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Issue paper IMRBPB # ATA-001-05 samples 84 Embraer... · Kleber Almeida Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05...

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Issue paper IMRBPB # ATA-001-05 samples Flashlight The aircraft has four flashlights, the hidden system failure (one flashlight failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related. If the system was not safety related, it could be considered route 9 because of the other 3 redundancies. Engine and APU Fire detectors The system has two loops for each detector. The failure of one loop is hidden; the second loop failure is evident. The hidden system failure (one loop failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related. Photo luminescent strip Failure to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency is not caused by any single failure of the photo luminescent strip. The hidden system failure was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related.
Transcript

Issue paper IMRBPB # ATA-001-05 samples Flashlight The aircraft has four flashlights, the hidden system failure (one

flashlight failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related. If the system was not safety related, it could be considered route 9 because of the other 3 redundancies.

Engine and APU Fire detectors

The system has two loops for each detector. The failure of one loop is hidden; the second loop failure is evident. The hidden system failure (one loop failure) was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related.

Photo luminescent strip Failure to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency is not caused by any single failure of the photo luminescent strip. The hidden system failure was classified as safety, because the system was classified as safety related.

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis

Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category

01. Provides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in case of an accident or emergency event

The Flashlight is inoperable 01.01.01 Fails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency evacuation

801.01 01.01.01.A Flashlight inoperative

01.01.01.B Recharge bracket failure

01.01.01.C Lamp burnt

01.01.01.D Battery failure

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 6

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DKleber Almeida Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 2

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

01.The Flashlight is inoperableProvides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in case of an accident or emergency event

Fails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency evacuation

Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

01.0101.01.01

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

No Although there is a daily check performed by the flight crew, failures may be hidden to flight crew

N/A

Yes In combination of an event that requires the flashlight failure will affect safety.

N/A

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 7

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DKleber Almeida Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 2

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-51 FLASHLIGHTMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Task is not applicable because there is no consumable to replenish

Operational Check is effective to detect failure 33-51-01-003

Not applicable. Reduced resistance to failure is not detectable

Deep cycle of battery reduces risk of failure or functional degradation

33-51-01-001

Task is not applicable because item does not show degradation at an identifiable age

Selected tasks are applicable and effective.

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

01.The Flashlight is inoperableFails to provide lighting assistance by the flight crew for emergency e

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Flashlight inoperative

Components:Provides lighting assistance by the flight crew to the passengers in c

8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

OPC

RST

01.0101.01.0101.01.01.A

33-51-01 FLASHLIGHT ASSEMBLY

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 8

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DKleber Almeida Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 2

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis

Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category

01. Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in case of fire.

Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.

01.1.1 Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.

901.1 01.1.1.A Engine fire detector failure.

Provides false fire warning indication.

01.2.1 May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.

901.2 01.2.1.A Engine fire detector failure.

02. Alerts crew of detection loop failure.

Does not alert crew detection loop failure.

02.1.1 Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.

902.1 02.1.1.A Engine fire detector failure

02.1.1.B MAU Failure(Transferred to MSI# 3141)

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 12

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

01.Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in

Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.

Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

01.101.1.1

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

No The loss of one path to detect fire is not evident to the operating crew because it will be indicated only in the CMC.

N/A

No The failure of second loop will only affect safety in the event of fire.

N/A

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 13

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable, because there is no consumable to replenish.

There is no check to verify operation. The CMC cannot be used to identify maintenance.

There is no inspection or functional check that is applicable and effective.

The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.

The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.

No

No

No

No

No

N/A

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

01.Loss of redundancy to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.Only one path available to detect fire in the designated engine fire zone.

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure.

Components:Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four

9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

01.101.1.101.1.1.A

26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 14

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

01.Provides false fire warning indication.Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four specific areas (right hand Fan, left hand Fan, Core upper case, Core lower case) in

May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.

Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

01.201.2.1

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

No It is not evident to the operational crew that the fire warning indication is false.

N/A

No The unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge will not affect safety.

N/A

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 15

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable,because there is no consumable to replenish.

There is no check to verify operation. The CMC cannot be used to identify maintenance.

There is no inspection or functional check that is applicable and effective.

The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.

The task is not applicable because the item does not show degradation at an identifiable age.

No

No

No

No

No

N/A

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

01.Provides false fire warning indication.May cause unnecessary fire extinguishing bottle discharge by the crew.

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure.

Components:Provide redundant capability of informing crew of fire in each of the four

9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

01.201.2.101.2.1.A

26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 16

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

02.Does not alert crew detection loop failure.Alerts crew of detection loop failure.

Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.

Form 4 - Failure Effect Analysis

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

02.102.1.1

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

No It is not evident to the operational crew that the failure is not being indicated.

N/A

No It will not affect safety. A non indicated single failure associated with fire event will not affect safety for the sensor must be in fact failed.

N/A

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 17

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

26-11 ENGINE FIRE DETECTION SYSTEMMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

A lubrication or servicing task is not applicable, because there is no consumable to replenish.

A check to verify operation is applicable but not cost effective. It may cause induced maintenance failure.

Not applicable.

Not applicable.

Applicable but not cost effective.

No

No

No

No

No

N/A

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

02.Does not alert crew detection loop failure.Crew will not be alerted of failure condition.

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Engine fire detector failure

Components:Alerts crew of detection loop failure.

9A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

9B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

9C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

9D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

9E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

9F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 9 - Hidden Non-Safety

02.102.1.102.1.1.A

26-11-01 Engine Fire Detector

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 18

Gustavo Bomfim - EmbraerRubens Nogueira - Embraer 02-Aug-04

Approved by ISCFirst PWG 0

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Form 3 - Functional Failure Analysis

Function(s) Functional Failure(s) Failure Effect(s) Failure Cause(s) Category

01. Provides Emergency Lighting in cockpit and passenger cabin areas in case of emergency.

Inability to provide: -Cockpit Emer Lt; -Cabin Emer Lt (FWD PAX Entr); -Exit Ident Sign (FWD RH Serv Door Liner); -Exit Mark Sign & FWD RH Passageway Emer Lt; -Exit Locator Sign (FWD); in case of emergency.

01.01.01 Cockpit and passenger cabin areas are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.01 01.01.01.A Battery 1 Failure.

01.01.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.

01.01.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.

01.01.01.D Cockpit Emergency Light failure.

01.01.01.E Cabin Emergency Light failure

01.01.01.F FWD RH Passageway Emergency Light failure

01.01.01.G Exit Locator Sign failure

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 31

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Inability to provide: -Exit Identifier Sign (FWD LH Lav); -Cabin Emer Lt (Main Ceiling Panel); -Exit Locator Sign (Overwing Emer Doors); -Exit Marking Sign (FWD PAX Entr); -FWD LH Passageway Emer Lt (FWD PAX Entr); in case of emergency.

01.02.01 Passenger cabin area is not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.02 01.02.01.A Battery 2 Failure

01.02.01.B Exit Marking Signs failure

01.02.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure

01.02.01.D Cabin Emergency Lights failure.

01.02.01.E FWD LH Passageway Emergency Light failure.

01.02.01.F Exit Locator Sign failure.

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 32

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Inability to provide: -Exit Locator Sign near to Overwing Emergency Doors; -Cabin Emergency Light at Main Ceiling Panel; -Exit Marking Sign at LH/RH Overwing Emergency Door; -Exit Identifier Sign at Overwing Emergency Door; in case of emergency.

01.03.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.03 01.03.01.A Battery 3 Failure

01.03.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.

01.03.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.

01.03.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.

01.03.01.E Exit Locator Sign failure.

Inability to provide: -Exit Marking Sign at LH/RH Overwing Emergency Door; -Exit Identifier Sign near to Overwing Emergency Doors; -Cabin Emergency Light at Main Ceiling Panel; in case of emergency.

01.04.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.04 01.04.01.A Battery 4 Failure

01.04.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure

01.04.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure

01.04.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 33

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Inability to provide: -Cabin Emer Lt (Main Ceiling Panel); -Exit Locator Sign (AFT Ceiling Panel); -Exit Identifier Sign (AFT LH Passenger Door Liner); -AFT LH Passageway Emer Lt; -Exit Marking Sign (AFT LH Ceiling Panel); in case of emergency.

01.05.01 Passenger Cabin Area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.05 01.05.01.A Battery 5 Failure.

01.05.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.

01.05.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.

01.05.01.D Aft LH Passageway Emergency Light failure.

01.05.01.E Cabin Emergency Light failure.

01.05.01.F Exit Locator Sign failure.

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 34

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Inability to provide: -Exit Identifier Sign at Aft RH Service Door Liner; -Cabin Emergency Light; -Exit Marking Sign; -Aft RH Passageway Emergency Light; in case of emergency.

01.06.01 Passenger cabin area and Overwing Emergency Exit are not illuminated as required in case of emergency.

601.06 01.06.01.A Battery 6 Failure

01.06.01.B Exit Marking Sign failure.

01.06.01.C Exit Identifier Sign failure.

01.06.01.D Cabin Emergency Light failure.

01.06.01.E Aft RH Passageway Emergency Light failure.

02. Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.

Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.

02.01.01 No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.

802.01 02.01.01.A Photoluminescent strip failure.

Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.

02.02.01 No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.

802.02 02.02.01.A Batteries (3, 4, 5, and 6) failure.

02.02.01.B External Emergency Lights failure.

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 35

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

03. Provides means to activate the emergency light system.

Fails to provide means to activate the emergency light system.

03.01.01 Unable to activate the emergency light system.

603.01 03.01.01.A Passenger Signs Panel failure.

04. Provides means to test the emergency light system.

Fails to provide means to test the emergency light system.

04.01.01 Unable to test the emergency light system.

604.01 04.01.01.A Passenger Signs Panel failure.

04.01.01.B Attendant Control Panel failure(Transferred to MSI# 25-25

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 36

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

02.Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.

No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.

Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

02.0102.01.01

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

No The failure is not evident to flight crew. No indication for the flight crew.

N/A No single failure can cause adverse effect on safety.

Yes Emergency light escape route must be available in an emergency event

N/A It will have a direct adverse effect to the operating capability. Emergency light system is required for dispatch.

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 76

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

Task is not applicable because there is no consumable to replenish.

There is no effective check

Inspection is applicable to detect obvious damage 33-50-21-002

Periodic restoration task is not applicable and effective.

Task is applicable and effective. 33-50-21-001

Selected tasks are applicable and effective.

No

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

02.Fails to provide lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case No lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency ev

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Photoluminescent strip failure.

Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme

8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

DET

DIS

02.0102.01.0102.01.01.A

33-50-21 PHOTOLUMINESCENT INDICATOR STRIP LIGHT

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

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Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 77

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of emergency.

No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emergency evacuation.

Form 4 - Failure Effect AnalysisFunction:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:

Safety Operational Economic Safety Non Safety

EVIDENT HIDDEN

1 - Is the occurrence of a functional failure evident to the operating crew during the performance of normal duties?

2 - Does the functional failure or secondary damage resulting from the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating safety?

4 -Does the functional failure have a direct adverse effect on operating capability?

3-Does the combination of a hidden functional failure and one additional failure of a system related or backup function have an adverse effect on operating safety?

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

YES NO

02.0202.02.01

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

No Functional Failure or missing illumination will not be evident to operating crew during normal operation

N/A

Yes Functional failure to this candidate MSI has a direct adverse effect on the operating safety.

N/A

1-

2-

3-

4-

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 78

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

There is no consumable to replenish.

A Operational Check of the External Emergency Lights is applicable and effective.

33-50-25-001

A Functional Check of the Emergency Light Power Unit is applicable and effective.

33-50-01-001

A restoration task to reduce failure rate is not applicable and effective, part failure is not time related

A discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate is not applicable and effective

The selected tasks are applicable and effective.

No

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emerg

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: Batteries (3, 4, 5, and 6) failure.

Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme

8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

OPC

FNC

02.0202.02.0102.02.01.A

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 79

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1

System and Powerplant MSG-3 Analysis

33-50 EMERGENCY LIGHTINGMSI Code: MSI Title: Effectivity: ALL

There is no consumable to replenish.

A Operational Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is applicable and effective.

33-50-25-001

A Functional Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is not applicable and effective.

A restoration task to reduce failure rate is not applicable and effective, part failure is not time related

A discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate is not applicable and effective

A Operational Check of the Emergency Exterior Lights is applicable and effective.

No

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

Form 5 - Failure Cause Analysis

02.Fails to provide lighted external path route for passenger and crew in No external lighted escape route for passenger and crew in an emerg

Function:Functional Failure:Failure Effect:Failure Cause: External Emergency Lights failure.

Components:Provides lighted escape route for passenger and crew in case of eme

8A - Is a lubrication or servicing task applicable and effective?

8B - Is a check to verify operation applicable and effective?

8C - Is an inspection or functional check to detect degradation of function applicable and effective?

8D - Is a restoration task to reduce failure rate applicable and effective?

8E - Is a discard task to avoid failures or to reduce the failure rate applicable and effective?

8F - Is there a task or combination of tasks applicable and effective?

Category 8 - Hidden Safety

OPC

02.0202.02.0102.02.01.B

33-50-25 EXTERNAL EMERGENCY LIGHT

Embraer proprietary Information - Use or disclosure of this information is subject to the restriction on the title page

Prepared by:Reviewed by:

Revision:Date:

Working Group: Status:Page 80

Rogerio Rodrigues - C&DK A Ribas - Embraer 23-Feb-05

Approved by WG1st 190 GWG 1


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