IV

THERE IS All ALTERNATIVE POLICY

Mr. Krishna Menon, India1a representative in the United Nations

In New York on 5 October M. Krishna Menon, the leader of the Indian delegation to the United Nations gave a press conference during which he declared himself in favour of ■direct contacts between leaders - or, better still, between spokesmen - of the two Germanles. This would give more chance of making progress towards the reunification of the country.”

(Translated from the French)

Soviet Proposals for Negotiations

In consequence of the exposd given above the Soviet Government proposes, for the examination of the French Government and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States, the convening, in November of a conference of the Foreign Ministers of France Great Britain and the Soviet Union to discuss the following questions :

1. The restoration of German unity on democratic and peaceful foundations and the organisation of free elections throughout Germany.

2. The withdrawal of the occupation troops of the four powers from the territory of East and West Germany.

3. The calling of a general European conference to examine the question of the creation of a system of collective security in Europe.

(Soviet note handed to the ambassadors of France,Great Britain and the United States on 23 October - excerpts)

Herr Erich Ollenhauer, President of the German Social Democra­tic ParTy

"The rearming of the Federal Republic within N.A.T.O. and the concentration of the Republic's foreign policy on its incorporation in the Western system to the exclusion of all else means that it is giving up a policy of active unity. We Socialist must therefore rejeot this solution.11

(Excerpt from a speech in the Bundestag, 7 October, 1954)

11. Edouard Herrlot, Honorary President of the French National Assembly

"Foreign policy - remember this principle - is made on the map : neither for or against certain ideologies*The union of seven or eight European powers is not enough; the union of the whole of Europe must be achieved ...

"I do net know what the Russian proposal is worth, but I say that it would have been better to begin by seeking agreement on this subject.

"I do not think that disarmament can be achieved through rearmament.M

(Excerpts from a speech delivered at the Radical Party Congress in Marseilles on 17 October, 1954)

A Group of Labour H.P.s

"There therefore seems to be every reason why the Labour Party should oppose the London Agreements in their present form ....

"Now that the Russians have agreed to discuss the British and other proposals for free elections throughout Germany the main obstacle to the resumption of 4-Power talks on Germany and European security has been removed....

"The essential point is that there is now a real prospect of agreement on free elections and German re­unification if the principle is accepted that Germany's contribution to collective security s^iall be made, at the appropriate time, through an all in European security system under U.N. (e.g. on the Locarno model), and not through 'a one-sided military allieance with East or West ..."

Letter addressed to all Labour H.P.s by

Fenner Brockway - Harold DaviesStephen Swingler - William Warbey

(Labour members of Parliament)

Proposals by well-know Frenchmen

"To reach a peaceful solution of the German problem, unilateral rearmament of Germany, which ueans division and war, must be rejected and negotiation must prevail,

"This requires loyal efforts ~t conciliation on the part of all the governments concerned.

"Negotiation should centre round the following considerations :

- the preparation of a peaoo treaty which must enable Gerroany to be reunited.

- the search for oonditions in which free elections oould be held in Germany,

- the organisation of real security for all the European nations as a fundamental part of collective security,

- general and progressive disarmament, to which the statute of a peaceful and reunited Germany would be the preface,"

This statement was issued on 1 October 1954 by the French Committee for the Peaceful Solution of the German Problem and signed, among others, by :

Professor Fr6d6ric Joliot-Curie, Nobel Prize Winner, Professor at the College de France; Charles d'Aragon, former Deputy; Ren6 Capitant, former Minister; Gilbert de Chambrun, Deputy for Lozfere; Paul Didier, President of the Paris Court of Appeals; Jean-Maire Domenach; Mme Marguerite Jean-Richard Bloch; M, Bernard Lavergne, Professor in the Paris Law Faculty; M. Louis Marin, former Minister, member of the Institut; M, Etienne Nouveau, barrister; M. Joseph Pau1-Boncour, former Prime Minister; M. Louis Vallon, Deputy for the Seine; Pastor Maurice Voge,

M. Jacques Soustelle, Deputy belonging to the Social-Republican££OU£

"If, as is said, Russian proposals on disarmament have been made recently on the basis of the French and British proposals, and if the Russian Foreign Minister has taken a new line on eleotions in Germany, then I do not believe that the best way to reply to them is to say, or to have the press say, that there is nothing new in all this, that these notes are of no interest, and that it is nothing but a propaganda manoeuvre."

(From a speech in Parliament on 8 October, 1954)

Mr. Rose Hillebrand, Bavarian Deputy/ member of the leadership oT'TKe' 'G'e~rman~ Ifnion TarEy----- ----------------------------

"To take the road of remilitarising Western Germany means leaving our country divided for a long period and increases the danger of a third world war ... The demand which we Germans firmly make is : immediate Four Power negotiations on the peace treaty with Germany and the withdrawal of all the occupation troops."

(Statement made on 10 October, 1954)

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■ 4*fc.-.v. v* .* -r-iir: '■*,,•« yv •

F M H

Itr. John Rankin, British Labour M.P.

"The Nine-Power Conference deci»iona are going to endanger world peace by creating a point of oonfliot in Europe.

•The initial argument of those who supported German rearmament was that it would lead to our boys being brought home.

"That has new been blown sky high, for under thedecisions of the conferenoe we are tc keep a force of 100,000 on the Continent for the rest of the century.

"Instead of cur military comuitments becoming less they are new going to increase." '

oo o

WIDESPREAD OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENTS

Appeal of the Wculd Federation cf Trade Unions

rn j "•*: To aphieve these alms the World Federation of Trade Unions therefore calls on the workers to strengthena?iir J5S w??ks^ P s , nationally and Internation-

a I join with all who support peace in every country. t° f^PP^rt the actions of the German workers against

the militarists in their country, for a unified, democra­tic and peace-loving Germany."

(Excerpt from a Declaration made in Vienna, 5 October 1954)

Opposition in France

General Confederation cf Trade Unions :

n-f "'lhe ^urea^ °£ C.G.T. urgently draws the attention workers to the grave danger which Parliamentary

b? thlapr?np uflli 1f pXef*nJati0n °f the &Sreezient signed Prime Minister in London would represent for theorklng class and fcr the whole nation ..."

Teachers1 Union

"The German question can only be settled within the

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framework of a general peace settlement, A genuine peace policy demands from men who cl.ilia to speak on behalf of the peoples that the four poweis occupying Germany agree to restore that country's unity on the basis of free elections, give it baok Its Independence through a peace treaty, and keep it disarmed and outside any military coalition, while they themselves really start on a big reduction of their armed forces."

(Excerpt from the resolution of the Executive Commit- . tee of the French National Union of Primary School Teaohers, 5 October,1954)

Ex-Servlcement

"The French Union of Ex-Servicemen's Associations confirms its unwavering opposition to any revival of German militarism.

"It wants the solution of the German problem to be sou ht in a system of collective security which would create the conditions necessary for general, progressive, simultaneous and controlled disarmament. To do this, it wants all measures likely to aggravate the armaments race throughout the world set asi , for the armaments race would render vain negotiations to bring about a lasting peace in Europe and the world."

(Resolution adopted by the General Assembly of the French Union of Ex-Servicemen’s Associations - membership 3,000,000 - held in Paris on 2 and 3 October, 1954)

Officers' Federation

"... neither is it possible in any way to restore arms and divisions to the part of Germany which is governed by Chancellor Adenauer. In this Germany, it is

fenerals who are well known to us who would lead this uture army; indeed the proportion of Nazi leaders in the General Staff which the Blank Office has reconstituted is higher than it was during Hitler's time."

(Excerpt from a letter addressed to M. iiend&s-France by the Federation of Republican Officers and N.C.O.s of the French reserve, 5 October, 1954)

In Germany

Trade Union Congress

The Federal Congress is greatly concerned by the fact that the London decisions prepare for West Germany's participation in a military alliance.

13

If confirmed and ratified, the Nine Power a*reec«»nt would Jeopardise the lessening cf international tension and the reunification of Germany. in the Federal Reoubli- rernilitarisacion would present the danger of facilitating the setting up of an authoritarian, militarist state which would put an end to -the efforts o* the U s

* S 2 3 & r° . ild Up a P0llti011> 8001,11 and economio

The Federal Congress rcjedts any military contribu-n*11 t* f 8 P°s^-^lHties of reaching and

understanding between the peoples and the reunification of Germany by negotiation have not been exhausted."

(Excerpts from the resolution of the German Trade

S 3 ? v o ^ a ^ l n s t ) * * ? * * * * } P“s#d

the London Agreement and German Rearmament.

In Great Britain

Trade Unionists

??advS Vnlon Congress which took place in Brighton at the beginning of September 1954, a resolution opposing German rearmament and demanding German reunifi-

E S S . S V S S ^ E t “ h lC h w a sT h u 3 the m a j o r i t y w as only° 468^000ritJl 4 ’ 0 9 0 ' 000 ^ n s i .

i\ « ...

v-noi rJ ° T 4 exa^?}e the attitude of the important Amalgamated Engineering Union was stated thus by its President Mr Openshaw In an Interview given to a ^ r e n o h ^ r a l i ^ :

"My union's National Committee has already unani- mously adopted a resolution condemning th. w a ? m £ £ £ of

There Is no doubt that the vaet S “ « T of engineers are opposed to German rearmament.

reeor^fttrai n«?er°w!tl0* 0Ur Natlonal Committee went on . record against German rearmament as envisaged under th-*European Defence Community. It would s S e tooppose German rearmament outside E.D.C.

In the Labour Party

PartvIif j / 0ll0Wi^ ores0luti0n waa Presented to the Labour Party (bngress at Scarborough on 28 September :

•' .

"This confereuce oondemns all prcpoaala for Germanrearmament and welcomes euoh effort* as were made at the Geneva Conference to resolve prrolems of International tension.

"Conferenceoalls for the continuation of these efforts and for negotiations at the highest level for a peace treaty that will bring about a united, democratic Germany."

«

This resolution won 2,910,000 votes while the majority resolution only Just managed to get a bijyrer vote with 3,281,000.

In Italy

Position of the Socialist Party

The responsibility of the leaders of the Cristian Democratic Party "appears greater still in view of the pledge given by the Italian Socialist Party to give its support to a government which is resolved to ... promote in international affairs the ending of the cold war, the reduction of armaments and an alternative to 2.D.C., not through German rearmament but in a general system of European security."

(Excerpt from the Resolution of the Central Committee cf the Italian Socialist Party. Rome. October 7. 1954)

§

Another big trade union organisation fi.rmly opposed to German rearmament is the Italian C.G.T. with its 5,000,000 members.

In Belgium

TP.Vng Socialists at their National Congress on October10tfa7 195T - -p.-.. --------------

Belgian Socialist Young Guard, the youth movement of the Belgian Social Democratic Party, passed unanimously a resolution which can be summed up as follows :

- For an international policy of Peace;- Negotiation with the U.S.S.R. to unite Germany

freely;- Opposition to any rearmament of Germany!- The banning of atomio weapons.

— o - o - o — o— o-o—

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SIS'

'■ , * . J x y * * s ®4 7 H 'l *

SECRETARIAT OF THE WORLD COUNCIL OF PEACE

o c u m e n t a r y M a t e r i a l

February 10,1955

«v*Y>SNATIQHAL

1

2

5

4

3

6

7

89

101112

BECISIQHS WHICH INSPIRE

TENSION

- Unanimous decisions taken at the United Nationa.

■ ^ tj r i - by- ^ . Sovi* t ” p r“entatiT* 8t u n i f d H . t i n «

- United Nations resolution on the peaceful use of atomic energy,• A Joint Anglo-American statement.

II

Xflg a W A X E Q W S X W E N t A ^ T *0. f l g c i a ^

• Threata of certain military chiefs.

• The Paria seaaion of the N.A;T.O* Council.

Statements by Mr. Spaeks Mr. Dullea and Sir Anthony Edai. Article by Marefcal Vassilimkl.

haa Cast the Die* (article by Hanson V. Baldwin in

the Paria Deciaion (Mapchtmaer ( W d ^ Editorial). ■

Letter to Xfrf Tlflffff by Capt. B.H. Liddell Hart.

Adventurous Plana (Prarda article).

I H

15

14

15

16

17

18

3 & J PA3C

Elaenhorer's Message making for Special Military Powr., Threat of an Atomic Attack.

U Blunder* (Editorial in the jfeacheater

C o u l d <g g & M g T Al8op ^

An 'Authorised* Despatch fran the Associated Pr....

Any Deciaion ia up to the President*

t-

Prepared hy the Reference Departwnt

•V’ ** 4

I N T B 0 P U C T Q J 1 Y N J L T E

:-i &

The Geneva Conference, the ending of the war in Indo-China and the fall of E.D.C. - remarkable Exults in thd fijh* for poace were node possible by the peoples' tireless and resolute struggle, and they o*ve the ordinary, honest people the feeling that great progress had been made toward the relaxation of international tension.

In the course of last year this feeling was strengthened when, on the basis of tnsninously accepted criteria, agree— gt was reached at the United Nations to continue the talks for the reduction of armed forces and the banning of weapons of m s s destruction and to call en international conference on the peac»- ful use of atonic energy.

But these important factors making for the relaxation of international tension received a first shock fro* the London sad Peris Agreements for the rearmament of Germany. Then there was theH.A.Tv.0. Council decision of December IB regularising the use of atonic and thermonuclear weapons. This decision is so far-reaching that it imnediately gave rise to an extremely dangerous aggrava­tion of the European and world situation* Indeed, shortly a f t e r ­wards, a new state of tension was created in the Pacifio through the special powers conferred on the President of the United State* and authorising him, should the need arise, to use araed force la the Formosa area* In this area also they threaten to use atomic weapons*

Confronted with this grave N.A.T.O. decision, the reoent meeting of the Bureau of the TTorld Council of Peace laid bare before the whole world the new dangers involved in the eonorete preparations for at aodc war and called on the people in every country to combine their efforts to oppose and avert them*

This co^>endium brings together a number of tarts which show bowsarious the international situation is end which cam be weed in the world-wide campaign which la non? starting*

rv- .#8$

-‘V . J

w m m s x s decisions t/jcj; at the uiTrcp nations

October 27, 1954 i

The General assembly Political CoraniiLtec unanimously adopted a joint a resolution submitted by Canada, Prance, the Joviet Union, Britain and the United States on control, restriction and balanced reduction of all armed forces and armaments (report of tho U.tf. Disanjaaent Commission) and on the •conclusion of an international convention (treaty) on reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass destruction."

November 4, 1954 :

The United ITations Assembly, at its plorxary session, unanimously adopted the draft resolution of the five powers (the United Stc.tes, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union) relating to the continuation of the work of the Disarmament Connission and its Bub-cosmittee.

0

At the same plenary session representative of the Soviet Union. lir. Vishinsky, stated:

•The Soviet delegation attaches great importance to the fact that not only has tuo draft resolution been supported by the five great powers, but also that it has been cdopted unanimously, b; the First Conmdssion ... The interest of the draft resolution does not roaide in the fact that they settle the procedural questions ... There are difficulties. They must be eliminated. The Soviet delegation, for its part, is determined to seek a solution accept- abie to all States ... I would point out that the Soviet Union has already taken a osi'tain number of steps towards bringing the points of vie* closetogether. She is justified in expecting as much from the other parties, in the coition interest, ’ '

B g s o u m o n OU Tin FGACISUL USD OF ATOMIC ITJKGY

November 23, 1954 i

The Political Commission of tho United Nations unanimously adopted a resolution which France Press suuood up as followst

•The intention to set up on agoncy is mentioned in a paragraph "...Noting that negotiations are in progress, and the intention that they ehould continue, for the establishment as quickly as possible of an Internation­al Atomic Energy Agency to facilifcrrto the use by the entire world of atomic energy for peaceful purposes, and to encourage international cooperation in the further development and practical application of atomic energy for the benefit of mankind.*

The resolution decided that an international technical conference of governments should be held under the auspices of the United Nations in August1955 at the latest,to explore means of developing the peaceful uses of atomic er.ergy through international cooperation and, in particular, to study the development of atonic power and to consider other technical areas - such as

.2.

'"I

biology, modicine, r .diction protoction, Uni rundanental scionce.

December 4, 1954:

T’ud United Nations General Aseeubly, in p le n a r y session, confirned the resolution of the Political CoanWBjgm by a unanimous vote.

** .*

♦

a joprr jBBjaK3 St

The stateneut mado on the occasion of the Eisenhcwer-Churchill aeeting, aooe tine before the U.1J.0. docisions, appeared to take the peopl e s t r o n g desire for a relaxation of international tension into account. In fv-ct, the fourth point of the statement says the following!

*•Jo be lie re that the cause of trorld peace oould be advanced by

geneiv.1 .-mil drastic reduction under effective safeguards of world araajosnt3 of all classes and kinds. It vill be our persevering resolve to promote conditions in which the prodigious nuclear farces nov in buaan hands can be used to wrich end not to destroy mankind*'

• - %

(Washington, July JO, 1954)

But if the uuininouB decisions taken by the United Rations gave hope to peace-loving people, at the sane tie© events hive occurred which aggravate the international situation sharply. J

_THHEAJS OF CERTaIH LTLITA3Y CHEFS

gjgld-ifcrshal Lord liontgonsry, Deputy Coomcnder-in-Chief of the H.A.T.O. forces, stated on October 21, 1934:

'I want to ueke it absolutely clear th..t we £,t S.B.A.PJS. are basing all our operational planninc on ualng atomic and therxaonuclear weapons in our defence. It is no longer a question of ^They aay possibly be used." It io very definitely "they will be used - if we are attacked." *

(Manchester Guardian. October 22, 1954)

* ’ -'I., ’ ‘ •' ^ ~ • • V-VGeneral J.D.S^venson, Consider of the 49th U.S.Air Division in Great Britain, stated:

•Each aircraft to be seen here (Bentwaters aerodrone near Wood- bridge, Ed.) today can carry a greater destructive puach to m y one target tlv.n all the aircraft which were in these islands in the Second World T/ar loaded with high explosives.

"Tro end a half years ago the 49th Air Division was deployed to the United Kingdon for the purpose of giving on atonic punch In sty port of I.A.T.O* forces.’

(The..Ijoes. Deoenber U , 1954)

♦

♦ *

assioy qy t i c ti,A.T,P, <?a/Hca

The H.A.T.O.Council, nee ting in Paris on December 18, 1954, published a final on— ml got fi. cn which ve take ths essential points.

Under Point III we read:

'In accordance with its regular practice, the Council exchanged views on natters of c o a u n concern in the international situation.

'The Council nelcoood the efforts being »sdo under the aegis of the United qa^igns for _a jnrld-wide agreeuant for a general .limitation and control of armament*. *

In spits of this assertion, the conuniqui goes on to give the follow ing do cl a ion s on concrete nilitary problems:

Point V -

•The Council took note of & p r o g r e s s report submitted by the Military Ccenittee. It noted with satisfaction that a request by the Supreme Alliod Compandor, Europe, had lod to negotiations between the Motherlands and the United States, the recont completion of which will permit the establishment of a S.B.A.PJ. (Supreme Headquarters, /Hied Powers in Europe) sir defence technical centre in The Hague at which ■cienti-ite of all meaber nations will be able to contribute to the development of air defence. The Council also noted that the H.A.T.0. Defence CollegB, now in its fotrth year, has made a valuable contribution of qualified personnel to staffs and agencies of H.A.T.0. and of ••bars'

governments.

Point VI -

’The Cornell considered a report J a the Military C o a t e s o n t j e moat effective pattern of H.A.T.O. military aefor.sive stren&th over the next feu years, taking into account modern developments in'weapons and technlquoa. It approved this report as a basis for dofence planning and preparations by the H.A.T.O. military authorities, noting th.it this approval did not involve the delegation of the responsibility of govern­ments to make decisions for putting plans into action in the event of

hostilities.

Point VII -

•The Council considered the report on the annual review for 1954, sets forth the co-ordinated H.A.T.O. defence programmes fear the

next three years. The review wee based on the Council directive adopted In December, 1955, that it would be necessary far meaber countries to support ever a long period forces uhich, by their balance, qpallty and efficiency would be a major factor in deterring aggression.

•The ministers considered and accepted as military guidance a report by the Military Coamittee giving ite coaments on the 1954 smmial review. This report stressed that the level of forces far the defence of the HJLT.O. area should be maintainod as planned.

*9h 0 Council noted that tlwre had been on increase in the strength af MJLT«0u forces and further steady improvement in their efficiency over the post year. This iiyrovemcnt in qgelity resulted primarily from the large-scale combined exercises held by H.A.T.O* land, sea and sir forces, from the incressee in operational and support units and from the supply of large quantities of now equipment.

•The Council expressed its satisfaction at the expansion of luropean production of defence equipment, as well as the continued provision of Worth American equipment, and urged continued co-operation in research and development.

* Policing the reoomnsndations m-.de in the annual review report, the Couicil adopted firm fbrce goals for 1955, provisional gools for1956 and planning goals for 1957. The force goals agreed upon for 1955 are of ubout the same numerical strength as those for 1954, but further Improvements in training, equipment end effectiveness are provided for. The Germ&n do fence contribution undor the Paris agreement remains, in

the opinion oC the Coucil, an indispensable addition to the effort of tho Uoat.*

The uoat serious decisions, which have alanwd public opinion throughout the world, are containod in Point VI. The confused language and subtlety of tJ«o formulation cannot hide the fact that this paragraph lays’ down the diroctivcs for preparing en c.tonic ear*

«

3±3Ei.aS LQ.5pAAKAy_vi& z;rp q ? _ ^ h.a.t.o.ccxjwcil uwm iQ

•Corancnting on this decision, U.Spaak said thr.t it net exactly the wishes of tho military, by authorising them to prepare for an atomic war, but kopt in civil hsjads the responsibility for deoiding on the use of tho atomic weapon. The moons by which that political decision could bo arrived at vac a subject for discussion within the peraamnt council of N.A.T.O., but in any case it could never be made public because it would be a military uecret of the greatost importance, IThilo the decision ought to be t oonon one, there might in prr.ctico bo difflcultiee in canuni- eeting ./ith governments, end in thB event of on atomic aggression against the vest tho -uoction of a "veto" v/ould beoomo nommtr t thmoretioal.'

(Quoted in Tho T i m m . Deosnber 20, 1954)

Q.

flBia;arr t i c lit? o f v i e M.A.-f.o.coiirciL icgriro

(extracts)

•I returned yoeterd*^ from the P.\ris meeting of the XJL.TU).Council. The coar.uniq u6 t;hich was issued reports in sumcry form what took placo. I vould like to ooaaent briefly on two items in the coimaiBil gu6. .*•

'The first was tho statooent that Soviet policy contimem to be directed toward wei-lcenixig and dividing tho ..estern nations mad that tbs threat to tho froo world has not ,,

'The second item of the agenda to uhich I would is thatwhich reports the approval of - report by the Military Committee, which definod tho riost effective pattern of 17*A.T.O. military deftautive strength for the no^t fo\; years, taking into account modern developments in weapons -nd techniques.

•This 1*0port, which ossueos a unity that includes ’./estern Germany, •hows for the first tiue the moans of developing a forward strategy which could be reliod on to protect .Testorn Europe from invasion. As that capability is developed, it will surely constitute the strongest deterrent against military aggression. Furthermore, it will assure that if, unhappily, aggrossion should be atteapted, it would mot succeed and that tho aggrossor would bs thrown back at tho thremtold.

•Thus wo soo tho means of achioving what the people of . estern

Europe have Ions sought - that is, a foru of security which, while having as its first o'ojoctivo ths proaorv.tion of peace, would also bo adequate for dofonce end ^rhich 'rould not put ..ostorn Europe in a position of having to bo liberated.

T/io Council action made it clo.r that, in approving th>? report, it did so ^or the purposes of planning tho preparation, and thrt this did not involve a delegation to tho military in a field which ic properly tho responsibility of governments v/ith respect to putting plans into action in tho ovont of hostilities.

*T.»c aitur.tion is thus norm-1 in tW|C respect. In this country, aa in tho other N.A.T.O. countries, it is tho civil authorities of govornraont awJ not the military who m Jco tho ;pvvo decisions. That,Of course, 'dll be the situation as rogarda the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation.* » ”

(The Nov7 York Tiacs. Docenber 22, 1954)

STA_Tg;.-i,rp by J ia jm iOifY ZJEi hi t.Z OF CO)i>;ars

(extract)

In erdor to attain this position of defensive deterrent strength, we look for ard, in tho coning yo^ra, to ta important con­tribution from tho German Federal Republic. Svan more significant will bo tho offoct of the now wocpons with which tho N.A.T.O. forcoa are nou bogiiming to bo equipped. As a result of this tho pattern of western military strength in tho noxt fow yoars can achiove - and I quote the words used by Hr.Poster Dulles in ashington yesterday: -a form of soairity which sooks the preservation of peacs aa its first objective, but in tho event of war would not put tho Continent in tho position of 'having to bo liberated*". I fully endorse those words.

11 ,mov'’ thr't public intorost haa boon arouaod by tho kmovrlodgo thc.t the North Atlantic Council haa had boforo it a report by tho military co*dttoo "on tho pattern of N.A.T.O. Military strength over

ooxt fow yoara". Bofore the liinistorial moating all aorta of ruooura woro circuiting of difficultioa and di;,agrme*mta on thia queation botnocn fiovonuaenta or botwoon tho civil and military authoritioa of T.O. None of thoao joimours waa vroll founded. As stated in the conouniqu6, tho North Atlantic Council approved tho military coaaittoo's report aa a baais for dcfonoo plrnning and

rh° ?^UaiUI by vUthoritioa. It notod, ho./ovor,t this approval did not involve tho delegation of the responsibility

of feovornmonts to «Uco decisions for putting pl..ns into action in the evon„ of hostilities. Hosponaibility in this nattar reata therefore withGovornciontc. it will, for obvious raojons, not bo possible to publish tho dotailod arrangements finally arrived at.*

(The Times. Dccombor 23, 1054)

AM jJfrlCLE BY tl.ISiyJL V^SILITVSKI

Under thu title * Don't play with fir o ’ , If. reh .1 Vrssilievski of the &.S.S .R. replied to th» diff eront statements on r.tonic war mrdo by Field Marshal tord Montgomery of Gre..t Britcin era October 8, 1954 in *a Irrr., on October 21, 1954 to the Royal United ;.orvics,3 Institution, on Uovonbor 11, 1954 in Ottawa end on November 30 in Los .jiggles.

\Tq reproduce here two long extract:: fror. this article:

•liontgor.iery’o persistent appuals for t!._ unloshiag of an atomic war arouse deep nfr-r in us Soviet people, 3* in .11 pcr.ce-loving pooplos. It ia just possible to understand to 3cne extent tbo insensate 3poochea of certain irresponsible .'Jaoric n Congressmen, 'Ao br.-r.die/. tbo atomic bombt they do not know -.’h't they 'JX taliang about. But we cannot say aa much of a British Field Harpkr.l who calls for .-.tonic \ r x : bee ..use ho crti understand the horrors or such a \ rr fitft fcargiad a t in i it vill bo li!:c, 03p0ci.-J.ly for r. country lihc Grer.t Britain.

*In his c\ae it iu not simply unreason but aouethin: warso. Th.t is uhy ;if r. llr-rah l ©£ Joviet Union, \.ho h-.vo not Fi~ld Urrshr.l Montgomery rnd who know hia r.a c. soldier, would like to sty thie to him:

*"YBu Mid I, Field li.rshal, being .oldiere, knou what war is; wo knot? well enough the destructive forco of atonic rnd hydrogen jorpons oafiid tho torriblo consequences of a wrr waged with tho so worpons. I 2> struck by tho cr 3urJ wr.y you speak of ouch m rtrocious v/rr ;nd by the inexplicable indiffcrenco to tho fato of men with uhieli you proach the necessity for it. Your passionate support of the idea ^hrt rn atonic war ia inevitable is astovjuling, to say tho least...

•";.s f-r "2 the purely to clinical ride of tlie ^uc3tion is concomod, you ara cortainly ar re of tho progress the Soviet Union has made in tho military sphere during the 1 st ten ye-rc. This is public knowledge but neve rt he lossI would like to remind you of it because your statements show th.t you hraro nort sufficiently borae it in nind.

,HLi];o you, Urjrshrl, I have spent ny life with tho colours. T7o V.vo soon tho growing destructive potential of arm. oent3 ;.nd we know how unornous this potenti 1 i.:> todr.y.

’"In the ovont of a future wrr wo military r.on would be responsible for the annihilation of hiLidreds of millions of hvman being3 rnd for the dis- cppearrjace of import*at fcultur 1 nd industrial centres. Tho destructive pooor which science h03 g fr v n to the 'naed forcon i.; 00 groat that it obliges us to understand the necessity for prohibiting atonic wcr.pons tad establishing an offoctive international supervision of tliir; ban.

’"You a>id I well l a w tli .t atomic ;nd h drogcn wc.'-pone rro \/cr.pona for the mrss j;rtermin tion of pjr c ful popul tiens 'nd for thD destruction of tc/na, tTcrpons ■..'hich -jrc ^spoci: llj d r^jorou3 to countries \.*hich rre snrJl in riror but densely popul ted.

'How then era you, Fi. ... rriv 1, prer.ch u'o of r.tonic "nd nuelorjr \7capono so nonch Xcntly? Hoe c'n >-ou see?: to lull public opinion while pre­paring it peycholodc ily to accept th^ incvitfidlity :nd even the necocaity of ctofldc wrjfS? I- ii not cle r to you tlx.t to thrust nnkiad in this wfj' into tho horrors of such a *rr ie to commit ■ c-*inc?

*"I . ill toll yoa iiaQvfvly nd fr -iklyf as becomes . soldier, that I x x s deopiy revolted by your pro .tomlc war. Your thOu^itloss staternonto oblige ao to v r m you .th t you re playin,-, . C iigerouo grjte. ju ;/ollkno-./n proverb h..s it thrt he who tows the wind wi ll ro;.p ilk? storm, I would not dviee j’ou, Fiele j:rruh\l, vo i-1 f tin. p v . of »he aa;er of rn atonic wrr."*

Pravdc.. Doceaber 4, 1S54..c. ■ *.V

(extracts)

■ • A . T . c f S u ^ U ioSiona: ‘ th° /* ,rle-'" r'r" = * P to - V » « « • the

T C - for

? « . S 5 « 5 Z Z r d T Z * T*»■«" j g i t w r ^ M , * 1 ..ti^tic h a v . V i S '

apeci.l weep on o (atomic) magazinoa, .jid the aircraft chioflv i ■*Banohee Jot fighter, ar* Bougie » « „ * * botlbor;."

« * * J S t f S J u S 5 “ “ r f f l j s r g * * £ 2 *ch^god »ith tho atomic ■ w J R J w S S o S f J ^ S ' S i ' £ L T could be oupplaoentod by many of tha U 5 t r M r T V i !!' fQrCOlight bombers h-oai on =uropJ.n f i ^ d ^ ! “Sh'^hombora u>d ....

762-on “ I f 31 “ “ “ U ™ <* th.conpcrable to t t e l U ^ ,W y r0Ck0t* '"lth * r“'«0 roughly

f e . r ^ ™ g ’s s r a r -

Xi* , C k ™ h ld 50 0,01 '-ith tho plentiful uae ofr° ^ na' fi™ d froo the ground ^d dJcpped ^ pl jLe-

S S & B S ^ ^ z & S S & i r

(it naon B.-ldwin in Tim New York T ima* December IS, 1954)

JMLft-JUS OBCIo IOH

(e.:tracte)

•n -tomiIh^eB^S!itr !0K0f^‘'!10 dociaion takon by th“ Horth / t l a n t i c Council

S 2 S

Council S S ^ to,^ ”B.0°’* 5 T ^ 2 iT rt*d 1 “? "°rth '•UantiC were i» o u ct^ave been ^

inpreused by the need to make a choice. Economically tho Y/'estom nations cannot afford to dcvoto moro monoy or non to d fence than they are already doing...

'In other Trorde, since 1948 it h^s beon very unlikoly that a war would be fought in Europe without atomic weapons. To that e::tent the 'North Atlantic Council's decision is not ncv: it3 only newness is that other nations hrve now shared in s/hat was formerly on American decision.'

v (Manchester Guardian, December 20, 1954)

*

BffUCATlOKS OF TIE HYDHOCi;; 130123

(extracts)

'Tho further ono thinks into the problem created by the hydrogen bomb, and its implications, the more questionable it bccomes whether present defence planning is realistic...

'It is very hard to relate warfare as knov/n in the past to warfare where atomic bombs, missiles, and shells can bo employed in hundreds ot thousands, and where thermonuclear (hydrogen) boubs each moasurod in uriTHnwa of tons of high explosive are also av&ilcble in quantity. (The original Hiroshima bomb was equivalent to a more 20,000 tens of TWT). Once such weapons are used it is scarcely conceivable that the war could continue, even in a "broken-backed" form. The conduct of war is "organised action" f and this collapses whore chaos roigna.

'In tho case of this country, whore the vital targets are closely grouped, it h..s boen ostia:.ted that as few as five therranuclear bombs might suffice, and that ton would almost certainly suffice to blot out all its main centres of industry - comprising half the population. Still fewer would suffico to paralyse tho vital contros of Ftvnce, Belgium and Holland. Moroovor, paralysis, and collapso, can bo produced by moral effect even where destruction doos not tako placo.

*To prevent such a catastropho, air dofenco T?ould have to attain nearly 100 por cent effectiveness of interception at the outset, and that is almost inconceivable. Tho most opti listic estiaate from any authc£it4tive quarter is that "ono out of every four Soviet bombsrs" might bo intercepted. In any case there is no mecjas in eriatonco or in prospect of intercepting atonic missiles. By 1945 the Gormns h-d successfully tost-fired a V2-typo rocket with a range of about 400 miles, and )v.d worked out plans to extend it - just beforo their research station at Poonamundo was captured by the Russians. Tho range of tho VI type, then only 150 miles, has already been trebled and it3 accuracy improved. London is 450 miles from tho Bussisn positions in Gon^ny, Paris less than 400 miles, while Brussels, Antwerp, and Amsterdam are barely 250 miles distant.

'Honce, the only real defence is tho dotcrrent powor of retort.This io, howovor, a very potont tir.fegu.rd against an attack of similar kind - or any tfc. t proaants a vital throat. It vrauld be tho blindest of grmblos for oithor sida to base a var p i n on destroying the other's power to retalinto. Tho Communist rulers hove nover inclined to dangorously blind grmbles; indoor', thoy h v j shov.n thomaelvos cautious in calculation to an

ice-cold point. The idea of a sudden "knock-out" cries no sense where there j j j j ' ^ ch th* " hydro cc a bomb ora" might take off - it

would be llJxi st-king otto s 11 fo an picking out tile proverbial "noodle in a haystack^. That conclusion npplios both ways.

unlnt J ? nf°nUn8ti y a gfave riak * * * * * thet a» «■ tonic war might develop unintontion<illy. The authorities agroo in aaylag it would be "mtualsuicide , yet present dcfonce planning runs eontrery to that conclusion.She preparation and tr.dning of tho western forcos zto now to be based onthe 1*0 of tactical" atomic weapons, with tho idea of oountar-balancin*the potential attacker's greater nmber of uen. Tho idoa has attractionson the surface, but on closor examination the advantages fade.

. .__ hcrd t0 drav7' ovon **r<J-»r to maintain, a dividing linek * 17000. L" and "strategical" action with auch woapons, so it isxtremelv doubtful if they could bo used without procipitating all-out

war, vlth hydrogen bombs. In such a war there would be little value in the u n n (with t ctical air forces) «hich tho North Atlantic Treaty

could ^ for tho dofance of wastern Europe. Those»aintain a defonco onco their homeland sources of supply were

ZZtahei. th<5ir h0‘“0land8 woro **iifcilatod their purpose would have

... ®a»sive attack by "conventional" forces only has become verv unlikely, for it will be obvious to a calculating aggressor that thaloes

h y d r o s bo*>8. Tho value of armies lies in providing o T ^ ^ * * * * * * attaok. To arm them with atomic woapons i s ^t h a t S t a ^ °a3°. f°r “g a i n i n g thorn. In that form they vould Increase

* aproading a local conflict into a universal conflagration without diminishing the fatal prospect. ^

mariHiiM, «.^Kioi3rC rosPonsiblc for dofonce planning naturally dosire the maxima. possible insurance, and it is not thoir responsibility to judgewhether tho app xont addition offered by nuclear uoapctui la outweiKhefbvt h e ^ r e a s o d risk of homeland chaos and collapse. 1 » a c c e p t ^ t ^ *

addod insurance tho stat03aon nav hopafully imaginet h a they can restrain its u*> until the need is J L 3 T This i T f T r a i l

p a l p a b l y ^ i c w S ? ! . ^ 1 °* **". *'dr°*°n b°mb cra 18 • *■* bec«D3

: (Lottor by Capt.B.lI.Liddoll Hart to Tt» Times.

January 5, 1955)

/Jjv^fruaous PLAWS

(extracts)

th« e— t:i° ‘f'ontion °* w l d public opinion has been drawn to Thl<! sossion of tho Council of tho aggrossivo North /tlantic bloc. Tills session docidod to work out plans for atomic nor. Such a decision

.11.

^ popul! tod f ■“» « * * i* * . b«t,

the ieli^io'f'Sopt^ o ™ * t h i n g possible to prevent

not J * * * .it, ,ho n i c o u e a ^ p ^ ^ " : ” - * - “

•ffirossive bloc lias in f c c t % ! S of ths "orth Atlonti*ar in ~urope on the b..sis of using -'tonir y, ^ ccoler&te the preparations for

Justify this c r im in a l decision in tho oves «f '«zpons. Seeking toconunontutors, obviously inspired by those t* .? lc °?inion, observers and the use of those voapcne S S t S . K ? “ th' “»«*">*. Preset^dispensable (!). They refer to thc f c ^ V u - t L r T - T J =mdof confronting "the possible enemy- eith t t r o S u “Uogedly incapable

the s o ™ ti,*, that the atomic affta,

of P u n e . ^ s S n ^ f l i S “ « H « in the . t . f e n *for atomic M r rfth the alleged "SovSt ItoncJ? Di”!'*!?0” Qn “» Preparation*Of the ooviet Union in every way nd nmPAr ,+4 * Dlotortin« the peaceful policy the participants in the Paris session ^ ^ it in a completely false light not hide the foot that tho ^ th,,lr P » I » . 4 o■ «“* “» Soviet Union a.j t h H S £ ? °f A“ontlc bloo or. direcied and other -ostorn European n e w s p a p e r s c o u n t r i e s . British, French he point of the cammunique which tffims th w k °n t ittafii«a*y importance of

right to decide when and where the atooic bomb w^lfs!"!!!!!!!** TOUld retaln the PfPera openly declrro that in reaUty t h L nn^ 7 ^ UB*d * but African news- Jiven the right to docido on the n u e ^ i ^ o ? ^ ! a®an8 toat the Unit»d Statea is bomb as it wishes. As the P a r i f a * th® of the ato*ic and hydroLnAssociated Press points out the Atlant^** kt* °f th° /'jnericen nows agency 1-poae on the United St~te,’t £ f ° C Couacil,» ^ciaion 4 E T * *

the permanent totrnotiS I r f V 1’ .......... * • * *the . lliod troops in Huropo". given to the Coimnander-in-Chief of

put / ? rt* oor oopondont of t'M_Aaaooi£t2d P r 5M H u u l .

the decision on tho use of tho loaJorT^i NATO* nro ^reed thatcould be trken by tho "overnnent of th n 4 do fence of Vestern Europo

£ & d°,l0efti0" <“ ooceaaary. £ T i u i

- of using otooic t S s t S K S S ^ s s j r *

« ° i f T f f i * * c l ' ',= » ° o f "tho * Uni t ad's os f \ tha° ° * * * * v,h4ch shoe that *■ £«? “o r„ce to prep.ro for « ^ ? * £ * f ? “ * * “"•

wing ..11 tho intrigues and manoeuvres of’♦ U " ? people are closelyW r e ^ y to t d . all neceasary ~ T £ L . . J

rtove !u0rL lt h T o o ^ i o ‘ f o V * a S ™ 2S p° ? pl0 ^ a U 'ountriea, a *in crso of atomc war will n-w> would inevitably bo tha v4 j

tb. orieiBr-l plana and p r ^ t tiona° fr ' " * « « * « * « - * «

(Pravda 24-12-1954)

.12.

Collection Number: AD1812

RECORDS RELATING TO THE 'TREASON TRIAL' (REGINA vs F. ADAMS AND OTHERS ON CHARGE OF HIGH TREASON, ETC.), 1956 1961 TREASON TRIAL, 1956 1961

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