ISSUES IN DEFENCE GOVERNANCE REPORT 2013

ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE | 1

This year’s workshop on Defense Governance is the result of the U.S. Office of the Secretary of Defense’s objective to encourage deeper thinking and reflection on the importance of the governance of the defense estate in national defense organizations in Central and Eastern Europe. Despite continuous efforts by the United States and its NATO allies to assist former-Communist countries reform their national defense organizations, it is clear that new approaches, methods, and concepts are required if these armed forces are to become comparable to their older NATO allies. What this year’s workshop attempted to accomplish was to engage regional defense officials, to include two very senior military officers, and expose them to new, innovative, and different approaches to framing and potentially solving long-standing defense governance challenges. Critically, experience in delivering Western-sourced technical assistance to aid and encourage defense reform shows that legacy concepts, assumptions, and logic have much deeper deterministic/shaping power and continue to impede the acceptance and adoption of Western concepts and models, when these are suggested through “end-user type” technical assistance. This workshop was given the challenge of ascertaining how these barriers and impediments to accepting and implementing reforms can be overcome. This is no small challenge when one considers the copious amount of Western resources spent over some 20-plus years in assisting countries in the region to reform their respective national defense organizations. In an era of finite, if not indeed diminishing resources, different, innovative, and demonstrably cost-effective approaches and methods need to be found, implemented, and validated.

PREFACE

Program design by Dr. Thomas Young, Dr. Kristina Soukupova, Mr. Vladimir Milenski, and Mr. Glen Grant. Report writing by Dr. Kristina Soukupova. Cover design, and report layout by Erik Kiyoi. Photos by Grant Ammon and Javier Chagoya. Copyright © 2013 Naval Postgraduate School. All rights reserved. The views expressed in this document are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

CONTENTSObjectives of the Issues in Defense Governance Workshop...pg 3

Introduction and Executive Summary...pg 4

Introduction to Governance...pg 6

Policy Framework, Hard and Soft Policy

and Security Vouchers...pg 10

LOOKING AT DIFFICULT AREAS: Problematic Areas of Having Special Operations Forces...pg 10

Governance and Culture...pg 13

Four Ways of Looking at National Defense Organizations...pg 18

self evaluation paper: Culture and National Organizational Tendencies...pg 20

Conducting Defense Reviews: From Parliament to Pilot...pg 22

The Practicalities of Governance and

Implementation of the Strategic Defense

Review/Force Structure Review

Processes...pg 24

The Czech Case Study: A Hard and Rocky Road...pg 26

German Ministry of Defense Re-organization...pg 28

The Bulgarian Case Study...pg 30

Participants and Staff...pg 34

Conclusion...pg 36z

DAY 5

DAY 4

DAY 2

DAY 3

By Dr. Thomas Young

2 | ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE | 3

Dr. Thomas Young, Faculty, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

Dr. Kristina Soukupova, Co-Author and Consultant to the White Paper on Defense for the Ministry of Defense, Czech Republic, Aerospace and Defense Practice Director of I3CAS, a London-based consultancy company, adjunct faculty for the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School

Mr. Vladimir Milenski, a retired Colonel of the Bulgarian Armed Forces and former Acting Chief of Policy of the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, and adjunct faculty for the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School

Mr. Glen Grant, a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the British Army and adjunct faculty for the Center for Civil-Military Relations at the Naval Postgraduate School.

The Issues in Defense Governance Workshop was held at the Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, CA from May 6-10, 2013. The event brought together distinguished guests from nine countries, including two Chief/Deputy Chiefs of Defense. The workshop was structured into two main overlapping sections: theoretical frameworks and case studies. All sessions were conducted as an interactive discussion of participants, speakers, and facilitators. Three models were introduced for creating a better understanding of the National Defense Organization. These were, the Cultural Web, McKinsey 7 S’s, and the Competing Values Framework. Towards the end of the week, the participants were asked to apply these tools to individual case studies presented to them, as well as to their own national defense organizations. To the best knowledge of the organizers and facilitators, it was the first time cultural theories were applied to analyze defense governance within the context of Central and Eastern Europe and the unique challenges they face as post-legacy institutions of countries in transition.

The main speakers and discussion facilitators during this event were:

Determine optimal defense governance practices suitable to national defense organizations that are in transition. Identify conceptual and cultural challenges associated with the reform of defense governance structures and processes, and determine methods to achieve organizational change.

Explore collaboration, leadership, and management processes of an effective MoD. Expand and enhance defense governance practitioner networks.

ofOBJECTIVESTHE ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE WORKSHOP

(Top L - R) Dr. Thomas Young, Dr. Kristina Soukupova, Mr. Vladimir Milenski, Mr. Glen Grant


& We are now beginning to understand, how important is to recognize and consider cultural differences in periods of defense reform. For many years the West, as the donor, assumed that once countries in transition reach a certain level in the democratization process institutional and national cultures would accordingly change in conformance with Western norms. These can be impediments or opportunities for organizational change. The concept of a policy framework, so common in the West, is often perceived as both a foreign concept and unintelligible for many officials in the region. During this workshop, the faculty organizers attempted to understand how one could comprehend and exploit culture, i.e; it need not be a major impediment to change. There is a great need for thoughts and ideas from officials on the receiving end of assistance as they see externalities that

most donors cannot see. The receiving countries have had experience that the donors will never be able to appreciate. The general assumption that ‘concepts are universal’ is flawed as they may indeed be antithetical to what existed there before and may in fact be working seamlessly with local standards. The West often sends ‘new and better’ processes assuming full compatibility of the underlying cultural traits, and which (unintentionally) can create a mess. History and culture have a huge impact and that without change and innovation, organizations will experience stasis and slow death.

The main points arising from the Workshop and Discussions:Governance is about delivering the right products, not just any products. Governance is defined by culture.

INTRODUCTION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Discussion Facilitator: Mr Glen Grant

CULTUREMODELS

TOOLSAPPLICABLE OF MODELS


There is no single, universally agreed definition of Governance. Several definitions were therefore used in order to explain what exactly was meant by the term. The World Bank in particular defines Governance as, “The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.” Her Majesty’s Treasury (HM Treasury), on the other hand, describes Corporate Governance in the following way:

It defines relationships and the distribution of rights and responsibilities among those who work with and in the organisation; Determines the rules and procedures through which the organisation’s objectives are set; Provides the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance; Defines where accountability lies throughout the organisation.

Governance is about delivering the right products, not just any products. If the right products are not being delivered, then governance has failed and corrective actions are needed. Defense governance has to be involved all the way from the highest ranks down to the equipment level of the soldier. Governance must prioritize needs since resources are never in excess. When we speak of governance, we must also note “negative control” in which individuals deal with many barriers to action and “positive control” in which decision-making or resource control is given to an individual. At the same time, we must be very careful to think about governance in the context of each country’s particular legislative framework, particularly recognizing the often stark contrast in approaches and assumptions used by Common and Civil Law frameworks.

In order to illustrate what Governance means in practice, the participants were asked a concrete question regarding recruitment, training and education of young officers - “How do we get the right young officers?”

Together, the participants compiled a list of qualities that they looked for in potential officers. These included: being open to learning, brave, courageous, creative, initiative takers, flexible, critical thinkers, internally motivated, responsible, and those who can understand the systems, processes and environments of the military.

There are certainly fundamental Governance questions that must be tackled in connection to any recruitment process, such as: “Who does the recruitment and selection? What are the requirements? How do we make sure that the most creative individuals do not get eliminated first?

The group discussed the importance of having the right “selectors” in order to get the right “Selectees” as well as having young officers who are either compliance driven or willing to take some risk. The concept of “leadership through penmanship” was mentioned, as an example of how writing people up for offenses can reinforce the idea that compliance is the most important aspect of the job and risk-taking is unacceptable. Mechanisms of oversight in governance must be carefully selected and overseen otherwise various stakeholders will inevitably start acting in their own self-interest.

Mr. Grant laid out the following questions in regards to getting good governance:

What sort of system do we want and why?What do we want to do with it, and what does this mean?How do we plan?How do we spend money?What sort of people do we want?How do we create innovation and a learning organisation?

Control in governance proves to be a delicate balance, as over-control in governance could lead to: centralized

decision-making, loss of innovation, rules that are out-of-date, apathy toward positive change, and the frustration of allies; while conversely, under-control could lead to the lack of good law, corruption, bullies getting their way and a system that does not work the way it was intended to.

The control method chosen for an organization is fundamentally determined by the culture of the organization as well as the nation’s culture in general, which in turn has an impact on whether or not the organization can complete its mission. Organizations should have a visible product and be open to bodies of government, the public, and media. This can be partly achieved by the internal use of MOUs, contracts, directives, service agreements and greater social interaction between managers and leaders as tools for maintaining good governance. But for external visibility of governance, it is vitally important that secrecy is not used as a tool for hiding mistakes, political decisions, inefficiencies or corruption. Regular use of Defence White Papers and briefing notes outlining decisions, changes and costs help to keep the rest of government and the public properly informed.

In summary, the ideal balance of good governance rests between over-control and under-control. Over-control slows everything, kills innovation and ruins the next generation of leaders. Under-control leads to lack of good law, laziness, and the biggest bullies have their way. Assuring good governance includes strategically identifying which organization needed change, looking at whether or not it has a clear mission and structure, engaging in tactical brainstorming, selecting viable change and governance tools, writing, testing, implementing and finally reassessing the changes made.

toINTRODUCTIONGOVERNANCE

Discussion Facilitator: Mr Glen Grant

Together, the participants compiled a list of qualities that they looked for in potential officers. These included: being open to learning, brave, courageous, creative, initiative takers, flexible, critical thinkers, internally motivated, responsible, and those who can understand the systems, processes and environments of the military.

In summary, the ideal balance of good governance rests between over-control and under-control.


& POLICY FRAMEWORK,

HARD AND SOFT POLICY

SECURITY VOUCHERS

The Ministry of Defense (MOD) is only effective if it is able to ensure that the Minister of Defense can use his or her authority in conjunction with the armed forces to achieve national security. The MOD must also be able to be effective as a military instrument, economical in its operation costs, and efficient. One of the ways of achieving this is through obtaining the so-called “Security Vouchers.”

As no country can defend itself alone, Security Vouchers are needed. In this sense, allies and alliances, relationships and activities that bring about National Security constitute and can produce Security Vouchers. Alliances are ways to solve political problems while maintaining the costs acceptable and endurable. For example, the likelihood of military offense from country A against country B is lessened when country A invests into country B.

Mr. Milenski used Bulgaria as a case study on Defense Policy and noted “NATO membership for Bulgaria brought new concepts that were accepted blindly. We erroneously believed we

understood what the introduction of these new concepts would entail. Defense Policy is the most critical part of governance and you cannot have one without the other. Within the Bulgarian Ministry of Defense, we tried to use these new concepts without success. In words we accepted the policy; in deeds we did the opposite. The general reaction was that “there was no time to change policy.”

He added an important caveat; “Vouchers come at a price and can never ensure total security. An example of this is Afghanistan—security there came with a heavy cost of human life.”

Mr. Milenski posed the following Governance and Security questions:

What is our balance of forces to be? When is a capability no longer required? What should the balance of budget be to create these forces?If the budget doesn’t cover new forces, how do you manage that?What are the things that are most vital for the future?

Facilitator: Mr. Vladimir Milenski


LOOKING AT THE DIFFICULT AREAS:

Problematic Areas of Having

Special Operations Forces

In order to illustrate issues of governance on concrete examples

from highly exposed and stressed area of defense, LTC Smith

presented his experience from the U.S. Special Operations

Command Europe.

“Special Operations Forces” (SOFs) are most commonly

associated with terms like, “strategic asset,” “unique capabilities”

and “soldiers who can be put into environmental conditions that

are above and beyond where you would normally send troops.”

LTC Smith explained that SOFs “Are given the creativity and

flexibility to conduct business. When you are looking at how

they operate, they need independence with little guidance. They

can go out for months without following the same orders and

with greater capability to help the indigenous peoples. Within

the Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) you have medical,

intelligence and weapons specialists. You want to influence the

population and tell them why you were there.”

“SOFs work together at all levels of the mission and the society

in which they are located. Parts of the U.S.’s Security Vouchers

in Europe are Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, and the

Czech Republic. There is a lot to be gained by SOF teams to

take down obstacles and conduct training. Latvia has no ability to

withstand a Russian onslaught, but with SOF it can buy time for

NATO. Having competent forces already behind enemy lines is

valuable.”

However, while Special Operations Forces are the best units

a country usually has, it is a question of governance to avoid a

widening SOF-Regular Forces Gap. According to LTC Smith,

the U.S. recognized this issue and Special Forces began training

with the regular troops in 2008. “The Commander worked with

observer controllers from the Special Forces realm to plan a

scenario to include everyone together so they could enhance

each other’s mission.” In addition to that, “there are standards

for shooting. What may be different is they may have to do other

type of shooting events. They might have to go through extra

steps to continue their training.”

As already noted, governance is determined by culture, so it is of

little surprise that the United Kingdom uses different mechanism

to minimize the gap between the SOF and the Regular Forces.

In the UK, it is customary that SF commanders circulate back

through the mainstream military. It is expected that going to SF is

a powerful way to get the officers to the Army board and secure

promotion. But, it is important that personnel need to go in and

out to remember where they come from. In the long term this

will help the whole armed forces.”

Facilitator: Lieutenant Colonel James Smith, U.S. Special Oper

ations Command Europe


1 E. H. Schein. (2010). Organizational Culture and Leadership. San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass A Wiley Imprint.2 F.Trompenaars, & P. Woolliams. (2003). Business Across Cultures. Capstone.3 G.Hofstede, (2001). Culture’s Consequences: Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, and Organizations Across Nations. (Second Edition). Sage.4 Thomas J. Peters and Robert H. Waterman, Jr.(1982). In search of excellence. New York: Harper & Row.5 T Peters (2011) McKinsey 7 S Model. It continues to benefit leaders. Leadership Excellence 28(10) 7-7

�

GOVERNANCE & CULTURECulture as a concept is deeply contested and definitions of culture are subject to various interpretations as presented by individual schools of thought. While the study of culture as such is not new, the application of cultural theories to defense governance is novel and unique. To the best knowledge of the facilitators, this was done for the first time in Monterey for this workshop. As cultural theories are extremely complex, culture was initially defined as: “A set of assumptions that have evolved over time; i.e. Culture is how we do things around here” and two forms of culture were explored: National and Organizational.

While there are numerous cultural theory models, selected theories were chosen to illustrate how culture affects the way we build, control and manage the national defense organizations. The first theory that was mentioned was Schein’s Three Level Model.1 Schein believes that culture can be explained through a dynamic

relationship between Artifacts, which are visible organizational

structures and processes; Espoused values, which

are strategies, goals and philosophies; and Underlining

Assumptions, which are the deep and long lasting unconscious beliefs that tend to be taken for granted and often not recognized by leaders as the force that drives their decisions and actions. Trompenaar’s theory on the other hand parallels Schein on several points, but he describes culture more as an onion, which has many layers – Artifacts and Products on the outside, Norms and Values underneath, and as one peels off more layers, one gets closer to the Core Belief, which is in the middle.2 According to Trompenaar, when something works for a long time, it becomes enshrined as a norm or a basic assumption, often long after the original purpose has changed or disappeared.

Yet Geert Hofstede, who claims that there are several dimensions to culture, offers another way of looking and explaining culture. These are: Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Individual vs. Group, Masculine vs. Feminine, Short Term vs. Long Term.3

After discussing what culture was, and how we can explain it, the participants then turned to cultural models, which can be used to analyze organizations. The first method introduced was McKinsey 7S Framework, which is a model developed by well-known business consultants Robert H. Waterman, Jr. and Tom Peters in the 1980s.4

While the study of culture as such is not new, the application of cultural theories to defense governance is novel and unique. To the best knowledge of the facilitators, this was done for the first time in Monterey for this workshop.

5

DAY 2


After a short discussion about the above given models, when participants were asked to come up with examples from their own cultures, Mr. Grant introduced the Competing Values Framework which was created by professors at Michigan State University twenty years ago.7 They looked at organizational culture through the lens of “What makes them effective” and found two main dimensions that shape an organization’s effectiveness: flexibility and stability on one axis, and if the organization looks outwards or inwards on another. Putting these ideas in a model makes four quadrants and every organization has traits from all of those quadrants.

According to Mr. Grant, “every organization has to have a little of itself in each quarter. There is no right or wrong culture if the organization is effective. The model should answer the questions; what are the dominant characteristics of the organization? What is the primary leadership style? How are employees managed? What is the glue for the organization? What is the strategic emphasis? What are the criteria of success? And who gets promoted?” It is from an understanding of where the emphasis lies that an organization can see what needs change to meet the future challenges.

6 G. Johnson, K.Scholes & R. Whittington (2008). Exploring Corporate Strategy: Text and Cases (8th Edn). Harlow: Pearson Education Ltd. 7 K.S. Cameron & R.E. Quinn (2006). Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mr. Grant then moved on to the Cultural Web model, which is relatively modern and is being used more in major, culturally sensitive organizations and was the driving tool used to assess and change the world leading toy company LEGO. 6


& DEFENSE HERITAGEINFLUENCES

Facilitator: Dr. Thomas Young

Interestingly enough, this question has not been addressed in the West when promoting defense transition in Central and Eastern Europe. Dr. Young and his team created a binary chart of the different mindsets between Western and Eastern, or legacy norms. Western were practical, Eastern theoretical. In the West, the most powerful norm is the decentralization of execution. In the East, power was incredibly centralized. The East is process and past oriented. The West has low context in terms of cultural rigidity and strengths and tends to look forward towards the next challenge. The West has low power distance. In addition to this, there are significant differences in semantics between the two geopolitical regions in that the same words very often mean very different things.

Dr. Young’s presentation sparked a very lively debate during which all participants offered examples of cultural differences and real life misunderstandings and misinterpretations of one culture by another culture.

“It seems as though everyone in Central and Eastern Europe can perform critical thinking but they’re not allowed to do it,” said one participant. “We’ve ignored the fact that your institutions are fundamentally unhelpful to you. The professional education systems have not kept up and are not giving the training that your young officers need. This is a cultural legacy. So many soldiers are trained in engineering as if the solution to a problem can be found in an algorithm. I have spoken with leaders who say, ‘If only we had the defense planning algorithm.’” There are none. The Positive Law heritage, which was perverted through the Communist era, causes people to use

the excuse ‘it’s the law’ from making needed reforms. You change the law, but then many times the law is changed badly.”

Dr. Young then brought up another aspect of the Communist legacy. “In the old systems and platforms you never had to think about money,” he said. “It came from society.” A participant responded; “This is a Soviet System. We spent a lot of time and effort optimizing what we have. In the old system the stuff just came in. Before, Moscow or Belgrade would take care of it.”

Mr. Grant pointed out that many Eastern concepts and ideas were antithetical to Western ones. “Some countries waste an enormous amount of money thinking about fixed territorial defense, fixed-line communications, and dispersed logistics depots. They are investing in paper battalions and headquarters. That’s money that could be spent wisely elsewhere. Nothing should be fixed. Everybody should be deployable.” In terms of governance, the main question for all countries in transition is, ‘which bits of the Western system will give us the greatest value? And ‘what will give us the capabilities we require?’

It was concluded that the longer national defense organizations remain in stasis, the more difficult it will be to change in all aspects of its life. Adaptive organizations stay at the edge of change, but even then big changes are hard. If structures are built on aging defense assets that are not replaced, at some stage the bluff will be called and something will go wrong. One cannot maintain more than one can afford, this is basic arithmetic.

As an economist, Dr. Young started his presentation referring to John Maynard Keynes, who observed that “The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones, which ramify, for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds.” Dr. Young then asked:

“How do you step beyond the legacy you have inherited?”

DEFENSE HERITAGEINFLUENCES

ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE | 1918 | ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE

Mr. Grant and Mr. Milenski presented four models of national defense organizations: Rational, Emotional, Politically Dominant, and Militarily Dominant. Note that no model can exist in a binary form, i.e., all models contain elements of all 4 themes. These four models are dynamic and change in time.

According to the presenters, national defense organizations follow the Rational Model when they are prepared to go to war at any given time. This model is prevailing in Anglo Saxon countries - US, France, Canada, Britain, Australia, and New Zealand.

The Emotional Model, by contrast, is trying to do everything except that. It is typical for the Emotional Model to run various pointless seminars about being operational, but not being operational in reality. The system does not have the capability to know what to do. In addition to that, people from this model are reluctant to request assistant as they could lose face. One can recognize an Emotional Model defense system by simply looking at the spending lines on the defense budget, which is most often unrealistic with far too much money spent on manpower, but little on training or new equipment.

In the Politically Dominant Model a country has taken a political (as opposed to rational) decision to build, manage, and maintain its defense sector in a way that they think suits them best. Most often, Political Defense models are based upon constructs like territorial defense, conscription, or heavy reliance upon society or reserves. This model is usually linked to, and enabled by, some other political ideas like non-alignment, neutrality, or independence. These countries often rely on a political decision to mobilize the country for war with a ‘hope’ to produce a working

national defense organization, in-extremis.

In the Militarily Dominant Model, the military have gained political power or influence for themselves and run the military organization for their own ends. There is loss of true civilian political control and this becomes extremely difficult to get back. The prime example today of this model is Egypt. Regaining true civilian control may take decades.

The facilitators stressed that the biggest challenge is to understand who you are in the model and who you want to be. There are always stresses that pull you in another direction. Everybody wants to be considered ‘rational,” but few truly are.

Mr. Grant offered an example of a country; “They have fixed territorial defense and it is militarily nonsense but the politicians believe it like a religion. Professionally the officers are trying hard to make a broken system work. They have to lie to themselves and others but they work hard to make it happen. The officers are breaking and they are losing them at a high rate. They reach a point where they can no longer stand it. Many highly qualified officers have left in the last few years because politicians are using things for their own benefit.”

Mr. Grant emphasized that the four models were not competing values, or mutually exclusive, and noted that it was possible for a country to change from one model to another over time. The tendency to stay in one particular model is determined by national culture and so is the ideal defense model. Participants then discussed particularities of each model including additional models that could be added to this construct.

4 Facilitator: Mr. Grant and Mr. Milenski

WAYS OF LOOKING ATNATIONAL DEFENSE ORGANIZATIONS

DAY 3

20 | ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE

& self-evaluation paper:

CULTURE NATIONAL ORGANIZATIONAL TENDENCIES

All participants were handed out Competing Values Framework Questionnaire and Graph and were asked to fill them in according to the best knowledge of their own defense organizations.1

The framework assigns a numerical value 1-100 to a number of key features in an organization: Organizational Glue, Strategic Emphasis, Criteria of Success, Dominant Characteristic, Organizational Leadership, and Personnel Management. These features get an A, B, C, D listing and each group (A,B,C,D) is added up, divided by 6 and graphed in one of four quadrants. This is done once for current organizational operation and once for desired changes.

The participants were informed that if the difference on an axis between now and future is more than 10 points the organization needs a revolution. The difference in points between 3 and 6 is incremental to development, meaning that the organization is at its cruising speed and from time to time it will adapt itself

Participants from the same country compared their findings and many were surprised to find that their assessments were similar. The first group decided they needed more creativity less hierarchy. “We have a human resource issues and

also we have different estimations for operations,” one member explained. “The general conclusion is that we need to change the level of creativity and innovation significantly and drastically decrease hierarchy.”

The second group assessed their training center and found that it had more hierarchy and less adhocracy and clan. “We want to reduce the hierarchy, increase adhocracy and operations,” said one member. “This is not for today, but for the future.”

The Fourth Group evaluated their country’s national defense organization. “What we want is more creativity and innovation and less formalized and hierarchical control,” explained one member. “It’s fascinating for us because now we can look at which training tools we need to develop. These are not what we’ve been looking at and thinking.”

The Fifth Group assessed a civilian department that was once military. “If you have too much clan culture plus hierarchy you don’t get the outcome desired,” one member said. “People are like family, but everybody looks to the father to make decisions. This is a civilian organization. I want an emphasis on market and adhocracy with new people and experts who think outside the box.”

Facilitator: Dr. Soukupova and Mr. Milenski

Group six looked at South Sudan for an assessment. “If I go back I will do this with the people there,” said the member. “There isn’t that big of a difference on the Clan culture. There are good things about that too. The model is good but doesn’t explain everything. You have to use common sense as well. This is complex and they have to change themselves.”

In every case the participants had a difference for their organization of more than 10 points between what they had and what they wanted in at least one quadrant and in most cases the difference was severe, indicating that dramatic transformational change was required immediately.

To conclude, the participants identified key areas in their respective national defense organizations that needed governance change. A fascinating result of this exercise showed that most participants realized that their military organizations were too hierarchical and wanted to move towards more flexible, merit-based structures. The participants recognized that they could use the hierarchy to “order” change and make the system more creative to a certain extent. There are also business tools such as key performance indicators, objectives, and reports or essays at the end of the year, which may assist them.

1 K.S. Cameron & R.E. Quinn (2006). Diagnosing and Changing Organisational Culture. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE | 21

22 | ISSUES IN DEFENSE GOVERNANCE

REVIEWS

CONDUCTING D E F E N S E

from PARLIAMENT t o P I L O T

Ninety percent of all defense reviews around the world are probably wastes of time. A prime example is in the U.S. The Quadrennial Defense Review has consistently failed to bring systematic change to the U.S. armed forces. Change

must be addressed in numerous aspects simultaneously. Dr. Young stressed that a review can be judged as having been successful if “money changes;” if it does not, then the review manifestly has been a waste of time and effort.

The most common reasons for initiating a Defense Review is in response to a decrease in resources, or a significant change in policy. The review uses operational analysis and financial, i.e., day-to-day defense planning tools. However, what distinguishes a review from normal/daily defense planning and management is that it must systematically question every assumption in the national defense organization. It is an intellectual and bureaucratic process. In fact, successful Defense Reviews empower change management, for which sufficient expertise is critical. Importantly, Defense Reviews must consider resources foremost and must balance their effective and efficient utilization.

Dr. Young then explained how Defense Reviews fail.” Governments don’t realize what they’re asking for and guidance typically isn’t clear. Parameters aren’t clear. There present huge financial and opportunity costs. Multi-year reviews take up time and typically can be seen as wasteful. Defense Reviews in former-legacy national defense organizations are a foreign concept as they are a highly nuanced Western idea. It’s a hard process to encourage countries to understand fully, let alone adopt successfully. We have sophisticated programs in the U.S. and U.K. and oftentimes we do not do it right.”

As an example of successful Defense Review the facilitators presented Defense Review conducted in the United Kingdom in 1992, which was open, and with full participation of all relevant ministries across the British government. The UK managed to solve the fundamental Defense

Review equation:

Current Policy = Today’s Budget = Current Force Structure.

The participants however pointed out that most post-Communist countries do not have a “costing culture” and so it is very difficult for them to include finances into their respective Defense Review processes. Another issue that became apparent was that the political leadership must be mentally ready and politically strong to face the public when making changes.

The true metric of success in the Defense Review is behavioral; it’s cognitive and social. Facilitators: Dr. Thomas Young and Dr. Kristina Soukup

The key change in any defense review is behavioural, cognitive, and social,


Implementation is about doing the actual change with regards to governance. When advising on how to achieve that, Mr. Grant stated that rather than making great plans it is much more effective to: “target the key person to make change and give him the responsibility, authority, and the deadline to achieve change.”

The best way is to start by organizing implementation committees and setting the priorities early, putting them under pressure to deliver change. Everyone in the organization must be involved in order to optimize all of its aspects. Focus must be on the optimization of the money. The key to success is to ensure that change is reflected in the budget. However, it is not just about having a good plan and budget; one should also look at changing doctrine and standards because new doctrine can change the plan.

The participants discussed examples of defense reviews in their own respective countries and compared experience with the implementation process.

Facilitator: Mr. Glen Grant

“Target the key person to make change and give him the responsibility, authority, and the deadline to achieve change.”


&The Czech Case Study:

A HARD ROCKY ROAD

It is unrealistic for anyone to expect convincing people to think critically about their defence governance unless first he demonstrates such thinking towards his own defence governance. Therefore three case studies were introduced and discussed, with the idea to stimulate participants to apply critical view at their own defence governance systems.

The Czech Republic is usually considered as a success case in terms of defense transition and defense governance in general. Dr. Soukupova presented a somewhat different view on the de facto process continuous defense transformation as it has taken place in the Czech Republic over the past twenty years.

Dr. Soukupova listed a few events defining the Czech civil-military ‘non-relations’: The First Republic (1918) and German Occupation (1938)-National Non-Defense I era. After building the most modern armed forces in Europe after World War I, Czechoslovakia was annexed to Nazi Germany as a result of the Munich Agreement and the military was ordered to turn over all equipment to the Germans. The Czechs and Slovaks were demoralized and many soldiers left to join foreign legions.

During the Communist Era (1948-1989), the military became political. With the Warsaw Pact (1955) the country lost any sort of independence; all guidance came from Moscow. With the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia (1968), the National Non-Defense II era began. Again, foreign forces occupied the country and the Czechoslovak military was told to stay in barracks and provide facilities. Next was the Velvet Revolution of 1989, which was effectively a police event, as the military was not used against the public by the communist regime. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia in 1993 divided the military into two (Armed Forces of the Czech Republic and Armed Forces of Slovakia) and NATO membership in 1999 unified many elements back again. Fundamentally, the Czech armed forces have always been part of the bigger whole and the country had only a very limited space to develop

its own non-technical defense expert base. First the Austro-Hungarians then the Soviets, and now the Czechs keep looking to Brussels and NATO for instructions.

Perhaps as a result of its historical experience, there is no public interest in defense and no public debate in the Czech Republic. Although there are very good things coming out of the Czech Republic (e.g., the successful overseas deployments of Czech soldiers, or defense technology exports), the public simply does not care. The Ministry of Defense does not have an effective PR capacity and the public does not care for the military – Dr. Soukupova termed this as the Czech civil-military non-relations, which create many opportunities for corruption, nepotism, and inconsistency of policy and purpose. However, despite its strange civil-military relations, the Czech Republic has a tiny,

Facilitator: Dr. Kristina Soukupova

but relatively strong defense industry with a long tradition of producing high-quality equipment. The defense industrial lobby has played a defining role in all defense transformations up to now.

The Czech Republic adopted twenty-four strategic documents since 1991, many of which were never fully implemented. The second to last one of them is the White Book on Defense 2011. The initial objective of this document was to give a new vector and start public debate. For the first time in twenty years, a fundamental question, “Why do we have the armed forces?” had to be asked. However, the adoption of new thinking met resistance already during the writing of the document.

The White Book acknowledges that the armed forces are transforming themselves towards becoming an expeditionary force, yet at the same time the claim is made that territorial defense remains one of its core functions. This is, indeed, a strange rationale for the armed forces given their advantageous defense position surrounded by NATO countries.

Two years after adoption by the government, the White Book is lagging in implementation, with some provisions having been cancelled altogether as being unrealistic. With that, there was further decline of the morale of the armed forces.

The White Book on Defense only added to the myriad of the previous strategic documents. The Czech defense sector has proven itself of transforming itself according to policy and requirements, and it only changes to comply with the various commitments they have made to NATO and EU. As Dr. Soukupova noted, “There is not one transformation or a continued process of us getting better. The Czech Republic is in a constant disjointed process of disaggregated transformations, which come with almost every new Minister of Defense. Western norms and procedures are accepted pro forma, but then simply applied on top of legacy systems. At the same time, while the system is broken, the soldiers on the ground perform exceptionally well and are regarded as true professionals outside of the Czech Republic.”

DAY 4


German Ministry Defense Re-organization

As Dr. Abenheim explained, Germany shows how well a democracy can unite and integrate armed forces from disparate political entities. The German military originated as an instrument of the monarch and from that battled unsuccessfully against Napoleon. Germans were great innovators and invited the institution of the General Staff, but in other areas they made bad decisions.

There are important things to know: The Bundeswehr is not a democratic army. Germany entered NATO 1955 twice and after 1999. The country worked from limited sovereignty to full sovereignty and the implications that has. NATO managed much of West Germany’s change. Early problems in the German national defense organization demonstrated that there was a need to adjust to modern technology, for example, for ten years Germans did not fly or maintain combat aircraft. Helmut Schmidt, as Federal Defense Minister, made significant process in rebuilding the German armed forces. Since 1990 and the end of the Cold War, the armed forces have been in the grips of change, while the government only changed defense policy incrementally and cautiously due to Germany’s unique history in modern times. That is a process that has received little notice outside of Germany. The title for this “new model army” is “the Army in Engagement.” The most critical reform has been the establishment of a full national command structure, whereby during the Cold War the German MOD had no permanent operations section and supporting national command procedures. Notwithstanding the altered security environment, German politicians and the public have had a long-term phobia of deploying forces “out of area.” Since 2009, when fighting moved northward in Afghanistan, two Federal

Defense Ministers left under a cloud. In 2010-11, the government made the decision to undertake a fundament reorganization of the Bundeswehr.

The most recent reform cycle started in 2009 and is scheduled for completion at the end of this year (2013). The need for reform was triggered by the current economic crisis, yet there were other reasons to reassess Germany’s defense posture. The current reform effort is not façade, but it attempts to build a mission- and future-oriented force embedded in NATO, capable of executing a broad spectrum of tasks. This reform should be seen as constituting both a challenge and an opportunity. Critically, it proposes to close the current gap that exists between resources and policy objectives.

The first reform steps were implemented at short notice in 2011. Now the national defense organization will have undergone big changes in light of the recent cut of 8 billion Euros in the medium-term defense budget. Accordingly, conscript has been ended and in 2009 the CHOD was directed to study reducing the armed forces by 40,000.

In terms of level of national ambition, it is necessary to understand that German military remains firmly dedicated to its NATO commitments. The Bundeswehr largely will retain its defensive orientation, but as outside missions remain the most probable task for our forces, the armed forces are being restructured to be able to deploy permanently land battle groups and maritime units, while contributing 15% of to NATO’s integrated command and force

Professor Donald Abenheim, Department of National Security Affairs, Naval Postgraduate School

structure. To carry out these ambitious objectives, efficiencies must be found and less important tasks must be sacrificed. This is being accomplished in a top-down approach, starting with the MOD and ending at the troop level. Previously, 12 departments, with a staff of 5,000, constituted the MOD; this has been reduced to nine departments with 2,000 personnel, located both in Berlin and Bonn. The Service Chiefs are no longer part of the MoD. The CHOD is now firmly responsible for overseeing operations.

A German participant discussed the lessons learned by Germany from its operations in Afghanistan. In 2004 an action plan to improve inter-ministerial co-operation was agreed to facilitate crisis management and conflict resolution. There is now a permanent group that reports to Parliament. New emphasis is being placed on the rule of law and good governance. What we have learned is that the other ministries are open to the national defense organization’s concerns. What has been learned from the

experience in Afghanistan is that the military itself cannot succeed alone in deployment operations.

Another German participant discussed the perspective as a young officer to give a view from the bottom of the organization. Importantly, there has been significant change in the armed forces due to a 10 year long deployment cycle conducting combat operations in a distant theater, all of which has had a huge effect on the armed forces culturally. In effect, the story of the recent reform of the entire German national defense organization can be underlined by the themes of change in a uniquely politically-sensitive environment at home and in Europe, played against the back-drop of the Bundeswehr undertaking over the past 10 years operations far from home and executing missions which are far different from the defense of national territory.

of


The BULGARIANCASE STUDYMr. Milenski started his presentation with a short overview of the history of Bulgaria, which dates back 1,300 years ago. The accent in this historical retrospection were those facts and traits, and even “legends and myths”, that are determinants, and represent very important cultural inputs and which are even today to a great extent shaping the defense system and its governance.

For example, Bulgarians are very proud of their ancient history. They often mention their state’s unique quality of being the only one in Europe that kept its name unchanged throughout the centuries. They take pride of being historically a warrior nation. Throughout history Bulgaria made many examples of heroism and military innovativeness. In 1878 the Russia-Turkish war finished and Bulgaria reappeared on the map after 500 years of nonexistence. However, Bulgaria lost any memory of governance during this time. There was no nobility, which shortened the power distance and made equality a dominant theme throughout the nation. Nationalism surged.

Mr. Milenski warned that, “It’s good to have symbols but not when they become a cult.” Another narrative is that Bulgarians never lost a battle, but equally never won a war. This represents the clash between the political and military groups. From defense governance stand point, politicians are seen as being bad, corrupt, and losing wars. Bulgaria lost the Balkan Wars, WWI was a

disaster and so was WWII. There were two military coup d’état (1923) and (1934) and there was military dominated politics. The Tsar suspended the constitution, forbade political parties, and took direct governance. Thus there was no institutional memory of democracy.

What was the National Ideal Mr. Milenski asked? Until today, it was and to extent still is what the Russians tried to impose: a geographically big Bulgaria under their influence. “We always expected during the last decades of the Ottoman War, that we could not liberate ourselves alone. How can a small mouse like Bulgaria defend themselves? We needed an all, i.e., Russia.” During the period leading up to WWII, the national ideal was to reunite the lands inhabited by Bulgarians (like Macedonia, pieces in Turkey and Romania, etc.) Every officer in a military school was taught that in his career there would be at least one war because we had to get back our lands. This was, and remains, a strong line of thought.

In 1945, after WWII Russians came to Bulgaria. The first three weeks were filled with slaughter. The Communists, protected by Russia, were in a hurry to kill: In several weeks they killed about 20,000 people. They decapitated those in governance, the aristocracy, intellectuals, and businessmen. They established a new leadership that was loyal to the Communist regime.

From 1945 to 1989, under Communism, it was the Orwellian “1984”, therefore no societal reflex for a good democratic governance. People often prefer a strong hand, a charismatic messiah etc. From 1989 to the present, Bulgarian went through a transition to Democracy. What happened in 1989 didn’t decapitate the Communist structure. In Defense, in 23 years we succeeded in conducting four and a half Defense Reviews. At least one was a total failure. We created a great document that was 95% secret and only useful to a selected few. We jumped toward NATO. Nobody was paying attention to the small problems that were to upset the apple cart (NATO least of all).

According to Mr. Milenski, Bulgaria suffers from a patriarchal mindset. “Face-saving and reluctance to criticize: equals-hardly ever, seniors-never! You can’t criticize, so you keep silent. Nobody taught me to look at myself. I thought this was unacceptable to argue face to face. To criticize the boss is your last day.”

“By having this indirect culture, we are always trying to understand what someone really meant when they said something directly. Ironically, when there is something contradictory, it can be said openly, but nobody will believe it. They are convinced that there is a hidden message.”

Passive waiting for orders:“But I’m only a two-star!” -A general’s reaction when suggested to propose change.

“Nobody has tasked me!”- Senior Policy Directorate Official.

They said this in the middle of a revolution. They were in power and respected, but they knew their place.

Flexibility of Truth- “Yes it seems this is the right way, but here it will not work. We are unique and different, you don’t understand us, and therefore we’ll do it another way.”

This is the answer when you make a suggestion. It will not work here, you don’t know us. They bring water from nine wells. Excuses to convince you this will not happen. Official documents never say: “It will not work here.” They say the contrary. When you ask how we will do things, declarations are one thing, actions are the other. People live in this “split mentality” world of diametrically opposite declarations and deeds. It is impossible at the lower level: you can’t tell the soldiers that they are trained when they never do training because they know the real truth. The national defense organization as a whole has stopped working.

A prime example was the Deputy Chief of Defense who had advanced to his position but had never had experience of commanding a proper combat unit.

How do we beat this? With science? Science during the Socialist times was discredited.

“Theory is for academia, reality has its own truth.”

Facilitator: Mr. Vlad Milenski

DAY 5

Every officer in a military school was taught that in his career there would be at least one war because we had to get back our lands.

IN BATTLE, PAINTING BY YAROSLAV VESHIN


The “Military Academy was ignored or kept in check by being told to keep their mouth shut.” Worse it was lauded as being world class and a pride of Bulgaria even when it was clear it was stuck in an educational time warp.

There is a lack of independent think tanks or NGOs that address defense issues in Bulgaria. And all the ones that exist are full of former generals and colonels.

Why was the science discredited? During the Communist period, every document had to start with an explanation of how it supported the Communist idea and the Party Line. Without this, it wasn’t published. Even things with no ideological relation had to be related somehow. This ruined the idea of the science. Now science is not taken as a trusted source of advice.

You’ve got people in the staff doing Master’s and PhD on the subject on the outside and they see no connection between what they’ve written and their jobs; that the study might have applications for change back home.

This has roots in the system. How science is qualified. It is necessary before preparation

of a paper to have approval from a scientific committee. They are made of old people and vote on whether or not it’s a good idea to publish the paper. All have a Soviet past and their mentality is stuck. They don’t see the important things for development. They are slow to adopt new technologies and management.

Redressing the inaction as balance or avoidance of radicalism?

Inaction is presented as the balanced way of moving forward. We avoid radical moves. Slowly, slowly so as not to make people suffer. In order to save 100 families you doom 100,000 families.

Faked activity. Running in place with high knees. You haven’t moved and you’re exhausted.

The biggest problem in Bulgaria is reported in media as corruption. This is a problem but not as big as people expect.

Corruption: Is it hard or soft? The biggest part of corruption is through the work environment. You do nothing for “eight

hours” Explain how this is necessary. You stop the system to do your job. As a result you have 20,000 people who do nothing, but get paid for 20 years. This is a much higher level of corruption. $500 million Euros is lost this way every year.

Defense Policy: This is completely absent from Bulgarians’ minds. This animal doesn’t exist. “There is an absent of a tradition of defense policy (be it hard or soft) and misinterpreting it with domestic partisan politics.” They do not even want to listen to facts or communicate with the outside world in case the Bulgarian “truth” becomes distorted.

Because there is no Defense Policy there is no informed public debate and populism and myths prevail. No public reflex for defence policy abuse.

Secrecy accepted as normal. “Say it’s a State Secret” and no one will question it. This comes back to the public image of the armed forces-they are good and have a right to be secretive.

Static vs. Dynamic thinking

Static prevails. People prefer to have a fixed plan. The attempt for any Defense Review is understood under the normal line of development: Unfreeze-Change-Refreeze.

Documents vs. Processes - The Document is the Tsar.

A Defense Review is a “post disaster exercise,” not a deliberate quest for adequacy to a dynamic reality and for scoping out a better future. It is difficult to go to the minister and suggest a Defense Review. I understand this but in any case, the strongest weapon the admirals have is the operation, which is insensitive to election cycles.

Because we couldn’t purge the old ranks. The old guys take things personally. You say the first Defense Review was a failure and you get an emotional outburst in response. The general marches out.

“Why am I a general if I’m a failure?” They simply switched off and failed to think about reform and change any further.

“It is not the cobblestone, but small pebbles that tip

over the chariot” - A bulgarian proverb

A Defence Review is a “post-disaster exercise,”not a deliberate quest for adequacy to a dynamic reality

and for scoping out a better future.


PARTICIPANTSFACILITATORS

State Counselor Ara Mesrobyan Deputy Director, Defense Policy Ministry of Defense

ARM

ENIA

Vice Admiral Dragan Samardzic Chief of Defense General Staff, Ministry of Defense

MON

TENE

GRO

Ms. Sanela Dozgic Chief of Staff Minister’s Cabinet, Ministry of Defense

MON

TENE

GRO

LTC Rajko Pesic Advisor to the Minister for Military Affairs Ministry of Defense

MON

TENE

GRO

CDR Elchin Mammadov Section Chief at J5 Ministry of Defense

AZER

BAIJ

AN

AZER

BAIJ

AN

Maj Murad Zeynalov Chief of IPAP cell at MoD International Military Cooperation Department, Ministry of Defense

Col Terje HaaverstadSenior Project Officer Centre for Integrity in the Defence Sector, Ministry of Defense

NORW

AY

Mr. Glen Grant Staff Consultant Adjunct Faculty, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

UNIT

ED K

INGD

OM

Mr. Vladimer MilenskiStaff ConsultantAdjunct Faculty, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

BULG

AR

IA

Dr. Thomas YoungEurope Program DirectorCenter for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

USA

Dr. Kristina Soukupova Staff Consultant Adjunct Faculty, Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

CZ

ECH

REP

UBL

IC

Mr. Matthew Vaccaro Program Director, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies Center for Civil-Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School

USA

Admiral Ihor KabanenkoFirst Deputy Chief of Defense General Staff, Armed Forces of Ukraine

UKRA

INE

Col Serhiy Maslovskyi Deputy of the Chief of Directorate General Staff, Armed Forces of Ukraine

UKRA

INE

LTC James (JP) Smith SOJ39 Division Chief, Effects and Special Programs Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR)

USA

Mr. Nicholas TombAssistant Program Manager, Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction StudiesCenter for Civil-Military Relations,Naval Postgraduate School

USA

&


CONCLUSIONAs noted at the beginning of this workshop, this was, to the best knowledge of the facilitators, a first effort to use cultural theories as a basis for analysis and furtherance of defense reform in a Central and Eastern European context. The workshop was, perhaps more importantly, a learning experience for all who attended. While the participants were given tools and models to analyze their own organizations, CCMR faculty had a chance to gain additional insights into the individual cultures within defense organizations of the participants. All involved contrasted Western norms against individual national cultures and evaluated what has, and what has not, worked in the past. The workshop brought some fascinating conclusions. For example, most participants agreed that they wanted their defense organizations to be less hierarchical, which is against the very essence of traditional defense organization structure. Moreover, participants from Slavic speaking countries agreed that the workshop made them realize that many of the problems they were facing during their reform were, in their origins, semantic in nature. For instance, there is no word or phrase in Slavic languages that would equal the English term Strategic Defense Review (SDR). As a result, there is no common understanding in many countries in transition of what is involved in such a review, let alone how to perform one. Many examples of cultural and semantic differences were discussed throughout the week and it was concluded that if change is to be effective and sustainable, it should begin with a full and mutual understanding of the cultural environment and cannot be implied, or simply imported from the outside. All participants agreed that the workshop was a tremendous, eye-opening experience, which made them think of their own cultures differently, and more importantly, appreciate their own cultures for what they are.

To the right, is a result of participants’ evaluation at the end of the workshop, which one CCMR official termed as the most successful participants’ evaluation he has seen.

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