Politicised Culture, Identity and Nationalism in Post-Communist Bulgaria; the Chalga discourse

This essay aims to examine nationalism in Bulgaria and in so doing, to situate its particularities in historical, cultural and political contexts. Specifically, it will address nationalistic ideology in relation to Bulgaria’s minorities, the Turks and the Roma. In order to see how this process manifests in day to day life the essay will analyse the significance of chalga. Consisting of a fusion of ‘folk’ ‘ethnic’ and ‘national’ elements mixed with western pop, this new musical genre has emerged in the wake of Bulgaria’s ‘transition’ from communism to capitalism. Far more that being a new genre it has become a site for contesting identities, exploring new opportunities and stirring social insecurities. The discussion will demonstrate the cultural, social and political elements that shape chalga and how it embodies a reaction to capitalism in a new political and economic era. In analysing this phenomenon the relationship between Bulgaria’s re-imagined past, newly found European present and the ambiguities that link them will come to light. This essay aims to situate social conflict within these wider processes and the relationship between what is imagined to be ‘eastern’ and it’s relation to the ‘western’. In addition, the contestation which surrounds chalga exemplifies not only ethnic tension, but class division also. Furthermore, this essay aims to explain the complex inclusive and simultaneously exclusive elements that shape Bulgarian nationalism through examining Bulgarian mumming rituals; in which conflict constitutes community, which may account for why Bulgaria has avoided ethnic violence and xenophobia.

In order to situate the significance of chalga in nationalism, the discussion will begin with an account of Bulgaria’s communist past demonstrating historical process and political campaigns aimed at minority groups. Specifically it will show how in communist rhetoric controlling material culture was thought to be imperative in the creation of a cultural revolution. The discussion will outline the motivation behind these campaigns situating them in the quest for ‘Europeanness’ following the Second World War. Furthermore in this the process of eliminating difference and emphasising sameness will become apparent. This will show how the opposition between east and west was constructed and justified through the re-remembrance of the Ottoman past.

Next the discussion will bring to light the significance of folklore in asserting an ‘authentic’ Bulgarian identity. This account will illustrate the political process of using folklore to stress similarity and shared culture. This process was aimed at eliminating traits considered ‘incompatible’ with the imagined ‘authentic’ Bulgarian identity. From this we will be able to see culture as something that serves political ends and in this case acts as a re-invention of Bulgarian identity. In this account forms of every day resistance through music will come to light.

The discussion will then turn to the transition from communism to capitalism, and the emergence of chalga. This new musical genre surfaces in the midst of economical struggles and new opportunities. Importantly, this turbulent time has facilitated the opportunity for new behaviours and the expression of contested identities. Here, the heated debate surrounding the new genre will be closer examined. In particular the analysis will reflect on how the re-imagined past affects the imagining of the future. In this way the discussion will illustrate that chalga captures the past and the present, while mediating and resisting the notions tied to modernity. In this process, chalga is a source of asserting new identities and challenging homogenous contentions of a nation built on ethnicity. The discussion will then situate the significance of chalga specifically in relation to Bulgarian nationalism.

Finally I will turn to the question of variations of nationalism, and address the Bulgarian case. The discussion will explore how and why Bulgaria has avoided the fate of its neighbours. It will bring into question if and how cultural particularities can have a constitutive effect on the imagining of a nation. An ethnographic example of Bulgarian mumming rituals, which are shown to be both collective and conflicting, will show the nature of social relations. This will suggest what community and nation might mean for local populations. More

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importantly, it will articulate culturally significant groupings, both in terms of ethnic and economic relations. Out of this, oppositional aspects will surface, but in the Bulgarian case these oppositions are simultaneously partly diffused and re-affirmed. The discussion will demonstrate parallels between history, ritual practice and chalga. It could be said that a notion of community in which conflict is part of its constitution accommodates ambiguity; and this is central to Bulgarian nationalism within its inclusive and exclusive nature.

Communism, minorities and material cultureIn order to understand nationalism in Bulgaria, it is important to firstly situate it within

its historical background. In the fourteenth century, Bulgaria was invaded by the Ottoman Turks. Turkish rule lasted five centuries and Bulgarian scholars often refer to this as “the darkest period in the history of the Bulgarian people” (Silverman 1983, p.55). In the wake of World War two, East and West took on new meanings in Bulgaria (Neuburger 2004, p.55). As the Soviet sphere spread west the concept of ‘Eastern Europe’ and the ‘Eastern Bloc’ solidified in opposition to the newly constituted West (Western Europe and the United States). Although the purpose of the new Soviet State was a military and ideological opposition to the capitalist West, this did not imply identification with the East. Bulgaria along side the rest of the Block assumed superiority of the more developed ‘European’ cultures within and outside the Bloc (2004, p.56). In this way ‘Europeanness’, in opposition to Eastern ‘backwardness’, remained significant in Bulgaria despite communist ideology. This opposition called for a revolutionary remaking of society; a cultural war against Eastern ‘backwardness’ within, seen as being namely Muslim difference, targeting Bulgaria’s minorities, the Turks and Roma.

By the late 1950s heightened Bulgarian nationalism and an aggressive approach towards minorities coloured Bulgarian policies. Todor Zhivkov who came into power in 1956 had an optimistic vision of a “ripe communism” (Neueberger 2004, p.69). In his vision, “visible vestiges of the Ottoman past were used as a way to determine the degree of progress along the path to a utopian future” (2004, p.69). If these persisted they were interpreted as resistance to socialist integration. The persistence of Islamic practices intensified fears of the Islamic threat within. The re- remembrance of the Ottoman past facilitated this fear and the Bulgarian Communist Party (BCP) announced “the great leap forward” which was accompanied by a “Cultural Revolution” (Emilov 1997, p.63). This entailed the control of culture, which for the purpose of this essay will be examined through folklore. But in order to grasp the social climate in which this took place, a brief account of the position of Turks and Roma during the communist period follows.

According to communist rhetoric, it was necessary to rectify Ottoman misdeeds for the sake of the ‘nation’ and especially, for the sake of progress and modernity (Neuberger 2004, p.28). This process took the form of Communist campaigns to eliminate the obvious remnants of the Ottoman past. The party viewed Muslims in particular as obstacles to Communist progress and incompatible with the development of new communist consciousness (2004, p.31). In what followed, material culture became the focus of Bulgarian Communist projects, aimed at tackling the Muslim ‘problem’. This was because Marxism was at the core a material ideology, based on the idea that material conditions determine consciousness (2004, p.57). Due to this, aspects of Muslim way of life were fundamental to the Communist confrontations with the Muslim provinces. While all features of Turkish culture were considered undesirable vestiges of the Ottoman past, ethnographers were trying desperately to preserve Bulgarian folk culture, as directed by the communist government (2004, p.69). Muslim way of life as well as Bulgarian way of life was the site for academics and ethnographers to lead the integration of Bulgaria’s minorities.

The BCP advocated a revolutionary transformation of material and cultural life into a new socialist way of life for all citizens of Bulgaria. Although both ways were targeted, the war on the eastern, Muslim way took on far more extreme measures. To name a few, Turkish attire such as the fez, the veil and shalvari (baggy trousers) were banned as part of intensive government campaigns (2004, p.74). The Party thought of Turko- Arabic names as major obstacles to national integration. In order to legitimise this, ethnographers and historians

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were obliged to supply ‘scientific proof’ concerning the origins of all Muslims in Bulgaria as ‘authentically Bulgarian’ (2004, p.75). This idea of blood-based sameness of Bulgarians and Turks increasingly spread into the discourse of political action of the Zhivkov regime. In light of the above, we can see that a specific political process took place; difference was moulded into sameness, resulting in the displacement of minority identities.

As assimilation was taboo in the new political rhetoric, the Party assumed a ‘unifying’ approach in light of ‘new found evidence’ and ‘historical proof’ of ethnic sameness (Emilov 1997, p.70). This was the claim that a significant proportion of Turks were actually descendants of mixed marriages between Ottoman soldiers and Bulgarian women (2004, p.74). Through this claim a “scientific case” was built for national integration. Assumptions about continued Turkish and Roma affinity with Turkey were seen as threats to national security (Neuberger 2002, p.79). These fears were exacerbated by developments in neighbouring Yugoslavia, the riots in Kosovo and rising Muslim/ Non Muslim tension.

In 1984-85 the Bulgarian government undertook an assimilation campaign in which nearly one million ethnic Turks were forced to change passports and acquire a Bulgarian Slavic name (Emilov 1997, p.65). This echoed the previously mentioned ‘naming campaigns’ aimed at the Roma. This was translated within the communist rhetoric as a ‘rebirth’ into both the ‘socialist nation’ and the Bulgarian one (Neuburger 2004, p.58). The coercive campaign was explained to the public as a necessary stage in an ongoing ‘revival process’ whereby individuals who had been ‘mislead’ into believing they were ethnic Turks were now ‘educated’ to recognise and embrace their ‘authentic’ Bulgarian-Slavic identity (Ganev 2004, p.75). This was the culmination of a long-term programme to eliminate ethnic diversity in the country, which conformed to the state’s general objectives of ethnic homogenisation (Kaneff 2004, p.131). Establishing the position of Bulgaria’s minorities during the communist period not only exemplifies the re-imagining of the Ottoman past; it allows us to begin to explore how it has been implemented into political ideology, specifically through folklore.

Folklore and nationalismIt has been noted that in many countries concern for national history and

independence often overlaps with pride in a distinctive folklore (Dorson sited in Silverman 1983, p.56). An example of this is the question of Turkish influence on Bulgarian folk music. In an effort to substantiate Bulgarian ‘purity’, Zhivkov claimed that “Turkish music left hardly a trace among the Bulgarian populace” (Kaufman cited in Silverman 1983, p.56). This correlates with the attempt to create one unified nation, which was the project of communist ideology. Furthermore, I argue that it is precisely statements like these which chalga challenges at the present time, as will become apparent later. First, a discussion regarding folklore is essential in examining its link to politics, history and culture and identity.

Folklore was a major contributor to the assertion of Bulgarian national identity. With its strong ties to the past and it’s potential to manipulate national consciousness it has been an important part for government involvement (Silverman, 1983, p.54).This has taken many forms such as sponsoring folklore festivals, schools and ensembles.

But this process has been inconsistent: on the one hand, its aim was to preserve traditional folklore, but on the other “traditional folklore is usually religious, ethnic, and regional” (1983, p.55). These traits were incompatible with creating a unified socialist Bulgarian folk culture. In light of this inconsistency the government implemented “a policy of selective preservation coupled with direct innovation to serve political aims” (1983, p.55). This discursive process took form in promoting nationalism and ethnic unity, through government sponsorship of specific ‘authentic’ folklore (1983, p.57). By turning tradition into folklore, the government was able to select what was imagined as ‘authentically’ Bulgarian while at the same time rejecting traditional elements, such as religious symbols and regional specificities. This was a deliberate means by which the state appropriated tradition for its own hegemonic purposes. In this way “anti-state constructions of the past were subsumed under historical goals” (Kane, 2004, p.139). Music and other activities, such as festive rituals became identified as folklore during socialist regime and were the products of a specific process. This process “created a socialist ‘other’ by separating the pre-communist traditional

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past from the new contemporary state ideology of a unified Bulgaria, ‘free’ from hybrid identities and traditions” (2004, p.140) . We can see from the above that, folklore is connected to issues of national identity, manufacturing Bulgarian nationalism and representing the pre-socialist past in particular ways as is further exemplified next.

The importance of folklore with respect to socialist Bulgarian identity is apparent in its purpose to unite the otherwise fragmented tendencies resulting from traditional practice (2004, p.156). Folklore was understood by Todor Zhivkov to have educational value and to be instrumental in the development of the nation. Its crucial role was to uphold and appropriate notions of national identity. Zhivkov identified folklore as a source of communist culture. It was the heritage accumulated through centuries of struggle against the Ottoman Empire and fascist dictatorship. Folklore and political songs/poetry portrayed the battles and heroes that were part of these national struggles for freedom (2004, p.158). Such cultural activities were seen as representing a celebration of heroism despite the adversary of domination in the struggle for national freedom. This element was particularly viewed as ‘truly’ Bulgarian because it was defined in opposition to an oppressor (2004, p.159). In order to define ‘authentic’ Bulgarian culture, the state controlled the type of culture that could be produced.

During the communist period, state-sponsored music was intimately linked to the Communist Party’s nationalist political agenda. In controlling the mass media the state sponsored three genres of music: obrabotena narodna muzika (‘arranged folk music’), estardna musica (a light European style popular music) and Western classical music (Rice 2002, p.25). These were all symbolic expressions of a political agenda which was aimed at progress for the state and its citizens. Narodna Muzika especially contained political implications within its name. Narodna in narodna muzika derives from the word narod meaning nation (Silverman 1983, p.60). In addition, it holds a second meaning referring to ‘the people’ in relation to the Peoples Republic of Bulgaria (1983, p.60). In its meaning as ‘the people’ its reference is to ‘folk’. Specifically referring to its roots in rural, peasant society it is linked to socialist ideology. In this way narodna muzika became a symbol of national identity (Rice 2002, p.26). While the government actively sponsored ensembles of ‘authentic’ Bulgarian folk music an obvious omission of the musical representation of national minorities, namely Turk and Roma was taking place. This government screening process was geared towards conformity to a unified image of Bulgarian folklore (Silverman 1983, p.57). When looking at the way in which ethnicities and identities are put into play in musical performance, it is important to note that “music is one of the less innocent ways in which dominant categories are enforced and resisted” (Stokes 1994, p.8).

This brings us to the question of music as a form of establishing an identity in relation to ethnicity. Stokes says that “ethnicities should be understood in terms of the construction, maintenance and negotiation of boundaries, and not on the putative social ‘essences’ which fill the gaps within them” (Stokes 1994, p.6). This means that music is not something that constitutes authenticity, but holds discursive elements and categories. He points out that ethnicity is central to anthropological concern in terms of classification. Through this process it is possible to “turn from the question of defining the ‘authentic’ traces of identity ‘in’ music, to the question of how music is used by social actors in specific situations” (1994, p.6). Specifically it is a context in which to analyse how social actors erect boundaries, maintain boundaries such as ‘us’ and ‘them’ and how terms such as ‘authenticity’ are used to justify these (1994, p.6). We can see from the Bulgarian example that music can be highly politicised. In addition, it is a vehicle of asserting autonomy, as will become apparent next.

As a result of the general politicisation of life during the communist period music not controlled by the state began to take on a symbolically oppositional character that it previously had lacked. The most prominent genres in this respect were rock music sang in Bulgarian and a popular genre of traditional music labelled svadbarska muzika (wedding music) which was largely performed by Roma musicians. In the 1980’s ‘wedding music’ evolved into a source of benefaction for musicians (Rice 2002, p.26). This happened in light of petty trading where people were allowed to sell homemade goods, skilled services (such

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as music) and agricultural products from their gardens. In a command that did not produce consumer goods the public wanted, people saved and subsequently spent on symbolic displays, such as extravagant weddings (2002, p.27). Many musicians flourished especially the Roma, challenging the formal restrictions placed on state-sponsored narodna muzika. This was done by improvising and emphasising styles not contained within narrowly constructed limits of ‘national’ music, namely elements of Rom music and the music of Bulgaria’s Balkan neighbours (2002, p.27).

‘Wedding music’ was initially condemned by the socialist government. This was because it operated outside the institutionalised channels of state folklore. Furthermore, it blended Bulgarian music with aspects of Roma, Turkish, Serbian and other Balkan music. Due to this, it was feared it would ‘pollute’ the alleged ‘purity’ of Bulgarian tradition (Buchanan 2007, p.238). Nevertheless by the mid 1980s ‘wedding music’ had gained great popularity among the public. “For regions and communities within the context of the modernising nation state that do not identify with the state project, music and dance are often convenient and morally appropriate ways of asserting defiant difference” (Stokes 1994, p.12).Because of ‘wedding music’s’ association with minority culture, in everyday conversation it came to signify Romani-Turkish musicians generally. For its fans, the genre represented a home-grown form of Bulgarian popular music that contrasted sharply with state-sponsored folklore in almost every way imaginable (Buchanan 2007, p.239). For the state however, it alluded to a Turkish Orient whose legacy in Bulgarian culture was, at the very least, aesthetically problematic.

The state sponsored musical genres played into dominant but contradictory discourses: cultural and economic progress toward industrialism via communism and mono-ethnic nationalism (Rice 2002, p.27). Although according to Marxists philosophy industrialism should lead to ‘the withering away of nationalism’ (Gellner sited in Rice 2002, p.27) this has not happened in Bulgaria. Nationalism developed in Bulgaria during the nineteenth century as a reaction against the Ottoman Empire. This meant extreme hostility towards it and a negative attitude towards its ‘legacy’. The nationalist discourse of the communist period supported a unified notion of national identity by maintaining narodna muzica as a symbol of national purity and shared culture. At the same time it sought to eradicate the Ottoman legacy by trying to control and limit the popularity of ‘wedding music’, which celebrated and continued the legacy. Furthermore it challenged the dominant and false discourse of a monoethnic nation- state (2002, p.28). In what follows, Todor Zhivkov implemented ‘The Great Excursion’ which would be one of his final acts as Bulgaria’s communist leader.

Despite prohibitions, Turkish language, names and culture continued to persist on the local level. Turkish objections to the ‘Rebirth’ conditions began to mount. By May 1989 public demonstrations began in the Turkish districts and spread throughout the country. Clearly the revolutionary ‘Rebirth Process’ had not been successful (Neuberger 2004, p.81). One week after the demonstrations, Todor Zivkov made his famous announcement of “The Grand Excursion”. He called for all Bulgarian Muslims who thought they were of Turkish origin and wanted to “visit” Turkey to apply for visas and leave the country as soon as possible (2004, p.82). Bulgarian propaganda which had spent the last decade convincing its citizens that Turks were Bulgarian, had suddenly launched a massive campaign asserting that Turks were infidel to the State and nation and should leave forever (2004, p.82). On November 10 th 1989 the Communist party ended its forty-five year rule (Ganev 1997, p.62). This event has been attributed by some not only to the people’s mistrust of the corrupt government, but “to a reaction against the nationalistic excess of the late 1980s” (Rice 2002, p.28).

Cultural change and the emergence of Chalga The transition from communism to capitalism entailed rapid social change. With the

new free market came the rise of economic inequality. This in turn highlighted once elaborately kept under the surface oppositions; us/ them, rural/ urban and nation/ state. In other words, a deconstruction of what was once hailed as ‘the Bulgarian national identity’ was taking place. The deregulation of media and music production changed the cultural landscape (Rice 2002, p.30). State sponsorship of the arts including folk was no longer

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available. Due to this, folk music which supported the state, had lost much of its cultural significance, as its “ideological underpinnings were swept away” (Kaneff 2004, p. 87). Although it was still shown on some national television channels, it was largely ignored by private, market driven radio stations (2002, p.30).Wedding music was also loosing its role as a tool for opposition to the state. The new economy had left many people too poor to hold lavish musical displays at weddings (2002, p.29). Due to this, only a couple of wedding bands were making a success of it. In response to these changes in cultural, social, political and economic life a new musical genre emerged.

The new genre goes by a variety of names, such as popfolk, etnopop and chalga. This genre is a fusion of Serbian, Macedonian, Turkish and Greek popular music; older Bulgarian music; Balkan Romani music; Western pop and rap and Afro- Cuban music (Buchanan 2007, p.144). Chalga is political, as its songs and videos are rich in social criticism. They comment on social problems through mockery and contain aggressive jokes which stray far from Western political correctness (2007, p.145). The objects of mockery are various: politicians, the state, the new elites, the Bulgarian mafia, policemen, macho culture, the sex business, and Arab sheiks to name a few (2007, p.146). We can see from this that it is at once a response to the ‘transition’ and a site for modelling new behaviours made possible by it. Furthermore it is a polysemic symbol (Rice 2002, p.36) leading us to its contested nature as will become apparent next.

Importantly the style is both Balkan and Bulgarian and its roots are often said to be found in ‘wedding music’. The labelling of this music has been fluid and contentious and provides a starting point for analysing its significance (2002, p.30). The term Chalga derives from Turkish language, and references the prominent role of Roma musicians. It also points to the indebtedness of the genre, at least in some respects, to Turkish culture and the Ottoman legacy (Buchanan 2007, p. 237). Due to this it has been described by some Bulgarian academic as ‘a course, ugly word’ with racial implications connected to the rejection of Muslim, Turkish, and Romani influences in Bulgarian Slavic culture by communist state institutions (2007, p.239). This becomes apparent when considering that the term only gained its negative connotations following a conflicting debate between practitioners and opponents to the genre (Levy 2002, p.201). Journalists and commentators held that it was a sign of bad taste and a synonym for badly made music (Rice 2002, p.31). Intellectuals and elites condemned it partly due to its sex-filled song lyrics which are mainly sang by sexbombi, meaning “sexually appealing women”. But within these music videos and performances there is a lot more going on than girls swinging their hips seductively. The following example of one major hit “100 Mercedes” glorifies somewhat ironically, new material values and links political and sexual freedom for women, made possible by democracy (Dimov 2001, p.77):

Demokratka stanah bate,“I became a democratic woman, brother,I svobodna sam sega.And now I am free,Sto mertsedesa da imam, sto, sto! May I have 100 Mercedes, a 100, a 100!Sto godini da gi karam, sto, sto!May I have 100 years to drive them, 100! 100!Sto muzhe da iskat moyata raka! May a 100 men desire my hand!

This example paints a portrait of newly emerging preoccupations, resulting from the transition. In addition, these preoccupations are even further internalised by Bulgarian men.

According to Dimov (2001, pp.136-68), men in Bulgaria today seek “strength and power” over society. This is represented in chalga by social symbols such as western cars, mobile phones, access to beautiful women, sex, fraudulent business deals (delavera) and lots of money. Chalga songs seem to reflect new values and behaviours brought about by the tensions stemming from the transition from communism to capitalism. Bulgaria’s new found political freedom came with a cost: joblessness, increased poverty, and inflation to

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name a few (Rice 2002, p.34). So while the elites claim chalga is ‘cheap’, for the rest of the nation it becomes a way of confronting and ridiculing economic hardship and dislocated identities. But while this example illustrates class relations and chalga’s symbolic meaning in relation to economic turmoil, the defining factor, which troubles some elites, academics and politicians, is the manifestation of Turkish and Roma influences (Levy 2002, p.200).

For them, this aspect veers away from the notion of a pure Bulgarian identity, which aims to distance Bulgarians from any multi-ethnic traces of the past (Levy 2002, p.201). Chalga’s association with Roma culture distinctly adds to their derogative comments. Rom musicians on the other hand regarded the term positively. For them the meaning was situated in the impressive, masterful, celebratory good (Peicheva and Dimov sited in Rice 2002, p.31). From these oppositional perspectives we can see that Chalga captures the association with Roma and Turkish cultural influences and in turn, its contestation. More importantly it exemplifies people’s views of those associations and how those seem to influence whether they regard the genre and its label in neutral, positive or negative terms as will be illustrated in the next instance.

Chalga portrays the contested nature of Bulgarian nationalism. This is because symbolically it captures at once “popular art, commoditisation, economic value, and behaviours made possible in a new era” (Buchanan 2007, p.237). Furthermore it celebrates hybrid identities and embraces what is imagined as Balkan, therefore constructed as non- European. Chalga is a satirical reflection on the diffusion of binaries such as us/them rooted in a paradoxical understanding of the national cultural identity (Levy 2002, p.200). The combination of hybrid elements in this genre create a symbol which articulates the place of its makers, fans and opponents in relation to Bulgarian, Rom, Turkish and other Balkan cultures; in so doing it participates in the making of a new Bulgarian national identity (Rice 2002, p. 36). In this way the emergence of chalga is highly significant.

The significance of Chalga lies in its ability to challenge two major communist- ideology driven projects: cultural progress based on a western-European elite model and monoethnic nationalism. These values still hold true for some politicians and intellectuals in the post-communist period. Furthermore, chalga itself contains some aspects of these ideas (2002, p.36). The use of Bulgarian language, the occasional reference to Bulgarian village tradition and its extraordinary popularity among Bulgarians place the genre within a conceptual framework, which is interpreted in the country as Bulgarian (2002, p.37). In addition, its modern themes and ironic lyrics, such as the devaluation of currency and owning BMW’s link it to developments in a modern global culture. Through chalga people can make light of the difficult economic situations they find themselves in, hoping that progress associated with western European global markets will come their way (2002, p.37). The contestation this genre fuels is not only rooted in what some elite term ‘cheap’, it also stems largely from its ‘eastern’ qualities. In this way it is highly connected to Bulgarian identity politics and could be interpreted as Bulgaria’s “revived old national identity syndrome” (Levy 2002, p.200). Chalga seems to fly in the face of values held high during the communist period and according to those who oppose it “performs Bulgaria’s Ottoman legacy” (Rice 2002, p.37).

By performing Bulgaria’s Ottoman legacy, chalga seems to expand Bulgarian national identity beyond previously constructed notions of a unique, “pure”, “clean” monoethnic cultural identity (Buchanan 2007, p.238). For some Bulgarian’s raised under a government that constructed and promoted a narrow Bulgarian nationalism in music, the popularity of chalga and the relative absence of narodna muzika on the radio, becomes an offence to their national feelings (Rice 2002, p.37). The conflict resulting from contesting national identity is based on a self/other distinction, which is directed at the ‘local other’ (Turks and Roma), rather than the ‘distant other’ (the West). This tendency is rooted in displacement. Caught between East and West, some Bulgarians are worried about their position in the world (2002, p.38). In desiring to be part of a European culture, the notion of an ‘authentic’ Bulgarian identity remains imagined as Bulgarian ethnicity. In order to fully grasp the extent to which chalga brings together historical, political and social factors, an analysis concerning nationalism in relation to chalga will illuminate its significance further.

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The significance of Chalga in Nationalism Chalga has become a “sign of modern hybridity and a specific form of

multiculturalism” (Levy 2002, p.202). Its popularity has become the subject of increasing ideological argument on the cultural identity of Bulgarians. The politics of 1989 implied a clear national orientation towards western values and standards (2002, p.202). According to Levy (2002, p.202), such an orientation stimulates and re-enforces at least a hostile attitude towards any presumed “non-Bulgarian” influences, which are understood to mean influences coming from the local cultures of Roma and Turks (Silverman 1983, p.55). The debates this genre has stirred has revealed views of the national as single, uniform concept, which remains vague with respect to the place of local minorities in the context of national discourse (Levy 2002, p.202).

Paradoxically, the Balkan has been conceptualised as the ‘other’, an enemy inside the nation, while the western (distant other) has been considered as promising, leading the nation to modern civilization and future prosperity (2002, p.203). Against this background, chalga has become a problematic site raising not only issues of identity, but tolerance, pluralism and cultural relativism (2002, p.203). Underneath the moral panic concerning ‘good taste’ threatened by ‘bad music’ lies a fear “that this music would result in the ‘Gypsification’ and ‘Turkification’ of the nation” (Rice 2002, p.39). Furthermore, this fear generates what could be seen as racism, defined as “a myth of desired cultural purity played out against ‘others’ who are perceived as being not only different but inferior” (Shechner, cited in Levy 2002, p.203). What is of interest here is the ‘othering’ of minority groups in Bulgarian national discourse, which chalga seems to confront as will become apparent next.

Chalga performs an Ottoman legacy that is simultaneously external to Bulgaria (due to its musical styles from neighbouring countries) and internal (Rom musicians and elements) (Rice 2002, p.39). In this process it diffuses the neat distinctions of national ideology between “our” culture and “other” culture. Chalga proclaims an expanded identity, that embraces ‘Balkanness’ and in this way challenges nationalistic discourse, which insists on the uniqueness of Bulgarian culture. From this we can see that “in contrast to folk music, chalga is anti-ethnocentric” (2002, p.39). In the Bulgarian case, cultural elites’ preoccupation with notions of what is ‘authentic’ or ‘phoney’ is an attempt to assert national discourse. This concern is not simply aesthetic, but prevailing in the inclusion and exclusion of “others”, who threaten Bulgaria’s ‘authentic’ national identity (Levy 2002, p.208).

The evidence of chalga as a musical symbol of an expanded national identity can be found in both its musical features and in the extreme critique it has evoked from the elite. A famous conductor in an interview in 1998 said that chalga was the only thing that would make him emigrate from Bulgaria (Dimov 1995, p.10). Additionally this new genre not only evoked public scrutiny, but made it into Parliament. A petition to the Bulgarian Parliament in 1999, pleaded for a “cleansing” of the national soundscape of what, for the Bulgarians who signed it, were “bad”, “vulgar” and “strange” sounds coming from the experiences of the local Roma and Turks (Levy 2002, p.207). This petition expressed concern about an ‘invasion’ by ‘their’ music, echoing the re-remembered Ottoman past. The antagonists of chalga repeatedly claimed that it “brings ‘bad taste’ and other ‘disgusting’ characteristics to which our children are exposed” (2002, p.209).

All this public noise in Bulgaria seems to mirror 1950s U.S.A when established pop-singers testified against the ‘brutal’, ‘degenerate’ and ‘false’ music of ‘non-civilized’ black Americans (2002, p.209). Although there is no direct musical parallel to chalga, its cultural significance and ability to stir highly strung debates in Bulgaria “could be seen as ‘the black music of the Balkans’” (2002, p.209). A number of Bulgarian scholars have interpreted chalga as “the Balkans in Bulgaria” and “above all Balkan” (Stetalova sited in Rice 2002, p.39). This points out that its popularity represents “a broadening of contemporary Bulgarian identity” (Dimov 1995, p.95). Furthermore, those who make chalga their cultural choice reverse the standard nationalist discourse which favours ‘ours’ while denigrating the foreign (1995, p.95). But although nationalists may object to an expansion of national identity, this does not fully explain their disgust. If the genre is understood as Balkan, then in theory it

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should minimise its contested link to Roma and Turkish influence. It is precisely when it is understood as the “gypsy in Bulgaria” that the elite’s disgust is evoked (Rice 2002, p.39). This will be examined next.

As stated throughout this essay, chalga emerged in a post-totalitarian situation, which liberated the local culture from old ideological taboos and created a space for more visible identification of different local ethnic groups. But the democratisation process has not been effective enough in eliminating the negative attitudes associated with Turkish and Roma culture (Levy 2002, p.209). Cultural elites cling to an older point of view that identifies the nation with its majority ethnic culture. By occupying a space within which ‘authentic culture’ becomes ambiguous, chalga and its popularity have constructed a counter discourse, that attacks and discredits the discourse of the elite and the “nationalist idea of cultural purity and authenticity” (Rice 2002, p.40). Rice goes on to suggest that, the commentary of the elite implies that they understand chalga’s threat to their position, not so much intellectually, but at a gut level. This is then expressed as an aesthetic disgust with the music because of its symbolic association with ‘gypsy culture’, characterised by some as “simply not from our world” (Statelova sited in Rice 2002, p.44). In addition, their derogatory comments may stem from noticing that, their ability to set, monitor and control taste and public ideology is being outwitted by mass-mediated, market driven, transmitted discourses such as chalga (2002, p.40). We can see from this, that these ideological tensions resonate in a process of deconstruction of what was hailed as the Bulgarian ‘authentic identity’. Furthermore, these tensions bring us to the question of the inherited Ottoman legacy, its current place in Bulgaria and how this relates to its European status.

Maria Todorova (1997) points out that there are two views regarding the Ottoman legacy. One is that Balkan nation-states and their cultures represent a complete break with the Ottoman past; the other argues for a “complex symbiosis of Turkish, Islamic and Byzantine/Balkan traditions” (1997, p.164) that “on a level of popular culture and everyday life, proved much more persistent” (1997, p.180). The first model represents political affiliation and fits with the Bulgarian elites aspirations. Bulgarian politicians have tried since 1989, to move Bulgaria out of the Balkans conceptually and into an integrated Europe (Rice 2002, p.41). But this move has been prevented culturally at least in part by chalga, whose fans revel precisely in Bulgaria’s Ottoman legacy. It could be said that, chalga is the cultural expression of Todorova’s “symbiosis” model. With this in mind, it is imperative to consider chalga’s “local, nonverbal, artistic manifestation of more widespread questioning of the idea of nationalism and the nation-state” (2002, p.41).

In order to situate Bulgarian nationalism it is useful to come back to Ernst Gellner’s (1997, pp.37-39) five stages of the development and practice of nationalism in Eastern Europe:

(1) the status quo of the Russian, Hapsburg and Ottoman empires;(1) the development of nationalism as a “self evident…principle of political

legitimacy” during the nineteenth century;(2) the emergence of small states that were “appallingly fragile and feeble”

between the world wars;(3) ethnic cleansing in an attempt to make congruent the political unit and

ethnicity of the population;(4) “The attenuation of nation feeling”, a stage which may be “part reality,

part wish fulfilment”. For Gellner, the countries of Eastern Europe were interrupted in this historical

process at or before the third stage by antinationalist ideology of communism. The Bulgarian case seems to have been at stage two and three during the communist period, as exemplified through nationalistic ideology regarding folklore. For him the point of interest was whether particular countries would emerge in the post-communist period at stage three, four or five and he predicts that it will be different in different places (Gellner cited in Creed 2004:57). The former Yugoslavia clearly emerged in stage four, but this nationalist pattern is particular to Yugoslavia and can not be generalised as Balkan (Todorova 1997, p.185). The Bulgarian case as illustrated by the conflict over national identity between the elite and the

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popularity of chalga seems to bring together Todorova’s claims for “a varied and historically contingent Balkans” and Gellner’s prediction of different stages of nationalism in different places. Bulgaria endured its stage four attempts at ethnic cleansing hidden behind the mask of the “Great Excursion” at the end of the communist period (Neueberger 2004, p.75). But this played out differently than in the case of its Balkan neighbours (Creed 2004, p.56). Currently, it seems to be working its way through stage five, a period of attenuated nationalism to which chalga is contributing in important ways, “even as intellectuals drag their feet” (Rice 2002, p.42). Chalga seems to articulate ordinary Bulgarian’s hope for a new understanding of Bulgarian national identity, which is not rooted in the state and majority etnicity (2002, p.43). Through this process this new genre could be providing a way for Bulgarians to understand themselves in a new way, which transcends the limitations of a uniform ethnic nationalism.

Nationalism considered: the Bulgarian caseAccording to Levy, in the post-communist transition in Bulgaria there has been

“notorious tolerance” among Bulgarians in the “struggle toward the values of a civil society, which includes pluralism and tolerance of cultural differences” (2000, p.70). We can see this accruing politically in 1989: with the fall of Zhivkov, the new communist party announced the reversal of the assimilation policy promising to work towards the creation of a democratic society in which the rights of minority populations would be granted and protected (Ganev 1997, p.62). From this perspective the conflict may be a matter of disconnection between a tolerant public policy towards minorities and a persistent ethnic intolerance. This has been demonstrated throughout this essay in the manifestation of negative commentary regarding the ‘bad taste’ of chalga. Furthermore, Bulgarian nationalism’s exclusive and simultaneously inclusive nature toward minorities, points towards Benedict Anderson’s (1983) “imagined communities”. This manifests in Bulgaria historically, when the BCP rationalised war on Bulgarian hybridity, through asserting Muslim sameness on a class as well as blood basis (Newberger 2002, p.13). Despite this, the party implemented specific campaigns, to eliminate difference. This shows its paradoxical inclusive/exclusive nature. In this case the boundaries are imagined as within the nation and because of this Creed (2004, p.56) suggests that, conflict is “accommodated within community notions”, a stand point which will be examined further.

Creed’s analysis suggests that, Bulgarian nationalism has not provoked exclusions of the violent type, such as those of its Balkan neighbours because in Bulgaria conflict is accommodated within community notions (2004, p.56). For example, rather than outlawing religious practice in the 1940s, the BCP saw religious leaders as most useful in the distribution of affective Party programmes within Muslim communities (Neuberger 2004, p.22). In light of this, Creed’s starting point is Anderson’s work, which saw nationalism as a change in consciousness brought about by cultural shifts and driven by print capitalism (Todorova 2008, p.141). But while this insight has revealed the historical and political construction of national ideas, it has been less successful in explaining why established nationalism produces different consequences in different places (Creed 2004, p.56).

For Creed, this is because the theory has concentrated on the imaginative quality of nationalism without attending to the foundational notion of community (2004, p.57). In other words the negative consequences of nationalism are not simply due to its imaginary quality, but to the fact that it is imagined as a community and this notion carries romantic connotations (2004, p.57). Additionally, community needs to be examined in relation to what it means to particular people at particular historical moments.

By considering the above in relation to the chalga discourse, it is possible to situate the conflict within shifting and ambiguous categories of self/other (Buchanan 2007, p.256). These emerge within a particular context, such as the transition in which identity categories become diffused. This means that in order to consider nationalism, cultural specificities must be taken into account. Community is not just “a conceptual tool for defining social relations, but a culturally specific expectation about the nature of social relations, with consequences

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for anything conceived in its image” (2004, p.57). To illustrate this Creed observes Bulgarian mumming rituals, which will be explored next.

In the rural context mumming is an agrarian ritual intended to drive off evil spirits and bring fertility to the land, animals and people (2004, p.60). Actually, the Bulgarian rituals consist of a collection of locally differentiated practices known by many distinct local terms. Our interest here is the participation and grouping of people, which reflect the inclusive/exclusive elements that shape Bulgarian nationalism. There are four categories of participants. The first are spectacular masked figures, whose costumes are made of natural animal skins and synthetic imitations of traditional folk costume (2004, p.62). The second category is centred on a transvestite figure, usually referred to as the “bride” or “virgin” and her escort, called “groom” or “fiancé”, (2004, p.62). The third category, most important in this essay’s analysis is the villagers dressed as “gypsies” or sometimes even referred to as “darkies”, who might also be marked as Middle Eastern or Turkish (2004, p.62). The actors are usually younger teenagers who dress in rags and blacken their faces with soot, embodying and performing the negative stereotypes of the Roma or generic ‘dark other’. We can see in this the link to negative notions of minorities, stemming from the Ottoman past. Interestingly, this role is also sometimes performed by actual Roma reflecting the “shifting and blurred everyday resistance of Muslim minorities” (2004, p.62). Neuberger notes that this resistance is “made up of a dense web of relations between coercion, negotiation and complicity” (2004, p.13). In other words, the boundaries resulting from nationalistic ideology are ambiguous. Furthermore, whether performed by ethnic Bulgarians or Roma, the participation and importance of this role demonstrates the inclusive/exclusive aspects of Bulgarian nationalism. In addition, mumming rituals are not only oppositional in relation to outsiders, but are “constituted by conflict within community” (Creed 2004, p.63) as will be revealed.

The ritual begins by dancing around the square (of the village) and continues by the mummers visiting each village house (2004, p.63), demonstrating the separation of community into units. The blessings are made in a conflicting fashion, such as “instigating fights with the men of the house”. ‘Battles’ also take place between neighbouring villages (2004, p.63). This points to the heroism so highly praised within nationalist ideology in reference to the Ottoman Empire. In this process conflict becomes a part of community. This description is one of many variations, but the point here is not symbolic analysis as such, instead our point of interest is community and how in this case, the demonstrations of solidarity and goodwill will are interwoven with contrary images.

While solidarity is expressed, it is not demonstrated by collective village gathering, but by the visit of each separate household. The disguises of the mummers embody “the mythic, usually unseen amorphous and potentially monstrous aspects of community” (2004, p.63) or the ‘local other’. In addition, urban residents with villas in the countryside often watch, but do not take part, neither side initiating interaction illustrating the rife rural/urban tensions in Bulgaria (2004, p.63). Ethnic tensions are also demonstrated, as Roma households are usually skipped, even if the mummers themselves include Roma (2004, p.63). Furthermore, the conflict between mummers and hosts is incorporated into the mumming performance itself. This is yet another indication of the inclusive/exclusive aspects of Bulgarian political and historical processes used in communist ideology (Neuberger 2002, p.56).

Mumming rituals are full of displays of conflict and contention, which is sometimes expressed in ethnic idioms, referring to Roma and Turks (2004, p.57). But at the same time, the role of Roma is an important part in the ritual emphasising the complexities of social relations. For Creed these rituals to some extend, explain Bulgarian nationalism: “a reflection of dense overlapping relationships, many of which are conflicting and contentious” (Creed 2004, p.57). The parallel here to chalga can be firstly found in historical roots and its relation to folklore. The status of mumming rituals was controlled and repressed, much like folk music. Furthermore, chalga also reflects conflicting ambiguous social relationships in terms of self/other, as shown throughout this essay. The significance of mumming rituals in relation to nationalism and in turn-to chalga can be found in the simultaneously inclusive and

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exclusive elements that constitute them. In order to understand Bulgarian nationalism, this overlap and its multi-national, economic and contested aspects must be analysed further.

The communist state organised mumming festival in an effort to convert “archaic” believes into “folkloric performances of nationalist value” (Kaneff 2004, p.141). But like ‘wedding music’ rather than suppressing it, the states efforts to eliminate it, actually helped sustain it. Mumming like ‘wedding music’ challenged the state (Creed 2004, p.60). Currently, by participating mummers create a picture of cultural vitality (formed in the image of authentic heritage). But simultaneously, these enactments also “continue to protest against the uniform hegemonic, modern project, now in its capitalist guise” (2004, p.60). We can see in this the comparable aspects of chalga. It is an expression of the rise of capitalism, while continuing to challenge notions of modern ‘europeanness’; much like wedding music did in light of communist ideology of ‘authentic Bulgarianness’.

The role of the Roma is ambiguous and complex; they are both insiders and outsiders (Levy 2002, p.200). This is captured by Creed’s (2004, p.65) example in which he describes one of their costumes to be “a jacket with the name of the village written across the back, accompanied by a fez”. The ‘bride’ is also sometimes dressed in shalvari (baggy trousers) and she is in some villages, ‘stolen’ by the ‘gypsy’ (2004, p.65). This scenario re-enacts conflicting social relation, while simultaneously diffusing the oppositions through ritual. The Ottoman past is clearly re-enacted in this scenario showing the re-remembrance of history. The Roma define a separate group and both their distinctiveness and marginality are graphically emphasised yet they are elemental to the ritual (2004, p.68). Although conflict is evident in mumming rituals, these events retain a collective character and in so doing, bring together conflict and cohesion (2004, p.67).

These rituals express the contradictions and oppositions of everyday community life, much like chalga does. But in the latter, this happens through ‘modern’ mass production (Rice 2002, p.34); while in the former it is expressed through ritual. Despite differences, both mediate oppositions while at the same time re-enforcing them. In considering this, it is important to note minority positions in relation to ritual. According to Creed, Roma enjoy the rituals and none expressed any cense of insult (2004, p.68). On the other hand, ethnic Bulgarians often complained about excessive Roma participation, but expressed gratitude to Roma for sustaining local tradition. The ‘gypsy’ element in mumming rituals testifies to a community that is unavoidably diverse and antagonistic (2004, p.68). Compared to other examples, Bulgarian nationalism seems to include and to some extent expect a degree of inevitable conflict. Creed suggests that: “The possibility that rural Bulgarians have a notion of community that is based on conflict may account for the lack of extreme xenophobic nationalism in this multiethnic country” (2004, p.68).

ConclusionThis essay has examined Bulgaria nationalism using chalga to situate current

tensions and identity politics and mumming rituals to explain its particularities. In the wake of Bulgaria’s transition from communism to capitalism the chalga discourse offers a rich analytical ground. In this musical genre, history, politics and culture meet and express the tensions, newly found freedoms and experiences of the Bulgarian public. The heated debates generated by chalga reveal the discrepancy between nationalistic ideology and the reality of Bulgaria’s multi-ethnic society. Moreover, Bulgaria’s ‘transition’ has provided a site for deconstructing the Bulgarian ‘authentic identity’ making visible its hybrid elements and expanding identity politics. Chalga not only satirically expresses social change and economic turmoil in the transitional period, but embraces the ‘eastern’ of the Balkans. By outlining Bulgaria’s communist past and the purpose of folklore within it, I have demonstrated the political and historical processes which have driven nationalistic ideology. Communist campaigns were shown to use folklore as a vehicle in systematically emitting anything termed ‘eastern’ on the basis of the Ottoman past. Furthermore, in insisting on class as well as blood based sameness of the Roma and Turks, Bulgarian nationalism’s inclusive/exclusive nature was exemplified. These processes have manifested in the current period as everyday resistance through chalga and takes part in making of a new Bulgarian national identity. One which is diverse and diffuses previously constructed rigid categories.

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Difference is concurrently re-affirmed, but embraced and celebrated by chalga’s fans, discrediting the elitist discourse of an ethnic nationalism. Furthermore, by locating the dispute in political cultural and historic contexts, this essay has raised issues concerning tolerance, showing ethnic conflict as the underlying current. With this in mind, I have drawn attention to the variations of nationalism and considered the Bulgarian case examining why it differs from its Yugoslav neighbours. Drawing from mumming ritual practice, notions of community in Bulgaria were shown to have conflicting elements. This further exemplified the inclusive/exclusive process constituting Bulgarian nationalism, also evident in Bulgaria’s communist past. This example showed conflict to be present not only in ethnic idioms but also in collective community notions. Lastly, it suggests that cultural specificities may play a part in how nationalisms manifest in different places and contexts.

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