of 38
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
1/38
Di Mauro-Nava 0
Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
Stefania Di Mauro-Nava
General University HonorsProfessor Schneider
4 May 2010
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
2/38
Di Mauro-Nava 1
Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
Introduction
Ask most Italians where they are from and most of the time, you are guaranteed to hear a
regional area before you hear the word Italy, or even Europe.1
This paper will argue the
failure of the Italian state to unite in a uniformed manner in the 1800s has directly impacted the
relative weakness of a national identity today, especially in contrast to the stronger nationalist
identities in Northern Europe.
In the current atmosphere, it seems unlikely that regions will cease to be important and
that Italian identity will predominate. Regions hold lot of power in terms of determining laws
and policy, much like the states in the United States do. The historical process of state formation
helps explain why these regionalist tendencies continue to persist in this state. For example, the
recognition of territorial differentiation, which was established in the 19482, continues to give
validity to these cleavages in Italian society.
The goal of this Capstone project is to explore the question of the creation of a collective
identity formation, by examining how the unification of the Italian state occurred and why
regionalism continues to plague this Southern European state. While some scholars have done
general research on regionalism, namely in the North and the phenomenon of the Lega Nord,
however, there has been surprisingly little research on the persistence of regional identities in
Southern Italy. Such research might shed light as to why old identities persist even when those
states have been superceded or merged into a larger entity. Italy was chosen because, unlike most
of its respective Western European brethren, especially those of the original six founding
1Personal observation made through two month travel in Italy and interaction with Italian nationals both
in Italy and outside of the state.2Amoretti, Ugo M. "Italy: Political Institutions and the Mobilization of Territorial Differences."
Federalism and Territorial Cleavages. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP, 2004, 186.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
3/38
Di Mauro-Nava 2
member states, Italys state formation led to a weak central government and the persistence of
regional enclaves.
Literature Review
In international studies, the role of cultural identity and its importance to political
structure are not agreed upon between the different ideological fields of IR research and
academics. In this case, the definitions and role of nation and identity and the role of institutions
and how these perceptions of the self do have an impact on not only present day but future
processes of cultural integration and governmental action.
The root of the internal Italian struggle for identity, according to the late Charles Tilly,
can be traced back to the very origins of the process of the state creation. The tolerance of the
states of Southeastern Europe for linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity stand in sharp
contrast to the intolerance of the Northwestern brethren, and surely stood in the way of effective
state-making. For Italy this process resulted in state weakness as Italy was formed from a
conglomerate of city-states, which did not wish to belong to a larger national state. The failure to
homogenize increased the likelihood that a state existing at a given point in time would fragment
into its cultural subdivisions at some time in the future.3
As Tilly argues a state and what it comes to represent is the result of a process; it did not
just exist. Transactional[social process] accounts take interactions among social sites as their
starting points, treating both events at those sites and durable characteristics of those sites as
outcomes of interactions.4In Europe, Tilly argues that war-making, capital and coercion are all
parts of the equation that lead to European states. When the Muslims left Europe by the 14th
and
15th
centuries, Europeans were in the position to expand into these areas left open by their former
3Tilly, Charles. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. The Formation of
National States in Western Europe. Ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 44.4Tilly, Charles.Identities, Boundaries, and Social Ties. New York: Paradigm, 2005, 14.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
4/38
Di Mauro-Nava 3
conquerors. It was through those in positions to coerce and their negotiations with those in
possession of capital that lead to the different formations of state creation.5
For Italy, war making was not a part of their story until much later in the state-making
process. The northern states began to look outside of their pre-set boundaries and continued to
draw Italy into their conflicts. According to Tilly:
In Italy, the alteration of warfare had devastating consequences. By the 1520s, Hapsburgs
and Valois were fighting their dynastic wars on Italian territory. In 1527, the Hapsburg
emperors mercenaries sacked Rome. As of 1540, Milan and Lombardy had fallen under
Spanish rule, France occupied such of Savoy and Piedmont, Florence had become a
Medici-ruled duchy., and Naples was an appanage [sic] of the Spanish crown. Of the
greater Italian powers, only the most maritime, Venice and Genoa, had maintained their
oligarchic institutions. Even they lost their pre-eminence in the Mediterranean.6
As the process of state development continued to form and develop from roughly the 15th
to 17th
centuries, European states of the time were very cautious in the development of national identity
within their territorial boundaries and those outside of them. This is a major distinction between
the development of Western and Eastern European states as well as a distinction between those
in the North and South. As Tilly argues in the European model of state making, In a large
perspective, the European state-making process minimized the cultural variation withinstates
and maximized the variation amongstates7. In a similar vain, Giorgio Chittolini argues that the
lack of consolidation of the Italian states is due to the strength of municipal traditions dating
back to the Middle Ages:
5Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States: Ad 990 - 1992. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.:
Blackwell, 2006, 14.6Ibid, 78.
7Tilly, Charles. Reflections on the History of European State-Making. The Formation of
National States in Western Europe. Ed. Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 79.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
5/38
Di Mauro-Nava 4
A unitary Italian state only formed in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Although
this tardiness was due to many other factors besides the strength of Italys cities, the roots
of a strong municipal tradition dating back to the Middle Ages certainly held back the
forces tending toward the countrys territorial unification. Most notably during the later
Middle Ages and the Renaissance, at precisely the time when the great western
monarchies were consolidating, the political system of central and northern Italy was
characterized by the city-states great fragmentation and spirit of autonomy.8
This system of developing a cultural identity differs from the state-making process and as such is
usually identified as nation-building. Nation-building is meant to reinforce these internal
differences from those on the exterior and create loyalty from those within the pre-determined
boundary9.
Tillys model for European state creation brings into light many of the historical aspects
that influence stare formation and how this process, unique to every state, does influence its
character and behavior. By applying the concepts of coercion and capital to the Italian model
Tilly demonstrates how the current division between North and South are not impossible.
The great disparity between North and South Italy is not questioned, it is accepted by
most scholars. However, the reasons for this disparity are contested, and one of the biggest
voices in this enterprise in Robert Putnam. According to Putnam, the main reason that Northern
Italy is more developed than the South is because the North has a tradition of civil society and
political participation. Additionally, Putnam argues, effective democracy is correlated with
8Chittolini, Giorgio. "Cities, "City-States," and Regional States in North-Central Italy." Cities andthe Rise of States in Europe, A. D. 1000-1800. Ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans. New York:
Perseus Books Group, 1994,28.9Almond and Powell qtd. inIbid,79.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
6/38
Di Mauro-Nava 5
socioeconomic modernization10
In order to test his theories, Putnam and his associates took to
the streets of Italy and in a quantitative research model, attempted to gauge the level of civic
participation in order to verify to what extent these differences existed. In their model, they
tested civic community on the level of members unions, church and political parties had in these
regions.
According to their results, the North had a higher level of civic community as opposed to
the South, which for Putnam translated to higher democratic values and a more horizontal
social and political network as opposed to the South, which displays a more vertical structure.
This means that in the North, citizens take a more active role in politics and participating in
local/regional activities that influence political leaders. Inversely in the South, Putnam claims
that citizens view politics as something that the notabilior elites deal with, and there is little
incentive to partake in debate because corruption is seen a normal.11
There are several problems with Putnam and others who relegate the South as an
uncivil and backwards society. The first issue with Putnam is that he assumes the South is less
democratic than the North because of the Norths civic community. While the data cannot be
disputed that the North does in fact have a more active civic society, this does not necessarily
mean that they were always more democratic. Putnam fails to mention in his book on several
occasions that those regions in Italy, which are now the most democratic, were the bases of
fascist organization in the early 20th
century. Having civic community means that ideas can
circulate to a wider audience and for an extended period of time, it does not mean that these
ideas are necessary democratic in nature.
10Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Nanetti.Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions
in Modern Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1994, 84.11
Ibid, 115.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
7/38
Di Mauro-Nava 6
Another issue with Putnams argument is his lack of consideration for how economic
progression has made the two different.12It is proven that the North is more economically
developed than the South, however, the South did not have the same opportunities to develop as
the North. The North has always had an advantage over the South, first as trade ports and
merchants and now in industry. The North had traditionally relied upon the South for sources of
cheap labor and agricultural production.13
Edward Banfield makes the same false assumptions, when he claims in his book, The
Moral Basis of a Backward Society, that:
the extreme poverty and backwardness of which is to be explained largely (but not
entirely) by the inability of the villagers to act together for their common good, or, indeed
for any end transcending the immediate, material interest of the nuclear family. This
inability to concert activity beyond the immediate family arises from an ethos-that of
amoral familism- which has been produced by three factors acting in combinations: a
high death rate, certain land tenure conditions, and the absence of the institution of the
extended family.14
It is the latter part of this, especially the absence of the institution of the extended family is
debatable. According to Gunther et al inDemocracy and the State in the New Southern Europe,
clientalism and familism play a role in the structure of the family unit and culture of Southern
Italy. In the South, home ownership is more prevalent than in than in the North and traditional
gender roles are more common in the South than in the North. This is because while the
12Tarrow, Sidney. "Making social science work across space and time: A critical reflection on Robert
Putnam's Making Democracy Work. " The American Political ScienceReview 90.2 (1996): 389-397.
ABI/INFORM Global, ProQuest. Web. 29 Apr. 2010.13Calavitas, Kitty.Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. New York:
Cambridge UP, 2005.14
Banfield, Edward. The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York, The Free Press, 1958.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
8/38
Di Mauro-Nava 7
economic situation may not be good, families tend to live with several members of their
extended family and at least the patriarch has some sort of income, with other family members
contributing in the form of pensions, watching the children or facilitating the running of the
household.15
Unlike Putnam and his notions of civic community, Sydney Tarrow has focused his
scholarly work on the power of social movements and their importance to state structure.
According to his work, four prerequisites need to exist in order for social movements to occur,
political opportunity, a diffuse social network, familiar forms of collective action and cultural
frames that resonate throughout a population.
16
Tarrow and his associates divide these social
movements in contained contention and transgressive [sic] contention. The majority of episodes
examined, including those of Italy, fall within the transgressive category, which is defined by
Tarrow as:
[contention which] consists of episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of
claims and their objects when (a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of
claims, or a party to the claims, (b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of the
at least one of the claimants, (c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-
identified political actors, and/or (d) at least some parties employ innovative collective
action. ) Action qualifies as innovative if it incorporates claims, selects objects of claims,
15Gunther,Richard,NikiforosP.
Diamandouros,andA.Sotiropoulos.
DemocracyandtheStateintheNew
SouthernEurope.Oxford:Oxford
UP,2006.16McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
9/38
Di Mauro-Nava 8
includes collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either
unprecedented or forbidden within the regime in question.)17
As Tarrow then highlights, the social movements of the 1960s in Italy broadcast how these
movements lead to the creation of other movements with similar goals. When the first wave of
protests began in 1967-68 in Northern universities, where students were protesting to reform in
response to the end of the Italian economic miracle. These various protests led to a clash between
the right and left political parties, with the left loosing ground and the rise of the right in Italian
politics, especially in the North where these protests concentrated.18
This specific example and others as illustrated by Tarrow show how the Italian state
continues to redefine its regional boundaries s and how the relationship between the North and
South, and between populous and government continues to change as internal conditions change.
The rebellions of the 1960s were partially due to the loss of cheap Southern labor, easing of Cold
War tensions and secularization.19
However, as the rest of the material suggests, these instances
in contentious Italian politics are not localized to the 20th
century, as rebellion and resistance are
part of the Italian narrative since before the inception of the modern Italian state.
Why are developments in the two regions so different? Scholars acknowledge that some
of this difference is attributed to the regional governments found in each of Italys twenty
regions.20
The struggle within these regional governments to form a solid regional identity and
common foundation has led to regional loyalty, yes, not national but also to a more problematic
national disloyalty to opposing regions. The creation of political parties such as the Lega Nord
17Ibid, 7-8.18
Ibid, 30-31.19
Ibid, 30.20Mammone, Andrea, and Giuseppe A. Veltri. "Italy in Chiaroscuro: the dark shadows of modern
Italian society."Journal of Modern Italian Studies13 (2008): 297-304. Academic Search Premier.
EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
10/38
Di Mauro-Nava 9
(Northern League) in the North has led to tension among the regions of the North and the South
as the LN calls for secession from regions they deem to be holding the North back from full
development21
.
The understudied regions of Southern Italy allow for misconceptions to be formed of the
region and why it continues to not be at the same economic and political standards of the North.
As some in the field have tried to explore, the problem of Southern Italy is larger than simply
economic infrastructure, but a larger question of cultural norms and how the creation of the state
has led to disparity between the two regions.
Same Problem, Different Perception
Culture and identity are an integral part of a persons self-awareness because they have
become social constructs that as a society we all try to define.
Identify is a bifocal concept. Identity has the dimension of identified as, a categorical or
emotional concept. Identity in both dimensions maps onto the nation-state dyad. Scholars,
even the most perceptive, often conflate identified as and identified with leading to
conceptual as well as terminological slippage. National citizenship was the standard
legal mechanism that nation-states used to bind individuals to the polity and to bridge the
gap between a categorical conception of identity and an emotional attachment (Marshall
1964).22
In fact, howwe choose to go about the defining process is itself a result of culture and identity
and the two are interconnected with how people within a state view themselves in the context of
21Giordano, Benito. "A Place Called Padania?: The Lega Nord and the Political Representation of
Northern Italy."European Urban & Regional Studies6 (99): 215-31. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO.
Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.22
Ibid52.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
11/38
Di Mauro-Nava 10
that statein other words whether their loyalties lie with the region, state or larger global
community.
While concepts like democracy and civil society are important to understanding the
development of national and regional identity, there is insufficient attention to the concept of
culture and self-identity as predictor of historical narrative. Historical narrative is an important
element to consider because these stories form the basis of how a group of people see
themselves and this in turn affects their actions and outlook on all facets of life, whether it be
familiar, community, or outside of the perceptions self. The basic problem with only looking at
concepts like democracy and civil society is that these are relatively modern developments that
arise afterregional or state identity have been forged, and how these are practiced depends on
how a society views the definition and role of each. Before we can consider the contributions of
institutions and other national and transnational actors, it is first important to build upon those
norms and cultural identities that already exist because it is through that lens that people perceive
and understand the events and actions that are taking place around them
Opportunity spirals, identity shift, competition, and brokerage were some of the
mechanisms at work in the creation of a unified state that superimposed a highly
centralized administration upon a society rife with regional differences. If life were
simple, these differences would have produced recurring movements of peripheral
nationalism. Instead, they produced a nation-state without hegemony.23
These weak models of unity and state building have been examined by other scholars like
Antonio Gramsci and Gaetano Salvemini who even several centuries ago:
23McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
12/38
Di Mauro-Nava 11
criticized the obvious costs and dysfunctions of this weak pattern of integration and
particularly the fact that integration took place through elites, encouraged corruption, and
at the margins blended with criminality. It left many ordinary southerns the prey of
landowners, Mafiosi, and corrupt politicians.24
There are several factors that can be attributed to this disparity, including economic disadvantage
and regional formation and integration into the state. A part of this weakness can be explained by
the history of some of the Southern regions, one of which is Sicily. Sicily was under external
control for the majority of its existence, and all of its rulers were non-Italian entities. For several
centuries, Sicily served as the midway point between the mainland the territories beyond Europe,
with each of its conquerors benefiting from its location in the Mediterranean25. Before Italian
unification in 1861, Southern Italy was an independent sate, with its own economic, political and
social structures and after unification, these structures continued to exist in conjunction with
those of the North. However, the South was opened to the commercial penetration of northern
industrial goods while its own industrialization was inhibited.26
This culture of exploitation
would remain in the narrative of Sicily and other Southern regions until the present day.
The Italy of today is not much different from the one of even two centuries ago. Problems
with a corrupt central government, organized crime and economic disparity continue to divide
the nation-state and those that have the power to create a stronger national identity do not care to
or feel the need to exercise this power. This is namely the role of political parties in the region,
which continue to hold onto regional powers as a method of holding onto their constituent base.
In the South, This base is made up of agricultural workers, sharecroppers, small farmers and
24Ibid
25Tilly, Charles. Coercion, Capital, and European States: Ad 990 - 1992. Cambridge, Mass. [u.a.:
Blackwell, 2006, 163.26
Tarrow, Sydney. Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. New Haven: Yale University, 1967,13.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
13/38
Di Mauro-Nava 12
artisans, all of which generally lean towards the left (sympathetic to Communist ideology)27
and
against the rhetoric that has made the Lega Nord so popular in the North.
The Development of the Italian State
Although there are several historical moments in Italian history that have shaped the
modern-day state, there are two key periods that are beneficial to study in an attempt to
understand why and how the attitudes and characteristics of the regions and state as a whole
developed to its present-day form. One is the time beginning after the French invasion of several
Italian city-states in 1494 to the signing of the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Although this key
period covers approximately 219 years of history, these years were vital to the development of
Italian region identity under French and later Spanish dominance28. The Italian Renaissance
had all but disappeared and the city-states were struggling to maintain cultural independence
from their conquerors. This is important because during a time when the Italian city-states could
have been developing connections with each other, they were in essence divided by foreign
powers and preserving their own regional culture.
Another key period is 1848-1861, during which the present-day regions in Italy fought a
revolution for unification. By 1861, Italy was declared the Kingdom of Italy (predecessor of
present-day Italian Republic), built upon the ideas of Guiseppi Mazzini and the failed revolts of
the early 1800s. Mazzini was an Italian philosopher and political activist who in the 1830s gave
democratic thought in Italy a distinct program and form of organization that distinguished it from
the model of liberal government: a concept of Italy that found expression in a unitary, republican
state.29
Mazzini was different from other revolutionary theorists of his time in that he
27Ibid, 205.
28Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002, 80-84.29Ridolfi, Maurizio. "Visions of republicanism in the writings of Giuseppe Mazzini."Journal of Modern
Italian Studies 13.4 (2008): 468-479. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 25 Apr. 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
14/38
Di Mauro-Nava 13
recognized the cultural and historical relevance emphasized by those who would create the
Italian nation and in his writings, he spoke about an image of the patria as a democratic
association of free individuals, of citizens called upon to act responsibly in the service of public
institutions.30
It was through his works and political activism that he rallied thousands of Italian
youth to mobilize in various parts of Italy, including Milan and Sicily, however these forces were
no match for elite forces in the area. Mazzinis failed attempts at revolution in the early half of
the 19thcentury would have to wait until the latter part of the same century when external forces
threaten these regions.
Even during this time of unification the roles the North and South played in the move
towards declaring a unified state varied greatly with each city-state region acting up at different
times as a direct result of a particular injustice being faced at the time31
. Up until the 1800s, the
regions of modern-day Italy had not wanted nor were they willing to unite to form a unified
republic. It was the threat of a common oppressive regime that lead to renewed efforts to forge a
unified state and not when it was originally suggested centuries before with Machiavelli and his
writings32.
For Italians, initial steps at becoming a Republic did not occur until the Peace of Lodi in
1454, and this effort was only made by five large city-states. The agreement was not very strong
however, and the invasion by France in 1494 opened Italy to foreign occupation for almost two
centuries afterwards. This occupation period further divided the Italian city-states, as foreign
powers ruled, traded, suppressed and took control of the various regions. Italy would not begin to
see true movement towards unification until the mid-1800s, when the Risorgimento movement
30Ibid
31Tilly, Charles, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly. The Rebellious Century: 1830-1930. Cambridge:
Harvard UP, 1975, 129-133.32
Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002, 83.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
15/38
Di Mauro-Nava 14
would provide the incentive for these individual city-states to finally unite for a common
purpose: to remove all foreign influence from the region.33The Risorgimento was mostly due to
the efforts of the northwestern region of Piedmont (then the Kingdom of Sardinia), which used
diplomacy, war and coercion to unite the peninsula.34
In 1848-49, the Piedmont began supporting
uprising in those areas under Austrian occupation with little result; a decade later, the Piedmont
was finally able to rid itself of its Austrian ruler and annex the region of Lombardy. Lombardys
annexation was shortly thereafter followed by the annexation of several central regions such as
the Duchies of Parma and Moderna and the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. These annexations were
peaceful, in that these duchies were asked if they wished to join the Kingdom of Italy. The
same cannot be said for the annexation of the Southern regions, especially that of Sicily, which
was under Bourbon rule. The Piedmont, now with forces from a larger contingency was able to
defeat the Bourbons and take Sicily and the Southern regions.35While the Piedmont was
successful in uniting Italy and ousting external ruling factors such as the Austrians and
Bourbons, unification did not translate into equality amongst the regions or a shared sense of
cultural and historical identities.
Initially, the conglomerate of city-states in modern-day Italy held significant differences
in function and services. As Stein Rokkan notes, the early Northern Italian city-states were
geographically more distant than those of the South, which had stronger ties to the old Roman
Empire and Catholic Church. When the process of state-making began in Western Europe, the
majority of this process was occurring through the already-established trade-route cities of
33Killinger, Charles L. The History of Italy. New York: Greenwood Group, Incorporated, 2002.
34Gold, Thomas W. The Lega Nord and Contemporary Politics in Italy. New York: Palgrave
Macmillian, 2003, 13.35
Ibid
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
16/38
Di Mauro-Nava 15
Europe, of which many city-states in Northern Italy belonged.36
Present-day Italy was one of the
first decentralized regions in Europe to initiate the state-making process, however, Italy would be
one of the last modern-day states to conclude the formalization of its current state. This is
because the present-day regions of the modern Italian state were in the 15-17th
centuries at
constant war with each other. Each wanted to dominate the other in terms of trade or other
commodities. It was not until the 18th
century that the common foreign threat forced this mish-
mash of city-states to unite to fend off external violence. Even still, old prejudices and mistrust,
years of foreign occupation and a cycle of compromises and disagreements made true unity
unattainable for the city-states of Italy, creating the vast regionalism that still exists today.
The Italian Question
From the onset of the cultural development of what is present-day Italy, regional identity
has been important to the people who come from these different regions. "The regionalism that is
still so strong today in Italy originally stems from the differences between all these groups
[Italics, Etruscans, Faliscans, Samnites, and Umbrians]," says professor Nicola Terrenato. "They
are our cultural roots.37These groups, once conquered by the Romans, continued to thrive under
Roman rule and this, inversely, continued the trend we see today.
Unlike some of its European counterparts, in Italy this lack of initial homogenization was
a link in the chain of events that would lead to an eventual separation of the two major regions in
the formalized country. Another impediment to state building was Italys location in the South
Mediterranean and the inhabitants of the region beginning in the 15 thcentury. This was because
the dynamics and political changes experienced by each region, North and South, were distinct
36Rokkan, Stein. Dimensions of State Formation and Nation-Building: A Possible Paradigm for
Research on Variations Within Europe. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Ed.
Charles Tilly. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1975, 575-576.37Zwingle, Erla, and Louis O. Mazzatenta. "Italy Before the Romans."National Geographic207
(2005): 52-77. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington D.C. 25 Feb. 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
17/38
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
18/38
Di Mauro-Nava 17
from much of the rest of Western Europe at this time42
. As mentioned before, Sicily was the one
great exception, refusing to fall in line with the remaining city-states.
This was an era [1860s] in which Sicilian intellectuals began retelling the islands
glorious, if tragic, history of repeated invasions and publishing dictionaries in the Sicilian
vernacular. Few Sicilians thought seriously of carrying the flag of Italian nationalism for
Pidemontese [sic] Victor Emmanuel.43
So although the 19thcentury was one in which modern-day Italy saw much internal change in
political and social dynamics, the pull of old regional ties remained firmly in place.
This relatively newly established identity still presents itself in various aspects of the
Italian identity, most notably the continued existence of regionalism and the differences in
attitude towards several aspects of government within the country.
Of course we cannot hope to fully understand the divisions between the regions of Italy
without also understanding the underlying tensions between the North and South. While both
belong to the same state, the mentality and perspectives held by the citizens of Northern and
Southern Italy are decidedly distinct as well.
Italys location exposes it to a plethora of ideas and influences from surrounding
countries ranging from low-context neighbors like Switzerland in the North, to high context
interactions with African nations in the South. The pull and influence of these nations, on top of
Italys already segmented identity help create the two very distinct cultural differences in the
regions, which in turn has led to the development of several distinctions between the two
regions; most notably, their economies. One of the results of this exchange of ideas is the
42Chittolini, Giorgio. "Cities, "City-States," and Regional States in North-Central Italy." Cities and
the Rise of States in Europe, A. D. 1000-1800. Ed. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans. New York:
Perseus Books Group, 1994,33-34.43
McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 2001, 239.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
19/38
Di Mauro-Nava 18
introduction of Protestant ideology into Northern Italy by Switzerland. As more traditional
ideology lost hold in the North, the region was able to adapt and incorporate new technology to
develop its economic structure, while the South, holding on to its traditional values (like those of
the Catholic Church) remained resistant to economic change and development.
It is valid to include political structure as a reason for why the economies of the two
regions are not equal, however this reason alone is not sufficient. Other modern components
make up this complex web of culture interacting with economic infrastructure (such as the
continued existence of the Mafia44
) but the larger question remains as to why these elements
exist in the first place and why they continue to have an impact.
In the Italian case, it is important to not only focus on the past several decades to
determine the disparity of North and South economies but to also focus on the history of the
country. Several developments in class structure have shaped the new Italian society but
remnants of the old elitist mentality continue to have hold, especially in the South where they
were most prominent. Even ancient forms of generating wealth continue to exhibit patterns
today: The North began as a region of finance and commerce while the South developed wealth
based on the products of the land. Today, the North is more industrialized and produces more
manufactured goods, while the South relies on agriculture45. However, because culture itself is
complex, this author argues there has to be another major series of cultural links that have
promoted the drastic divergence of the two economies. Historically, Italy was a series of
independent regions, which developed their own series of characteristics and strengths. These
developments in characteristics extend to more than just political structure (although that is one
44Mammone, Andrea, and Giuseppe A. Veltri. "Italy in Chiaroscuro: the dark shadows of modern
Italian society."Journal of Modern Italian Studies13 (2008): 297-304. Academic Search Premier.
EBSCO. Bender Library, Washington. 21 March 2010.45
Ibid
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
20/38
Di Mauro-Nava 19
component) but to several other factors that helped shape the identity of several regions such as
how they deal with government, how involved a community is in civic activity and how these
levels of involvement in other areas of culture affect the development of the two economic
structures found in Italy46
.
The same holds for political identity. When the Northern regions of Italy succeeded in
coercing the Southern regions into integrating with them in the 19th
century to form a unified
Italy, they were not able to rid the region of the practices performed by its long history of
external rulers.
nothing has changed completely, in the sense that no new, modern organization of
social roles has yet crystallized. Politically, the same thing is true; the Bourbon monarchy
and its trappings are long since gone, but the liberal, democratic institutions imported
after the Risorgimento function in a manner their founders never intended.47
Unlike Northern Italy, which has developed several organizational structures for governmental
operations, such as institutions and groups that carry out the functions of the regional and central
government Southern Italy ahs developed no such mechanisms. However, because these
mechanisms are not in place does not mean that they do not exist. The fragmentation of social
roles that continues to exist in Italy (traditional gender roles, etc,) translates into the political
field, with clientelismo substituting for more traditional bodies of government.48
Simply belonging to this form of political structure does not mean that political
participation is less than it would be if the South followed more traditional political bodies.
According to Tarrow, the participation is simply different, which leads Northern Italians to
46Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, and Raffaella Y. Nanetti.Making Democracy Work : Civic
Traditions in Modern Italy. New York: Princeton UP, 1993.47
Tarrow, Sydney. Peasant Communism in Southern Italy. New Haven: Yale University, 1967, 71.48
Ibid, 74.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
21/38
Di Mauro-Nava 20
believe that the South is not willing to become involved in politics or they simply do not care,
which is not the case whatsoever.
Thirdly, the issue of social structure is one that continues to divide the North and South.
As explored by Tarrow, Southern Italy is still very much a system of social class, because prior
to the formation of the Italian state, the nobility held a prominent place in Southern Italian
culture, while upward mobility for peasants was not at all common.
The bourgeoisie was perhaps the most strategic class in the formation of the modern
social and political system of the Mezzogiorno. Its most significant feature is its
concentration in the tradition professions, in landholding, and in administration, and its
detachment from role-shaping, productive process in industry.49
This is different from the North, which saw an influx in emigration from the South in the years
after unification until about the 1960s (the end of the Italian miracle). This influx of emigrants
restructured standards of living for those who moved and local Northern Italians adapted to the
growth of the region by becoming more urbanized and industrialized.
In todays economic, political and social context, many of thee issues have yet to be
resolved, or at least accepted as valuable differences. The North continues to see the South as a
money-leeching region, in part because of the rhetoric of the Lega Nord and their desire to see
Italy become more regionalized. Moreover, the Southern economic system, more dependent
upon underground economies50
will not be able to compete with the more advanced North,
which perpetuates the existing bad blood among the two regions; the North wishes to keep
more of its financial gain, the South believes the North has an unfair advantage. In terms of
political and social structures, the North, with its more malleable population and political
49Ibid, 49.
50Calavitas, Kitty.Immigrants at the Margins: Law, Race and Exclusion in Southern Europe. New York:
Cambridge UP, 2005.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
22/38
Di Mauro-Nava 21
structures will be continues to be seen by those outside of Italy as the only ones that are
modernizing with the rest of Europe. However, these presumptions are unfair, as studies in
Southern Italy are still lacking as compared to those in Northern Italy and calling a region
backward because it follows a different political, economic and social structure is not useful to
closing misperceptions and understanding differences between the two major regions.
Further Study
Future studies into the dichotomy of Italy and why these regional identities continue to
persist would go a long way in understanding not only Italy but also the other regional actors in
Europe. However, empirical data, as collected by Putnam in the early 1990s, has shown how
preconceived notions of incivility and disregarding periods of history are not the most effective
way to study regional narratives and disparities. Should scholars want to take on the project of
cultural differences in Italy, exploring individual stories and relationships of the South to the
North and vice versa, can prove more detailed knowledge as to why further integration has not
yet occurred.
Implications: Italy as a Microcosm for the EU
As Italy now becomes further integrated with the European Union, we begin to see how
similar issues; economic disparities among member states, cultural differences and perspectives
of history are challenging the creation of a Pan-European identity. As the Union continues to
expand and different cultures are juxtaposed and made to work together, discourse and lack of
understanding threaten to slow down the growth of the European Union and the implementation
of the Lisbon Treaty. This is because regionalism and nationalism threaten to undermine efforts
by the Union to create a supra-national identity. It is because of these elements that Italian
regionalism will persist and a Pan-European identity will be difficult to achieve.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
23/38
Di Mauro-Nava 22
The processes and perceptions of historical context and self-image that a collective holds
dictate all economics, politics and social norms and how they choose to interact with and
interpret a new element in their sphere. By using Italy as a basis for comparison, we can compare
Italy and its regions to the member states of the European Union and the central government of
Italy as the EU. The point of this comparison is notto say that politically or economically these
are similar, but how individualsand cultureinfluence whether or not importance is given to the
entity perceived as closest to those cultural norms developed over a long period of time.
As some will argue, the unique forces that created the various European identities that
make Europe heterogeneous are now playing against Europe in the further consolidation of
European states in the European Union.
Every European nation-state accomplished political and cultural consolidation in
different time periods and with different degrees of fit between culture and the polity.
In formal terms, the nation-state is a dyad linked by territorial consolidation on the one
hand and cultural consolidation on the other (Berezin 1999b). In practice, nation and
state, culture and structure, are enmeshed inextricably. But separating the nation and the
state is an analytic move that provides conceptual leverage. It lends clarity to the issue of
Europeanization, where scholars often discuss institutions and identities as if they were
independent of each other, It [sic] permits rigorous conceptualization that may be brought
to bear upon the relation between rightwing populism and the advancing European
project.51
Just as Italy has internal forces that push her in different directions, so does the European Union.
In fact, several states within the Union face similar cases to the Italian example and therefore add
51Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, 49.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
24/38
Di Mauro-Nava 23
to the growing mixture of voices clamoring to be heard on the larger EU platform, which clearly
makes for the establishment of a Pan-European identity much greater.
The European Union is the result of history, a history of empires, conquests, war, famine,
division, union, expansion and revolution. The past 50-odd years since the creation of the EU
have shown that although this continents fraught nationalistic tendencies have led awry and to
upheaval, a common goal could unite them in the hopes of turning a new page and writing a
more peaceful future. However, the success of the European Economic Community which in
turn led to the creation of the European Union has not, in its short existence, been able to
supercede core human identity values and beliefs. For while the benefits of the euro and the ease
of belonging to Schengen have made belonging to the EU a plus for many members, especially
economically, xenophobia, nationalism and a resistance to perceived loss of sovereignty have
made the transition of the EU from a purely economic entity to a dual economic and political
entity challengingas has accepting a common European identity.
As a member of the original six, Italy has a unique relationship with the EU and so this
paper and the comparison of Italian regionalism to the larger question of European identity make
for a peculiar comparison and point of inquiry. In contrast to France, Italian politicians of all
political persuasions have embraced Europe even if for different reasons.52Like this author
mentions, this statement is really not that difficult to believe, in the larger context that Italians
have not found a national voice, so they hope to be able to find a supra-national one. Italy is
paradoxically finding its national voice in Europe that is, Europe as an object of identification
is helping to produce an Italian national identity that looks outward as well as inward.53
However, the Italian example does help explain how lacking unifying events, such as the French
52Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 223.53
Ibid, 240.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
25/38
Di Mauro-Nava 24
revolution movement or the German collapse of the Wall can hinder the process of identity
building and why the EU is not wholly ready to accept a Pan-European identity.
Not all members of the European Community are as hesitant to presume that a common
European identity is to far off in the future. Unsurprisingly, one of these proponents of a
common EU identity is an Italian politician, Gianfranco Fini.
Fini argued that a national and a European identity are complementary and do not
exclude each other: European culture isEuropean identity. Can one think of a Europe
that is not profoundly steeped in single national cultures and of Italian culture in
particular? (p.21) Fini argues that a European demosis forming. Youth are at the core
of the demosas well as the Internet, which breaks down barriers. Paradoxically, Fini
supports that idea that since English is the language of technology it will also be the
language of Europe even if one must continue to learn and use ones national language.
When asked if he is committed to a human or a national identity, Fini replies, We cannot
neglect that fact that the concept of identity is always married to the concept of
community, the smallest is the family, the largest is already Europe today. Although
according to others, it is not Europe but the West.54
Is it enough simply to belong to this larger community to efface centuries old ideas and create
a new identity?
While the European Union has proven it is a force to be reckoned with in terms of
economic strength, this may not be enough to solidify the entirety of the people living within the
Union to create and establish themselves within the perception of a supranational identity that
supercedes that of their own national one.
54Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 241.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
26/38
Di Mauro-Nava 25
It cannot be ignored that the efforts of the European Union to integrate the states of
Europe has led to some new ideas about what it means to be European in the broader sense of the
word.
Important EU-level developments have challenged and impacted on collective nation-
state identities and are constitutive of a European identity. These include the emergence
of the European public space through the establishment of supra-national institutions and
the formation of transnational European discourses, as well as the establishment of a
European polity through the transfer of competences from the nation-state to the
European level and the ensuing importance of inter-subjective meanings that people
attach to the Europeanisation [sic] process as a whole.55
The greatest of these has been the success of the economic integration of the members of the EU
and how this economic integration ahs changed several aspects of how everyday living functions
have altered.
is the obvious economic success of the process of European integration [have
promoted the development of a European political community]. the greater
permeability of national borders after the agreement of Schengen, as well as the ever-
increasing contact frequency of European citizens as a result of progressing economic
integration, might have promoted perceptions of community and mutual solidarity among
EU citizens.56
The development of the euro, the EU flag, EU institutions and other Pan-EU entities create a
sense of ownership for not one state but for all of those that belong to the club in the same way
55Matonyte, Irmina, and Vaidas Morkevicius "Threat Perception and European Identity Building: The
Case of Elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland."Europe-Asia Studies61.6 (2009): 967-985.
Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 2 March 2010.56Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal of
European Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
27/38
Di Mauro-Nava 26
that lowering borders amongst the member states should create a sense of belonging to not
only the territory in which you reside in but to any of the other states which you wish to travel or
live in. The common currency is the strongest symbol of European unity because it comes
closest to citizens' everyday life (Risse 2003). In the same way, the introduction of European
citizenship is a symbol that imitates the nation-state in order to stimulate a European political
community.57
However, while these economic benefits have been great for accepting the
supranational elements for the European Union, the truth is these elements have not been enough
to overcome national prejudices against neighbors mistrust and obliterate memories of past
wrongs. So while its true that the members of the EU will never go to war with each other again,
this does not mean that they necessarily see their neighbor as equal to themselves.
The recent accession of Eastern and Central European states has significantly challenged
the concept of what it means to be European as people from many of these states were once
considered to belong to the other, especially post WWII and the rise of the Iron Curtain.
If we drew a map of European Union identifications in the early 2000s, a centre-
periphery picture would come to the fore. The highest level of identifications exists in the
six original member countries, closely followed by European South; the further away one
gets from this core of the Union in geographical and/or temporal terms, the weaker
identifications become.58
This is because just like a state is a process of key events and the outcomes of those decisions
that lead to an outcome, the formation of identity and making one identity supercede another is
equally challenging and a process that needs to be achieved with more than a common currency
and flag.
57Ibid58
Ibid
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
28/38
Di Mauro-Nava 27
The European Union of today clearly stems for initial ties in purely economic policies
that slowly over the years and with the aid of several treaties incorporated a more political
structure.
The increasing role of supranational, as opposed to intergovernmental, decision-making
and the establishment of a European citizenship might have promoted the development of
a political community of the EU. But the growing-together of a political community
depends at least as much on people's self-perceptions and identifications as on the
provision of rights of citizenship or on predominant modes of government.59
As scholars in the field have highlighted and studied, the EU can only continue moving forward
so long as the citizens of the EU do not see the EU as trying to overtake their own identities and
abilities to make decisions.
further EU integration is perceived by citizens to fundamentally alter the nature of the
nation-state. The pooling of sovereignty at the EU level may be seen by citizens as
constraining the power of states to act independently, leading to the undermining of the
symbolic value of the nation-state.60
Much of Europe comes from divisions of empires and wars and struggles from foreign reign,
making sovereignty an integral part of national identity and an important component to the way
they view how their government should care for their citizens and the way the EU should
function for the member states.
even if integration itself has been economic in nature, ordinary Europeans may not
perceive it this way. She argues that with the move to the generation of a common
59Ibid
60Garry, John, and James Tilley "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on
Attitudes towards the EU."European Union Politics10.3 (2009): 361-379. Academic Search Premier.
EBSCO. Web. 25 Feb 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
29/38
Di Mauro-Nava 28
citizenship, with citizens having an EU passport, the end of different national currencies,
the coordination of policies relating to asylum and immigration matters and the
generation of a military force at the European level, integration is beginning to appear
less and less economic in nature . . . integration seems to pose a threat to national identity
by seeking to reduce nationalist sentiment (McLaren, 2004: 8967).61
So the perception of the function of the EU has shifted, much like the perception of national
identity and sovereignty shifts in states as historical events change the dynamic of a state.
Berezin argues that the rise of the populist right is an effort to step away from the conglomerate
that is the European Union:
The modern nation-state is the institutional location of a relationship between a polity and
a people that provides security for its members. Legal institutions of the modern nation-
state, such as citizenship requirements, structurally inscribe individuals in the polity and
society. National cultural practices from common language to shared norms cognitively
and emotionally inscribe individuals in the polity and society.Experience, individual and
collective, is a temporal and cognitive phenomenon that consciously or unconsciously
draws upon the past to access the future.62
the experience of the ordinary European is
still national- that is, their cultural and social capital, as well as their economic
possibilities, are still firmly tied to the national state.63
With this in mind, it does not seem too ludicrous to assume that with newer generations reverting
back to nationalistic tendencies, the exponential growth and expansion of the European Union
will start to curb. While the function of the EU may or may not have changed, the fact that
citizens perceptions of it has changed needs to be taken into account because these perceptions
61Ibid62Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times. New York: Cambridge UP, 2009, 6-7.63
Ibid, 8
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
30/38
Di Mauro-Nava 29
influence attitudes towards the EU and how they wish to address the EU to reflect national
identity.
There are several elements that are facing the EU in its battle to assume a common supra-
national or pan-national identity. One of these major challenges is the language barrier. While it
is true that most Europeans take it upon themselves to learn a second and even third language 64,
communicating in this fashion is never the same as being able to do so in your mother tongue.
The mere existence of currently 23 official languages of the EU specifies that language is an
important component of national identity and culture; with one not wanting their own language
to be less important than any other one. Although at the moment it is understood that official
languages and working languages are necessary to gets things done at the supranational level, the
thought of imposing a common European language and forcing all members of the EU to adopt
as a compulsory language (e.g. English or French) would seem completely ludicrous. Why?
Because this would severely infringe upon national sovereignty, would conflict with nations who
have historical problems with native English or French speakers and because allowing ones
language to take back seat to another nations language would be allowing a part of ones
identity to disappear, something that the collective EU is not ready for yet.
Another division amongst the members of the European Union is that of religion. Even
though the worlds population seems to be becoming more secular and agnostic as time
progresses, religion played a very important role in the development of several of the states in
the Union and continues to play a role in some states, even if it is only a social one.
Religious and linguistic differences essentially underlie the major ethnic cleavages that
have regularly been the reason for confrontation and war. Three religious cleavages are at
the basis of distinct socio-cultural areas on the European continent: the division between
64Personal observation made by the author of this paper
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
31/38
Di Mauro-Nava 30
Latin and Orthodox Christianity, that between the Christian and the Islamic world and,
finally, the division between Catholics and Protestants.65
As European history in general has shown, wars have been fought over which of these religions
should be practiced and even now, theorists like Edward Hall contribute unique cultural
attributes to religious groups.66Religions help form cultures and national identities, to the point
where religion is apartof national identity such as like in Italy.67
Today, Europe is still the
continent of great cathedrals and churches, and center for many religious organizations and
religions influence of national character is too important to not be considered, especially when
political parties (e.g. the Christian Democrats) continue to exert major influence in the political
landscape.
Another issue is the question of Euroskepticism and its impact on national identity.
Individuals in richer countries and individuals in net contributor countries are less enthusiastic
towards the EU.68
Additionally, this same study concluded that in states which political elites
are divided on the EU issue (the UK is currently the biggest name in the media) exclusive
national identity is a particularly strong predictor.69Other factors, such as fear of cultural threat
65Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal ofEuropean Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb. 2010.66
Hall divides societies into high and low context, in this case, Protestants would fall under low-context(more time conscious, proactive, straightforward and in charge of their destiny) while Catholics and
Muslims would fall into the high context scale (less time conscious, have little sense that destiny is in
their personal control, etc.)67While separation of church and state legally exists in Italy, crucifixes are common fixtures in publicspaces, especially classrooms. On November 3, 2009, the European Court of Human Rights ordered the
Italian government to pay reparation damages to Soile Lautsi who brought the case to court. She wanted
crucifixes removed from school buildings where her children attended school. The majority of the Italian
public is outrages by the ruling. http://www.lifeinitaly.com/node/1238768
Garry, John, and James Tilley "The Macroeconomic Factors Conditioning the Impact of Identity on
Attitudes towards the EU."European Union Politics10.3 (2009): 361-379. Academic Search Premier.
EBSCO. Web. 25 Feb. 2010.69
Ibid
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
32/38
Di Mauro-Nava 31
and suspicion of immigrants also increase Euroskepticism, which in turn increases national
identity and the want to relate less with a greater EU identity.70
Regionalism is another identifying character of national identity and its importance on the
acceptance of a Pan-European identity. For countries like Belgium and Spain, regional
differences have caused their own regional identities, which differ from those of the rest of the
regions even within the same country. Identifying with fellow countrymen is a struggle, so
identifying with other Europeans, outside of economic terms would seem like a stretch.
According to a study conducted by Wil Arts and Loek Halman, for almost half of Europeans,
neither the European Union nor its member countries, but towns and localities offer fulfillment
of the need for roots. Attachment to the country as a whole is limited to less than a third of the
population and only a tiny minority identifies with Europe.71
In a larger scope, the same study found that many Europeans are now uneasy with the rapid
rate of expansion being experienced by the EU:
many Europeans of different nationalities also see the further unification of Europe as
posing a danger to the survival of national cultures and identities. The disappearance of the
internal borders between the European Union states may in the end, so they fear, result in a
loss of variety in national cultures and distinct national identities. Further unification may
cause problems of national identification and some observers have argued that it will
therefore generate a reemphasis on regional and local cultures.72
Such is the case in France where the new rise on Europeanization and the transfer of sovereignty
to the supra-national entity has caused an interesting dynamic in the French-EU relationship.
70Ibid
71Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology
35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.72
Ibid
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
33/38
Di Mauro-Nava 32
The French state has displayed a peculiar ambivalence to various dimensions of European
integrations and has repeatedly pulled back from Europeanization in ways that support
national identity over European identity. The headscarf debate is the most publicized
example, but the regional language issue73
was a more telling if less prominent instance of
retreat74.
If we can conclude anything from these first studies in the field, it is that culture and national
identity remain very important to the definition of a persons character and how they choose to
interact with fellow member of the international community. The problem here becomes when
certain states begin to mistrust other states because of lack of common values or identity.
Majorities of EU citizens trust the people of other member countries. The people of the
new member countries in Central and Eastern Europe, however, are still less trusted, and
Turks are trusted the least. Figures on trust as well as on readiness to accept new members
show that European citizens have a rather clear-cut mental map of the Union, a shared
understanding of who is alike and who is different. The new Eastern member countries are
still considered different; the East-West continental divide remains detectable. It will take a
while for them to be fully integrated and accepted in the European ingroup [sic]. An
additional but somewhat minor difference is commonly seen between people from the
North and the South of Europe. A common view of all members is, however, that Turkey is
clearly different from what is considered European.75
The progress of enlargement has each time shaken what it means to be European and where the
73This is in reference to the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, an initiative of the EU
to promote the preservation of regional languages. Former French president Jacques Chirac refused to
sign, stating it would require a revision of the French constitution that made French the language of
France and threaten one of the grand principles of the Republic. (Berezin, 207)74
Berezin, Mabel.Illiberal Politics in Neoliberal Times.Cambridge UP: New York, 2009, 208.75
Scheuer, Angelika, and Hermann Schmitt "Dynamics in European Political Identity."Journal ofEuropean Integration31.5 (2009): 551-568. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb. 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
34/38
Di Mauro-Nava 33
boundaries end for who is and is not a part of the club. States, which would not have been
considered European in centuries past, are now up for consideration (Turkey) and even members
(Malta and Cyprus) and while this makes sense economically, the inclusion of different cultures
causes states to re-examine what it is that they stand for, what it means to be European and
sometimes these elements do not mix across borders.
This is not to say that members of the EU are not happy with the European Union and wish
to see its demise. On the contrary, as studies have shown, European citizens are for the most part
content to belong to the European Union and follow the EU as long as it continues to prove
benecial for them.
Concern for other Europeans is very low. in Europe neither a clear pattern of cross-
national differences in national identity nor clear developments over time are discernible.
in spite of these findings, support for the European Union is high and widespread. This
probably has more to do with expediency than with emotions and affections.76
So while membership is confined to something that constituents do not feel impacts them
directly, most everyone is perfectly content to belong to the EU. However, this does not mean
that most members of the EU are yet comfortable with identifying with all members of the Union
and still retain their individual citizenship and classify those living within their territories as
outsiders who do not quite fit with all of the customs and values pre-established by the state.
behind the image of a unifying Europe and the overall positive views about the integration
process diversity and heterogeneity prevail: the complexity of long term historical legacies,
institutional variance, political and economic interests do play a role.77
Clearly, the success of
76Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.77
Ilonszki, Gabriella "Introduction: A Europe Integrated and UnitedBut Still Diverse?."Europe-AsiaStudies61.6 (2009): 913-919. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 1 March 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
35/38
Di Mauro-Nava 34
the EU has given incentive to member states to continue to cooperate for the betterment of their
individual state and the progress of the EU in general terms. However, the success of the EU has
not incited politicians or individuals to want to form an identity outside of a common we are all
European because we live on the European continent or we are all European because we share
a common history to a certain extent.
Enlargement also has a big role in why a common Pan-European identity is difficult to
come by. Although the big bang enlargement of 2004 and the subsequent enlargement of 2007
have considerably depleted the candidate pool for entry, there are still a number of states that
wish to enter the EU, some with more European ties than others, and Turkey being the most
politicized and highly debated for cultural reasons. However, not everybody is welcome to the
family. Apparently, some politicians regard differences in cultural identity as sufficient reasons
for not including certain countries in the European Union.78So long as national identity is
perceived to be more important than economic benefit or that these differences are too great to
outcome, policy will not be able to forcibly mesh together groups of people that have a history of
conflict amongst them.
Italy, Europe and an Identity for All
Will a Pan-European identity ever form? Just like the development of the EU certain
criteria need to exist for the creation of a common identity.
ideas about European order, as well as transnationally [sic] rooted European and
national identity constructions, interact with given collective nation-state identities. The
more such European political visions and identity-building resonate with ideas about the
national political order embedded in collective nation-state identities, the more likely they
78Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology
35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
36/38
Di Mauro-Nava 35
are to merge with and be incorporated into these national collective views. It follows that
the very content of the 'European' collective nation-state identity might also vary,
depending on how various ideas about Europe resonate with visions of national
identities.79
So certain values and ideas are already held in common, otherwise the EU would not have been
created and things like the acquis communtairewould have absolutely no validity. Recent efforts
like Lisbon however, have shown just how un-ready the EU is to completely consciously forgo
national identity for the sake of the Union. Lisbon passed, but not before it was repacked and
efforts were being made towards a common European Security and Defense Policy may be at the
forefront of some politicians agendas, but little will come of it without it being on the agenda of
all 27 member states. These elements show that they are not enough to create a common
identity, a perception that we all belong together because the creation of the European state was
each unique to the next and because the creation of the EU is new to history as well.
The main obstacle to forming a Pan-European identity is defining what it means to be
European. There is a difference between being European (residing on the European continent)
and identifying as a European or more specifically a European of the EU, which encompasses
holding values that allEuropeans would hold; this is something that members of the European
Union have yet to attain.
Internationalization and globalization incite nationalistic counteractions. One of these
counteractions may be the emergence of a quasi-national European identity (De Beus
2001). Although European unification means a loss of national identity, it also means the
building of a more encompassing economic, political, and cultural community. At the
79Matonyte, Irmina, and Vaidas Morkevicius "Threat Perception and European Identity Building: The
Case of Elites in Belgium, Germany, Lithuania and Poland."Europe-Asia Studies61.6 (2009): 967-985.
Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 26 Feb 2010.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
37/38
Di Mauro-Nava 36
practical level of policy, claims of competing identitiesthe European and nationalmay
come into conflict. 80
Are members of the European Union ready to give up elements of what makes them themfor the
sake of adopting a new identity? For now, the EU is too new, still growing and still trying to
determine and shape its itself into the structure that it will potentially become one day.
There is a debate among European leaders regarding what a European government should
be. On one hand, Europe might be a nascent nation-state on its way to becoming the United
States of Europe. In this image, common identity is seen as especially important, as it was
for the legitimation of states in an era of nationalism (Kohn 1944; Shafer 1955 and 1982).
On the other hand, the EU might be seen as something quite different than a nation-state,
perhaps a security community as envisioned by Karl Deutsch (1957), or even a looser
system of coordinated states (Adler and Barnett 1998).81
Without primarily identifying wherethe Union is headed in the next fifty years of its existence, it
may not be possible to ask for European citizens to challenge their ideas of nationalism and
cultural identity for an institution that has no clear path. Looking at the big picture, and leaving
moral consideration aside, the Italian pattern of unification shows a tradeoff between
legitimation [sic] and state strength, on the one hand, and between durability and state weakness,
on the other.82
Is the European Union willing to risk the same? As it stands now, the
appointment of Lady Catherine Ashton as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy of the EU indicates that EU is still struggling to form its own identity outside of
80Arts, Wil, and Loek Halman "National Identity in Europe Today."International Journal of Sociology
35.4 (2005): 69-93. Academic Search Premier. EBSCO. Web. 24 Feb. 201081Herrmann, Richard K., and Marilynn B. Brewer. "Identities and Institutions: Becoming European in theEU." Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield,
2004, 3.82
McAdam, Doug, Sidney G. Tarrow, and Charles Tilly.Dynamics of Contention. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 2001, 246.
8/13/2019 Italian Regionalism as a Microcosm for the EU Identity Question
38/38
Di Mauro-Nava 37
its member states. Just like it took several decades and even centuries for the national identities
of some of the member states to form, so too will it take several decades of work and dedication
for a Pan-European identity to form if the members of the European Union decide this is the
trajectory they wish to take and there is no indication as of right now that any of the 27
member states wish to give up a piece of what they perceive makes them who they are to become
something else.
Even for Italy, a large supporter of the Union and its eventual goal of supra-national
identity, the EU has not entirely dismantled their internal differences and struggles to form an
Italian identity, outside of regional contexts.
These international events [Tangentopoli, Maastricht Treaty, and immigrant receiving
state] rearranged but did not eliminate what Bodei (1998) labeled as the divisions among
Italians. In addition, they created possibilities for new divisions. Europe writ large, the
presence of others from Africa, Eastern Europe and Albania, and even new political
parties, had to be incorporated into an Italian public grappling with new political parties
and ideas. 83
While the European Union has, can and will achieve a lot for the citizens of the EU and
help progress this region of the world and make it a more viable player in the international arena,
it is unlikely to be able to override narratives that continue to be perpetuated by generations.
Even though it makes sense that states with internal regional identities such as Italy, Spain and to
an extent Belgium would like to see the creation of a European identity because it would trump
the authority and emotional power of their internal governments, Europe at large does not face
this cultural and identity crisis as these states do.