Issue 1346 21 December 2018 - U.S. Department of Defense

Issue 1346 21 December 2018

// USAF CSDS News and Analysis Issue 1346 //

twitter.com/USAF_CSDS | au.af.mil/au/csds // 2

Feature Report

“Anatomy of Iran’s Deception and How Iran Benefited - Iran’s Nuclear Archive Confirms Gchine Uranium and Yellowcake Production Plant were Originally Part of a Clandestine Nuclear Weapons Fuel Cycle. Yet, Gchine never stopped operating.” By David Albright, Olli Heinonen, Frank Pabian, and Andrea Stricker. Published by Institute for Science and International Security; Dec. 19, 2018

http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/anatomy-of-irans-deception-and-how-iran-benefited-irans-nuclear-archive-con

Iran’s Nuclear Archive contains considerable new information about its past nuclear weapons program including documentary evidence showing Iran’s deceptions in its declarations to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) about its past military nuclear activities. This report illustrates one case of deception and the value of the new documentary information, when combined with other existing public documentation, by considering the Gchine uranium mine and yellowcake production plant, or “mill,” located in southern Iran near Bandar Abbas. The product of Gchine, or alternatively called the Bandar or Bandar Abbas Project, was uranium ore concentrate or yellowcake. Gchine represented key nuclear source material toward Iran’s production of highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. New documents, not available to the IAEA prior to the seizure of the Nuclear Archive, or alternatively called the Atomic Archive, show concretely that Gchine was originally part of Iran’s covert nuclear fuel cycle aimed at the production of nuclear weapons and directly contradict Iran’s multiple declarations to the IAEA. Moreover, these documents allow a deeper understanding of how Iran carried out its deception.

Issue No. 1320 22 June 2018

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TABLE OF CONTENTS NUCLEAR WEAPONS

GAO: USAF Ballistic Missile Defense System Meets Operational Requirements

(Air Force Magazine) The Air Force’s major ballistic missile defense radar in Alaska, Cobra Dane, met its requirement for

operational capability though the service may face limitations on space surveillance when the radar is

down for maintenance, according to a new report …

Lockheed Martin Scores a Big Win in New Missile Defense Agency Radar Contract (C4ISRNET) The radar will support ballistic missile defense systems intended to protect Hawaii from ballistic missile

strikes, which took on new urgency during the early part of the Trump Administration when North Korean

dictator Kim Jong Un was conducting regular missile tests.

New Interactive Site Explores Remote Russian Nuclear Test (Middlebury Institute) Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute’s James

Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Research Associate Anne Pellegrino MANPTS ’18

have launched an interactive website offering extensive information about historical and current activities

at the Russian nuclear test site Novaya Zemlya.

US COUNTER-WMD

GAO Examines Long-Range Emerging Threats (Homeland Preparedness News) The category breakdown is comprised of adversaries’ political and military advancements, dual-use

technologies, weapons and events, and demographic changes.

Pentagon Wants ‘New Industrial Base’ for Hypersonic Weapons (National Defense)

Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said the Pentagon must “scale and operationalize” hypersonic

capabilities on both the offensive and defensive side.

Audit Finds Cyber Vulnerabilities in US Missile Defense System (Navy Times) The Army, Navy and Missile Defense Agency are failing to take basic cybersecurity steps to ensure that

information on America’s ballistic missile defense system won’t fall into nefarious hands, according to

a Defense Department Inspector General audit released Friday.

US ARMS CONTROL

North Korea Evading US Sanctions: Report (The Hill)

The Trump administration has struggled to keep economic pressure on North Korea as it attempts to

convince the isolated nation to give up its nuclear weapons.

Republican Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Put Financial Pressure on Iran

(Homeland Preparedness News)

The Blocking Iranian Illicit Finance Act would protect the global financial system from Iranian illicit

finance and impose maximum financial pressure on Iran.

Russia Claims Pentagon Ignoring Request to Discuss Nuclear Dispute (The Hill) Russian officials claim that their U.S. counterparts are unwilling to sit down for discussions related to

alleged violations of a nuclear arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia.





COMMENTARY

China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making (The National Interest) The Nixon-Kissinger gambit is now known as “playing the China card.” Today we should be asking: is Xi

Jinping’s China “playing the Russia card?”

The United States and Its Allies Need to Understand China’s North Korea Policy (Atlantic Council) Chinese diplomacy on North Korea, however, can help achieve some positive results for the United States

and its allies in the region.

The New U.S. Strategy to Tackle WMD Terrorism Is New Wine in Old Wineskins

(War on the Rocks) Although one can agree with the need for a deliberate policy approach to guide interagency efforts in this

area, one cannot say that this strategy is new, in either its assumptions or its particular lines of effort.

Will Europe Try to Save the INF Treaty? (Brookings) The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while

Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders

should act.





NUCLEAR WEAPONS Air Force Magazine (Arlington, Va.)

GAO: USAF Ballistic Missile Defense System Meets Operational Requirements

By Brian Everstine

Dec. 18, 2018

The Air Force’s major ballistic missile defense radar in Alaska, Cobra Dane, met its requirement for operational capability though the service may face limitations on space surveillance when the radar is down for maintenance, according to a new report from the Government Accountability Office.

The GAO, in the Fiscal 2018 National Defense Authorization Act, was tasked to review the Air Force’s operation of the Cobra Dane station, which first began operating in 1976 on Shemya Island for ballistic missile defense and space surveillance.

The Air Force and Missile Defense Agency together planned to spend $278.6 million in fiscal 2019 for operation and sustainment of the radar station, and the Air Force also plans $140 million for operations and maintenance of the site.

The GAO found that the Air Force has developed procedures to mitigate risks when the site is down, for example by using SeaBased X-band radars for ballistic missile defense.

The Air Force could face limitations on space surveillance if the radar is down because it can track objects that no other radar can track, according to the GAO. However, there are no plans to take the system offline long enough to compromise space surveillance, the report states.

http://www.airforcemag.com/Features/Pages/2018/December%202018/GAO-USAF-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-System-Meets-Operational-Requirements.aspx

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C4ISRNET (Vienna, Va.)

Lockheed Martin Scores a Big Win in New Missile Defense Agency Radar Contract

By David B. Larter

Dec. 18, 2018

The U.S. Missile Defense Agency awarded Lockheed Martin the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii contract, a $585 million deal that could open the door for billions in additional business.

The radar will support ballistic missile defense systems intended to protect Hawaii from ballistic missile strikes, which took on new urgency during the early part of the Trump Administration when North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un was conducting regular missile tests.

The radar will provide “autonomous acquisition and persistent precision tracking and discrimination to optimize the defensive capability of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and counter evolving threats,” according to the contract.

Lockheed Martin beat out competitors Raytheon and Northrop Grumman for the contract. The win positions Lockheed Martin for two other potential homeland security radar contracts, with a potential value of up to $4.1 billion.







The radar is based on Lockheed’s Long-Range Discrimination Radar, a Lockheed Martin executive told Defense News earlier this month.

“It ... leverages everything that we’ve done for LRDR and improves on it based on the different threats that we have to attack for HRD-H,” said Chandra Marshall, the LRDR program director.

https://www.c4isrnet.com/land/2018/12/18/lockheed-martin-scores-a-big-win-in-new-radar-missile-defense-agency-radar-contract/

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Middlebury Institute (Monterey, Calif.)

New Interactive Site Explores Remote Russian Nuclear Test

By Eva Gudbergsdottir

Dec. 13, 2018

Dr. Jeffrey Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Middlebury Institute’s James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) and Research Associate Anne Pellegrino MANPTS ’18 have launched an interactive website offering extensive information about historical and current activities at the Russian nuclear test site Novaya Zemlya. The website offers an annotated tour of Russia’s Central Testing Ground on this remote archipelago.

Like many of their colleagues at CNS, Lewis and Pellegrino are passionate about lifting the veil on some of the world’s best kept secrets, including nuclear test sites. The Soviet Union conducted multiple nuclear tests throughout the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya, which remains Russia’s only active nuclear test site, used for subcritical nuclear experiment. This site is considered comparable to the U.S. Nevada Test Site (now known as the Nevada National Security Site). Before now, very little public information had been available about the Russian site, in relation to both historical and current activities. When Lewis started looking for satellite images for purchase, he discovered they were hard to come by and those that were available were extremely expensive. The geographical location of Novaya Zemlya in the Arctic Ocean means that it is dark for a large part of the year, and is often covered by a shroud of clouds, so in any given year there is a limited opportunity for good images. Lewis contracted with Planet Labs to have regular images taken of the site over the course of a year when there was daylight and the cloud cover was not too dense.

The extensive research Pellegrino and Lewis conducted included examining old German Luftwaffe images taken of the area before nuclear testing began, comparing and trying to make sense of conflicting notes on locations from various sources, and memorable interactions with Norwegian researchers and politicians about the work they had done decades ago to assess the impact nuclear tests have had on the archipelago. Pellegrino, who graduated from the Institute’s Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies program last May, first came to the Institute as aSummer Undergraduate Fellow in 2015. Last summer she worked at CNS on a project using open source methods to analyze and map weapons of mass destruction in Syria. “That was the summer I discovered I could really do this!” she says of what she calls the “Where’s Waldo” detective work involved in the research.

Anne Pellegrino MANPTS '18 presented the project at the annual meeting of James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies’ International Advisory Council in November.

Nearly three decades ago, the United States and Russia each implemented unilateral test moratoriums. According to experts there are now serious questions about whether the two nations might choose to resume nuclear testing. One of Lewis and Pellegrino’s findings is that the Central







Testing Ground at Novaya Zemlya is well maintained and could, if necessary, host resumed nuclear testing.

The new interactive website is supported by a grant from the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). In Lewis’ view it “reframes the issue” at a particularly important time in US-Russia relations. He says one of the main arguments against the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in the US has been that it is difficult to trust the Russians, but Lewis maintains that publicly available imagery and analysis changes that. Opening up the test site on a public website facilitates greater transparency and confidence building, as it “takes it away from just a few people being able to talk about this, and makes it easier to imagine ways forward on arms control.”

https://www.middlebury.edu/institute/news/new-interactive-site-explores-remote-russian-nuclear-test

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US COUNTER-WMD Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.)

GAO Examines Long-Range Emerging Threats

By Douglas Clark

Dec. 17, 2018

The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released last week a report examining long-range emerging national security threats, with federal agencies identifying 26 potential harms within four categories.

The category breakdown is comprised of adversaries’ political and military advancements, dual-use technologies, weapons and events, and demographic changes.

National security threats will continue to evolve, officials said, with the advent of new and resurgent adversaries developing politically and militarily, the advancement of weapons and technology and environmental and demographic changes.

GAO officials said the effort involved analyzing more than 210 individual threats identified by organizations across the Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Homeland Security, and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The report also included a review of national security strategies, related documents, and interviews with key agency officials.

A questionnaire was administered to 45 government organizations. The process yielded a 78 percent response rate.

The analysis stems from a House committee report accompanying a bill for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018. The measure included a provision for GAO to identify emerging threats of high national security consequence. Long-range emerging threats have been categorized as those that may occur in approximately five or more years or those that may occur during an unknown time frame.

https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/31772-gao-examines-long-range-emerging-threats/

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https://homelandprepnews.com/stories/31772-gao-examines-long-range-emerging-threats/



National Defense (Arlington, Va.)

Pentagon Wants ‘New Industrial Base’ for Hypersonic Weapons

By Jon Harper

Dec. 13, 2018

The Pentagon needs an industrial base that can support the development and production of thousands of hypersonic weapons and the means to defend against them, top department officials said Dec. 13.

Great power adversaries such as China and Russia are moving fast to field their own hypersonic weapons, which can travel at speeds of Mach 5 or faster and are highly maneuverable. The systems could put U.S. military assets at risk, and the United States needs to catch up, Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering Mike Griffin said during a discussion in Arlington, Virginia, hosted by the National Defense Industrial Association.

China is of particular concern, having conducted more tests in the past year than the United States has conducted over the past decade, he added.

“If I were their version of me, I would say we’re at IOC [initial operating capability],” he warned.

“The choice facing us is … whether we are going to respond,” Griffin said. “This is something the United States must do in order to deal with what our adversaries are already doing.”

Deputy Defense Secretary Patrick Shanahan said the Pentagon must “scale and operationalize” hypersonic capabilities on both the offensive and defensive side.

Griffin — who has identified hypersonics as his top priority — said thousands of the weapons must be deployed to deter potential enemies. The Pentagon is interested in a range of capabilities from rocket-based boost glide systems to air-breathing weapons to combined cycle systems. A space-based sensor architecture is also needed for detection and tracking to help defend against enemy attack, he noted.

“We are going to have to create a new industrial base for these systems” he said. “Industry will get a very clear message from the department as to the paths we are pursuing in hypersonic offensive and defensive systems development, and we’re confident that you guys will respond.”

The department needs “multiplicity and redundancy” in the supply chain, he added.

Shanahan noted that producing thousands of hypersonic weapons and other systems to defend against them has implications for the size of the industrial base, how many suppliers are needed and the amount of government investment required.

“As we’re looking at kind of setting up the industrial base or production system or development, we want to have [at least] two or three competitors,” he said. “So instead of a winner-take-all, it’s how do we create that ecosystem that has sustained competition?”

The United States’ test infrastructure has atrophied over the past decade, Griffin noted, and more government investment will go into beefing it up.

Shanahan said department leaders want input from industry as they pursue new capabilities. Pentagon officials will be able to provide more specifics next year about the road ahead to help companies make investment decisions, he added.

“We’re now getting to the place where we can start to put together programmatics and pick [schedule] dates,” he told reporters during a media roundtable after the event. “It’s so much easier for the industry to be able to move out when we have more clarity about what we want.





“I think a year from now we’re going to be able to show you against the portfolio, here’s what the deliverables look like, or here’s what IOCs look like, or here’s what quantities look like,” he added.

Meanwhile, NDIA has launched a hypersonics “community of influence” to bring together stakeholders in this field. The association, in partnership with Purdue University, will host a Hypersonics Capabilities Conference next year in West Lafayette, Indiana, March 12-14.

The gathering of government, industry and academia will address the technical foundations of hypersonic systems, the current approach to developing the capabilities, and warfighter, policy and acquisition perspectives. It will include keynote addresses from military, government and congressional leaders, along with presentations from industry and acquisition executives, according to NDIA.

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2018/12/13/pentagon-wants-new-industrial-base-for-hypersonic-weapons

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Navy Times (Vienna, Va.)

Audit Finds Cyber Vulnerabilities in US Missile Defense System

By Geoff Ziezulewicz

Dec. 15, 2018

The Army, Navy and Missile Defense Agency are failing to take basic cybersecurity steps to ensure that information on America’s ballistic missile defense system won’t fall into nefarious hands, according to a Defense Department Inspector General audit released Friday.

Investigators visited five sites that manage ballistic missile defense elements and technical information, but the names of the commands were redacted in the publicly released report.

“The Army, Navy and MDA did not protect networks and systems that process, store, and transmit (missile defense) technical information from unauthorized access and use,” the declassified report states.

Such inadequacies “may allow U.S. adversaries to circumvent (missile defense) capabilities, leaving the United States vulnerable to missile attacks,” the report states.

They found officials failed to employ safeguards familiar to most people online in 2018, the latest development to raise questions about the U.S. military’s cybersecurity vulnerabilities.

Among the shortcomings: Administrators for classified networks had no intrusion detection and prevention systems in place to watch for cyberattacks, much less stop them, according to the report.

At one site, officials said they had requested to purchase those cyber safeguards in December 2017 but nine months later it still hadn’t been approved.

“Without intrusion detection and prevention capabilities, (the site) cannot detect malicious attempts to access its networks and prevent cyberattacks designed to obtain unauthorized access and exfiltrate sensitive (missile defense) technical information,” the report states.

Officials also failed to patch system flaws after receiving vulnerability alerts, one of which had first been identified in 1990 and had still not been fixed by April.







Another vulnerability that could be exploited by an attacker was first identified in 2013 but also was never pathced, according to the report.

“Countless cyber incident reports show that the overwhelming majority of incidents are preventable by implementing basic cyber hygiene and data safeguards, which include regularly patching known vulnerabilities,” the IG report states. “(Missile defense) technical information that is critical to national security could be compromised through cyberattacks that are designed to exploit these weaknesses.”

Some facilities failed to force employees to use common access cards, or CAC, when accessing the classified system, a basic cybersecurity practice known as multi-factor identification.

Instead, officials were able to access the sensitive information using just a username and password, the report states.

Hackers use phishing and other tactics to exploit passwords and gain access to such systems.

New hires are supposed to be allowed network access without a card for only their first two weeks on the job. But IG investigators found users on the systems without CAC cards for up to seven years.

At one site, a domain administrator never configured the network to allow only CAC holder access.

“Allowing users to access networks using single factor authentication increases the potential that cyber attackers could exploit passwords and gain access to sensitive (missile defense) technical information,” the report states.

Investigators also found unlocked server racks at some locations, another key vulnerability to insider snoopers.

“The insider threat risk necessitates that organizations implement controls…to reduce the risk of malicious personnel manipulating a server’s ability to function as intended and compromising sensitive and classified data,” the report states.

External storage devices held unencrypted data and some sites failed to track who was accessing data, and why. Other administrators told investigators that they lacked the ability to record or monitor data downloaded from the network onto these devices.

Unless these officials enforce the encryption of such removed data and monitor its downloading and transferring, “they will be at increased risk of not protecting sensitive and classified (missile defense) technical information from malicious users,” the report states.

Investigators also found that some supposedly secure sites were failing to even lock their doors. One location had a security door that hadn’t worked for years.

“Although security officials were aware of the problem, they did not take appropriate actions to prevent unauthorized personnel from gaining unauthorized access to the facility,” the report states.

Other sites featured no security cameras to monitor personnel movement and security officers failed to conduct badge checks.

While the report makes recommendations to fix the documented problems, officials for the inspected agencies offered no comments on the non-classified draft report of the audit.

Friday’s scathing IG audit marked the latest in a string of reports detailing shoddy cybersecurity throughout the armed forces and defense contractors.

During the same week, the Wall St. Journal reported that Chinese hackers are targeting military systems and those of defense contractors working on Navy projects.





Beijing-linked cyber raids have attempted to steal everything from missile plans to ship-maintenance data in a series of hacks over the past 18 months, the Journal reports.

As a result, Navy Secretary Richard Spencer has ordered a “comprehensive cybersecurity review” to assess if the Navy’s cyber efforts “are optimally focused, organized, and resourced to prevent serious breaches,” spokesman Capt. Greg Hicks said.

The review will also look at authorities, accountability and if the efforts reflect and incorporate government and industry best practices, he said.

“Secretary Spencer’s decision to direct a review reflects the serious to which the DoN prioritizes cybersecurity in this era of renewed great power competition,” Hicks said.

https://www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2018/12/14/audit-finds-cyber-vulnerabilities-in-us-missile-defense-system/

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US ARMS CONTROL The Hill (Washington, D.C.)

North Korea Evading US Sanctions: Report

By Ellen Mitchell

Dec. 14, 2018

North Korea is getting around United Nations sanctions by transferring oil at sea, according to a new report from NBC.

The transfers are taking place despite U.S. efforts to stop them.

A top-secret U.S. military assessment found that warships and surveillance aircraft deployed by a U.S.-led, eight-nation coalition since September has forced Pyongyang to transfer oil farther away from the Korean Peninsula, NBC reported, citing three U.S. officials familiar with the intelligence.

The transfers are now taking place in the territorial waters of other countries, according to the U.S. Pacific Command report.

The North Koreans are also using smaller ships to evade being spotted by the coalition's ships and aircraft, the officials told NBC.

While attempts to transfer oil have not decreased, the change in locations could eventually affect the pace and number of transfers, upping the cost of smuggling for North Korea, according to the officials.

The Trump administration has struggled to keep economic pressure on North Korea as it attempts to convince the isolated nation to give up its nuclear weapons. The nation's economy depends on the smuggled oil.

Following publication of NBC’s report, President Trump wrote on Twitter that the administration is “in no hurry” in its nuclear negotiations with Pyongyang.

“Many people have asked how we are doing in our negotiations with North Korea — I always reply by saying we are in no hurry, there is wonderful potential for great economic success for that







country. Kim Jong Un sees it better than anyone and will fully take advantage of it for his people. We are doing just fine!”

Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in June to discuss denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but negotiations have stalled in the six months since.

A meeting set for early November between Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and a top North Korean official was indefinitely postponed, though administration officials have said Trump expects to meet Kim for a second summit early next year.

North Korea has perfected ways to get around international prohibitions, using shell companies, illicit financing and illegal shipping, and by having China and Russia smuggle in prohibited items, experts and former officials told NBC.

Under a U.N. Security Council resolution in September 2017, there is a cap on refined imports at 500,000 barrels a year for North Korea.

To attempt to quell the oil smuggling, Washington in October 2017 began surveillance flights over the East China Sea to disrupt the transfers. The U.S. has conducted more than 300 surveillance flights since then, and allied nations have flown more than 200 surveillance flights since April 30, a U.S. defense official told NBC.

The U.S. and its allies increased its surveillance in September with the eight-nation coalition, including Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand.

The coalition naval forces at sea have caused smugglers to stop ship-to-ship transfers in 30 instances.

“We've increased pressure and have been collecting information on these illicit transfers and then feeding them back to our interagency partners for financial, law enforcement and diplomatic action,” the official told NBC.

The expanded surveillance was in response to a sharp increase in ship-to-ship oil transfers this year, including 89 deliveries to North Korea’s ports between January and May, then-U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Nikki Haley said in July.

“It's a sustained effort but I would tell you the North Koreans are learning, evolving, getting better so the ship-to-ship transfers are taking place farther away from the Peninsula,” Randy Schriver, assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs, said at a discussion this month at the University of Chicago Institute of Politics.

The Treasury Department, meanwhile, continues to move forward on sanctions against North Korea. In recent months, the Treasury has blacklisted individuals, ships and companies accused of violating U.S. sanctions against North Korea. It has also given warnings to businesses and insurance companies to stay away from vessels or organizations suspected of taking part in smuggling operations.

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/421421-north-korea-evading-us-sanctions-report

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https://thehill.com/policy/defense/421421-north-korea-evading-us-sanctions-report



Homeland Preparedness News (Washington, D.C.)

Republican Lawmakers Introduce Bill to Put Financial Pressure on Iran

By Dave Kovaleski

Dec. 18, 2018

U.S. Sens. Marco Rubio (R-FL), Ted Cruz (R-TX), and U.S. Rep. Mike Gallagher (R-WI) introduced a bill that would counter Iranian money laundering and financing of terrorism.

The Blocking Iranian Illicit Finance Act would protect the global financial system from Iranian illicit finance and impose maximum financial pressure on Iran.

“This important legislation would empower the United States and our like-minded allies to do more to end the Iranian government’s ability to illicitly finance its dangerous efforts to sponsor terrorism and militancy, to advance its nuclear and missile programs, to egregiously abuse human rights in Iran and abroad, and to suppress the Iranian people’s aspirations for self-determination,” Rubio said.

Sens. Tom Cotton (R-AR), Thom Tillis (R-NC), Cory Gardner (R-CO), Cindy Hyde-Smith (R-MS), Todd Young (R-IN), and Reps. Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Jim Banks (R-IN), Elise Stefanik (R-NY), Jacki Walorski (R-IN), Peter King (R-NY), and Don Bacon (R-NE) co-sponsored the bill.

“The Obama Iran nuclear deal gifted the Ayatollahs with hundreds of billions of dollars and reconnected them to the global financial system, which they used launder even more money and fund even more terrorism” Cruz said. “Undoing that damage requires imposing maximum pressure against the Iranian regime. President Trump was absolutely right when he began that process by withdrawing from the nuclear deal. Effectively disconnecting Iran from the global financial system, which this bill does, is a necessary next step.”

Gallagher said that withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) is just the first step in ratcheting up pressure on Iran.

“We now have an important window to impose maximum economic pressure and degrade the Iranian regime’s ability to export violence across the region. This legislation does exactly that by effectively cutting Iran off from the international financial community. Its message is clear: Iran must pay a steep price for its aggressive and destabilizing behavior, and the United States will never tolerate its pursuit of nuclear weapons,” Gallagher said.

https://homelandprepnews.com/policy/31801-republican-lawmakers-introduce-bill-to-put-financial-pressure-on-iran/

Return to top The Hill (Washington, D.C.)

Russia Claims Pentagon Ignoring Request to Discuss Nuclear Dispute

By John Bowden

Dec. 15, 2018

Russian officials claim that their U.S. counterparts are unwilling to sit down for discussions related to alleged violations of a nuclear arms treaty between the U.S. and Russia.

A spokesman for Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told The Associated Press on Saturday that Defense Secretary James Mattis has yet to respond to a proposal from Shoigu to begin







conversations between the two countries about alleged violations of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The alleged lack of a response is proof, the spokesman claims, that the U.S. is uninterested in maintaining official contacts with Russia on security officials. The U.S. issued an ultimatum on Dec. 4, declaring that Washington would exit the treaty if Russia does not come into compliance with the agreement in 60 days.

The U.S. has claimed that Russia is in violation of the treaty due to a new missile, designated by NATO as the SSC-8, which the U.S. says operates in ranges banned under the treaty. Russia has denied the U.S.'s claim.

Russia, meanwhile, has accused Washington of noncompliance with the treaty. Russia, the AP reported, has taken issue with U.S. deployment of anti-missile systems — specifically, a U.S. Mk-41 vertical launching system — in Romania and Poland. According to the AP, the system can launch a number of U.S. missiles, including the sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missile, which would be banned under the treaty if it were deployed on a land-based launching system.

U.S. claims of alleged Russian violations of the INF date back to the Obama administration.

"It is time now for Russia to come to the table and stop the violations," U.S. Ambassador to NATO Kay Bailey Hutchison told reporters in October.

https://thehill.com/policy/defense/421527-russia-claims-pentagon-ignoring-request-to-discuss-nuclear-dispute

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COMMENTARY The National Interest (Washington, D.C.)

China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making

By Graham Allison

Dec. 14, 2018

Defying the long-held convictions of Western analysts, and against huge structural differences, Beijing and Moscow are drawing closer together to meet what each sees as the “American threat.”

THE YEAR before he died in 2017, one of America’s leading twentieth-century strategic thinkers, Zbigniew Brzezinski, sounded an alarm. In analyzing threats to American security, “the most dangerous scenario,” he warned, would be “a grand coalition of China and Russia…united not by ideology but by complementary grievances.” This coalition “would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower.”

Few observers heard his admonition then. Even fewer today recognize how rapidly this grand alignment of the aggrieved has been moving from the realm of the hypothetical toward what could soon become a geostrategic fact. Defying the long-held convictions of Western analysts, and against huge structural differences, Beijing and Moscow are drawing closer together to meet what each sees as the “American threat.”







For two proud nations with long memories, their convergence also serves as a kind of cosmic revenge on the diplomatic maneuver Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger orchestrated a half century ago.

When Nixon became president (in 1969), he and his National Security Advisor Kissinger sought to establish a relationship with Communist China to widen the divide between it and the Soviet Union, which they rightly regarded as the preeminent—indeed, existential—threat.

Even as they watched communists pursue “wars of national liberation” around the globe, Nixon and Kissinger embraced George F. Kennan’s strategic insight about containment: that nationalism would prove a sturdier pillar than communism. They also recognized that the crack in the Eastern Bloc between the Soviet Union and its junior Chinese partner could be widened by deft U.S. diplomacy at the expense of the Soviets.

We know how the story turned out—so it is difficult to appreciate how radical this thought was in 1969, though Nixon had noted a year earlier in an essay in Foreign Affairs , “There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation.” Had Nixon asked his government’s interagency process to consider the possibility of the United States establishing a relationship with Mao’s Communist China, this option would doubtless have been rejected as not just unrealistic, but unsound. So instead, in a cloak of invisibility worthy of Harry Potter, Nixon sent Kissinger to Beijing for a series of meetings so secret that even his secretaries of state and defense were unaware of them. Ultimately, this led to Nixon’s historic visit in 1972 to China, recognition of Beijing (rather than Taipei) as its capital, and the creation of an uneasy but selectively cooperative relationship that contributed to the ultimate defeat of the Evil Empire.

The Nixon-Kissinger gambit is now known as “playing the China card.” Today we should be asking: is Xi Jinping’s China “playing the Russia card?”

THAT THOUGHT seems to strike many Washington strategists as outlandish. Secretary of Defense James Mattis repeatedly emphasizes Moscow and Beijing’s “natural non-convergence of interest.” And the differences in national interests, values and culture are stark. As Russian strategists think about the longer run, they must view China’s rise with consternation. Today’s map draws a line between Russia and China that leaves a large swath of what was in earlier centuries Chinese on the Russian side of the divide. That border has repeatedly seen violent clashes, the last in 1969.

Given these structural realities, the prospects for a Chinese-Russian alliance in the longer run are undoubtedly grim. But political leaders live in the here and now. Denied opportunities in the West, what alternative do Russians have but to turn East? Moreover, while history deals the hands, human beings play the cards, even sometimes practicing a quaint art known in earlier eras as diplomacy. The confluence of China’s strategic foresight and exquisite diplomacy, on the one hand, and U.S. and Western European clumsiness, on the other, has produced an increasingly thick and consequential alignment between two geopolitical rivals, Russia and China.

In international relations, an elementary proposition states: “the enemy of my enemy is a friend.” The balance of power—military, economic, intelligence, diplomatic—between rivals is critical. To the extent that China persuades Russia to sit on its side of the see-saw, this adds to China’s heft, a nuclear superpower alongside an economic superpower.

American presidents since Bill Clinton have not only neglected the formation of this grievance coalition; unintentionally but undeniably, they have nurtured it. Russia emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 with a leader eager to “bury Communism,” as Boris Yeltsin put it, and join the West. The story of how we reached the depth of enmity today is a long one, strewn with mistakes by all parties. The Clinton administration’s decision in 1996 to expand NATO toward Russia’s borders, Kennan observed, was the “most fateful error of American policy in the entire





post-cold-war era.” He predicted that the consequence would be a Russia that “would likely look elsewhere for guarantees of a secure and hopeful future for themselves.”

Vladimir Putin and Xi have watched the U.S.-led war in the Balkans (including the “accidental” bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade in 1999), Western-supported “color revolutions” topple governments in Georgia and then Ukraine, and even Secretary of State Hillary Clinton encourage street protests in 2011 against Russia’s parliamentary elections. Putin would not have to suffer from paranoia to imagine that the United States was seeking to overthrow him.

As U.S. pressure on Russia grew with sanctions after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and a diplomatic effort to “isolate” Russia, China opened its arms. At every point the United States and Western Europeans imposed pain, China has offered comfort. Particularly when the United States has attempted to “diss” Putin personally, Xi has found ways to demonstrate profound respect. Consider what has actually happened in Sino-Russian relations along seven dimensions: threat perceptions, relationship between leaders, official designation of the other, military and intelligence cooperation, economic entanglement, diplomatic coordination and elites’ orientation.

WHEN RUSSIAN or Chinese national security leaders think about current threats, the specter they see is the United States of America. They believe the United States is not only challenging their interests in Eastern Europe or the South China Sea, but is actively seeking to undermine their authoritarian regimes. Indeed, Putin and Xi reportedly compare notes about the ways Washington is working to weaken each leader’s control within his own society and even topple him.

In contrast with Barack Obama’s disdain towards Putin and Donald Trump’s charge that China is “raping America,” Xi has persuaded Putin that they are “best buddies.” To which capital did Xi take his first trip after becoming president? Moscow. Which foreign leader gets to speak immediately after Xi at every international meeting China hosts? Putin. As Putin noted earlier this year, the only leader in the world with whom he had ever celebrated his birthday is Xi. In awarding Putin China’s “Medal of Friendship,” Xi called the Russian president his “best, most intimate friend.”

Official U.S. national security documents designate Russia and China America’s “strategic competitors,” “strategic adversaries” and even “enemies.” Increasingly, they are discussed in the same sentence, as if they were twins. According to the Trump National Security Strategy: “China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.” Both are accused of conducting major “influence operations” against the United States and interfering in U.S. elections.

By contrast, Chinese and Russian national security documents call their relationship a “comprehensive strategic partnership.” According to Xi, this is “the world’s most important bilateral relationship, and is the best relationship between large countries.” China’s ambassador to Russia, Li Hui, says “China and Russia are together now like lips and teeth.” The words used by Russia’s Foreign Ministry are “comprehensive, equal, and trust-based partnership and strategic cooperation.” Even alpha male Putin has found an artful way to recognize publicly Russia’s junior role in this partnership, saying “the main struggle, which is now underway, is that for global leadership and we are not going to contest China on this.”

Most American experts discount Sino-Russian military cooperation. Commenting on this year’s unprecedented military exercise in which 3,000 Chinese soldiers joined 300,000 Russians in practicing scenarios for conflict with NATOin Eastern Europe, Secretary of Defense Mattis said: “I see little in the long term that aligns Russia and China.”

HE SHOULD look more carefully. What has emerged is what a former senior Russian national security official described to me as a “functional military alliance.” Russian and Chinese generals’ staffs now have candid, detailed discussions about the threat U.S. nuclear modernization and





missile defenses pose to each of their strategic deterrents. For decades, in selling arms to China, Russia was careful to withhold its most advanced technologies. No longer. In recent years it has not only sold China its most advanced air defense systems, the S-400s, but has actively engaged with China in joint r&d on rockets engines—and UAVs. Joint military exercises by their navies in the Mediterranean Sea in 2015, the South China Sea in 2016 and the Baltic Sea in 2017 compare favorably with U.S.-Indian military exercises. As a Chinese colleague observed candidly, if the United States found itself in a conflict with China in the South China Sea, what should it expect Putin might do in the Baltics?

In their diplomacy, Russia and China mirror the relationship between the two leaders. On major international issues, they coordinate their positions. For example, when voting in the United Nations Security Council, they agree 98 percent of the time. Russia has backed every Chinese veto since 2007. The two have worked together to create and strengthen new organizations to rival traditional American-led international organizations, including the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICs. For a Russian who wants to visit China, getting a visa takes one day; to visit the United States it takes them three hundred days to obtain a visa application interview.

Economically, Russia is slowly but surely pivoting east. China has displaced the United States and Germany as Moscow’s number one trading partner. Today, China is the top buyer of Russian crude oil. A decade ago, all gas pipelines in Russia flowed west. With the completion of the Power of Siberia pipeline in 2019, China will become the second largest market for Russian gas, just behind Germany.

When U.S.-led Western sanctions excluded Russia from American-dominated dollar-denominated markets, its relationship with China has allowed it to continue to buy and sell. In the current U.S. push to prevent Iran selling oil to the world, Russia is trading goods for Iranian oil and then selling it on to international markets, including China.

Meanwhile, Russian elites continue to look west. They are predominantly European in their culture, history, religion and dreams. Wealthy Russians buy second (and third) homes in London, New York and on the French Riviera. They speak English and travel to Paris, New York or London to shop. Many have children who live in the West.

Cultural change is hard, and slow. But oligarchs who now find themselves the targets of sanctions that prevent them doing business in the United States are exploring alternatives. And some of Russia’s leading thinkers are changing their tune. The Honorary Chairman of Russia’s Council on Foreign and Defense Policy Sergey Karaganov maintains that “the ‘westernizer’ today is a thing of the past. Those looking forward to the future most show interest in the East.” Surveys this year show that 69 percent of Russians hold a negative view of the United States, while the same percentage of Russians hold a positive view of China. When asked “who their enemies are,” two-thirds of Russians point to the United States, ranking it as Russia’s greatest foe. Only two percent of Russians view China as their enemy.

Grievance is a powerful motivator; respect can have a powerful magnetic pull. In Putin’s mind, the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century was the break-up of the Soviet Union. Who was responsible for that break-up? In Xi’s mind, China’s “century of humiliation” only ended once the Communist Party defeated the Nationalist Party in a bloody civil war. Which country supported those nationalists, and continues to arm their island fortress of Taiwan? Against the backdrop of this history, as we reflect on what the United States is now doing, we should ask whether Brzezinski’s warning about the “most dangerous scenario” could soon become a fact.





Graham T. Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at the Harvard Kennedy School. He is the former director of Harvard’s Belfer Center and the author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?

https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-and-russia-strategic-alliance-making-38727

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The Atlantic Council (Washington, D.C.)

The United States and Its Allies Need to Understand China’s North Korea Policy

By Taisuke Mibae

Dec. 17, 2018

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing on October 26 marked the first time in seven years that a serving Japanese prime minister has traveled to China for official bilateral meetings with his counterparts. Lost in the headlines of this historic summit was the fact that the two leaders discussed North Korea and recommitted their nations to close cooperation on denuclearization and the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolutions aimed at Pyongyang.

Many experts are cynical about Chinese cooperation on North Korea. They tend to focus on the unique aspects of the China-North Korea relationship, such as shared communist ties and geographical proximity, and view China’s proactive diplomacy with North Korea, starting with the first summit between Xi and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un summit in March, as an attempt to maximize its own interests, which do not coincide with those of the United States and its allies.

Chinese diplomacy on North Korea, however, can help achieve some positive results for the United States and its allies in the region. Therefore, it is important for policy makers in the United States and allies in East Asia to understand China’s motivations in the region, in general, and on North Korea, in particular. This will help them work effectively with China while guarding against Chinese actions that could undermine their strategic priorities.

When it comes to North Korea, China prioritizes stability over all else, including denuclearization. For Beijing, North Korea is neither a primary challenge to its stability, nor does Pyongyang’s nuclear ambition pose a direct threat to China’s national security. Instead, Beijing believes that it is Washington’s reaction to North Korea that in many ways represents the most immediate threat to regional stability.

Beijing’s main concerns on North Korea are: (1) the impact of excessive sanctions or US military actions that could cause a refugee crisis with North Koreans streaming across their border into China; (2) reinforcement of a US military presence in the region and the use of North Korea as an excuse to sustain the de facto US-Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance; (3) criticism of China for its perceived responsibility for North Korea’s actions, and possible punishment by the United States as a consequence; (4) the negative economic impact of sanctions, particularly on China’s northeastern provinces; and (5) the possibility of nuclear accidents and influence of nuclear tests on China’s territory. Most of these concerns are linked to US actions. This is why Beijing looks to Washington when North Korean nuclear tensions are heightened.

Consequently, China’s response to the North Korean nuclear crisis primarily focuses on the management of relations with the United States. When US President Donald J. Trump’s administration escalated its maximum pressure campaign on North Korea, including strongly



https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-and-russia-strategic-alliance-making-38727



calling for Chinese cooperation on the implementation of tougher UN Security Council resolutions, Beijing took steps to manage the situation within a US-China context.

North Korea’s charm offensive early this year and meeting in Singapore between Trump and Kim on June 12, however, relieved much of the pressure felt by Beijing. China is eager to preserve the current positive atmosphere surrounding issues related to North Korea.

Beijing definitely does not want to see further nuclear and missile tests by North Korea. It wants Kim to keep his commitment to denuclearization. China’s encouragement of North Korea to move in this direction is good for the United States and its allies. Xi’s absence from celebrations of the 70th anniversary of North Korea’s founding in September could have been a signal to Pyongyang that Beijing is not satisfied with North Korea’s progress on denuclearization.

Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is clearly in China’s interest. Most Chinese officials and experts believe that the United States is using North Korea’s drive for nuclear weapons as an excuse to maintain and expand its military presence in Northeast Asia. This belief was demonstrated by Beijing’s opposition to the deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in South Korea. Progress on denuclearization could remove the US justification for its military build-up and allow Beijing more room to press Washington to scale back its forces in the region.

Progress on denuclearization would also open the door to more economic exchange with North Korea, although this is not something that Pyongyang would explicitly endorse. In light of its own experience, China believes close economic ties would be the best way to enable a soft landing for North Korea’s economy. Furthermore, China’s Jilin and Liaoning provinces, which share a border with North Korea, have suffered from a traditional dependence on state-owned enterprises. They could greatly benefit from the growth that would come about as a consequence of increased Chinese-North Korean trade.

Despite the advantages of denuclearization, China places a higher priority on long-term stability than these short-term gains. While Beijing desires eventual progress, it currently has no incentive to compel North Korea to take quick action, putting it at odds with the United States and its allies.

The United States and its friends should also recognize that China’s active North Korean diplomacy aims to create an advantageous regional strategic environment in the medium and longer term. Simply put, China aims to compete for influence over the Korean Peninsula, weakening the US-ROK alliance and the US military presence in Northeast Asia. The United States and its allies must guard against China using easing tensions with North Korea to gain an edge in this competition.

Against this backdrop, the United States, Japan, and South Korea should deal with China with a thorough, shrewd, and consistent strategy on North Korea. US-China relations are increasingly deteriorating. Although China appreciates the South Korean president’s policy of engagement with North Korea, negative feelings over the deployment of THAAD persist in Beijing. Meanwhile, Japan is strengthening its ties with the United States by buying into a shared Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision.

While the conversation between Abe and Xi on North Korea might have been short, it should be seen as a critical opportunity to jumpstart a new allied strategy to effectively engage China on the issue of North Korea.

Taisuke Mibae is a visiting senior fellow with the Asia Security Initiative of the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. He is also a minister at the Embassy of Japan in Washington. He earlier served as a minister covering Korean affairs at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing. The views expressed in this blog post are the author’s own and do not reflect those of the Japanese government.





https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/the-united-states-and-its-allies-need-to-understand-china-s-north-korea-policy

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War on the Rocks (Washington, D.C.)

The New U.S. Strategy to Tackle WMD Terrorism Is New Wine in Old Wineskins

By Al Mauroni

Dec. 14, 2018

Americans have long been obsessed with the notion that someday a terrorist will detonate a nuclear weapon within the United States. In no small part, our own top defense experts have encouraged this view to motivate the government to take actions to prevent such an eventuality. Despite spending hundreds of billions of dollars every year on countering terrorism, senior defense leaders and politicians still grapple with the paralyzing scenario of a terrorist using a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon against the American public. Two decades ago, the Clinton administration issued a presidential decision directive to organize the U.S. government efforts against unconventional threats to the homeland. A lot has been done since then. Do we really need a new strategy today?

The White House released a new national strategy to articulate its approach to address the possibility that terrorists may attack the United States and its interests with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The White House fact sheet identifies “new aggressive steps to counter the growing threat posed by WMD terrorism” as necessary due to the failure of past approaches to sufficiently mitigate the threat. This document builds upon the 2017 National Security Strategy that noted the increasing danger from “hostile states and non-state actors who are trying to acquire nuclear, chemical, radiological, and biological weapons” and called for efforts to detect and disrupt efforts to use such weapons against the United States. The 2018 National Strategy for Counterterrorism also emphasized this threat. Although one can agree with the need for a deliberate policy approach to guide interagency efforts in this area, one cannot say that this strategy is new, in either its assumptions or its particular lines of effort.

There’s an inherent challenge in using the term “WMD terrorism” in that it identifies very different chemical, biological, and radiological hazards equally as potential mass casualty threats. To the credit of the authors of this strategy, they caveat this point by noting that chemical and radiological weapons may not cause large-scale casualties, but the qualitatively distinct effects of their use are rationale for requiring a specific national strategy. The strategy calls biological agents “the only other class of WMD that has the potential to match nuclear weapons in the scale of casualties they produce.” This is a talking point that dates back to the first term of the George W. Bush presidency, when his administration was developing its Biodefense Strategy for the 21st Century. It’s still only applicable if one is comparing multiple tens of kilograms of weaponized anthrax to a single low-yield nuclear weapon. Finally, the strategy groups nuclear and radiological materials together, which can be explained by the focus on securing nuclear material — an Obama administration policy favorite — but certainly we treat securing fissile material such as uranium-235 and plutonium-239 much more seriously than other radioactive isotopes, considering the impact of an improvised nuclear device as compared to a radiological dispersal device.

The strategy’s introduction attempts to justify why this effort is necessary, and in making that case, there are some questionable statements. It uses the past 40 years as the backstage to describe “multiple groups and individuals” using WMD agents to injure “hundreds of people in multiple







countries” and to kill dozens. That’s an awfully broad window to identify contemporary security trends. If the timeframe was only the past 15 years, a much more relevant scope, it would be a much less interesting story. Calling out al-Qaeda as having pursued an interest in nuclear weapons is debatable, and really was more of a pre-9/11 effort. One also has to question the assertion that “multiple countries operate clandestine chemical or biological weapons programs” and that those countries’ technical personnel would assist terrorists in their WMD efforts. There is no evidence that any nation-state has ever considered transferring nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons to non-state actors.

The strategy uses the same generic statement used by the past three presidential administrations, that “technical advances and other global developments” will allow terrorists to have easier access to WMD-program related material and technology. And yet, since 1995, the only significant terrorist “WMD” incidents have been Iraqi insurgents and the Islamic State’s limited and ineffective use of industrial chemicals in the Middle East (of note, the Amerithrax attacks in 2001 were not caused by a terrorist group). Are these events really the precursor to future cases of terrorists bringing WMD into the United States? Following the 9/11 attack, it was popular to say that terrorists would not hesitate to use WMD, should they acquire them. So we’re back to using that tired phrase, despite the absolute lack of any factual cases to support that assumption.

We can argue about the assumptions used in WMD terrorism strategies and the probability of such events actually occurring and resulting in mass casualty events, but of more significance is the federal government’s plan to deter, disrupt, and respond to such threats. The Trump administration’s strategy identifies three core elements that will drive eight lines of effort to achieve five strategic objectives (see Figure 1).

This is not a new policy approach to countering “the growing threat posed by WMD terrorism.” It is certainly not “the first-ever comprehensive, public description of the United States Government’s approach to combating WMD terrorism.” As shown in Figure 1, nearly the exact same words, if not the same intent, were used as key elements to combat WMD terrorism in the 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

The State Department’s 2006 Country Reports on Terrorism echoed this counter-WMD terrorism policy and included a chapter on the global challenge of WMD terrorism in its each of its subsequent annual Country Reports. The Obama administration dropped the objective-based strategy in favor of articulating nonproliferation activities and international forums that supported U.S. government efforts to counter chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, but it largely continued the many governmental programs initiated by the Bush administration. It’s not a surprise to see this administration use a strategy developed by the Bush administration, but one cannot call this a new approach.

I’ve stated in past articles that state WMD programs require a greater national security focus than a generic terrorist group that can’t do much more than use a few gallons of industrial chemicals or grams of a biological toxin. Terrorist groups don’t have the infrastructure to develop or capability to deliver nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare agents on the scale to cause mass casualties. I don’t endorse the “one percent doctrine,” but I will acknowledge that the interagency has a responsibility to develop programs in response to the policy direction of the White House. All presidential administrations beginning with the Clinton administration have developed executive orders toward mitigating the risk of WMD terrorism, and the counterterrorism community responds accordingly.

The Trump administration’s national strategy may be echoing old phrases and bad assumptions, but the lines of effort offer a consistent and executable agenda for the purpose toward which it is designed. The proof of the pudding, however, is in the eating. The introduction of this national





strategy notes that “implementation guidance will be developed to establish clear roles and responsibilities, avoid duplication of effort, and ensure that activities are properly prioritized.” Does this mean that the National Security Council’s senior director for WMD and biodefense will be organizing and tasking the interagency on how they progress against these lines of effort? Traditionally, the “WMD Czar” has been limited to working arms control and nonproliferation activities and not corralling the executive agencies.

There are several executive agencies that already have roles and responsibilities, and more importantly, funded programs that align with this strategy’s objectives. Presidential Policy Directive 8 (National Preparedness) still directs federal efforts to prepare for and respond to acts of terrorism. The State Department and Energy Department have nonproliferation programs designed to restrict or secure certain materials from being illicitly taken and used contrary to their intended purposes. The intelligence community, notably the National Counterproliferation Center and National Counterterrorism Center, track the possible intersection of terrorist groups and WMD materials. The Defense Department directs the U.S. Special Operations Command to focus on terrorists seeking WMD and U.S. Northern Command to support a federal response to WMD terrorist attacks. The Justice Department has its FBI WMD Directorate to investigate WMD threats and terrorist attacks. The Department of Homeland Security has a strategic goal to prevent terrorists from transporting WMD across U.S. borders, as well as guiding the development of state, local, tribal, and territorial WMD response efforts. There are many actors and many other national security priorities. If this strategy is to be more aggressive, does that translate into additional funding for existing and/or new programs? Or will the direction be to do more with less in counterterrorism efforts? We shall see.

Of all the objectives in this strategy, I am most skeptical as to the ability of individual Americans to be “resilient and steadfast in the face of a WMD attack.” We have trouble keeping military service members proficiently trained to survive and sustain combat operations in a WMD environment, and they have specialized defensive equipment and training. I do have faith in the public’s ability to weather conventional terrorist incidents, considering their post-attack reaction to the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and 9/11 incident, but not a true mass casualty event that features nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. I’m just not sure what it would take to get the public prepared for such an event, or even if it’s really necessary.

Terrorists have, for whatever reason, eschewed developing WMD and instead relied on conventional firearms and explosives for their attacks. With a very few exceptions, terrorist CBRN incidents have been single, small-scale events that have been manageable. It’s unclear as to why the Trump administration decided that the U.S. government needed this national strategy today, given other significant national security threats and other funding priorities. It may not be a new strategy, but it’s always a good idea to raise the profile of these discussions if not just to assess where we are and where we need to be.

Al Mauroni is the Director of the U.S. Air Force Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies and author of the book, “Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the U.S. Government’s Policy.” The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Air University, U.S. Air Force, or Department of Defense.

https://warontherocks.com/2018/12/the-new-u-s-strategy-to-tackle-wmd-terrorism-is-new-wine-in-old-wineskins/

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Brookings (Washington, D.C.)

Will Europe Try to Save the INF Treaty?

By Steven Pifer

Dec. 13, 2018

Editor's Note: In early February, the U.S. government will suspend its INF Treaty obligations, relieving Russia from performing its treaty obligations. The clock is ticking for Europe, writes Steven Pifer. This piece was originally published by the Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford.

On December 4, U.S. Secretary of State Pompeo announced that Russia has 60 days to come back into compliance with the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Otherwise, Washington will suspend its obligations under the agreement.

The treaty’s future appears grim. The Kremlin has threatened countermeasures if the United States goes through with suspension, while Washington seems uninterested in preserving the treaty. If the treaty is to be saved, European leaders should act.

Up until recently, senior European officials said little publicly about the need for Russia to correct its violation of the treaty. They did not make that a major issue in their diplomacy with Moscow. In a recent discussion about the INF Treaty’s potential demise, a former U.S. government official even asked whether Europeans cared.

They should. While global in scope, the INF Treaty focused on enhancing European security. It resulted in the banning and elimination of U.S. and Soviet ground-launched missiles of intermediate range (500–5,500 kilometers), missiles that were deployed in large numbers between the Atlantic and the Ural Mountains in the 1980s.

Russia’s development and deployment of an intermediate-range, ground-launched cruise missile known as the 9M729 now constitutes a material breach of the treaty. U.S. officials have raised this violation with their Russian counterparts for some five years, all to no avail.

In October, President Trump said the United States would exercise its right to withdraw.

Many expected Mr. Pompeo to announce that the United States had given Moscow formal notice that it would withdraw from the treaty in six months’ time, as the treaty allows. A leaked memorandum prepared by National Security Advisor Bolton, no fan of the INF Treaty, said the notice should be conveyed by December 4 and that the Pentagon should develop a U.S. intermediate-range, ground-launched missile as soon as possible.

However, apparently reflecting discussions between Mr. Trump and German Chancellor Merkel in Argentina, Mr. Pompeo instead announced the 60-day period, after which the United States would suspend its INF Treaty obligations if Moscow does not return to compliance. U.S. suspension of its obligations would relieve Russia of its obligations to implement the treaty. The treaty would technically remain in force, but neither side would be observing its terms.

Russia has shown no sign of readiness to address its violation. Neither Mr. Trump nor Mr. Bolton appears interested in maintaining the agreement, while interest in the Pentagon in having an intermediate-range missile seems to be growing.

That bodes ill for the agreement’s prospects. If America’s European allies, whose countries derive the most security benefits from the treaty, wish to preserve it, they should try three things.

First, European leaders should engage President Putin directly and forcefully on this issue. He needs to hear from Ms. Merkel, President Macron, Prime Minister Conte and other leaders that the 9M729 poses a major problem for relations with his European counterparts.





To date, Mr. Putin has taken little direct heat over this question. If European leaders want to save the treaty, they should change that.

They do not have to ask Mr. Putin to admit the 9M729 is a violation. They can instead note that the missile poses an unacceptable threat to their countries and urge him to make a critical contribution to European security by eliminating that missile. He could do it as a confidence-building measure, without admitting guilt. They also need to make clear that, if Mr. Putin does not act, this will remain a difficult issue for him in the future.

Second, Europeans need to take a serious look at military steps to respond to the 9M729. Upping the political pressure on the Kremlin would prove useful, but military steps would carry far greater weight, especially at the Russian Ministry of Defense. Moscow never would have agreed to the INF Treaty in the first place had NATO not deployed Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe in the 1980s.

Are NATO allies ready to countenance deployment in Europe of a new U.S. intermediate-range missile? That would definitely grab the Russians’ attention, but it may be a bridge too far. European allies nevertheless could immediately begin a detailed and substantive discussion about military steps that NATO should and will take to offset Russia’s 9M729. The Pentagon is ready for that exchange. That said, it would have greater impact in Moscow if it were European governments and militaries that press the question of military countermeasures.

Third, European officials should recommend to Washington that, if the Russians change course and begin to deal seriously with Western concerns about the 9M729, the Pentagon should explore ways to address Russia’s concern that the Aegis Ashore missile defense launchers in Romania could carry offensive missiles. That does not pose an intractable problem. The United States could fix it, also as a confidence-building measure.

Would these steps succeed? Russia thus far has shown no readiness to abandon its investment in the 9M729. Saving the INF Treaty would prove an uphill struggle, but the fight is not yet over.

Do Europeans care? If so, Berlin, Paris, Rome, Budapest, The Hague and other European capitals will have to decide to make preserving the treaty an urgent priority in their relations with Moscow. If they do not care, the handwriting is on the wall. In early February, the U.S. government will suspend its treaty obligations, relieving Russia from performing its treaty obligations. The INF Treaty effectively will be dead.

The clock is ticking.

https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/13/will-europe-try-to-save-the-inf-treaty/

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ABOUT THE USAF CSDS The USAF Counterproliferation Center (CPC) was established in 1998 at the direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Located at Maxwell AFB, this Center capitalizes on the resident expertise of Air University — while extending its reach far beyond — and influences a wide audience of leaders and policy makers. A memorandum of agreement between the Air Staff’s Director for Nuclear and Counterproliferation (then AF/XON) and Air War College commandant established the initial personnel and responsibilities of the Center. This included integrating counterproliferation awareness into the curriculum and ongoing research at the Air University; establishing an information repository to promote research on counterproliferation and nonproliferation issues; and directing research on the various topics associated with counterproliferation and nonproliferation.

In 2008, the Secretary of Defense's Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Management recommended "Air Force personnel connected to the nuclear mission be required to take a professional military education (PME) course on national, defense, and Air Force concepts for deterrence and defense." This led to the addition of three teaching positions to the CPC in 2011 to enhance nuclear PME efforts. At the same time, the Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center, in coordination with the AF/A10 and Air Force Global Strike Command, established a series of courses at Kirtland AFB to provide professional continuing education (PCE) through the careers of those Air Force personnel working in or supporting the nuclear enterprise. This mission was transferred to the CPC in 2012, broadening its mandate to providing education and research on not just countering WMD but also nuclear operations issues. In April 2016, the nuclear PCE courses were transferred from the Air War College to the U.S. Air Force Institute for Technology.

In February 2014, the Center’s name was changed to the Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies (CUWS) to reflect its broad coverage of unconventional weapons issues, both offensive and defensive, across the six joint operating concepts (deterrence operations, cooperative security, major combat operations, irregular warfare, stability operations, and homeland security). The term “unconventional weapons,” currently defined as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, also includes the improvised use of chemical, biological, and radiological hazards. In May 2018, the name changed again to the Center for Strategic Deterrence Studies (CSDS) in recognition of senior Air Force interest in focusing on this vital national security topic.

The Center’s military insignia displays the symbols of nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards. The arrows above the hazards represent the four aspects of counterproliferation — counterforce, active defense, passive defense, and consequence management. The Latin inscription "Armis Bella Venenis Geri" stands for "weapons of war involving poisons."

DISCLAIMER: Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency.



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Issue 1346 21 December 2018 - U.S. Department of Defense

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