Issue paper IMRBPB # ATA-001-05 samples Flashlight The aircraft has four flashlights, the hidden system failure (one
flashlight failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related. If the system was not safety related, it could be considered route 9 because of the other 3 redundancies.
Engine and APU Fire detectors
The system has two loops for each detector. The failure of one loop is hidden; the second loop failure is evident. The hidden system failure (one loop failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related.
Photo luminescent strip Failure to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency is not caused by any single failure of the photo luminescent strip. The hidden system failure was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related.
System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis
Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category
01. Provides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in case of an accident or emergency event
The Flashlight is inoperable 01.01.01 Fails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency evacuation
801.01 01.01.01.A Flashlight inoperative
01.01.01.B Recharge bracket failure
01.01.01.C Lamp burnt
01.01.01.D Battery failure
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
01.The Flashlight is inoperableProvides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in case of an accident or emergency event
Fails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency evacuation
Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
01.0101.01.01
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
No Although there is a daily check performed by the flight crew, failures may be hidden to flight crew
N/A
Yes In combination of an event that requires the flashlight failure will affect safety.
N/A
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Task is not applicable because there is no consumable to replenish
Operational Check is effective to detect failure 33-51-01-003
Not applicable. Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable
Deep cycle of battery reduces risk of failure or functional degradation
33-51-01-001
Task is not applicable because item does not show degradation at an identifiable age
Selected tasks are applicable and effective.
No
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
01.The Flashlight is inoperableFails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency e
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Flashlight inoperative
Components:Provides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in c
8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
OPC
RST
01.0101.01.0101.01.01.A
33-51-01 FLASHLIGHT ASSEMBLY
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis
Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category
01. Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in case of fire.
Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.
01.1.1 Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.
901.1 01.1.1.A Engine fire detector failure.
Provides false fire warning indication.
01.2.1 May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.
901.2 01.2.1.A Engine fire detector failure.
02. Alerts crew of detection loop failure.
Does not alert crew detection loop failure.
02.1.1 Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.
902.1 02.1.1.A Engine fire detector failure
02.1.1.B MAU Failure(Transferred to MSI# 3141)
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
01.Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in
Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.
Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
01.101.1.1
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
No The loss of one path to detect fire is not evident to the operating crew because it will be indicated only in the CMC.
N/A
No The failure of second loop will only affect safety in the event of fire.
N/A
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable, because there is no consumable to replenish.
There is no check to verify operation. The CMC cannot be used to identify maintenance.
There is no inspection or functional check that is applicable and effective.
The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.
The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
01.Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure.
Components:Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four
9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
01.101.1.101.1.1.A
26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector
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Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0
System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
01.Provides false fire warning indication.Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in
May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.
Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
01.201.2.1
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
No It is not evident to the operational crew that the fire warning indication is false.
N/A
No The unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge will not affect safety.
N/A
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable,because there is no consumable to replenish.
There is no check to verify operation. The CMC cannot be used to identify maintenance.
There is no inspection or functional check that is applicable and effective.
The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.
The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
01.Provides false fire warning indication.May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure.
Components:Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four
9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
01.201.2.101.2.1.A
26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
02.Does not alert crew detection loop failure.Alerts crew of detection loop failure.
Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.
Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
02.102.1.1
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
No It is not evident to the operational crew that the failure is not being indicated.
N/A
No It will not affect safety. A non indicated single failure associated with fire event will not affect safety for the sensor must be in fact failed.
N/A
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable, because there is no consumable to replenish.
A check to verify operation is applicable but not cost effective. It may cause induced maintenance failure.
Not applicable.
Not applicable.
Applicable but not cost effective.
No
No
No
No
No
N/A
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
02.Does not alert crew detection loop failure.Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure
Components:Alerts crew of detection loop failure.
9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety
02.102.1.102.1.1.A
26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis
Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category
01. Provides Emergency Lighting in cockpit and passenger cabin areas in case of emergency.
Inability to provide: -Cockpit Emer Lt; -Cabin Emer Lt (FWD PAX Entr); -Exit Ident Sign (FWD RH Serv Door Liner); -Exit Mark Sign & FWD RH Passageway Emer Lt; -Exit Locator Sign (FWD); in case of emergency.
01.01.01 Cockpit and passenger cabin areas are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.01 01.01.01.A Battery 1 Failure.
01.01.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.
01.01.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.
01.01.01.D Cockpit Emergency Light failure.
01.01.01.E Cabin Emergency Light failure
01.01.01.F FWD RH Passageway Emergency Light failure
01.01.01.G Exit Locator Sign failure
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Inability to provide: -Exit Identifier Sign (FWD LH Lav); -Cabin Emer Lt (Main Ceiling Panel); -Exit Locator Sign (Overwing Emer Doors); -Exit Marking Sign (FWD PAX Entr); -FWD LH Passageway Emer Lt (FWD PAX Entr); in case of emergency.
01.02.01 Passenger cabin area is not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.02 01.02.01.A Battery 2 Failure
01.02.01.B Exit Marking Signs failure
01.02.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure
01.02.01.D Cabin Emergency Lights failure.
01.02.01.E FWD LH Passageway Emergency Light failure.
01.02.01.F Exit Locator Sign failure.
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Inability to provide: -Exit Locator Sign near to Overwing Emergency Doors; -Cabin Emergency Light at Main Ceiling Panel; -Exit Marking Sign at LH/RH Overwing Emergency Door; -Exit Identifier Sign at Overwing Emergency Door; in case of emergency.
01.03.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.03 01.03.01.A Battery 3 Failure
01.03.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.
01.03.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.
01.03.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.
01.03.01.E Exit Locator Sign failure.
Inability to provide: -Exit Marking Sign at LH/RH Overwing Emergency Door; -Exit Identifier Sign near to Overwing Emergency Doors; -Cabin Emergency Light at Main Ceiling Panel; in case of emergency.
01.04.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.04 01.04.01.A Battery 4 Failure
01.04.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure
01.04.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure
01.04.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Inability to provide: -Cabin Emer Lt (Main Ceiling Panel); -Exit Locator Sign (AFT Ceiling Panel); -Exit Identifier Sign (AFT LH Passenger Door Liner); -AFT LH Passageway Emer Lt; -Exit Marking Sign (AFT LH Ceiling Panel); in case of emergency.
01.05.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.05 01.05.01.A Battery 5 Failure.
01.05.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.
01.05.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.
01.05.01.D Aft LH Passageway Emergency Light failure.
01.05.01.E Cabin Emergency Light failure.
01.05.01.F Exit Locator Sign failure.
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Inability to provide: -Exit Identifier Sign at Aft RH Service Door Liner; -Cabin Emergency Light; -Exit Marking Sign; -Aft RH Passageway Emergency Light; in case of emergency.
01.06.01 Passenger cabin area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.
601.06 01.06.01.A Battery 6 Failure
01.06.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.
01.06.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.
01.06.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.
01.06.01.E Aft RH Passageway Emergency Light failure.
02. Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.
Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.
02.01.01 No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.
802.01 02.01.01.A Photoluminescent strip failure.
Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.
02.02.01 No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.
802.02 02.02.01.A Batteries (3, 4, 5, and 6) failure.
02.02.01.B External Emergency Lights failure.
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
03. Provides means to activate the emergency light system.
Fails to provide means to activate the emergency light system.
03.01.01 Unable to activate the emergency light system.
603.01 03.01.01.A Passenger Signs Panel failure.
04. Provides means to test the emergency light system.
Fails to provide means to test the emergency light system.
04.01.01 Unable to test the emergency light system.
604.01 04.01.01.A Passenger Signs Panel failure.
04.01.01.B Attendant Control Panel failure(Transferred to MSI# 25-25
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
02.Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.
No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.
Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
02.0102.01.01
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
No The failure is not evident to flight crew. No indication for the flight crew.
N/A No single failure can cause adverse effect on safety.
Yes Emergency light escape route must be available in an emergency event
N/A It will have a direct adverse effect to the operating capability. Emergency light system is required for dispatch.
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
Task is not applicable because there is no consumable to replenish.
There is no effective check
Inspection is applicable to detect obvious damage 33-50-21-002
Periodic restoration task is not applicable and effective.
Task is applicable and effective. 33-50-21-001
Selected tasks are applicable and effective.
No
No
Yes
No
No
Yes
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
02.Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency ev
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Photoluminescent strip failure.
Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme
8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
DET
DIS
02.0102.01.0102.01.01.A
33-50-21 PHOTOLUMINESCENT INDICATOR STRIP LIGHT
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.
No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.
Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:
Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety
EVIDENT HIDDEN
1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?
2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?
4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?
3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
02.0202.02.01
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
No Functional Failure or missing illumination will not be evident to operating crew during normal operation
N/A
Yes Functional failure to this candidate MSI has a direct adverse effect on the operating safety.
N/A
1-
2-
3-
4-
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
There is no consumable to replenish.
A Operational Check of the External Emergency Lights is applicable and effective.
33-50-25-001
A Functional Check of the Emergency Light Power Unit is applicable and effective.
33-50-01-001
A restoration task to reduce failure rate is not applicable and effective, part failure is not time related
A discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate is not applicable and effective
The selected tasks are applicable and effective.
No
Yes
Yes
No
No
Yes
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emerg
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Batteries (3, 4, 5, and 6) failure.
Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme
8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
OPC
FNC
02.0202.02.0102.02.01.A
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System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis
33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL
There is no consumable to replenish.
A Operational Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is applicable and effective.
33-50-25-001
A Functional Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is not applicable and effective.
A restoration task to reduce failure rate is not applicable and effective, part failure is not time related
A discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate is not applicable and effective
A Operational Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is applicable and effective.
No
Yes
No
No
No
Yes
Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis
02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emerg
Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: External Emergency Lights failure.
Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme
8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?
8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?
8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?
8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?
8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?
8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?
Category 8 - Hidden Safety
OPC
02.0202.02.0102.02.01.B
33-50-25 EXTERNAL EMERGENCY LIGHT
Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page
Prepared by:Reviewed by:
Revision:Date:
Working Group: Status:Page 80
Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05
Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1