war at times when it perceives that its chosen strategy isfavoured. A country that adopts an attrition strategy, in other words, is morelikely to initiatewar at timeswhen it believes that conditions favour attritionwarfare, while a country that adopts a manoeuvre strategy is more likely toinitiatewarattimeswhenitbelievesthatconditionsfavourmanoeuvrewarfare.ItisnowappropriatetoexaminewhetherwarinitiationintheArab-Israeliwarsconformstothisbehaviouralpattern.

The1948—49WarofIndependence

On the eve of theWar of Independence, Arab knowledge about the Yishuv'smilitary capabilities could best be characterized as very spotty.17Arab leadershadsomeideaofhowmanymentheYishuvcouldputintothefield.Theydidnot,however,trulyknowanythingaboutthequalityoftheJewishforces—theirleveloftraining,theirstateofmorale,theirofficers'effectivenessandsoon.Thecrude abilities of Arab countries in the late 1940s to gather and processinformation ensured that such intangibles would not affect Arab militarydecision-making. Besides, Arab leaders initially had an extremely dismissiveviewofJewishmartialprowess—aviewinformed,toagreatextent,byoutrightprejudice. Even had information about these intangibles been available,therefore, it is quite unlikely that it would have influenced their decision-making.Arableaderswerealsoawarethat,ontheeveofwar,theYishuvhadnoheavy weapons ready for combat— no genuine combat aircraft, no genuinetanksandnomodernartillerytubes.18TheyknewthatJewishforcescouldfield

only a handful of non-combat aircraft, some hastily improvised 'armoured'vehicles (actually civilianbuses and trucks coveredwith armouredplates) andlightweapons,mainlysmallmortars,machineguns,rifles,pistolsandgrenades.Arableaders,inshort,believedthattheYishuvwasmilitarilyweak.Moreover,theywereawareof the fact thatPalestinian(andforeignArab) irregulars,whohadbeenwagingacampaigntocutJewishsupplyandcommunicationslinesandtooverrunisolatedJewishagriculturalsettlementssincelate1947,hadmanagedto inflict significant losseson theYishuv.To thisalreadyencouragingpicture,Arab leaders added the knowledge that their own military forces — whosequalitytheyoverrated—wereequippedwithmoderncombataircraft,armouredvehicles and modern artillery tubes, albeit in limited numbers. Finally, Arableaders believed that their traditional colonial patrons, especially the British,would come to their assistance in awar, supplying themwith arms,while theJewish forces could not count on similar support from foreign governments.19

Arab leaders, then, convinced themselves that themilitary forcesof thenewlycreated state of Israel would eventually be overwhelmed and destroyed in anattritioncampaignthatfeaturedaseriesofset-piecebattlesofannihilation.ThebeliefthatconditionsfavouredthesuccessofattritionwarfaresurelyinfluencedtheirdecisiontooptforwarinMay1948.

The1956SuezWar

IntheWarofIndependence,Israellostapproximatelyonepercentofitspre-warpopulation—about6,000soldiersandciviliansfromaninitialtotalof600,000people—inwhatwas,atleastuntilitsfinalstages,adrainingwarofattrition.Equipmentlossesprovedcorrespondinglyheavy.AlthoughtheIDFfinallywonagreatvictoryofwhichtheIsraelipublicwasjustifiablyproud,theheavylossoflifeconstitutedaseriouspsychologicalblowtothenewcountry,bornasithadbeenoutoftheashesoftheHolocaust.Furthermore,theYishuv'salreadyshakyeconomy had been shattered by the war, with productive activity essentiallygrinding toahalt.Thenewcountry's territorialdimensions, too,didnot augurwell for its future security. While much land not originally allocated to thecountryhadbeencaptured,Israelnowhadindefensiblebordersandnostrategic

depth.20Moreover,thecountryemergedfromtheWarofIndependencewithnoallies that could be relied upon to provide it with military, diplomatic oreconomic assistance during a future round of fighting. Based on Israel'sexperiences in that war, in fact, Israeli leaders thought that, in a future war,foreign powers would— if granted an opportunity— intervene in ways thatwould harm the country's vital interests. Given these national circumstances,Israeli leaders of the immediate post-independence years concluded that Israelsimply could not afford another round of attrition warfare. This feeling,combinedwiththeIDF'ssuccessfulapplicationofmanoeuvrewarfareinthelaststagesoftheWarofIndependence,especiallyagainsttheEgyptianarmyintheNegevandSinai,convincedIsraelileadersthattheIDFhadnoalternativebuttobe built formanoeuvrewarfare.However crude by later Israeli standards, theIDFdidindeedadoptamanoeuvrestrategybythemid-1950s.21Itindoctrinatedand trained its units for this brand of warfare. What it still needed was themodern aircraft, armour and artillery necessary to implement a blitzkrieg.Fortunately for it, the French agreed to supply the IDF with this equipment,particularly from the summer of 1956 onwards. By the autumn of that year,Israeli leaderswereconfident that the IDFcould launchasuccessfulblitzkriegagainstEgypt, itsmostvisiblythreateningfoeat thetime,acrosstheSinai.Allthatwasnowrequiredwastherightpoliticalscenario-onethatwouldpermittheIDFtoeffectablitzkriegwithoutleavingIsraelcompletelyisolatedintheworldcommunity.ThisscenariobecamearealityinOctober1956,withtheconclusionofaBritish-French-Israeliwarpact.TheIDFwasunleashedagainstEgyptsoonafter.

The1967SixDayWar

TheIDF'sblitzkriegintheSuezWarturnedouttobetremendouslysuccessful.Atthecostoffewerthan200dead,andcorrespondinglysmallequipmentlosses,the IDFcompletely shatteredEgyptian forces in theSinai in amatter ofdays.NotonlyweremanythousandsofEgyptiantroopskilled,woundedorcaptured,but significant quantities of Egyptian armoured vehicles, artillery tubes andsmallarmsalsofellintoIsraelihands.Inalargersense,atleastinthenearterm,

theIDF'sblitzkriegremovedtheEgyptianthreat,withoutcausingseriousharmto Israel. Not surprisingly, then, Israeli leaders became even more firmlyconvincedthatamanoeuvrestrategywasidealfortheIDF.22Theyhadnowseenhow such a strategy maximized Israel's strengths, especially its superiormanpower,andminimizeditsweaknesses,especially its limitedresources.TheIsraelAirForce(IAF),whichhadperformedverywellintheSuezWar,receivedabiggerroleinIsraeliplanning.Attheoutsetofthenextwar,itwoulddestroyan opponent's air power on the ground, thereby furnishing Israel with airsuperiority.Onceair superiorityhadbeenguaranteed, the IAFwould flycloseair support and battlefield air interdictionmissions in order to assist the IDF'slandforcesintheiradvance.Tothisend,theIAFgotaconsiderablylargershareoftheIsraelidefencebudgetthanithadinthepast,principallytopurchasemoreand better aircraft, to improve the air base infrastructure necessary to handletheseaircraft,andto trainmoreandbetterairandgroundcrews.Likewise, theIDF's tank formations, which had also performed very well in the SuezWar,received a much bigger role in Israeli planning. They now became the leadelement in the land component of the IDF's manoeuvre strategy. Rather thansupporttheinfantry,theinfantrywouldsupportthem.Between1956and1967,theIDFpurchasedmoreandbettertanksaswellasimprovedthequalityofthemanpowerandtrainingwithintankformations.By1967,theIDFhadthoroughlypreparedtoexecuteaclassicblitzkriegstrategy—astrategyverysimilartotheoneusedby theWehrmacht against theFrench andSoviet armies in the earlydays of the Second World War. Before the Six Day War, therefore, Israelileaders were confident that the IDF could unleash an even more devastatingblitzkrieg againstEgypt than theoneunleashed in theSuezWar, despite theirknowledge that the Egyptian army had steadily improved quantitatively andqualitativelysincethatwar.23Furthermore,sinceIsrael'sfundamentalterritorial,economic and diplomatic position had not changed in the inter-war years, amanoeuvre strategy remained imperative in the eyes of Israeli leaders.24Onceagain, all that was necessary for the IDF to launch a blitzkrieg was for thecorrectsetofpoliticalcircumstancestoemerge—thatis,atangibleArabthreattoIsraelcoupledwithanensuingIsraelidiplomaticefforttoconvincetheUnitedStates that theeventualuseof force toeliminate this threatwouldbe justified.That set of circumstances, which began tomaterialize in mid-May 1967, had

cometogetherbyearlyJune1967,usheringtheIDFintobattle.

The1969—70WarofAttrition

Contrary to Arab decision-making on the eve of the War of Independence,Egyptiandecision-makingontheeveoftheWarofAttritionstemmednotfromignoranceof—andcontemptfor—Israelimilitarycapabilities,butratherfromfirst-hand knowledge of— and healthy respect for— those capabilities.25 Inboth the Suez and Six Day wars, the Egyptian army had been thoroughlydefeatedinmanoeuvrewarfarecampaigns,whichpromptedEgyptianleaderstoconclude that Egypt simply could not compete with Israel in this form ofwarfare. Rather, Egypt had to wage attrition warfare if it had any hope ofachieving its political aims through war. What it needed to initiate attritionwarfare, however,was an environment thatwould compel Israel to engage inthis form of warfare. The post-Six Day War environment, Egyptian leadersconcluded,providedEgyptwithaperfectopportunitytoinduceIsraeltofightonEgyptian terms.Since Israel had conquered theSinai in theSixDayWar, theSuezCanalnowstoodbetween the twocountries.Althoughnotan impassablegeographicalbarrier,astheEgyptiancrossingandIsraelicounter-crossingintheYomKippurWarwoulddemonstrate, thisobstaclewasexcellent forwagingastatic, attrition campaign. It would be exceedingly difficult, Egyptian leadersreasoned,fortheIDFtorespondtoanEgyptianattritioncampaignwithaswift,manoeuvrecampaignacrossthecanal.Additionally,becausetheEgyptianarmyhad recovered from its personnel losses in the Six Day War and had beengenerouslyre-suppliedwithequipmentbytheSovietUnion,itoncemorehadaconsiderablequantitativeedge,especiallyinartillery,overtheIDF.Itwouldbebetter able than the IDF, therefore, to sustain losses in a 'trench' war.Furthermore, an attrition campaign would compel the IDF to mobilize asignificantportionofitscombatunits,puttingbothpsychologicalandeconomicpressure on Israel. Finally, since the Soviet Union was firmly supportive ofEgypt,whiletheUnitedStateshadinterestsatstakeinbothIsraelandEgypt,anextended attrition campaign had the potential to elicit the intervention of thesuperpowersonbehalfofEgypt'seffortto 'liberate'theSinaiwithouthavingto

signapeaceaccordwithIsrael.ItwasthismixofcircumstancesthatmotivatedtheEgyptianleadership'sdecisiontoinitiatetheWarofAttritioninearly1969.

The1973YomKippurWar

EgyptianandSyriandecision-makingpriortotheYomKippurWarbearsstrongsimilarities toEgyptiandecision-makingbefore theWarofAttrition.26Leadersof both countries realized that their armies would suffer grave reverses in amanoeuvrewarfarecampaignagainst the IDF.Thus, conditionswouldhave tobe ripe for attritionwarfarebefore theycouldconsider embarkingonawar toachievetheirpoliticalaims.Specifically,thismeantthattheywouldhavetofindawaytoneutralizetheIDF'ssuperiorairandarmouredforces.State-of-the-art,Sovietsuppliedanti-aircraftandanti-tankmissilesofferedthisprospect,makingattritionwarfarefeasible.TomiretheIDFinanattritioncampaign,EgyptianandSyrianleadersdevisedaningeniousplan.TheEgyptianandSyrianarmieswouldfirst launch a surprise assault in the Sinai and on the Golan, respectively,capturingslicesofIsraelicontrolledterritory.Thentheywouldfortifytheirnewpositionswithverylargenumbersofanti-aircraftandanti-tankmissilesinordertodefeattheinevitableIsraelicounterattack.NotonlywouldIsraelsufferheavylosses in men and equipment in the subsequent attrition campaign, causingpsychologicalandeconomicdistresstothecountry,butthesuperpowerswouldalso be dragged into the war to terminate the fighting. Egyptian and Syrianleaders,inshort,wereconvincedthat,byinflictingpainonIsraelandbydrawingthesuperpowersintotheArab-Israeliconflict,theycouldachievetheirpoliticalaimsofregainingthe'occupiedterritories'.Allofthemilitarypiecesnecessarytoimplement this planwere in place by autumn 1973. Hence, the Egyptian andSyriandecisiontogotowarinOctoberofthatyear.

The1982LebanonWar

In 1982, in contrast to 1956 and 1967, Israeli leaders recognized that the IDFcouldnot launchaclassicblitzkrieg.27Unlike thegenerally flatanddrydesertterrainoftheSinai,southernLebanon'sterrainismountainousandoftenmuddy,

which makes rapid armoured penetrations quite difficult. On this occasion,however, Israeli leaders did not feel that the capability to engage in a classicblitzkriegwas of the utmost importance. Israel still had amanoeuvre warfareoption available to it. The IDF, after all, had enormous quantitative andqualitativeadvantagesoverPLOforces.Moreover, italsohadthecapabilitytoputarmoured,artilleryandinfantryforcesbehindPLOlinesviaamphibiousandairborneassaults, therebyputtingPLOforcesunderpressurefromanumberofdirections. Even if an invasion of Lebanon sparked a larger war with Syria,IsraelileadersbelievedthattheIDF'ssuperioritywouldallowittoachieveallofIsrael'smilitaryobjectivesquickly-andwithminimallosses-inablitzkrieg-likeadvance. Put differently, Israeli leaderswere thinking in terms of a very briefandrelativelypainlesswar.28Israeliwarinitiation,therefore,simplyawaitedthecorrect political circumstances, especially American approval for an Israelioperation. By June 1982, these political circumstances had materialized,promptingtheinvasionofLebanon.

Conclusion

Arab and Israeli behaviour has thus far been consistentwith the hypothesizedrelationshipbetweenwarinitiationandmilitarystrategy.Eachofthethreewarsinitiated by theArabswas begun at a timewhenArab leaders perceived thatconditionsfavouredtheirchosenstrategyofattritionwarfare.Likewise,eachofthethreewarsinitiatedbytheIsraeliswasbegunatatimewhenIsraelileadersperceivedthatconditionsfavouredtheirchosenstrategyofmanoeuvrewarfare.Thevalidityof this relationship is further reinforcedbypointingout thatArableaders had no plans to initiate war in 1956, 1967 and 1982, at least in partbecause theybelieved that conditionswerenot ripe for the successof attritioncampaigns.Egyptian leadersmayhavebeen eager for battle in1967, but theywere content to allow the IDF to attack first. They believed that theEgyptianarmy could block the initial Israeli assault, thereby turning a manoeuvrecampaign, which they could not win, into an attrition campaign, which theycouldwin.Similarly, Israeli leadershadnoplans to initiatewar in1969-70or

1973, at least in part because they perceived that conditions favoured attritionratherthanmanoeuvrewarfare.In1948,becauseIsraelwasinvadedimmediatelyupon itsbirth, Israeli leadershadnochoiceaboutwhether to initiatewar;but,hadtheyhadsuchachoice,itissafetoassumethattheywouldnothaveinitiatedwar,recognizingthattheArabworld'sgreaterresourceswouldnothaveauguredwell for an Israeli victory in an attrition campaign.All in all, then,while thedecisionsofArabandIsraelileaderstoinitiatewarhaveneverbeenmadesolelyonthebasisofmilitarythinking,thesedecisionshaveclearlybeeninfluencedbyperceptionsaboutwhethertheirchosenstrategieswerefavoured.

DavidRodmanisaNewYork-basedwriterandcommentator.

Notes

1. It does not follow, of course, that theArab-Israeli conflict has therefore been themost destructive

conflictofthepost-warera.Thisconflict,infact,hasnotbeenoneofthemoredestructiveenduring

-or,forthatmatter,passing-conflictsinthepost-warworld.Manyotherconflictshavewitnessed

farmoredeathanddestruction.

2.TheArab-Israeliwarsaremostcommonlyknownbytheir'Israeli'names;consequently,thesenames

will be used throughout this article. The 1991GulfWar, which pitted aWestern-Arab coalition

against Iraq over the latter's invasion, occupation and annexation of Kuwait, does not fit the

definition of an Arab-Israeli war, even though Israel became a target of repeated Iraqi ballistic

missileattacksduringthiswar.Thesemissileattacks,whichwereintendedtosparkawiderArab-

Israeliwar,ultimatelyfailedtodoso,afterall.

3.For oneof the best comprehensive battlefield histories of theArab-Israeli conflict see a prominent

American military historian's two-volume survey: Trevor N. Dupuy,Elusive Victory: The Arab-

IsraeliWars,1947-1974,NewYork,1978andTrevorN.DupuyandPaulMartell,FlawedVictory:

TheArab-IsraeliConflictandthe1982LebanonWar,Fairfax,1986.AlsoseeMartinvanCreveld,

The Sword and theOlive: ACriticalHistory of the IsraeliDefenseForce,NewYork, 1998 and

Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East from the War of

Independence through Lebanon, New York, 1984. For diplomatic histories of the Arab-Israeli

conflictthattacklemorethanasinglewarsee,forinstance,MichaelBrecher,DecisionsinCrisis:

Israel, 1967 and 1973, Berkeley, 1980 and Avner Yaniv, Deterrence Without the Bomb: The

PoliticsofIsraeliStrategy,Lexington,1987.

4. For two works that have discovered patterns see John J. Mearsheimer,Conventional Deterrence,

Ithaca,1983andDavidRodman, 'WarInitiation:TheCaseofIsrael', journalofStrategicStudies,

Vol.20,No.4(1997),pp.1-17.

5.ForoneefforttoaddressboththepoliticalandmilitaryvariablesaffectingIsraelidecisionstoinitiate

ornottoinitiatewarseeRodman,'WarInitiation'.

6.QuotedinJohnA.Vasquez,TheWarPuzzle,Cambridge,1993,p.23.

7. For efforts to define war based on objective, measurable criteria see Melvin Small and J. David

Singer, Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816-1980, Beverly Hills, 1982; and

Vasquez,TheWarPuzzle.

8.OnthispointseeItamarRabinovich,'SevenWarsandOnePeaceTreaty',inAlvinZ.Rubinstein(ed.),

TheArab-IsraeliConflict:Perspectives,NewYork,1984,p.50.

9.Thisdefinition,itshouldbenoted,carriesnonormativeovertones.Itisnottheintentionofthisessay

toassignblameonlegal,moralorhistoricalgroundstoeithersidefortheoutbreakofvariouswars.

Because thisessaygrappleswith theconnectionbetweenwar initiationandmilitarystrategy, it is

appropriatetodefinetheformerconceptinamannerthatmakessensefromamilitaryratherthana

legal,moralorhistoricalpointofview.

10.Mearsheimer also includes a 'limited aims' strategy in his useful typology ofmilitary strategies.A

limited aims strategy seeks to capture a portion of an opponent's territory usually for use as a

politicalbargainingchip-throughasurpriseassault.Theessenceofthisstrategyistoavoidheavy

fightingwithanopponent.SinceneitherArabsnor Israelishavegenuinelyexpected tobeable to

avoid heavy fighting in their wars, this strategy is beyond the purview of this article. For

Mearsheimer'stypologyofmilitarystrategiesseeConventionalDeterrence,pp.13-66.

11.Ibid.,p.34.

12.Ibid.,pp.36-7.

13.OnemayconsultforexamplethewritingsofMartinvanCreveldandEdwardLuttwakfor thereal-

worlddistinctionbetweenattritionandmanoeuvrestrategies.

14.NotmuchhasbeenwrittenaboutgeneralArabmilitarystrategy.Someinformationonthisstrategy,

however,maybegleanedbyconsultingthefollowingsources:J.BowyerBell,'NationalCharacter

andMilitaryStrategy:TheEgyptianExperience,October1973',Parameters,Vol.5,No.1(1975),

pp.6-16;vanCreveld,TheSwordand theOlive;Dupuy,ElusiveVictory;MuhammedHeikal,The

Road to Ramadan, London, 1975; Haim Levenberg, The Military Preparations of the Arab

Community in Palestine, 1945-1948, London, 1993; Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence,

pp.155-64;andAnwarSadat,InSearchofIdentity,NewYork,1978.

15.Today, the IDF's qualitative superiority in equipmentover itsArabopponents is taken forgranted.

Actually, thissuperiority isof relatively recentorigin.TheIsraelAirForce(IAF)didnotachieve

superiorityuntilthelate1960s,whenitbegantoreceiveAmericanA-4SkyhawkandF-4Phantom

aircraft.Ontheground,Israelisuperiorityisanevenmorerecentphenomenon,emergingonlyinthe

yearsaftertheYomKippurWar.

16. Much has been written about general Israeli military strategy. The following accounts offer

informative introductions to thisstrategy:MichaelHandel, 'TheEvolutionof IsraeliStrategy:The

PsychologyofInsecurityandtheQuestforAbsoluteSecurity', inWilliamsonMurray,MacGregor

Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (eds), TheMaking of Strategy: Rulers, States, andWar, New York,

1994, pp.534-78; Yoav Ben-Horin and Barry Posen, Israel's Strategic Doctrine, Santa Monica,

1981; Ariel Levite, Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Strategy, Boulder, 1989; Bard E.

O'Neill, 'Israel',inDouglasJ.MurrayandPaulR.Viotti(eds),TheDefensePoliciesofNations:A

Comparative Study, 3rd ed., Baltimore, 1994, pp.497-541; and Yaniv, Deterrence Without the

Bomb.

17.ForArabpreparationsfor theWarof IndependenceconsultvanCreveld,TheSwordand theOlive;

Dupuy,ElusiveVictory;AmitzurIlan,TheOriginoftheArab-IsraeliArmsRace:Arms,Embargo,

MilitaryPower,andDecisioninthe1948PalestineWar,NewYork,1996;DanKurzman,Genesis

1948:TheFirstArab-IsraeliWar,NewYork,1970;Levenberg,TheMilitaryPreparationsof the

ArabCommunityinPalestine;NetanelLorch,TheEdgeoftheSword:Israel'sWarofIndependence,

1947—1949,NewYork,1961;EdwardLuttwakandDanHorowitz,TheIsraeliArmy,NewYork,

1975.ThesesourcesalsoprovideasenseofArabstrategyin-andattitudesabout-thewar.

18.Theextent towhich theywere informedabout the increasinglysuccessful Jewishefforts toacquire

thesetypesofarmsinforeigncountriesisunclear.

19.OntheArabbeliefinforeignassistanceseeIlan,TheOriginoftheArab-IsraeliArmsRace.Thatthis

beliefwasnotentirelywithoutfoundationisdemonstratedbyanumberofBritishmeasuresintended

toassisttheArabwareffort,despiteGreatBritain'sofficialneutralityintheWarofIndependence.

20.ForIsrael'soverallsituationinthewakeoftheWarofIndependencesee,forexample,S.N.Eisenstadt,

TheTransformationofIsraeliSociety,Boulder,1985;HowardM.Sachar,AHistoryofIsrael:From

theRiseofZionismtoOurTimes,NewYork,1979.

21.Before theSuezWar, the IDFbased itsmilitary strategyonmechanized infantry rather than tanks.

Nevertheless, thisstrategy'semphasisonspeed,mobilityandcasualtyavoidanceclearlymarkedit

as a manoeuvre strategy. For the IDF's emphasis on manoeuvre warfare by the mid-1950s see

Luttwak and Horowitz, The Israeli Army, S.L.A. Marshall, Sinai Victory, Nashville, 1985;

Mearsheimer,ConventionalDeterrence,pp.136—40.

22.ForthedevelopmentofIsraelimanoeuvrestrategybetween1956and1967seeMartinvanCreveld,

Command inWar, Cambridge, 1985 andThe Sword and the Olive; Luttwak and Horowitz,The

Israeli Army; Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, pp.143-53; Gunther Rothenberg, The

AnatomyoftheIsraeliArmy,NewYork,1979.

23. It isworth noting that Israelwished to avoid a landwarwith Jordan andSyria in 1967,whatever

transpired on theEgyptian front. Israel simply did notwant to get involved in a three-frontwar.

Additionally, the hilly terrain in Jordan and Syria, along with the extensive fortifications of the

JordanianandSyrianarmies,meantthattheIDFwouldhavetoemployanattritionstrategyagainst

these states. Israel,ofcourse, foughtanddefeatedbothof them,butonlyafter they initiated land

warfare.

24. In 1967, Israel was still without defensible borders and strategic depth; it was still vulnerable to

economiccollapseinalongwar;anditwasstillunabletocountonforeignsupportinsuchawar.

25. For Egyptian military strategy in the War of Attrition see Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The Israeli-

EgyptianWarofAttrition,1969-1970:ACaseStudyofLimitedLocalWar,NewYork,1980;JonD.

Glassman,Arms for the Arabs: The SovietUnion andWar in theMiddle East, Baltimore, 1975;

Heikal,TheRoadtoRamadan;DavidA.Korn,Stalemate:TheWarofAttritionandGreatPower

Diplomacy in the Middle East, 1967-1970, Boulder, 1992; Jonathan Shimshoni, Israel and

ConventionalDeterrence:BorderWarfarefrom1953to1970,Ithaca,1988.

26. For Egyptian and Syrian military strategy in the Yom KippurWar see Hassan el Badri, Taha el

Magdoub and Muhammed Dia el Din Zohdy, The Ramadan War, 1973, Dunn Loring, 1978;

AnthonyH.CordesmanandAbrahamR.Wagner,TheLessonsofModernWar(Vol.1):TheArab-

IsraeliConflicts,1973-1989,Boulder,1990;Dupuy,ElusiveVictory;Glassman,ArmsfortheArabs;

Heikal,TheRoad toRamadan;Mearsheimer,ConventionalDeterrence, pp.155-64; andSadat, In

SearchofIdentity.

27. For Israeli military strategy in the Lebanon War see van Creveld, The Sword and the Olive;

Cordesman andWagner,The Lessons ofModernWar; Dupuy andMartell,Flawed Victory; and

RichardA.Gabriel,Operation Peace forGalilee: The Israeli-PLOWar in Lebanon,NewYork,

1984.

28.ThatIsraelileadersapparentlyfailedtoconsiderthatanIDFoperationinLebanoncoulddeteriorate

intoaprolongedattritioncampaignisindicatedinAmosPerlmutter,Israel:ThePartitionedState,a

PoliticalHistorySince1900,NewYork,1985,pp.313-30.

Israel'sNuclearHistoryEDWINS.COCHRAN

Despiteitssmallsize,Israel'sformidablemilitarycapabilitiesqualifyitasamid-level power in the global context and as the pre-eminent power in theMiddleEast.ThetechnologicalbasisforIsrael'smilitarysuperiorityoverotherregionalactors is awell-developedmilitarytechnicalbasewhosecapabilities far exceedthose of any of Israel's potential adversaries.1 This 'impressive scientific andtechnologicalinfrastructure...hasbecomeamainbulwarkofnationalsecurity,and indeed of national survival'.2 Israel has consistently used its technologicalsuperiority tooffset thequantitativeadvantagesof theArabstatesand todeteranddefeattheirnumericallysuperiorforces.3

An integral part of Israel's technological 'bulwark of national security' is itsregionally unique nuclear capability. In the literature of nuclear proliferation,Israel is generally considered to be an undeclared, second-generation nuclearpower,4andiswidelyreportedtohaveproducedenoughfissionablematerialtofabricate60-300nuclearweapons,includingenhancedradiationvariants.5

BeginningwiththegovernmentofDavidBenGurion,thenation'sfirstPrimeMinister,Israelhasimplementedastrategyof'deliberateambiguity'concerningits nuclear capabilities and intentions. While it has developed an impressivenuclear infrastructure, the Israeli government has not formally admittedpossessingnuclearweaponsnoristhereconclusiveevidencethatIsraelhaseverconductedanucleartest.Ithasalsoconsistentlyrefusedfullytoopenitsnuclearfacilities to international inspection or to join the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty(NPT).6

Israel'sdeliberatelyambiguousnuclear strategyservesasaparadigmfor theconceptof 'opaque'nuclearproliferation,andprovidesamodel forotherstatesseeking to develop a nuclear weapons capability without violating perceivedinternationalnon-proliferationnorms.OfficialsecrecyisthebackboneofIsrael'snuclearstrategy.Thereislittle'official'evidenceavailable-mostoftherelevantdocumentsremainclassifiedandIsraeligovernmentofficialsareloathtoadmit

thatsuchaprogrammeevenexists.Nevertheless,overthepast30yearsabodyofliteraturelargelybasedoninterviewswithpastpolicymakerscombinedwithjournalisticaccountshasemergedwhich'appearstorevealacentral,convergentcoreof"receivedwisdom"onthesubject'.7

This essay, based on a survey of the relevant literature and interviewswithknowledgeableIsraelisources,providesanaccountofIsrael'sdevelopmentasanuclearpower.Forpurposesof analysis, it divides Israel's nuclearhistory intofive distinct phases: 1948-53, the period of early Israeli efforts in the nuclearfield; 1953-67, an era marked by nuclear collaboration with France and theemergence of Israel's nuclear strategy of deliberate ambiguity; 1967-80,whenIsrael achieved a regional nuclear monopoly; the decade of the 1980s, whenIsraelileadersactivelysoughttomaintainthatmonopoly;andthe1991PersianGulfWar and its aftermath,which presented Israeli leaderswith new securitychallenges. It concludes with a discussion on the historical nature of Israel'snuclear programme and the evolution of its nuclear strategy of deliberateambiguity.

PhaseI:1948-53

Israelileadershavelongrecognizedtheimportanceofscienceandtechnologytothesecurityoftheirnation.Evenbeforethefoundingofthestate,ZionistleadersconsideredthemasteryofscienceessentialtothesurvivaloftheJewishpeople.In his autobiography ChaimWeizmann, Israel's first President, wrote that forJewslivingintheRussianPaleofSettlement'theacquisitionofknowledgewas...notsomuchanormalprocessofeducationasthestoringupofweaponsinanarsenal,bymeansofwhichwehopedlatertobeabletoholdourowninahostileworld'.8

NuclearresearchanddevelopmentinIsraelbegansoonafterthefoundingofthestate.Theseearlyeffortsseemtohavebeenconcernedwiththedevelopmentofabasicnuclearinfrastructure,andnottohavebeenlinkedtoafirmtimetablefor weapons development. According to knowledgeable Israeli sources, theprogramme's original intention was the development of nuclear energy for

peaceful purposes.9 Israel's early leaders clearly recognized the possibilitieswhichtheexploitationofnuclearpowerofferedtoanationwhichlackedreadilyavailable fuel resources. Weizmann, a renowned organic chemist in his ownright,wasalsoa long-time friendofbothAlbertEinsteinand thegreatBritishexperimental physicist ErnestRutherford.AndWeizmann actively encouragedthe development of nuclear science in Israel,10 expressing his hope that Israelwouldbecome'acentreofthenewscientificdevelopmentwhichwouldgettheworldpasttheconflictarisingfromthemonopolisticpositionofoil'.11

In 1948 a Research and PlanningBranchwas establishedwithin the IsraeliMinistryofDefence.Oneofthisorganization'sfirsttaskswastodeterminetheamountof uraniumore contained in theNegevDesert's phosphatedeposits.AsurveysubsequentlyconductedbytheIsraeliArmyScienceCorpsrevealedthatthe Negev's phosphate deposits contained from 0.01 to 0.1 per cent uranium,providing Israel with an estimated national reserve of 30,000-60,000 tons ofuranium.12

Ayearlater,in1949,aDepartmentofIsotopeResearchwasestablishedattheWeizmann Institute of Science, Israel's leading scientific institution. Thedepartment'sfacilitiesincludedseparatelaboratoriesfortheconductofresearchinthefieldsofappliednuclearphysics,electronics,nuclearmagneticresonance,spectroscopyandtheproductionofdeuterium('heavywater'),usedasacoolantin nuclear reactors. This latter research effort was led by Professor IsraelDostrovsky,whohadconducted similarworkat theUniversityofLondon.Bytheendof1949atleasttwootherIsraeliuniversities,theHebrewUniversityinJerusalem, and the Israeli Institute of Technology (Technion) in Haifa, hadactivenuclearresearchprogrammes.13

Alsoin1949,thefirstgroupofIsraelistudentswentabroadtostudynuclearscience, most likely under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Defence. Thisgroup included several men, notably Amos de Shalit, who would figureprominentlyinthefutureIsraelinuclearprogramme.14InitiallysenttoHolland,Switzerland, Britain and the United States, all eventually obtained academicappointmentsintheUnitedStates.15

In1952Israel'snuclearprogrammebegantoemergeasaco-ordinatedeffortwith the establishment of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission (IAEC).SubordinatetotheDepartmentofResearchandPlanningwithintheMinistryof

Defence,theIAECremainedasecretorganizationfromitsfoundingon13June1952untilitsexistencewasmadepublicon19November1954.16

Subordination of the IAEC to the Ministry of Defence probably reflectedseveral factors. First, Israelwas in a virtually continuous state ofwarwith itsneighbours, and the defence establishment was best suited to maintain thenuclear programme's security. Second, of all the new state's institutions, theIsraeli military probably had the greatest degree of technical and managerialexpertise,skillsessentialtothemanagementofacomplexnucleardevelopmentprogramme. Finally, there was the almost unlimited influence of DavidBenGurion.BenGurion,whoserved,withtheexceptionofonebrief interlude,asIsrael's

PrimeMinister andMinister of Defence from 1948 to 1963, was the drivingforce behind Israel's nuclear programme. By centralizing control of Israel'snuclear programme in his office, BenGurion both provided it with politicallegitimacy and insulated it from unwanted interference. He also initiated thegreattraditionofsecrecysurroundingtheIsraelinuclearprogramme,informingneitherhiscabinet,northeKnesset,northeIsraeliintelligencecommunityoftheinitialdecisiontodevelopnuclearweapons.17

BenGurion'sgreatestconcernfollowingtheIsraeliWarofIndependencewasthepossibilityofasecondHolocaust,thistimeatthehandsoftheArabs.Fromhisperspective,suchfearswerewellfounded.AwarofdestructionagainsttheJews in Palestine had been a traditional goal of local Arab leaders. In theiroppositiontoJewishimmigration,theyhadforcedtheBritishtoclosethegatesof Palestine to Jewish refugees almost completely during the 1930s. Later themostinfluentialPalestinianleader,HajjAminal-Husseini,theone-timeMuftiofJerusalem, went so far as to collaborate with Hitler and enthusiasticallysupportedhis'finalsolutionoftheJewishQuestion'.18

So traumatic was the impact of the Holocaust on the Jewish people as awhole,andsoself-evidenttheneedforanindependentstatethatwouldprotectJews from futuredisastersof suchmagnitude, thatBenGurion included it as ajustificationforaJewishstateintheIsraeliDeclarationofIndependence.19Twospecific aspects of the Holocaust have left a lasting impression on thoseresponsible for Israel's security. First, theHolocaust focused their attention onthe basic question of physical survival. Unlike their counterparts in other

countries, Israeli leadersbelieved,andcontinuetobelieve, that it is inadequatetodefinesecuritymerelyasthesafeguardingofpoliticalvalues,institutionsandawayoflife.FortheleadershipofIsrael,securitymeanstheveryexistenceofapeople.Second,theexperienceoftheHolocausthasdrivenIsraelileaderstotheconclusionthatphysicalsecurityistooimportanttobelefttoothers.Israelmuststrivetobeasself-reliantaspossibleinmattersofdefenceandsecuritybecausein times of extreme peril sympathetic friends may be unable or unwilling tointervene.The primary lesson thatBenGurion took from theHolocaustwas that other

nationswouldnotsacrifice their interests tofighta 'Jews'war'.Ashewrote inhis1948wardiary,IsraelhadtosecureitsexistencebeforetheArabsrecovered,modernizedtheirarmedforces,andpossiblyevenunited.20Israel'sonlysecurity,he repeatedly warned, would come through self-defence and self-reliance.BenGurion's initial concern was the immense quantitative superiority of theArabs over Israel. 'What is Israel?', he mused. 'One dot. A spot. How can itsurvive in this Arab world?'. BenGurion also believed that it would be onlynaturalfortheArabstoseektoacquirenuclearweapons.Forhim,themainissuewas to ensure that Israel,with itsmore advanced scientific skills and contactsabroad,gainedandkepttheleadinapotentialnucleararmsrace.21

The taskofdisciplining Israel'snascentnuclearprogrammeand focusing itsefforts on weapons development fell to two of BenGurion's most trustedsubordinates,ProfessorErnstDavidBergmann,thefirstchairmanoftheIAEC,and Shimon Peres. Both shared BenGurion's conviction that Israel needed anuclearcapabilitytosolveits'securityproblem'.Ernst Bergmann was the scientific 'father' of Israel's nuclear programme.

BeforetheSecondWorldWar,Bergmannhadbeenonthefringeofagroupofeminent scientists, includingErnestRutherford inEnglandandMarieCurie inFrance,whowere on the cutting edge ofwhatwould become an internationalracetounravelthemysteryofnuclearfission.Followingthewar,hemaintainedhisactivecontactsintheFrenchnuclearweaponsprogramme.InIsrael,Bergmannbecamechairmanof theWeizmannInstitute'schemistry

department. As well as serving as chairman of the IAEC, he also held theportfolios of Scientific Adviser to the Minister of Defence and Director ofResearchandPlanningwithin thedefenceministry.Asonecolleague recalled,

'Hewas in chargeof everykindof nuclear activity in Israel.Hewas themanwho completely understood it [nuclear fission] and then explained it to otherpeople'.Bergmann(thesonofarabbiwhowasanardentZionist,arefugeefromNazi Germany, and a friend of Chaim Weizmann) was deeply affected bymemoriesof theHolocaust. 'Iamconvinced',hewrote, 'that theStateof Israelneedsadefenceresearchprogrammeofitsownsothatwewillneveragainbeaslambs led to the slaughter'. ItwasBergmannwho originallymadeBenGurionawareofthepotentialofnuclearweapons.22

It was BenGurion's protege Shimon Peres who, as Director-General of theIsraeliMinistryofDefencefrom1953to1959andasDeputyDefenceMinisterfrom 1959 to 1965, provided the administrative acumen required to manageIsrael's nuclear programme.Pereswas responsible for building Israel's nuclearinfrastructureaswellasarrangingforitsfunding,partiallyfromprivatesourcesin the United States. He was also responsible for developing Israel's longcollaborativerelationshipwithFrance.23

PhaseII:1953-67

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s France and Israel maintained a closecooperative relationship. France was Israel's primary source of militaryequipment and high-technology items; indeed following the 1956 SuezCampaign, France was Israel's sole source of military assistance. Thiscollaborationwas a pragmatic, two-sided affair involving trade-offs in nucleartechnology, avionics andmissiles. Israelimilitary technicians apparentlymadesignificantcontributions toanumberofFrenchweaponssystemsincluding theMirageseriesoffighteraircraftandshort-rangeballisticmissiles.24

Itwasalsoearlyinthisperiod(1953-54)thatthefirstIsraelissentabroadtostudynuclearsciencereturnedhome,andin1954afullDepartmentofNuclearPhysicswasestablishedattheWeizmannInstitute.Thatsameyearadeuteriumproduction facility became operational atRehovot. Israel's nuclear programmemay also have benefited from the immigration of American and Europeanscientists, some of whom may have been involved in the United States and

Frenchnuclearprogrammes.25

In 1953 the IAEC entered into a technical exchange agreement with theFrench Commissariat of Atomic Energy (CEA). As part of this agreement,Israeli scientists were given access to basic French nuclear technology andtraining,possiblyincludingdetailedinformationfromtheresultsofearlyFrenchnuclear tests in the SaharaDesert. This technical exchange agreementmarkedthebeginningofanextendedperiodofFrench-Israelinuclearcollaborationfromwhichbothcountriesapparentlyreapedsignificantreward.Much remains unclear about the exact nature or French-Israeli nuclear

collaboration between 1953 and 1967,when the SixDayWar led to a virtualsevering of their previously close military ties. The full rationale for Frenchnuclear assistance to Israel - that is, whether the technological trade-offs andtemporaryconvergenceofaimsvis-à-is theArabswas thewholestory - isnotknown,noristheextenttowhichFrenchdecisionsinthisareamighthavebeena contentious issue among successive groups within the governments of theFourthandFifthRepublics.Therewascertainlyaconvergenceofinterestsbetweenthetwogovernments

atthetime.FrancewasfacedwiththeAlgerianrevolt,whichwassustainedbyEgyptianPresidentGamalAbdelNasser.He,inturn,wasregardedbyIsraelasanarchenemybecauseofhisadvocacyoftotalwarbytheArabworldagainsttheJewishstate.FurtherimpetustoFrench-IsraelinuclearcooperationmayhavecomefromtheimpasseinFrance'srelationswiththeUnitedStatesoverFrenchnuclear development. This was highlighted by Secretary of State John FosterDulles's rebuff of President Charles de Gaulle's bid for a special nuclearrelationshipwiththeUnitedStatessimilartothatenjoyedbyGreatBritain.26

French-Israeli cooperation entered the scientific realm when France soughtIsraeli experience in nuclear physics to support development of its force defrappe. Israel offered France its knowledge of deuterium production andextractionofuraniumfromlow-gradeores,bothreportedlyofconsiderablehelptotheFrenchindecreasingtheirrelianceonAmericantechnology.TheIsraelis,fortheirpart,welcomedalltheassistancetheycouldgetinthewayofweaponsandequipment.Another factor in the French-Israeli nuclear relationshipmay have been the

personaltiesthatlinkedmanyFrenchscientiststoIsrael.Sincealargenumberof

Frenchatomicscientistsinthepost-warperiodwereJewish,numerousunofficialcontactswereeasilyestablishedovertheyears.ThereisalsothefactthatmanyLeft-leaning French scientists had close associationswith leadingmembers oftheSocialistpartyandwithLeonBlumwho,inturn,hadclosetiestoIsraelandthesocialistLabourpartythatheldpower.Others,likeFredericJoliot-Curie,theHighCommissioneroftheFrenchCommissariatofAtomicEnergy,hadplayedanimportantroleintheResistance,wheremanyFrenchsympathiestowardsthenascentJewishstatewereforged.27

France was not the only external source of support for Israel's nuclearprogramme.In1955,beforeFrench-Israelicollaborationreacheditspeak,Israelreceived its first nuclear reactor from the United States. This was the fivemegawatt 'swimmingpool' type reactorwhich is still inoperationat theNahalSoreqNuclearResearchCentreatYavne,southofTelAviv.IsraelacquiredtheNahalSoreqreactorunder theaegisof theEisenhoweradministration's 'Atomsfor Peace' Programme.This initiativemarked a change in the focus ofUnitedStates non-proliferation policy fromdenial of information to promotion of thepeaceful aspects of nuclear research. This change of focuswas articulated byPresidentEisenhowerinaDecember1953speechattheUnitedNationsinwhichhemade clear theUnited States'willingness tomake available to cooperatingcountries the peaceful applications of nuclear energy 'as widely as expandingtechnologypermits'.28

UnderthetermsoftheagreementgoverningconstructionoftheNahalSoreqreactor theUnitedStates contributed$350,000 towards theproject's total cost,which was estimated at approximately $3 million. The United States alsoprovided training for Israeli scientists and technicians at American nuclearfacilities and provided the Israelis with a technical library consisting of some6,500reportsonnuclearresearch.Finally, the United States provided the reactor's fuel, 90 per cent enriched

uranium-aluminumalloy. In return, Israel agreed to receive the fuel on a loanbasis only, to pay four per cent interest on its value, to return the fuel to theUnitedStates afterburn-up, and topay for the reductionof itsU-235content.TheUnitedStatesmayalsohave sponsored theconductofnuclear researchattheWeizmann Institute during this period.A substantial part of the institute'soperatingbudgetwasprovidedbytheUnitedStatesNationalInstitutesofHealth

andbytheUnitedStatesairforcewhich,alongwiththenavy,reportedlyfundedclassifiednuclearresearchattheinstitute.29

The greatest boost to the Israeli nuclear programme came in 1957, whenFrance agreed to construct a reactor and associated research facilities near thetownofDimonain theNegevDesert.30AlthoughtheFrench-IsraeliagreementconcerningconstructionoftheDimonanuclearfacility(officiallyknownastheNegev Nuclear Research Centre, or NNRC) remains secret, some idea of itsscopewassuggestedbyProfessorFrancisPerrin,FrenchHighCommissionerforAtomicEnergyfrom1950to1970,whenhestated:

In1957weagreedtobuildareactorandachemical[separation]plantfortheproductionofplutonium.WewantedtohelpIsrael.Weknewtheplutoniumcouldbeusedforabombbutweconsideredalsothatit could be used for peaceful purposes. It was kept a secret because of the Americans.We had anagreementwith themwherebyFrench scientists connectedwithwork on nuclearweapons inCanada(duringWorldWarII)couldreturntoFranceandusetheirknowledge,butonlyonconditionthesecretswould be kept. We considered we could give the secrets to Israel provided they kept them tothemselves.31

There was no clear consensus within the Israeli political elite at this timeconcerning the development of nuclear weapons. The decision to build theDimona reactor reportedly led to a fierce debate among Israeli scientists andpoliticalleaders,resultingintheresignationofsixoftheoriginalsevenmembersoftheIAEC(includingIsraelDostrovsky,whoseworkindeuteriumproductionhad been so important to inducing the French-Israeli relationship in the firstplace). Ernst Bergmann continued to hold the title of chairman of the IAEC,althoughhehadnocommissionoverwhichtopreside.Therewasapparentlynoinquiryconcerningtheresignations,norwereanynewcommissionersappointed.Bergmanncontinued to actwithin the frameworkof thedefenceministry and,since BenGurion was also Minister of Defence, control over Israel's nuclearprogrammeremainedeffectivelycentralizedinhisoffice.32

ConstructionatDimonacontinuedinsecretuntil1960,whenitwasdetectedbyanAmericanU2overflight.WhenqueriedbytheEisenhoweradministration,BenGurion initially claimed that the facility was a 'textile plant'. Later, in aspeech before the Knesset on 21 December 1960, he admitted that a nuclearreactor was indeed under construction in the Negev, but insisted that it wasintended only for peaceful scientific and industrial purposes, and to train

operatorsforfuturenuclearpowerstations.33

Construction of the basic facilities in Dimona was apparently completedsometimearound1960-61,thoughthereactoritselfdidnotbecomeoperationaluntil1964.Inordertoinitiatereactoroperations,theIsraeliswouldhavehadtoobtainlargequantitiesofbothdeuteriumanduranium.Thereactorwouldhaverequiredatleast18tonsofdeuteriumtocoolitat itsinitialpower-ratingof24megawatts.AlthoughthedeuteriumplantatRehovothadalreadybeenworkingforsometenyearsbeforetheDimonareactorbecameoperational,itsproductioncapacity was limited and it probably manufactured only enough deuteriumoccasionally to 'topup' thereactor.AssuchIsraelacquiredits initialsupplyofdeuterium (20 metric tons) in 1959 from the Norwegian company NorskHydro.34Israelalsoacquired'afewtons'ofdeuteriumfromFrance,whichmayhaveoriginallyobtainedthematerialfromNorwayortheUnitedStatesandthenillegallyreexportedittoIsrael.35

TheDimona reactorwould also have required 20 to 25 tons of uranium tomeet its initial fuel requirements. By 1964, Israel had already producedapproximately ten tons of uranium as a by-product of its phosphoric acidindustry. The Israelis were able to obtain the balance on the world market,primarilyfromwesternEuropeanandAfricansources.FourtonsinitiallycamefromFrance,andanadditionaltenfromSouthAfrica.AdditionalsuppliescamefromBelgiumandtheFrench-controlledminesinGabon,Niger,andtheCentralAfrican Republic. Israel also purchased 13.6 metric tons of uranium fromArgentina.36

Controversy at the highest levels of the Israeli government over theacquisition of nuclearweapons continuedwell after the IAEC commissioners'resignations.Sometime in1962,BenGurion convened ameeungof his closestadvisersinanefforttoreachconsensusontheissue.MosheDayanandShimonPeres presented the arguments in favour of accelerated nuclear development,emphasizing the element of deterrence and the possibility of reducingexpendituresonconventionalweapons.IsraelGalili andYigalAllonpresented theopposingview that Israel should

not base its national security on nuclear weapons. Galili and Allon wereformidablefigures.GalilihadservedasChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheHaganaduring the Israeli War of Independence and afterwards became a leading

politician,deeplyinvolvedinsecurityaffairs.AllonhadservedascommanderofthePalmach - the elite corpsof theHagana - and, likeGalili, continued tobeinvolvedinmattersofnationalsecurity.BothwereleadersofAhdutHa-avoda,oneofIsrael'ssocialistparties.In generalGalili andAllondrewa distinctionbetween thenuclear situation

between the United States and the Soviet Union and the likely form of suchrelationships in the Middle East. Whereas the superpowers possessed a widerange of instruments of power which allowed them to exhibit flexibility andcontrolduringcrisesandtoavoidnuclearescalation,thiswouldnotnecessarilybe the case in the Middle East. In the end, BenGurion was at least partiallyconvinced by their arguments. Israel, he and his advisers decided, would notbase its security exclusively on nuclear weapons, but would continue to seeksomesortofnuclearcapability.37

This decision regarding Israeli nuclear policy may also have reflectedelements within Israel's relationship with the United States. Nuclear non-proliferation was given a high priority by the Kennedy administration, whichtookofficeafterconstructionof theDimona reactorwasmadepublic in1960.PresidentKennedywas concerned that a nuclear-armed Israelwould not onlydestabilize theMiddleEast,butwouldalsocomplicateAmericanarmscontrolinitiatives with the Soviet Union. Kennedy's concern over nuclear weaponsproductionatDimonaledtotensionsinAmericanrelationswithIsrael.FormerSecretaryofStateDeanRuskrecalledhowhe told 'Israel [sic]more thanoncethattheywouldlose[UnitedStatespoliticalsupport]andournuclearumbrellaiftheyintroducednuclearweaponsandathreattousethemintotheMiddleEast.ButinthesixtieswegotnocooperationatallfromIsraelwhenwesentpeopletolookatthatDimonareactor'.38

Resolution came in 1962with the negotiation of a simultaneous agreementwherebytheUnitedStateswouldsellIsraelHawksurface-toairmissiles,andinturn the Israelis would permit regular American inspections of Dimona. ThisdegreeofAmericanconcernwithIsraeliproductionofnuclearweaponsseemstohave endedwith President Kennedy's death, American inspections of Dimonaeventually became pro forma and ended altogether during the Johnsonadministration.39

In 1966, for unspecified reasons, Israel awarded its State Security Prize

(presented to those who have contributed significantly to the state's nationalsecurity) to Ernst Bergmann, its leading nuclear physicist. The award toBergmannincreasedspeculationabroadthatIsraelmightbedevelopingnuclearweapons. Bergmann implied as much when he said 'it's very impontant tounderstand that bydeveloping atomic energy forpeaceful purposes, you reachthenuclear[weapons]option.Therearenotwoatomicenergies'.40

PhaseIII:1967-80

While Israelmayhavebeenclose todevelopingnuclearweapons in1966, thefinal decision to develop a full nuclear capabilitywas apparentlymade in theaftermathofthe1967SixDayWar.Despitetheirresoundingvictory,thepost-wardiplomaticandsecuritysituationleftIsraelileaderswithaprofoundsenseofinsecurity. French-Israeli political andmilitary cooperation came to an abrupthaltin1967withPresidentdeGaulle'sreversalofFrenchMiddleEastpolicy.DeGaulle's return to power had already brought various 'slow-downs' in therelationship.Indeed,

[H]econveyedhisdoubtsto[FrenchForeignMinister]MauriceCouvedeMurvilleabouttheclosenessof the relations that had been established by the general staffs of the two countries during the SuezexpeditionandtheAlgerianwar.Thehigh-rankingIsraeliofficershadentryintoallthedepartmentsinwhichFrenchdefenceplansweredrawnup,particularlyintheareasof information[intelligence]andnuclearresearch;theatomicstationatDimona...whereuraniumwasturnedintoplutonium,wassortofanannexofMarcouleandPierrelatte[France'snuclearinstallations].41

Abandoned by their French ally, the Israelis were now dependent on limitedmilitary aid from the United States while Egypt and Syria received massiveshipmentsoftanks,aircraftandsmallarmsfromtheSovietUnion.Inadditiontothis feeling of isolation, thewartime capture ofEgyptian nerve gas stocks (aswell as the knowledge that Egyptian troops had used gas while fighting inYemen) prompted Israeli fears that the Arabs might in the future wage agenocidalchemicalcampaignagainsttheJewishstate.Surroundedbyseeminglyimplacable enemies and almost entirely dependent on the United States formilitary hardware, Israeli leaders were haunted by doubts about their nation'sabilitytosurviveanotherwar.

ThissenseofforebodingwasnotrestrictedtotheIsraelileadership.MemoriesoftheHolocausthadsharpenedthesenseofdangerfeltbytheIsraelipublicasawholeduringtheSixDayWar.Inadiscussionbyyoungmembersofkibbutzimafewdaysafterthewaroneparticipantcommented:

It'struethatpeoplebelievedthat...wewouldbeexterminatedifwelostthewar.Theywereafraid.Wegot the idea -or inherited it - from theconcentrationcamps. It's aconcrete idea foranyonewhohasgrownupinIsrael,evenifhepersonallydidn'texperienceHitler'spersecution,butonlyheardorreadabout it.Genocide - it's a feasiblenotion.There are themeans todo it.This is the lessonof thegaschambers.42

General Moshe Dayan played the central role in moving Israel from nuclearpotential tonuclearproduction.Strongly influencedbyBenGurion,Dayanwasone of Israel's leading proponents of nuclear weapons and a declared nucleardeterrentstrategy.NominatedasMinisterofDefenceontheeveoftheSixDayWar,DayanremainedthehighestauthorityondefencemattersinPrimeMinisterGoldaMeir'scabinetuntilafterthe1973YomKippurWar.Whilethe1967WarseemedtodemonstratethatIsraelcouldattainsuperiorityoveritsenemieswithconventionalforces,Dayanbelievedthatthecontinuingwarofattrition(mainlyon the banks of the Suez Canal), demonstrated the inadvisability of Israel'srelianceonconventionalforcesinthelongrun.43In1967,DayanannouncedonFrenchtelevisionthatIsraelhad'thepossibility[sic]ofmanufacturingthebombnow'.Sixmonthslater, inCanada,Dayanstated, 'Israelpossessesthescientificand technical capability to produce an atomic bomb should the Arab statesthreatentousesuchabomb,butIsraelwillneverbethefirsttolaunchnuclearwarfareintheMiddleEast'.44

Dayan'scommentsconcerningIsrael'snuclearcapabilitiesandintentionswerefundamentally consistent with those which would be made by other Israelileaders over the next 30 years. This continuity is found in the repeatedformulationthatIsrael:(1)doesnotpossessnuclearweapons;(2)willnotbethefirst to introduce nuclearweapons into theMiddle East; but, also, (3) has thecapacitytomanufacturesuchweapons.Reiterated by successive Israeli governments, this official positionwas first

articulated by PrimeMinister Levi Eshkol in 1964. This formulation remainsambiguous in that Israeli leaders have offered no clear, or publicly stated,criterion for either the 'possession' or 'introduction' of nuclear weapons. On 5

October 1968 Eshkol added what would become the third element in theformulationofdeliberateambiguitywhenhestated,'Israelhastheknowledgetomakeatomicbombs'.45

Also in 1968, Israeli leaders formulated the justification for their nation'sconsistentrefusaltoaccedetotheNPT.TheofficialIsraeligovernmentpositionontheNPTisthatitendorsedthetreatyinprinciplewhenitvotedinfavouroftheUnitedNations resolution commending the text and that it is engaged in a'deep, thorough, prolonged study to establish its attitude toward the treaty'.46

Publicly stated reasons for not acceding to the NPT have all involved someaspectofIsrael'ssecuritysituation.DuringtheNPTdebateattheUnitedNationsinMay1968theIsraelidelegatestated:

Forobviousreasons,mycountryhasaspecialsensitivitytothesecurityaspect.Weareinvolvedinanunresolvedconflict inwhichoursecurityisbeingthreatenedandwhichthriceintwodecadeseruptedintoarmedconflict,ismarkedbyamassiveanduncheckedarmsraceofconventionalweaponswhich,byanystandards,haveavastcapacity tokillanddestroy.Wecannotknowwhatdangersand threatsmay confront us in the future. It is only natural thatwe should give earnest scrutiny to the securityprovisions intended toaccompanyandcompensate for the restrictions thatnon-nuclearpowerswouldvoluntarilyassumeunderthetreaty.47

Having made the decision fully to develop a nuclear weapons capability, theIsraeli government may also have tasked its intelligence services to obtainadditionalfissilematerial,eitherforacceleratedreactoroperationsatDimonaorfor weapons fabrication. In 1968 the Mossad allegedly diverted 200 tons ofuraniumoxide,enroutefromAntwerptoGenoa,toIsrael.48

Also, sometime in the early 1960s, the then Deputy Minister of DefenceShimon Peres established a new intelligence agency, the Bureau of ScientificRelations(LishkaLe-KishreiMada,orLekem).Thisorganization'smissionwasto conduct both overt and clandestine collection of scientific and technicalintelligence. The clandestine acquisition of nuclear-related materials andtechnology may have significantly aided Israel in developing as many as tennuclearwarheadsbythemid-1970s,upto100bythemid-1980s,andasmanyas200by1990.49

Followingthe1973YomKippurWar,Israelisbelievedtohaveexpandeditsnuclear programme to include the development and deployment of tacticalnuclear weapons. Again, it was the memory of the Holocaust which shaped

Israeli leaders' decisions regarding their country's nuclear capabilities. For theIsraelipeopletheperceiveddangerofannihilationwasevenmoreacutein1973thanithadbeenin1967.InthewordsofIsraelihistorianLeniYanil,'theeventsofMay 1967 had revived thememory of theHolocaust.But theYomKippurWargavetheprospect[ofannihilation]evengreaterfocus'.50

Although thewar resulted inArabmilitarydefeat itwasalsoapartialArabpolitical and strategic victory, particularly for Egypt. It demonstrated thatEgyptian troops could successfully execute a major operation and resistcounterattacks from Israel's best forces, at least until moving out of theirpreparedpositions toaidSyria.The suddenadvanceofEgyptian forcesacrosstheSuezCanalandtheSyrianattackontheGolanHeightsachievedbothtacticalandstrategicsurprise.Israel, in contrast, took days to mobilize and deploy its ground forces and

EgyptandSyriaachievedmajorinitialsuccesses,rekindlingIsraelifearsofthedestructionoftheJewishstate.ItwasinresponsetosuchfearsthatMinisterofDefence Dayanmay have at least tentatively suggested the arming of Israel'sexisting nuclear weapons.51 Early Arab operational successes, especially thenear-breakthroughbySyriaon theGolanHeights,were reportedly the impetusfortheIsraelidevelopmentoftacticalnuclearweaponsfollowingthewar.Thesereportedly included nuclear-capable artillery systems as well as atomicdemolitionmunitions(nuclearlandmines).52

Expansionof Israel's nuclear programme following theYomKippurWar iswidely reported to have included collaboration with several other countries,particularly South Africa. Unconfirmed reports claim that Israel and SouthAfricaconductedat least three jointnuclear tests. Itwas the thirdsuchallegedtestwhichmayhavebeendetectedbyaUnitedStatesVelasatellitenearPrinceEdward'sIslandin theSouthPacificOceanon22September1979.TheIsraeligovernmentofferednocommentontheeventand,despiteextensiveanalysisofthe available data, there is no conclusive evidence that such an event tookplace.53

During the 1970s, international perceptions of Israel's status as a nuclearpowerbecamelessopaque.InDecember1974IsraeliPresidentEphraimKatzirtoldameetingofAmericanandEuropeansciencewritersinJerusalemthatIsraelhadboththecapabilityandthewilltobuildnuclearweapons.'Wenowhavethe

potential',hetoldthem.'Wewilldefendthiscountrywithallpossiblemeansathand.Wehavetodevelopmorepowerfulandnewweaponstoprotectourselves'.WhenaskedwhetherIsraelinuclearactivitiesshouldbeamatterofinternationalconcern Katzir replied, 'why should this worry us? Let the rest of the worldworryaboutit'.54

Theworldhad,infact,becomeawareofIsrael'snuclearprogramme.AsoneformerUnitedStatesdiplomat saidof the firstmeetingof theLondonNuclearSuppliersGroupinearly1974, 'Israel[asanuclearpower]wasagiven,notanissue'.55RegionalresponsestoIsrael'snuclearprogramme,however,lackedthissenseofunanimity.ThepositionstakenbyArabgovernmentsonIsrael'snuclearprogramme reflected varying national assessments of both Israel's nuclearcapability and of appropriate responses to the Israeli acquisition of nuclearweapons.In general,Arab responses to Israel's nuclear programme during this period

fellintofourcategories:attemptstogainnuclearweaponsoranuclearsecurityguarantee from the Soviet Union; development of chemical and biologicalweaponsasacountertoIsrael'snuclearweapons;demandsthatIsraelaccedetotheNPT;andthreatstodeveloptheirownnuclearweapons.56

Arab attempts to garner nuclear support from the Soviet Union were notwholly successful. Egypt apparently sought to obtain nuclear weapons, or atleast assistance in developing a nuclear infrastructure, when Soviet-Egyptianrelations were at their height. Egypt may have also requested a securityguarantee from theSovietUnion in the eventof Israeli deploymentofnuclearweapons. The Soviets reportedly denied both requests. According to formerEgyptianMinisterofForeignAffairsIsmailFahmy,'theSovietUnionrefusedtosupplyEgyptwithnuclearweaponsor toprovideherwithaguaranteeagainstIsraeliuseofsuchweaponsagainstEgypt'.57

SyriamayhavebeenmoresuccessfulinsecuringaSovietnuclearguarantee.UnconfirmedreportsatthetimeindicatedthatsuchaguaranteewasprovidedinasecretclausetotheSoviet-SyrianTreatyofFriendshipsignedinOctober1981.Syrian Minister of Defence Mustafa Tlas had earlier warned Israel and theUnitedStatesofthedangersinvolvedinanuclearattackonSyria. 'OurfriendstheSoviets',hesaid, 'willnot letusdownshouldwefaceawarofdestructionwagedbyAmericanimperialismandZionism'.SeveralmonthslaterTlasstated

that 'the Soviet Union will defend Syria should we face an Israeli nuclearthreat'.58

Arab leadersalsousedIsrael'snuclearprogrammeasa justificationfor theirownefforts to acquire chemical andbiologicalweapons.Thiswasparticularlytrueof theEgyptian leadershipprior to thenegotiationof peacewith Israel in1979. Shortly after the 1973 Yom Kippur War Egyptian Minister of WarGeneralAbd al-GhaniGamassy told thePeople'sAssembly that chemical andincendiaryweaponscouldbeaseffectiveasnuclearweapons.Twoyearslater,inaspeechbeforethenationalconferenceofthePartyofSocialistUnity,Gamassystated,that'inthefieldofnuclearresearchIsraelisfaraheadofus...[I]fIsraelshoulddecide touseanuclearweapon in [sic] thebattlefield,weshalluse theweaponsofmassdestructionwhichare at ourdisposal'.Ayear laterGamassyreiteratedthispositionwhenhestatedthat 'theintroductionofnuclearweaponsand their use in theMiddle East will create a new and serious situation, andIsraelwill be held responsible. Israelmust not forget that there are also othertypesofweaponsofmassdestruction'.59Gamassylateraddedthat 'weaponsofmassexterminationarenot limited tonuclearweapons ...Egypthasenoughofthe other types ofweapons ofmass extermination and it has the capability ofretaliatingtoanIsraelinuclearblowbymakinguseoftheseweapons'.Arabstates,particularlyEgypt,maderepeateddemands that Israelaccede to

theNPT.In1976EgyptianForeignMinisterFahmydemandedIsraeliaccessionto the treaty as a precondition for a comprehensive regional peace agreement.Fahmy called on Israel to 'commit itself not to produce or acquire nuclearweapons; itmust sign the [NPT] and agree to international inspections of heractivitiesinthenuclearfield...Egyptisreadytoacceptthesameconditions'.60

ThesedemandswererepeatedbyPresidentSadatduringatelevisioninterviewon 24 February 1977. In 1978 the Egyptian government proposed that bothnationsrenouncenuclearweaponsandalsoacceptlimitsonconventionalforcesas part of their 1979 peace treaty. Egypt's position, as articulated by the thenSecretaryofStateforForeignAffairsButrosGhali,wasthat'ifIsraelwishestoemphasizeitspursuitofpeacetoArabpublicopinion,itmustsigntheNPT'.61

Beginningin1978,bothEgyptandIraqadoptedavariantonthedemandsthatIsrael accede to the NPT by calling for the establishment of a Middle Eastnuclear-weapons-free zone (NWFZ). This demand was first presented at the

UnitedNationsintheformofresolutionswhichweresubsequentlyadoptedbytheGeneralAssembly. Israeliaccession to theNPTand theestablishmentofaMiddle East NWFZ have, from that point onwards, became standard Arabprerequisitesforacomprehensiveregionalpeacesettlement.Throughoutthe1970sthemostfrequentArabrhetoricalresponsetopotential

Israeli acquisitionof nuclearweaponswas to threaten that thiswould lead theArabs do the same. In 1974 Egyptian President Sadat warned that 'if Israelintends to introduce nuclearweapons into the area,we toowill find away ofacquiringsuchweapons'.Alsoin1974,ForeignMinisterFahmytoldtheUnitedStates Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 'it must be completelyunderstoodthatshouldIsraelproducenuclearweapons,Egyptwillhavetherighttoacquirethisweaponinordertomaintainherstrategicintegrity'.Whilein1976SyrianPresidentHafezAsaddeclaredthatIsrael'snuclearcapabilitygaveSyriatwo options, either to prevent Israel from acquiring a nuclear capability, or toacquire theweapons themselves.AndAsadwas innodoubt that 'it seems thatthe second alternative is the more promising one for the Arabs'. A year laterAsadreiterated:'IfIsraelpossessesthisweapon,thenwewillpossessit[also]'.62

Arableaders'behaviour,however,didnotmatchtheirrhetoric.Mostnotablewas the absence of a unifiedArab effort to counter Israel's perceived nuclearcapability.Inter-Arabpoliticalrivalrieseffectivelyprecludedtheformationofacoalition with the objective of developing nuclear weapons. Due to the deepdivisions in the Arab world the progress of any one Arab state towards theattainment of a nuclear weapons capability would have been (and remains) asourceofconcerntootherArabstates.

PhaseIV:The1980s

By 1980 Israel had emerged as the only state in the Middle East with thecapacity tomanufacturenuclearweapons.The focusof Israelinuclearstrategyfor thenextdecadewas themaintenanceof this regionalnuclearmonopoly. InDecember1981ForeignMinisterYitzhakShamirstated:

The third element in our defence policy for the 1980s is our decision to prevent access to nuclear

weaponsforbothconfrontationstatesandpotentialones.Israelcannotallowtheintroductionofnuclearweapons.Forusitisnotanissueofabalanceofterror,butaquestionofcontinuedsurvival.Therefore,weshallhavetopreventthisdangerfromtheoutset.63

Thispolicyofdenialwasthefoundationoftheso-called'BeginDoctrine'-thatIsraelwouldpre-emptanyArabattempttodevelopnuclearweapons.ThispolicywasmostdramaticallyillustratedbyIsrael'sairstrikeontheIraqiOsiraqnuclearreactor at al-Tuweitha on 7 June 1981. According to Arye Naor, MenachemBegin'scabinetsecretary,thePrimeMinisterhadfirstbroughtaproposallinkedtotheattackbeforetheIsraelicabinetasearlyasOctober1980.BeginlinkedthisproposaldirectlytotheIraqinucleareffortbyarguingthat

'three ... Hiroshima-type bombs would suffice to destroy Israel'. Begin'sassessment reflected the strategic constraints imposed by Israel's geography.Israel'spopulationandindustrialbaseareconcentratedona60-milecoastalstripless than 20miles wide, running from just north of Tel Aviv to immediatelynorthofHaifa. Iraq,Beginsaid,mightbe tempted touse itsnuclearcapability'onceshehaddevelopedit'.64

OtheraspectsorIsrael'snuclearstrategy,includingthenatureorstatementsbyIsraelileadersconcerningIsrael'snuclearposition,nonaccessiontotheNPT,andthedegreeofofficialsecrecysurroundingIsrael'snuclearprogrammeremainedconstant throughout the 1980s. One of the most significant public statementsconcerningIsrael'snuclearcapabilityduringthisperiodwasmadebyMinisterofScience Yuval Ne'eman in 1984. 'We decided from day one to create thenecessaryinfrastructuresothatifsomedaywedecidedtomakenuclearweapons,wewouldnothave todependonanyoneelse',hesaid.Whenaskeddirectly ifIsraelpossessednuclearweapons,Ne'emanreplied:

That'stechnicallyaccuratebutcouldbemisleadingintermsofthelengthoftimerequiredtomakeone.If we were to cross the threshold, we would provide every justification for third parties to arm theArabs.Sowehaveeveryinteresttocreatetheinfrastructure,inordernottobecaughtunprepared,andthenstop.Wesaywehavenotcrossedthenuclear threshold.Howcloseweare,wedon'tsay.We'vehadthesamesituationnowfortwentyoneyears.65

Ne'eman'sstatementwasparticularlyrevealinginlightofhisowncareerwithintheIsraeliscientificanddefencecommunities.Ne'emanhadheldvirtuallyeveryposition of any consequence related to Israel's strategic programmes: DeputyDirector of Military Intelligence; scientific adviser to, and chairman of, the

IsraeliAtomicEnergyCommission; chairmanof theNationalCommission forHighEnergyPhysics;andchairmanof theIsraeliSpaceAgency.Ne'emanwasalsofounderandleaderoftheultra-nationalistTehiyaParty.On 2November 1987 the IsraeliRepresentative to theUnitedNations First

Committee,ShalhevethFreier,againexplainedhisgovernment'sreasonsfornotaccedingtotheNPT.'TheNPTalonedoesnotinhibitlocalwars,andlocalwarsarethebaneoftheMiddleEast',hesaid.'ForallthevalueoftheNPT,letmetellyouwhich of its deficiencies are pertinent in theMiddle East conflict'. FreierthenwentontoexplainIsrael'sperceptionoftheinadequaciesofthesafeguardsystem.QuotingfromastatementmadebyInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyDirectorHansBlixon11December1981,Freierstated:

Thesafeguardsdonot,of course, revealwhat future intentions [a] statemayhave. Itmaychange itsmindonthequestionofnuclearweaponsandwishtoproducethemdespitepossibleadherencetotheNPT.Neithersuchadherencenorfullscopesafeguardsarefullguaranteesthat[a]statewillnotonedaymakenuclearweapons.

Freier then quoted a statementmade byLibyan leaderColonelGaddafi on 22June1987:'TheArabsmustpossesstheatombombtodefendthemselves,untiltheir numbers reach one thousandmillion ... and until they liberate Palestine'.Pointing out that Libya was not a signatory to the NPT, Freier discussed the'qualifications' put on accession to the treaty by other Arab nations who hadexpresslystated that theirobligationsunder theNPTdidnot implyrecognitionofIsrael.66

Finally,theIsraeligovernmentcontinuedtoenforcethehighdegreeofofficialsecrecysurroundingitsnuclearprogramme.InJune1980itreportedlypreventedthepublicationofamanuscriptentitledNoneWillSurviveUs:TheStoryoftheIsraeli A-Bomb by two Israeli journalists, Eli Teicher and Ami Dor-On.Brigadier General Yitzhak Shani, Israel's chief military censor, prohibited itspublication'whollyorpartially,inHebreworintranslation,sinceitspublicationwouldbedamaging to thedefenseof Israel'.The authorswere furtherwarnedthat disclosure of the information contained in their manuscript would bringthemasentenceof15yearstolifeinprison.67

In1986theveilofsecrecywhichhadsurroundedIsrael'snuclearprogrammefrom its inception was lifted, if only briefly and partially, as a result of the'Vanunu Affair'. Mordechai Vanunu, a disaffected nuclear technician, had

workedattheNegevNuclearResearchCentrefrom1976until1985.InJanuary1986 he left Israel with hand-written notes concerning the centre's operationsand 57 photographs which he claimed to have taken inside some of its mostsensitiveareas.VanunuprovidedatleastaportionofthismaterialtotheLondonSunday Timeswhich then published it on 5 October 1986 under the headline'TheSundayTimesReveals:TheSecretsofIsrael'sNuclearArsenal'.68

On 23 September 1986, prior to publication of Vanunu's information, theIsraeli embassy in London issued a denial of the Sunday Times' story. TheIsraelis characterized Vanunu as merely a minor technician with only limitedknowledge of the NNRC's operations. Subsequently, Vanunu was (allegedly)lured to Italy where he was kidnapped by an Israeli intelligence team andforcibly returned to Israel.Therehewas tried incamera,convictedof treason,espionage, and exposing state secrets, and sentenced to 18 years of solitaryconfinement in an Israeli prison. The Israeli State Prosecutor specificallycharged that Vanunu had revealed classified information that 'caused seriousdamagetothesecurityofthestate'.69

Despite the apparent damage to security, the Vanunu scandal may haveactually enhanced the ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding Israel's nuclearefforts.AsoneIsraeliacademicsaidof theVanunuAffair: '[I]tdoesnotreallyhurt security.Thepointofnucleardeterrents [sic] is that theother sideshouldknown thatyouhavenuclearbombs inordernot tohave touse them.Let theArabsknow,andevenbetter that it isnotyouwho tell thembut itcomes inaroundaboutway.LikeareportintheSundayTimes'.70

PhaseV:The1990s

Israel entered the 1990s with its regional nuclear monopoly intact and as theonly regional actor with a coherent nuclear strategy. Israel's deliberatelyambiguousnuclearstrategyhadservedthreeends:reassuringtheIsraelipeople'in timesofgloom';making theArabs 'think twice'beforeengagingIsrael;andrelieving 'any country that does not want to take up a definite position[concerningIsrael'snuclearcapability]fromhavingtodoso'.71

OneofthesalientfeaturesofIsrael'sdevelopmentasanuclearpowerhasbeenthelackofpublicdebateonthesubject.Israelisademocracywithatraditionoffreeandopendebateovervirtuallyeveryaspectof itsnationalsecuritypolicy.Thefact thatnopublicdebateover theproductionofnuclearweaponsor theirproperroleinthenation'ssecuritystrategyhastakenplaceisperhapsindicativeofpublicsupport,asawhole,forthegovernment'snuclearstrategyofdeliberateambiguity.72TheIsraelipublicviewsthedegreeofsecrecysurroundingIsrael'snuclearprogrammeaspartoftheconceptofthe'sacrednessofsecurity'(kidushba-bitahon). This has effectively limited the nuclear debate in Israel to eliteswithinthemilitary,thecivilgovernment,academiaandthepress.73

The1991PersianGulfWar,however, served toheighten the Israelipublic'sawarenessof thenuclear issue.74Whilemost Israelisbelieve that theircountrypossesses nuclearweapons, there is no clear consensus regarding their role inIsrael'ssecuritystrategy.Israelisprovided the following responses toa15February1991Galluppoll

whichaskedthefollowingquestion:'Underwhatconditions,ifany,shouldIsraelusenuclearweapons?':ninepercentwereopposedtotheuseofnuclearweaponsunderanyconditions;41percentfavouredtheuseofnuclearweaponsonly toprevent the annihilation of Israel; eight per cent favoured the use of nuclearweapons only if Israel suffered 'very extensive' casualties; and 42 per centfavouredtheuseofnuclearweaponsinresponsetotheirusebyIraq.75

Israel's nuclear programme may in fact have played a major, thoughunspoken, role in thePersianGulfWar.At least one analyst believes that 'theprospectofanuclearwarintheMiddleEastunleashedbyIsraelandbeyondthecapacityofthe[UnitedStates]tocontrolwasareal,butlittlepublicizedelementof the1990-91crisis in thePersianGulf'.76Following the invasionofKuwait,Iraq declared its chemical arsenal to be a first-strikeweapon intended for useagainstIsrael.TheIsraeligovernment,takingsuchthreatsseriously,distributedgas masks to its citizens and articulated a policy of deterrence that remainedconsistentthroughoutthewar.Israel communicated explicit warnings during the critical period between

November1990and15January1991thatwerewidelyinterpretedtomeanthatanyIraqiactionabovethenon-conventionalthresholdwouldprovoketheuseofnuclearweaponsinresponse.InapublicwarningtoIraq,PrimeMinisterShamir

pledged that Israel would respond to any non-conventional aggression with a'terrible blow'.On5December 1990, onemonthbefore thewar began, IsraeliForeignMinisterDavidLevydeclaredthat'Israel'slowprofilewillchangeifandwhenSaddamHussein threatens theveryexistenceof thestateof Israel. Israelwillhavenochoicebuttodefenditself...andnotwithalowprofile,butwiththehighestpossibleprofile'.77

InaspeechtotheKnesseton18February1991YitzhakRabin,thenLabourMKstated:

Whatdidwetell[theArabs]?IfyousendmissilesonTelAviv,Damascuswillbeturnedintoruin.Ifyou send missiles on Haifa not only Damascus, but also Aleppo will cease to exist. They will bedestroyed root and branch.Without dealing with missile launchers, we will destroy Damascus. ThesameappliestoBaghdad.WetoldtheIraqis,ifyousendamissile,Baghdadwillturnintodust...Israelshouldpreserveitsdeterrentpowersimplybysayingthat intheeventofasingleland-to-landmissilestrikeonTelAviv,thenDamascus,Aleppo,andBaghdadwillexistnomore.78

The followingmonth, on 8March 1991, Israeli air force commanderGeneralHerzlBodingerstatedthat'weknowthatIraqhadsurface-tosurfacemissilewithchemical warheads, but they nevertheless refrained from using them. In myopinion, the only reason was that they were afraid of the power of theresponse'.79

More recent statements by Israeli leaders concerning their country's nuclearcapabilitieshaveretainedtheirearliersenseofambiguity.On25October1993DeputyDefenceMinisterMordechaiGur, inresponsetoanEgyptianreporter'squestion concerning Arab demands that Israel open its nuclear facilities tointernational inspection, stated: 'I don't know what facilities they are talkingabout.ButIadviseIsraelnottogiveupanyofitsmilitarystrengthinfavourofanyoftheneighbouringcountriesbecausethiswillonlyendangerIsrael'.80

Atthesametimeas thePersianGulfWar, Israeli leaders'perceptionsof thethreatposed to theirnationbyother regionalactorsapparentlyevolved fromafocusonthequantitativesuperiorityoftheirclosestneighbourstotheacquisitionofweaponsofmassdestructionbythenationsontheirperiphery.Thischangeoffocus became evident as early as October 1991, when at least three IsraelipoliticalleadersmadepublicstatementsconcerningtheproliferationofweaponsofmassdestructionintheMiddleEast.LabourKnessetmemberMoshe Shahal foresaw nuclear proliferation in the

region as inevitable, stating that 'I believe that theMiddleEastwill achieve anuclearoptionwithinadecadeandthebattle,if,Godforbid,itcomes,willseetheentryofnon-conventionalweapons'.TheMinisterofDefence,MosheArens,declaredthat'[t]heMiddleEastismarchingtowardanuclearweaponsera,[and]that is the realitywewill have to livewith and prepare [militarily] for'. EzerWeizman (latterly President of Israel) said: '[T]he nuclear issue is gainingmomentum[andthe]nextwarwillnotbeconventional'.81Inthisregard,IsraelileadersperceivethegreatestthreattotheirstateasemanatingfromIranandIraq.Iran's 'Islamic foreignpolicy' includes a vehement anti-Israeli stance and its

leadershipregardsIsraelasa'cancerousgrowthintheMiddleEast'.TheIraniangovernment has intentionally isolated itself from the regional peace process,viewing theendorsementofanysortofsettlementwithIsraelasan intolerableaffronttoIslamandasanegationofIran's'Islamicidentity'.InDecember1990theIranianPresidentHashemiRafsanjanicalledfortheestablishmentofapan-IslamicarmyfortheannihilationofIsrael.82

Iran is assessed as having an active chemical and biological weaponsprogramme, and Israeli leaders have expressed particular concern over thepossibility of Iranian development of nuclear weapons. On 8 June 1992, forexample,MajorGeneralUriSaguy,chiefofIsraeliMilitaryIntelligence,stated:

Iranisconductinganuclearfusionprojectwhichmightcauseus tobeconcernedaboutourexistenceandbasic security if andwhen that process becomes ... irreversible ... [W]ith time that potential [fornuclearweapons]willbecomerealandbytheendofthedecade...itwillbepossibleforIrantoachieveanindependentnuclearcapability.83

On15June1992MajorGeneralHerzlBodinger,commanderoftheIsraeliairforce,discussingtheeffortsofotherregionalactorstoacquirenuclearweapons,stated:

Theintelligenceinformationthatwehaveisthatthesecountries,especiallyIran,striveveryhardtogetthisability.Wethink,accordingtotheinformationthatwehave,thatifnothingisdonewithinadecadeorsoIranwillhaveanability[sic]ofnuclearweapons.84

EighteenmonthslateranIsraeliairforceofficeridentifiedonlyas'ColonelA'told the Israeli Air Force Review: 'Iran will have [North] Korean NodongmissilesinayearwhichcouldbedeployedintheWestofthecountryandreachIsrael ...There isnodoubt that Iran is trying toobtain thecapacity toproduce

chemical and nuclearweapons'. The colonel also stated that the Iraniansweretrying to develop aircraft and missiles 'directly threatening' Israel, and at thesame time were continuing a long-term nuclear research programme. Morerecently, in February 1995, a senior Israeli military official stated that 'thebiggestproblem[for Israel] in thenextdecade is [Iran]withnuclearweapons.That'stheworstcaseourplannersmustcurrentlylookat'.85

Iraq had traditionally figured in Israeli threat calculations to the extent towhichitcouldbolstertheArabeasternfrontbydispatchingexpeditionaryforcesthrough Jordan. During the Iran-Iraq War, however, Israeli military plannersgainedanappreciationofIraqasathreattoIsraelinandofitself.Whenthatwarendedin1988,theIsraeliChief-of-Staff,LieutenantGeneralDanShomron,andhis staff concluded that SaddamHussein's ambitions for pan-Arab leadership,combinedwitheitherrealorperceivedpressuresfromIslamicfundamentalists,made Israel the next likely target for Iraqi aggression.86 Theywere proved atleast partially correct during the 1991GulfWarwhen the Iraqis declared thattheirchemicalarsenalwasintendedforuseagainstIsrael.Israeli leaders are especially sensitive to the fact that, aside from theirown,

Iraq'snuclearprogrammewasthemostadvancedintheMiddleEastpriortotheGulfWar. They are also concerned by Iraq's chemical and biologicalwarfarecapabilities,anditsdemonstratedwillingnesstoemploychemicalagents.IsraelidefenceplannersdonotconsiderHussein'sdefeattobetheendoftheIraqithreattoIsrael.TheybelievethatIraqpossessesboththewillandtheabilitytorecoveritsmilitary capabilities and they foresee the re-emergenceof an Iraqi threat inthelongterm.87

PerceptionsofthenatureoftheexternalsecuritythreatplayedamajorroleintheIsraelidecisiontorefusetojointheNPTyetagainin1995.On20November1993,inalettertoUnitedNationsambassadors,ShalhevethFreierstated:

TheIsraeliswishtotestwhetheradesireforpeaceexistsonthepartoftheArabstates,andarereadytotakesubstantialriskstothisend.TheIsraelisdonotknow...whethersuchadesireonthepartoftheArabstatesdoesexist,orwhether thepresentnegotiations,and theconcessionsextractedfromIsrael,simplyserveasameansofattritiononpreparationforafurtheronslaughtatanopportunemoment...Israelmustcontinuetobewaryand...nothinghashappenedsofarwhichjustifiesanyrelaxationofitsdefenseposture.88

ThereluctanceofsuccessiveIsraeligovernmentstoaccedetotheNPTandtheir

practice of keeping thematter under constant review have reflected both theirperceptions of the threat to the Jewish state and their own national character.StatessuchasIranorIraqhavethelicenceeventuallytooptoutoftheNPTorsimply to disregard their treaty commitments. Israel believes that itwould nothave such an option since, as a democracy, itwould be expected by both theinternationalcommunityanditsowncitizenstoabidebyitscommitmenttotheNPT.DespiteitslongresistancetoaccessiontotheNPT,theIsraeligovernmenthas

defined the terms under which it would willingly become a signatory to thetreaty. Essentially, Israeli accession to the treaty is contingent upon theestablishment of a Middle Eastern NWFZ which, in turn, requires acomprehensive regional peace settlement. As Shalhevet Freier put the Israeliposition:

Israel[cannot]accedeto[the]NPTuntilafteracredibleNWFZintheMiddleEastisinplace.IfIsraelwere toaccede[to theNPT]now, itwouldbedoingitssecurityafatefuldisservice.Everyonewouldapplaud,andthatdoesnotcountformuch,andtheArabstateswouldbehappytothinkthattheycouldpress onwards [towards Israel's destruction] with all means at their disposal, with nothing to worryabout...

Stable and proven peace is a prerequisite for a Middle East NWFZ. Peace must include all theconfrontation states, including Iran. Also, a Middle East NWFZ will not be supervised by theInternational Atomic Energy Agency; rather, the non-proliferation regime must be based on mutualverificationbythecontractingparties.89

Thus, theIsraeliapproachto theprocess(acomprehensivepeacesettlement,followedbyestablishmentofaregionalNWFZculminatinginaccessiontotheNPT)isfundamentallytheoppositeofthat takenbytheArabstates,especiallyEgypt, whereby Israel's accession to the NPT would be followed byestablishmentofaMiddleEastNWZFculminatinginacomprehensiveregionalpeacesettlement.

Conclusions

Twoconclusionsmaybedrawnfromthisaccountof Israel'sdevelopmentasanuclear power. The first concerns the historical nature of the Israeli nuclear

programme; thesecond- theevolutionofIsrael'snuclearstrategyofdeliberateambiguity.The historical record, at least that portion which is publicly available,

indicates that since the government of David BenGurion Israeli leaders havesought some form of nuclear capability. While there was no clear consensusamong the Israeli political elite concerningnuclearweaponsat the timeof theprogramme'sinitiation,thedevelopmentandmaintenanceofanuclearcapabilityappears to have emerged as a consistent, though unspoken, element of Israelisecuritystrategysincethe1967SixDayWar.The Israeli rationale fordevelopmentofanuclearcapabilityhasbeenbased

ontwointerrelatedfactors: theperceptionoftheexternalthreattoitsexistenceand thehistorical experienceof the Jewishpeople.Unlikeothernationswhichmayseektodevelopanuclearcapabilityforreasonsofinternationalprestigeorasawaytoachieveregionalhegemony,Israelhasdonesoinordertoensureitsnational existence. Originally concerned with the unmitigated hostility andoverwhelmingconventionalsuperiorityoftheirimmediateArabneighbours,theIsraelithreatperceptioniscurrentlyfocusedonthedevelopmentofweaponsofmassdestructionbynationsontheirperiphery,particularlyIranandIraq.Atthesametime,memoriesoftheHolocaustcontinuetoimpressuponIsraeli leadersthe necessity for self-reliance in matters of national security. This continuingsharedmemoryofthedestructionofEuropeanJewryhasplayedaconsistentrolein Israeli leaders' decisions regarding development of their country's nuclearcapabilities.Israel's nuclear strategy of deliberate ambiguity does not result from the

execution of a well-planned design. Instead, it has developed over time inresponsetoavarietyofinternational,regionalanddomesticconsiderations.Thisstrategyofdeliberateambiguityhasserveddifferentfunctionsatdifferenttimes.Originally,itservedtoconcealIsrael'seffortstodevelopanuclearinfrastructure.Later, it helped avert conflict with United States policymakers when Israel'snuclear programme became a focus of American non-proliferation policy.Deliberate ambiguity also served to deny the Arab states a clear picture ofIsrael'snuclearcapabilitiesandhaseffectivelyforestalledthedevelopmentofapotentially contentious domestic debate in Israel concerning the acquisition ofnuclear weapons and their proper role in Israeli security strategy. As it now

exists, deliberate ambiguity provides Israeli leaders with a coherent strategicframeworkgoverningtheircountry'snuclearcapabilitiesandintentions.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or

positionoftheDepartmentofDefenseoroftheUSGovernment.EdwinS.Cochranisanofficerin

theUnitedStatesarmy.

Notes

The authorwould like to thank Shalheveth Freier, ShlomoAronson,Avi Beker,Yair Evron,Ariel

Levite,Ze'evSchiffandGeraldSteinbergfortheirhelpfulcomments.

1. Bard E. O'Neill, 'Israel', in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (eds), The Defense Policies of

Nations:AComparativeStudy,Baltimore,1982,p.432;EdwardB.Atkeson, 'TheMiddleEast:A

Dynamic Military Net Assessment for the 1990s',Washington Quarterly, Vol.16, No.2 (1993),

p.120.

2.IsraelMinistryofScienceandDevelopment,ScientificResearchinIsrael,Jerusalem,1989,p.i.

3.GeraldM.Steinberg,ArmsControlandIsraeliSecurity:ARealisticApproach,PolicyPaperNo.9,Tel

Aviv,May1993,p.7.

4.See, for example,AvnerCohenandBenjaminFrankel inBenjaminFrankel (ed.),OpaqueNuclear

Proliferation:MethodologicalandPolicyImplications,London,1991,pp.17-18.

5.In1986,MordechaiVanunu,aformertechnicianattheDimonanuclearreactor,toldtheSundayTimes

that Israelcouldmanufacture100-200nuclearweapons.FrankBarnaby,The InvisibleBomb:The

Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East, London, 1988, p.25. In 1993, the Russian Foreign

IntelligenceServicereleasedareportcreditingIsraelwithpossessionof60-100weapons. 'ANew

Challenge After the Cold War: Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction', Report by the

Russian Foreign Intelligence Service,Moscow, 1993. Translation by Joint Publications Research

Service, JPRS Report 'Proliferation Issues 5 March 1993', pp.24-5. See alsoWilliamWindrem,

CriticalMass:theDangerousRaceforSuper-weaponsinaFragmentingWorld,NewYork,1994,

p.308;AnthonyH.Cordesman,AftertheStorm:TheChangingMilitaryBalanceintheMiddleEast,

Boulder,1993,p.244.In1994,BurrowsandWindremreportedthatIsraelhasactuallyproduceda

totalof300nuclearweapons,buthasretiredmanyoftheolderones.

6.PeterPry,Israel'sNuclearArsenal,Boulder,1984,pp.30-33.SeealsoEdwinS.Cochran,'Deliberate

Ambiguity: AnAnalysis of Israel's Nuclear Strategy', Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol.19, No.3

(September1996),pp.321-42.

7. National Security Archive,U.S. Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy, 1945-1991, Vol.1,Washington

DC,1991,p.24;RobertHarkavy,'TheImperativetoSurvive',inLouisReneBeres(ed.),Securityor

Armageddon:Israel'sNuclearStrategy,Lexington,1986,pp.103—4.

8.ChaimWeizmann,TrialandError:TheAutobiographyofChaimWeizmann,London,1950,p.18.

9.Forthisviewseetheauthor'sinterviewwithMrShalhevethFreier(formerIsraeliambassadortothe

UnitedNations FirstCommittee), 18May 1994. In an interviewwith the veteran Israeli defence

correspondent, Ze'ev Schiff, 23May 1994, the latter agreed that this was so, but added that the

considerationofnuclearweaponsbegan'muchearlier'thanisgenerallyrealized.

10.FuadJabber,IsraelandNuclearWeapons:PresentOptionandFutureStrategies,London,1971,p.

15;RichardRhodes,TheMakingof theAtomicBomb,NewYork,1986,pp.86-8,173;RobertE.

Harkavy,SpectreofaMiddleEasternHolocaust:TheStrategicandDiplomaticImplicationsofthe

Israeli NuclearWeapons Program, Denver, 1977, p.5.Although a proponent of nuclear science,

ChaimWeizmannplayednoroleinIsrael'ssubsequentnuclearprogramme.Author'sinterviewwith

ShlomoAronson,16May1994,andwithShalhevethFreier,18May1994.

11.Weizmann,TrialandError,p.444.

12.Harkavy,SpectreofaMiddleEasternHolocaust,p.5;Barnaby,TheInvisibleBomb,p.5.

13.TaysirN.Nashif,NuclearWarfare in theMiddleEast:DimensionsandResponsibilities,Princeton,

1984,p.15;Barnaby,The InvisibleBomb, pp.4-5;StephenGreen,TakingSides:America'sSecret

RelationswithaMilitantIsrael,NewYork,1984,p.149.

14. Christopher S. Raj, 'Israel and Nuclear Weapons: a Case of Clandestine Proliferation', in K.

Subrahmanyan (ed.),NuclearMyths and Realities: India'sDilemma, NewDelhi, 1981, p.92.De

Shalit eventually headed the Physics Department at the Weizmann Institute of Science. This

scientist,whodiedin1969,wasconsideredbymanytohavebeenaquantumresearcherinthesame

class as Oppenheimer and Bohr. See Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear

ArsenalandAmericanForeignPolicy,NewYork,1991,pp.25-6,144.

15.LeonardBeatonandJohnMaddox,TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons,NewYork,1962,p.170.

16.RaviShastri,'IsraeliNuclearStrategyandDeterrenceinWestAsia',StrategicAnalysis,Vol.13,No.l

(August1989),p.38;Nashif,NuclearWarfare,p.15;Jabber,IsraelandNuclearWeapons,p.19.

17.LouisToscanao,TripleCross:Israel,theAtomicBomb,andtheManWhoSpilledtheSecrets,New

York,1990,p.100.

18.ShlomoAronson,ThePoliticsandStrategyofNuclearWeaponsintheMiddleEast:Opacity,Theory,

andReality,1960-1991-AnIsraeliPerspective,Albany,1991,p.46.

19.JayY.Gonen,APsychohistoryofZionism,NewYork,1975,p.149.

20.QuotedinAronson,ThePoliticsandStrategyofNuclearWeapons,p.51.

21.Hersh,TheSamsonOption,p.22;BurrowsandWindrem,CriticalMass,p.281.

22.Hersh,TheSamsonOption,pp.23-6;Weizmann,TrialandError,pp.356-7;author's interviewwith

Aronson,16May1994.

23.Author's interviewwithFreier, 18May 1994;Raj, 'Israel andNuclearWeapons', p.96;Hersh,The

SamsonOption,pp.66-7.

24.Thus, forexample, theJericho-1 (orYA-1), isan Israeliadaptationof theFrenchDassaultMD620

missile design. For this period of French-Israeli political and military cooperation see Sylvia

Crosbie,ATacitAlliance:FranceandIsraelfromSueztotheSixDayWar,Princeton,1974;Roger

F.Pajak,NuclearProliferationintheMiddleEast:ImplicationsfortheSuperpowers,Washington

DC,1982,p.31;Harkavy,SpectreofaMiddleEasternHolocaust, pp.6-7;Barnaby,The Invisible

Bomb,p.22.

25.ErnestW.Lefever,NuclearArmsintheThirdWorld:U.S.PolicyDilemma,WashingtonDC,1979,

p.70;BeatonandMaddox,TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons,p.170;Barnaby,TheInvisibleBomb,

p.5.

26. Pajak, Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East, p.31; Harkavy, Spectre of a Middle Eastern

Holocaust,pp.5-6.

27.Crosbie,ATacitAlliance,p.115.

28.Pajak,NuclearProliferationintheMiddleEast,p.14.

29.Green,TakingSides,p.151.

30.Jabber,IsraelandNuclearWeapons,pp.25-32;Pajak,NuclearProliferationintheMiddleEast,p.31.

Actual construction of the reactor was undertaken by the French nuclear firm Saint-Gobain

TechniquesNouvelles(SGN).

31.SundayTimes,12October1986.

32.Harkavy,SpectreofaMiddleEasternHolocaust,p.5;YairEvron,Israel'sNuclearDilemma,Ithaca,

1994,pp.5-10;Green,TakingSides,pp.150-51.

33.MichaelBar-Zohar,BenGurion:TheArmedProphet,EnglewoodCliffs,1968,pp.266-7.

34.TheNorwegiangovernmentallowedthesaleontheconditionthatthedeuteriumwouldbeusedonly

for peaceful purposes and that the Israelis would allow inspections to verify compliance. The

Norwegiansexercisedtheirrightofinspectiononlyonce,in1961,whenthedeuteriumwasstillin

storage.In1964theWeizmannInstitutepurchasedanadditionalsevenkilogramsofdeuteriumfrom

NorskHydro,and the Israeligovernment itselfbought100kilograms in1968.Between1959and

1968,NorskHydrosoldatotalof21,107kilogramsofdeuteriumtotheIsraelis.See,Barnaby,The

InvisibleBomb,p.9;LeonardSpector,NuclearAmbitions:TheSpreadofNuclearWeapons,1989-

1990,Boulder,1990,p.153.

35.Spector,NuclearAmbitions,p.105.Israelalsoobtained3.9tonsofdeuteriumfromtheUnitedStates

under the bilateral agreement concerning construction of the Nahal Soreq reactor. Barnaby, The

InvisibleBomb,pp.9-10.

36.Barnaby,TheInvisibleBomb,p.11;Spector,NuclearAmbitions,pp.152-3.

37. Yair Evron, 'Opaque Proliferation: The Israeli Case', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.),Opaque Nuclear

Proliferation,pp.46-7andnote7,p.62.

38.CitedinJohnNewhouse,WarandPeaceintheNuclearAge,NewYork,1988,p.271.

39.ForadetaileddiscussionofUS-IsraelinucleardisagreementsduringtheKennedyadministration,see

AvnerCohen, Israel and theBomb,NewYork, 1998,Chapters 6-9.See also,McGeorgeBundy,

Danger and Survival:ChoicesAbout theBomb in theFirstFifty years,NewYork, 1988, p.510;

LewisA.Dunn,'FourDecadesofNuclearNonproliferation:SomeLessonsfromWins,Losses,and

Draws',WashingtonQuarterly,Vol.13,No.3(Summer1990),p.10;Hersh,TheSamsonOption,pp.

111—13.

40.JamesFeron,'IsraelisHonourAtomScientist',NewYorkTimes,14May1966,p.3.

41. Jean Lacouture,DeGaulle: The Ruler, 1945-1970, NewYork, 1992, p.435; Pry, Israel's Nuclear

Arsenal,p.19.

42.LeniYanil,TheHolocaust:theFateofEuropeanJewry,1932-1946,NewYork,1990,p.8.

43. Uri Bar-Joseph, 'The Hidden Debate: the Formulation of Nuclear Doctrines in the Middle East',

JournalofStrategicStudies,Vol.5,No.2(June1982),pp.214-15.

44.Toscanao,TripleCross,p.100.AccordingtoAvnerCohen(IsraelandtheBomb,p.274),afewdays

beforethewarIsraelhad'"improvised"twodeliverablenuclear"primitive"nucleardevices'.

45. Savita Pande, 'Israel and the Non-Proliferation Regime', Strategic Analysis, Vol.16, No.2 (1993),

p.148;Cochran,'DeliberateAmbiguity',p.326.

46.Statementby the IsraeliForeignMinister to theKnesset,17December1968,cited inPande, 'Israel

andtheNon-ProliferationRegime',p.151.

47. Ibid.,p.152,quotinga statementby the Israeli representative to theFirstCommitteeof theUnited

NationsGeneralAssembly,29May1968.

48.Barnaby,TheInvisibleBomb,p.ll.ForanaccountofthisoperationseeElaineDavenport,PaulEddy

andPeterGilman,ThePlumbatAffair,Philadelphia,1978.

49. JeffreyT.Richelson,Foreign IntelligenceOrganizations,Cambridge,1988,pp.193-4;Cordesman,

AftertheStorm,p.242.

50.Yanil,TheHolocaust,p.18.

51. Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, p.72. Evron maintains that Prime Minister Meir rejected this

recommendation.

52. The Israeli army has reportedly developed a nuclear projectile for its 175mm self-propelled gun

system.Israelisreportedtohavefieldedthreenuclear-capableartillerybattalionsof12gunseach,

andtohavestockpiledthreenuclearprojectilespergun.MichioKaku,'ContingencyPlans:Nuclear

WeaponsAfter theColdWar', inPhyllisBennisandMichelMoushabeck(eds),AlteredStates:A

Reader in the NewWorldOrder, NewYork, 1993, p.66. See also, Cordesman,After the Storm,

p.244;Hersh,TheSamsonOption,p.319.

53. Michael Dunn, 'Israel', in Gregory R. Copeland (ed.), Defense and Foreign Affairs Handbook,

Washington,1985,p.319;Barnaby,TheInvisibleBomb,pp.14-21.

54.Pande,'IsraelandtheNon-ProliferationRegime',p.148;Maariv,2December1974.

55.Newhouse,WarandPeaceintheNuclearAge,p.271.

56.ShaiFeldman,IsraeliNuclearDeterrence:AStrategyforthe1980's,NewYork,1982,p.67.

57.Al-Sha'ab,17February1981.

58.Tishrin,5August1980;al-Qabas,5October1980.

59.Al-Ahram,25July1975;Akhbaral-Usbu,14October1976;YediotAharanot,5October1976.

60.Feldman,IsraeliNuclearDeterrence,p.67.

61.AssociatedPress,26April1976;Maariv,17May1979.

62.Feldman,IsraeliNuclearDeterrence,pp.67-70;MiddleEastNewsAgency(MENA),16August1974.

63.CitedinAronson,ThePoliticsandStrategyofNuclearWeapons,p.179.

64.Ibid.,p.167.

65.CharlesHardenberger(ed.),TheArmsControlReporter,1991,Brookline,1991,p.453.

66.Pande,'IsraelandtheNon-ProliferationRegime',p.153.

67.Raj, 'Israel andNuclearWeapons', p.88; IsraelShahak, 'The IsraeliMythofOmniscience:Nuclear

DeterrenceandIntelligence',Arab-AmericanAffairs,Vol.36(1991),p.77.

68. Barnaby,The Invisible Bomb, pp.vi-vii. The Sunday Times investigative team allowed Barnaby to

interviewVanunu for two days. Barnaby subsequently used this information as the basis for his

bookTheInvisibleBomb.

69.Forafullaccountofthe'VanunuAffair'seeToscanao,TripleCross.SeealsoNormanMoss,'Vanunu,

Israel'sBombs,andU.S.Aid',BulletinoftheAtomicScientists,Vol.46,No.4(1992),p.617.

70.ForthesecommentsbyBaruchKnei-PazseeShastri,'IsraeliNuclearStrategy',p.43.

71.Author'sinterviewwithShalhevethFreier,18May1994.

72.InterviewwithAviBeker,15May1994.

73.Author'sinterviewwithAviBeker,15May1994andYairEvron,22May1994.

74.Author'sinterviewswithAronson,16May1994,andSchiff,23May1994.

75.YediotAharanot,16February1991.

76. Geoffrey Aronson, 'Hidden Agenda: US-Israeli Relations and the Nuclear Question',Middle East

Journal,Vol.46,No.4(1992),p.617.

77.Ibid.,p.619.

78.CitedinShahak,'TheIsraeliMythofOmniscience',p.96.

79.YediotAharanot,8March1991.

80.See'GurInterviewedonPeace,NuclearFacilities',MENA,25October1993.TranslationbyForeign

BroadcastInformationService(FBIS),DailyReport:NearEastandSouthAsia,29October1993,

p.34.

81.Shahal'sSpeechinKnesset,14October1991,citedinAronson,'HiddenAgenda',p.621;Arens'sand

Weizmann'sstatementsasbroughtinYediotAharanot,23October1991.

82.FrankE.Blair(ed.),CountriesoftheWorldandTheirLeadersYearbook,1992,Vol.1,Detroit,1991,

p.683; Louis Rene Beres, 'Israel, Iran, and the Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East',

StrategicReview,Vol.21,No.2(1993),p.53;Atkeson,'TheMiddleEast',p.120.

83.'IntelligenceOfficialonIran,ArafatAllegations',TA0806150892,TelAviv,IDFRadioinHebrew,8

June1992,inFBISDailyReport-NearEastandSouthAsia,9June1992.ForassessmentsofIran's

non-conventionalprogrammesseeCordesman,AftertheStorm,pp.419-23;Evron,Israel'sNuclear

Dilemma, pp.28-30; W. Seth Carus, 'Proliferation and Security in Southwest Asia',Washington

Quarterly,Vol.17,No.2(1994),p.135;Beres, 'Israel,Iran,and'TheProspectsforNuclearWarin

theMiddleEast',p.52.

84. 'Bodinger -US "NotDoingEnough'",YA15006185792, Jerusalem,Kol Israel inEnglish, 15 June

1992,inFBISDailyReport-NearEastandSouthAsia,16June1992.

85.'IsraeliColonelSaysTeherantoHaveDPRK'sNodong-1"WithinYear'",NC2012101093,ParisAPF

inEnglish,20December1993,JPRSReport-ProliferationIssues,18January1994;MichaelParks,

'IsraelLooksPastBorders,ArmsforLong-RangeWar',LosAngelesTimes,5February1995.

86.LauraZitrainEisenberg, 'PassiveBelligerency: Israel and the1991GulfWat', Journal of Strategic

Studies,Vol.15,No.5(September1991),pp.304-5.

87.GeoffreyKemp,TheControloftheMiddleEastArmsRace,WashingtonDC,1991,p.73;Cordesman,

After the Storm, pp.494-516; Evron, Israel's Nuclear Dilemma, pp.25-8; Eisenberg, 'Passive

Belligerency',pp.321-2.

88.Letter fromShalhevethFreier to thoseUNambassadorswhohad voted against the IsraeliNuclear

ArmamentResolutionintheGeneralAssembly,20November1993.

89.Ibid.;author'sinterviewwithFreier,18May1994.

PartIII:TowardsPeace

Jewish—Non-Palestinian-ArabNegotiations:TheFirstPhase

ELIEZERTAUBER

MostofthestudiesonthefirstphasesoftheArab-IsraeliconflictconcentrateonJewish-Palestinian relations during that period, and the attitudes of theZionistmovementandthePalestineArabstowardseachother.ItistheintentionofthisessaytofocusonvariousnegotiationsheldinthisperiodbetweenZionistsandnon-PalestinianArabslivingintheneighbouringcountries.Thetime-limitoftheessaywill be from theYoungTurk regime,when thevariousArabnationalistmovements started to strive for the preservation of Arab rights, until thebeginning ofMandatory rule over theFertileCrescent,which signalled a newphase also for theArab-Israeli conflict. Furthermore, byway of learning howArab-Jewishnegotiationsinthatperiodintegratedintothenationalistaspirationsofeachofthemovements,theessaywillconcentrateonlyonnegotiationsheldbetween representatives of political organizations, leaving out the variouscontactsmadeontheindividuallevel.1

During theoppressive ruleofSultanAbdulHamid IIand thediscriminatingregimeoftheYoungTurks,manySyrianandLebaneseactivistsemigratedfrom,at times fled, the Ottoman Empire. The most important centre of Syrian andLebanesenationalistactivityoutsidetheEmpireduringtheYoungTurkregimewas in Egypt, then under British occupation. In late 1912 several Syrian andLebanese emigres residing in Cairo founded the 'Ottoman Party forAdministrativeDecentralization'.Ostensibly, thepartyworked for thegrantingofadecentralizedregimetoalloftheprovincesoftheOttomanEmpire.Itsrealgoal,however,wastostrivefortheimprovementoflivingconditionsinGreaterSyriaandtheachievementofsomemeasureofautonomy.Theparty'spresidentwasRafiqal-Azm,aMuslimfromDamascuswhohademigratedtoEgyptsometwo decades before that.Other prominentmemberswere the party's secretary,Haqqial-Azm(Rafiq'scousin),theMuslimthinkerRashidRida,andtheeditor-

in-chiefofal-Ahram,Da'udBarakat.While theparty'sheadquarterswasinCairo, italsohadbranchesthroughout

Syria,MountLebanonandPalestine.At first, thepartyoperated strictly in theopen.However,followingthemilitarycoupinIstanbulinJanuary1913,whichreturned the nationalist circles of theYoung Turks to power (after the liberalcircleshadruledtheEmpireforhalfayear),thepartydespairedofallpossibilityof introducing changes into the Empire by legalmeans. Shortly thereafter theparty leadersdecided tostrive for transformingSyriaandMountLebanon intoan independent principality. At this juncture, however, the party did not haveanymeansforimplementingsuchagrandioseplan.2

Inearly1913someofthepartyleadersreachedtheconclusionthattheZionistmovementcouldbeapotentialallyintheirstruggleagainsttheYoungTurks.ItallstartedwithanarticleDa'udBarakatwroteinal-AhraminFebruary,inwhichhe emphasized the necessity of reaching an understanding betweenArabs andZionists.HeconsideredtheZionistsanessentialelementthatcouldbringcapitalandknowledgetotheregion.SeveraldayslaterHaqqial-Azmwroteinthesamenewspaper that the Syrians agreed to Jewish settlement in their country, sinceSyrianeededmoneyand laboriouspeople, and the Jewswere thebest for thispurpose. He pointed out that until then the Syrians had opposed Jewishimmigrationonlybecausemostof the immigrantskept their formernationalityandwere sympathetic towards theYoungTurks.Were theZionists to becomeOttomansubjectsandbeloyaltothecountryandtoitslanguage,theywouldbewelcome.Otherwise,Arabhistorywasgoing tobe smudgedby the things theArabswoulddototheJews.3

In early April, Ibrahim Salim alNajjar, another member of theDecentralizationParty,sentalettertoSamiHochberg,aleadingZionistactivistinIstanbulandtheeditor-in-chiefofLeJeuneTurc(wherealNajjarhadusedtowork in the past). He argued that since the Ottoman government refused toreform the empire, itwas advisable for theZionists to reach anunderstandingwithArab reformists and to support their demand for a decentralized regime,thus precluding the eventuality of an Arab Muslim-Christian union in Syriaagainst the Jews.Al-Najjar askedHochberg to forward hismessage toVictorJacobson, the representative of theZionistOrganization in Istanbul.Hochbergforwarded the message to Jacobson, who in turn forwarded it to the Central

Zionist Office in Berlin, recommending that Hochberg should travel to EgyptandenterintonegotiationswiththeDecentralizationParty.TheCentralZionistOfficeapprovedoftheventure.4

Hochberg set out forCairo,where hemetmembers of theDecentralizationPartyandalsoarepresentativeof theReformSocietyofBeirut thenpresent inCairo(seebelow).Hereachedtheconclusionthatbothorganizationshadnotyetformed a distinct policy towards the Jewish immigration into Palestine. TheChristianmembersoftheorganizationsrevealedpositiveattitudetowardsJewishimmigration, since they considered the Jews an additionalminority that couldhelpthemcounterbalanceMuslimoverwhelmingmajorityintheregion.Amongthe Muslim members, there were those who favoured Jewish immigrationbecause of its potential economic advantages. Others, however, voicedreservations,suchasthatthenumberofJewishimmigrantsshouldbelimitedtoseveral thousands per year and that there should be limits to Jewish landacquisitionfromtheArabfellahin.TherewerealsothosewhoentirelyopposedJewishimmigration.5

Hochbergmade it clear to the party representatives that if theywanted theZionistmovement to join their demands, theywould have to take the Zionistdemands into account and adopt them. To include theZionist demands in thepartyplatform,however,requiredtheconveningofageneralconferenceofpartyrepresentatives in all branches throughout Syria and Palestine. This could bedone only after the generalArab congress thatwas about to convene in PariswiththeparticipationofmostArabpoliticalorganizationsoperatingatthetime.6

For the time being, therefore, the party reached an entente verbale withHochberg, to the effect that since in principle it was favourable to Jewishimmigration into Syria and Palestine and to an entente with the Zionists, thepartywouldstriveforarapprochementbetweentheArabandJewishworlds.BymeansoforalpropagandaandthroughtheArabpress,itwoulddissipatealltheprejudicesexistingintheArabworldaboutJewishimmigrationthathadhithertoprevented an Arab-Jewish rapprochement. In exchange,Le Jeune Turc wouldtakeupon itself to support thecauseof theArabmovement, so longas itwascompatible with the unity and integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The journalwoulddoitsbesttoconvinceEuropeannewspaperswithwhichithadcontactstodothesame.Theententewasconsideredbyitspartnersanexchangeofservices,

withtheintentionofreachingacomprehensiveagreementinthefuture.7

InlateApril,thepartydeclaredpubliclythatithadbeenfoundedonthebasisof genuine equality of all Ottoman nationalities, regardless of religion ornationality. The Jews should have equal rights in the Ottoman Empire, andshouldnotbedeniedthecommonrightsenjoyedbyalltheOttomansingeneraland theSyrians inparticular.Furthermore, theparty'spresident,Rafiqal-Azm,published an announcement in favour of Jewish immigration, in which hedeclared inter alia that the party had decided to safeguard the rights of theJewish nationality. They realized all too well the precious aid that could berenderedbyJewishcapital,manpowerandintelligenceforarapiddevelopmentof theirprovinces to refuse them. Itwasalsoagreed that alNajjarwouldwriteseveral articles in this spirit, thatwould laterbepublishedunder thenamesofvariouspartymembers.8

The Decentralization Party was not the only organization which strove forimproving the conditions in theArab provinces of theOttomanEmpire. SuchactivityalsotookplacewithintheEmpire,thoughgiventhecircumstancesatthetime, thedemandsraisedbyArabactivistswereofamoremoderatenature. Inearly 1913 a new movement began to operate in the Arab provinces of theOttoman Empire, calling for administrative reforms that would improve theliving conditions in these provinces. InBeirut, aReformSocietywas formed,embodying bothMuslims and Christians, which in addition to the demand toimplement various administrative reforms in the province sought Europeanadviserstosupervisetheimplementationofthesereforms.However,theReformSocietyofBeirutmanagedtooperatefreelyonlyfora

short time. The Young Turks, who advocated centralized regime, could notallowtheexistenceofareformsocietyseekingadministrativeautonomy,andinAprilthevali(governor)ofBeirutissuedanorderforitsclosure.ThepeopleofBeirutrespondedwithcivildisobedienceandageneralstrike.Anarchyseemedtoovercomethecity;thevaliarrestedsomeoftheactivists.Finally,throughthemediationoftheBritishConsul-Generalinthecity,thevaliconsentedtofreetheprisonersinexchangeforapromisebythepeopleofBeiruttokeepthecalm.9

TheeventsofApril1913inBeirutservedasaproofforArabactiviststhatnoremedy could be found fromwithin the Empire. Therefore, it was decided toconvene a congress in Paris in June,with participation of the various existing

Arab organizations, that would pronounce Arab demands from the OttomanEmpire.The intentionwas togive internationalpublicity to theArabquestion,thus putting pressure on the Ottoman authorities to grant the demands of theArabreformists.Amongthedelegationssupposedtoparticipateinthecongresswas also a five-member delegation representing theReformSociety ofBeirut.ThefirstofthemtosailtoEgypt,inearlyMay,onhiswaytoParis,wasAhmadMukhtarBayhum,aprominentMuslimmemberoftheReformSociety.InCairo,he met Hochberg and took part in the discussions about the entente with theZionists.Furthermore,hepersuadedHochbergtosailforBeirutinordertoreacha similar entente with his own society. This Hochberg did, and the ententereached in Cairo was endorsed by the Beirut Reform Society, two of whosemembers, the Muslim Ahmad Hasan Tabbara and the Christian Rizq AllahArqash, published announcements in the spirit of Rafiq al-Azm's statement.Arqashdeclared,interalia,thattheintercommunalunionexistinginBeirutalsoembodiedtheJews,andthatJewishimmigrationtoSyriaandPalestinehadtobewelcomed. Itwouldbeacrimeagainst thefatherland tostop this immigration,he argued, since it could benefit the region by its capital and new workingmethods.10

In June, the congress of the Arab organizations opened in Paris, with theparticipationof21representativesfromvariousplacesinGreaterSyriaandtwofromIraq.Althoughthecongresswassupposedtobeofanall-Arabcharacter,inpracticeitsdistincthumanmake-upturneditintoaSyrian-orientedcongress.Itsdiscussionsdealtwith administrativedecentralizationand its application to theSyrian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Its resolutions demandedadministrative reforms, recognition of Arabic as an official language, thebroadeningofthegeneralcouncil'sauthorityinthevilayet(province)ofBeirut,andfinancialaidtothesanjaq(district)ofMountLebanon.11

Among those present in the congress hall was also Sami Hochberg. Hepreparedhimself for the third sessionof the congress, atwhichAhmadHasanTabbara of the Reform Society of Beirut was supposed to speak aboutimmigration to Syria, a topic which obviously was of interest to the Zionistmovement.Beforethecongressbegan,Hochberghadwarneditsparticipantsthatif the congress accepted an anti-Jewish resolution, the Arabs would lose allpossibleassistancefromtheJewishworldandwouldsettheJewsagainstthem

insteadofwiththem.HochbergespeciallytriedtoinfluenceTabbara,requestinga 2,000-franc credit from the Central Zionist Office in Berlin to invite theprincipalmembersofthecongresstoagoodmealbeforethedayofdiscussionsaboutimmigration.12

Thethirdsessionofthecongressopenedon21Juneat2.30pm,andSheikhAhmad Hasan Tabbara began his speech on 'Migration to and from Syria'.Statistics about emigration from Syria were followed by an analysis of itscauses.Hecontendedthat theemigrationwasagainst theemigrants'will.BornasOttomans, theArabswanted to remain such, but they alsowanted reforms.They did not want to secede from the Ottoman Empire, but the Empire wasmarching towards its ruin.The call for reforms emanated fromBeirut and theentireArabnationwasrespondingtoit.Itwouldbewrongtoretreat,becausethelife of the nation depended on reforms. It was imperative that the Ottomangovernmentrespondandgrantreformsonthebasisofdecentralizationforeveryprovince. As for immigration into Syria, Tabbara noted that Syria could holdfour times asmany inhabitants, and that organized immigrationwould benefitthecountry.Hochbergcouldbesatisfied.13

In the discussion following Tabbara's speech, the speakers expressedoppositiontoTurkishimmigrationintoSyria.(FollowingtheBalkanWarmanyMuslimTurks fled thebattlefieldsandmoved toother regionsof theEmpire.)They demanded a resolution about this, but Abd alHamid alZahrawi, thecongress'spresident(representingtheDecentralizationParty),maintainedthatitwaspreferabletodeferaresolutionconcerningtheTurkishimmigrantstoalaterstage of the congress. At this juncture, Khayrallah Khayrallah, one of theparticipants, announced thathewasagainstTurkish immigrationand thatonlyimmigrationofrichpeoplecouldbenefitthecountry.AtthatmomentBayhum,oftheReformSocietyofBeirut,shouted:'Jewishimmigration-yes!ButTurkishimmigration - no!'. His statement was accepted with astonishment by theaudience.Thereweresomewhispers,butnoonespokeagainstit.14

Shortlyafterthecongress,alZahrawiandBayhumtoldHochbergthatintheiropinionJewishimmigrationtoSyriaandPalestinewouldimprovethesituationin theseprovinces.Therewere,however, twoconditions: that the Jews shouldbecomeOttoman subjects, and thatArab fellahinwould not be expelled fromlandsboughtbytheJews.Theyexpressedtheirwillingnesstoarriveatasecret

agreementwithHochbergaboutthis,whichwouldconstitutethebasisofafinalagreementtobesignedwiththeleadersoftheZionistmovement.Hochbergalsointerviewed alZahrawi for his journal Le Jeune Turc. He asked him why theJews were not explicitly mentioned in the congress resolutions, to whichalZahrawi responded thatall the resolutions relating to the rightsanddutiesofthe Syrians included the Jews as well. The Jews were their brethren in race,beingSyrianswhohad left theircountry in thecourseof time.All theJews intheworldwerebutSyrianemigrants,thesameastheSyrianslivinginParisandAmerica, for example.Al-Zahrawi also remindedHochberg of the pro-JewishstatementsdeliveredearlierbyRafiqal-AzmandRizqAllahArqash.15

TheOttomangovernment,perplexedbytheinternationalreverberationsofthecongress, decided to reach an understanding with its participants in order toplacatethem.AYoungTurkemissaryarrivedinParisandcametoanagreementwith thecongressmembersaboutreformsthat theOttomangovernmenthad toimplement in the Arab provinces. But the agreed-upon reforms remained onpaper. TheOttoman government never really intended to keep to its promisesandevadedimplementingthereforms,whichledtothefinalbreakbetweentheTurksandtheArabactivists.16

WhenthehopespinnedbytheDecentralizationPartyontheParisagreementwere dashed, it decided to try again to enter into a treaty with the Zionistmovement. In late September, Da'ud Barakat told a Zionist representative inCairo that, bywayof preventing futuremisunderstandings, itwasdesirable torevive the entente that had been achieved between the party and the Zionistmovement.AnaccreditedZionist representativeshouldarrive inCairo toenterintonegotiationswithRafiqal-Azm,theparty'spresident,inthisregard.Inearly1914,RafiqandHaqqial-AzmandRashidRidaapproachedtherepresentativeoftheJewishNationalFundinCairo,expressing theirwill tomakecontactswithinternationalZionism inorder toarriveatanagreement thatwould lead to theaccomplishmentofthedesiresofbothmovements.Theystatedtheirfaithintheeffective help the Zionists would be able to extend to them to achieve theirgoals.17

However, at this stage the relationship between the party and the Zionistmovement began to deteriorate. Apparently, the very fact that the Zionistleadership disregarded these approaches was taken by the party leaders for

disrespecttowardsthemonthepartoftheZionists.InMarch,RashidRidawroteinhisperiodical,al-Manar,thatitwasimperativefortheArableaderstoachieveoneofthetwo:eithertoreachanagreementwiththeZionistleadersthatwouldaccommodatetheinterestsofbothparties,ortojoinforcesagainsttheZionistsanduseeverymeanstofightthem,includingarmedbands.18

InearlyApril,NisimMalul, a Jewishmemberof theDecentralizationPartyand a Zionist, employed by the Cairo newspaper al-Muqattam as its Jaffacorrespondent, interviewedtheZionist leaderNahumSokolow.SokolowcalledforunityamongArabsandJewsina jointstruggleforPalestine.Heexplainedthat theJewswereonly returning to theirhomeafter living inexile fora longtime. They did not intend to harm theArabs but to live by their side. JewishpresencewouldbenefittheArabs,sincetheJewswoulddevelopthecountrybymeansoftheirmoney,educationandmoderninventions.TheywouldprovetheirintentiontoapproachtheArabsby(a)learningtheArabiclanguage;(b)sendingphysicianstocurediseasesprevalentamongtheArabs;(c)launchingsheltersfortheneedy,especiallyamongtheArabs;and(d)openingbranchesoftheAnglo-PalestineCompanythatwouldlendmoneytothelocalpopulace.19

It seems that Rafiq al-Azm considered Sokolow's words regarding sendingdoctorsandopeningsheltersarrogantandoffensive,sinceseveraldayslaterhepublished a response in al-Muqattam, in which he uttered his disbelief inSokolow's statements regarding the Jewishwill to integrate in the country. Inpractice, theJewswereendangering theArabs,whoconsidered their refusal toforgotheirformernationalitiesapotentialpretextforaforeignforcetoconquerthecountry.IftheJewswantedtobewelcomeinthecountrytheyhadtobecomeOttoman subjects, to teach Arabic in their schools, to admit Arab students tothese schools, and to associate Arabs in their economic and commercialenterprises.Forthetimebeing,theyhaddonenoneofthis.20

At this juncture, Ibrahim Salim alNajjar, too, started to write against theZionist movement and Jewish immigration into Palestine. In an article in al-Ahram,hesurveyedajourneytoPalestinehehadmadeseveralmonthsearlier,which convinced him that the Jews were about to become the majority inPalestine.The Jews, alNajjar said,were gripping the economyofPalestine bythe throat. They dissociated themselves from the local populace, organized intheir own organizations out of the government's reach, and their settlements

actuallybecameastatewithinastate.Al-Najjarclaimed that theOttomanauthoritieshadeffectivelyacquiesced in

the Jews' actions. He attacked the Zionist leaders for ignoring the 'entente'reachedwiththeDecentralizationPartyin1913,whichinhisviewhadbecomeadead letter because theZionists had reached the conclusion that the partywasweak and it was preferable to negotiatewith theOttoman government.MalulrespondedtoalNajjarintwosharparticlesinal-Muqattam,whereherefutedhisallegationsconcerningtheJewishpresenceinPalestine.HealsopointedoutthatalNajjarhadquittheDecentralizationParty,andthereforewasinnopositiontodeclarethattheZionistshadwithdrawnfromthe'entente'withtheparty.21

In late April, the party's secretary, Haqqi al-Azm, sent a letter to Malul,warning him that the ongoing press campaign was liable to effect unpleasantconsequences for bothArabs and Jews.Hewas of the opinion that Sokolow'swords proved that hewasmocking theArabs the sameway theYoungTurkswere. He was especially angered by Sokolow's statement that the Jews werereturningtotheirownland.Sokolow'swordsthattheJewswouldapproachtheArabsbyopeningsheltersorhospitalswererejectedbyhimaspreposterous.TheArabswouldarriveatanunderstandingwith theJewsonlyif the latterdidnotjeopardize the Arabic language by their Hebrew, and on condition that theyrenegedontheirforeignnationalities.22

NisimMalul,oneofthemainadvocatesofJewish-Arabrapprochementinthatperiod,decidedpersonallytotrytosolvethecrisisandbylateMayhearrivedinCairo.Hewentstraighttothecafewherethepartyleadersusedtomeetandwaswarmly welcomed. Rafiq al-Azm attended the beginning of the conversationwhich followed but then retired. The main part of the conversation wasconductedbyHaqqialAzm,whomentionedanarticlepublishedbyJacobsoninal-MuqattamthepreviousdayinresponsetothearticlewrittenbyRafiqal-AzminearlyApril.Jacobsonhadcalledforunderstandingandco-operationbetweenJewsandArabsinPalestine,andsupportedtheideathattheJewsshouldbecomeOttoman subjects.Malul confirmed that thiswas the Zionist stand, though hepointedout that itwas the foreigndiplomatswhoputobstacles in theprocess,delayingtheJewsfromrenouncingtheirforeignnationalities.HealsoexplainedtheimportanceofHebrewfortheJews,keepingthemfromextinctionaftertheirreligiousconnectionhadweakened.Haqqial-Azmthenbroughtup theentente

reached with Hochberg, and claimed that the Zionists were ignoring it,preferringtomakecontactswiththeYoungTurks.HealsotoldMalulthatRafiqal-Azm intended to publish an anti-Zionist article the next day in response toJacobson'smessage.Malulansweredthatthisargumentinthepresswasharmfulandproposedinstead(a)todiscusstheentirerelationshipbetweenthetwosidesinaZionist-Arabcongress;(b)toinviteSokolowtoCairoforconsultations;and(c) to prevent further publications of this type since they were poisoning theatmosphere and preventing rapprochement. Haqqi al-Azm agreed and advisedhim to locate Rafiq alAzm and prevent the publication of the article. Malulimmediatelywent to thepartyclub,waited thereuntil1.30ambutal-Azmdidnotturnup.23

Thenextday,Rafiqal-Azm'sarticleappeared inal-Muqattam,attacking theZionistsforbeingassistedbytheOttomangovernmentandurgingtheArabstoresist them. He rebuked the Zionists for their methods in buying lands andreprovedtheOttomangovernmentfornotpreventingit.Atthisjuncture,MalultriedtosavethesituationbypersuadingRafiqal-Azmtopublishanotherarticlein which he would rectify the bad impression caused by his previous article.ConvincedbyMalul'sarguments,thenextdayal-Azmpublishedanotherarticleinal-Muqattam,expressinghisopinionthatifbothsidesagreedtorelentalittle,theywouldbeabletoreachanunderstanding.TheArabswantedtheZioniststoprove their good intentions in practice and not only in bare words. He alsopointedoutthathispartywasreadytoholdanArab-ZionistcongressinCairo.Twodayslater,al-Muqattam'seditorialofficeannouncedtheclosureofthepressdebate, and that no more articles on the issue would be published until theproposedArab-Zionistcongress tookplace,soas toallowitsdiscussionstobeheld without pressure. The announcement, ostensibly published by thenewspaper'seditorialoffice,wasinfactwordedbyMalul.24

InJune,NajibShuqayr,amemberoftheDecentralizationParty,metSokolowinIstanbulanddeliveredhimaninvitationfromRafiqal-AzmtocometoCairo.Sokolow did not arrive. At the same month, another party member, As'adDaghir, met Richard Lichtheim, Jacobson's successor as representative of theZionist Organization in Istanbul, and intimated to him that he would not beopposedtoalimitedJewishimmigrationintoPalestine.Describinghimselfasafriend of the Jews, he, however, pointed out that the Arabs were afraid that

Jewish economic superiority would eventually drive them out of Palestine.Lichtheim forwarded the message to Jacobson in Berlin, following whichJacobson delivered several proposals to Daghir: (a) since the Jews hadknowledge, capital and influence, while the Arabs possessed land, power andmaterialwealth,itwasadvisablethatthetwopeoplesarriveatanunderstanding;(b) the Arabs should accept the Jews as brothers, conditional upon theirbecoming Ottoman subjects; (c) in exchange, the Jews would invest theirmaterialandculturalresourcesintheserviceoftheArabcause,andsupporttheArabpartiesfinancially(threemillion liraswereoffered,accordingtoDaghir);(d) a Jewish-Arab congress should be held in Cairo. Daghir forwarded theproposalstoCairo.25

Inthemeantime,MalulwascontinuinghistalksinCairo.HepersuadedShibliShumayyil,amemberof thesupremecommitteeof theDecentralizationParty,to write a pro-Zionist article in al-Ahram, in which Shumayyil described thecampaign against the Zionists as superfluous and detrimental.Malul alsometRashidRida,who,whileadmittingthattheJewswerebeneficialtothecountry,demandedthatalsotheArabsshouldsharethebenefits.Ridafurtherstatedthattheparty leaderswere suspicious that the Jewshadcontactswith theOttomangovernment, at a time when the Arabs intended to free their lands from theTurks.SincetherewereonlythreetofourmillionTurks,and20millionArabs,Ridawarned,itwaspreferablefortheJewstoreachanunderstandingwiththeArabs,asArabvictorywasguaranteed.Rida'sfigureswereofcourseimaginary.Malul,atanyrate,deniedanyconnectionsbetweentheZionistsandtheOttomangovernment.26

At this point, however, the short-lived rapprochement between theDecentralizationPartyand theZionistmovementwasover. It seems that thereexisted a basic distrust on the part of the party activists towards the Zionists,suspectingthemofcollaboratingwiththeOttomangovernmentandofoperatinginPalestineunderOttomanaegis.Under suchcircumstances, theparty leaderssawnopointincontinuingthedialoguewiththeZionists.ItmightevenbethatsomeofthembelievedthattheentiredialoguewasamerestratagemonthepartoftheZionists,meanttoenablethemtopeacefullycarryouttheirplans.Ifsuchwas the case, then the only way to handle the situation was by using forceagainsttheZionists.

InalettertotheheadofthepartybranchinBeirut,Haqqial-Azmopposedtheidea of an Arab-Jewish congress and claimed that the Zionists intended toexpandtoSyriaandIraq.TheZionistshadtobestoppedbymeansofthreatsandpersecution,bypersuadingtheArabpopulationtodestroytheirfarmsandburntheir settlements, and by organizing bands to execute this. A secret societyestablishedinEgyptforthispurposewasalsomentionedbyhiminthisrespect.InJuly,Haqqial-Azmpublishedanarticleinthesamespiritinal-Iqdam(editedby the anti-Zionist Palestinian partymember,Muhammad al-Shanti), inwhichheattackedtheOttomangovernmentfordoingnothingagainsttheZionistperil.TheOttomangovernmentwasbribedbytheZionists,hebelieved.However,intheend,thealliancewiththegovernmentwouldnothelptheZionists,andtheywouldbeforcedbytheArabstoleavePalestinewithgreatlosses.27

Rafiqal-Azm,moremoderatethanHaqqial-Azm,wroteinlateJulyinalettertoAs'adDaghirregardingJacobson'sproposalsofJune.Hearguedthat,whileinprincipletheseproposalswereallfine,theZionistshadtounderstandthatiftheirideaswerenotamenabletothePalestinianArabs, thenegotiationsbetweentheZionists and the partywould becomemeaningless.28 At the very samemonththat Rafiq al-Azm wrote this, Richard Lichtheim, the representative of theZionist Organization in Istanbul, wrote to the Zionist Actions Committee inBerlinthat'DiegrosseFrageistnun:Washabenwirzubieten?'.29Bythis,thesetwomeninfacttouchedtwokeyquestions:wasthereapointinanynegotiationsbetween Zionists and non-Palestinian Arabs? and was there anything to talkabout? However, for the time being there was no imperative need to answerthese questions, since by August 1914 the First World War intervened andturnedthepre-warnegotiationswhollyirrelevant.During the war, the Ottoman authorities executed several dozens of Arab

activists, among them some of those involved in the negotiations with theZionists, such asAhmadHasanTabbara andAbd alHamid alZahrawi.Others,who had long lived in Egypt, such as Rafiq andHaqqi al-Azm,RashidRida,Da'ud Barakat, and Ibrahim Salim alNajjar, or had fled the Empire at thebeginning of the war, like Rizq Allah Arqash, were sentenced to death inabsentia. Inorder to justify theexecutions, theOttomanspublisheda seriesofincriminatingdocumentswhichbelongedto theDecentralizationPartyandhadfallen into their hands. In some of the documents the negotiations with the

Zionistswerepartlyexposed.30

The Decentralization Party itself disintegrated during the war, and itsremaining activists turned to establish new organizations that would be bettersuited for the changing circumstances. The next time the Palestine questionoccupied the minds of the Syrian and Lebanese activists in Cairo was inNovember1917,withthepublicationoftheBalfourDeclarationconcerningtheestablishmentofaJewishnationalhomeinPalestine.Assoonasthedeclarationbecame known in Cairo, Fawzi alBakri (an activist from Damascus) andSulaymanNasif(aLebaneselawyer)wenttotheBritishArabBureaubearingatelegram signed by them and by Rafiq al-Azm and Faris Nimr (one of theownersofal-Muqattam),inwhichtheyassertedtoBalfourthatPalestinewasanintegral part of Syria. They also demanded from the British that the Syriansshouldhave the same rights inPalestine as the Jews, in all fields.TheBritishfirstpromisedtosendonthetelegramtoLondon,butaftertheyhadkeptitforalmostamonththeyinformedthesendersthattheirtelegramwouldnotbesent,andalsorecommendedtothemtodesistfromthismethodofprotest.31

But the Syrian activists were not ready to give up. In mid-December, adelegationofMuslimSyriansleftCairoforAqaba,headedbyHaqqial-Azm,topersuade Amir Faisal to protest against the British policy towards Zionism.Much as Faisal expressed his misgivings about the Balfour Declaration, herefused to protest against it to the British.Apparently, Faisalwell understoodthat he was in no position to criticize the British, upon whose assistance theentiremilitaryeffortof theArabRevoltwasdependent.Haqqial-Azmtried topersuadehimthatinhisstatusasanArableaderhewasobligedtoprotest,andcertainly his father, Hussein, the 'King of the Arab Nation', was obliged toprotest.ButFaisalstoodbyhisrefusal.AnattemptbytheSyrians toappeal toHussein himself, through his Cairo representative, had the same result, withHusseinpointingoutthathewaswellawareoftheBritishplansfortheJewsinPalestine. This attitude ofHussein and Faisal towards theBalfourDeclarationcaused the Syrian activists in Cairo to reach the conclusion that Hussein wastotally under British control, and that he had even committed himself to theBritishnottointerfereintheirpolicyregardingPalestine.32

Inthemeantime,inLondon,MarkSykes,anexpertinArabaffairsonbehalfof the British government (and a partner to the Sykes-Picot agreement), was

busy bringing about an Arab-Armenian-Jewish understanding. Professing therealizationof thenationalaspirationsof these threepeoples,andbelieving thattheyshouldco-operateforattainingtheirgoals,hesetupacombinedcommitteewhich included Syrian, Armenian and Zionist (Chaim Weizmann)representatives. Inmid-November Sykes sent a letter to several of the Syrianleaders in Cairo, who then got together in the framework of a 'SyriaWelfareCommittee',33proposingtothemtoco-operatewiththeArmeniansandtheJewsintheinterestsoftheliberationoftheircountry.HepointedoutthatallthattheZionistswantedwas tobegiven the right to settle inPalestineand to conducttheirnationallifethere.Following his request, Gilbert Clayton, Director of British Intelligence in

Cairo,alsojoinedintheattemptstoconvincetheSyrianactivistsofthebenefitof joiningtheArab-Armenian-Zionist tripartiteententedesignedbySykes.ThemembersoftheSyriaWelfareCommitteediscussedthematterandreachedtheconclusion that their best policywas to co-operatewith the Jews on the linessuggested.TheyinformedClaytonthatbeingawareofthestrengthandstatusoftheJews,theywereinterestedindisseminatingpropagandainPalestineinfavourofSyrian-Jewishbrotherhood.This couldbeachievedby sendingadelegationon their behalf to Palestine. Concurrently, they also began contacts withrepresentativesoftheZionistmovementinCairo.34

InJanuary1918,themembersoftheSyriaWelfareCommittee,amongthemSulaymanNasif,RafiqandHaqqial-Azm,FawzialBakriandFarisNimr,sentareply letter toSykes,stating that ifall that theZionistswantedwas tosettle inthe country and enjoy the same rights and duties as the local people, theyacceptedfavourablyhisproposalsforArab-Armenian-Zionistco-operation.Fortheir part, theywere ready to send a delegation to Palestine to preach in thisspirit.Sykesansweredtheirletterinmid-February,informingtheminthenameof theLondon-Syrian-Armenian-Zionist committeeof the impending arrival inEgyptofaZionistdelegationheadedbyChaimWeizmann.35

Intheend,nothingcameofSykes'splan.ContributingtoitsdemisewasalsoHussein'srefusaltosendarepresentativetoattendthiscommittee,onthegroundthat hewas the sole spokesmanof theArabnation.Nevertheless, the contactsbetween the Zionists and Syrians in Cairo continued. In March, the Zionistdelegation headed by Weizmann arrived in Egypt and met with the

representatives of theSyriaWelfareCommittee - SulaymanNasif, FarisNimrandSa'idShuqayr.Prior to themeetingNasifhadcompileda listofdemands,whose main ones were: (a) that the Arabs would enjoy equal rights in thegovernmentofPalestine; (b) thatArabic shouldbe theofficial language there;(c) that until war's end no sale of land in Palestine should be permitted.WeizmannagreedtothedemandsandevenaddedthathehadpersonallyaskedBalfour that until the end of the war no purchase and sale of land should beallowedinPalestine.HeemphasizedthattheZionistshadnointentionofsettingupaJewishgovernmentinPalestine,andthattheyregardedPalestineasarefugethatwouldservethemasanationalandintellectualhome.WeizmannalsospokeoftheprogressandeconomicwelfarethattheZionistsmovementwouldbringtoPalestine, from which the Muslims and Christians would also benefit. TheSyrian participants of the meeting were very satisfied with Weizmann'sclarifications and even promised to send a soothing letter to the PalestinianArabs.36

In earlyApril theZionist delegation continued toPalestine. Itwas receivedtherewithhostilitybythelocalArabs,whosesuspicionsconcerningtheZionistintentions regardingPalestinewere only aggravated by the visit. In earlyMaythe British permitted the Syria Welfare Committee to send a delegation toPalestine to calm the fears of the population about the Zionist plans.ParticipatinginthedelegationwereRafiqal-Azm,SulaymanNasifandMukhtaral-Sulh,and itwasdecided todefine itasaprivatevisit rather thananofficialdelegationunderBritishsponsorship,oronbehalfoftheSyriancommittee.Thedelegationspenta fortnight inPalestine,duringwhich itvisitedJerusalemandJaffa.InthetwocitiesthedelegationencounteredveryhostilefeelingstowardstheZionists,andall itsefforts toconvince the inhabitants that theZionistsdidnot intend tosetupaJewishgovernment inPalestine,and that stepshadbeentaken to prevent Jews from buying land in Palestine, were in vain. The localArabs saw the delegation as an officialmission that had come to handle theirproblems,andtheybegantopourouttheirtroubles.Rafiqal-Azmpromisedthatthedelegationwoulddoitsbesttoassistthem.WhenthedelegationreturnedtoCairo it suggested to the British a number of measures, including economicmeans, to allay the distress among the Palestinian Arabs. However, in itsprincipalobjectiveofcalmingtheArabsofPalestinewithregardtotheZionist

plansthemissionprovedtobeafailure.37

Frommid-1918Arab-Jewish dialoguewas reduced to the contacts betweenFaisal and Weizmann, which are outside the scope of this essay, and havealreadybeenstudiedthoroughly.ItstartedinJune1918withameetingbetweenthe two north of Aqaba, and ended in January 1919, at the Paris PeaceConference,with the famous Faisal-Weizmann agreement,which, as aBritishofficer put it severalmonths afterwards,was 'notworth the paper it iswrittenon'. The assessment of theBritish officer,Major J.N.Camp,was accurate, asFaisalwasapuppet in thehandsof theSyriannationalistorganizations,whichweretherealrulersofSyriaatthattime.38

Nevertheless, also during the existence of Faisal's short-lived state in Syriasubsequent to the First World War, there was another attempt to reach anagreementbetweenaSyrianpartyand theZionistOrganization. ItwascarriedoutbytheSyrianNationalParty.Astheextremistnationalistcirclesinpost-warSyriawere gaining the upper hand, a counter-reaction began among themoreconservative and moderate groups - aristocrats, notables, landowners andbusinessmenwhostood to lose fromasituationofdisorderorwar,whichwasboundtostemfromthedeteriorationofrelationsbetweenSyriaandtheFrench.These groups were less anti-French, and desired first and foremost order andtranquillity, and if possible - senior positions in Faisal's regime.When FaisalstartedtorealizehowtenuoushispositioninSyriawas,hesawthesepeopleasnaturalallies,whocouldhelphimincarryingouthispolicyofappeasementwiththeFrench.Hedecidedtosetupapartythatwouldsupporthimandbecomeacounterweight to the extremist nationalist organizations. Thus, he hoped, hewouldnotstandaloneinthepoliticalarenainhisattemptstopersuadetheSyrianpopulationtoacceptapeacefulagreementwiththeFrench.InJanuary1920theestablishmentof theSyrianNationalPartywasofficially announced. Initiatingthe partywasNasib alBakri, Faisal's special adviser (and a brother of Fawzi),and most members of its administrative and advisory committees came fromamong the socio-economic groups described above. The party platform statedinter alia that it sought equality of civil and political rights for all of Syria'sresidents, regardless of creed or origin, and that it supported the principle ofdemocraticmonarchy.39

InMarch 1920 the partywas involved in an attempt to reach an agreement

withtheZionistmovement.Theinitiatoroftheagreementonbehalfofthepartywas Najib Sufayr, a rather dubious personality from Beirut.40 Followingpreliminary talksbetweenSufayr,WeizmannandMosheShertok,anumberofparty members from the western region - Sufayr himself, YusufMu'adhdhin,RashidKaram,NajibHashim andAntun Shahada - signed an agreementwithJoshuaHankin,representingtheZionistOrganization.According to the agreement, the signatories acquiesced in the severance of

Palestine from Syria and the establishment by the Zionist Organization of anational home (foyer national in the French version of the agreement, bay itle'umi in the Hebrew version, andmawtin qawmi in the Arabic one) for theJewish people there. They also agreed to massive Jewish immigration toPalestine, and promised to prepareArab public opinion to accept the Jews astheirneighbours.AlltheinhabitantsofPalestine,regardlessofreligion,weretoenjoyequalcivilandeconomicrights.TheZionistOrganization,foritspart,wastoundertakenottoencroachonthebordersofSyriaandLebanoninthefuture,not to intervene in the affairs of the Muslim and Christian holy places inPalestine, and to assist the governments of Syria and Lebanon financially indevelopingtheircountries.TheagreementboreconsiderableresemblancetotheFaisal-Weizmannagreement,anditsfatewasthesame:itremainedanarchivaldocumentwithoutanypracticalconsequences.41

Conclusion

During the final years of the Ottoman Empire, the Arab nationalists foundthemselvesinconfrontationwiththeYoungTurks,theEmpire'srulers.Strivingfor autonomy, or even independence for their provinces, they perceived theZionistmovementasapotentialallyinthestruggleagainstacommonenemy.Intheir opinion, the shared interests of the movements prescribed such a co-operation, and they believed in the power and influence of the Zionists andespecially in their financial capabilities. The Zionist activists, for their part,found it easier to negotiate with Syrian or Lebanese activists, for whom anententeofsharedinterestswiththeZionistsagainsttheOttomanauthoritieswas

ofahigherimportancethanthespecificinterestsofthePalestinianArabs,whowerethefirsttolosebyJewishimmigrationandZionistactivity.Inthisperiod,the characteristics of the Arab-Israeli conflict were not clear yet, and suchnegotiationscouldtakeplace.However,eventuallyitallcrumbledawayowingto the distrust felt by the Arab activists towards the Zionists, suspected ofcollaborating with their rivals, the Turks, at Arab expense (whether this wasfactuallytruewasirrelevantinthisrespect).DuringtheFirstWorldWar,andinits aftermath, several other attempts to reach Arab-Jewish understanding tookplace,buttheywerealltofail.ThedisintegrationoftheOttomanEmpireandtheestablishmentofthemodernArabstatesdidnotbodewellforthefutureofeitherPalestinian-Jewishrelationsornon-Palestinian-Arab-Jewishrelations.

EliezerTauberisProfessorofMiddleEasternHistoryatBar-IlanUniversity.

Notes

1.ForathoroughresearchofallsortsofcontactsbetweenJewsandArabsbeforetheFirstWorldWar,

seeNevilleJ.Mandel,TheArabsandZionismbeforeWorldWarI,Berkeley,1976(thisisarevised

versionofhisdoctoraldissertationtitled'Turks,ArabsandJewishimmigrationintoPalestine1882-

1914',Oxford,1965).Mandelalsowrotetwoarticlesaboutthisissue,thefirstwiththesametitleas

his dissertation, published in St Antony's Papers, No. 17, London, 1965, pp.77-108; the second,

titled'AttemptsatanArab-ZionistEntente1913-1914',MiddleEasternStudies,Vol.I,No.3(1965),

pp.238-67.Manyofthepre-waroccurrencesmentionedinthisessayarealsodescribedinMandel's

publications.

ForPalestinian-JewishrelationsseeEliezerBe'eri,ReshitHa-sikhsukhIsrael-Arav,TelAviv,1985,for

thepre-warera;andYehoshuaPorath,TheEmergenceofthePalestinian-ArabNationalMovement

1918-1929, London, 1974, for the post-war period. The best analysis of the Zionist viewpoint is

YosefGorny,Ha-She'elaHa-AravitVe-ha-Be'ayaHa-Yehudit,TelAviv,1985.

2. For the history of the Decentralization Party, see Eliezer Tauber, The Emergence of the Arab

Movements,London,1993,pp.121-34.Whileabout70percentofpartymemberswereMuslim,itis

knownthattherewereonlytwoJewishmembersintheparty,NisimMalulandYosefMoyal,both

initsJaffabranch.TherestofthememberswereChristian.

3.Al-Ahram,19and25February1913.

4. Central Zionist Archives (hereafter CZA), Z3/45: letter, Victor Jacobson (Istanbul) to Richard

Lichtheim(Berlin),10April1913; letter,LichtheimtoJacobson,13April1913.Later thatmonth

Da'ud Barakat approached a Zionist representative regarding the possibility of reaching an

agreement between theZionists and the party. SeeCZAZ3/752: letter, S.Hasamsony (Cairo) to

CentralZionistOffice(Berlin),25April1913.

5.CZAZ3/114:'Lemouvementarabe',bySamiHochberg(Istanbul),17May1913.

6.Tworepresentativesofthepartyweretoparticipateinthecongress:AbdalHamidalZahrawi,elected

thecongresspresident,andIskandarAmmun,thepartyvice-president.

7.Ibid.

8.Ha-Herut,5/196,18May1913;CZAZ3/114:'Lemouvementarabe',byHochberg,17May1913.See

alsoHa-Herut,5/216,10June1913.LateronHochbergwasexpectedtodeliver10lirastoalNajjar

forwritinganarticle'wiewireswiinschen'.SeeCZAZ3/45:letter,Jacobson(Berlin?)toJ.Neufach

(Istanbul),23May1913.ItwasnottheonlytimethatalNajjarwasexpectedtowritearticles'suivant

nosinstructions'.See,forexample,CZAZ3/47:letter,illegible(Berlin)toLichtheim(Istanbul),29

September1913.

9.FortheReformSocietyofBeirutandtheAprileventsinthatcity,seeTauber,Emergence,pp.135-47.

ThemembershipoftheReformSocietyofBeirutdividedequallybetweenMuslimsandChristians,

withtwoJewishmembers,IbrahimHakimandSalimRefa'elHakim.

10.CZAZ3/114:'Lemouvementarabe',byHochberg,17May1913;Ha-Herut,5/216,10June1913;Le

JeuneTurc,5,p.150,1June1913,citedinMandel,Arabs,p.158.

11.FortheParisCongress,seeTauber,Emergence,pp.178-97.OneoftheIraqidelegatestothecongress

wasaJew,SulaymanAnbar.TherewasonlyonePalestinianArab in thecongress,AwniAbdal-

HadiofNablus.

12.CZAZ3/114:letters,Hochberg(Paris)toJiacobson(Berlin),10and16June1913.

13.Al-Lajnaal-Ulyali-Hizbal-Lamarkaziyyabi-Misr[Muhibbal-Dinal-Khatib],al-Mu'tamaral-Arabi

al-Awwal, Cairo, 1913, pp.83-93; CZA Z3/114: letter, Hochberg to Jacobson, 24 June 1913;

Archives duMinistere desAffaires Etrangeres (Paris) (hereafterMAE),Nouvelle Serie, Turquie,

Vol.122:report,PrefecturedePolice(Paris)22June1913.

14.CZAZ3/114:letter,HochbergtoJacobson,24June1913.

15.CZAZ3/114:letters,HochbergtoJacobson,26and27June1913;Ha-Herut,5/266,8August1913.

16.FortheParisagreementanditsconsequences,seeTauber,Emergence,pp.198-212.

17.CZAZ3/753:letter,HasamsonytoZionistActionsCommittee(Berlin),1October1913;letter,Jacob

Caleff(Cairo)toPresidentoftheZionistActionsCommittee(Berlin),10January1914.

18.Al-Manar,17/4,27March1914,p.320.

19.Al-Muqattam,10April1914.

20.Ibid.,14April1914.

21.Al-Ahram,11April1914;al-Muqattam,23and24April1914.

22.CZAL2/94Ib:letter,Haqqial-Azm(Cairo)toNisimMalul,29April1914.

23.CZAA18/14/6:letter,Malul(Cairo)toNahumSokolowandArthurRuppin(Jaffa),29May1914;al-

Muqattam,27May1914;Ha-Herut,6/232,21July1914.

24.CZAA18/14/6: letter,Malul toSokolowandRuppin,31May1914;al-Muqattam,29and30May,

and1June1914;Ha-Herut,6/232,21July1914.

25. CZA Z3/49: letters, Lichtheim to Jacobson, 7 June 1914, and Lichtheim to Zionist Actions

Committee, 3 July1914;As'adDaghir,Mudhakkirati alaHamishal-Qadiyyaal-Arabiyya,Cairo,

n.d.[1959?],p.43.

26.CZAL2/94Ib:letter,MalultoZionistOffice(Jaffa),7June1914;al-Ahram,3June1914.Foranother

pro-ZionistarticlebyShibliShumayyil,seeal-Muqattam,1May1914.

27. Letter 70,Haqqi al-Azm toMahmud al-Mihmisani (Beirut), 20 June 1914, cited inLe Journal de

Beyrouth, 413,1September1915.AHebrew translationofHaqqi al-Azm's article is available in

CZAL2/94Ia.

28. Letter 68, Rafiq al-Azm (Cairo) to As'ad Daghir (Istanbul), 30 July 1914, cited inLe Journal de

Beyrouth,414,2September1915.

29.CZAZ3/49:letter,LichtheimtoZionistActionsCommittee,3July1914.

30.For theexecutionsof theArabactivists, seeEliezerTauber,TheArabMovements inWorldWar I,

London,1993,pp.35-56.Fortheincriminatingdocuments,seealsoidem,'LaVeritesurlaQuestion

Syrienne:AReconsideration',JournalofTurkishStudies,15(1991),pp.315-44.

31.ThePublicRecordOffice(Kew,London),ForeignOfficeRecords(hereafterFO),141/654/356:letter,

C.A.G.Mackintosh (Cairo) toGilbertF.Clayton (Cairo),22November1917, enclosing telegram

from the Syrians (Cairo) to Balfour (London) 20 November 1917; National ArchivesMicrofilm

Publications(UnitedStates)(hereafter:NA),367/381:reports7,8and10,WilliamYale(Cairo)to

LelandHarrison (Washington),10,17and31December1917;FrankE.Manuel,TheRealitiesof

American-PalestineRelations,Washington,1949,p.187.

32.NA367/381: reports5,8and10,Yale toHarrison,26November, and17and31December1917;

Manuel,Realities,pp.187-8.

33. Established ostensibly for the purpose of sending economic aid to the Syrian population, which

suffered greatly during the war, the Syria Welfare Committee was in fact a feeble political

framework,whichdisintegratedbutafewmonthsafteritsestablishment.

34. FO 882/17: report 113/1/3744, Mackintosh to Clayton, 27 December 1917, enclosing letters,

SulaymanNasif(Cairo)toClayton,26and28December1917;Manuel,Realities,p.187.

35.FO371/3398:letter,Nasifandothers(Cairo)toMarkSykes(London),17January1918,andletter,

Sykes(innameofSyrians,ArmeniansandZionists),15February1918.

36. NA 367/382: report 22, Yale to Harrison, 8 April 1918; CZA L4/768: letter, Kinahan Cornwallis

(Cairo)toSymes,20April1918,and'TheArabCommissioninJaffa'byIsaalSifri(Jaffa),22May

1918;Mir'at al-Gharb, 15August 1918, citing a letter fromNasif to al-Kawkab, 14 June 1918;

Manuel,Realities,p.188.

37.CZAL4/768:'TheArabCommissioninJaffa'byalSifri,22May1918;NA367/383:report29,Yale

toHarrison,27May1918;ArabBulletin,No.91(Cairo)4June1918,p.182;Mir'atal-Gharb,15

August1918,citingaletterfromNasiftoal-Kawkab,14June1918;MAE,Levant1918-29,Arabie-

Hedjaz,Vol.1:despatch185A,Cousse(Jidda)toMAE10July1918.

38. 'The Arab Movement and Zionism', by J.N. Camp (Jerusalem), 12 August 1919, cited in E.L.

Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, London,

1952,FirstSeries,Vol.IV,p.364.ForFaisal'sstatus inSyriaduring1919-20,seeEliezerTauber,

TheFormationofModernSyriaandIraq,London,1995,pp.39^18.

39.FortheSyrianNationalParty,seeTauber,Formation,pp.54-5.

40. InJuly1920NajibSufayrwas involved inanattemptby theparty topersuade themembersof the

administrative council ofMount Lebanon to co-operatewith the Syrian government. Preliminary

meetings to discuss the matter were held in Sufayr's house, with the participation of several

membersoftheadministrativecouncil.However,Sufayrregularlyreportedeverythingthathadbeen

saidinthesemeetingstotheFrench,thenrulingoverMountLebanonandlittoralSyria.Theresult

wasthatallthecouncilmembersinvolvedinthemeetingswerearrestedbytheFrench.SeeAnisal-

Nusuli, Ishtu waShahadtu, Beirut, 1951, p.49, and Bulus Mas'ad, Lubnan wa-Suriya qabla al-

Intidabwaba'dahu,Cairo,1929,p.75.

41.Theagreement, inFrench,HebrewandArabic, signedbyNajibSufayr,YusufMu'adhdhin,Rashid

Karam,NajibHashim,AntunShahada,andJoshuaHankin(Jerusalem),26March1920,isavailable

in CZA S25/9907. See also:Moshe Sharett,YomanMedini, Tel Aviv, 1968, Vol. I, p.65. Najib

SufayrwastocontinuehiscontactswiththeJews.In1936heofferedWeizmannandShertoktobuy

landsineithernorthernSyriaortheTyre-Sidonregion,accordingtohim,withFrenchpermission.

Hisofferwasdeclined,tohisgreatdisappointment.Seeibid.,pp.64-5.

TransitionfromConflict:TheImportanceofPreNegotiationsinthe

OsloPeaceProcessILANG.GEWURZ

Since time immemorial humanbeings have sought to understand howconflictcan be transformed into peace through non-violent conflict resolution.Particularly since the end of the Second World War, this issue has receivedmuch attention from scholars and statesmen alike. Article 33 of the UnitedNations Charter (1945) addresses the issue of pacific settlement of disputessaying that 'parties to any dispute ... shall first of all, seek a solution bynegotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement,resorttoregionalagenciesorarrangements,orotherpeacefulmeansoftheirownchoice'.1Whileadvanceshavebeenachievedinthisarea,thereisstillmuchtobe learned regarding what brings parties in conflict to consider bilateral ormultilateral solutions. Indeed, it should be remembered that 'crucial as it is,"around the table negotiation" is only a later part of a (much) larger processneededtoresolveconflictbypeacefulmeans'.2

Thereareanumberof important factorswhich influenceastate's (oranon-state actor's) decision to abandon a unilateral approach to a given conflictsituation - aiming to achieve its own maximal objectives - in favour of anegotiated agreement. Changing realities within the international context,regionalfactorsanddomesticcircumstanceseconomic,politicalorsociological-canallbeoffundamentalimportanceininfluencingthedecision.However,theprocess of transforming a conflictual relationship into one involving directnegotiations is not a simple one. Historical grievances, the psychological andpolitical 'baggage' of actors and established government approaches to dealingwiththeconflictallposesignificantchallengestothecontinuation,oreventhecommencement, of negotiations. Thus prenegotiations were identified as anintermediary stage which is central to the success of such transitions.

Prenegotiationsfunctionasa'learningprocess',gettingeachpartytounderstandtheneeds,interestsandexpectationsoftheotherside.Furthermore,theyenableDovish views to be explored in a lowrisk environment thereby gaininglegitimacywithinthemainstreamoftheirowngovernment'spolicychoices.3

Oftenpartieshaveexperienced theirconflictual relationshipsforyears ifnotgenerations and a negative portrayal of the other may be entrenched in theirnational ideologies.Fearandmistrust rundeepanda lackofconfidence in theotherparty'ssincerityandwillingnesstocomplywithanagreement(ifonewereto be reached) do not lend themselves to building an environment in whichnegotiations can occur in good faith. Thus, 'a shift towards more accurateperceptions and images, more favorable attitudes, more open and accuratecommunication, increased trust and a cooperative win-win orientation wouldaugurwellforameaningfulandsuccessfulnegotiation.'4Itisinthisregardthatprenegotiationsaresoimportant,asalowriskopportunityinwhichtheadvocatesof negotiations themselves can be convinced of the viability of the process aswellasconvincethemoremainstreamdecision-makersofitsvalue.On13September1993theworldwitnessedthefamous 'handshake'between

PalestinianLiberationOrganization (PLO)ChairmanYasserArafat and IsraeliPrimeMinisterYitzhakRabinontheWhiteHouselawn,andthesigningofthe'DeclarationofPrinciples'(DOP)5byArafatandIsraeliForeignMinisterShimonPeres.Thissetinmotionperhapsthemostoptimisticandfar-reachingprocessinthe history of the conflict. Israel at long last recognized the PLO as the solelegitimaterepresentativeofthePalestinianpeople.Inturn,thePLOrecognizedthe right of the state of Israel to exist, renounced the use of terrorism and allotherformsofviolenceandcommitteditselftoaprocessofpeacefulresolution.Much has been written on this 'historic breakthrough' and its subsequent

agreement. The secret negotiations which took place between Israeli andPalestinian representatives - known as the Oslo process - also receivedsubstantialcoverage.However,fewaddressOsloasaprenegotiationwhichlaidthefoundationsforthesuccesseswhichfollowed.ThispaperwillarguethattheearlystagesoftheOslotalkswerecrucial,constitutingaprenegotiationprocessthat allowed theofficial negotiating track todevelop.A successful negotiationbetweenthegovernmentofIsraelandrepresentativesofthePLOcouldnothavetakenplacewithoutfirstaddressingvariousobstacleswhichweredealtwith in

theprenegotiationprocess.Thispaperbeginsbydrawingattentiontothenatureandinherentimportance

of theprenegotiationprocess itself.First, it expands theexistingdefinitionsofprenegotiations in order to achieve greater clarity of both what constitutes aprenegotiation and what role it actually serves. Second, it examines theconditions which are conducive for prenegotiations to begin and outlines thedifferentstagesoftheprocessitself.Indoingso,itexploresthefunctionswhichprenegotiations serve and the impact they have on the subsequent officialnegotiationprocess.Itsuggeststhatprenegotiationsplayacentralroleinhelpingpartiesreach thenegotiating tableandshaping theprocessonce theyare there.Theprocessisalsoimportantfordefiningtheparameters,insettingtheagendaand selecting the participants of the official negotiations which may follow.Furthermore, it also serves to gain support among central decision-makers fortheprocessitself.Having analysed the literature on prenegotiations, the paper situates this

theory in the case study of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking efforts in Oslo. Itargues thatwhat has been looked upon as one process of negotiations can beviewed as two relatively distinct stages; the first serving as a prenegotiationwhichhelpedtoshapeandbringaboutthesecond.RecognizingthisfunctionoftheOslotalksandunderstandingtheearlystagesofthesecretchannel(JanuarytoMarch1993)asaprenegotiationclarifies theway inwhich thenegotiationsevolved.This first periodenabled theparties to learnmoreaboutoneanother,evaluate the other party's needs, interests and intentions and helped bring theprocesstoapointwhereitcouldenterintomainstreamforeignpolicy.Itthussetthestagefortheformalnegotiationwhichdevelopedoutofthesesuccesses.Theessaywill concludebydrawing lessons from theexperience inOslo regardingthenatureofprenegotiationsingeneral.

UnderstandingPreNegotiations:DefiningtheProcess

Temporality

The most prominent 'working definition' of prenegotiations was developed in1989andservedasthebasisforwhathasbeenthemostcomprehensivebookonthetopictodate.Itstatedthat 'Prenegotiationsbeginwhenoneormorepartiesconsidersnegotiationsasapolicyoptionandcommunicatesthisintentiontotheotherparties.Prenegotiationendswhenthepartiesagreetoaformalnegotiationorwhenonepartyabandonstheconsiderationtonegotiationasapolicyoption'.6

Though analytically distinct from the official negotiations, prenegotiations arestill part of thebroader attempt tomoveparties froma situationof conflict tooneofmutuallyagreed-uponsettlementandshouldthusbeunderstoodasapartof the negotiation process itself. However, this temporal definition ofprenegotiations is not sufficient in and of itself. The boundaries between theprenegotiation and the actual negotiation cannot be described as being sharp.Rathertheprocessisdynamicanddivisionsarepermeable.Itisthusdifficulttospecifyexactlywhenonestageendsandthenextbegins.Thenegotiationandtheprenegotiation often overlap, and the process may move back and forth.Furthermore, whereas this definition specifies when prenegotiations occur, itdoes not clarifywhat the functions of this process are nor how it attempts toachievethem.Indescribingtheprenegotiationprocesstheoristshaveexpandedonthistime-

baseddefinitionandhavefocusedonthestructure,thefunctionsservedanditsrelationshipwiththeofficialnegotiationswhichmayfollow.Itisthusimportantto construct a definition of prenegotiations which encompasses all of theseaspectsinordertofurtherourunderstandingoftheprocess.Anexclusivelytime-baseddefinitionalsorunsintodifficultiesatthelevelofapplicationasitcanbeallinclusive and subsequently add nothing to our understanding of thetransformationofconflict.Forexample,allsecretdiscussionsthateveroccurredbetween Israelis and Palestinians could fit this definition and thus classify asprenegotiations. While these may have been significant in creating anatmospheremoreconducivetonegotiations,theydonothelptoexplainwhytheOsloprocessspecificallygainedsuccess.

PsychologicalandPracticalFunctions

Oneof the central functions of prenegotiations is to address the psychologicalbarriersthatimpedeofficialnegotiations.Thisincludesredefiningrelationshipsand jointly reframing the problems, addressing the parties' fears andapprehensions and creating an atmosphere of common understanding. In sodoing it helps the parties to transform the conflict by generating sharedunderstandingsoftheproblemandencouragingdefinitionsoftheconflictwhichareconducive tonegotiatedoutcomes.Thus theprenegotiationprocessenablespartyrepresentativestomovebeyondexistingobstaclesandtowardsamutuallyacceptable starting point. It provides an opportunity for the parties to becomeconvincedthat there ismutual interest inresolutionandthatreciprocitycanbeexpected.This function isparticularly important incasesofprotractedconflictwhere stereotyping and vilification of the other party have become deeplyembeddedinperceptionsandevennationalideology.

StructuralCharacteristics

There are also structural featureswhich can be used to define prenegotiationsand which allow the above functions of prenegotiations to be achieved.Prenegotiations generally occur in informal settings, and are usually secret,taking place beyond the scrutiny of the media or domestic audiences. Theytypically involve discussionswhich do not formally commit either side to theideasbeingaddressed.Theythereforeprovideanopportunitytoassessthecostsofcommitmentbeforeundergoinga shift inofficialpolicy.Theyalso serve toreduce the risks involved in conciliation by enabling the parties to withdrawfromtheprocessatanytimewithoutmajorconsequences.Finally,throughdirectexchangeofinformationtheyallowpartiestoidentifyandclarifypotentialrisksand explore thenegotiationoption as a possibility formainstreamgovernmentpolicy.Prenegotiations often involve the participation of a third party, who, in

performing a variety of functions, helps keep the parties and the process ontrack.Theroleofthethirdpartyvariesintermsoftheextentofinterventionandthe level of activity in the process. Prenegotiations may include a proactivemediator who is involved in the ongoing process and actually becomes a

participant to the discussions. Themediatormay even apply pressure or offerincentives to achieve concessions from the parties.7 Alternatively,prenegotiationsmayinvolveanimpartialfacilitatorwhoseroleismorelimited.While not an active participant in the prenegotiation process, they may beinvolved in arranging the logistics, providing moral support and acting as anoutsideconsultant.8

RelationshipwiththeOfficialNegotiations

Working within this secret and informal setting, prenegotiations perform anumber of taskswhich lay the foundations for the official negotiationswhichmay follow. Rothman describes these tasks by defining prenegotiations as apreparatory stage in which parties 'jointly frame the issues of the conflict,generate various options for handling them cooperatively, and interactivelystructure substance and process of future negotiations'.9 In this wayprenegotiations help parties avoid surprises at a later stage, a necessaryprerequisiteifformalnegotiationsaretoavoidfailure.10

Prenegotiations are also important inhelping to set the actual agendaof theofficial negotiations which follow, by eliminating 'non-negotiable' issues andbypassingthosepointswhicharelikelytoimpedetheonsetofformaltalks.Theyassistpartiesinavoidingnon-starters,whilesimultaneouslykeepingtherangeofissues broad enough so as not to lock the parties into their adversarialpositions.11Assuch,prenegotiationsplayacentralroleinshapingthestyleandcontent of the official negotiations, outlining the substantive aspect anddemarcatingtheboundariesofnegotiationsbydelimitingtherangeofissuesonthetable.12

PhasesoftheProcess

Understandingthevariousrolesplayedbytheprenegotiationprocessallowsfora more satisfactory integrative 'working definition' to be developed.Prenegotiations are usually secret, informal contacts between parties which

provide themwith the opportunity tomove beyond various psychological andpractical obstacles in theway of formal negotiations. They serve as a lowrisk'learningprocess'inwhichthepartiescanclarifymisperceptionsandstereotypesabout one another, evaluate risks and chances for success, while jointlyaddressingalternativesandpotentialstructuresoftheformalnegotiations.Theyalso test the viability of a negotiation approach, helping it to gain acceptancewithinthemainstreamofgovernmentdecision-making.Thisdefinitionessentiallydescribesastep-by-stepprocesswhichundergoesa

numberofstagesfulfillingthesevariousfunctionsandtasks.Theorderofthesestagesislargelycontextual.However,theearlystagesofprenegotiationsusuallyinvolve searching for mutually acceptable and creative definitions of theproblem and addressing various alternatives.13 This is generally followed bysomeformofcommitmenttoenterintoformalnegotiationsleadingtoaprocessofpreparingtheactualnegotiations.Thepointatwhichthepartiesundertakethecommitment to negotiate depends on the perceived risks involved. For when'leadersconsider theprocessofnegotiationahigh-riskoption,withpotentiallylargecosts,thereductionofuncertaintywilldominatetheprocessandorderthephases'.14 In such cases the parties will put off any formal commitment tonegotiateuntiltheyfeelthattheriskshavebeensufficientlyreduced.Thismayresult in the prenegotiation process transforming itself into the officialnegotiationprocess.15

TheContextforPreNegotiations

ConduciveFactorsVersusRipeMoment

Distinguishingtheprenegotiationphasefromofficialnegotiationsnotonlyhelpstoidentifythestagesofthenegotiationprocess,butalsoaimstounderstandwhatbringsparties inconflict tothenegotiatingtable.16Assuchitcanberelatedtothe concept of 'ripeness' which was developed in an effort to understand thetransition from conflict to a search for peaceful settlement. It is important toexamine the concept of ripeness in order to assess how the role of

prenegotiations fits into the broader movement from conflict to negotiations.Ripenesscanbeunderstoodasparticularcircumstanceswhichleavetheconflictreadyforthestartofanegotiatedprocessorevenprogress.17Kriesberggoesasfarastoarguethatnomatterhowskilledthenegotiatorsmaybe,iftheconflictsituation is not 'ripe' nor ready to move towards a peaceful settlement,negotiationsareunlikelytosucceed.18

Three essential factors have been identified in producing ripeness enablingpartiestoexploretheoptionsofnegotiation.Thefirsttwoareconditionswhichmaybehelpfulormayadvancethetransitionprocesswhilethethirdisonethatinvolves the absence of certain unfavourable conditions. First, a mutualperceptionofthepotentiallynegativeorhighcostofthestatusquo,orabeliefthatcontinuedstalematewillbeincreasinglydamaging, is important.Thismaygrow out of either a recent crisis or a desire to avoid a pending crisis,whichneither sidebelieves it can achieveunilaterally.Second, a senseof exhaustionfrom the costs of the ongoing conflict or disillusionmentwith the struggle, aswell as a recognition that all other approaches which had been employed toresolvetheconflictuntilthatpointhadfailed.Third, ripeness requires the absence of regional and international political

obstacles to peaceful conflict resolution. For example, the bipolar balance ofpower during the ColdWarmanifested itself in theMiddle East conflict andmade it difficult for parties to pursue peace. Leadersmust be in a position tobeginnegotiations.Thiscaneithermeanbeingsufficientlystrongwithregardtotheir local constituency to make concessions or sufficiently weak vis-à-visexternalpowerswhichhaveaninterest in theadvancementof theprocess, thattheyhavenoalternativebuttoparticipate.19

The concept of ripeness, however, has beenoverused and is amore limitedtool for understanding conflict resolution thanmany scholars seem to suggest.Ripenessisnotbinarybutrathershouldbethoughtofintermsofacontinuum.Most conflict scenarios cannot be clearly defined as either entirely 'ripe' or'unripe'thoughtheextentofripeness,thatis,towhichinternational,regionalanddomesticfactorsfavourtheparties'readinesstoexploreanegotiatedsettlement,willimpactupon(thoughnotdetermine)thepossibilityofasuccessfulattemptatnegotiations.This makes the task of assessing what is considered 'ripe enough' very

difficult.Indeedtheideaisusedpredominantlyinhindsight.Italsoresultsintheconceptbeingused to explain eventsbeyond its intendedpurpose.Ripeness isrelevantinexplainingwhyundercertaincircumstances,deemed'unripe',groupswouldavoidthenegotiatingtable;howeveritdoesnot,norisitmeantto,explainwhyapeaceagreement,onceinplace,succeedsorfails.Theconsequenceofthisoveruse is the emergence of an almost tautological concept, namelywhen theattempt to begin negotiations fails the situation is termed unripe and when itsucceedsitisdefinedashavingbeenripeenough.Furthermore, in social conflicts leaders canhelp to create a realitywhich is

more conducive to achieving a peaceful settlement, thereby bringing about'ripeness'. Alternatively they can make decisions that perpetuate the conflictdespite factors which may theoretically qualify it as ripe. As the biologicalmetaphor suggests, ripeness seems to be a process over which we have nocontrol;however,itcanbehumanlymanipulated.Thuswhileunderstandingthefactorswhichmaybeconduciveoranimpedimenttobeginningaprenegotiationisimportant,theterm'ripeness'shouldbeemployedwithcaution.

GettingtotheOsloNegotiations

PoliticalBackgroundtotheIsraeli—PalestinianConflict

Oslo was not the first attempt to resolve the decades-long Israeli-Palestinianconflict. There is a long list of failed plans and doctrines, many put forth byvariousAmericanadministrations,offeringalternativeapproachestosettlement.The evolution of the conflict and events surrounding it, including the variousattemptsatsettlement,allserveasbackgroundtotheOsloprocess.Theyhelpedtocreateanenvironmentwhichwasconducivetobeginninganegotiatedprocessandtoshapetheperspectivesoftheactorsinvolved.InordertounderstandtheevolutionofthepoliticalbackdroptoOslo,onemustbegin(atleast)in1967.In the decisive Israeli military victory in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Israel

capturedtheGolanHeightsfromSyria,theWestBankandEastJerusalemfromJordan and the Gaza Strip and Sinai Peninsula from Egypt and was left

occupyingalargeArab(Palestinian)population.Thewarchangedthefocusofthe conflict.Arab states now sought to regain control of the lost territory andwere forced to recognize the existence of the Jewish state.20 In contrast, theArab-Israeli war of 1973 shook Israeli confidence in itsmilitary prowess andstrengthenedtheArabpoliticalbargainingposition.21ItalsohelpedrestoreandstrengthenasenseofArabpride.TheofficialunitedArabstancetowardsIsraelbegantochangesoonafterasa

resultofanumberofcrucialevents.TheCampDavidAccordsof1978,andtheformalpeaceagreementbetweenIsraelandEgyptitproduced,broketheunityofthe Arab front for the first time. This created the possibility that other Arabstates might follow Egypt's lead and pursue bilateral negotiations with Israel.The Iranian revolution of 1979 and the Iran-Iraq war which began in 1980divertedArabattentionawayfromtheIsraelithreat.WithincreasinginstabilityintheGulfandtheriseofapowerfulIslamicfundamentaliststate,Israelwasnolongerseenastheonly,oreventhemost,dangerousthreat,particularlyfortheGulfstates.Israel was also facing major challenges to what had been the dominant

perspective and was consequently undergoing significant changes. The IsraeliinvasionofLebanon, in1982,seenasIsrael'sfirst 'warofchoice',washeavilycriticized within the country. The effectiveness of a national security policybasedexclusivelyonmilitarystrengthwascalledintoquestionforthefirsttime.This debate regarding the redefinition of the sources of Israeli security wasfurthered by the emergence of an Israeli peace movement, which aimed toredefine the notion of security and mobilize support for its peace-orienteddefinitionsoftheproblemsthatIsraelfaced.The spontaneous eruption of the intifada (Palestinian uprising) in 1987

increasedthelevelofresistancebythelocalPalestinianpopulationintheWestBank andGazaStrip. In addition to demonstratingPalestinian frustrationwiththe occupation and bringing the Palestinian issue back into the internationalspotlight, the intifada challenged the already declining military ideology inIsrael. Furthermore, it raised serious questionswithin Israelwith regard to thecostsofcontinuedoccupationparticularly in termsof the infringementson thecountry'sdemocracy.22

TheGulfWarof1991alsohadimplicationsfor theIsraelipositionvis-à-vis

theArab-Israeliconflict.TheIraqiuseoflong-rangeScudmissilesagainstIsraelreinforced the idea thatwithadvancements inwarfare technology territorywasno longer the decisive factor for security.23 Furthermore, the tacit alliancebetweenIsraelandtheanti-IraqArabcoalition(withtheformerrestrainingitselffrom responding to attack), demonstrated to both sides the reliability andpragmatismoftheiradversaries.These events also had major consequences for the PLO leadership and the

evolution of the dominant Palestinian perspectives. The Israeli invasion ofLebanonforcedthePLOtomoveitsheadquarterstoTunis,distancingitfurtherfromtheIsraeliborderandthelocalPalestinianpopulationtherein.TheintifadamarkedaseriouschallengetotheTunis-basedPLOwhichwaslosingtouchwiththeneedsofthelocalPalestinianpopulationlivingunderIsraelioccupation.ThePLO were also threatened by the emergence of the Islamic ResistanceMovement (Hamas), which was founded at the start of the uprising as theclandestinemilitantwingofthePalestinianbranchoftheMuslimBrotherhood.24

At the 19th Palestinian National Council meeting in 1988 the PLO officiallyabandoned its revolutionary slogans and shifted to political pragmatism,accepting the possibility of a 'two-state solution'.When this shift reaped fewtangiblebenefits fromtheIsraeliLikudgovernment, it fosteredfurtherpopulardisillusionment, enabling Hamas to fill the resulting ideological and doctrinalvacuum.25

ThePLOwasfurtherthreatenedasaresultofitsdecisiontosupportSaddamHusseininthe1991GulfWar.ThedecisionprovedtobeacatastropheforthePLO, whose budget was virtually cut in half as payments they had beenreceivingfromSaudiArabiaandKuwaitwereended.PLOfinancialsupport tothe West Bank and Gaza Strip dropped from $120 million in 1989 toapproximately $45million in 1992, leaving funding for hospitals, universities,community centres and familypayments to be either be drastically reducedorterminated.26Furthermore,SaudiArabiaandotherPersianGulfstatesbegantobackHamasasanexpressionoftheirdispleasurewiththePLO.27Nowabletofinancebothitsintifadaactivitiesandwelfareprogrammes,Hamasmadefurtherpolitical headway challenging the leadership of the politically and financiallyisolatedPLO.The endof theColdWar,which resulted in both the collapse of theSoviet

Unionand theemergenceof theUnitedStates as the single superpower in theworld, also removedwhat had been amajor obstacle to the pursuit of peace.First, the end of the bipolar balance of power and consequently Russia'sdiminishedroleintheMiddleEastregionmeantthattheArab-Israeliconflictnolonger reflected international antagonisms.28 Second, the new internationalrealityserved toweaken the radicalArab regimeswhich theSovietUnionhadsupported,particularlySyriaandthosefactionsofthePLOthattheysupported,therebystrengtheningAmericaninfluenceintheregion.29

It was within this regional and international context that the Bushadministration, in cooperation with the government of Russia, initiated theMiddle East peace conference in Madrid in October 1991. The Madridconferenceachievedlittleinthewayofactualagreements.However,thelessonsofbothitsachievementsanditsfailuresprovedsignificantfortheestablishmentoftheOslonegotiations.Theinclusionofrepresentativesofsomanyconflictingstates in the joint discussion in Madrid, was a great accomplishment anddemonstratedthepossibilityofchangingoldrealities.Italsoprovidedalevelofinteractionbetweentheindividualsinandaroundtheprocessandenabledthemtogainfamiliaritywithoneanother.ThePalestiniandelegationhaddecidedtoparticipate,despiteSyria'sdecision

toboycottthemultilateralnegotiations,thusdemonstratingtoIsraelPalestinianreadiness to search for a separate settlement and move ahead without Syriansupport. Finally, the highly public nature of the talks helped legitimize theprocesstobothpopulations.EventheshortcomingsoftheMadridtalkscarriedwith themimportant lessons. Itbecameclear that themedia'sconstantscrutinyofeverydevelopmentandsetbackservedtoobstructtheprocessandresultedinincreased rigidity by all parties. Furthermore, the inability of the Palestiniandelegation30tomakeanydecisionswithoutfirstconferringwithArafatinTunisdemonstrated that the PLO could not be excluded from a serious negotiationprocess.31

However,theIsraeliLikudgovernmenthadnorealintentionsofeverreachingan agreement through the continuation of the Madrid talks. Prime MinisterShamir later admitted that he 'would have carried on autonomy talks for tenyears'whilecontinuingtobuildJewishsettlementsinJudeaandSamaria.32ThustheelectionofYitzhakRabinintheIsraelielectionsof1992wasperhapsthelast

essential factor in creating a context which was conducive to a negotiatedsettlement. The Labour government was elected on a platform of peace andpromised its constituency a settlement within six months to a year of gettingelected.Uponbeingelecteditenteredintoacoalitionwiththeleft-wingMeretzparty,excludingtheLikudfromthegovernmentcoalitionforthefirsttimesince1977.Insummary,withtheunitedArabfrontbroken,thedeclineofthemilitaristic

ideology in Israel, the PLO on the verge of collapse as a result of financialbankruptcy,politicalisolationandtheriseofthemoremilitantHamas,theendof the Cold War, the Washington talks (the continuation of the Madridconference) at an impasse, the Israeli election of a leadership committed toachievingpeaceandboth sides exhaustedby the consequencesof the conflict,thestagewassetfornegotiationsbetweenIsraelandthePLO.

TheUnfoldingoftheOsloTalks:ParticipantsandSetting

The origins of the Oslo talks can be traced back to 4 December 1992 andinvolvedahighdegreeofcoincidenceandspontaneity.Whilemultilateraltalkson economics (the continuation of theMadrid conference)were being held inLondon,DeputyForeignMinisterYossiBeilin,whowasamemberoftheIsraelidelegation, asked Yair Hirschfeld, a senior lecturer at Haifa University inPoliticalSciencewitha specialization ineconomicdevelopment in theMiddleEast,tojoinhim.Overthecourseoftheprecedingfouryearsthetwomenhadbeen involved in a series of unofficial secret meetings with prominentPalestinianbusinessmanFaisalHusseini,asawayofcommunicatingindirectlywiththePLO.33HananAshrawi,whohadmettheIsraelisatanumberofthesesecretmeetings,hadsuggestedthatHirschfeldmeetPLOmemberAbuAlawhowasinLondonatthetime'callingtheshots'behindthescenesforthePalestiniandelegation,todiscusseconomicdevelopmentwhichwasamutualinterest.34

TerjeLarsen,thedirectoroftheInstituteforAppliedSocialSciences(FAFO),a Norwegian think-tank, helped arrange the actual meeting. He had strongcontactsintheMiddleEastandwasacquaintedwithmanyofthecentralplayers.Larsenwasmarried toaseniorNorwegiandiplomat,andhadaccompaniedhis

wifeon adiplomatic appointment inEgyptwherehehaddevelopedparticularinterestintheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.Hirschfeld and Abu Ala first met secretly in a hotel lounge in London.

Hirschfeld informedAbuAla thathehadclosecontacts in thegovernmentbutemphasized that he was 'not authorized by anyone' and that he was 'onlyspeaking informally'.35 Following this initial meeting, Hirschfeld informedBeilin of his contact. Beilin urged him to pursue the opportunity although heprovided no guidance or instruction.36 Coincidentally, at the same time,Hirschfeld'raninto'DanKurtzer,aUSStateDepartmentofficialresponsibleforthemultilateraltalksandinformedhimofthemeeting.37Asecondmeetingwasheld the following morning, where the two men agreed to accept Larsen'sinvitationfor themtomeetagain inNorwayfora 'brainstormingsession'.AbuAla returned to PLO headquarters in Tunis where he met with Abu Mazen,seniormemberofthePLOresponsiblefornegotiationswithIsrael,andinformedhimofthemeetingsinLondon.The meetings in Norway began under a heavy cover of secrecy and

informality. In order to preserve the secret nature of the meeting Larsenorganized a small conference through the FAFO, addressing the livingconditions in the Israeli-occupied territories. This provided a seeminglylegitimate reason for both the Israelis and Palestinians to be there. Hirschfeldattendedalongwithhislong-timeassociateandformerstudentRonPundak.ThePLO sent Abu Ala who was accompanied by Maher al-Kurd, a PalestinianeconomistandHassanAsfour,assistanttoAbuMazen.Themeetingstookplacebetween20and22January1993attheBorregardManorinSarpsborg,60milesoutsideOslo.Larsen servedashost andwas responsible for takingcareof thelogistics. Larsen'swife,Mona Juul, a seniorNorwegian diplomat, representedtheNorwegianForeignMinistry,whichwascoveringtheexpensesofthetalks,addinganairofofficialdomtotheproceedings.38

AbuAlasetthetonebystatingthatthepartiesshouldavoidgettingentangledinunproductiveargumentregardingthehistoryoftheconflictandheargued'letusnotcompeteonwhowasrightandwhowaswronginthepast,andletusnotcompeteaboutwhocanbemorecleverinthepresent.Letusseewhatwecandoin the future'.39 He also impressed the Israelis by suggesting that an IsraeliwithdrawalfromtheGazaStripwould'heraldthebeginningofcooperationwith

Israel'.40 It was decided that rather than actually attempting to reach a peaceagreement, the goal of themeetings would be to work towards drawing up a'Declaration of Principles' that would outline how an agreement could bereached.ThePalestiniandelegationreturnedtoTunisthistimetobriefArafatandAbu

Mazen regarding their impressionsof themeeting.Theywereaware that therewas some formof political connection and although they felt optimistic aboutthe position expressed by the Israeli academics they were worried about thenature of the backing enjoyed by the professors. The Israelis were alsoconcernedabouttheauthoritybehindthePalestiniandelegates,asAbuAlawasnot well known within Israel. Nonetheless Hirschfeld expressed a degree ofoptimism in briefing Beilin, who in turn informed Israeli Foreign MinisterShimonPeresofthemeetingsforthefirsttime.PerespresentedthesemeetingstoPrimeMinisterRabinasapotentialsecretback-channelwhichcouldprovidevaluable information to the official talks in Washington.41 For Rabin it wasmerelyoneamongseveral secretdiscussionsgoingonat the timeand, thoughscepticalaboutthepossiblevalue,heallowedthemtocontinue.42

The same group met a second and third time at the Borregard Manor inSarpsborbduringwhichtimetheydrewupa 'DeclarationofPrinciples'.At thesecondmeeting (11-12February1993)both sides arrivedwithpositionpaperslaying out the vision of their respective parties and including concessions thathad not been offered in the official Washington talks. Most importantly,Hirschfeld reaffirmed Israeli interest in withdrawal from the Gaza Strip andintroducedtheideaofastep-by-stepIsraelitransferofpowerintheWestBank,which he termed 'gradualism'.43The six-pageDeclaration ofPrinciples,whichbecameknownasSarpsborbIII,wascompletedinthethirdmeetingheldon20-21March.InMarch1993ArafatappointedAbuAlaamemberofthecentralcommittee

and head of the PLO economic delegation to the multilateral negotiations,reflecting the seriousness with which the Palestinian leadership viewed thediscussions.44ThePLOsimultaneouslydemandedsomeformofIsraeliofficialcommitmenttotheprocess.Arafat'floated'toRabin,throughEgyptianPresidentMubarak,hisacceptanceofIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheGazaStripandtheWestBank city of Jericho, a plan originally suggested byPeres and rejected by the

PLOin1992.The Palestinian withdrawal from the official Washington negotiations in

response to theIsraelideportationof415Hamasprisoners, inDecember1992,further discouraged Rabin regarding the possibility of progress on that track.Negotiations resumed inApril primarily as a result of American intervention.However, itwas becoming increasingly clear thatPalestiniannegotiatorFaisalHusseiniwastakinghisinstructionsdirectlyfromTunis,andthatprogresswasunlikelyaslongasthePLOwasformallyexcluded.Rabinwasthusconsideringfor the first time raising the Oslo talks to an official level, but wanted toguarantee that thePLOwas trulyready tomakeconcessionsand thatAbuAlawasinfactdirectlyconnectedtoArafat.45

At the next round of the Oslo meetings (30 April-1 May), Hirschfeld andPundakthereforeaskedthePalestiniansto interveneintheofficialWashingtontrack and create some goodwill in that process. The Palestinian delegation toOslo agreed to do so and also offered concessions, including postponing thequestion of Jerusalem until a later date. Abu Ala was able to influence theofficial negotiations, which were taking place in Rome followed by a round(coincidentally)inOslo.Theformerendedonanunusuallyoptimisticnotewhilein the latter the Palestinian delegation agreed to a number of concessionsincluding an Israeli proposal on the issue of Palestinian refugees, which theymayotherwisenothaveaccepted.46ThisprovedbothAbuAla'sinfluencewithinthe ranksof thePLOandArafat'scontrolover theofficial talks, strengtheningtheprospectsforsuccessthroughtheOslotrack.ReassuredbythePalestinian'scredentialsRabinsenttheDirector-Generalof

theIsraeliForeignMinistryUriSavirtoOsloon13May1993.47Savir,thefirstIsraeli official to participate in the talks, responded favourably. Thereafter,RabinpersonallyselectedYoelSinger tobegin theofficialnegotiationprocessbetween Israel and the PLO. On 11 June Singer, an Israeli attorneywho hadserved under Rabin in the Israeli Defence Forces Advocate-General'sdepartment, joined Savir in order to evaluate the agreement that had beenachieved.48 Singerwas highly critical of the declaration of principles that hadbeen drawn up, but felt that there was enough common ground to reach asettlementandthusagreedtorenegotiatetheagreement.AsPundaklaterputit,'what happened was that betweenMay/June until July/August, we turned our

prenegotiationperiod...intoanofficialpaper'.49

ExaminingOsloasPreNegotiation

Theliteratureonprenegotiationsaddresseshowthetransitionfromasituationofconflict to one involving a peaceful negotiation occurs. It can thus shed lightuponwhy the initialphaseofOslowas important inachievingwhat itdidandcanimproveourunderstandingoftherelationshipbetweentheearlystagesandthe official negotiations which followed. The early stages of the Oslo talksincorporated many of the characteristics of prenegotiations, in terms oftemporality,structure,functionsandtasks.Thisessaywillgoontoexaminetherolethattheseattributesservedintheevolutionoftheprocess.

TimingofOsloPreNegotiations

Though at first glance one may think otherwise, the temporal definition ofprenegotiations is relevant to the case of Oslo. It is true that both the IsraeligovernmentandthePalestinianleadershiphadexpressedinterestinnegotiationsand in fact official negotiations had already begun in Madrid. Whereas, intheory,practicallyeverythingthatoccurredpriortothecommencementofOslocouldalsobeconsidered'prenegotiations',thebeginningoftheOslotrackcanbedistinguished from the processes which preceded it. It was a quasi-officialprocessthatinvolvedrepresentativesofthePLOandthustheexaminationoftheprenegotiationphasecanbeginthere.Theprenegotiationswhichbeganwiththeearly phase of Oslo were prior to and temporally distinct from the officialnegotiationswhichfollowed.

FunctionsofOsloPreNegotiations

The early stages of theOslo talkswere crucial in performing the functions ofprenegotiations and addressing the psychological and practical barriers with

hindered the possibility of a negotiated settlement. A successful negotiationbetweenthegovernmentofIsraelandrepresentativesofthePLOcouldnothavetaken place without first addressing these fears and various other obstacleswhich stood in the way. As Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister and one of thearchitectsoftheOslochannelYossiBeilinstatedclearly,'Wedidn'treallyknowwhatthePLOreallystoodfor.Weknewthepropaganda.Wedidnotknowthetruth.Hirschfeldwasthefirstpersonwhocheckedwhatwasmoreimportantandwhatwaslessimportantforthem.Wheretheirredlineswere'.50

HirschfeldandPundakpreparedthepsychologicalgroundandpavedthewayfor the professionals who later joined them after the initial phase had takenplace. From the Israeli perspective, the PLO had been seen as untrustworthy,riddled with internal conflicts and incapable of responding reasonably topractical proposals.51 The Palestinians similarly feared Israeli expansionistintentionsandfeltthatIsrael'spoliciesonthegrounddemonstratedtheirplanstoconsolidatecontrolovertheWestBankandtheGazaStripratherthantomakeconcessionsforpeace.Consequently,bothpartiesneededassurancesandthusacleargoalwastotestboththesincerityandthereliabilityoftheothersideintheearly stages of the process. Although those individuals directly involved alltheoretically believed in the possibility of a negotiated settlement (many hadbeen involved in illegal dialogue for years), the viability of the actual processhad to be proved both to the individuals themselves and the leaders theyrepresented.Withoutthis,policieswhichsupportednegotiationscouldnothavebeenacceptedwithinthemainstreaminstitutionsofforeignpolicy.AbuAlaopenedthefirstsessionbyexpressingthePLO'sinterestinreaching

anagreementandstressingtheneedtolookonlytowardsthefuture.Respondingtohisfirst impressions,Hirschfeldstartedthesecondroundof talksbystating,'WhatIhaveheardisextremelyimportantWehavereceivedamessageofpeacefromyou.Thismessage is important inaffectingourpolitical thinking'.52ThisfunctionofcreatingconfidenceinmutualreciprocalcompliancewasessentialasPundaklatersaid:

Weconvinced thePalestinians that at the Israelidecision-making level therewasagenuinedesire toreachapeacesettlementbasedonsecurity,andaninterestinhelpingthePalestinianstoreachastable,and prosperous entity of their own. In return, the Palestinian negotiators convinced us that theirleadershiprealizedthatterrorandarmedstrugglewouldnotbringthemclosertotheirdream,andthattheonlysolutionwasreconciliationanddialogue.53

Butmore than lipservicewasrequired tosatisfy theIsraeligovernment'sneedfor this function of testing the waters. They asked Abu Ala to influence theofficialnegotiationsandinstilgoodwillinthepublicprocess,asawayoftestingboth his influence within the ranks of the PLO and the organization'scommitment to the process. The Palestinian success in this area was a majorturningpointintheprocessastheIsraelileadershipbegantofeelmoreconfidentwith regard to the capabilities and commitments of the PLO as a potentialnegotiatingpartner.During thisperiod thepartiesalsohadachance toget toknowoneanother

whichenabledthemtobuildtrustandhelpedthemtoovercometheirfearsandmisperceptions.Inshort,theybegantoconvincethemselvesthattheir'dreams'ofpeacewere attainable.Thus 'at the endof the first round itwasnot thepointsraised that had to be analysed, but rather the atmosphere of the talks and theIsraeli(andPalestinian)opinions'thatwereimportant.54Trustandunderstandingwerequicklybeingbuiltamongthepartiesandtheresoonemergedasensethatthe twogroups began to formone teamwhichwasworking together to try tofindsolutions.AsPundaknoted, 'Suddenlytheredevelopedthiskindofaveryintimate,whatIcallchemistry,betweenthenegotiators,althoughatthattimewewerenotstillnegotiators'.55

StructureoftheOsloPreNegotiations

Thestructuralmake-upoftheearlyphaseoftheOslochannelalsocorrespondsto thedescriptionofa theoreticalprenegotiationprocess,ascanbeseen in thecharacteristicsoftheprocess.First,thesettingandenvironmentwithinwhichtheprocess occurred was extremely important to its success. The sessions weregenerallysetinthecountrysidewherethenegotiatorscouldgoforwalksinthesurrounding forests, and the meetings were often held in comfortable sittingrooms.Closeattentionwaspaidtothefoodandwinebeingserved,whileseatingarrangements and room assignments were carefully scrutinized by theNorwegianhosts.Thegoalwastocreateamorerelaxedandsocialenvironment,which became an important factor contributing to a conducive setting forconfidence-building.56

Second,secrecy,whichhasalsobeenidentifiedasanimportantcharacteristicofprenegotiationsingeneral,wascentraltotheOslotalks.Itenabledbothsidestomoveawayfromwhathadbeentheofficialpartylineandmakeconcessionswhichtheywouldnothavebeenabletomakeinapublicnegotiation.Thelackofprogressintheofficialtrackhasoftenbeenassociatedwiththehighlevelofpublicitysurroundingit,whichtendstoresultinrigidnegotiatingpositionsandleaveslittleroomforconcessions.57 Insecretmeetingsthepartieswereabletodiscussvariousalternativesandjointlyeliminatethosewhichwereunacceptablewithouthavingeverywordanalysedinthemedia.The secret nature of the talks also proved significant for a number of other

reasons.First, theverydecisiontonegotiatewith thePLOandtherebygrant itlegitimacy,was seen as a concession by the Israeli government and could nothavebeendonepubliclybeforeanagreementhadbeenreached.Thesamewastrue for the Palestinians, who had not yet officially recognized the state ofIsrael'srighttoexist.Second,secrecy,combinedwiththeunofficialnatureofthetalks(whichHirschfeldrepeatedlystressed),provideddeniability.Thisrenderedasenseofsecurityforleadersonbothsides,providingthemwiththepossibilityof walking away at any point without serious cost. This created a lowriskenvironment inwhich the viability of the negotiations,whichwere previouslyunacceptable to either side, could be explored before it was undertaken as acentralforeignpolicyobjective.Boththesecretandtheunofficialnatureofthetalkswerecloselytiedtothe

fact that the Israeli representatives were academics who were not officiallyconnected to thegovernment.The fact that theirwordswerenotbindinggavethe negotiators (or pre-negotiators) a significant amount of leeway in dealingwithhighlysensitiveissuesandaddressingalternativeapproachestosettlement.Thus secrecy was crucial to both parties. One example of how it manifesteditself is seen in the fact that theentireSarpsborg III documentwaswrittenonFAFOstationery, inorder toreinforce the idea that itwasmerelyanacademicexercisewhichcouldbedeniedbyleadersintheeventofapublicleak.58

Asisoftencharacteristicofthestructureofprenegotiations,theroleofthird-partyinterventionwascentraltotheprocess.Norway,becauseofitshistoricallybalanced foreign policy, was uniquely situated vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinianconflict. Thus both parties perceived it as relatively neutral, enabling its

representatives to gain the trust of both sides. Furthermore, unlike theintervention of a powerful state like the United States, Norway could not besuspectedofahiddenagendanorcoulditbeseenasimposingsolutionsoneitherside.59Indeed,oneofthecentralproblemswiththeWashingtontalkshadbeenthe role of the US as broker to the process. Both sides had played for betterrelationswiththemediatorandwerelookingto'scorepoliticalpoints'ratherthanaddresstheissues.In contrast, the involvement inOslo of a non-proactive impartial facilitator

forcedthepartiesjointlytoconfronttheunderlyingissuesoftheconflict,aidingconflictresolutionratherthanjustpoliticalsettlements.ForTerjeLarsen,MonaJuul and Junior Foreign Minister Jan England did not serve as proactivemediators;rathertheyservedtofacilitatetheprocessbytendingtothelogistics,creatinganenvironment thatwasconducive toaprocessofbuilding trust.Thefacilitatorsactedasasupportsystem,listeningtobothsideswhentheyneededto'letoffsomesteam'andcalmingthemdownwhentheprocessmetwithseriousobstacles.AsLarsen said, 'we've never occupied the driving seat.Our jobhasbeentocreateaframeworkthatwouldmakethepeaceprocessassuccessfulaspossible-toidentifypossibledirectionsthesidescouldchoosetotake,andhelpthembackontotheroadwherenecessary'.60

TheOsloPreNegotiationsandtheOfficialNegotiations

Withregard to therelationshipbetween theearlystagesof theprocessand theofficial negotiations, Oslo again fits the description of prenegotiations. Non-negotiableissueswereidentifiedandjointlysetasidetobedealtwithatalaterstagesoastokeepthemfrompreventingthebeginningsofanegotiationprocessaltogether.For example, theparties agreed to leave thequestionof Jerusalem,whichwas certainly among themost difficult issues for both sides, out of theinterim self-rule phase, to be discussed only in the final status negotiations.Similarly the status of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza andquestions regarding Palestinian refugees from 1948whose right to returnwasseenbyIsraeliofficialsasathreattotheJewishcharacterofthestateofIsrael,weretoremainoffthenegotiatingtableuntilaftertheinitialself-rulephase.This

process-ofeliminatingthemostcontroversialquestionswhichwereconsiderednon-negotiable-servedtodelimittherangeofissuesandcreatedtheboundariesoftheofficialnegotiationswhichfollowed.The early stagesof theOsloprocessnot onlydefined theboundaries of the

subsequentofficialnegotiationswithregardtotheissuesbeingnegotiated,italsoestablishedwhoparticipated in theprocess.Defining thepartiesaswell as theindividuals at an early stage served to create a relationship between therepresentatives of the respective delegations before the official negotiationsbegan. Itwas inOslo that the Israeli governmenthad the chance todeterminewhether or not thePLOcould truly be trusted and accepted as thePalestinianparticipanttotheprocess.Onanindividuallevel,therelationshipsthathadbeenestablishedbetweenthe

pre-negotiatorswasanessentialingredienttotheprocess.AbuAlawasnotwellknownwithin Israel andwould not have been a likely negotiator under othercircumstances.Furthermore,fromtheIsraeliperspective, 'PundakhalfexpectedthatassoonastheprofessionalsarrivedheandHirschfeldwouldbeeliminated,butSavirandSingerwantedtopreservetheinformalatmosphereandmakeuseoftheirinsights,andaskedthemtostayon'.61Thuswhiletheprenegotiationinthe Oslo case did not involve the same individuals who later negotiated thesettlement(atleastnotontheIsraeliside),itdiddefinethepartieswhichweretoparticipate in theprocessaswellasdynamicsbetween individualswhichwereconducivetosuccessfulnegotiations.Finally, the early stages of theOslo talks served the prenegotiation task of

structuringtheofficialnegotiationswhichfollowed.Thiswasacasewhere theprenegotiationactuallytransformeditselfintotheofficialtrack,therebybuildingthe official process directly upon the agreements reached in the preparatorystage.Theprenegotiationsnotonlydefinedthecontentbydelimitingtheissueswhichweretobenegotiated,italsosetthetonefortheofficialprocess.Thestyleoftheearlystagesoftheprocessandthemomentumithadachieved,whichhadbecome known as the 'Oslo spirit', carried over after the official negotiatorsarrived and built on the unique character of the prenegotiations despite thedifficult process which was to follow.62 Furthermore, the Sarpsborb IIIdeclaration of principleswas later used as the foundation for negotiations andprovided a starting point from which the official negotiators could begin to

restructuretheagreementandtheirrespectivepositions.

Conclusions

LessonsfromtheOsloExperience

The experience in Oslo carries with it important lessons for the theories ofprenegotiations and for our understanding of the transition from conflict tonegotiation.Itshedslightonthefactthatprenegotiationsnotonlyservetobringpartiestothenegotiatingtable,butalsoaffectthenegotiationprocessitselfandthemakingofagreements.Prenegotiationsalsoilluminatethestrengthsofthird-party facilitation as a form of intervention, particularly in cases of protractedconflict.Finally, it showshowprenegotiationnotonlybenefits the individualsinvolvedintheprocessitself,buthelpspreviouslyunacceptableideasmoveintothe mainstream and capture the political agenda and mechanisms of foreignpolicy.The early stages of the Oslo process show that prenegotiations have both

positive and negative implications, carrying with them ramifications beyondintended objectives. First, in the efforts to bring parties to the table,prenegotiations affect 'the table', shaping the evolution of the officialnegotiations and the final agreement. Second, the fact that the IsraelirepresentativestotheOslochannelwereacademics,whowerenotofficiallytiedto thegovernment,gave theprocessanunofficial and flexiblenaturewhich inmanywaysworkedtoitsadvantage.However,seeingasthesenegotiatorswereneitherboundbynor totallyknowledgeablewith regard togovernmentpolicy,theymadeconcessionsthatrancountertothepoliciesoftheIsraeligovernmentofthetime.Theseposeddifficultchallengesfortheofficialnegotiatorswhohadto renegotiate after the level of the talkswas raised. In the initial draft of theagreement, for example, it is stated that 'the future of Jerusalem would bedecidedaspartofthefinalstatustalksontheWestBankandGazaafteraperiodofPalestinianautonomy.Inaccepting thisconcept the twoacademicsdepartedfromLabourPartypolicy.'63

Third, while the secret nature of the talks was conducive to reaching thenegotiatingtableitplacedtheprocessbeyondevaluationbyindividualsfromtheoutside.Consequentlyitwasnotassessedbylegalormilitaryexpertsuntilverylate in its development.Upon entering into the negotiations inMay, the legaladvisertothegovernmentofIsrael,JoelSinger,notedthathe'thoughtthedraftwas (legally) catastrophic but was told to change only the really importantthings,sincewewereclosetosigningtheDOP'.64Furthermore,tryingtoavoidleaks,Rabinhadnowheretoturnforadviceandthus'lackedbothmilitaryadviceandanindependentintelligenceassessment,andendedupvettingeverylineoftheDOPhimself'.65

OnthePalestinianside,decisionsweremadebyasmallgroupofindividualsaroundArafatwhohadlittleknowledgeoflegalproceedings.Furthermore,therewasnoconsultationwithotherregionalgovernmentssuchasLebanon,SyriaorJordan,allofwhomweresurprisedtohearofthebreakthrough.66Secrecyalsoisolated thosegroupswhichwerenotdirectly involved in theprocessfromtheagreementwhichhadbeenreached.ThishadmoreseriousconsequencesonthePalestinian side than on the Israeli, as the PLO did not enjoy democraticlegitimacy.Forexample,poetMahmoudDarwishaccusedthePLOofconfusingitsownpoliticalinterestswiththatoftheentirePalestinianpeople.67InsodoingthePLOmarginalized thosegroupsnot represented in thenegotiatingprocess,especially its Diaspora who make up more than half the total Palestinianpopulation.68

Finally, by not addressing issues deemed 'non-negotiable' the Oslo channelavoided problems that threatened to obstruct the commencement of officialnegotiations.However, insodoingtheprenegotiationleft thepartieswithverydifferent perspectives with regard to what had been achieved. Key issuesincluding the final boundaries of the Palestinian entity, the question of 1948refugees, the future of Israeli settlements and the status of Jerusalem werepostponed for later negotiation.69 The two sides actually agreed upon so littlethattheaccordhasbeencalled'nomorethananagreementtoagree'.70

The peace process was consequently plagued from the very beginning bydifferent visions of what it entailed and where it was leading. For example,following the signing of the agreement Arafat called for the liberation ofJerusalemas thefuturecapitalofaPalestinianstate,whereasRabinstated that

'Jerusalem remains under Israel's sovereignty and is Israel's unified capital'.71

Furthermore, debates over the definition of Israeli redeployment from Jerichobeganalmostimmediately.Itwasunclearastowhetherthisreferredtothetownof Jerichoor theentire administrativearea.Thuswhile leavingnon-negotiableissuesoff theagenda served toget anegotiationprocess started, a seriousgapwasleftbetweenthedifferentvisionsofthepeaceprocess.Oslo also illuminates the reluctance of officials to commit to formal

negotiations in high-risk situations. The commitment to begin officialnegotiations in Oslo came only after most other prenegotiation functions hadalready takenplace, not before the parameters of the negotiationswere set, asmanytheorieswouldhaveexpected.72 Incasesofprotractedconflict, inwhichthe conflict is often closely tied to ideology, parties tend to postpone anycommitment to such a late stage that the prenegotiations are likely to betransformedintotheofficialprocess.Thisisespeciallytrueincaseswhereoneparty is a non-state and where the very granting of legitimacy is seen as aconcession.TheexperienceinOsloalsoillustratessomeofthebenefitsofimpartialthird-

party facilitation as opposed to highly interventionist power-mediation.Norwegianinterventionhelpedtocreateanatmospherewhichwasconducivetothe process of building trust and left the negotiators to dealwith one anotherdirectly. It avoided having the parties compete for favour in the eyes of themediator,as in theWashington talks.Facilitationforcedbothsides toconfrontbothpsychologicalandsubstantive issuesand thus resulted inaprocesswhichwasmoreconducivetoresolutionratherthanapoliticalsettlement.Finally,theexperienceinOsloshowshowprenegotiationscanenableideason

thefringeofthepoliticalspectrumtobeexploredinalowrisksettingandgainlegitimacywithinmainstreampoliticaldecision-making.Beilin,HirschfeldandAbu Ala were all in favour of approaches to peacemaking that were notacceptable within the mainstream of their respective political communities.However, the lowrisk exploration of these ideas through prenegotiationsreinforcedtheirfaithintheviabilityofthisapproachandpavedthewayforthenegotiations to be acceptable within the mainstream political agenda. Thenegotiationsinvolvedalargerisk,oneRabinforexample,wasreluctanttotake.Facing an impasse at the Washington talks, he had preferred to pursue

negotiations with Syria. Similarly, Arafat faced serious opposition within theranksof thePLO to the ideanegotiatingwith Israel. Itwas the successof theprenegotiation that brought the Israeli-PLO talks on to the political agenda,enabledittogainlegitimacywithinthemainstreamandbecomeacentralforeignpolicyobjective.WhatoccurredinOslobetweentwoIsraeliacademicsandrepresentativesof

thePLOfromJanuarytoMay1993wasacomplicatedinteractionwhichcannotbeunderstoodasentirelydistinctfromtheofficialnegotiationswhichfollowed.Itbeganasaninformalexchangeofideas,evolvedintoanattempttofindwaysof assisting the official negotiations, but essentially ended up serving as aprenegotiation. Understanding the early stages of Oslo in terms ofprenegotiations helps to shed light on the evolution of that process and itsrelationship with the official negotiations which followed. Furthermore, theexperiencebroughtwithitmanylessonswhichareusefulforourunderstandingofhowprenegotiationsworkingeneral.

IlanG.GewurziswritingaJ.D.inLawatStanfordUniversity.

Notes

TheauthorwouldliketothankProfessorDafnaIzraeliforherconstantsupport.

1.UnitedNationsCharter,'PacificSettlementofDisputes',ChapterVI,Article33,Section1,1945.

2. Harold Saunders, 'We Need a Larger Theory of Negotiation: The Importance of PreNegotiation

Phases',NegotiationJournal,Vol.1(July1985),p.255.

3.Thelowcostofinformationsharingallowsmoderateviewstobeexpressedonbothsides.SeeJanice

Gross-Stein, 'Getting to the Table: The Triggers, Stages, Functions, and Consequences of

PreNegotiation',InternationalJournal,Vol.44(Spring1989),pp.498-9.

4. Ronald J. Fisher, 'PreNegotiation Problem-Solving Discussions: Enhancing the Potential for

SuccessfulNegotiation',InternationalJournal,Vol.44(Spring1989),p.443.

5. The DOP contained a set of mutually agreed-upon principles which proposed a five-year interim

periodofPalestinianself-rule.Negotiationsontheissueofpermanentstatusweretobeginnolater

thanthethirdyear,andwouldtakeeffectattheendofthefive-yearperiod.

6. Janice Gross-Stein (ed.), Getting to the Table: The Process of International PreNegotiations,

Baltimore,1989.

7. Jacob Bercovitch, 'International Negotiations and Conflict Management: The Importance of

PreNegotiations',JerusalemJournalofInternationalRelations,Vol.13,No.1,p.19.

8.Fisher,'PreNegotiationProblem-SolvingDiscussions',p.445.

9. Jay Rothman, 'Negotiation as Consolidation: PreNegotiation in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict',

JerusalemJournalofInternationalRelations,Vol.13,No.1(1991),p.26.

10. Raymond Cohen, Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International

Diplomacy,WashingtonDC,1991,p.60.

11.Ibid.,p.490.

12.Gross-Stein,'GettingtotheTable',p.488.

13.I.WilliamZartman, 'PreNegotiations:PhasesandFunctions',InternationalJournal,Vol.44(Spring

1989),p.238.

14.Gross-Stein,'GettingtotheTable',p.487.

15.Bercovitch,'InternationalNegotiationsandConflictManagement',p.18.

16.Zartman,'PreNegotiations:PhasesandFunctions',p.241.

17. Richard N. Haass, 'Ripeness and the Settlement of International Disputes', Survival, Vol. 30

(May/June,1988),p.245-6.

18. Louis Kriesberg, International Conflict Resolution: The U.S.-USSR and Middle East Cases,New

Haven,1992,p.144.

19.Haass,'RipenessandtheSettlementofInternationalDisputes',p.245-6

20. Efraim Karsh, 'Peace Not Love: Toward a Comprehensive Arab-Israeli Settlement', Washington

Quarterly,Vol.17(Spring1994),p.143.

21.Ibid.,p.146.

22.DonPeretz, 'The Impact of theGulfWar on Israeli andPalestinian PoliticalAttitudes', Journal of

PalestineStudies,Vol.21,No.1(Autumn1991),p.29.

23.Karsh,'PeaceNotLove',p.51.

24.MichelJubranandLauraDrake,'TheIslamicResistanceMovementintheWestBankandGazaStrip',

MiddleEastPolicy,No.2(Winter1993),p.6.

25.ZiadAbu-Amr,'Hamas:AnHistoricandPoliticalBackground',JournalofPalestineStudies,Vol.22,

No.4(Summer1993),p.17.

26. An estimated 90,000 Palestinian families in the territories had been receiving payments for being

relativesof'martyrs'oftheuprising.SeeDavidMakovsky,MakingPeacewiththePLO:Policyand

PoliticsintheRabinGovernment,Boulder,1996,p.56.

27. Clyde Mark and Kenneth Katzman, 'Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad: Recent Developments,

Sources of Support, and Implications for U.S. Policy',CRS Report for Congress, December 12,

1994,p.10.

28.JoneOliversen,'TheFacilitator',Statoil,Vol.17,No.1(March1995),p.30.

29.Karsh,'PeaceNotLove',p.50.

30.ThePalestinianswererepresentedbyajointPalestinian-Jordaniandelegationwhichwasnotallowed

toincludemembersoftheDiaspora,thePLOorresidentsofJerusalem.

31.DaoudKuttab,'TotalityofthePalestinianProblem',JerusalemPost,19February1992.

32.CitedinAviShlaim,'PreludetotheAccord:Likud,Labor,andthePalestinians',JournalofPalestine

Studies,Vol.23,No.2(Winter1994),p.11.

33. Husseini was a senior PLO leader and was unofficially known as such to all at the time. See

Makovsky,MakingPeacewiththePLO,p.13.

34.KarinAggestam, 'Two-TrackDiplomacy:NegotiationsBetween Israel and thePLOThroughOpen

andSecretChannels',DavisPaper,No.53,Jerusalem,1996,p.20.

35.JaneCorbin,GazaFirst:TheSecretNorwayChanneltoPeaceBetweenIsraelandthePLO,London,

1994.

36.RonPundak,'GettingtotheTable',minutesfromconference,'TheResolutionofIntractableConflicts:

theIsraeli-PalestinianandSouthAfricanExperiences',TelAviv,March1995,p.113.

37.TheAmericanadministration lateraskedRabinabout the talks.Bythispointhewasawareof their

existence; however, he dismissed them as irrelevant and they were quickly forgotten by the US

delegation.

38.AmosElon,'ThePeacemakers',NewYorker,20December1993,p.80.

39.Ibid.,p.81.

40.SeeAbbasMuhmoud(AbuMazen),ThroughSecretChannels,Reading,1995,p.121.The'GazaFirst'

planwasdevelopedbyShimonPeresandwaspreviouslyrejectedbythePalestinians.

41.Makovsky,MakingPeacewiththePLO,p.21.

42. There were constantly secret contacts taking place, none of which (other than Oslo) achieved

breakthroughs.SeeRonPundak,'OutstandingIssues:TheTimeFactor',inPrerequisitesforPeace

intheMiddleEast:AnIsraeli-PalestinianDialogue,NewYork,1994,p.56.

43.Corbin,GazaFirst,p.60-61.

44.MohamedHeikal, Secret Channels: The Inside Story of Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations,London,

1996,p.440.


46.Corbin,GazaFirst,pp.72-3.

47.Savir,whowascloselytiedtoPereswasPeres'sratherthanRabin'schoice.

48.Aggestam,'Two-TrackDiplomacy',p.23.

49.Pundak,'GettingtotheTable',p.119.

50.Elon,'ThePeacemakers',p.82.

51.Shlaim,'PreludetotheAccord',p.14.

52.Hirschfeld,inAbuMazen,p.127-8.

53.Pundak,'TowardsaNewChapterintheIsraeli-PalestinianNegotiations?',Palestine-IsraelJournalof

PoliticsandEconomics,No.5(Winter1995),pp.6-7.

54.AbuMazen,p.118.

55.Pundak,'GettingtotheTable',p.116.

56.Corbin,'GazaFirst',p.49.

57.Aggestam,'Two-TrackDiplomacy',p.18.



60.01iversen,'TheFacilitator',p.30.



63.Heikal,p.439.


65.Ibid.,p.51.

66.EdwardW.Said,PeaceanditsDiscontents,London,1995,p.3.

67.Heikal,p.462.

68.Said,PeaceanditsDiscontents,p.14.

69.AviShlaim,'TheOsloAccord',JournalofPalestineStudies,Vol.23,No.3(Spring1994),p.34.

70.RashidKhalidi,'APalestinianViewoftheAccordwithIsrael',CurrentHistory(February1994),p.62.

71.Heikal,p.458.

72. BrianWTomlin, 'The Stages of PreNegotiation: TheDecision to Negotiate NorthAmerican Free

Trade',inGross-Stein,'GettingtotheTable',pp.23-5.

UnambiguousAmbiguity:TheOpacityoftheOsloPeaceProcess

NADAVMORAG

Thetwoagreementsthatmakeupwhatispopularlyknownasthe'OsloAccords'(including theDeclaration of Principles (DOP) signed in September 1993, theGaza and JerichoAgreement signed inMay1994, and the InterimAgreementsigned inSeptember1995)havebeenhailedasa 'blueprint forpeace'betweenIsraelisandPalestinians.What isparticularlystrikingabout theseagreements -as well as a number of other bilateral agreements that fall under the generalrubricoftheOsloprocessincludingtheHebronAgreementofJanuary1997-isthatwhiletheydealwithextremelycriticalmattersforbothsidessuchaspeace,securityand theright toselfdetermination, thepartiesentered intonegotiationsand made significant concessions to each other without any guarantee (andindeedoftenwithoutanyrealconception)astothenatureofthefinalsettlementbetweenthetwoparties.TheIsraeliandPalestinianarchitectsoftheOsloAccordsdidnotprovidean

outlineastothenatureofthefinalsettlementbetweenIsraelandthePalestiniansbecause,theyclaimed,itwasimpossibletodosoinSeptember1993sincetherewasverylittlethatthetwosidescouldagreeuponatthatstage.Bothsidesfeltthat they were about to embark on an unprecedented journey which wouldchangenotonlytheMiddleEastbutalsotheirperceptionsofeachotherandofthemselves and hence it was impossible to carry out such profound changeswithinthespaceofashortperiodoftimeandwiththesigningofoneagreement.Oslowasthereforeenvisagedasaprocessofchangeoveradefined'transitional'time-period of five years. This relatively drawn-out process was seen asnecessaryfortwoprincipalreasons.Thefirstwasbecausethepositionsofbothsides appeared to be so far apart on the critical issues (settlements, borders,refugees, Jerusalem, Palestinian statehood, etc) that reaching an agreement onthese issues appeared impossible. Thus, by developing a dynamic of gradualchange and by building up a co-operative relationship between the Israeli

governmentandsecurityorganson theonehandand thePalestinianAuthoritygovernmentalandsecurityorgansontheother(asenvisagedbytheDOP),itwasthought that the mutual suspicions and ill will that seemed to preclude acomprehensiveagreementwouldbegreatlyreduced.This,inturn,wouldenablethe two sides to dealwith the really difficult issues later in amore conduciveatmosphere.Second, both sides felt that, for domestic political purposes, it would be

difficultenoughtoselltheagreementstotheirrespectiveconstituenciesastheystoodwithoutalsohavingdeterminedthefateofextremelycontroversialissuessuchasJerusalem,settlements,andthelike.WiththesigningoftheDOP,bothIsraelis and Palestinians were being asked to make extremely significantpsychological and perceptual changes and concessions. The two populationswerebeingasked tobeginviewingeachother aspartners rather thancontinuethe 100-year-old view of each other as adversaries. Israeli Jews were beingaskedtopartwiththeidealofindefinitelyholdingontoallofEretzIsrael(withitsattendant securityand religioussignificance),whilePalestinianswerebeingaskedtofinallypartwiththeidealofagreaterPalestineencompassingalloftheterritoryoftheformerBritishMandate.ThePalestinian side evidencedawillingnesspublicly towithdrawclaims to

areas beyond the Green Line (the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)adopted the 'two-state solution' approach at the Palestine National Council(PNC) conference in Algiers in 1988 - althoughmany Palestiniansmay haveinterpreted this as part of the PLO's 'step-by-step' strategy of the 1970s ofregaining a foothold in Palestine for the purpose of eventually destroying thestateofIsrael).However, theIsraeliside-whichwasbeingaskedtowithdrawphysicallyfromterritoryandwhichwasfacedwithvociferousoppositionfromthecentre-right and right-wingpolitical spectrum- found it considerablymoredifficulttospeakofapermanentbreakwiththeidealofEretzIsraelandhencepreferredtopresenttheDOPasaninterimsolutionandemphasizethefactthatIsrael, insigningtheDOP,wasnotcountersigningaPalestinianDeclarationofIndependence.Hence, the opaque nature of the Oslo process, which effectively left all

options open for the final settlement, served the needs of the negotiators andtheirpoliticalbossesbyenablingthepartiestoachieveabreakthroughwithout,

at the same time, relinquishing strongly held positions as to the nature of thefinalsettlement.ThePLOwasabletoportraytheAccordsasaroad(fromwhichtherewasnoturningback),thatwouldleadtothecreationofaPalestinianstateinalloftheWestBank,GazaStripandEastJerusalem.TheRabingovernmentwas able toportrayOslo as a step towards separating Israelis andPalestiniansandproviding thePalestinians limited autonomywhile ensuring overall IsraelisecuritycontrolovertheTerritoriesfortheforeseeablefuture.Bothsidescouldclaimvictoryfortheirpositionssince(despitethefactthatitwasclearthatmanypeople,onbothsides,wouldbeunhappywithOsloandviewtheagreementsasconceding far toomuch to theotherside), its supporterscouldalwayspoint totheagreementsas temporaryandpoint toArticleV(4)of theDOP(whichwasrepeatedinthesubsequentagreements)that'theoutcomeofthepermanentstatusnegotiationsshouldnotbeprejudicedorpre-emptedbyagreementsreachedfortheinterimperiod'.1

The chief drawback - and a very big one at that - to this type of opaqueapproachtoconflictresolutionisthatinabsolvingitselfofprovidinganytypeoflegal-contractual precedent with respect to the final settlement, Oslo virtuallyinvited the parties to interpret the agreements reached in a manner that wasconvenientforthem-evenifthismeantthattheywouldbemovinginoppositedirections.Hence,Oslo,byitsverynature,madeitalogicalimperativeforbothsidestoworkoutsidetheOsloframeworkinordertoestablishnew'factsontheground'sincewhatevergainscouldbereachedwithintheOsloframeworkwerenon-bindingwithrespecttothefinalsettlement.Thisisratherlikeasituationinwhich two parties engaged in a war having signed a ceasefire agreementproceed,inthehoursleadinguptothepredeterminedhouratwhichallhostilitiesmustcease,tobloodyeachothermercilesslyinanefforttocaptureanotherhillor strong-point in order to improve their future negotiating position or thedefensibilityoftheceasefirelinewhichmaysoonbecomeaborder.Indeed,thisis precisely what has happened since the signing of the agreements: thePalestinian-initiated clashes with the Israeli army in September 1996; thecontinued construction of the Dahaniye Airport in the Gaza Strip; IsraeliconstructionatHarHomainEastJerusalem.The Wye River Accord, which was touted by the then Prime Minister

BenjaminNetanyahuandForeignMinisterArielSharonasan'improvement'on

Oslo since it denied either side the right to carry out unilateral actions of thiskind, has failed to deter Israel from allowing the expansion of settlements toadjacenthilltops-Sharonhimselfcalledforjustsuchanexpansion-orYasserArafatfrompubliclypromisingtodeclarePalestinianindependenceinMay1999andfromdemandingthatJerusalembemadethecapitalofthenewstate,sinceArticleVof theWyeRiverAccord calls for both sides to refrain from taking'anystepthatwillchangethestatusoftheWestBankandtheGazaStrip'.2Suchanalysishowever,begs thequestionas towhy theOsloAccords in fact turnedout to be so opaque. In order to determine this, we need to look at both theevents leadingup to theAccordsand thenatureof thediplomaticprocess thatproducedtheagreements.

TheRoadtoOslo

The first precedent for Oslowas established on 17 September 1978, with thesigningof theCampDavidAccords inWashington.EgyptianPresidentAnwarSadat, aware that theArabworld viewed the signing of a separate peacewithIsraelasanactoftreacheryandfeelingthestingofEgypt'sgrowingisolationinthe region, insisted on incorporating guarantees vis-à-vis Palestinian self-ruleintowhatwasforallintentsandpurposesabilateralpeacetreaty.ThefactthatIsraeliPrimeMinisterMenachemBegin's interpretationof theclauses thatcallfor'five-yeartransitionalarrangementsfortheWestBankandGaza',aswellas'Israelimilitarywithdrawal',and'negotiations...todeterminethefinalstatusofthe West Bank and Gaza'3 was completely different from the Egyptianinterpretation, and yet did not significantly hinder the Egyptian-Israelirapprochement,provesthattheseclausesweremoreofanEgyptianface-savingmeasure than a significant political demand. However, the principles withrespecttoPalestinianself-rulesetdownatCampDavidwouldformthebasisfornegotiationsatOslo.ThePLO,havingrejectedtheEgyptian-Israelipeaceprocessasinimicaltoits

interests, led the rejectionist camp in denouncing the treaty and condemningEgyptanditcontinueditsexecutionofthe'militaryoption'byconductingcross-

borderattacksagainstIsraelimilitarypersonnelandciviliansfromitsstrongholdin southern Lebanon. The failure of Begin's subsequent attempts to foster thedevelopment of an indigenousWest Bank and Gaza Palestinian leadership tooffset the influence of the PLO and to negotiate with Israel on the Likudprinciple of 'autonomy for people, not for territory' (which was designed toperpetuate Israeli control over the territories), led him and Defence MinisterSharontoconcludethattheonlywaytodevelopamorepliablelocalPalestinianleadershipwastodestroythePLObothmilitarilyandpolitically.4ThiswasoneofthechiefreasonswhyIsraelinvadedLebanoninJune1982andexpelledthePLOfromthatcountry.ThePLO,humiliated,militarilydestroyed,andfindingitselfunabletooperate

from any of the Arab states bordering Israel, limped to Tunis and set aboutreconstituting itself and building the only viable option it had left: thepolitical/diplomatic one.This apparent realization by thePLO that it could nolongerdependuponthesupportoftheArabworldoritsownmilitaryoptionledthePLOformallytooptforthe 'two-statesolution'withits1988declarationatAlgiers.5Theoutbreakoftheintifadashortlybeforethis(inDecember1987),atoncerevitalizedthePalestiniannationalmovementandpresentedthePLOwithnewchallengesintheformofa'home-grown'intifadaleadershipthatviewedthePLOaslargelyirrelevant.Despitethedifficultiesinvolved,thePLOwaslargelysuccessfulinasserting

controlovertheintifadaandtheeventsoftheintifadahadaprofoundimpactontheIsraelipublicandleadershipconvincingmanyontheIsraeliLeftthatIsrael'sonly option was disengagement from the Territories by way of a politicalsettlement.However, by the early 1990s, thePLO found itself in themidst ofoneoftheworstpoliticalandfinancialcrisesofitshistory.Arafat'sdecisiontosupportSaddamHusseinintheGulfWarledtothehaltingoffinancialsupportfrom the Gulf states estimated at about $120million in annual donations. Tomakemattersworse, theconfiscationofPalestiniandeposits inGulfbanksandthelossofotherrevenues(includingthoselostastheresultoftheexpulsionofsome40,000PalestinianexpatriateslivingandworkingintheGulfstates)ledtoanoveralllossofrevenuebetween1991and1993ofapproximately$10billion.6

This loss of revenue led to the closure of sizeable numbers of PLO-runinstitutions that provided welfare, educational and social services to the

Palestinian population within the Territories as well as in the PalestinianDiaspora.Thiswasparticularlyworrying for thePLOas the IslamicextremistorganizationsHamasandIslamicJihadwereabletoprovidealternativeservicesfor the population thus enhancing their political stature and support in theTerritoriesattheexpenseofthePLO.Inaddition,theblowtoPalestinianmoraleasaresultofthemassiveinfluxofJewsfromtheformerSovietUnionintoIsraelaswellasthedeteriorationoftheintifadaandgrowingIsraelimilitarysuccessincapturingintifadaactivistsalladdedtothePLO'sincreasingweakness.7

Somewhatironically,inviewofIsrael'spreviousapproachtowardsthePLO,aswell asYitzhakRabin's own record, thedeterioration in support forYasserArafat in the Territories came to be viewed by the newly elected Rabingovernment as a sign for concern. Rabin's predecessor as Prime Minister,Yitzhak Shamir, had unenthusiastically joined the post-Gulf War American-mediatedMadridMiddleEastpeaceconferencewhichdidnotallowthePLOtoparticipatedirectly in thenegotiations (and thus requirednoIsraeli recognitionofthePLO)andforcedthePalestinianstoappearaspartofajointPalestinian-Jordaniannegotiatingteam.Upon assuming office, Rabin continued to shun the PLO and offer the

PalestinianslargelythesamekindofautonomythatShamirhadofferedthematMadrid.RabinpreferredtoworkwithlocalPalestinianleadersthatheviewedasmuch more moderate and pragmatic and tried to marginalize the far lesspalatable(fromtheIsraelipointofview)Arafat.8TheMadridtalks,whichhadbynowbeentransferredtoWashington,foundered,however,primarilybecausetheywerebasedon theprincipleofmovingdirectly towardsa final settlementbetweenIsraeland thePalestiniansata timewhenIsraelwasstillunwilling toenvisage thecreationofaPalestinian state in theTerritories. In themeantime,Rabin's response to increasing Hamas terrorist attacks, including arrests anddeportationsofHamasactivists toLebanon,was strengthening the Islamists attheexpenseofthePLO.Rabin'sroreignMinister,ShimonPeres,andPeres'deputy,YossiBeilin,came

totheconclusionthatitwouldbenecessaryformallytorecognizethePLOandmakeeveryefforttostrengthenitlestIsraelbefacedwithwhattheyfeltwouldbe a far more implacable enemy, the Islamic extremists. This was the chiefreasonthatBeilingavehissupporttotheopeningofback-channelnegotiations

between Israeli and PLO representatives in and around theNorwegian capitalthatbeganinJanuary1993.

Oslo,Taba,CairoandWashington

ThedevelopmentoftheOsloback-channelprovedtobeextremelyusefultobothsides. For the PLO, the negotiations atOslo enabled them finally to negotiateface-to-face with (initially unofficial, but later official) representatives of thestateof Israel.The successof theOslo talkswouldmean that Israelwouldbeforced to recognize the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians thusenabling it to position itself in such a way that it could take the credit forPalestiniangainsandIsraeliwithdrawalsattheexpenseoftheHamaswhocouldonlyofferthePalestiniansintheTerritoriesacontinuationofthearmedstruggle.Additionally,Oslo offered thePLO the chance to re-establish a presence in

Palestine (and indeed control over land) for the first time since 1967. For theIsraeli government, Oslo had the benefit of allowing Israel to conductnegotiationsinsecretwiththePLOthathadtheadvantage,intheinitialstages,of deniability (Yair Hirschfeld and Ron Pundak were academics, not Israeligovernmentfunctionaries).Theorists of conflict resolution emphasize the usefulness of what they

commonlyrefertoas'track-twodiplomacy',especiallyindisputeswherethereisastrongsenseofvictimhoodonbothsidesandinwhichthefreedomofactionofpoliticalleadersisconstrainedbyemotionalattitudesamongtheirconstituenciesand by a high degree of fear and loathing among the public towards theadversary.9PublicopinionwasclearlyaproblemforIsraelinenteringintoopennegotiations with the PLO and the secret Oslo channel, unlike the publicWashington talks, allowed thebuildingof confidencebetweennegotiators andthekindofisolatedandintensivenegotiationsleadingtoabreakthroughsuchasoccurredatCampDavid.10

However, at CampDavid, both sideswere able to agree upon not only thebasicnatureoftheirfuturerelationshipbutalsothedetailsofthatrelationship.Infairness, itmust be added that perhaps it was easier to do so at CampDavid

becauseitwasaquestionofrelationsbetweentwoexistingsovereignstatesthatdid not represent a structural threat to each other - as is the case when theexistenceofone state seems topreclude the existenceof theother (somethingwhichmostIsraelisandPalestinianshaveheldtobetrueinthepast).At Oslo, the Israeli side was unable and unwilling to commit to even the

vaguest allusion as to the nature of the final settlement with the Palestinians.ThiswasnotonlybecauseoftheRabingovernment'sfearsofapublicopinionbacklashifitbecameknownthatOslowastoleadtothecreationofaPalestinianstate,butalsobecausethegovernmentitselfwasdivided.Onegroupwithinthegovernment (headed byRabin)wanted to drag out negotiationswith the PLOthusensuringIsraelicontrolovertheTerritoriesandastatusquosituationforaslong as possible while the other (headed by Peres) felt that withdrawal frommostof theTerritoriesand thecreationofaPalestinianstatebeside Israelwasinevitableandthatthefive-yeartransitionalperiodshouldbeusedtodevelopacompletelynewtypeofrelationshipwiththePalestinians.11

The PLO had much to gain from Oslo (Israeli recognition and withdrawalfromterritory)andlittletolosesince,forreasonsnotedabove,itspositionwasdeteriorating rapidly. The Israeli government, on the other hand,was taking aserious political risk in moving from the stalledWashington formula to Oslosince it entailed recognition of the PLO and, by extension, recognition of thePalestinian right to selfdetermination. As long as Israel shunned the PLO, itcould allow itself to deny the very existence of a Palestinian people and dealwith the inhabitants of theTerritories on a local, case-by-case basis - perhapsrecognizing certain individual rights, but not imbuing the Palestinians withcollective rights as a nation. The language used by Israelis, intent on denyingPalestinian nationhood, was even tailored to this with the Palestinians beingreferred to only as Mekomi'im (locals) or Aravim (Arabs) - the first termatomizing thenationalgroup intogroupsofpeople inhabitingaparticularareaandthesecondblendingthegroupintoanamorphousmassofpeoplewhoshareaparticularlanguageandsomeculturalcharacteristics-butneverasFalestinim(Palestinians).In recognizing the PLO, Israel would have to come face to face with the

realityofaPalestiniannationwhosedemandsforastateoftheirownwerenotunlikethoseoftheearlyZionists.InenteringOslo,Israelenteredintoaprocess

ofterritorialpartitionand,insodoing,albeitinchangedcircumstancesandwithaltered frontiers, returned to 1947 and theUNpartition plan forPalestine thatenvisagedthecreationofaPalestinianstatealongsideIsrael.ThegreatdeparturethatOslorepresentedfrompreviousPalestinianautonomy

plans was that it envisaged a transitional autonomy period that provided thePalestinians not only with control of their day-to-day lives with respect toeconomic, social, educational and governmental affairs, together with otherissues,butitalsogavePalestinianscontroloverterritory.TheDOPandtheMay1994Agreement on theGaza Strip and JerichoArea are partition agreementsthat provide for the establishmentof adifferent, and inmanyways sovereign,political and security regime in Gaza and Jericho. This process was thencontinued with the Interim Agreement, to include the remaining Palestiniancities on theWestBank (exceptHebron, thebulkofwhichwas transferred toPalestiniancontrolbytheNetanyahugovernmentinJanuary1997).Those Israelis who criticized these agreements because they felt that Oslo

would result in a repartitioning of the land of Israel and a setting up of thefoundationsofaPalestinianstatewerereadingthesituationcorrectly(althoughwhetherthiswasnecessarilybadforIsraelwas,ofcourse,adifferentquestion).Naturally,RabinmusthaveunderstoodthatoncehehadaffixedhissignaturetotheDOP, he had begun a process of repartitioning historic Palestine.Hemayhavefelt,however,thataJordanian-PalestinianconfederationwouldbetheendresultandthushewouldnotbedepartingradicallyfromthelegacyofhisformerLabourcolleague,YigalAllon.Nevertheless,IsraelwasenteringintounchartedwatersinwhichthePLOhadfarlesstolosethantheRabingovernment.Since Israel was the party in the strongest position when the negotiations

began,Rabincoulddictatethetermsinsuchawaysoastoattempttominimizethe political risks and hence the process of interim stages was viewed asattractivebytheIsraeliside,asShimonPereslaterremarked,'Whiletheproposallackstheclarityofamap,itprovidesthecommitmentofacalendar'.12WhenthetimecametodeterminewhereIsraelwouldwithdrawfromfirst,theGazaStrip-with its poverty, refugee camps and population density of 2,000 people persquare kilometre -was the obvious choice being almost universally viewed inIsrael as a burden whose continued control provided questionable securitybenefits,adjoiningasitdoesademilitarizedSinai.

WhenthePalestiniansidedemandedthattheyalsoreceivesometerritoryonthe West Bank, so that Israel might not be tempted to make Arafat merely'SheriffofGaza',theIsraelisideagreedthatthePalestinianswouldalsobegivencontrol of Jericho. Jericho was viewed as the best candidate for transfer toPalestinian control since there were few Israeli settlements nearby and it wasclosetoJordan-withwhichIsraelhopedthePalestinianAuthority(PA)wouldbecloselylinked.Additionally,IsraelhopedthattheinfantPAwouldsetupitsadministrativeheadquartersinJerichosothatpressurecouldbetakenoffnearbyJerusalem as a potential Palestinian capital.13As things turned out,Arafat didnot provide them with this satisfaction, choosing instead to set up hisheadquartersinGazaCity.Whilebothsidesagreedtopostponedealingwiththemostcontentiousissues

until the finalstatus talks, the initialagreementsalsodealtwith issues,andsetprecedents,thathaveveryprofoundrepercussionsforthefinalsettlement.WhileIsrael conceded in all the agreements that the basis for a settlement with thePalestinians was UN Security Council Resolution 242, which calls forwithdrawal from territories occupied in 1967, it did not renounce any Israeliclaimtocontrollingpartoralloftheterritoriesanddidnotundertaketopromiseanyfurtherwithdrawals.14

These essentially contradictory positions allowed Israel to accede toPalestinian demands that Oslo create the conditions for the building of aPalestinian state in most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip (as well as EastJerusalem)whileatthesametime,keepitsoptionsopenforthefinalsettlementandnotopenlypartwith theconceptofaunitedEretzIsraelorat leastoverallIsraeli security control over the territories. Hence, the agreements gave IsraelexclusivecontroloverexternaldefenceandforeignrelationsofthePAareasaswell as providing Israelis with, in most cases, 'extraterritorial' rights in PAareas.15Inthisway,theRabingovernmentwasabletoportraytheOsloAccordsintermsof'redeployment','interimphases',and'Palestinianself-rule',ratherthanin terms of permanent Israeli withdrawals and the creation of an independentPalestinianstate.TheOsloAccordsneededtobeambiguous,notonlybecausethepartieswere

notyetreadytodealwiththemostseriousissuesatstake,butalsobecausetheIsraeli sidewas not prepared to concede the fact that theOslo processwould

eventually lead to a Palestinian state - just as the Palestinian side was alsoreluctant to relinquish its ideological commitment and dream of regainingcontrolofallofhistoricPalestine.Thepoliticalprice that thegovernmentandIsraeli society would have to pay in terms of bitter divisiveness (and no onecould have known then that thiswould cost the country its PrimeMinister aswell)wasdeemedtoohightogivethegovernmenttheluxuryofmakingacleanbreakwith the past andmaking clear statements aboutwhere the processwasleadingto.Ambiguity was also useful for the PLO because it could claim that its

concessions to Israelwere temporary, while at the same time establishing thepolitical, military, economic and administrative infrastructure of the futurePalestinianstate.However,thePLOwasmuchclearerastowhatitviewedtheonly possible logical outcome of the process to be - the creation of anindependent Palestine. While the opaque nature of the Oslo processunquestionablyservedvery importantdomesticpoliticalgoalsonbothsides, itensuredthatbothsideswouldenjoyahighdegreeoffreedomininterpretingtheagreementindifferentways.Thus,insteadofOsloprovidingtheframeworkandsettingthetoneforfuture

bilateralrelations, itcametobepulledalongbyexternaldevelopmentstosuchanextentthateventheseeminglymosttrivialevents(suchasadelayinIsraeliairtrafficcontrol'sapprovalforArafat'shelicoptertoflyfromGazatotheWestBank)couldjeopardizethepeaceprocess.However,theAccordsdidnotdealatallwiththemostseriousbonesofcontentionbetweenIsraelandthePalestinians.Itistotwoofthesethatwemustnowturn.

QuestionsLeftUnanswered

TheOsloAccordsaresilentwithrespecttosomeofthemostcriticalissuesthatdivide Israelis andPalestinians.Once again, therewas a consciousdecision todefer these issues to thefinalstatus talks thatwere tocommence,according totheDOP,nolaterthanthethirdyearoftheinterimperiod.Yet,sinceOslowasestablishingnew'factsontheground'withrespecttomatterswithinitsscope-

nearlyallofwhichwouldhaveaneffectonfinalstatusissues-itwasclearthatthesematterswouldnotsimplywaitforresolutioninthefinalstatustalks;rather,bothsideswouldtrytoact toimprovetheirnegotiatingpositionvis-à-vis theseissues before final settlement talkswere to commence.By1998 there had notbeen any substantive progress towards sketching the outlines of a finalsettlementwithrespecttotheseproblems.Theseissueshavebeendealtwithindetailelsewheresowewillonlybrieflylookattwoofthemostsignificantissuesfor the final settlement that have not been addressed by theOslo agreements:demographics(andtherelatedquestionofidentity)andborders(andtherelatedquestionofsovereignty).

Demographics

The population within the original borders of the Palestine Mandate (Israel,Jordanandtheterritories)todaynumberscloseto12million.Ofthis,some7.5millionareArab(mostlyPalestinian)andsome4.5millionareJews.Focusingonwestern Palestine (Israel and the territories), the ratio is approximately 4.5million Jews to 3.2 million Arabs (again, mostly Palestinians). Jews andPalestinianArabsinwesternPalestineliveinintertwinedcommunities-whetherin 'mixed' cities such as Jerusalem, Hebron, Haifa, Acre, Nazareth, Lod andRamieorinadjacentcommunitiesthroughouttheGalilee,theWadiAraregion,theLittleTriangleandpartsoftheWestBankandGazaStrip.Inaddition,asizeablepopulationofPalestinianArabslivesinJordanmaking

upatleasthalfoftheJordanianpopulation(estimatesrangebetween50and80percent).HencethedemographicissueisatriangularoneinvolvingIsrael, theterritories and Jordan (namely, all of the original Palestine Mandate).Essentially, threenationalgroups live in thisarea:Jews,PalestinianArabsandwhatwemay termTrans-Jordanians (that is to say those citizensof JordanofBedouin or other stockwho do not identify themselves as Palestinians but doidentifywith theJordanianstate innational-andnot justcivil - terms).WhiletherearenoJewsinJordanandnoTrans-JordaniansinIsraelortheterritories,there are Jews in the territories and Palestinians in Israel, the territories andJordan.

The logic of partition-based constructs is to divide heterogeneous politicalunits-thatis,pluralsocieties-intosmallermorehomogeneousonesinordertoachieveselfdetermination,stabilityandlegitimacy.16Hence,partitionasapolicyrests on demographic realities and perceptions of national existence. Theseparation of Palestinian populations in eastern and western Palestine did notreflect demographic realities, quite the contrary, but they did reflect Britishinterests in partitioning Palestine and creating a new political entity - theKingdomofTransjordan. The borders of theWestBank andGaza Stripweredecided largely by war and were not drawn to reflect demographic realities(unlikethoseofthe1937RoyalCommissionunderLordPeelorthe1947UnitedNationsplanwhichatleastattemptedtodosowithregardtowesternPalestine).Hence, theexistingbordersof Israel, Jordanand the territoriesdonotmake

allowancefordemographicrealities.Thus,Palestiniansfindthemselvesdividedbetween three political units - with at least twomillion Palestinians living inJordan,andsome2.5millionlivingintheWestBankandGazaStripandclosetoonemillionlivinginIsrael-andthesenumbersdonottoincludethesizablePalestinian Diaspora in the Middle East and elsewhere. Any partition-basedconstruct thatwill bebasedonexistingborders (andOslo is sucha construct)will create a situation in which the majority of Palestinians living within thebordersof theoriginalBritishMandatewillnotbe residentsof thePalestinianstate(evenifthatstateincludestheentireWestBankandGazaStripaswellasEastJerusalem).Thismeans that partition - regardless of economic and labour ties will not

meanthatIsraelwillnolongercontrolPalestinianpopulationsorthatIsraelwillbecomemore homogeneous as a virtually exclusively Jewish state. SeventeenpercentoftheIsraelipopulation(thatis,closetooneinfiveIsraelis)willstillbePalestinian Arabs. Much of the Palestinian population of Israel is located inareas where they form a majority or near majority.While the Sea of Galileeregion and the Jezreel and Beit Shean valleys in the north; the coastal strip(stretchingfromHaifatoAshkelon)andtheJerusalemcorridorinthecentreofthecountry;andtheNegevandAravainthesoutharemainlyJewish,muchoftheGalilee,WadiAra,LittleTriangleandEast JerusalemareArab.TheWadiAra,LittleTriangleandEastJerusalemareasarealsogeographicallycontiguoustotheWestBank(afactthatisofnosmallsignificanceintermsofpartition).

The location of the Jewish population in Israel is also significant in thecontext of partition because the hills of the West Bank hold a commandingpositionoverIsrael'scoastalstriptothewestandtheJerusalemcorridor(southofSamariaandnorthofJudea).Thecoastal stripcontains61.3percentof theIsraelipopulation(overwhelminglyJewish)andmuchofIsrael'sindustryandtheJerusalemcorridor(includingWestJerusalemandtheJewishneighbourhoodsofEastJerusalem)contains12percentofthecountry'spopulation.Takentogether,nearly three-quarters of Israel's population live in areas geographicallycontiguoustotheWestBank(ortheGazaStripinthecaseofthesouthernedgeof the coastal strip). This demographic reality complicates matters because itmeansthatthebulkofIsrael'spopulationlivespracticallyastone'sthrowfromthe territories and hence is highly vulnerable to military or terrorist actionsoriginatingintheadjacenthillsoftheWestBank.A further complication arises from the fact that some 140,000 Israelis have

chosentomaketheWestBanktheirhome.Thismeansthatsome17percentoftheWestBankpopulationisIsraeli(intheGazaStrip,theIsraelipopulationof5,000 comprises only 0.6 per cent of the population - although this smallminoritycontrolsahighlydisproportionateshareofthelandintheStrip).Hence,partitionalongexistinglineswillalsomeanthattheseIsraelismusteithervacatetheir homes or live under Palestinian rule - neither of which is acceptable tothemandtothemajorityoftheIsraelipublic(atleastwithrespecttomostofthesettlements).The geographic distribution of the settlements alsomakes partition difficult

since thecreationofageographicallycontiguousPalestinianstateon theWestBankwouldresult insomeof thesettlementsbeingincludedin the territoryofthe Palestinian state. The continued existence of the settlements, from thePalestinian perspective, represents a tangible day-to-day symbol of Israel'scontinuingdominationoftheirlives-theexistenceofthePalestinianAuthoritynotwithstanding.Forthesettlers,theneedtocoexistwiththePAand,attimes,pass through PAcontrolled areas, makes the tenuousness of their positionpainfullyclearandthuscreateshostilitytowardsthePAontheirpart.SincethesettlerscametotheWestBankforeitherZionistoreconomicmotivesandhencehavenodesiretoberesidentsofaPalestinianstate,theyknowthatthedrawingofborderswill determine their fate andhence canbe expected topressure the

Israeli government into insisting on drawing the borders - in the event that itappearsthatthecreationofaPalestinianstateisinevitable-insuchawaythatmostofthesettlementswillbeannexedtoIsrael.The existence of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip

represents a serious problem in terms of final status negotiations. Just as theJewishpopulationintheterritoriesrepresentsaproblemintermsofpartition,sodoes the Palestinian Arab population in Israel. As noted above, the ceasefirelinesof1949(namelytheGreenLineseparatingtheWestBankfromIsraelandtheGazaStrip fromIsrael)createdborders thatwere the resultofwar.Hence,while the greatest concentrations of Palestinians (especially as a result of themovementofrefugeepopulations)inwesternPalestinewerelocatedintheWestBankandtheGazaStrip,PalestinianArabpopulationsalsoremainedwithinthestateofIsrael.Eventually,throughthereturnofsomerefugeestotheirhomesinIsrael and through natural increase, the Palestinian Arab population in Israel(generally referred to as Israeli Arabs) has, as noted before, come to numberclosetoamillion.MostoftheseindividualsenjoyfullIsraelicitizenship(unliketheir Palestinian counterparts in the territories) and formal equality before thelaw.However,sincethestateofIsrael'sraisond'êtreisthatitisaJewishstate,thissizeableminorityfindsitselflivinginastatethatwasspecificallydesignedforJewsratherthanforallcitizensofthestateinaproportionalmanner.It should be emphasized here that although the State of Israel has been in

existenceforhalfacentury,therehasbeennodevelopment-orevenaseriousattempt todevelop - an Israelinational identity.This is in sharp contrastwithother states in the Middle East, Asia and Africa which received theirindependenceaftertheSecond"WorldWarorduringthe1950sand1960sandatleast attempted (although in many cases unsuccessfully) to create a nationalidentity to unite their various ethnic-tribal groups in order to ensure greaterstabilityandthecontinuedexistenceofthenew-bornstate.In the case of Israel, it was perceived as totally superfluous, and in fact

contrary to the principles of Zionism, to attempt to create an Israeli nationalidentity since the state was being created for an already established nationalgroup(atleastintheeyesofZionists):theJewishpeople.Therefore,whilenotallJewsarecurrentlyIsraelis,Israel'sLawofReturnensuresthattheyareallatleastpotential Israelis. ThePalestinianArab population in Israel, on the other

hand,was granted citizenship by virtue of the fact that they residewithin thebordersof thestateof Israel (meaningagain, thepre-1967borders) rather thanby virtue of the fact that the state was created to express their nationalaspirations.Hence,theirlinktothestateofIsraelisnotanemotionalone-liketheirJewishco-citizens-butratheranoperationalone(thestateprovidesthemwith public goods and enables them - to varying extents - to pursue theirpersonalinterests).One could argue that Israelis - Jews andArabs - have over time developed

elements of a common mentality which differentiates them from Jews orPalestinian Arabs outside of pre-1967 Israeli borders. However, sharingelements of a common mentality is still a long way from sharing commonnationalbonds,especiallywhenbothgroupshavestrongbondswith theirnon-Israelicompatriots.OneshouldalsorememberthatPalestinianArabcitizensofIsraelhave,especiallysince1967,beenundergoinganationalawakeningastheybecameincreasinglyexposedtoPalestiniannationalism.WithwhatappearstobetheinevitabilityofthecreationofaPalestinianstate

in the not too distant future, it would be hard to imagine that Israel's Arabswould now choose to gravitate more in the direction of their fellow Jewishcitizens in creating somesortof commonnational identity (which Israeli Jewsare not interested in creating anyway) when they can find fulfilment in aPalestinian national identity, even if they themselves do not residewithin thebordersofthePalestinianstate.WhileitappearsthatfewIsraeliArabswouldbeinterestedinreplacingthegreaterfreedomandstandardoflivingthatmostenjoyin Israel in favour of living under the control of the sometimes heavy-handedPA,onecannotruleoutthepossibilitythatforwhateverreasons-IsraeliArabsmaysomedaywanttoliveunderPalestinianrule.Suchaspirationscouldproveaserious threat to Israel's geographic contiguity and indeed its existence in thefuture.AllofthispresentsaseriousdilemmaforIsraelandforthePalestinians.Israel

cannot hope to achieve separation between Jews andPalestinians (even if thiswerefeasiblefromaneconomicpointofview)because-regardlessofhowonedraws the partition lines (even if Israel is prepared to relinquish certain areaswith a large Israeli Arab population to the Palestinian state in exchange forterritorialconcessionsfromtheotherside)-onecannotachievetotalseparation.

The Jewish and Palestinian Arab populations are far too geographicallyintertwinedtoachieveacleanseparation.WhilephysicalseparationwastoutedbytheLabourgovernmentasoneofthechiefbenefitsoftheagreements,Osloisemphatically incapable of achieving this (unless both parties are prepared toagreetoanexchangeofpopulations).Clearly, the idea of physically separating Jews and Palestinian Arabs in

western Palestine, although still useful as a political slogan in Israel, is apracticalimpossibility.Hence,Oslo,despitetheRabingovernment'spromises,isbasednot somuchonaphysical anddemographicpartitionasapoliticalone.That is tosay thatbothsideswill theoreticallybeable to realize theirpoliticalaspirations in the form of sovereign states (albeit with different degrees ofsovereignty)butitwillnotresultinacompletephysicalseparationbetweenthetwopopulations.Israelwould like to incorporate asmany of the Israeli settlers living in the

territoriesandtheirsettlementsintothestateofIsrael.NearlyallIsraelipartitionschemes stretching back to the Allon plan of the 1970s, call for Israeliannexation of many if not most of the Israeli settlements on theWest Bank.MostofthesettlementsarelocatedinareasnotfarfromtheGreenLine,someinareas of relatively sparse Palestinian population and others with significantpockets of Palestinian population. Any large-scale dismantling of settlementswouldbelikelytocausecivilstrifewithinIsraelastherelativelylesstraumaticexperienceofthedismantlingoftheSinaisettlementofYamitsuggests.Therefore,fromtheIsraelipointofview,afinalstatusaccordthatwouldcall

for thedismantlingofmorethanafewsettlements isunimaginable.ThemajorquestionformanyIsraelis,andcertainlyfor thesettlers themselves, iswhetherthe settlers will be living in Israel or in Palestine. In fact, there are threeconceivablepossibilitiesintermsofthestatusofthesettlersandthesettlements.First,mostofthesettlementscouldbeannexedtoIsrael-somethingwhichthemajorityofIsraelisofallpoliticalstripesprefer-andthenthesettlerswouldbeIsraelicitizenslivinginIsrael.AsecondpossibilityisthatthesettlersretaintheirstatusasIsraelicitizensbut

physicallyresideinthePalestinianstateperhapswithsomeextraterritorialrights(such as not being subject to Palestinian law, security forces, etc) - Oslo, asnoted above, already sets the precedent for this (albeitwith Israel and not the

Palestiniansresponsibleforthesecurityofthesettlers).Thispossibilityisalmostuniversallyrejectedbythesettlercommunity,however,becausetheydonottrustthe Palestinian authorities and do not believe that such an arrangement couldwork once the Israeli army is withdrawn from the settlements. The finalpossibility is that the settlers become citizens of the Palestinian state andtherefore become a Jewishminority in Palestine just as there is a Palestinianminority in Israel. This, of course, is totally unacceptable to the Israeli sidebecauseitrepresentsafundamentalcontradictionoftheprincipleofZionismastheyseeit-thatJewscametoZioninordertoliveinaJewishstateandnotasaminorityinanArabstate.

Borders

DeterminingthelocationandnatureofthefuturebordersbetweenIsraelandthePalestinian state is inmanyways the catch-all of thenegotiations since itwillinvolvetakingintoconsiderationmostofthefactorsthatmustbedealtwithforthe final settlement. As noted, the Oslo agreements are based on territorialpartition. However, in keeping with Oslo's opaque and phased nature, theagreementsdidnotundertake todetermine theexactnatureandlocationof thelines of partition, leaving this for future negotiations. The Oslo agreementscreatedonlytemporarylinesofpartitionaroundthePalestiniancitiesandmuchof theGaza Stripwhile itwas understood by both sides that these lineswerestrictly interimones. Palestinian fears that theNetanyahu government -whichcametopowerinthesummerof1996-wouldchangetheofficialIsraelipositionandcometoviewtheseinterimlinesasmoreorlesspermanent(thusleavingthePalestinianswithscatteredenclavesundertheircontrolandnopossiblebasisforthecreationofaviablestate)mayhavelargelybeenresponsiblefortheviolentclashes with Israeli security forces initiated by the Palestinians in September1996.Those clashes and the subsequent international pressure brought to bear on

Israel ultimately led to the abandonment of any hopes on the part of somemembers of theNetanyahu government that the interim arrangement could betransformed into a permanent one and led to the conclusion of the Hebron

Accords(whichincludeIsraelicommitmentstocontinuetheredeployment-thatis,partition-process).FromtheIsraelipointofview,threeissuesstandoutasbeingcrucialvis-à-vis

thenegotiationsonborder lines: security, resourcesandsettlements.Suffice tosayherethatIsraelwillwanttobeabletoannexasmuchstrategicterritoryandterritorywithsizeableIsraelipopulationsontheWestBankaspossiblesoastoensure that Israelwillbeable toenjoy theaddedstrategicdepth that theWestBankprovides,havecontroloversomeof the landabovethemountainaquiferand not have to dismantle most of the existing Israeli settlements. One otherpointworthmentioning is that Israelwould like to retainexternalcontroloverthebordersofthoseareasintheWestBankandGazathatwilleventuallycometomake up the Palestinian state. Control of the Egypt-Gaza and Jordan-WestBankbordershasbeenahighpriority for Israel.This ischieflybecauseof thedanger that extremist elementsmight try to enter the territories or smuggle incontrabandthusincreasingthethreatofterrorism.Toalesserextent,economicsmayplayarolebecauseoncegoodsaresmuggledintotheterritories,itbecomesmoredifficulttopreventthemfromenteringIsrael.Controlofone'sborders,includingtherighttodecidewhoorwhatmayenter

and exit them, is an important facet of sovereignty. Yet this aspect ofsovereignty,likemanyothers,willalmostcertainlybelimitedwithrespecttothePalestiniansinthefinalstatusphase.UndertheOsloAccords,thisproblemwasdealt with operationally without having to tackle the repercussions forsovereignty that thisproblemsentails.Since thegoalof the first twostagesoftheOsloprocesswasnottheestablishmentofasovereignPalestinianstate,butratheraninterimarrangementofautonomyforthePalestinians,thisissuecouldbe addressedwithout prejudice in the final settlement, according to the IsraeliinterpretationoftheAccords,andthusenablethePalestinianstoacceptultimateIsraelicontrolovertheirexternalborders.OsloI(theGaza-JerichoAgreement)stipulatedthatalltheareasunderPalestiniancontrolwouldberegardedaswithinanIsraelisecurity'envelope'andthusIsraelwould'maintainsecuritycontrolandsupervision over the entry of persons, vehicles and weapons at all points ofentry'.17

Palestiniandemandsforsomesemblanceofsovereigntyoverbordercrossingsledtothecreationofadual-entrysupervisionarrangementsetdownintheCairo

Agreement of February 1994. This arrangement provides for border terminalswithtwowings:thefirstservesPalestinianslivingintheautonomousareasandvisitors to these areas as well as Palestinian residents of other parts of theterritories who wish to enter the autonomous areas, and the second servesIsraelisandotherswhosedestination is Israelorareasunder Israel's control inthe territories. Israel has overall control of the terminals and inspection rights(including the right to deny entry into the autonomous areas) with respect tothoseenteringthePalestinianwing.18

WhiletheroleofIsraelisecuritypersonnelwithrespecttothoseenteringthePalestinianwing is supposed to be as unimposing as possible (Israelis behindtintedglassor two-waymirrors)andwhile thePalestiniansenjoy thesymbolictrappings of sovereignty such as a raised Palestinian flag at the terminal andarmed uniformed Palestinian police officers, the arrangement still gives IsraeloverallcontroloverentranceandexitfromtheterritoryofthePA.Thesolutionto theproblemofbordercrossingssetdownby theCairoAgreementoffersanexampleofcreativeproblem-solvinginwhichthecravingforsovereigntyanditssymbols on the part of the Palestinians is recognizedwhile, at the same time,Israel'sneedforsecurityisaddressed.Adifferent,butrelatedproblem,hastodowithIsraelifearsthattheprovision

to the Palestinians of unlimited seaport and airport rights can also present asecurity threat to Israel. Under the provisions of theOsloAccords, Israel hascomplete control of the airspace above the autonomous areas and control ofwatersoffthecoastoftheGazaStrip.WhilethePalestinianpolicehaveanavalarm, theyareconfined tocoastalpatroldutieswithinwhat is referred to in theOsloIIAccordsas'ZoneL'(uptoadistanceofsixnauticalmilesfromthecoastwith theIsraelinavybeingresponsibleforoverallnavalsecurity, includingtheareas between Egyptian territorial waters and PA territorial waters that arepatrolledexclusivelybytheIsraelinavy).19

ThePalestinians,todate,operatetworotary-wingaircraftwhichmustobtainclearancefromIsraeliaviationauthoritiesinordertoflyfromPAenclavetoPAenclave. In termsof security, the Israeli air forcehas total controlof the skiesabove PA areas. This situation, in which Israel controls the sea and skiesadjacenttooroverPalestinianareas, isnotlikelytochangeunderthetermsofthefinalsettlement.Airpower isparticularly important in termsof theMiddle

Eastern battlefield and it is not likely that Israelwill allow thePalestinians tobuildanairforceorrestrictitsownabilitytoflyovertheterritoriesfortraining,reconnaissanceanddefencepurposes.ThePalestinianshave,however,demandedtherighttobuildsea-andairports

to serve their population. The existence of such facilities is psychologicallyimportantforthePalestiniansbecausesovereigntyappearstobemuchmorerealwhen one can enter the territories directly by sea or air rather than via Israeliports such as Ashdod and Israel's international airport near Tel Aviv. ThecreationofaportatGazaandanairportatDahaniyehavebeendiscussedbutnotresolved.In themeantime, the Palestinians have completed their international airport

whichwillbeable toaccommodate largepassenger jetaircraft.Despite Israeliprotests, the Palestinians have gone ahead with construction of the airport,although it is obvious that the airport will not be able to operate withoutclearance from Israel.The principal problemhere is that Israelwouldwant toapply the same arrangements existing at border crossings to sea-and airports.This can be problematic when one considers that, for example, if a port iscompletedontheGazaCityseashore,itwouldmeanallowingIsraeltoreturntoGazaintermsofallowingthepresenceofIsraelissecuritypersonnelattheport.The same problem existswith respect to the airport,which is located entirelywithin territory under civil and security control of the PA (Area A under theInterimAgreement).The Palestinians are understandably interested in maximizing the territorial

scopeoftheirfuturestateandhenceconsidertheGreenLine-asidefromsomeminorbordermodifications-tobetheirfutureborder.ThePalestiniansmakethepoint that they would require the whole of theWest Bank and Gaza Strip inorder tocreateaviable statewith room to settle refugeesandbuild industries.Anyreductionintheterritorialscopeoftheirstate,theyargue,willdiminishitsviabilityandthereforebeunacceptabletothem.Thisisespeciallysoinviewofthe fact that the Palestinians would already be severely constrained by theabsenceofadirectlinkbetweentheWestBankandtheGazaStrip.20

Significantly,thePalestinianshavenotautomaticallyrejectedproposalssuchastheBeilin-AbuMazenplan,whichcallsforIsraeliannexationofsomepartsoftheWestBankinexchangeforIsraelitransferoflandsinIsraeltothefuture

Palestinian state. Along with the importance of obtaining as much land aspossible for the Palestinian state, the Palestinians want full control over theirexternal borders as befitting a sovereign state - somethingwhich Israel is notlikelytoapprove.There are several options available in terms of setting the location of the

border between Israel and the Palestinian state that lie within a spectrum ofoptions in which, at one pole, represents a bare minimum of Palestinianterritorial control (half or less of the West Bank with Israel controlling theJordanValley,Jerusalemregion,westernSamariaandJudeanDesert),andattheother, representsaPalestinianstatecontrollingnearlyallof the territoryof theWest Bank andGaza Strip. The smaller (physically) the Palestinian state, themore advantageous for Israel, allowing it to safeguard its most importantdemographic,resourceandsecurityinterestswhileamaximalistPalestinianstatein the territorieswould be perceived by the Palestinians as the bareminimumthatwouldbeacceptable.Bothsideswillmostlikelyeventuallyhavetocompromiseonthisissue.The

twopartiescancompromiseeitheronaterritorialorfunctionallevel.Thatistosay that Israel can retain control over some one-quarter to one-third of theterritoryoftheWestBankwiththePalestiniansgettingcontroloftherestorthePalestinianscanbegivencontrolovervirtuallyalloftheWestBankwithIsraelobtaining extraterritorial rights for settlements and the Israeli army (so thatsettlementscouldbeunderIsraeliauthoritywithsettlersguaranteedfreedomofmovementbetweenthesettlementsandIsraelandthearmycouldbeallowedtomaintain bases and freely move in troops to the Jordan Valley in order tomaintainexternalsecurity).TheadvantageofthesecondoptionisthatitwouldallowPalestinianstofeel

thattheyhaveenoughterritoryforaviablestateanddidnothavetomakeanyadditionalterritorialconcessionstoIsrael(sincetheyfeelthattheyhavealreadymadeonemajor territorial concession - relinquishing their claim to the rest ofPalestine)while at the same time itwould allow Israel largely tomaintain thedemographicandsecuritystatusquo.ThisarrangementdependsonPalestiniangoodwillandwillingnesstoabidebytheagreementsoverthelongterm.Clearlythen,theissuesrelatingtodemographicsandborders,aswellasahost

ofothermatterssuchasPalestinianrefugees,thestatusofJerusalem,economic

relations, water rights and security arrangements, will largely determine thenatureof the future relationshipbetween the twostatesand thestabilityof thepeacebetweenthem.Osloislargelysilentwithrespecttothesecriticalmatters.

OsloWiththeBenefitofHindsight

SincetheinitialestablishmentofthePalestinianAuthorityinGazaandJericho,theIsraeli-Palestinianpeaceprocesshasprovedtobefarmoreproblematicthanthe negotiators at Oslo imagined. The opacity of the agreements, which wereviewed by some as their genius, because of the flexibility that they gave thepeace process, have turned out to be their greatest shortcoming.Many of theprincipals, both Israeli and Palestinian, involved in working out the Accordshave since modified, if not reneged on, their support for Oslo's opaque andphased structure and have, like Yossi Beilin, called for moving forwardimmediatelytofinalstatusnegotiations.NotonlyhasthefocusofeffortsonboththeIsraeliandPalestiniansidesbeen

on effecting changes outside the Oslo process - and often with the aim ofunderminingit-butOslodidnotevenprovidethevaguestframeworkastothenatureofafinalsettlementbetweenthetwosides.Sincetheydidnotdoso,andsincethechangesthattheydideffectwerestilltechnicallynon-binding,theOsloAccords were unable to force the parties to accept a mutual agenda for thefuture.The chief reason for this was the hesitancy on the part of the Israeli

governmenttoeffectsuchradicalchangesinashortspaceoftime.However,inviewof the severecriticism that theRabingovernmenthad toendure from itsIsraelicriticsasaresultofthesigningoftheDOPandtheensuingagreements,onemightthinkthatgoingafewstepsfurther(suchasagreeingtothecreationof a Palestinian state and gaining Palestinian concessions on borders, etc inexchange)mightnothavesignificantlychangedthealreadyhighdecibellevelintheKnessetwhentheagreementwasfirstannounced.Afterall, theIsraeliRight immediatelysawintheDOPthefoundationsofa

PalestinianstateandtheLabourgovernmentexpendedmuchpoliticalcapitalin

the negotiations with the Palestinians (in terms of making the agreements asopaqueaspossible)andtheninattemptingtowinoverpublicopinionbytryingto portray the agreement as specifically not setting the foundations for such astate. Sketching the future outlines of the process would have establishedimportant-andbinding-precedentsthatcouldhaveservedtoguidetheprocessthroughits intermittentstages toafinalsettlementrather thanleavingthefieldopentounilateralmovesonthepartofeachside.Finally, when looking at the 100-year-old conflict between Jews and

PalestinianArabsinPalestine,wemustrememberthatcertainthingswillremainunresolved, nomatter howperfect the peace process itself appears to be.Onesuch problem, as noted above, is that of the future identity of the Israelipopulation.TheestablishmentofaPalestinianstatesometimeinthefuturewillnot result in a separation between Arab and Jew in the land between theMediterraneanandtheJordanRiver.ThecreationofaPalestinianstatewillnotsolvetheidentityproblemsofthemajorityoftheworld'sPalestinians-whowillfindthemselvesoutsidethebordersofthisnewstate.Similarly,thecreationofaPalestinian state will not, despite what the Israeli peace camp suggests, solveIsrael'sdemographicproblemsinthelongtermbecauseitwillnotguaranteethatIsrael will remain overwhelmingly Jewish forever. This may lead one to theconclusionthatperhapsIsraeliJewsandPalestinianArabsshouldhavetriedtodevelop a common Israeli identity and live jointly in the same state. But ofcourse,itisalittlelateinthedayforthistypeofsolution.Hence,sinceOslohasalreadycreatednewphysicalrealities,itwouldappear

that the only realistic alternative would be to pursue Oslo to its logicalconclusion in creatingaPalestinian state inmuchof theWestBankandGazaStripwithsometypeoflinktoEastJerusalem.However,inviewofthefactthatIsraeli-Palestiniansecurityco-operationhasyettoproveitselfandsincethereiscurrentlyadistinctlackofgoodwillonbothsides,someelementsoftheinterimarrangements (such as Israeli security control over external borders and anIsraelimilitarypresenceintheterritories)mustbemaintainedforthenearfuture.Paradoxically, the shortcomings of Oslo - the chief one being its drawn-outnature-forcesthepartiestoperpetuatethoseshortcomingsbecauseastimegoeson, itbecomesmoredifficult, rather thaneasier, tobuildarelationshipof trustandco-operationbetweenIsraelisandPalestinians.

co-NadavMoragisLecturerinPoliticalScienceatTelAvivUniversity.

Notes

1.'DeclarationofPrinciplesonInterimSelf-GovernmentArrangements',13September1993.

2.'TheWyeMemorandum',23October1998.

3.'TheCampDavidAccords:TheFrameworkforPeaceintheMiddleEast',17September1978.

4.SeeMarkTessler,'TheCampDavidAccordsandthePalestinianProblem',inAnnMoselyLeschand

Mark Tessler (eds), Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinians: From Camp David to Intifada,

Bloomington,1989,p.18.

5.PalestineNationalCouncil,'PoliticalCommuniqué',Algiers,15November1988.

6.GrahamUsher,Palestine inCrisis: The Struggle forPeace andPolitical Independence afterOslo,

London,1995,pp.1-2.

7.Usher,PalestineinCrisis,pp.2-5.

8.AviShlaim,'TheOsloAccord',JournalofPalestineStudies,Vol.XXIII,No.3(Spring1994),p.28.

9.JosephVMontville,'TransnationalismandtheRoleofTrack-TwoDiplomacy',inWScottThompson

andKennethM.Jensen(eds),ApproachestoPeace:AnIntellectualMap,Washington,DC,1992,

p.262.

10.GabrielBen-DorandDavidB.Dewitt,'ConfidenceBuildingMeasuresintheMiddleEast'inGabriel

Ben-Dor andDavidB.Dewitt (eds),ConfidenceBuildingMeasures in theMiddleEast,Boulder,

1994,p.13.

11.AviShlaim,'IsraeliPoliticsandMiddleEastPeacemaking',JournalofPalestineStudies,Vol.XXIV,

No.4(Summer1995),p.25.

12. Quoted in Avi Shlaim, 'Prelude to the Accord: Likud, Labour and the Palestinians', Journal of

PalestineStudies,Vol.XXIII,No.4(Winter1994),p.14.

13.ShimonPeres,TheNewMiddleEast,NewYork,1993,p.23.

14.'TheOsloAgreement:InterviewwithHaydarAbdal-Shafi,JournalofPalestineStudies,Vol.XXIII,

No.1(Autumn1993),pp.14-15.

15.SeeArticleV,'AgreementontheGazaStripandJerichoArea',14May1994.

16.ArendLiphart,DemocracyinPluralSocieties:AComparativeExploration,NewHaven,1977,p.5.

17.'AgreementontheGazaStripandJerichoArea',14May1994.

18.'TheCairoAgreement',FinalVersion-9February1994.

19.'AnnexI:ProtocolConcerningRedeploymentandSecurityArrangements,TheInterimAgreementon

PalestinianAutonomy',ArticleXIV.

20.SeeA.S.Khalidi,'OntheDrawingBoard,ABlueprintofPalestine',InternationalHeraldTribune,12

February1997.

TheNetanyahuEra:FromCrisistoCrisis,1996-99

NEILLLOCHERY

The defeat of Benjamin Netanyahu by Ehud Barak in Israel's 1999 electionsbrought to an end one of themost interesting and complex periods of Israelihistory. For three years following his surprise election victory over ShimonPeresinJune1996NetanyahuledIsraelwithanadministrationinastateofnearpermanentcrisiswhichappearedclosetocollapseonnumerousoccasionsbeforeits eventual disintegration in December 1998. During the same period Israel'syoungestand leastexperiencedPrimeMinisterwasfacedwithdealingwithanincreasingly complex set of peace negotiationswhichwere left over from thepreviousgovernmentsofYitzhakRabinandShimonPeres.Ineffect,bothRabinandPereshadleftthedifficultstagesofreachingagreementwiththePalestinians(andtheSyrians)toasecondtermLabourledgovernment.Theoutcomeofthe1996electionsmeantthatitwasNetanyahuandtheLikud

whowerechargedwithattemptingtoreachanagreementwithYasserArafatandthePalestinianAuthority(PA)overHebronandnegotiatingthemajortransferoflands in the West Bank to PA control. In addition, the administration wasscheduledtostartthefinalstatusnegotiations.Thesenegotiationsincludeissuessuch as statehood, the status of Jerusalem and the question of Palestinianrefugees.It isat thisstage thatIsraelwillbecalledupontomakeanumberofcompromises. In reality, these negotiations were overshadowed by problemsbetween1996and1999with the InterimAgreementswhich culminated in theWye Memorandum in 1998, the event which led to collapse of theadministration.It isstill toopremature todetail thesuccessesandfailuresof theNetanyahu

era from an historical perspective. Suchwas the divisive nature ofNetanyahuthat there are two polarized academic perspectives on this period. The firstconcentrates on 'thewasted opportunities' between 1996 and 1999 and arguesthatNetanyahunearlydestroyedthepeaceprocess.Thesecondsuggeststhatthe

NetanyahuerawasavitalstageinlayingfirmfoundationsforpeaceinIsrael.Ineffect the period saw a necessary stage of consolidating the process after thespectacular (but divisive) agreements reached by the previous administration.Proponents of the latter concentrate on the structural problems of the OsloAccords and emphasize that any Israeli government would have encounteredseriousdifficulties.ThisessayaimstodetailanaspectoftheNetanyahuera,whichinthehighly

polarized and charged atmosphere would appear to have been overlooked,namely the internal restraints that were placed on Netanyahu's actions in thearena of peacemaking. These so-called 'shackles' included the new Israelielectoral system, the numerical weakness of the Likud he led in the Knesset,intrapartyandintercabinetconflictsandoppositiontothePrimeMinister(PM).InthesecondpartoftheessaytheeffectsoftheaboveandNetanyahu'sstrategyfor dealingwith the restraints are analysed in each of themajor tracks of thepeaceprocess.

SourcesofConflict

Netanyahu faced both major intraparty and inter-block conflict within hisgovernment.1IntheLikudpartyheledtherewasasizeablegroupthatfeltthatNetanyahu's1996electionvictorywasachievedattheexpenseoftheparty.ThisgrouparguedthatthedealswhichNetanyahumadewithRafaelEitan'sTsometandDavidLevy'sGesherParty toensure thathewas thesolecandidateof theRight in the direct election for PM cost the party in terms of its ownrepresentationontheKnesset list.Inessence,bothEitanandLevy,insecuringplaces on the Likud Knesset list for their respective candidates, did so at theexpenseofleadingfiguresintheLikud.2

The Likud-Gesher-Tsomet list won a total of only 32 seats in the 1996Knessetelections.Outof theseonly23camefromtheLikud(theotherplacesweretakenbymembersofGesherandTsomet)whichisadrasticreductionforapartywhichinthe1980shadwononaverage45seatsinKnessetelections.Asaresult of his relative lack of strength in the Knesset, Netanyahu's powers of

patronageweregreatlyreduced,andhewasleftwithalargegroupofdisgruntledLikudnationalfigureswhofailedtowinaseatintheKnesset.Normalpatronagetoolssuchas theappointmentofnewambassadorscouldhavehelpedalleviatethisproblem,but suchappointments arenormally reserved fordisappointedordisillusionednationalleaderswhohavenotbeenincludedinthecabinet,andnotforlargergroupswhofailedtoentertheKnesset.Atthetime,Netanyahuwaswellawareofthisproblemandtriedtosolveitby

introducingthe'NorwegianPrinciple'wheremembersofthecabinetresigntheirKnessetseatsandarereplacedbythenextnameonTheparty'soriginalelectorallist.Moreover,cruciallyforNetanyahuthenamesfrom32to40ontheLikud-Gesher-Tsomet list were mainly members of the Likud. However, oppositionfromcabinetmemberswhowerereluctanttoresigntheirseatsprovedtobetoostrong forNetanyahu to force thechange through theKnesset.Asa result, theeightministers (not includingNetanyahuhimselfwhowouldhave retainedhisseat)fromtheLikud-Gesher-Tsometlistkepttheirseatsandthecandidateswhooccupiedpositions33to41intheKnessetlistwerenotabletogototheKnesset.In the original Knesset list the Likud members occupied six of the positionsbetween33and41andafurtherthreebetween42and45.An additional problem that faced the new PM was the selection of

chairpersons and members for the Knesset committees. In the past, this hadtraditionally been an opportunity for a leader to hand out patronage to loyalclients. Put simply, as head of the largestKnesset party and block, the PrimeMinister'schoicewasalmostcertaintobeconfirmedinthesubsequentballotofmembersoftheKnesset]whichselectsthechairpersonsandcompositionoftheparliamentarycommittees.However,after the1996Knessetelection theLikudwasnotthelargestpartyintheKnesset,andthisfactwasreflectedinitsnumberof committee chairpersons; out of 12 committees the Likud had only twochairpersons,UziLandau(ForeignAffairsandDefence)andNaomiBlumenthal(Immigration andAbsorption). Conversely, the Labour Party,which remainedthe single largest party in the Knesset, was able to get five of its memberselected as chairpersons. An additional problem for Netanyahu lies in that thenumber of Likud MKs who sit on these committees also reflects the party'srelativelyweakparliamentarystrength,andthereforeitsabilitytododealswithsmaller parties to ensure the election of its members to the committees.

Consequently,notonlywasNetanyahufacedwithunhappyLikudniks,butalsomanyof theLikudmemberswhowereelectedtotheKnessetweredisgruntledbecause theywere not occupying positions of prestige or influencewithin theparliament.Netanyahu'sweaknessintheLikudwasdemonstratednotonlybyhislackof

patronage powers, but at a more fundamental level in his lack of a clearlyidentifiable group of constituency support within the party. Both MenachemBegin and Yitzhak Shamir, Netanyahu's predecessors as leader, gained theirrespectivesupportfromtheoldgenerationofHerutsupporters,manyofwhomtheyhad foughtwith sideby side in theundergroundduring Israel's battle forindependence.AtthetimeofShamir'sdepartureafterdefeatinthe1992electiontherewere threemajor internal groupingswithin theLikud; the Shamir-Arenscamp,theSharoncampandtheLevycamp.3

OftheseNetanyahuwasseenasbeingclosesttotheShamir-Arensgroup.ThesurprisedecisionofMosheArenstoretirefrompoliticsafter the1992electionlefttheleadershipofthisgroupingwideopen.However,Netanyahuwasnottheheir apparentof thisgroup;manyof its supporters regardedhimas tooyoungandinexperienced,othersdidnotlikehisconcentrationonthemediawherehewashighlyvisiblebothwithinIsraelandintheworldviaCNN.Inshort,hadtheuseofprimariestoelectanewleadernotbeenadoptedbythepartyitisunlikelythatNetanyahuwouldhavebeenelectedasitsleader.4

In the event, during theprimariesNetanyahuwas able toportrayhimself tothe100,000massrank-and-filemembersofthepartyasthemanmostlikelytoreturn the party to power. Such an achievement should not be underestimatedfor,atthetimeoftheleadershipcontestin1993,thepartywasstillindeepshockafteritselectiondefeatin1992atthehandsoftheLabourParty.5

Following his victory in the primaries Netanyahu moved swiftly toconsolidatehispower, pushing throughanewparty constitutionwhich amongother things limited the possibility to challenge him for the leadership fromwithin the Likud. However, despite his victory Netanyahu clearly at no timeenjoyedmajority support fromwithin theparty institutions. In factNetanyahu,almost uniquely in Western-style democracies, was unable successfully toconstructhisownsizeablefactionwithintheLikuddespitebeingitsleader.IronicallyitwasNetanyahu'soriginalmentor,MosheArens,whochallenged

the PM for the leadership of the Likud in 1999. Arens came out of politicalretirement to fight a campaign that centred on questions of Netanyahu'sleadershipqualitiesratherthanissues.Thecampaignwaslowkeywiththeresultseemingly assured.By 1999Arenswas no politicalmatch forNetanyahu in acontest that was determined by the rank-and-file membership of the Likud.FollowinghisdefeatArensacceptedthepositionofMinisterofDefenceforthefinal six months of the Netanyahu government. Further complications andrestraints on Netanyahu arose at inter-block level, and in particular in themanagementof thegovernmentcoalition.Thetensionswhichbecameapparentinthecabinetreflectedthelargenumberofcoalitionpartners(eightintotal),andtherelativeelectoralweaknessoftheLikud(neverinIsrael'shistoryhasapartybeen viewed as themajor force in a government coalitionwhich has only 32seats).6

Having outlined the problems that Netanyahu faced at both intraparty andinter-blocklevelitisimportanttoanalysethetoolsthatheemployedtodealwiththemandtoassesstheireffectonthepeaceprocessbetween1996and1999.

Netanyahu'sManagementStrategy

Netanyahu's major strength in dealing with party, coalition (cabinet) andparliamentary sources of conflict was that owing to the new electoral systemadopted for the 1996 elections hewas playing by a new set of rules. Politicalscientistshavedebatedthesignificanceofthechangeintheelectoralsystemandits implications for Israel's political system. Put simply, Israel no longerremained a pure example of parliamentary democracy, but nor does it fit thepresidentialmodelofgovernment.Itisnotthepurposeofthisessaytoenterthecomplexdebate surrounding Israel's new systemof government, but simply tosuggest that its introduction created a high degree of ambiguity in how thegovernment functions. In essence, the relationships between the PM, party,coalitionandparliamentarenotaseasilyidentifiableasinthepastandarenowmore open to interpretation and challenge by the PM.7 Paradoxically, thisuncertainty was also Netanyahu's major weakness, because large areas of his

powerandspheresofinfluencewerenotasclearlydefinedasthoseofpreviousPrimeMinisters. Inaddition,Netanyahu'sauthoritywasdiminishedby thefactthathewasthefirstIsraeliPMwhodidnotenjoythebenefitsofleadingapartywhichisthelargestforceintheKnesset.Inessence,Netanyahuhadtomarkouthisareasofcontrolandthendefendthemagainst,attimes,hostilereactionsfromhisownparty,coalitionandparliament.

ANewRoleforthePrimeMinister'sOffice(PMO)

Oneof the first actions ofNetanyahu after assuming powerwas to attempt todevelop the PMO along presidential lines. In both preelection statements andpost-election planningNetanyahu supported the idea of creating anAmerican-styleNationalSecurityCouncilwhichwouldhavebeenbasedinthePMO,andconsequently taken large powers away from theDefenceMinistry.Moreover,controloftheprivatizationprogramme,whichwasviewedasvitaltothehealthoftheIsraelieconomy,wastakenawayfromtheFinanceMinistryandrelocatedin Netanyahu's office. In addition, the PM tried, unsuccessfully, to appointcabinet Secretary,DannyNaveh to the position of co-ordinator of the variouspeacetalks.TheoveralllevelofconcentrationofpowerwhichwasenvisagedbyNetanyahuandhisChiefofStaff,AvigdorLiberman,ledsomeIsraelijournaliststostate thatNetanyahu'sPMOwastobebasednotontheWhiteHousemodelbutrathertheKremlin.8

CentraltoNetanyahu'sthinkinginattemptingtomaximizetheinfluenceofhisofficewashisdesiretocontrolallaspectsofthepeacenegotiations.Inshort,hewanted tominimize the sphere of influence of the ForeignMinistrywhere hehadbeenforcedtoappointhisoldarchrival,DavidLevy,asForeignMinister.Inaddition,asbothRabinandPeresbeforehimhadbeenaware,controloftheDefence Ministry was an important tool in maintaining control over theimplementationofthepeaceprocess.NetanyahuwasnotaspoliticallystrongorexperiencedasRabinandPeres(postRabinassassination)tobeabletoholdtheportfolio himself in addition to his responsibilities as Prime Minister.Consequently,heaimedtostriptheministryofitskeypowers,anddowngradethe influence of the subsequently appointed Minister of Defence, Yitzhak

Mordechai.9Inasimilarfashionthedecisiontomovecontroloftheprivatizationprogramme to his office reflected Netanyahu's attempt again to minimize theinfluence of a key ministry where he had been forced by the Likud party toappointperhapshisstrongestintrapartyrival,DanMeridor.10

NetanyahuandtheCabinet

Netanyahu believed that his victory provided him with the authority to alterIsrael's traditional parliamentary systemof cabinet governmentwith thePrimeMinisterbeingprimusinterpares, toamorepresidentialsystem.Here therealactionwaskeptawayfromthecabinet,whichwasrelegatedtoadiscussionandratification forum. This seemed a natural trend, for recent administrations, inparticular the government of Rabin, saw an unprecedented move towards thepresidential style where the role of the cabinet had substantially diminished.Privately,Rabinsawcabinetmeetingsaslittlemorethanpressconferences(suchwashisexasperationattheposturingofministersandnumberofleaksthatweretracedbacktothemeetings).During his first years in office Netanyahu achieved some successes in the

management of the cabinet, notably on ratification of the Hebron deal andsubsequent troop redeployments in the West Bank. However, theseachievements should not obscure the fact that he failed to alter the balance ofpower away from the cabinet and towards his office. On the contrary, manyIsraeli commentators note thatNetanyahu faced stronger opposition in cabinetthan Rabin did, and that ministers were far more successful in assertinginfluence than during theRabin government.There are twomajor factors thatexplainthis.First,therewasanaturalmajoritywithinthecabinetwhoopposedthe Oslo Accords and wanted nothing to do with them. Therefore, whenNetanyahu brought a deal such as the Hebron Agreement to the cabinet hestarted fromapositionofdisadvantage.Second, the fact that thereweresevenparties in the coalition and cabinet further complicated matters. Moreover,Netanyahu'sattemptstoplaythepartiesoffagainsteachother,andinparticulartopitthesecularpartiesagainstthereligiousparties,wasfarfromsuccessful.

NetanyahuandtheLikud

TheLikuditselfemergedfromthe1996electionsinastateofdazedconfusion;relief thatNetanyahuhadwonanarrowvictory in theelectionfor thePMandwas able to form a coalition, but despondency at the poor performance of theparty in the Knesset election. Party leaders were quick to blame the newelectoralsystemthathadledtoagreaterfragmentationofthevoteandadeclineinthesupportforbothofthetwomajorpartiesinIsrael.ItsoonbecameevidentthatNetanyahuenvisagedthepartyalongmuchthesamelinesasanAmericanpoliticalparty;alooselyorganizedsupermarketofideaswhichispulledtogetherat election times. In essence, the days of the party being one of the mostimportant institutions in Israeli society were clearly numbered. The PrimeMinister's attitude to the party was, to a large extent, a result of his relativeintraparty weakness. Party institutions such as the Central Committee werelargelycontrolledbyArielSharonandtoalesserdegreethesonoftheex-leaderMenachemBegin,Binyamin(Benni)Ze'evBegin.In dealing with the party on the key issue of the peace process Netanyahu

presented himself as far more hardline than his actions as PM indicated. Forexample, to help neutralize the hardliners in the party Netanyahu adopted astrategy of saving his more radical statements, notably on Jerusalem, formeetingsof theLikudCentralCommittee.11Clearly,hewaswellawareof theneed to play to his audiences who reflected a party where the majority ofmemberswereatbestscepticaloftheOsloAccords.TheseemingincompatibilityofretaininglandandcontinuingtheOsloprocess

wasusedasakeystrategic tacticbyNetanyahu in retaining thesupportof thepartyforhispursuitofpeace.Putsimply,hearguedthatitwaspossibletoretainthe land and still workwithin the framework set out in theOsloAccords. Ineffect,Netanyahuattemptedtopostponethemomentofchoicebetweenlandandpeacebyofferingthepossibilityofboth.Even themeetingwithArafat, so long a demon figure in theLikud, passed

withonlyBeginandtheoldguardattackingNetanyahu.Moreover, theHebrondeal,overwhichBeginresignedfromthecabinet,didnotcreatetheuproarintheLikud that commentators thought itwould,whichwas in no small part due toNetanyahu's careful preparation of the party during the months prior to the

agreement.

TheCarrotandStickofaNationalUnityGovernment(NUG)

During the first years of his administration the most effective tactic whichNetanyahuemployedagainstthecabinet,thewidercoalitionandtheLikudwasthe threat that he would break up the government and form a NUGwith theLabour Party. Netanyahu used a variety of tools to send signals that such agovernmentwasimminentincludingpublicstatementsbyhimselfandcontrolledleaksfromhisoffice.Israelipoliticalcommentatorswerekeptbusybyconstantrumour,gossipandconspiracytheoriesthattheformationofsuchagovernmentwouldtakeplace.MuchoftherumouroriginatedfromofficialsinthePMOwhousedthepossibilityofaNUGasathreatagainstdissentingvoicesduringtimesof crisis. This tactic was employed successfully in the first years of theadministration incrisisduring the roundofbudget-cutnegotiations in1996-97andintheratificationoftheHebronAgreementin1997.

Netanyahu'sThirdWay:PragmatismVersusIdeology

TheperiodoftheNetanyahuadministrationwasdominatedbyaseriesofcrisessurroundingthepeaceprocess,especiallythePalestiniantrack.Inexaminingtheprogress of the various tracks of the peace process there is a need to identifywhere, together with why, Netanyahu felt unable to deliver concessions andwhere he successfully manipulated, persuaded or coerced his right-wingconstituencyintoacceptingcompromisesinthenegotiations.BeforeexaminingtheindividualrestraintsonNetanyahuinthevarioustracksofthepeaceprocessitisimportanttolocatejustwhereNetanyahustoodhimselfonthepeaceprocessandspecificallytheOsloAccords.Netanyahuwas a politicianwho in the past had prided himself on his rigid

ideological beliefs ofwhich 'Greater Israel' is the central pillar. In his bookAPlace AmongNations,which iswidely viewed as the blueprint of his beliefs,NetanyahureturnstimeandagaintothequestionofIsrael'ssecurityandtheneedfor it to maintain theWest Bank in order to protect Israel's eastern border.12

Takeninconjunctionwithhishardlineviewsandactionswhileinopposition,hisnonacceptanceoftheOsloAccords,thebuildingofaunitednationalblockandhis leadership of militant demonstrations against the Accords, led many topresumethatNetanyahuwasahardlineLikudideologue.However, suchconclusions fail to take intoaccounta rangeofother factors

that indicate that Netanyahu's main characteristic is his pragmatism.13 Hiseducation in theUnitedStates and the timehe subsequently spent living therehelpedinfluencehisearlyyearsandprovidedhimwithaworldlyviewwhichisstill absent inmany of the leaders of the Likud today.14 Netanyahu has oftenstressed his admiration for the American political system and, as with themajority of American politicians, Netanyahu's guiding light is power.15

Moreover, he was well aware that in order to gain power he needed to drawsupport from awide spectrumof groups.While opposition leader in Israel heclearly felt a need to unify the nationalist block (or Likudled block) whosedisunityhadbeenoneofthemainreasonsthattheLikudlostpowerinthe1992elections.16His robust opposition to theOsloAccords,whichwas at the timecertainlygenuine,servedanadditionalpurposeofgivinghimanopportunityandrallying call to control the development of new ties, and strengthen existinglinks,betweentheLikudandthepartiesoftheRightinIsrael.Astheelectioncampaignin1996started,Netanyahuandhisteamofadvisers

movedhispositioningstrategy to thepoliticalcentre. Inessence, this involvedan acceptance of the Oslo Accords and a promise to continue the process ofimplementing the Interim Agreement. This change which was made over aperiod of only a few days revealed the extent of, first,Netanyahu's desire forpower far above and beyond any ideological convictions; second, the newpoliticalrealtiesinIsraelwhereacceptanceofOslowasseenasvitaltoattractingthe centreground voters.17 In shifting his strategyNetanyahu risked alienatinglargepartsofhispartyandthenationalistblocwhichhehadworkedsohardtodevelopclosertieswith.However,duringthecampaignhemadeitclearthathewould be a reluctant participant in the process and would not make theconcessionsthattheLabourPartywouldofferinfinalstatustalks.18

Inapracticalsensewhatthisallamountstoiswhatcanbeviewedasthethirdway. Netanyahu's policies towards the peace process clearly rejected theideologically dominated era ofYitzhak Shamir and the visionary newMiddle

EastofhispredecessorShimonPeres.19Inakeynotespeechin1997Netanyahusummarizedthisvision:

Between'rosegarden'dreamsontheonehand,andparanoiaandisolationontheother,thereisagoldenpathofrealism,ofrealpolitik.ThisisthepaththatIsraelchosebeginningintheBenGurionera,andthismustbeourchoicetoday.Ifweknowwhentocompromise,whentograspopportunitiesandwhentodisplay determination and decisiveness, we can bring peacewith security to our country and to ourpeople.20

More specifically, he set three criteria (or pillars) on which he argued that alasting peace had to be built: security, reciprocity, and democracy and humanrights.21 However, the form that this third-way vision took in the real worldremained unclear and Netanyahu's actions and restraints in each of themajortracksofthepeaceprocessneedtobeexaminedinordertoattempttoprovideaclearerpictureofhispremiership.

TheIsraeli-PalestinianTrack

RatificationoftheHebronAgreement1997

Netanyahu needed to employ all his considerable political skills to get theHebron Agreement and subsequent troop redeployment deal (February 1997)past thecabinetand theLikud.However, thedecision toprocedewith theHarHoma construction project in East Jerusalem, and the smaller than expectedtransferoflandtothePA,indicatewhatneedstobeviewedasthepaybacktothepartyandcoalition.Inaddition,theextentofthedifficultiesthatNetanyahufacedoverratificationoftheHebrondealwereshownwithwhatbecameknownas theBar-Onaffair.Netanyahu,hisDirectorof thePMO,AvigdorLiberman,andtheMinisterofJustice,TzachiHa-negbi,wereallplacedunderinvestigationoveranallegedpleabargaindealwiththeleaderofthereligiouspartyShas.ThedealwouldhaveseenShasministers in thecabinetsupportingorabstaining inthevoteoverratificationoftheHebrondealinexchangeforapleabargainforAryeh Deri, the leader of Shas, who was eventually convicted of corruption

chargesin1999.22

CentraltothestrategythatNetanyahuemployedtowardsthenegotiationsoverHebronwastheneedtomakeanyfinaldealoverHebronappeartobeduetotwofactors. First, that the previous Labourled government had already committedIsrael toawithdrawal;andsecond,pressurefromthe internationalcommunity,inparticulartheUnitedStates.AnadditionalintegralpartofthisstrategywastospinoutthenegotiationswiththePalestiniansoveraperiodoftimetoallowthenew Israeli government time to flex its muscle to its largely right-wingconstituents before finally accepting a deal. However, Netanyahu failed toforeseetwocomplicationstohisstrategythatalmostledtoitsfailure.Thefirstof thesecomplicationsconcerned the relative lackofexperienceof

thenew Israelinegotiators appointedbyNetanyahu.ThiswascompoundedbytheattemptofNetanyahutoclip thewingsof theIsraelDefenceForces(IDF),who he felt had become too politicized under Rabin and Peres with theirparticipation in the peace negotiations. In attempting to reduce the role of theIDFNetanyahupreferredinsteadtointroducehisowncivilianappointeestothenegotiations.23TheresultofsuchmoveswasthatthenewinexperiencedIsraelinegotiators, many of whom were drawn from the Israeli Right and had notchangedtheirviewofthePalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)asaterroristorganization,conductedthenegotiationsinanabrasiveandaggressivemanner.24

TheatmosphereoftheearlyroundsoftalkswassobadtherewasarealchancethatthenegotiationswouldhavebrokendownaltogetheriftheAmericansintheform of the Special Envoy to theMiddle East, Dennis Ross, had not directlyintervenedtoensurethetalkscontinued.SuchanoutcomewouldhavedamagedNetanyahu'sinternationalstandingbecausethepreviousIsraeligovernmenthadpromisedtowithdrawfromHebron,whichwouldhavemadeNetanyahuappeartheguiltypartyresponsibleforthebreakdown.After eventually signing theHebron dealNetanyahu brought the agreement

beforecabinetforapproval.TheLabourPartyhadmadeitclearthatitwouldactas a safety net in the subsequent Knesset vote on ratification thus givingNetanyahuasizeablemajorityinparliament.Consequently,thecabinetbecamethe soleopportunity for theopponentsof thedeal to secureenoughsupport toreject it. Crucially, had the cabinet done so thenNetanyahuwould have beenfacedwithbringingthedealbeforetheKnessetwithoutcabinetratification,and

insuchcircumstancesit isdifficult toseehowthegovernmentcoalitionwouldhave remained intact. However, long before the final deal had been signedNetanyahuhadcanvassedcabinetcolleaguesuntilhewascertainthathehadatleastaslendermajorityinfavour.Whenthecabinetmet toratify thedeal thePMadoptedastrategyof letting

everyministerspeakontheissueinthehopethatministerscouldletoffsteamfortheirvariousright-wingandreligiousconstituencieswhichtheyrepresentedandthenreluctantlyfallintolineforcabinetvote.UnfortunatelyforNetanyahu,his strategy again revealed his inexperience, asmembers of cabinet, includingsomefromhisownparty,wereactivelyengagedincampaigningagainstthePM,suchwasthestrengthoffeelingagainsttheHebrondeal.Moreover,Netanyahu'slack of authority and a power base in theLikudwas embarrassingly exposed.However,muchtoNetanyahu'screditthedealwasratifiedbythecabinet(tentoseven)duelargelytothefactthatthePMwasabletoconvinceenoughministers,whowerekeentomaintainthestabilityofthegovernment,thatthedealwouldservethelong-terminterestsofIsrael.25

TheeventsofFebruaryandMarch1997needtobeseenwithintheframeworkoftheinternalrestraintsonNetanyahuwhichwereclearlyillustratedbythepaybackforthedealthatthePMmadetohispartyandcoalitionduringthisperiod.ThedecisiontohandoveronlyninepercentofWestBankandnotthe25to30percentthatthePAexpectedwasaimedatpacifyingtheLikudandthecoalitionby returning theminimumamountof landpossible.Again thePMintended topursuethedualaimofcontinuingwiththeOsloprocessandInterimAgreementswhileminimizingthelandthatwashandedovertothePA.However,oncemoreNetanyahuhadtodealwithahostilecabinetwhoobjectedtothetwopercentoflandwhichwas to be handedover fromAreaC (under Israeli rule andwherealmost all the Jewish settlements are located) to Area B (joint Israeli andPalestinian control). Keymembers of the cabinet, including the Likud's ArielSharonandLimorLivnat,objectedtotheagreementstatingthatnopartofAreaCshouldbehandedoverprior to the final statusagreements in theyear2000.Eventually,Netanyahuwonthecabinetvoteonratification(tentosix),butonlyasadirectresultofgainingthesupportofsomethereligiousministers.ThiswasgainedonlybyagreeingapackagewiththereligiouspartieswhichincludedthedecisiontobuildanewJewishhousingprojectatHarHomainEastJerusalem.

ThedecisiontobuildatHarHomawas,inpart,anillustrationofNetanyahu'srelative intrapartyandinter-blockweakness.Hisoriginalstrategyofplayingtohisright-wingconstituencybyhandingoveronlyninepercentoftheWestBankhadclearlybackfired.Consequently,heturnedhisattentiontoIsrael'scontrolofJerusalem,which is a relatively safe domestic issue for any Israeli leader.Hecorrectly calculated that the majority of the opposition Labour Party wouldsupporthisdecisiontobuildhomesfor42,000JewsinEastJerusalemandthustherewouldbenomajordomesticpoliticalconfrontationwhichwouldweakenedhis position. After announcing the decision Netanyahu increased his rhetoricnotably at meetings of the Likud Central Committee where he declared thatJerusalem is the eternal capital of Israel and that Israel has the right to buildwhereitwantsinthecity.Moreover,heusedthesubsequentPalestinianviolenceintheWestBankandthesuicidebombingsofaTelAvivcafeandaJerusalemmarket further to slowdown the pace of the peace process.This allowed himfurther to postpone 'D-day', ormore specifically the choice between returninglarge parts of the West Bank or causing a terminal breakdown of the peaceprocess.

RatificationoftheWyeMemorandum1998

Netanyahu's conduct of the lengthy negotiations that culminated in the WyeMemorandum (23October 1998) illustrated how acutely aware hewas of theinternalrestraints.PriortothenegotiationsattheWyePlantationNetanyahuhadbeen able to resist strong US pressure to agree to further West Bank troopredeployments.Duringthisperiodthecoalitionheldfirm,butthepeaceprocesswiththePalestiniansveeredtowardstotalcollapse.AtthesametimeUS-Israelirelations became increasingly strained as US officials argued that Netanyahuwasputtinghisdomesticrestraintsaheadofmovingtheprocessforward.IncontrasttotheHebronAgreementNetanyahuattemptedtoputinplacethe

paybackbeforehemadedifficultcompromises.Centraltothisstrategywastheappointmentoftheveteranhawk,ArielSharon,asForeignMinister.Unlikehispredecessor,DavidLevy,SharonplayedafullroleinthenegotiationswiththePalestinians.Netanyahubelieved(wrongly)thatSharonwouldbeabletosellthe

dealtothecabinet,coalitionandthefarRight.TheratificationthatledtotheprematureendoftheNetanyahuadministration

illustratedtherestraintsthatthePMoperatedunder.ItshouldbestressedthatbyOctober-November 1998 the Netanyahu coalition was already at an advancedstage of destruction. It survived votes of confidence in the Knesset on thegrounds that the opposition could not muster the required 61 seats. Mostworryinglyfor thePMmanyseniorLikudMK'sabstainedorvotedagainst thegovernment in key debates. The opposition Labour Party sensed victory anddespiteitsassurancestoactasasafetynetintheKnessetforNetanyahu'speaceagreementmovedtobringdownthegovernment.IneffectNetanyahuwasforcedtobringratificationoftheWyeMemorandum

intoanalreadyhostilepoliticalenvironment.AtcabinetlevelratificationprovedevenmoredifficultthanithadwithrespecttotheHebronAgreement,withthecabinet split and Netanyahu's exercising the casting vote. Clearly, manyministersscentedthedemiseofthegovernmentandwerepositioningthemselvesfor the expected election campaign. Other ministers simply could not bringthemselvestosupportadealthatmadedifficultterritorialconcessionstothePA.DdayarrivedforthePMatatimewhenhehadusedupanypoliticalgoodwilltowards him from a coalition which had become increasingly difficult tomanage. In a last attempt to keep the coalition together the PM froze theimplementationoftheagreement,citingPalestiniannoncompliance.By late 1998 the tactical option of broadening the coalition into aNUGby

adding theLabourPartywas no longer viable. Secret negotiationswhich tookplaceinautumn1998betweenrepresentativesofNetanyahuandBarakproducedagreedpolicyguidelinesforaNUGbutmadelittleprogressonthequestionofthedivisionofcabinetportfolios.Inreality,BarakhadlittleinterestinformingaNUG and had taken a strategic decision towork towards new elections. TwofactorsdominatedBarak's thinking.First,hedidnotwant tobenumber twotoNetanyahu,andsecond,unlikehispredecessor,ShimonPeres,hedidnotneedthepatronagepowersofofficetomaintainhispositionasleader.Ontopofthisitappearedprobable that thecoalitionwouldcollapseandBarakwouldbegivenhischancetobringelectionsforward.ForNetanyahuthesadironywasthatjustwhenheneededtouseoneofhismostvaluablecards(NUG)againsttheinternalrestraintsonhimthecardwastakenawayfromhim.

TheSyrian-IsraeliandLebaneseTracks

The key issue in the Syrian track lies with security and does not contain thecomplicatedadditionalfactorofideology.Putsimply,theLikud,otherpartiesofthe Right and the religious parties have no ideological claim over the GolanHeights, but rather believe them to be vital to the security of Israel.Consequently, in theory, if agreement can be reached with Syria that ensuresIsraelisecurityneedsthenthereisnohistoricalorbiblicalreasonformaintainingcontroloverthelands.ThecloselyrelatedLebanesetrackisalsoaquestionofsecurity.Inaddition,it

isinthistrackthatNetanyahuenjoyedthelowestlevelofinternalrestraints,butconversely the external restraints were complicated by the control that Syriaexerts over Lebanon, and to a considerable degree Hizbullah in SouthernLebanon. In short, Netanyahu faced a challenge similar to those faced by hisimmediatepredecessorsasPM;tofindawayofwithdrawingIsraeliforcesfromsouthernLebanonwhileprovidingnorthernIsraelwithadequatesecuritycoveragainstrocketandterroristattacksfromitsborder.Inexamining,first,theSyriantrackinisolationfromLebanonitisclearthat

Netanyahuinitiallyadoptedthehawkishpositionthathispreviouswritingsandspeeches had suggested he would. To some degree, Netanyahu used thenegotiationswithSyriaasanavenuetoflexhishawkishcredentialstohispartyandcoalitionwhilemakingdifficultcompromisesinthePalestiniannegotiations.Herefusedtoresumenegotiationswith theSyriansonthebasisofcarryingonwherethenegotiationsendedwiththepreviousLabourgovernment.Hearguedthat Syria signed no binding international agreement with the previousgovernment, and therefore he was not obliged to continue the policies of theprevious government. Labour Party sources have confirmed that Peres waswillingtohandbackthevastmajorityof theGolanHeightsinreturnforafullpeacewithSyria.The internal restraints thatdidexiston theSyrian trackcame fromboth the

Likud and government coalition. Security experts in the Likud rejected theformulaofatotalreturnoftheGolanHeightsforatotalpeace.Inessence,theyweresearchingforaformuladifferentfromtheoneemployedwithEgyptaftertheCampDavidAgreement(1978) thatsawallof theSinaireturnedtoEgypt.

Suggestions from Netanyahu's close advisers included confidence-buildingmeasuressuchastheSyriansrestrainingattacksagainstIsraelfromgroupsbasedin southern Lebanon, discussions about water issues and high-level militarycontacts to prevent misunderstandings on the Golan Heights. However, theLikudwhich was having to addressmajor ideological questions over 'GreaterIsrael' was not ready radically to alter its platform on opposition to a totalwithdrawal fromtheGolanHeights.Moreover, thecoalitioncontainedaparty,theThirdWay,whichwasformedbyrebelLabourPartyKnessetmembers,withthemainpurposeofopposinganyIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheGolanHeights.However,asitbecameclearthattherewouldbenofinalagreementwiththe

Palestinians before elections that were originally due in 2000, Netanyahuattempted to reach a peace agreement with Syria in late 1998. Recent papersmade available from the PMO in Jerusalem (by the Barak administration)suggest thatNetanyahuoffered a fullwithdrawal from theGolanHeights to4Juneborders inreturnforpeace.26Netanyahu'sofferwasrejectedbyPresidentAsad who either felt Netanyahu's administration to be too weak, or wasreceivingbetteroffersfromBarakandtheLabourPartyorsimplydidnotwanttosignapeaceagreementwithIsrael.Putsimply,Netanyahu'sapparentchangeof strategy on the Syrian track reflected his need to secure some positiveagreementbeforegoingtothepollsinIsrael.ThePMwouldhaveattemptedtobypass the internal restraints on him from the Right by making the Israelielections a vote of confidence on any agreement or calling for a nationalreferendum. The shifts in Netanyahu's position on the Syria track during hisperiod in office were substantial. These further illustrated his pragmaticapproachtocoreissuesofthepeaceprocess,andhisstrongdesiretoremaininpowerbyholdingthepoliticalcentreground.ThequestionofIsrael'srelationshipwithLebanonisverycloselyrelatedwith

Lebanon's power-broker Syria.Netanyahu himselfwas keen to remove IsraeliforcesfromLebanonasquicklyaspossible;hestatedpubliclythathewishedtoleave'yesterday'.However,hewasacutelyawareoftheneedtoreachsomekindofsecurityagreementthatwouldpreventattacksonIsrael'snortherntownssuchasKiryatShmona.The ideaof the 'Lebanon first'wasmutedbyNetanyahu intheearlydaysofhisterminoffice.Inessence,thisplanwouldhaveseenIsraeliforceswithdraw fromLebanonwithSyrianagreement toexercisecontrolover

Hizbullah.Unfortunately forNetanyahu, theSyrians rejected thisproposaloutofhand.

Throughout Netanyahu's period of office the Syrians made it clear that theywould use Lebanon as a means of increasing the pressure on the Israelileadership to agree to a withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Consequently,NetanyahubecamefurtherentwinedinLebanondespitehisstrategicobjectiveofremovingIsraeliforcesfromthearea.Duringthe1999electioncampaignBarakandLabourpromisedtowithdrawIsraeli forcesfromLebanonwithinoneyearofcomingintooffice.Netanyahumatchedthisofferfordomesticconsumption,butmajorexternalrestraintsremainforanyIsraeliPMonthisissue.

TheDownfallofNetanyahuandConclusion

During the Netanyahu era the Israeli political system was in a period oftransition,causedtoalargeextentbytheadoptionofanewelectoralsystemin1996whichwasdesigned to reduce the levelofpoliticalhorsetrading thathadcharacterized Israeli politics during the 1980s. In reality, the introduction ofdirectelectionsforPMreflectedashiftinIsraelipoliticsawayfromthecentralrole of ideology and political parties towards a concentration on personalitypolitics; where the personality and credibility of the leader become the mostsignificantfactorinelections.Strongevidenceforthiswasprovidedbythe1999election campaign inwhich the central defining issuewas the personality andleadershipabilitiesofNetanyahu.Netanyahu found to his cost just how strong the internal restraints are on a

directlyelectedPM,andhowvulnerable thePMremains tohisownparty, thecabinet and the government coalition. EhudBarak entered office in 1999 in amuchstrongerposition thanNetanyahudid in1996.Lackofstrong inter-partyopposition to his leadership, a cabinet consensus (on the peace process) andacceptance of his mandate by alternative leaders would all seem to point toBarak being able to develop the strength of the executive. Consequently, theinternalrestraintsonBarakappear lesssignificant thanthoseonNetanyahu.Inthese terms it is possible that the Netanyahu era represented a period of

transition inwhich the fullextentof theeffectsof thechanges in theelectoralsystemwerenottransferredtothepoliticalsystem.The initial signs from Israel's new PM is that he intends to build a highly

centralized and strong executive, staffed by professional experts who willoverseethemostsensitivenegotiationsinthepeaceprocess.UnderBarakIsraelis seeing a further shift away from parliamentary democracy to a morepresidentialstyle.TheKnessetremainsthecentreofpoliticaldebate,butthekeydecisionsaretobetakeninthePMO.

NeillLocheryisLecturerinModernIsraeliPolitics,UniversityCollegeLondon.

Notes

1.'Intrapartyconflict'isdefinedasconflictwithintheLikudand'inter-blockconflict'asbeingwithinthe

partiesof theLikudledblockwhichinrecentyearshave includedthepartiesof theRightandthe

religiousparties.

2.Netanyahuwaswellawareof theneed toavoidafragmentationof theLikudledblock'svote in the

1996electionastheLikudhadlostpowerin1992partlyasaresultofinternalsplitsanddivisions

withintheLikudaswellasitsrespectiveblock.ThethenPrimeMinisterYitzhakShamircitedthe

actionsofDavidLevy individing theparty in1992asan important factor in theparty'selectoral

defeatandemphasized the importanceofpartyunityatelection time. Interviewconductedby the

authorwithYitzhakShamir,TelAviv,17August1994.

3.ForadetailedaccountoftheinternaldynamicsoftheLikudduringthisperiod,seeNeillLochery,The

IsraeliLabourParty:IntheShadowoftheLikud,Reading,1997.

4.AstheLikudhadbeenledbyonlytwoleaderssinceitsformationitwasnaturalthattherewasaqueue

of senior national leaders who were older than Netanyahu and who felt that they had more

experiencethanthemanthatwasregardedasa'LikudPrince'.

5.EvidencethatthemainreasonthatLikudnikselectedNetanyahuwasthatheofferedthebestchanceof

returningthepartytopowerratherthananyothermotiveswasputforwardbymanyleadingfigures

in the Likud at the time. Interview conducted by the author with Dan Meridor, Jerusalem, 17

October1994.

6.Theproblemsofdealingwithsuchalargecoalitionwereemphasizedinaninterviewwiththeauthor

by David Bar-Illan, the Director of Communications and Head of Policy Planning in the Prime

Minister'sOffice.InterviewwithDavidBar-Illan,Jerusalem,5March1998.

7.Netanyahuandhisadvisershavetakentheviewthatitistooearlytocommentontheeffectsofthe

changesintheelectoralsystembutsuggestthatitsresultshavebeenfarfromperfect.Interviewwith

Bar-Illan,Jerusalem.

8.Foradetailedaccountof theattempt tostrengthen the influenceof thePrimeMinister'sOffice,see

BarryRubin,'NoPrimeMinister:AMelodramainThreeActsJerusalemPost,21June1996.

9. Mordechai was sacked by Netanyahu in January 1999 after he declared his candidacy for PM.

Mordechai co-founded the Centre Party, but withdrew his candidacy on the eve of polling and

begrudginglyendorsedLabourPartyleader,EhudBarak.

10.Meridorresignedin1997overNetanyahu'smodusoperandiandlefttheLikudin1999toco-foundthe

CentreParty.HeranforPMbutwithdrewhiscandidacyinfavourofYitzhakMordechai.

11. See for example,Address ofNetanyahu to theCentralCommittee of theLikud on 3March 1997.

Netanyahu stated 'Jerusalem is ours.Whoever asks Israel to give up the unity of Israel does not

understandhowthischordplaysonourheart.Wewillbuildeverywherewedecidedandnoone-no

onewillpreventus'.LikudPartyHeadquarters,TelAviv.

12.BenjaminNetanyahu,APlaceAmongNations:IsraelandtheWorld,NewYork,1993.

13.ForahighlycriticalaccountofNetanyahu'sbeliefs,seeColinShindler,Israel,LikudandtheZionist

Dream,London,1995,pp.284-7.

14.ManyIsraelicommentatorsarguethatNetanyahu'stimeasIsraeliambassadortotheUnitedNationsin

NewYorkwascritical inhelpingformhisviewsandhowhisgovernmentoperates.Foracritical

examinationofthis,seeYoelMarcus,'TheRobberofDreams',Haaretz,22August1997.

15. For a reference to his admiration for theUnited States, seeNetanyahu, speech to joint session of

Congress,10July1996.

16.Seeforexample,N.Lochery,TheIsraeliLabourParty.

17.Itshouldbestressedthatalthoughthepublicshift inNetanyahu'spositionwasremarkablyrapid, in

privateasearlyas1994NetanyahuandmanyseniorfiguresintheLikudwerereconciledtocarrying

outatleastpartsoftheOsloprocess.Thiswasmadeapparentininterviewsconductedbytheauthor

with leaders of the Likud at the time, for example, interview with Dan Meridor, Jerusalem, 8

November1994.However, thereremainedotherseniorfiguresinthepartywhobothpubliclyand

privatelyrejectedallaspectsoftheOsloprocess,notablyBennyBegin.Thiswasmadeclearinan

interviewconductedbytheauthorwithM.K.Begin,Jerusalem,9November1994.

18.For an accountof the attemptsof theLikud to come to termswith theOsloAccords and thedeep

internal divisions in the party over the issue, see, for example, Efraim Inbar, 'Netanyahu Takes

Over',inDavidElazarandShmuelSandler(eds),IsraelatthePolls1996,London,1998,pp.34-6.

19.For a damming summaryofNetanyahu's 'thirdway', see 'NowForMyNextTrick',Economist, 25

April1998,p.71.

20. Speech by Benjamin Netanyahu at the Graduation Ceremony of Cadets of the National Defence

College,14August1997.

21.Foralucidaccountofthesepillars,seeNetanyahu,speechtojointsessionofCongress,10July1996.

22.ForadetailedaccountoftheBar-Onscandalandthereasonsbehindit,seeNeillLochery,'Blocking

Bibi'sBidforPower',WorldToday,53-6,June1996.

23.SeeSteveRodan,'ShakySoloist',JerusalemPost,15November1996.

24.Manycommentatorshavenotedthat themajorproblembetweentheIsraelandthePAintheeraof

Netanyahu was the almost total lack of trust between the parties. This was in contrast to close

workingrelationshipsestablishedbytheOslonegotiators.Seeforexample,DanMargalit, 'Needa

GiantPortionofMutualTrust',Haaretz,11August1997.

25. Interestingly, thescepticismof thecabinetdidnot reflect themajorityviewof the Israelielectorate

abouttheHebronAgreement,whichwasmuchmorepositive.Thispointwasillustratedinasurvey

for theTamiSteinmetzCentre forPeaceStudies atTelAvivUniversitybyModi'inEzrachi.The

pollwasbasedonarepresentativesampleof504IsraeliJews(includingthoseintheterritoriesand

kibbutzim)on29January1997.Thesurveyhasafourpercentmarginoferror.

'WhatisyourpositionregardingtheagreementthatwassignedbetweenIsraelandthePalestiniansover

theredeploymentinHebronandtheremainderoftheWestBank?22percentsupportalot,44.7per

cent Considerably support, 17.7 per cent so-so, 9.1 per cent considerably oppose, 9.1 per cent

opposealot,6.5percentdon'tknow.'

26. See Nana Gilbert, 'Ramon: NetanyahuAgreed to June 4th 1967 LinesJerusalem Post, 13 January

2000.

Jerusalem:PartitionPlansforaHolyCityELISHAEFRAT

FewcitiesevokesuchstrongemotionalresponsesfromsomanypeopleasdoesJerusalem. Sacred to at least threemajor religions, Jerusalem has long been asource and a scene of contention among adherents of these faiths and theirpoliticalsponsors.Duringthefirstpartofthetwentiethcentury,eachofthethreereligions, represented by a Christian, a Jewish and an Islamic polity, hasattempted to determine the orientation of development in the city. The city'sparticularphysicalcharacteristicsandthereligiousaspectsofthesettlementhaveproduced a unique combination of factors that affect decisions by politicians,regardless of the controlling administration. These conditions are likely toremain influential in thefuture.Thepurposeof thisessay is todescribeandtoanalysethemainpoliticalpartitionplansforJerusalemproposedbothduringtheBritishMandatoryregimeandafter theestablishmentof thestateofIsraelasasolutiontothecomplexsituationthatevolvedinthecity.

SiteandSituation

The status and the importance of Jerusalem throughout the course of its longhistoryhavebeendeterminedpartiallyby its location in theJudeanhillsat theintersection of north-south and west-east routes. Notwithstanding the brokennatureof theplateauonwhichJerusalem is located, thecitybecameacentral,nodal point and a stronghold dominating a wide area. This location and theavailability of localwater supplies in ancient times explain both the choice ofsite and many aspects of the connection in recent history between Israel andJordan. In the twentieth century the city's centre of gravity oscillatedwith thechanging political fortunes. At the beginning of the British Mandate the

municipal boundary of Jerusalem encompassed an area of 12.7 squarekilometres, 59 per cent of which was the Old City. The influx of JewishimmigrationduringtheMandateperiodforcedfurtherextensionofthemunicipalboundaries,withthecity-planningareareaching37.5squarekilometresby1948.Afterthe1948Warthecitywaspartitionedanditssettledareawasreducedinsizebecauseofpoliticaluncertainties.

AnEarlyJewishPartitionPlanforJerusalem

AplanforapoliticalpartitionofJerusalemhadalreadyexistedadecadebeforethecreationofthestateofIsrael,havingbeendrawnupbynoneotherthantheJewishAgency-theofficialestablishmentZionistbodyinPalestinerepresentingtheJewishandZionistintereststotheBritishauthorities.1TheJewishAgency'splanforthepartitionofJerusalemwasapartofitsoverallreactiontotheRoyalCommission'splanforthepartitionofPalestine,whichwasproposedin1937.According to theRoyalCommission's proposal the entire city of Jerusalem,

both inside and outside thewalls, was to be includedwithin the borders of aBritishMandate enclave.The reason for thiswas that Jerusalem is holy to allreligionsand itwasnecessary toguard itasa 'sacred trustofcivilization'.TheJewish Agency Executive (JAE) clearly realized that there was no chance ofBritish consent to a Zionist demand to include the Old City of Jerusalem, inwhichalloftheplacesmostholytoJudaismareconcentrated,withinthebordersoftheJewishstate.TheJAE'spositioninrelationtotheNewCityofJerusalem,in which the majority of the Jewish population and its institutions wereconcentrated,wasentirelydifferent.IthadafewreasonstodemandtheinclusionoftheJewishpartoftheNewCitywithintheprospectiveJewishstate.Amongthese was the demographic importance of the New City's population for thefuture Jewish state. At that time the population of the New City comprisedapproximatelyone-fifthof theJewishpopulation inPalestine,or75,000outof400,000. In the Old City there were only 4,700 Jews.2 Other reasons for theinclusionoftheNewCityintheJewishstatewerethesymbolismofJerusalemand its centrality in the history of the Jewish people, apart from its being the

centreofthecountry'spoliticalandculturallifeatthetime.Onthisbasis,theJAEassumedthatitsdemandfortheinclusionoftheJewish

partsofJerusalemoutsidethewallswithintheJewishstatewouldbeamenabletotheBritishgovernment.TheJAEthusdrewaboundarylinethatdividedthecity into two areas: one characterized by largely Jewish concentrations ofpopulation and property, the other where the population and property weremainlynon-Jewish.InitsproposaltheJAEgaveuptheJewishholyplacesintheeasternpartofthecity,includingTempleMount,MountZion,theWailingWalland theMount ofOlives.The JAEalso forwent the JewishQuarter inside thewalls of the Old City. On the other hand,Mount Scopus, where the HebrewUniversity complex had been built,was included in the borders of the Jewisharea(Figure1).

FIGURE1THEJEWISHAGENCY'SPROPOSALFORTHEPARTITIONOFJERUSALEM(AFTERY.

KATZ)

In deciding to accept the plan for partition in principle, the ZionistOrganization demonstrated the political pragmatism of its leaders, who werepreparedtodetachtheholiestsitesinJudaism,theWailingWall,TempleMountand theMount of Olives, from the Jewish state to be. It is arguable that theJewish Agency's plan for the partition of Jerusalem, while giving up the OldCity,sowedtheseedsofitsagreementadecadelatertotheinternationalizationofJerusaleminaccordancewiththeUNPartitionResolution,anditssubsequentacquiescenceinthepartitionofthecityfollowingthe1948War.

PartitionPlansafterthe1948War

Since 1948 Jerusalem has usually been discussed in terms of a threefolddivision: the Old City, East Jerusalem and West Jerusalem. East JerusalemusuallyreferstothepartsofthecityoutsidethewallsoftheOldCitythatwereunderJordanianrulebetween1948and1967.ThepopulationofEastJerusalemismostlyArab.WestJerusalemhasbeenunderIsraelicontrolsince1948anditspopulationispredominantlyJewish.From1948 to1967 Jerusalemwaspolitically and religiouslyadividedcity.

The armistice line in 1949 confirmed the city's partition and created a neutralzone to be administered by theUnitedNations between the Jordanian and theIsraelimilitarypositions.Thatnoman's landcomprisedsevenareas,butalongmost of the dividing line, hostile positionswere immediately adjacent to eachother. The armistice line ran through land that was open, undeveloped, oroccupiedby former roadways.The Jordanian armyoccupied theOldCity andEast Jerusalem, and the Israeli army controlledMount Zion,West Jerusalem,andanimportantenclaveonMountScopus(Figure2).

FIGURE2THE1949ARMISTICELINEINJERUSALEM

The division symbolized by the armistice lineworsened during the next 19years. Each political sector in the city underwent separate development withdifferentorientations.ConnectionsbetweeneasternandwesternJerusalemwereeffectively severed, because streets were often blocked by cement walls as aprotectionagainstsnipers,andprominentbuildingsnearthelinewerefortified.In thecentralarea, theJordanianshad theadvantageofoccupying themassivesixteenthcenturywallssurroundingtheOldCity.The portion of Jerusalem under Israeli control was oriented by a narrow

corridor connecting itwith the rest of Israel and ultimately theMediterraneancoast.ArabJerusalemwasgenerally focusedeastwards, especially towards theJordanian capital ofAmman.Thepopulationwas almost totally segregatedonthe basis of ethnicity: virtually noArabs, eitherMuslim orChristian, lived inWest Jerusalem, and no Jews inhabited East Jerusalem. The government ofIsrael, being concernedwith the holy places in Jerusalem, and especiallywiththeJewishones in theOldCity, submittedaproposal inMay1950 to theUN

Trusteeship Council outlining arrangements for the holy places in Jerusalem.Israel's positionwas that theUN should focus its attention exclusively on theholyplaces,mostofwhichwereatthattimeunderJordaniancontrol,andshouldestablisha special regimespecifically for their control.To fulfil its taskat theholy places the UN would appoint a representative body as an independentauthority, and its main tasks with respect to the holy places would be: tosuperviseandprotectthem;tosettledisputesbetweenthereligiouscommunitiesregardingrightsatholyplaces;topreserveexistingrightsattheholyplaces;tosupervise free access and pilgrimage to the holy places, subject to therequirementsofpublicorder.3

TheJewish-ArabStrugglefortheJerusalemEnvirons

A significant change in Jerusalem occurred following the 1967 SixDayWar.Shortly after its conclusion, Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem and theOldCity brought Jerusalem under unified political control. For security reasons,militaryofficialsandpoliticiansmadehastydecisionsaboutthepreciselocationof the newboundaries of the reunited city.Twogoals guided those decisions:militaryconsiderations,especially the inclusionofheights tofacilitatedefence,and a desire to minimize the size of the Arab population. Difficulties ofachieving the latterwere reflected in the fact that between 60,000 and 70,000ArabswereincludedintheunitedcitythatwasapproximatelythreetimeslagerthantheexclusivelyJewishpre-1967portioncontrolledbyIsrael.Themunicipal boundarywas drawn to include all the uninhabited noman's

landandtoincorporateareasofMountScopusonthenortheast

FIGURE3THEBOUNDARIESOFGREATERJERUSALEM

and the Mount of Evil consent and other mounts on the south, so that adefensible perimeter existed in the event of future conflict.The boundarywasextended considerably to the north along theRamallah road to encompass theairportsite(Figure3).At the same time the demographic balance in the city had changed. The

annualincreaseintheJewishpopulationwasabouthalfoftheArabandtheratio

of73.3percentJewsto26.7percentArabsin1967hadshiftedto68percentJewsto32percentArabsby1999.Thistrendhaspersistedsince1969,andhasfurtheracceleratedwiththegovernmentassistedmoveofJerusalemresidentstonearbytownsbeyondthe'GreenLine'.An accelerated Arab construction in East Jerusalem has had spatial and

politicalimplicationsforthefuturedevelopmentofJerusalem.Theseincludetheoccupationofaconsiderableamountofterritorybyarelativelysmallpopulation,controlof important roadsconnectingJerusalemwith theenvirons, theplacingofobstaclesbetweensitesofJewishdevelopment,andthecreationofdifficultiesinprovidingservices(Figure4).Thesedevelopmentshaveforcedtheauthoritiestotakepreventivemeasuresin

theformofconfiscatingland.Jewishprivateindividualsandpublicbodieshavebeenacquiringhundredsofacresofland,occupyingasmuchaspossibleinorderto ensure the orderly future construction and development of the region.According to the settlement and development authorities, within one or twodecades the settlement policy of the government will have proved to be asolution to the establishment of rural and semi-urban settlements, based on acomprehensiveregionalplantotheeastoftheArabpopulation.Withinthisframework,manyJewishsettlementswereerected.Thetownletof

Givat-Zev,forinstance,comprisedin1998some9,700inhabitants.ThetownofMaalehEdumim, to the eastof Jerusalem,was rapidlypopulated to absorbby1998 approximately 22,200 inhabitants. The Jewish expansion over the regionwasdesignedtoensurecontrolofaccesstoJerusalem,therebeingnodesiretoreturntothepre-1967situationwhenJerusalemwasacul-de-sac,cutofffromitsenvirons.TheArab-JewishstrugglefortheJerusalemareahadademographicaspectas

well. At the end of 1998 Jerusalem had about 633,700 inhabitants; of these433,600 were Jews and 200,100 non-Jews. Furthermore, the city's Jewishpopulationisageing,whiletheArabpopulationisbecomingyounger.DespiteconsiderableeffortsmadebysuccessiveIsraeligovernmentsandthe

municipalitytocreatenewandmoderncityfacilities,theartificialreunificationof the cityhasnotbeeneffective.TheArabs arenot impressedwithwhathasbeen achieved in the city during the last three decades, and they have clearlyexpressedtheirattitudebyjoiningthe intifadabetween1987and1993.During

theconflict,theartificialityandbasicweaknessinthereunificationofJerusalemcameasagreatsurprisetotheJewishleadersofthecity.FormerMayorTeddyKollek,oftencitedasagreatunifyingforce in thefaceofdivisionselsewhere,admitted grudgingly that the delicate peaceful coexistence between Jews andArabsinJerusalemhaddied.Without a declared war, the artificial fabric of unity was torn asunder by

demographic, geographical and political realities. Though Jerusalem has beendecreed a reunified city, it has effectively returned to its earlier status as adividedcity,sunderingalongtheso-called'GreenLine'.TheIsraeliillusionofaGreater Jerusalem and a reunified city for the two peoples has vanished,probablyforever.

FIGURE4ARABNEIGHBOURHOODSINJERUSALEM1997

PartitionPlansforJerusalemafterthe1967War

Followingthe1967SixDayWar,demonstratingsensitivitytotheholyplacesintheJerusalemarea,Israelproposedthattheybegrantedthestatusofdiplomaticmissions. Christian andMuslim clerics serving at the holy places were to begranted a special status, similar to that of diplomatic representatives; Jordanwouldbeconsideredthe'accreditingstate'oftheMuslimclerics,andtheVaticanthe'accreditingstate'ofChristianclerics;andeachholyplacewouldconstituteaseparateanddistinctentitywithrespecttotheabove-mentionedcommunities.4

A proposal prepared in July 1968 byMeron Benvenisti, in his capacity asadvisertothemayoronEastJerusalemaffairs,wasmadewithaviewtocreatinga unified zone for the areas within the sphere of influence of metropolitanJerusalem, and serving as a proper framework for the city's development;establishingindependentmunicipalunitswithintheframeworkof theextendedmunicipalarea,withdueattentiontothetypesofsettlementitcontainedandtothedesireof theminorities forself-government inEastJerusalem;andmakingan attempt to meet the Arabs' request for controlling part of Jerusalemwhileensuring Israeli sovereignty over the territory within the city's currentboundaries.Themeanstothisendwerethedelimitationofmunicipalboundarieswhich would include territories under Israeli and Jordanian sovereignty; thecreationof a jointumbrella-council for fiveboroughs: Jewish Jerusalem,ArabJerusalem, the villages, Bethlehem and Beit Jalla; the granting of limitedautonomy to the JerusalemArabboroughand thevillage sector,with someofthe villages placed under Jordanian sovereignty. The Jewish borough was toincludetheentireJewishcityaswellasastripbetweenSanhedriyaandMountScopus,theOldCity'sJewishandArmenianQuarters,MountofOlives,theCityofDavid,EastTalpiyot-RamatRachel area,MarEliasMonastery,Beit Safafaarea and theNeveYaacov area.This territorywas to ensuredevelopment andsettlement of about 100,000 people, of whom no more than 9,000 would beArabs, and to be entirely under Israeli sovereignty. For their part, the Arab

boroughsweretoincludetheOldCity'sMuslimandChristianquarters,SheikhJarrah,theAmericanColony,WadiJoz,Shuafat,urbanBeitHaninaandSilwanallcurrentlyunderIsraelisovereignty-andal-AzariyaandAbuDis,whicharenot under Israeli sovereignty. The villages borough was to include the semi-agricultural villages around the city, some of which would be under Israelisovereignty- IssawiyaandSurBahir,UmTubawhileotherswere tobeunderJordanian sovereignty: al-Ram, Anata, Kafr Aqab, Beit Hanina, Bir Naballa,KalandiyaandJudeda.TheBethlehemandBeitJallaboroughsweretoincludetheirmunicipalareas(Figure5).The Greater Jerusalem council had to deal with the preparation of the

programmeanddailyrunningoftheboroughs,aswellaswith

FIGURE5DIVISIONOFJERUSALEMINTOSELF-ADMINISTRATIONBOROUGHS

regional and rural development, economy and tourism, fire-fighting, regionalsewageandwaterprojects,andtransportationandhousing.Thestateauthoritieswouldhavethepowertoannulanydecisionrelatingtotheirsovereignsphere.5

InDecember1969,attheheightoftheEgyptian-IsraeliWarofAttrition,aplanfor the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict was put forward by WilliamRogers, the thenUSSecretaryofState,only tobe rejectedbybothEgyptandIsrael.OneofthereasonsforIsrael'snegativereactionwasthattheplandidnotstipulatethatJerusalemwouldremainunderIsraelirule.RatheritstatedthattheUnitedStatescouldnotacceptunilateralactionsbyanypartyregardingthecity'sfinal status, which could only be determined by mutual agreement of allconcernedparties,primarilyJordanandIsrael, taking intoaccount the interestsof other countries in the area and the international community at large.Accordingtotheplan,Jerusalemshouldremainunified,withopenaccesstotheunified city for persons of all faiths and nationalities. The plan did notspecificallyrefertotheholyplacesbutdidnotetheneedtoensurefreeaccesstothe city and to take into account the interests of all its inhabitants and of theJewish,MuslimandChristiancommunitiesinthecity'sadministration.6

Among the resolutions of an Arab summit conference at Fez in September1982,afewprovisionsconcerningJerusalemwerementioned.TheseincludedanIsraeli withdrawal from all Arab territories occupied in 1967, including ArabJerusalem; thecreationofaPalestinian statewith Jerusalemas its capital; andfreedomofworshipforallreligionsintheholyplaces.In thewinterof1991-92,agroupofIsraelisandPalestinians(C.Calbin,M.

Amirav and H. Siniora) co-operating within a research project, published aproposal suggesting that Jerusalem's territory would be quadrupled by theincorporationof an almost equal amount of territory from Israel and theWestBank. The new metropolis would include Ramallah in the north, MevasseretZioninthewest,Bethleheminthesouth,andMaalehEdumimintheeast.WiththenewboundariesJerusalemwouldhaveapopulationofsome800,000,almostequally divided between Jews and Arabs. This population balance would bemaintainedinthefuturebymeansofanimmigrationpolicybasedonanannualincreaseofnomorethanthreepercent.MetropolitanJerusalemwouldthenbe

divided into 20 municipalities; the government of Israel and the prospectivePalestinian state would still handle most matters normally vested in nationalauthoritiesandwouldmaintaindualjurisdictiontoadjudicateinthemetropolis.Thecitizenshipofthemetropolitancity'sresidentswouldbedeterminedbytheirownwishesratherthanbytheareainwhichtheyhappenedtolive,andthecitywouldbeonephysicallyopenareawithnocheckpointsorphysicalbarriers.TheOldCitywould form its ownmunicipality and be run by a city council,withdecisions regardingphysical planning anddevelopment approvedunanimouslyby its residents and each faith having full administrative power over its holysites.7

Two years later, in June 1994, the Israel-PalestineCentre forResearch andInformation(IPCRI)similarlyproposedthatJerusalembenotphysicallydividedandpreserve itsopencharacter.Separateareaswouldbecreated,basedon thecompositionofthepopulation,inwhichIsraeliandPalestinianauthoritieswouldrespectively be vested with limited sovereignty, whereas sovereignty over theOld City would be entirely relinquished by both sides with each communitymaintaining its legal system in those areas where it enjoyed a demographicmajority according to the boundaries betweenmunicipalities or boroughs.Theholy places, as well as religious buildings and sites would not be under thenationalsovereigntyofeitherIsraelorPalestine.Thetwomunicipalitieswouldestablish a joint planning commission to coordinate between the variousreligiousauthorities.8

RecentPartitionPlans

In October 1995 three maps, prepared by the Jerusalem Institute for IsraelStudiesanddescribingalternativeplansforthefinalsolutioninJerusalem,werepassed by government officials to the Palestinian Authority. In one of thesemaps the recognition of Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalemwas clearlyexpressed, but also the annexation to Israel of certain territories such as theEtzionBloc,MaalehEdumim,Givat-ZevandBetar(Figure6).The plan suggested five alternatives for Palestinian sovereignty in East

Jerusalem,fromtheeasytothedifficult:

1. Sovereignty over a limited area, along the fringe line of Jerusalem'smunicipal boundary, would be connected by a strip of land to thePalestinian territories, to be partly used as a Palestinian governmentcompound.ThisfringelinemightincludesuchareasasRasalAmmud,Arabal-Sawahra,UmLizan,SurBahirandUmTubaatthesouth-eastpartofthecity;theeasternpartoftheMountofOlives,al-Shuyukh,al-Turwiththe'ContinentalHotel'andIssawiya,andinthenorthernpart-Shuafat, Beit Hanina andKafr Aqeb. All other Arab neighbourhoodsweretoremainunderIsraelisovereignty.

2. Sovereignty in East Jerusalem, excluding its Jewish neighbourhoodsand the Jewish Quarter in the Old City. The other parts of EastJerusalem, together with the Old City, the Mount of Olives and theTown of David, which contain themost important sites for the threereligions, would receive a special status of suspended sovereignty orcondominium.

FIGURE6PROPOSALOFEXPANDEDISRAELIAUTONOMYINJERUSALEM1997

3.SovereigntyoverEastJerusalem-excludingtheJewishneighbourhoodsandtheOldCitywhichwouldremainunderIsraelisovereignty.

4.SovereigntyoverEastJerusalem-excludingtheJewishneighbourhoods,the Jewish cemetery on theMount of Olives, the Town of David, theJewishandtheArmenianQuartersintheOldCity,WestJerusalem,andastripoflandconnectingtheEtzionBloctoIsrael.

5.SovereigntyinEastJerusalem-excludingtheJewishneighbourhoods.

The advantages of these alternatives, from the Israeli point of view are asfollows:

ReconciliationwiththePalestinianandtheMuslimworld,andagreater

chancetoachievealong-termstablepeaceagreement.PreservationofIsraelisovereigntyintheJewishneighbourhoodsofEastJerusalem, including the JewishQuarter, and a substantial part of EastJerusalem.PalestinianrecognitionofIsrael'ssovereigntyovermostpartsofthecity,includingthenewneighbourhoodsbuiltafter1967andconsistingtodayofsome170,000inhabitants.A possible territorial exchange in return for the connection ofMaalehEdumim and Givat-Zev to Jerusalem, and a connection of the EtzionBloc to Israel after Israel's surrender of all the Arab areas in EastJerusalem.NoneedforaphysicaldivisionofJerusalemandassuranceoffreeaccessto all parts of the city without disrupting the economic fabric, andwithout the need to rule the 170,000 Palestinians living in EastJerusalem.ThesecurityinthecityanditsforeignaffairswillbekeptunderIsrael'sauthority.The possibility of gradual long-term progression towards Palestiniansovereignty-startingwithalimitedgovernmentcompoundasaninterimarrangement to a bigger part in East Jerusalem, excluding the Jewishneighbourhoods,asafinalagreement.

Theplan'sdeficienciesforIsraelareasfollows:

With the functioning of two political capitals in Jerusalem, the Jewishnatureof thecitywillbediminishedand itspoliticalstatusasaJewishdomainmightbeundermined.PalestiniansovereigntywillbeestablishedontheTempleMount,whichisaholyplacefortheJews.The running of a mutual administration and policing is bound to becomplicatedandtogenerateconflictsbetweenthetwocommunities.

Another plan proposed by the same institute took for granted the existingsituation in the city, created since the Six Day War, and was based on theassumption that the municipal area of Jerusalem will remain under Israeli

sovereignty. Exchange of areas by mutual agreement between Israel and thePalestinians,becauseofpragmaticandmunicipalreasons,willbepossible.Theadvantagesofthislatterplanareasfollows:

ProtectionofJerusalemasaJewishentity.ReinforcementoftheideaamongIsraelisandJewsthatotheralternativesmay weaken Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem, aggravate tension andviolence between Arabs and Jews, and create breaches that cannot behealed.Thisplanmaybeusedasaprovisionalstepinasituationofdisagreementbetween the two sides, enabling a return to other alternatives once thePalestinian entity has proved its stability as a political and democraticbody.

Theweaknessesofthisplanareformidableindeed:

ItistotallyunacceptabletothePalestinians.ItmaybeanobstacletotheIsraeli-Palestinianpeacenegotiations.It is unacceptable to the Arab states and can exacerbate the peacenegotiationswiththem.ItmaystrainAmerican-Israelirelations.ItmaycreateagitationandigniteanewuprisingintheTerritories.

Yetanotherplanhasbeensimilarlybasedon theassumption that IsraelwillhaveexclusivesovereigntyinJerusaleminitspresentmunicipalboundaries.Intheframeworkofamutualagreement,theexchangeoflimitedareasinthecitywithterritoriesinJudeamightbepossible.AsymboliccentreofsovereigntyforthePalestiniansinthecitymightbeapproved.TheTempleMountwillbeunderthe supersovereignty of Israel and a Palestinian-Islamic-Jordanianadministration;asimilarstatuswillbegiventotheChurchofSepulchre,andtotheChristianQuarter in theOldCity; theArmenianQuarterwill get a specialstatus,aswillthespacebetweenthewallsandthenearsurroundingsoftheOldCity(Figure7).TheaimofthislatterplanistoadministerfunctionalautonomyunderIsraeli

sovereigntyinallquartersofEastJerusalem.Suchautonomywillbesupervised

by the Jerusalem municipality and will include among others the followingdomains: collecting domestic taxes, administration of borough councils withpermanent staffmembers, culture, education, sport, social services, gardening,healthandreligiousservices.The idea of functional autonomy has been already accepted in principle by

different institutions and organizations involved in Jerusalem's political future.The idea is to delegate some important powers to borough administrations, todevelop in them domestic security with civil guard and to encourage theirindependencevis-a-visthemunicipalauthorities.Boroughadministrationwouldbe established in all parts of the city, allowing in turn the creation of a sub-municipalityfortheOldCitywithainter-religiousandinternationalcouncil.In this plan it is also recommended that the existing system of borough

administration would be dispersed to all city neighbourhoods. Theadministration in theOldCitywould be establishedon the basis of the ethnicandreligiouscompositionoftheinhabitants.Theboundaries

FIGURE7PROPOSALFORJEWISHANDARABBOROUGHSINJERUSALEM1997

of each borough would be delineated in consultation with the residents'representatives.Functional autonomy to the boroughs may have a good chance of being

accepted. The present situation in the city is unacceptable to the Palestinians,while recognition of Palestinian sovereignty in East Jerusalem is not agreedupon by many of the Israelis. This plan, however, is flexible: it enables theproposal of different kindsof arrangements between the two communities andcan be executed gradually according to future circumstances. Its maindeficiency,though,isthatiftherulesarenotstrictlyobserveditmightleadtoa

weakeningofIsrael'ssovereigntyinthecity.

Conclusions

Theabove-mentionedfactsindicatethatJerusalemisasiteofdemographicandphysical competitionbetween twopopulations,with theclearpoliticalpurposeofholdingandcontrollingthecityanditsadjacentenvirons.Itmaybeassumedthatwithoutamutuallyagreedcomprehensivepoliticalplanandrapidsystematicimplementationofimportantaspectsofit,Israelwillnotbeabletosafeguardthecityasacapital.Itmayalsobeassumedthatthecity'sreunificationin1967didnotbring an end to thedivisionbetween JewsandArabs.The animosities aredeep and have survived the recent geographical shifts. None of the differentpartitionplansofJerusalemwillensure thecity'snormalfunctioning.It isalsodoubtfulwhethertheseplanswillallowJerusalemtoremainauniversalcapitalasopposedtoamerespatialpoliticalarenawheretwopeoplesfindthemselvesembracedinhatredwithoutanylogicalsolution.While in a normal city, not to speak of a capital, the boundaries usually

conform to topography,buildingzones,homogenousneighbourhoods, efficientarteries thatconnectvitalplaces to their surroundingsandeconomic siteswithoptimal places - in Jerusalem the opposite situation exists. The possibility ofpartialsovereignty,suspendedsovereigntyoracommonfunctionalsovereigntyforspecialareaswillneverbeanoptimalsolutionforthecity.Theproposedplansdemonstrate,afterall,thatJerusalemhasbecomeanurban

mosaicofdistorteddecisionsunparalleledelsewhereintheworld.ItseemsthatJerusalemhasactuallybecomeapartoftheterritoryofJudeaandSamariaandmaybeeventuallyincludedinsomeoftheAtoCcategoriesoftheOsloAccordsforthepurposeofpartition.Thethree-decade-longterritorialconflictinJerusalemhasdismantledthecity

from its special urban properties to the point ofmaking it a 'no city'. Furtherexpansion of the city to its peripherywill only exacerbate the problems.Anydecision on the city's future should be based on the ethnic composition ofneighbourhoodswithminimalfrictionbetweenArabsandJews,soastoensure

Jewish and Arab neighbourhoods as independent entities and to protect theJewishnatureofthecityinthosepartswherethemajorityofJewslive.Shouldthisnotbeachieved,onemightbeforcedtoreturntotheideaexpressedbythelate King Hussein of Jordan whereby 'Jerusalem belongs to God and not topeople'.

ElishaEfratisProfessorofGeographyatTelAvivUniversity.

Notes

1.Y.Katz, 'ThePolitical Status of Jerusalem inHistoricalContext:Zionist Plans for thePartition of

JerusalemintheYears1937-1938',Shofar,Vol.11,No.3(Spring1993),pp.41-53.

2.Ibid.

3.'UNGeneralAssemblyOfficialRecords',FifthSession,Supp.No.9,1950(A/1286),p.29.

4.U.Benziman,Jerusalem:CitywithoutaWall,JerusalemandTelAviv,1973,pp.110-14(Hebrew).

5. M.D. Hirsch, D. Housen-Curiel and R. Lapidoth, Whither Jerusalem? Proposals and Positions

ConcerningtheFutureofJerusalem,Hague,1995.

6.Ibid.

7.C.H.Calbin,M.Amirav andH. Siniora, 'Jerusalem: anUndividedCity asDualCapital',Harry S.

Truman Institute for theAdvancementofPeaceandTheArabStudiesSociety, Israeli-Palestinian

PeaceResearchProject,WorkingPaperSeries,No.16,1991-92.

8.G.Baskin (ed.),NewThinkingon theFutureof Jerusalem:AModel for theFutureof Jerusalem -

ScatteredSovereignty,Jerusalem,1994.

Arab—IsraeliCoexistence:TheCauses,AchievementsandLimitations

EFRAIMINBAR

Manywelcomed theMay 1999 victory of PrimeMinister EhudBarak, in thehopethatitwouldinjectalong-awaitedboosttothepeaceprocess.Indeed,theprevalent viewamongobservers andpolicymakers is that the peaceprocess isbackontrackaftertheSeptember1999Sharmal-SheikhsummitandtheJanuary2000 renewal of the Israeli-Syrian talks, although they continue to regard theArab-Israelipeaceprocessasfragile,withlackofprogressendangeringregionalstability. In March 2000 the mood was again one of concern. Such a viewunderestimates, on the one hand, the force of the regional processes that havepushed the Arab states away from the goal of destroying the Jewish statetowardsattemptsat solvingdifferencesprimarilybydiplomaticmeans.On theother hand, it has unrealistic expectations for further progress in the peaceprocessandbelittlestheinherentregionalconstraintsonitsdevelopment.ThisessayreviewsfirstthemainreasonsfortheentrenchmentofIsraelinthe

Middle East and for the shift towards its greater acceptance as a regularinternationalplayerinregionalpolitics.Thesecondsectionarguesthatthepeaceprocess is quite resilient, and that it has successfully realized most of itspotential. The third part clarifies the often forgotten limitations to the peaceprocess,whichthestrategicandculturalrealitiesoftheMiddleEastimposeonArabstates'relationswithIsrael.Thisarticleconcludesbyofferingafewpolicy-relevantobservations,andespeciallyadvisesagainstimpatienceanddiplomatichyperactivity.

Israel'sAcceptancebyitsRegionalFoes

The visit of Anwar Sadat, the President of Egypt, to Israel in October 1977

signalled a dramatic change in the pattern ofArab-Israeli relations. TheArabworld,inparticular,wasstunnedbythemovewhichrecognizedIsraelasafaitaccompli. The 1978CampDavidAccords and the 1979 peace treaty betweenEgypt and Israelwere notwelcomed bymost of theArab countries or by thePalestinians. Peace with Israel violated a basic tenet of Arab consensus andchallengedoneofthecorevaluesinArabpoliticalculture.Therefore,EgyptwasforseveralyearsostracizedbyitsArabbrethren.Yet,Egypt,thestrongestArabcountry,weatheredtheattemptstoisolateit1andafterthe1991GulfWarmostoftheArabworldjoineditinnegotiatingpeacewithIsrael.Severalfactorsledtothisprocess.

FutilityofAttemptingtoEradicateIsraelbyForce

ThemostimportantreasonforthepeaceprocesswasthegrowingrealizationbyArab political elites of the futility of attempting to eradicate Israel by force.Indeed,since1973weseeacleardeclineinthemilitaryintensityof theArab-Israeliconflict.Duringthefirstthreedecadesofitsexistence,Israelfoughtandwon four large-scale wars, in 1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973, involving Israel'simmediate neighbours, as well as expeditionary forces from 'second ring'countries,suchasIraqandSudan,andevenfrommoreremotecountriessuchasMorocco. Since October 1973, however, no large-scale war has been foughtbetweenIsraelandanArabcountry.After1979,whenEgyptsignedapeacetreatywithIsrael, theArabslostnot

only the strongest military force to be mobilized against Israel, but also theability towagea two-frontassaultonIsrael (itsworst-casescenario).Thus thedestruction of Israel by a successful all-out Arab military conventional effortseemed no longer to be a practical goal, despite the fact that limitedwar andlow-intensity conflict were (as was realized earlier), useful tools in bleedingIsraelandinpressuringitintoterritorialconcessions.2

AlthoughthestrategicsignificanceoftheIsraelinuclearpostureinArabeyesis not entirely clear, it probably had a sobering effect on the belligerentArabstates.3 Israel's nuclear option, coupled with the awareness of Israel'sconventional weapon superiority, certainly constitutes a contributing factor to

thestrategiccalculusthatledtotheArabrealizationthatthepriceofeliminatingtheJewishstatebywarcouldbeextremelyhigh.ThenewlinksbetweenJerusalemandAnkara in the latterpartof the1990s

reinforcedthenotionthatIsraelismilitarilystrongandcannotbeeasilyremovedfromthemap.InmanyArabquartersthereareconsiderableapprehensionsaboutthecombinedmightofthetwo,whichchangesdramaticallytheregionalbalanceof power in favour of the non-Arab actors.4 The burgeoning Turkish-Israelieconomicandmilitarytieshaveunitedthetwostrongestcountriesintheregion,whichfurtherbuttressedthepositionofIsraelasapowerfulregionalactor.Thisrelationshipisresilientandlikelytocontinue,asitisbasedonasharedviewoftheMiddleEastasacombativeneighbourhoodinwhichthetwocountrieshaveacommonlistofproblematicrivals-IraqandIran.

ChangesinArabCountries'ForeignPolicyOrientation

ParalleltothechangingevaluationsconcerningthechancesofdestroyingIsrael,Arabcountrieshaveundergoneashift in their foreignpolicyorientation.Theyhave moved since the 1970s from various degrees of allegiance to Pan-Arabideologytoaforeignpolicymoreopenlydeterminedbynationalstatistinterests.ThePan-Arablongingforsupra-stateidentityandpoliticalstructurehasalwaysservedasalegitimizingmechanismfordomesticandforeignpolicyprocessesinArab states, but has also constituted a constraint in the open pursuit of eachcountry's own narrow statist interests. Gradually, Pan-Arabism became lessappealing, and at the same time, Arab states were relatively successful instrengthening their statist structures and in crystallizing a particularArab stateidentity,whetherIraqi,JordanianorSyrian.5Despitethefactthatonlyafewofthe existing Arab states seem the right and natural focus of ultimate politicalloyalty,itisthesestatesthathavebecomethemostimportantarenaforpoliticalactionintheArabworld.6

ThisshiftinthefocusofregionalpoliticshasledtoadeclineinthesalienceoftheArab-IsraeliconflictandthePalestinianissue,whichwerecentralinthePan-Arabethos.7 Indeed,Egypt, after thedeathofNasser, themost importantpan-Arab advocate,moved toward amoreEgyptcentredviewof regional politics.8

Thereafter, it could concentrate on retrieving the land it lost in June 1967,without conditioning the return of theSinai to the resolutionof other disputesbetween Israel and its neighbours. Moreover, the success of the PalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO)inestablishingitselfasthevoice,parexcellence,ofPalestiniannationalism,inattractinginternationalattentiontothePalestinianissue, and in acquiringmodest freedom of action in the Arab arena, allowed,paradoxically, Arab states to limit their commitment to the Palestinian cause.After the PLO reached its own agreement with Israel in September 1993 (atOslo), the Arab states had even less of a constraint in dealing with Israelaccordingtotheirownperceivedinterests.

ChangesinthePalestinianNationalMovement

An additional contributing factor to the evolution of the peace process is thechangesthathavetakenplaceinthePalestiniannationalmovement,whosemainproponentwas thePLO.ThePLO's international status and regional influencepeakedinthelate1970s.However,in1982,theIsraeliinvasionofLebanonputanendtothePLOmini-state,resultingintheremovalofthePLOleadershipandthousandsofitspersonneltofarawayTunisia.(NootherArabstatewaswillingtohost thePLOheadquarters, indicating the limits to theArabcontribution tothePalestiniancause.)ThedistancefromPalestinemadetheuseofforceagainsttargetswithinIsraelamorecomplicatedoperationthaneverbefore.ThemostsignificantPalestinianaction-theintifada-wasnottheresultofa

PLOinitiative.Moreover,thePalestinianuprisingintheIsraeli-ruledterritoriesbrought a new leadership to the forefront of the Palestinian struggle - the'insiders'-PalestinianswhofoughtIsraelioccupationinsidetheterritories.9Theyhad impeccable nationalist credentials and were less vulnerable to charges ofcorruption (of which a large part of the PLO leadership was suspected).Although nominally subordinate to the PLO, the 'insiders' believed that theirintimate knowledge of the Israeli enemy placed them in a better position toformulatethePalestiniannationalstrategy.The 'insiders'haveinfusedagreatersenseofrealismintothePalestiniannationalmovement,intermsofwhatcouldbeachieved,aswellasacertainurgencyindealingwithPalestinianproblems,

which also moderated their demands. The influx of Israeli settlers into theterritories and the building of Jewish settlements also led to a realization thattime was not necessarily on the Palestinian side. In concrete terms, thesePalestiniansadvocatedacceptingIsrael in its1967linesandnegotiatingwithitto bring about a withdrawal from the occupied territories. They wereinstrumental in pushing the PLO away from its maximalist position, and itsrefusaltorecognizeIsrael,intoadoptingatwo-stateformula.InNovember1988,thePLOfinallyacceptedtheUN1947PartitionPlan(Resolution181).Amajor blow to thePLOwas its strategic blunder of 1990.At that time it

allieditselfwithSaddamHussein,whochosetochampionthePalestiniancauseinordertoevokesympathyinthestreetsoftheArabworld.ThismoveangeredtheUSandcostthePLOthediplomaticandfinancialsupportofmanyimportantArab countries. Following the 1991 American victory over Iraq, the USconvenedtheMadridconferenceandthePLOhadtobecontentwithsendingitsrepresentatives within a Jordanian delegation. Moreover, the Palestinians nolongerdemandedthataPalestinianstatehadtobeontheagendaandagreedtoatwo-stage open-ended process following the outline of the 1978 CampDavidAccords,andconcentratingfirstonachievinganinterimagreement.Again, the'insiders'werethemovingforceinmoderatingthePalestiniandemandsissuedinTunis.Theapprehensionsthattheleadersoftheintifada,withintheIsraeli-ruledterritories,wouldtakeoverthePalestiniannationalmovement,coupledwiththedeep financial crisis of the PLO, led Arafat to the September 1993 OsloAgreement. Then the PLO recognized Israel, renounced the use of force, andpromised the cancellation of the clauses in the Palestinian Covenant whichcalledforthedestructionofIsrael.10

GrowingSignificanceofOtherThreatstotheArabWorld

AnimportantcontributingfactortothepeaceprocesswasthelessonlearnedbyArableadersthatIsraelwasnotthebiggestthreattotheArabworld.Khomeini'sIslamic revolution in 1979 triggered, for many, memories of another historicenemytotheArabpeople-thePersians;otherswerefrightenedbythechallengethe Islamic revolution posed to the legitimacy of their regimes. Indeed, most

ArabstatesalliedthemselveswiththeaggressorofthefirstGulfWar(1980-88),Iraq,inordertocontaintheIranian-Islamicwave.Duringthisperiod,thedisputewithIsraelwassecondary.11TheSyrians,whosidedwithIran,wereallowedtofaceIsraelontheirownin1982.EventhePalestinianuprisingin1987didnotelicitmuch support asmost of theArabworldwas busy parrying the IslamicchallengefromTehran.An initially ostracized Egypt capitalized on the Iran-IraqWar to regain its

leading status in inter-Arab affairs, without giving in to the demands that itchange its policy vis-á-vis Israel. Its much-needed assistance to Iraq (theprovisionofmanpower,militaryequipmentandinstruction),anditsassociationwiththeUS,thevictorintheColdWar,broughtEgypt'sisolationtoanend.Inaddition,Egypt'sreintegrationwithintheArabsystemmadeitspeacetreatywithIsraelmoreacceptabletotheArabworld.Yet,onlyafewyearslater,Arableaderslivedtoseetheirallymakeanabout-

turnastheirfellowArab,themegalomaniacSaddamHussein,becameintentonhegemonicpursuitsandtheattainmentoftherichesofKuwait.HisappealtothemassesintheArabworldwasnotlostonthoseinpowerwhofeltthreatenedbythe Iraqi actions. The Americans were invited to curtail Saddam Hussein'saspirationsandeventuallytoreversetheconquestofKuwait.PresidentBushwasadeptatbuildingamilitarycoalitiontofreeKuwait,andIsraeldiditsbestnottospoilthecoalitionbyabsorbing39Iraqimissiles.Israel,atthisjunction,andnotforthefirsttime,wasaligneddefactowithmanyArabstates.For years, the potential for an Israeli alliance was well known to the

Hashemites, who shared a common enemy with the Israelis, the Palestiniannationalmovement,andwereaidedmorethanoncebyIsraelimilitarybacking.12

The events of September 1970, when Israel's military moves deterred anexpansionoftheSyrianefforttoinvadeJordan,arethebest-knownexampleofIsrael'ssupportfortheHashemites.JordanisindeedtheclosestArabcountrytoIsraelandeventakespartintheIsraeli-Turkishalignment.Similarly,someofthesmallGulfstatesseeinIsraeladistantpowerabletoplayabalancingroleintheregion,particularlyagainsthegemonicambitions.

DomesticPolitics

Another development facilitating the peace process originates in domesticpolitics. Growing social weariness towards war has forced the politicalleadership in several countries in the region to redefine their national goals.Populations have grown tired of protracted conflict. This has led tomoderatepositions and to greater willingness to discuss the possibility of peace by allnationsintheregion.ThiswasaclearfactorinEgypt'sdispositiontosignpeacetreaties with Israel, and influenced the Palestinians to accept more realisticresults from their national struggle. Israel likewise iswar-weary and has littleappetiteordesiretopolicetheareasinhabitedbyPalestinians.Preciselyforthisreason, Israel isno longer attracted to thenotionof 'Greater Israel'.Hence theredefinition of collective goals in light of newly perceived realities made itpossibleforthetwosidestomoveclosertogether.

InternationalDevelopments

Certain features of the international system were no less important than theregionaldevelopmentsinfosteringagreateracceptanceofIsrael.Inthebipolarinternationalsystem,IsraelwasalignedwiththeUnitedStates.Thealliancewiththe US was an important component of Israel's deterrent power in regionalpolitics. TheOctober 1973American airlift to its embattled ally remained formanyyearsapotentindicationofUScommitmenttothesecurityofIsrael.Oneimportant Arab strategic goal for years has been to weaken the link betweenIsrael and its superpower ally and to deny the Jewish state internationallegitimacy.13 The overall robustness of Jerusalem-Washington relations andparticularlytheincreasedstrategicco-operationbetweenthetwosidessincethe1980smadetheArabgoalofputtingawedgebetweenthetwounrealistic.ThecampaigntoisolateIsraelintheinternationalcommunityalsofailed.Moreover,theendoftheColdWarwasbeneficialinstrategictermstoIsrael.

ArabcountrieswerefurtherweakenedbythecollapseoftheSovietUnion.TheArabsnolongerhadthebackingofasuperpower,thuslimitingtheirmilitaryanddiplomaticoptions.Incontrast,IsraelcontinuedtobealliedwiththevictorintheColdWar.Thetwomostviciouslyanti-Israelicountries,IraqandIran,becametheenemiesoftheUSandsubjecttoAmericansanctions.ThefactthattheUS

emerged as the only global superpower has made Arab countries moreresponsivetoAmericanpreferences,includingtheacceptanceofIsrael.TheArabworldwaspoliticallyfurtherweakenedbyanothersystemicchange

- the emergence of a buyers' market in the world oil economy. Arab oil-producing countries, in particular, lostmuchpolitical clout because of lowoilprices, while the mismanagement of their economies further reduced theirinternationalstanding.14

Indeed,in1991,intheaftermathoftheColdWar,theAmericanscapitalizedontheirvictoryintheGulfWarandonthetrendsdiscussedabovebypromotinganother attempt at continuing the peace process the October 1991 Madridconference.Thisconferenceinitiatedaprocessofbilateralnegotiations,aswellastheparticipationofIsraelandanunprecedentednumberofArabcountriestodiscussMiddleEastproblems.TheAmericansbroughttheSyrians,thePalestiniansandtheJordanianstothe

negotiating table in Madrid, primarily on Israeli terms. No preconditionspreviouslydemandedbySyria(forexample,anIsraelicommitmenttowithdrawfrom the Golan Heights and negotiations under the umbrella of a bindinginternationalconference)weremet.Indeed,PresidentAsadofSyriawasdraggedinto thepeaceprocessoutofweakness, followingthe lossofhisSovietpatronand the American demonstration of military might and resolve in 1991.ParticipationinthepeaceprocesswasaSyrianadjustmenttoanewinternationalreality.15

However,overall,theregionalprocessesandthefluctuatingperceptionsofthepoliticalleadersintheMiddleEasthavebeenshowntohavemorecloutthantheglobalchangesandsuperpower influence.TheAmericanefforts tobringaboutan Israeli-Syrian accord have thus far failed to achieve concrete results.Similarly, the American involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian track has hadmixed results. And historically, the main breakthroughs in the Arab-Israeliconflict,namelySadat'svisittoJerusalemandtheOsloAgreement,werenotduetoanAmericaninitiativeandinfact,cametothemasasurprise,albeitapleasantone.

TheResilienceofthePeaceProcess

TheResilienceofthePeaceProcess

SeveralregionalprocessesandglobaldynamicsfuelledtheArabrapprochementwithIsrael.ThepeaceprocessstemmedbasicallyoutofArabweakness.Aslongas the trends enumerated above continue, even in the absence of progress(usuallyaeuphemismforIsraeliconcessions),thelikelihoodofareverseinthehistoric accommodation towards Israel is small. To a great extent, the ArabworldhascrossedtheRubiconinacceptingIsrael'sexistence,notlegitimacy,asan almost irrevocable fact, and as a regular international actor in theMiddleEast.Inmanyways,thepeaceprocessisover,andhasbeenconcludedsuccessfully.

IsraelhashadapeacetreatywithEgyptsince1979.Areversaltobelligerenceisunlikely as long as Egypt holds on to an American orientation in its foreignpolicy. In 1994, Jordan formalized its good relations with Israel by signing apeace treaty. On the Palestinian track, the 1993 Oslo Agreement - in fact arepartitionofPalestine-isbeingimplemented,albeitgraduallyandnotwithoutdifficulties. The contours of the Palestinian state, its borders and degree ofsovereignty remain to be negotiated. The rationale of partition and theestablishmentoftwoentitiesispoliticallycompelling.Since1993,thePalestiniannationalmovementhasneverhadsomuchtolose

- real control over most Palestinians and exclusive rule over parts of theirperceivedhomeland.ThePalestinianshavelearnedfromtheirhistorythatthelipservicepaidbyArabcountries to theircause is rarelybackedbydeeds,whichleaves them almost alone to face themuch stronger Israelis.Thus,while low-levelconflicttakesplace,ArafatseemstobecarefulsoasnottoprovokeIsraelintoalarge-scaleconflict.Moreover,Israel,asawhole,hasmovedinfavourofpartitionoftheLandof

Israel. The Likud-led government (1996-99) signed agreements inwhich landwas transferred to the Palestinian Authority (PA) - the January 1997 HebronAgreement and the October 1998 Wye Plantation Accords. The May 1999election results clearly show that supportwithin Israeli society for the idea ofGreaterIsraelisminimal(lessthanfivepercent).IsraelishaveevenreconciledthemselvestotheemergenceofaPalestinianstate.Nevertheless,thechangesinIsraeli attitudes do notmake an agreementwith the Palestinians inevitable, aseven in the case of a Labour-led government there is still no convergence of

viewsbetweenthetwosocieties,particularlyonissuesofborders,refugees,andJerusalem. Indeed, the expectations that the negotiations between a Barak-ledgovernment and thePAon final status issueswill be conducted smoothly andwillendwithinayearorsoarenotveryrealistic.BarakhasinthepastvoicedgreatreservationsabouttheOsloAgreementandseveralpoliticalforceswithinhis wide coalition are unlikely to support territorial largesse toward thePalestinians.OntheSyriantrackofthepeaceprocess,Asadhassofarprovedunwillingto

moveforward.HerefusedtoaccepttheGolanHeightsinexchangeforapeacetreaty, which required him to open up his closed society a little and whichquestioned his continuous control over Lebanon. This has been the Americanevaluation,andevenArabcapitalsrecognize,unofficially, thatAsadmissedanhistoricopportunitytomakeaveryfavourabledealwithIsrael.16Indeed,Rabinofferedhim theGolanHeights inAugust1993andPeres repeated theoffer inJanuary1996.17Inallprobability,evenNetanyahusuggestedasimilardeal,butAsaddidnotbitethebullet.Barak succeeded in bringing back the Syrians to the negotiating table in

January 2000, but he is even more insistent than Rabin on adequate securityarrangements and he has consistently been critical of Labour's negotiatingformulathat'thedepthofthewithdrawalfromtheGolanHeightscorrespondstothe depth of peace'. His preferred equation has been 'the depth ofwithdrawalshallbeequal tothequalityofpeaceandthestrengthof thesecurityandearlywarningarrangements'.18

It remains tobe seenwhetherAsad's successor is ready forpeace.Possibly,thetalkswereonlyashieldagainststrongerAmericanand/orIsraelidiplomaticandmilitarypressures,butitisremarkablethattheyhavebeenheldatall.Inanycase,SyriahasonlylimitedpotentialtoobstructIsrael'sacceptanceintheregion.BynowitisclearthatSyriadoesnothaveavetopowerinregionalaffairsasitsopposition to Jordanian and Palestinian attempts to reach separate agreementswithIsraelprovedfutile.Indeed, even when Arab states complained that a Netanyahu-led Israel

violated the agreements with the PA and that he was not generous enough,territory-wise, towards the PA and Syria, we see very little inclination in theArabworld toheed the adviceof the radical states to revert to a stateofwar.

Since 1996, Arab summits have called upon Israel to implement its peacecommitmentsandhavethreatenedtofreezetheirrelationswiththeJewishstate.Yetdespitetheofficialrhetoric,inmanywaysrelationsbetweenArabstatesandIsraelareproceedingwell. InOctober1999, forexample,Mauritania, anArabLeaguemember,evendecided tohave fulldiplomatic relationswith Israel.Assuch,thebelligerenceofthestatusquoanteisthusnotarealoptioninthenearfuture.

TheLimitationsonPeacefulCoexistence

Israelnowdefinitelyhasbetter relationswith theArabworld than itdidafewdecadesago.Thispatternislikelytocontinue.Yet,therearelimitstowhatIsraelcan achieve in its ties with its neighbours. Expectations that Israeli-ArabrelationscanemulatethetypeofinteractioncharacteristicofwesternEuropeorNorthAmericaare totallyunrealistic forseveral reasonsrooted in thestrategicandculturalrealitiesoftheregion.

PowerPoliticsintheMiddleEast

Basically, the old patterns of regional interaction - power politics - haveremainedunchanged,despitetheremovalof thesuperpowercompetitioninthearea.19ThedreamsofanewMiddleEastarejustthat.PresidentMubarakinaninterviewto theIsraelipressadmitted that thevisionShimonPerespropagatedleftmanyEgyptiansuncomfortable, reminding theIsraeliaudience they live inthe Middle East.20 Indeed, the dominant perception of international relationsamongthepoliticalleadershipoftheMiddleEast,withtheexceptionofafewinJerusalem, has remained power politics. This is why Cairo, Damascus andBaghdadfeartheIsraeli-Turkishentente.Moreover,intheMiddleEasttheuseofforceisstillconsideredanacceptable

andusefultoolofforeignpolicy.Indeed,theregion'sZeitgeistfavoursviolence,'where guerrillas are lauded, and peacemakers ridiculed'.21 Even peacenegotiations are accompanied by violence. For example, Syria does not desist

from using the Hizbullah in bleeding Israel while it engages in peacenegotiationswithIsrael.ThePAisturningablindeyetoHamasterroristswhenitbelievesitsuitsitsinterests.InSeptember1996,thePAalloweditssoldierstoshootattheIsraeliarmy,whileArafatoftenthreatensIsraelwithanewintifadaifhisdemandsarenotsatisfied.IndeedtheemergingPalestinianentityhasgreatpotential for developing into a revisionist and predatory state,22 andMubarakandotherArableadershaverepeatedlywarnedthatintheabsenceof 'progress'therewillbeaviolenteruption.Thebestwecanexpectintheregionisanarmedpeace.Egypt,despiteits20-

year-old peace treatywith Israel, continues to arm itself and has developed alargeandmodernAmerican-equippedarmy.Accordingtosomeofitsgenerals,Egypt continues to see Israel as a potentialmilitary rival.23NeitherEgypt norJordancapitalizedontheirpeacetreatywithIsrael toreducedefencespending.DespitetheMadridpeaceprocess,SyriausedmoneyreceivedfromSaudiArabia(for its antiIraq stance in1991), over$1billion, tobuyarms.24 In fact, armedpeace characterizes inter-Arab relations. No Arab state feels that all of itsbordersaresafeandeachharbourssuspicionsagainstitsneighbours.Indeed,allof Israel'sArabneighbourshave legitimatesecurityconcerns in regard to theirother neighbours. Israel also, despite the reduction in threat perception,continuestoarmitselfandevenleadersontheIsraeliLeftseetheIsraeliarmyasthefinalguaranteeforpeacefulrelationswithitsneighbours.

BorderDisputes

Generally,bordersintheMiddleEast,whichweredrawnbycolonialistpowers,stilllacklegitimacy.Thisallowsforrevisionistpolicies.SyrianeverrecognizedLebanonasanindependentstateandwassuccessfulinturningitintoitssatellite.Iraq still has ambitions to annex Kuwait. South Yemen disappeared as anindependent state inMay1994as itwas 'united' by forcewith its neighbour -NorthYemen.A dissatisfiedPalestine could become the source for irredentistclaims east and west. Indeed, Arafat's willingness 'to sacrifice even the lastPalestinianchildforplacingthePalestinianflagonthewallsofJerusalem'andhis repeated calls for Jihad indicate the potential for additional demands and

tensions. As recently as the spring of 1999, the Palestinians renewed theirdemand that the Jewish state be confined to the borders of the 1947 PartitionPlan,inaccordancewithUNResolution181.

Non-AcceptanceofIsrael

The acceptance of Israel is far from being internalized by Arab societies.Notably,manyArab intellectualsandprofessionals refrain fromsupporting thepeace process. In stark contrast to their Israeli counterparts (the most ardentsupporters of the peace process), these groups are most critical of thereconciliation with the Jewish state and with a few exceptions boycott anycontacts with Israelis. In Jordan, the peace treaty with Israel is pejorativelytermed'theKing'speace'.There,aswellasinEgypt,professionalassociationsoflawyers, physicians, journalists and engineers impose sanctions on memberswho dare talk about normalizing relations with Israel. Public opinion in theLevant clearly indicates that thepeaceprocess is limitedprimarily to regimes,not societies,25 anddespite the fact thatArab states are not democracies, theirpoliticalleadersaresensitivetopublicopinion.26

ThoughIsraelisviewedinlessdemonictermsthaninthepast,fearsofIsraelieconomicdominationhavereplacedthefearsofIsraeliterritorialexpansion.Forexample, the1994Casablancaconference,atwhichdynamicIsraelisdisplayedeagerness to enter into business ventures with the Arabs, backfired; it wasmisconstruedasanIsraelidesigntocontroltheMiddleEastbyeconomicmeans.Indeed,Israel'sgrossnationalproduct(GNP)islargerthantheGNPofallofitsneighbourscombined.Paradoxically, Israel'sefforts to integrate into theregionhavealsotriggeredfearsofculturalimperialism.Israelisstillseen,notonlybytheIslamists,butbylargersegmentsoftheArabpoliticalandintellectualelite,asanoutpostoftheWestanditscoloniallegacyintheMiddleEast.The litmus test of changing attitudes towards Israel in the long run is the

education system, where the socialization process of a new generation takesplace.Unfortunately,theschoolcurriculumevenintheArabcountriesthathavesignedagreementswithIsraelremainsunchanged,propagatinganti-Israeliviewsandrabidanti-Semiticimages.TheArabmedia(usuallygovernment-controlled)

isrepletewithlanguageofhatetowardsallJews.Incontrast,theIsraeliMinistryof Education has published a unit for Peace Studies to be taught in grammarschoolsandsearcheditsbooksinordertoeliminateanti-Arabstereotypes,whilenewhistory textbooksare introduced into thestateschoolsystem,whichshowgreaterempathytowardsthePalestinians.27

TheAppealofRadicalIslam

Anotherpolitico-culturalfeatureof theMiddleEastwhichplaceslimitsontieswith Israel is the widespread appeal of radical Islam, particularly in Egypt,Jordan and Palestine; there, as elsewhere, radical Islamist groups oppose anyreconciliation with the Jewish state. The enmity for Israel and the West isgreat.28IntheMiddleEast,IslamicfundamentalismenjoysgreatsupportbeyondIranandSudan-thetwoIslamicrepublics-inalmosteverystateintheregion,includingsecularTurkey,anditspotentialconsequencesshouldnotbeignored.For the time being, however, the Islamic radicals have only limited ability toobstruct the peace process. Egypt and Jordan have not changed diplomaticcoursebecauseoftheIslamistopposition.YettheIslamicpoliticalinfluenceisastrong domestic constraint on openly pursuing cordial relations with Israel inmanycountriesoftheregion.

ChangingCircumstances

Finally, the peace process, despite its present robustness, is not necessarily aone-way historic development. An abrupt change of direction is possible,althoughunlikelyatthispointintime.ScenariosforturmoilincludeanIslamictake-over in one of Israel's neighbours. If this happens in Egypt, the mostimportant Arab country, it would be a particularly terrible blow to the peaceprocessandtoWesterninterests.SimilarlythreateningforIsraelisthedemiseofHashemiteJordananditsconquestbyPalestine,SyriaorIraq.Jordanisapivotalstate in the quest for regional stability. Its disappearancewould allow for thereorganizationof theeasternfrontagainstIsrael, indangerousproximity to thestrategicheartlandofIsrael.ThereturnofRussianinfluencetotheMiddleEast

could also re-energize the radical forces in the region. The realization thatchange can happen suddenly in theMiddleEast dictatesmuch caution,whichfurtherslowstheprocessofrapprochementbetweenIsraelandtheArabworld.

Conclusions

Thefirstpolicy-relevantobservationconcernsthewell-intentionedpolicymakingcommunity,whichfeelsanurgetodogoodintheMiddleEast.ThesituationintheArab-Israeli conflict has improved considerably, but cannot improvemuchfurther.Eveniftheevolvingpeaceprocessweretostayitscourse,theattainmentofthetypeofrelationsweseeamongdemocraticcountriesmaytakegenerationstodevelopintheArab-Israeliarena.ThesecuritydilemmaofallthestatesintheMiddleEastdictatesthattheirrelationshipwiththeirneighbourstaketheformofarmedpeace.Whilethemerenatureofpolitics(thepursuitofnationalinterests)makesIsraeliparticipationininterstateinteractionseasier,thereligiousandthecultural dimensions of the Arab-Israeli conflict are less amenable to quickchange.The recommendation for thediplomats, chasingafterdramatic foreignpolicysuccesses,istolookelsewhere.Second, foreigners have limited leverage, while the locals have

underestimated power to block extra-regional initiatives. Almost all AmericaninitiativestosettletheArab-Israeliconflicthaveendedinfailure.Breakthroughshavebelonged to theregionalactorsandprogresscomes tofruitiononlywhentheyarereadyforit.TheUScanplayapositiveroleincompensatingthepartiesfortheriskstaken,butitcannotimposeaPaxAmericana.Itcanalsoengageindamage limitationwhenviolenceerupts.More important,Americahas little togain nowadays from investing much more energy in an unattainablecomprehensive settlement between Arabs and Jews. Actually, year 2000, anelectionyear,couldbeagoodAmericanpretextfornotdoinganythingdramaticandfoolishintheMiddleEast.The third observation revolves around the time factor. The peace process

evolved over two decades, as a result of a number of regional developments,primarily the entrenchment of Israel as a strongmilitary and economic power

linked to the US, the winner of the Cold War. De-escalation in protracteddisputes takes time, and there may be temporary setbacks. Much of theimpatiencedisplayed in several quarters, particularly in theWest, seems to beignorantof thepace involved inhistoricprocesses.As longas thedirectionoftheregionalandinternationalfactorsthatmovedtheArabworldintoacceptanceofIsraelisunchanged,thepeaceprocesscanbeconsideredasviable,andevenrobust, despite the fact that not all issues have been satisfactorily resolved.Therefore,thewidespreadfeelingofurgencyisunwarranted.Fourth, Israel's leverage versus the Palestinians and other Arab actors is

considerable. Only recently did Arafat desist from unilaterally declaring aPalestinianstateasresultofIsraelithreats.Indeed,Jerusalemcanusecarrotsandstickstoachieveitsforeignpolicygoals.Moreover,itcanwaitforabetterofferin its negotiations with its neighbours. In retrospect, the Arabs have changedtheir positionsmore than the Israelis.So far, timehasbeenon the Israeli sideandthereislittletosuggestthatthetimevectorischangingcourse.Finally, we must remember that power-politics considerations led Arab

political elites gradually to accept Israel as a fait accompli. The realpolitikoutlookoninternationalrelationsisgoingtopersistintheMiddleEast.AstrongIsraelis,therefore,aprerequisiteforthepeaceprocess.Weakeningitharmsthepeaceprocess.

EfraimInbarisAssociateProfessorinPoliticalStudiesatBar-IlanUniversityandtheDirectorofits

Begin-Sadat(BESA)CenterforStrategicStudies.

Notes

TheauthorwouldliketothankStuartA.Cohen,StevenDavid,AviKober,BarryRubinandShmuel

Sandler for their useful comments on an earlier draft. He would also like to acknowledge the

financialsupportoftheIhelFoundationatBar-IlanUniversityinwritingthisessay.

1.FortheprocessofEgyptianreintegrationwithintheArabregionalsystem,seeAliE.HillalDessouki,

'Egyptian Foreign Policy SinceCampDavid', inWilliamB.Quandt (ed.),TheMiddleEast: Ten

YearsAfterCampDavid,Washington,1988,pp.102-5.

2.SeeShimonShamir,'ArabMilitaryLessonsfromtheOctoberWar',inLouisWilliams(ed.),Military

AspectsoftheIsraeli-ArabConflict,TelAviv,1975,p.175;BernardLewis,'SettlingtheArab-Israeli

Conflict',Commentary,Vol.63(June1977),p.53.

3. For Arab perceptions, see Ariel E. Levite and Emily B. Landau, Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab

PerceptionsofIsrael'sNuclearPosture,TelAviv,1994(Hebrew).

4.See,interalia,NadiaE.ElShazli,ArabAngeratNewAxis',WorldToday,Vol.55,No.1(January

1999),pp.25-7.

5.FouadAjami, 'TheEndofPan-Arabism',ForeignAffairs,Vol.57,No.2(Winter1978-79),pp.355-

73; Roger Owen, State, Power and Politics in theMaking of theModernMiddle East, London,

1992;GabrielBen-Dor,StateandConflictintheMiddleEast,NewYork,1983.

6.R.StephenHumphrey,BetweenMemoryandDesire:TheMiddleEastinaTroubledAge,Berkeley,

1999,p.81.

7. Avraham Sela, The Decline of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Middle East Politics and the Quest for

RegionalOrder,Albany,1988.

8.MichaelN.Barnett,Dialogues inArabPolitics:Negotiations inRegionalOrder,NewYork,1998,

p.198.

9.HelenaCobban,'ThePLOandtheIntifada',inRobertO.Freedman(ed.),TheIntifada,Miami,1991,

pp.70-106.

10.ForthePLO'slongroadtoOslo,seeBarryRubin,RevolutionUntilVictory.ThePoliticsandHistory

ofthePLO,Cambridge,1994.

11.PaulC.Noble,'TheArabSystem:Pressures,Constraints,andOpportunities',inBahgatKoraniandAli

E.HillalDessouki(eds),TheForeignPoliciesofArabStates:TheChallengeofChange,Boulder,

1991,pp.81-2.

12.Themost comprehensiveworkon Israeli-Jordanian relations isMosheZak,HusseinMakesPeace,

Ramat-Gan,1996(Hebrew).

13.EfraimInbar,OutcastCountriesintheWorldCommunity,Denver,1985.

14.ForareviewofthedemographicandeconomicconditionsintheArabworldafter1991,seeEliyahu

Kanovsky,TheEconomicConsequences of thePersianGulfWar: AcceleratingOPEC'sDemise,

Policy Papers No. 30, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington DC, 1992; and

MuhammadFaour,TheArabWorldAfterDesertStorm,WashingtonDC,1993,pp.15-32.

15. Raymond A. Hmnebusch, 'Asad's Syria and the New World Order: The Struggle For Regime

Survival',MiddleEastPolicy,Vol.2,No.1(1993),pp.1-14.

16.InterviewswithEgyptianandJordanianhighofficials.SeealsoDanielPipes, 'AsadIsn'tInterested',

JerusalemPost,29August1999,p.6.

17.ForareviewoftheIsraeli-Syriantalks,seeItamarRabinovich,TheBrinkofPeace:IsraelandSyria,

1992-1996,TelAviv,1998(Hebrew).

18.ForeignMinisterEhudBarak'sspeechintheKnesset,25December1995(IsraelInformationService

Gopher).Thisistheformulahehasusedeversince.

19. For the persistence of the old rules of the game in the Middle East, see Max Singer and Aaron

Wildavsky, The Real World Order: Zone of Peace/Zones of Turmoil, Chatham, 1993; L. Carl

Brown,'TheMiddleEastAftertheColdWar:SystemicChangeorMoreoftheSame?',inGeorge

Downs (ed.), Collective Security Beyond the Cold War, Ann Arbor, 1994, pp.197-216; Efraim

Karsh,'ColdWar,Post-ColdWar:DoesItMakeADifferencefortheMiddleEast?',inEfraimInbar

andGabriel Sheffer (eds),TheNational Security of Small States in a ChangingWorld, London,

1997,pp.77-106.

20.Maariv,ShabatSupplement,1September1995,p.3.

21. Daniel C. Byman and Jerrold D. Green, 'The Enigma of Political Stability in the Persian Gulf

Monarchies',MERIA,Vol.3,No.3,September1999.

22. Efraim Inbar and Shmuel Sandler, 'The Risks of Palestinian Statehood', Survival, Vol. 37, No. 2

(Summer1997),pp.23-41.

23.For the tensions between the two countries, seeFawazA.Gerges, 'Egyptian-IsraeliRelationsTurn

Sour',ForeignAffairs,Vol.74,No.3(May-June1995),pp.69-78.

24. For an analysis of the military capabilities in the region, see Anthony H. Cordesman, Perilous

Prospects:ThePeaceProcessandtheArab-MilitaryBalance,Boulder,1996.

25.SeeHilalKhashan, 'PollingArabViewsontheConflictwithIsrael',MiddleEastQuarterly,Vol.2,

No.2(June1995),pp.3-13.

26.Barnett,DialoguesinArabPolitics,pp.44-5.

27. See Ethan Bronner, 'Israel's History Textbooks Replace Myths with Facts', New York Times, 14

August1999,pp.A1,5.

28. See, inter alia, Emmanuel Sivan, Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics, New

Haven,1985;GrahamE.FullerandIanO.Lesser,ASenseofSiege:TheGeopoliticsofIslamand

theWest,Boulder,1995.

AbstractsThe Forgotten War: Jewish-Palestinian Strife in Mandatory Palestine,December1947-May1948

DavidTal

ThisessayexaminestheJewish-Palestinianstrugglethatprecededthe1948War.In doing so it analyses the key developments that ultimately led to conflictbetween theopposingparties. It argues that thedefiningeventwas the Jewishacceptance of the United Nations Partition Resolution of 1947, as thisdetermined the strategy that was adopted by the Jewish forces in the initialstages of the conflict. It then argues that, though determined to prevent thecreationofaJewishstate,thePalestineArabs,dividedastheywerebyinternalconflicts and disagreements within the governments of the surrounding Arabstates,wereneitherpreparednorequippedforthetasktheyundertook.

ShallWeGo toWar?And IfWeDo,When?TheGenesis of the InternalDebateinIsraelontheRoadtotheSinaiWar

MottiGolani

This essay attempts to analyse the process that ultimately led to Israel's entryintoajointoffensivewithBritainandFranceagainstEgyptin1956.Indoingsoit assesses thecentralityofvarious senior figures in thedecision togo towar,focusing in particular on the roles of three individuals: Moshe Dayan, DavidBen-Gurion and Moshe Sharett. It shows the antagonism between PrimeMinisterSharettontheonehandandDefenceMinisterBen-GurionandChief-of-StaffDayanon the other, in the years preceding theSinaiWar, and arguesthat it was the latter two who guided Israel's security policy in the face ofoppositionfromwithinthepoliticalestablishmentandthegovernment.

The 1956 Sinai Campaign: David Ben-Gurion's Policy on Gaza, theArmisticeAgreementandFrenchMediation

MordechaiGazit

This essay seeks to highlight several ignored aspects of David Ben-Gurion'spolicies during the 1956 Sinai Campaign. Thus, for example, it demonstratesthat,contrarytothereceivedwisdom,Ben-GuriondidnotruleoutIsraelicontroloftheGazaStrip.Whilein1949heexpressedhiswillingnesstoincorporatetheStrip intoIsraeland to integrate itsentireArabpopulation,after thecaptureofthis territoryin1956heoptedformaintainingaholdovertheStripwithout itsannexation. The essay also highlights the role played by the 1949 ArmisticeAgreement in the 'Understanding'of1March1957endingthecrisiscausedbytheSuezCampaign.BywayofdoingsoitdetailsthepoliticalmanoeuvresofUSSecretaryofStateDulles, including theorchestrationofFrenchmediationasameansofbringingaboutanIsraeliwithdrawalfromtheSinaiPeninsula.

The 'Tranquil Decade' Re-examined: Arab-Israeli Relations During theYears1957-67

MenachemKlein

Thisessaytakesissuewiththeclaimthattheperiodbetweenthe1956SuezWarandthe1967SixDayWarwasthe'tranquildecade'inregardtotheArab-Israelimilitaryconflict.IndoingsotheauthorlooksbothattherelationshipwithintheIsraeli political-security elite throughout these years, and at the military andpoliticalinteractionbetweenIsraelandseveralArabstates.Itsconclusionisthatthenotionofthe'tranquildecade'wasaconsciousattempttohideIsrael'sfailuretoachieveitslong-termpoliticalobjectivesinthe1956War.

Israel'sNuclearProgramme,theSixDayWarandItsRamifications

ShlomoAronson

ThemainthesisofthisessayisthatIsrael'sinitialefforttoacquiretheultimatedeterrent,aimedatdrivingtheArabstoaccept theJewishstatewithinits1949boundaries,wasaccompaniedbyastrategyofconventionalpre-emptionwhichwas eventually implemented during the May 1967 crisis. The essay thenproceedstoarguethatfollowingtheIsraeliconventionalpre-emptiveoperations

inJune1967,theArabsadoptedconventionalwaraimsleadingtothe1973YomKippurWar. Combinedwith Israel's nuclear option, which survived the 1967crisis unscathed, the peace negotiations between Israel and its neighboursfollowingthe1973War,theactiveregionalroleplayedbytheUnitedStates,andchanges in the Arab world and in the former Soviet Union, may explain thecurrentpeaceprocess.

TowardsaParadigmShiftinIsrael'sNationalSecurityConception

UriBar-Joseph

ThisessayexaminestheshiftinIsrael'snationalsecurityconceptioninthefaceof new internal and external factors. The author argues that variousdevelopments such as the end of theColdWar and the collapse of theSovietUnion, theArab-Israelipeaceprocess and thenewattitudesof Israelis to theirsociety and state as they enter a 'post-Zionist' era are making the oldpreconceptionsregardingnationalsecurityobsolete.

Patterns of War Initiation in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A Note on theMilitaryDimension

DavidRodman

SixArab-Israeliwars have been fought over the past 50 years. Each side hasinitiated three of thesewars.TheArabs began those of 1948-49, 1969-70 and1973,whiletheIsraelisbeganthoseof1956,1967and1982.Thisessayarguesthateachside'sdecisions to initiate thesewarsrested inparton itsperceptionsaboutitschosenmilitarystrategy.Specifically,theArabsinitiatedthe1948-49,1969-70and1973warsinpartbecausetheyperceivedthattheirchosenstrategyofattritionwasfavouredatthesetimes.Likewise,theIsraelisinitiatedthe1956,1967and1982warsinpartbecausetheyperceivedthattheirchosenstrategyofmanoeuvrewasfavouredatthesetimes.Thisrelationshipbetweenwarinitiationand military strategy, however, has not been consciously explored in theliteratureabouttheArab-Israeliwars.Hencethisessayisafirstattempttofillalacunainthatliterature.

Israel'sNuclearHistory

EdwinS.Cochran

Beginning with the earliest years of the state, this essay provides a detailed,historical account of the development of Israel's nuclear-weapon capability.Dividing the development of Israel's nuclear programme into five distinctchronologicalphases, theauthor investigatesboththedebateswithinthestate'spolitical,militaryandscientificeliteineachstageandtheactualeffortstobuildupthehumanandscientificresourcesneededtopursuethenuclearpath.

Jewish-Non-Palestinian-ArabNegotiations:TheFirstPhase

EliezerTauber

NegotiationsbetweenZionistsandnon-PalestinianArabsfromthebeginningoftheYoungTurkruleuntil thestartof theMandatoryeraarethesubjectof thisessay. It assesses the various organizations that looked to negotiate with theZionist Movement and shows the complex, and at times contradictory,motivationsbehindArabsympathyandhostility towards theZionistproject. Italso looks at various (fruitless) efforts to foster possible Arab-ZionistnegotiationsinthefinalyearsoftheOttomanEmpire.

Transition fromConflict:The ImportanceofPre-Negotiations in theOsloPeaceProcess

IlanG.Gewurz

Thiscase studyof Israeli-Palestinianpeacemakingefforts inOsloconcentratesontheroleandinherentimportanceofthepre-negotiationprocess(especiallyinthe early stages of the secret channel between January and March 1993) indetermining the way that negotiations evolved. It argues that this first periodenabled the parties to learnmore about one another, evaluate the other party'sneeds, interestsand intentionsandhelpedbring theprocess toapointwhere itcould enter into mainstream foreign policy. The essay concludes by drawinglessonsfromtheexperience inOsloregardingthenatureofpre-negotiations in

general.

UnambiguousAmbiguity:TheOpacityoftheOsloPeaceProcess

NadavMorag

This essayanalyses theOslopeaceprocess. Indoing so it concentrateson theambiguousnatureoftheagreementsattheheartofOslo.WhileexplainingwhytheOsloprocessneededtobeofanopen-ended,noncommittalnature,theauthorarguesthatitisthisambiguity,nowherebetterseenthaninOslo'savoidanceofspecific issues vital to a final settlement between parties, that is the mostdamagingaspectof theagreement. IssuessuchasdemographyandbordersareanalysedinthecontextoftheOsloprocesstohighlighttheextenttowhichtheprocess has ignored, or is unsuited to dealing with, some of themost criticalissuesattheheartoftheIsraeli-Palestinianconflict.

TheNetanyahuEra:FromCrisistoCrisis,1996-99

NeillLochery

During the Netanyahu era the Israeli political system was in a period oftransition,causedtoalargeextentbytheadoptionofanewelectoralsystemin1996whichwasdesigned to reduce the levelofpoliticalhorsetrading thathadcharacterized Israeli politics during the 1980s. In reality, asNetanyahuwas tofindtohiscost,thenewsystemseverelyconstrainedthePrimeMinister'sroomformanoeuvre,makinghimevermorevulnerabletohisownparty,thecabinetandthegovernmentcoalition.This,inturn,hadanadverseimpactontheArab-Israeli peaceprocess, asNetanyahuvainly sought tonavigatebetweenLikud'sideologicalpreceptsandhisownpragmaticdisposition.

Jerusalem:PartitionPlansforaHolyCity

ElishaEfrat

Because of strategic location and religious importance, Jerusalem presentsformidablechallengestopoliticians.IsraelisandPalestinianseachhavedifferent

perspectives on the city, but neither has so far been entirely successful inprescribing a solution that would benefit the two peoples. Different partitionplansandspatialalternativeshavebeenproposedforJerusalemduringthepasthalf-century,basedonthecity'sgeographicalanddemographicposition.Noneoftheseplanshasthusfarbeenapprovedoracceptedbybothsidestotheconflict;meanwhileJerusalemhasbeenlosingitsurbanfabricasaplannedandrationalcapital.

Arab-IsraeliCoexistence:TheCauses,AchievementsandLimitations

EfraimInbar

This essay analyses the military, political and domestic reasons that haveresulted in the increasedArabacceptanceof Israel.Having shown that Israel'srelationshipwith theArabworldhas improvedgreatly in the last fewdecades,the author attempts to place this new state of affairs in its proper context andcautionsagainstunrealisticoptimismorexpectationsgiventhepossiblebarriersto further relations. He argues that the Arab-Israeli peace process cannot beexpectedtoachievemorethanthelimitationsoftheregionalsituationallow.

IndexAbdallah,KingofTransjordan,8,9-10,14

AbdulHamidII,159

AbuAla,187-9,191,194,197

AbuMazen,187,188,217

Algeria,85,86,87,134,139

Allon,Yigal,70,72,77,79,80,83,91,93,137,207

AlphaPlan,38

Amer,Abdal-Hakim,73,79,90

Amit,Meir,70,72,79-80

Amman,17,29

ArabHigherCommittee(AHC),7,8

Arab-Israeliconflict,

1948War,3-21,30,47-8,84,99,107,115-18,121,122,126,132,137,239,257

1956War,22,23,40,43-65,68-9,80-81,85-6,106,115-18,122,123,126,133,257

1967War,48,69,72,83-95,107,109,115-18,123,124,126,134,139,152,184,242,246,257

1973War,83,93-4,102,107,109,115-18,125,126,139,141,143,184,257,261

1982LebanonWar,103,109,115-18,125,126,184,259

earlyArab-Zionistnegotiations,159-73

infiltrationandretaliation(1950s),22-40

non-conventionalweapons,103-4,112,142

nuclearcapabilities,76-77,83-95,102,104,112,129-52,257

peaceprocess,94,177-236,256-68

'tranquildecade',68-81

WarofAttrition(1969-70),102,115-18,124,126,248

ArabLeague,7,8,10,11,37,89,264

ArabLegion,9-10,73,75

ArabLiberationArmy(ALA),8-9,16

Arafat,Yasser,89,90,94,178,188,189,196,197,202,204,221,260,265,268

Aranne,Zalman,24,32

Arens,Moshe,149,223,224

Armisticeagreements(1949),25,30,33,44-5,48-9,51,54-9,84,88,90,91,241

Asad,Hafez,144,234,262,263,264

Ashrawi,Hanan,187

Azm,Rafiq,159,162,164-7,168,169,170,171

Baghdad,174,264

BaghdadPact(1955),174

BalfourDeclaration,4,169

Barak,Ehud,221,233,234,235,236,256,263

Ba'th,75,90

Beersheba,3

Begin,Benny,227

Begin,Menachem,93,144-5,203,223

Beilin,Yossi,187-9,191,197,205,217

Beirut,162,168

Ben-Gurion,David,71-2,75,76,79-80

andthe1948War,5-6,9-13

andthe1956War,43-65,68

andarmisticeagreements,44-5,48-9,51,52,54-9

andGazaStrip,43-4,46-54

andnuclearweapons,76-7,83-95,129-36,152

andPalestinianrefugees,43-4,46-9

militaryconception,105-6

perceptionofNasser,77-8

retaliatorypolicy,22-40

Bergmann,ErnstDavid,132-3,136,138

Britain,4,5,7,11,12,22,29,74,75,85,104,106,123,131,169-70,201,209,210

Bunche,Ralph,44-5,49-50,54-5,59

Bush,George,260

Cabotlodge,Henry,62,65

Cairo,7,29,88,160,164,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,216,264

CampDavidAccords(1978),184,203,205-6,234,257,259

Clayton,Gilbert,170

Czechoslovakia,34

Daghir,As'ad,167,168

Damascus,14,29,88,90,91,101,148,159,169,264

Darwish,Mahmoud,196

Dayan,Moshe,22-40,68,70,72,90,93,111,137,139-41

DeGaulle,Charles,86,87,90,134,138-9

Dimona,87,88,89,90,92,135-8,140,146

DirYasin,16

Dulles,Allen,25

Dulles,JohnFoster,26,38,44-6,49-54,56-65

Eban,Abba,26,30,32,49-54,56,59-60,62,64-5

Egypt,10,22,26-40,45,47-65,68,73,74-81,83,85-95,102,104,106,112,117,123,124-5,134,139,

141,142,143,144,159,169,171,184,189,203,215,234,248,256-8,260,262,264,265,267

Eilat,27,49,51,86

Einstein,Albert,130

Eisenhower,Dwight,45,48,51-2,54,57,61,63,13-56

Eshkol,Levi,30,32,69,70,72-3,78-80,88,90,91-3,140

Ethiopia,76,79

Fahmy,Ismail,142,143,144

FaisalIbnHussein,169-70,172

Fatah,70,71,72,73,89,90,91

Fawzi,Mahmoud,45,52,60,65

France,22,45-6,50,58,59-65,74,75,77,85-7,90,92,122,130,133-9,172

Frier,Shalheveth,145-6,150-51

Gaddafi,Muamar,146

Gahal,72

Galilee,11,111,209,210

Galili,Israel,70,72,137

Gamassy,Abdal-Ghani,143

Gaza,10,26-40,44,45-65,86,91,92,93,184,185,188,189,191,194,195,200,202,203,207-20

Germany,86,87,133

Ghali,Butros,143

Givli,Benyamin,106

Gohar,Salah,34

GolanHeights,48,72,93,106,125,141,184,233-5,262,263,264

GreaterSyria,8,159,163

GulfofAqaba,27,49,53,57,58,62

Gulfstates,184,185,204

GulfWar,(1991)93,102,103,109,130,147,148,149,150,185,204,257

Gur,Mordechai,148

Hagana,5,9-17,104,105,137

PlanB,4,10-12,15

PlanD,4-5,12-17

Haifa,10,13,17,48,131,148,209,210

Hamas,185,187,204,205

Hammarskjold,Dag,44-6,49-50,52-6,58-62

Harkabi,Yehoshafat,37,78,106

Hebron,10,11,207,209

HebronAgreement,200,215,221,226,228,229-32,263

Hizbullah,110,233,235,265

Hochberg,Sami,160-61,162,163,164

Holocaust,84,107,122,132,133,139,141,152

HusseinIbnAli,170,171

Hussein,KingofJordan,73,75,92

Hussein,Saddam,93,148,150,204,259,260

Husseini,Abdal-Qadir,8,11,14,15,16,

Husseini,HajjMuhammadAmin,7,8,9,10,14,15,17,132

Intifada,93,109,185,203,242,260,265

Iran,74,76,79,102,104,112,149,150,184,258,260,261

Iran-IraqWar,150,184,260

Iraq,7,74-5,76,88,93,102,103-4,112,143,144-5,148,149,150,168,185,258,259,260,261,265,267

IslamicJihad,204

Israel,

conflictwiththeArabs,3-128

militarydoctrine,99-114

nuclearcapabilities,76-7,83-95,129-52,257

peaceprocess,94,109-10,177-236,238-68

Istanbul,160,169

Jacobson,Victor,160,166,168

Jaffa,165

Jerusalem,11,13,14,15,16,23,39,48,50,53,184,194,196,200,202,209,210,217,229,232,234,238-

55,257,261,265,268

JewishAgency,5

Johnson,LindonB.,88,92

Jordan,27,35,48,73,74,75,76,90,91,150,184,196,207,209,215,241,248,260,262,264,265,267

JordanRiver,24,70,71,210,217,218

Kennedy,JohnF.,78,87,88,138

KhanYunis,39

Khomeini,AyatollahRuhollah,260

Kissinger,Henry,107

Knesset,35,44-5,48,49,54,55,59,70,87,132,222,225,227,230,231,232,236

Kollek,Teddy,26,244

Kuwait,93,148,185,260,265

LabourParty(seealsoMapai,Rafi),110,186,221,223,224,227,230,232,233,234,235

Lavon,Pinhas,22,106

LeagueofNations,4

Lebanon,35,76,106,110,111,125,159,160,163,169,173,184,196,233,235,263

Levy,David,148,222,223,225,232

Libya,104,112,146

Lichtheim,Richard,167,169

Likud,110,185,186,221,222,223,224,226,227,228,229,231,232,233,234,263

Lydda,11,209

MadridPeaceConference(1991),186,187,204,259,262,265

Mapai,23,28,30,35,38-9,72,87,93

Mauritania,264

Meir,Golda,10,30,55,61,70,74,78,88,139

Mollet,Guy,60,63,64,85

Morocco,76

Mubarak,Husni,189,264,265

Mufti,seeHusseini,HajjMuhammadAmin,

Nasser,GamalAbdel,27,29,31,34-5,37,39,54,60,73,74,75-81,85,86,87,89,90,91,92,134,258

Ne'eman,Yuval,145

Negev,23,24,29,87,89,92,111,122,131,135,146

Netanyahu,Benjamin,202,215,221-36,263

Non-ProliferationTreaty(NPT),84,93,129,140,142,143,145,146,150,151

NorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization(NATO),76

Osloprocess,177-236,258,260,263

OttomanEmpire,159,161,162,163,164,166,168,172-3

Palestine,3-21,84,99,104,132,160,161,162,163,164,165,169,170-73,239,265,267

PalestineLiberationOrganization(PLO),73,89,91,93,102,110,125,178,185-220,230,258,259,260,263

Palestinians,29,70,71-3,90-91,93,99,111,159,168,248-55,257,260,264,268

andthe1948War,3-21

andthepeaceprocess,177-220,262,263,265

1936-39revolt,6-7,10

Pan-Arabism,258

Peres,Shimon,23,24,68,72,78,90,93,133,137,141,178,188-9,205-6,221,229,233,263,264

Pineau,Christian,58,60-65

Qassem,Abdal-Karim,74-5,76

Qawuqji,Fawzi,8,11

Quwaitly,Shukri,14

Rabin,Yitzhak,70-73,78,91-2,148,178,186,188-90,195,197,201,204,205-7,213,221,225,263

Rafi,71-2,93

Ramie,11,209

RedSea,24,25,86,92

Rida,Rashid,159,164,165,168,169

Rogers,William,248

Russia,69,73,83,85,86,90,91,93,101-2,103,110,124,125,142,186,204,262,267

Sadat,Anwar,143-4,203,256-7

SaddamHussein,seeHussein,Saddam

Safwat,Ismail,7,

Salame,Hassan,11,14,15

Samaria,11,186,217

Samu,73,91

SaudiArabia,90,102,185

Shamir,Yitzhak,144,148,186,204,223,229

Sharett(Shertok),Moshe,9,22-42,106,172

Sharmal-sheikh,44,60,256

Sharon,Ariel,203,227,231,232

Shas,230

Shiloah,Reuven,53

Shishakli,Adib,70

Shuqairi,Ahmad,89,91

SixDayWar,seeArab-IsraeliConflict,

Sokolow,Nahum,165,166,167

SovietUnion,seeRussia,

Sudan,76,104

SuezCanal,27,51,74,85,86,106,124,141

Sykes,Mark,170-71

Syria,7,8,10,11,14,15,69-73,74-5,76,89,90,91,93,101,102,103,104,106,111-12,125,139,141,

142,144,159-64,169,170,171,172,173,184,186,196,197,233-5,260,262,263,264,265,267

TelAviv,13,15,16,17,145,148,217,232

Tiberias,17

Tiran,Straitsof,68,73,92,117

Tlas,Mustafa,142

Transjordan,7,9-10

Truman,Harry,47

Trumpeldor,Yossef,108

Tunisia,76,259

Turkey,69,74,76,79,257-8,260,264

UnitedArabRepublic(UAR),74-6,78

UnitedNations,5,26,32,37,43,47,49-65,74,86,150,177,242

andarmisticeagreements,44-6

PartitionResolution(1947),4,6,9,13,210,265

SpecialCommitteeforPalestine(UNSCOP),8

UnitedNationsEmergencyForces(UNEF),45,49,50,51,53,55-6,59-65,73,90,91

UnitedNationsTruceSupervisionOrganization(UNTSO),31

UnitedStates,26,29,36,38,44-6,47,49-65,69,70,74,75,76,77,83,85,86,87-93,101,103,124,126,

131,134-9,142,186,187,203,230,248,259,260,261,262,263,268

Vanunu,Mordechai,146-7

Weizman,Ezer,71,149

Weizmann,Chaim,130,133,170,171,172

WestBank,48,73,74,91,92,93,185,189,191,194,195,202,203,207-20,226,232

WhitePaper,5

WyeRiverAccord,202,232-3,263

Yariv,Aharon,71,78

Yemen,78,90,91,265

Yishuv,4,5,6,99,121,122

YomKippurWar,seeArab-IsraeliConflict

YoungTurks,159,160,166,173

Zahrawi,Hamid,163-4,169

Zionistmovement,4,206,239

acceptanceofpartition,9-10,13

andkingAbdallah,9-10

earlynegotiationswiththeArabs,159-73

militaryconception,99-100,104-8

Date post:	11-Sep-2021
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