CONTENTS
E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S
Crisis and Russia ................................. 2
The Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev Visits Salut .............. 8
Vladimir Putin Visits
Tactical Missiles Corporation ............. 11
B I G B O S S TA L K I N G
Ups & downs for United Aircraft ........ 12
I N D U S T R Y
Zhuk-AE AESA
is ready for demonstrations
to the customers ................................ 16
E X H I B I T I O N
Under New Year Tree ......................... 20
Airshow China 2008 ........................... 22
WA R P L A N E S
J-10 «Tzianbin»:
«the dragon» is ready to fight ............ 25
ADA LCA light multipurpose fighter .... 34
C I V I L AV I AT I O N
Arab capital for Aeroflot ..................... 44
PUBLISHER & CEO
Nikolay Laskov
FIRST DEPUTY GENERAL DIRECTOR
Alexander Chernov
PUBLISHING HOUSE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Vladimir Ilyin
MARKETING DIRECTOR
Alexander Kiryanov
KEY ACCOUNT DIRECTOR
Nina Gusyakova
CREATIVE DIRECTOR
Dmitry Bykovskiy
PR DIRECTOR
Sergey Kovalski
EDITOR
Vladimir Karnozov
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Vladimir Zhilinko
DESIGNERS
Alvina KirillovaSergey Velichkin
IT DEPARTMENT
Anton Pavlov
PHOTOS IN THIS ISSUE:
Nikolay Laskov, Vladimir Karnozov, ITAR-TASS, HAL,Chinese Ministry of Defence
Circulation: 10,000
The magazine is registered in the Committee for Press of the Russian Federation. Certificate #016692 as of 20.10.1997.Certificate #77-15450 as of 19.05.2003. Any mate ri al in this publi ca tion may not be repro du ced in any form without the writ ten per mis sion of the publisher. The edi to ri al staff’s opi nion does not neces sa ri ly coin ci de with that of the authors. Adver tis ers bear res pon si bi li ty for the con tent of pro vi ded mate ri als. Authors bear res pon si bi li ty for the accu ra cy of the facts and infor ma ti on they pro vi de.
© AIR FLEET, 2009
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SINCE 1997
1.2009 (75)
E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S
2
The world-wide financial crisis started in
autumn 2008, with liquidity problems hitting certain
North American banks. During the fourth quarter
of the past year it evolved into a global economy
downturn. Now, the crisis is taking its toll on
Russia’s power and capability. The country’s GDP
rose by 6% in 2008, against 7% in 2006-2007,
reflecting poor results of the last quarter. This year
GDP is expected to have no growth or even fall by
few percent.
The Russian power will continue to contract for
awhile. In crisis environment, the world’s consump-
tion of fossil fuels runs low. Manufacturers reduce
production rates due to weak solvent demand.
They buy less energy and raw materials to feed
their plants and factories. Economists believe that
Russian economy will go strong again after the
price of crude oil rises above 70 dollars per barrel. It
will be doing more or less OK with the figure within
the corridor of 50-60.
When this story was written, the price was fluc-
tuating between 37 and 45 dollars. That’s below the
critical mark. And this reduces the amount of money
at hand to support Russia’s ailing defense industrial
complex, military and civil aviation.
Kremlin strategists working on the country’s
2009 annual economy plan balanced it on the
assumption that during the year a barrel of crude
oil would sell at 50 dollar on average. There is some
hope their assumption may turn out right. It was
made in November, when the oil was selling for
merely 34-38 dollars. The strategists calculated,
however, that, even at 50 dollar per barrel, the
Russian economy will make losses.
The strategists have predicted a budget deficit
this year, after a decade of profitable growth. The
years of 2009 and 2010 will be to be critical for the
Russian industrial enterprises and airlines. Some
of them will fly into bankruptcy or be devoured by
larger and more stable players. The Russian govern-
ment has indicated that it is ready to buy stakes in
private and mixed-capital companies provided they
operate in the strategic areas or carry substantial
social function. This will increase state share in the
economy, on the account of private capital.
In December 2008 Kremlin-controlled struc-
tures increased their stake in NPO Saturn to over
50%. It made the first case in the recent Russian
history when privately-control aero engine manu-
facturer went back from the private hands to the
state control. Saturn makes D-30KP/KU turbo-
fans for Il-76TD/MD airlifters and Tu-154M airlin-
ers, AL-55 non-reheated turbojets for Hindustan
Aeronautics HJT-36 trainers, cruise missile pro-
pulsion systems, marine and industrial turbines.
The company hired much money for the PowerJet
SAM.146 turbofan project undertaken jointly with
Snecma of France. But it ran out of funds in late
2008. The government moved for rescue, provid-
ing money in exchange for a control stake in the
enterprise. The SAM.146 powers Sukhoi Superjet
100 small commercial airliner. If not for the
crisis and inflated banking interest rates, Saturn
would never have gone back under government
control. This view is widely shared in the Russian
aviation community.
Addiction to petrodollarsRussia is as much dependant on export of
fossil fuels and raw materials as the oil-rich Arabs,
Iran, Venezuela etc. Saudi Arabia holds the title of
world’s largest oil exporter. Russia comes second.
But Moscow takes the lead when it comes to a
grand total of raw material export, taking account of
natural gas and minerals. Officially, the share of the
fuel sector in the nation’s economy is given at some
30%. But some experts estimate that the share of
“fossil fuel + raw materials” – based sector of the
Russian economy is as large as 70%.
CRI$I$ AND RU$$IAAfter collapses in 1991 and 1998, the Russian economy was on the way of recovery for almost ten years, riding
on the back of rising oil and natural gas prices. Late last year the petrodollar income started contracting. This
poses a threat to Vladimir Putin’s grand plans on reinstalling Russia as a manufacturing nation. What is going
to happen to Russian aviation?
PRICES FOR CRUDE OIL, BRENT
Vladimir Karnozov
144,98
65
274135
3
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
A good example of how issues with energy
resources can influence relations between great
powers and their collaborators is the natural
gas conflict between Russia and Ukraine. It took
Moscow and Kiev a whole month to come to terms,
with dead losses exceeding US dollar 5 billion for
Russia alone. Political damage to the relations
between Moscow and Western powers is difficult
to underestimate.
There has been bravado in the Kremlin-
controlled offices and the mass media about “sub-
stantial and growing” achievements of the current
administration in the deed of improving the national
economic system. Reality is darker. The Russian
economy remains strongly dependant on raw mate-
rial exports, which account for over 70% of hard
currency earnings. Volume of domestic manufactur-
ing stays low.
Little is produced in the home territory these
days. In contrast, the Soviet Union manufactured
almost everything locally. Home-made products
provided the lion’s share of the Soviet Union’s own
consumption. In fact, the Soviet people saw very
few foreign-made products in the shops, with the
rear exemptions being Indian tea, Cuban sugar and
Egyptian fruits.
All changed in the 1990s. Collapse of the
communist-style command economy opened doors
wide to foreign manufacturers. The Japanese came
with their cars, the South Koreans with home appli-
ances, Chinese with clothes and the Europeans
with all sorts of machinery (save war machines)
etc. Airbus and Boeing duly obliged Russian carri-
ers seeking modern, fuel-efficient and comfortable
airliners. Their number in the Russian fleet has
exceeded 300 units (including 84 B737s, 16 B757s,
76 A320s, 27 B767s and 12 B747s).
Not surprisingly, local output of commercial
airplanes, ships, machine tools, power units and
all other sorts of high-tech machinery dwarfed. In
some areas, such as super heavy trucks and high-
power gas turbines, Russian production ceased
entirely. This was because the foreign competitors
offered a better combination of price, reliability,
consumer qualities and after-sales support.
Today, it is difficult to name even few high-tech
areas where Russia has been keeping pace with
the US, European and Japanese manufacturers.
Perhaps the only exceptions are certain points in
defense, nuclear power and space. The leading
positions there have been kept with great difficulty.
Quite often, Russia’s leadership in a particular area
is due to the huge Soviet-time investments into
base science, technologies, development centers
and production sites.
Aviation is the area where Russia lost a lot in the
past fifteen years. To such an extent, that in some
key areas the Russian manufacturers needs huge
investments to regain competitive level. For instance,
the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) needs Rouble
500 billion to attain competitive level with the leading
western manufacturers by 2015. Of that total, Rouble
300 billion is required for development programs,
and 150 billion for technical renovation. As of this
time, government-approved programs allocate less
than 30 million in the period of 2009-2010.
Russia’s first president Boris Yeltsin and his
ministers did not care much for downturn in domes-
tic production of processed goods. And they had
had reasons for such an attitude. During Yeltsin’s
term Russia’s sovereignty was threatened. The
Kremlin inhabitants were preoccupied with fighting
separatists on all sides and doing other things to
keep Russia united. They succeeded, saving the
federal republic from a sort of collapse that hap-
pened to the Soviet Union (and which had sparked
separatist movements in the largest of former
Soviet Republics).
Economy-wise, Russia kept afloat by means
of increasing oil and metal exports. Heavy taxes
on exporters provided a stable flow of petrodollars
into the state treasury. This helped Moscow raise
a stable income in the hard currency. It was big
enough to buy from the West what the nation was
no longer producing at home.
Vladimir Putin continued Yeltsin’s policy and
perfected it. He strengthened state control over the
industry, including large producers of fossil fuels and
raw materials. At the same time, these companies
enjoyed favorable terms as far as business expan-
sion and technical renovation were concerned.
Putin’s administration has tirelessly been sew-
ing the network of oil and gas pipelines. This effort
has not been purely economical; it has carried a
political significance. New pipelines have been laid
down to provide more links between the oil fields in
Siberia and the consumers in Europe and Asia.
The Kremlin has made a few steps aimed at
strengthening Russian presence and influence on
the global market for fossil fuels and the sources of
energy in general. Putin’s administration made great
efforts in Venezuela, Algeria, Libya, Saudi Arabia
and other oil-rich countries of the developing world.
The policy of befriending other oil exporters has
produced mixed results. However, it is certainly an
achievement that, as of today, Moscow’s relations
with the above mentioned countries are best ever
in history.
After fifteen years of “don’t bother me any
longer, my little brothers” policy towards Cuba and
Syria, the Kremlin has recently chosen to resume
financial and military aid to Habana and Damascus.
Conveniently positioned in terms geographical,
Cuba and Syria are meant to serve as bases for
Russian penetration into their neighborhood: the
Spanish-speaking America and the Muslim world
Tu-204 in CUBANA colors
4
E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S
respectively. Besides, Syria and Cuba have some
natural resources that need substantial investment
to exploit. Moscow shows willingness to provide
the requisite funds and technologies in return for
control over those resources.
Despite a heavy pressure from the West insist-
ing on Iran’s isolation, Moscow has been developing
relations with Tehran. This involves direct deliveries
of advanced rocketry (like the Thor-M1 surface-
to-air missiles – 29 launchers were shipped in
2007-2008), and prolongation of license production
rights for Russian designs such as armored vehicles
and assault rifles. The two large oil exporters have
not become close friends, thought. But they have
been improving coordination of their efforts on the
global scene. There is a growing understanding in
both Moscow and Tehran that, through expansion
of mutual trade and joint industrial undertaking,
the two nations may lessen their dependence on
the West. Russian and Iranian manufacturers would
expand outlet for their products, thus enlarging their
anchor markets.
Automotive industryAs it was mentioned above, the Russian manu-
facturing industry has been suffering from the
transition from command to open-doors economy.
Heavy and medium machinery and electronics have
been most affected.
Let us take automotive industry for illustration.
Production of Russian legacy cars has halved. The
nation now has only one large maker in the form of
AutoVAZ in Togliatti (makes Lada and Kalina series
cars). Also, there is a tiny production of UAZ 4x4
vehicles in Ulianovsk. Moscow-based AZLK ceased
production completely; Izhevsk (Izh) and Nizhny
Novgorod (GAZ) dropped their legacy models in
favor of out-of-production Korean and US designs.
By car numbers, local production accounts
for less than 40% of total sales. By value, it is
less than 20%. In 2005 Russian arms vendor
Rosoboronexport assumed control over AutoVAZ
“so as to save it for the nation”. While the maker
continues afloat, the change of proprietor does not
seem to have brought feasible changes in Lada
competitiveness.
The Russian government has been following
the situation in the automotive industry. But findings
have been rather upsetting. The national legacy cars
sector will invariably continue losing its positions to
foreign manufacturers. Furthermore, the open doors
policy attracted Chinese makers. They seem to have
been using Russia as a convenient testing range for
their cheap products.
The Kremlin tried to amend the situation by
offering global car manufacturers erect their plants
in the Russian territory, promising relaxed taxation
terms. A few Japanese and European makers seized
this opportunity. They opened “screwdriver assem-
bly workshops”, producing copies of “global model”
cars. Although these new workshops have created
some new jobs in Russia, they produced little effect
on the overall situation in the Russian automotive
industry and the inner market. And this could not
have been otherwise, since most of the car com-
ponents are imported (rather than made locally).
When the crisis hit, the Kremlin had a rude awak-
ening. Newly erected “screwdriver” factories did
not decrease the inner market dependence on the
outside world in the given area. With a substantial
drop in car sales in the late 2008, the newly erected
facilities had to stop working. Relatively low-rate,
“screwdriver”-based sort of in-house manufactur-
ing does not justify local production economically
in competition with ready-to-use cars assembled by
bigger plants abroad.
A manufacturing nationThere is a growing understanding in the Russian
society and the corridors of power that the national
economic policy should be based on the notion
that Russia is a manufacturing nation. The country
developed that way since the dawns of time.
In the early Medieval, Slav swords and mails
were most desirable trophies for both European
and Asian invaders, including German knights and
Mongolian cavalrymen. Better quality of Slav-made
arms became apparent in 1240, when the army
of Novgorod (Rus strongest northern city) subse-
quently crashed the elite of the Swedish (1240, the
Battle of the Neva River) and the German knights
NUMBER OF COMBAT, TRAINING AND TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT IN THE SOVIET INVENTORY
YEAR 1917 October 1924 1928 1930 1933 1941 June
NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT 1109 326 1078 1581 316517500 combat
12100 training
5
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
(1242, the Battle of the Chudskoe Lake). These
great victories reflected the fact that Slav-made
armor was stronger and lighter than that of the
opponents.
In 1380 the Moscow-led army of the united
Russian duchies crashed numerically larger force of
the Golden Horde. Again, the Russians demonstrat-
ed better quality of their armor. Besides, for defense
of cities and castles, the Russians used cannons.
Their craftsmen went swiftly from light guns to
very heavy cannons (such as the Tsar Cannon, now
a Kremlin memorial). Artillery was something the
nomad invaders did not have.
The fall of Kazan (a khanate on the Volga River)
to the army of Ivan IV the Terrible in 1556 led to
merging of the Russian and Tatar technologies. This
enabled Russia to capitalize on this unique blend of
European and Asian achievements in arms manu-
facturing techniques. And helped the tsar’s army
withstood heavy pressure on Eastern and Western
directions. In many ways, the Russian victories of
the time were due to the advanced blade and fire
weapons produced in the country.
In 1709 the Battle of Poltava saw Peter the
Great soldiers defeating Europe’s strongest army
of the time, that of Carl XXII of Sweden. This great
victory was preceded by Peter’s sustained efforts
on improving the structure of the Russian army and
industry by means of West-European “technology
insertions”. Since then Peter’s lasting legacy was
mobilizing Russian resources to complete on equal
terms with the West.
Under Peter the Great, Russia became an empire.
St. Petersburg attracted great many talented West
Europeans for permanent residence. This helped
Russia master many of the then-advanced European
technologies. Although in somewhat smaller scale,
this strategy was carried out by Peter’s successors.
As a result, the Imperial Russia kept pace with the
Western Europe on military technologies, including
artillery and armored ship building.
There is a lot of evidence to that. Perhaps
the most illustrative is naval hardware: battle-
ships, armored cruisers and submarines. Warships
of these classes were constructed by domestic
manufacturers to the standards corresponding to
those in the United Kingdom, Germany, France and
the United States. From time to time, the Russian
Imperial Navy purchased new warships in other
countries. The purpose was to assess them and,
if necessary, set up local production. But larger
portion of newly made weapons was developed
domestically. Thus, Russia kept among world’s top
five countries in advanced weaponry making and
armed forces organization.
Born in 1917, the world’s first Republic of the
Workers and Peasants had to fight enemies on
all sides of its immense territory stretching from
The Baltic and Black Seas all the way to Pacific
waters. The new Kremlin inhabitants understood
early in their careers the importance of high-
tech, massive local production of military equip-
ment. Revolutionary leader Vladimir Lenin launched
GOELRO project calling for “total electrofication”
of the country. Thus, Lenin laid foundations of
Russia’s next-generation economy.
In 1929 Josef Stalin launched the great indus-
trialization campaign by adopting the Soviet Union’s
first Five Year Economic Plan. In four years that
followed the Soviet industry assembled 4,289 new
aircraft, and 2952 more in 1933. The new indus-
trial policy focused on erecting thousands of small,
medium and large plants all over the country.
Among others, aviation plants were erected in
Irkutsk, Novosibirsk, Komsomolsk-upon-Amur. To
this day these plants remain Russia’s largest pro-
ducers of fighter aircraft.
In the 1930s, the Soviet Union developed
faster than any other country. In 1939 it became
the world’s third largest economy after the USA
and Germany. Stalin laid foundations of the Soviet
military-industrial complex, which later evolved into
the Russian defense-industrial complex. Whatever
is being said and written today about Lenin and
Stalin, one fact remains undisputed: the communist
leaders succeeded in bringing the Russian industry
into a new quality level, sufficient enough to defend
the USSR from its aggressive neighbors such as
Japan and Germany.
When, in the late 1930s, the world went onto a
massive war, the Soviet Union emerged as a promi-
nent exporter of advanced war machines. Moscow
supplied fighters, bombers, tanks and cannons to
Republican Spain, China, Czechoslovakia etc. The
Soviet-made equipment fared well against that of
the Japanese in China and Mongolia, and against
that of the Germans and Italians in Spain.
In particular, the popular Polikarpov I-16 was
the world’s first fighter to have retractable landing
gears. Equipped by powerful M-25 radial piston
engines (later replaced by more powerful M-62/63 –
these motors were manufactured in Moscow, at the
enterprise now known as MMPP Salut), the I-16
developed top speed of 450km/h, a record for its
time. Strongly-built and agile, I-16 fighters won
numerous air duels with contemporary Japanese,
German and Italian designs.
In summer 1939 the Red Army aviation and
armor units crashed numerically larger Japanese
expedition force in Mongolia. Japanese equipment
was outclassed by the Russian one. Suffering three
times larger losses and complete defeat in the
battlefield, the Japan made decision to maintain
peace with the Soviet Union for the next five years.
“Disproportioned” losses in 1939 made Tokyo
refrain from attacking the Soviet Union even when
its strategic ally Germany had its forces fighting at
Moscow outskirts in winter 1941/1942.
When fascist Germany invaded Soviet Union
in June 1941, VVS RKKA (acronym for the Air
force of the Workers and Peasants Red Army) had
17,500 combat aircraft. This number included 9,288
fighters (of which about two thousand copies of
brand-new MiG, LaGG and Yak types), 5,065 frontal
bombers (including 458 Pe-2 diving bombers),
2,147 heavy bombers, 611 close air support air-
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E C O N O M Y P R O B L E M S
planes (including 249 Il-2 armored attack aircraft)
and 560 reconnaissance.
The bloody and vigorous war with the fas-
cist Germany 1941-1945 gave another boost to
development of the Russian weapons school and
production capability. The Soviet Union managed
to produce more aircraft, tanks and cannons than
Germany. Despite heavy losses in 1941-1942, the
Red Army’s might grew fast, surpassing that of the
invaders in 1943. Although the German industry
was larger, the Soviet Union attained high produc-
tion rate of military equipment by increasing its
share to 65-68% of the total output.
During the war, the Soviet Union manufactured
102,8 thousand tanks and self-propelled cannons
against 65 thousands for Germany. The Soviet
aviation industry grew fast. In 1941 the industry
had 466,4 thousand workers on about 80 plants,
including 174.4 thousand people employed on 24
airframe and 7 aero engine plants. Daily produc-
tion output exceeded 50 airplanes. In 1945 the
Soviet Aviation industry increased its labor force to
640,213 and number of airframe plants to 34.
After WW2 the Soviet Union’s might was only
matched by that of the USA. Moscow even managed
to outdo Washington in space, by placing Sputnik
into orbit in 1957 and making Yuri Gagarin first man
in space in 1961. Only USSR and USA appeared
capable of development and series production of
strategic bombers (the Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160
versus B-52, B-1B and B-2) and intercontinental
ballistic missiles with multiply warheads. In the
last years of its existence the Soviet Union created
through-deck aircraft carriers (other producers the
USA and France only) and nuclear-powered subma-
rines (US, France, UK and China only).
Sometimes the high Soviet technologies
became available to its friends and neighbors.
During 1988-1992 the Indian Navy operated the
Chakra, a nuclear submarine of the Project 670
type that previously served the Russian Navy as
the K-43. The Indian Navy acquired eight Tupolev
Tu-142 ASW aircraft sharing airframe and systems
with the Tu-95 Bear strategic bomber. Next step is
associated with the Project 971 nuclear subma-
rine, Tu-22MR supersonic maritime reconnaissance
aircraft and the INS Vikramaditya through-deck
aircraft carrier.
Oil trapThe pace of Russian technology development
slowed down with the collapse of the Soviet Union
in 1991. Some experts, including then– Russian
prime-minister Egor Gaidar, believed that the sharp
fall of crude oil prices delivered a final blow to the
Soviet Union. Why and how did it happen? Gaidar
has the answer.
The 1973 war in the Middle East caused a sharp
rise in oil prices, from 1.9 dollar at the turn of the
century to 12 in 1974. This urged the Soviets to sell
their “black gold” to the West for hard currency. The
market accepted the offer. In the period of 1971 to
1975 the daily production of oil in the Soviet Union
rose from 7.6 million barrels (one million ton) to
9.9 million barrels (1.4 million ton). This enabled
the Kremlin not just stabilize the national economy
– the Soviet Union launched massive investment
programs in the national defense and questionable
“free-bee” programs on support of communist-
style political regimes in the developing world.
As time went on, Kremlin planners got used
to these “extra funds”. They put together national
economy development plans, taking for granted
smooth petrodollar flow into the state treasury.
The Soviet leaders mistook the behavior of the oil
market. They allowed too much exposure of the
national economics to the international market
outside their control. After a rise to 35-40 dollar per
barrel in the late 1979-early 1980, the oil prices fell
from the peak of 50-60 to 15-17 dollars per barrel
in the late 1980s. The price then stabilized at this
level for a decade.
The Soviet Union tried to keep its earnings high
by increasing, in 1987-1989, the output to 12.6 mil-
lion barrels daily or nearly 20% of the world’s total.
Export rose to 3.7 million barrels daily or 15% of
OPEC capacity. Still, because of the low prices, the
flow of petrodollars came lower than expected. This
caught Moscow off guard, and corrective action
was not made. The oil-addicted industry did not
timely curtail large-scale production of numerous
and expensive weaponry. This soon rendered the
whole country a bankrupt.
In 1990s the Russian government made Rouble
exchangeable. It was definitely a quantum leap in
the economy management. But this measure alone
did not save the national banking system from a
complete collapse in 1998. The most plausible
explanation of the 1998 events is that that the Urals
brand oil was selling for merely 7.8 dollars per
barrel, the lowest point in the recent history. In the
conditions of weak demand, Russian oil production
drops by 40%. It then ran at 6.2 million barrel daily,
making it just 8.3% of world’s production – the
export was 2.3 million, or 7.5% of OPEC capacity.
As the oil price grew again, the Russian finan-
cial system recovered. In 2000 the price went up to
30 dollars. This urged Russia rise its daily produc-
tion to 7.7 million barrels against Saudi Arabia’s 8.7
million in 2002. This quickly stabilized the nation-
al economy. During 2003-2007, Rouble to Euro
exchange rate was more or less stable, averaging at
35 (it floated between 33.33 and 37.83). During the
first three quarters of 2008 the exchange rate fluctu-
ated between 36 and 37. The US dollar was selling
at 30.6 Roubles in September 2003. It dropped 27.7
in 2005, and then steadily fell (2006 – mid 2008) to
the lowest point of 23.2 in July 2008.
The International Monetary Fund commended
on the strong economic performance of the Russian
economy, noting that it had been “not only to high
oil prices”, but also “a good marco economic
management”. Was it just some flattery for the
Kremlin? Months after this comment came, the
period of Rouble’s stability ended. In October 2008,
the exchange rate to Euro came to 34.4 (reflect-
ing the relative rise of the dollar to Euro) and then
skyrocketed to 41.63 at the year-end. The dollar
also rose sharply, to 30 a the year-end and 33.5 in
January 2009.
The main source of anti-crisis measures in
the Kremlin’s possession is so-called State Gold
and Hard Currency Reserves. In autumn 2008
the reserves rose to US dollar 600 billion. At the
end of the year the figure dropped to 430 billion
(no official explanation was given). “In recent
years it has become increasingly difficult to collect
and analyse meaningful data on Russian Federal
budget, and particularly the finances of Russian
national defense, owing to a number of presenta-
tional changes” – a good remark on Page 209 of the
Military Balance 2008 issued by the International
Institute for strategic studies (IISS, London).
In late 2008 the Russian government made
decision to provide Rouble 5 trillion to major
Russian banks so as to help Russian financial
system survive the crisis. Four banks were named
as primary receivers: Saving Bank, VTB, VEB and
Gazprombank.
So far, none of prominent Russian banks
went bankrupt. While executing a more careful
approach to lending money than before the cri-
sis, the banks remain busy and afloat. Ups and
downs with the Rouble do not seem to bother
them much, since many deals are made in the
“dollar+Euro” coordinates.
Banks are fine; who is suffering? Let’s look
at the Index of Moscow MMVB exchange. It
dropped from 1,600-1,800 points in early 2008
7
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
down to some 600 in October – December 2008.
I then dropped tobelow 600 in January 2009.
The Russian exchange index went down by three
times, while the western counties registered drops
by one-third at maximum. This reflects the fact
that foreign and local investors have been pulling
their money out of the Russian economy. The lat-
ter is no longer “a point of growth”. The oil selling
at 45 dollars per barrel, at the level of 1980, the
Russian economy is of no interest. The investors
are likely to come back when the crisis is over and
the oil prices go up again. It is not expected before
2010-2011, though.
ForecastWill Putin’s Russia follow the path of the
Soviet Union in similar circumstances? It remains
to be seen. There are signs that the attitude of the
Russian decision makers and society to the issue
of “real” and “virtual” economics is starting to
change. The decision in favor of “real economy”
development would entail a set of measures aimed
at development of in-house manufacturing capabil-
ity. One of the reasons is to lessen dependence on
the global market.
Today’s oil-based economy does not provide
stability in the view of unpredictable behavior of
the fossil fuel prices in the global marketplace. The
oil price dropped from 144.8 dollar per barrel (July
2008) down to 34.4 (November 2008), more than
fourfold within four months! This fact gives evi-
dence of how unstable the global market can be.
The Kremlin has made some corrective actions.
It has pumped Rouble 5 trillion into the four lead-
ing banks. It also provided support to a tiny group
of airlines and industrial enterprises. On the eve of
the New Year Vladimir Putin said the government
is putting together a list of 300-400 strategically
important and up to 1,500 socially important enter-
prises. These will receive financial aid from the
Russian government and favorable credits from the
four leading banks. On 26 December the Russian
government issued the list with 290 enterprises on
it, including United Aircraft Corporation, RSK MiG
and KAPO.
Besides, the Russian government has pre-
pared draft of the law for State Weapons Order
2009-2011. Spending on national defense is going
to be increased, Putin said. Besides, the govern-
ment is ready to increase the share of state funding
in research-and-development projects that were
previously meant to have shared funding (Russian
government, export customer, investors, manufac-
turers’ own money). These measures shall support
the Russian military industrial complex suffering
from a system crisis.
The federal budget for 2009 provides govern-
mental air of Rouble 2.5 billion to airlines operating
“socially important routes”. Draft budget for 2010
is twice that amount. Which airlines may get the
money? Not clear yet. It is believed that a good
portion will go to OOO Aviakompania. This is a
newly established company that is accepting con-
trol over AirUnion, Atlant-Soyuz, GTK Rossiya and
Vladivostok Avia. The merger is controlled by Sergei
Chemezov’s Russian Technologies state corpora-
tion (Rostechnologii). The new carrier, which is yet
to be formed, may provide serious competition to
Aeroflot on both domestic and international routes.
While the Kremlin’s promises may sound well,
will they be kept? At the end of the past year the
Russian government and banks gave the ailing
manufacturers and airlines only a fraction of the
promised funds. This fact was acknowledged by
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev on 10 January.
When visiting MMPP Salut plant (Moscow-based
manufacturer producing AL-31F/FN and AI-222
engines for Su-30MK/34 and Yak-130 warplanes),
he said the government works too slowly imple-
menting anti-crisis measures in the real economy.
He added that the current banking rates are not
affordable for companies of the heavy industries.
Medvedev is certainly right. The Russian banks
offered the industry credits at 6-10% before the
crisis and 16-20% after it hit. The latter is too
expensive for the manufacturing industry with long
cycles, such as aircraft production.
Critics say the Russian government unspoken
policy is to wait passively for the oil to get expensive
again, while providing restricted support to a nar-
row circle of “real economy” companies. Russia’s
Central Bank is expected to purposely reduce value
of the national currency in relation to US Euro/dollar
basket, further by 30-50%. (One dollar changed for
23.2 in July 2008, and for 31-33.5 in January 2009).
The weak Rouble would render export orders lucra-
tive for the industry. It increases competitiveness of
the Russian products in the international market.
Our prediction for 2009-2010 is the follow-
ing one. We expect Russian aviation industry to
execute a narrower focusing on well-selling legacy
products such as the Sukhoi Flanker series fighters,
Mil Mi-17 helicopters and Tupolev Tu-204 airliners.
Expected annual output is 40-50, 60-70 and 10-15
units respectively. At the same time, the schedules
of next-generation products will shift further into a
more distant future.
Explanation is that production cycle for a
certified aircraft, be it a Su-30MK, a Mi-17 or a
Tu-204, falls between 12 and 18 months. Pricing
(manufacturing expenses, labor costs, customer
value etc.) and price degradation over years of
operational service are known or predictable.
Banks will fund production of the tried products
since the risks involved are relatively low, and the
time cycle is short enough. Newer products may
offer higher gains, but they imply higher risks and
longer return times. The latter is less acceptable in
the conditions of liquidity shortage, market stag-
nation and instability.
8
On January 11, 2009 the Russian President
Dmitry Medvedev visited Salut MMPP
(Moscow Machine-Building Production
Plant), got acquainted with manufacturing process
of aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines and
chaired a meeting to discuss issues of stabilisation
of the situation in real economy. The President
was accompanied by his Assistants, Deputy Prime
Ministers and other Members of the Government,
the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed
Forces, the Mayor of Moscow, and heads of several
leading Russian banks.
Salut is one of the leading Russian manufactur-
ers of aircraft engines and industrial gas turbines.
It was founded in 1912 and now produces AL-31F
engines for the Su-27/30 family of fighter aircraft
as well as other products vital for national defence
and energy industry. Salut was one of 295 enter-
prises defined by the government in December,
2008 as crucial for national economy and bound
to receive government’s support to overcome the
global financial crisis.
Addressing the meeting, President Medvedev
said: “As early as October, I gave a series
of instructions to the Government, which were
directed towards the systematic support for the
sector during the global financial crisis. The
Government is working, those instructions are
being fulfilled, although, I must admit that at
the moment we are not in a position to say that
we have done all that is necessary. The imple-
mentation of these measures is happening more
slowly than we expected, and what is more impor-
tant, more slowly than the current circumstances
require. I have just looked at the data: only 30%
of what had been envisaged has been carried out,
and parts of the instructions have extended the
time by which they need to be completed. We
must get to grips with all of this, and take the
necessary measures to energise our work.
Let me say that this is by no means a simple
situation, the volume of industrial production in
the period October-December last year, on aver-
age, fell by more than 6% per month, compared
with the same period in 2007. Of course, this was
the result of the decrease not only in domestic
demand, but also in the significant fall in export
prices which fell significantly in several different
production areas. In metallurgy there was a fall in
prices from 30 to 70%, in the machine building
sector the global market price fell from 20 to 60%.
All this, of course, does nothing to make the situ-
ation more straightforward.
Secondly, what makes the situation even more
difficult, and what creates problems, is the fact that
most businesses have quite serious deficits in their
cash reserves. The interest rates on credit taken
have increased, and additional demands are made
on companies to secure their credit against assets,
and other guarantees supporting the credit applica-
tion. And all this, of course, has led to the decreased
profitability of industry, and in many cases has led
simply to businesses operating at a loss.
Thirdly, all these factors have made the situation
regarding the budget more difficult, and of course,
particularly in the regions. Practically everywhere
we forecast a decreased budgetary income. To sum
it up – it’s a complex situation. I should say that we
did foresee this. This is wholly difficult time. The
main thing, that I wanted to speak about, is the fact
that we must be swifter both in our actions, and in
the answers we find to these problems. We have set
to work on passing the regulations and subordinate
legislation, but even here, many things are simply
taking an unforgivable length of time”.
President Medvedev pointed out some posi-
tive factors of the current economical situation: “a
lowered price on raw materials and on components,
which in the long run are sure to give industry the
ability to run a more flexible pricing policy. “Today,
(and of course this is bad for our metallurgists,
but nonetheless for companies such as “Salut” it
does have also a positive effect) the price of metals
is falling. But here we simply need to look at the
Russian engine manufacturers included in the
list of enterprises crucial for national economy
and bound to receive government’s support to
overcome the global financial crisis: Chernyshev
MMP (Moscow), Klimov (St.Petersburg), Perm
Motors Plant (Perm), Salut MMPP (Moscow)
Saturn (Rybinsk), UMPO (Ufa).
THE RUSSIAN PRESIDENT DMITRY MEDVEDEV VISITS SALUT
Alexander VelovichPhotos: Nikolay Laskov
9
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
price offered to our consumers for the products. Of
course it should be accompanied by a fall in produc-
tion costs, which would be no bad thing. And, in
the end, even on the background of a falling growth
rate, we could see an increase in labour efficiency
in industry this year, irrespective of the very difficult
context”. The Russian President reminded that a
commission on increasing sustainable growth in the
economy has been created as part of Government,
comprising key industries and organisations, and it
had taken several most important decisions.
The President warned against reorganizations
and reforms for purely the sake of reforms them-
selves in the difficult times of the financial crisis: “I
am just drawing attention to the fact that our main
task is the protection of our production base, not
reform”. These particular words may be regarded
as a victory of Yury Eliseyev, the Salut Director
General, who is reported to oppose the inclusion
of his plant in an integrated engine-manufacturing
concern controlled by Russian Technologies cor-
poration. Salut still retains the status of a Federal
State Unitary Enterprise. This year the Russian gov-
ernment plans to provide RUR 300 billion (Russian
roubles) for credit guarantees for businesses, of
them one third is dedicated to the defence indus-
try complex.. However, the president remarked:
“All these credit procedures are very bureaucratic,
including in the banks themselves, where the time
it takes to make the agreement is simply endless”.
“Today it is simply unforgivable for the documents
to take so long to complete”, he added.
Prepayment for work on national defence
orders and on federal programmes was another
question discussed at the meeting. The president
stated: “The work on this is going extremely slowly,
everyone is complaining. Another theme that we
ought to consider – is what additional measures,
and mechanisms are needed in order to raise the
overall efficiency of the all steps we have taken
both in the budgetary-financial sphere and in the
support of the real economy”. The president urged
Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin to take the issue
under his control and to implement changes to
administrative technology “adequate to the current
tasks before us, and which is fully focused on the
serious financial crisis”.
10
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Emergency Medicine of Peace and War Time
11
On 15 January, 2009 the Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin visited the head-
quarters of Tactical Missiles Corporation in
Korolev, near Moscow. Avoiding traffic jams, the
prime minister arrived at the TMC premises in a
helicopter. He made a tour of the missile manufac-
turing plant and then Putin chaired a meeting on
the measures of state support to enterprises of the
defence industry complex. Deputy Prime Ministers
Sergey Ivanov, Igor Sechin and Alexei Kudrin,
the Minister of Economics Elvira Nabiullina, the
Russian Central Bank Vhairman Sergey Ignatyev
and over 30 other government officials, repre-
sentatives of financial institutions and director
generals of Russian defence enterprises attended
the meeting.
TMC incorporates 19 enterprises develop-
ing and manufacturing missiles and other guided
smart weapons for the Russian Air Force and the
Navy. The situation at TMC corporation is typical
of Russia’s defence industry which incorporates
about 1,400 entreprisese employing over 1.5 mil-
lion people. Putin acknowledged that the economic
crisis has influenced the denece industry complex.
“Many enterprises of this segment have encoun-
tered delays of payments for shipped orders,
their creditor’s debt has increased, they have met
difficulties in getting bank loans”. Under these
circumstances, “an adequate reaction of the state
is needed,” said the Prime Minister.
The Russian government plans to spend over
RUR 1 trillion (Russian roubles, about $30 billion
USD) for defence orders in 2009, and about RUR
4 billion in the years 2009-11. Putin believes that
this spending will allow the defence industry to
survive in the crisis when orders from commercial
sector have fallen significantly. Boris Obnosov says
that in 2008 80 per cent of TMC’s revenues came
from export orders, and only 20 per cent – from
contracts from the Russian Armed Forces. Among
the leading customers Obnosov names India and
China, and recently Venesuela, Algeria and Vietnam
as well. This year the proportion of export and
domestic revenues is expected to change signifi-
cantly in favour of domestic orders.
In December, 2008 the Russian government
approved the list of 295 enterprises crucial for the
national economy and bound to receive financial
support from the state. TMC, Almaz-Antey PVO
Concern, United Aircraft Corporation, RAC MiG
and other major defence industry enterprises are
included in that list.
Taxation preferences, state guarantees for bank
loans including writing off bank interest payments
and direct loans from the Central bank of Russia
are among the measures considered to provide
support for the defence industry. The state budget
figures for 2009-11 provide for RUR 100 billion for
state loan guarantees, plus RUR 50 billion more for
subsidizing interest rate payments, anti-bankruptcy
measures and direct capital investments.
The Prime Minister stressed: “As I said more
than once, we have to thoroughly monitor the
situation in the real economy sector, and literally in
a day-by-day mode evaluate the efficiency of anti-
crisis measures which awe are working out in order
to make, if needed, additional decisions in time
and correct what has been already adopted and
planned”.Amendments to Russia’s Taxation Code
have been adopted to make easier procedures of
tax debts restructuring and providing investment
tax loans.
The Prime Minister warned that the gov-
ernment will differentiate between enterprises in
financial trouble due to objective causes and
those which have constant difficulties because of
systematic poor management. Top manager of the
latter ones are likely to be easily replaced because
the state still keeps them in the Federal property.
The government and the Central bank have
provided commercial banks with substantial
money to credit the real economy sector, how-
ever so far this money is scarcely reaching enter-
prises because of very bureaucratic procedures of
approving bank loans.
The Prime Minister mentioned also the neces-
sity to continue investments in technology mod-
ernization of production plants as well as crucial
research and development programmes. “We have
to optimize federal defence task programmes and
direct the saved money for completion and realiza-
tion of projects critical for upgrading the technol-
ogy level of our defence industry”, said Putin.
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance
Alexei Kudrin confirmed that “optimization and
restructuring are needed, however, he warned that
there would be no increase in the overall sum of
R&D and production technology investment pro-
grams. So some of them could benefit only at the
expense of the others.
Indirectly acknowledging that so far restruc-
turing of the defence industry has not brought
anticipated results, the Prime Minister instructed to
speed up work on boosting efficiency of integrated
defence industry holdings. “What for have we
formed them? We need to make them really com-
petitive, and thus not only meet the requirements
of our Armed Forces, but also expand the export
potential of Russia’s defence industry”. Detailed
strategy how to reach that objective has not been
made public, though.
Alexander Velovich
VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS VLADIMIR PUTIN VISITS TACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATIONTACTICAL MISSILES CORPORATION
12
B I G B O S S T A L K I N G
– Please tell us about results of the past year. How restructuring of the Russian aviation industry has been going?
– In the past year we carried on with consistent
efforts on reforming core business and enterprises
of our corporation. Let me remind you, the United
Aircraft Corporation was established in 2006, in
accordance with the decree of the president of the
Russian Federation. UAC strategy was approved in
February 2008. It postulates that the Corporation’s
structure shall have three new business units.
Initial plans allowed us three years to set them up
and running. But life makes us go faster. By the
end of 2008 the business units “Civil Aviation” and
“Transport Aviation” had been established. Now
we are doing some structural work to supplement
these new establishments by moving plants and
design houses under control of these units and
specializing them.
“Combat Aviation” business unit will take into
shape during 2009. It will take after Sukhoi and
MiG companies, by accepting control over their
assets. Initial plan called for forming this structure
sometime later, with completion of the founding
process in two years’ time. But life makes us go
faster. We had to initiate the founding process in
the end of 2008.
As per UAC itself… it is up and running now,
following completion of the founding process and
forming of the core team in the head office. By
now, the core team has been formed. It enables
us carry out all the functions that were prescribed
for UAC by the presidential decree [dated February
2006] and charter documents. By far and large,
UAC has accepted the function of control over the
whole of Russian fixed wing aircraft manufacturing
industry. Besides, councils of directors have been
formed on all daughter companies.
Corporate Strategy provided base for putting
together plans of our subsidiaries. The Strategy
was approved by UAC board of directors in the
beginning of 2008. It was then submitted to the
government for approval, and got it. The Strategy
lists aircraft models that UAC shall manufac-
ture at its plants. It also gives exact figures for
production output.
So, the primary result of the past year is that
we laid firm foundations for our industry to start
functioning as a system.
As we speak, I still do not have yet exact fig-
ures for UAC operational results and performance
in 2008. Preliminary calculations indicate that the
production output came to about Rouble 100 bil-
lion, roughly the same figure we reported for 2007.
In the conditions of world-wide financial crisis, it is
not bad, at least in my view.
A special effort – perhaps not so visible one
yet – has been done in the sphere of renovation.
We have done a lot introducing new technologies,
purchasing new equipment and installing it. Today,
anyone of our plants has newly installed facilities,
tooling, machines etc. This is something that
shall help us boost our competitiveness, improve
manufacturing quality and reduce costs. Higher
competitiveness shall enable UAC to hope for
larger orders in conditions of the modern market
dominated by western manufacturers.
– How hard is it to restructure the Russian aviation industry?
– It is a hard work, indeed. The new system is
being created not from a clean sheet. Much rather,
it is being created on the base of what Russia
inherited from the Soviet Union. Foundations of
the Soviet aviation industry were laid down back
in the 1930s. That time the Soviet Union erected a
number of new plants, and these still remain larg-
est in the country. Those are the aviation plants
in Komsomolsk-upon-Amur, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk
etc. Process of reforming this industry, changing
its structure and tuning it to the realities of the
modern world is a very hard work that requires
determination, patience and managerial skills.
– How long will it take UAC to restructure the industry? And how much will it cost?
– We need to invest over one billion dollars
into technical renovation of our enterprises. In
Typescript of an interview with Alexey Fedorov, UAC president and
Chairman of Executive Board
FOR UNITED FOR UNITED A IRCRAFTA IRCRAFT
UPS & UPS & DOWNSDOWNS
Vladimir Karnozov
B I G B O S S T A L K I N G
13
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
large part, investments go into development of
commercial aircraft production. More funds – in
order of several billion dollars – are needed for
development of new airplanes employing new
technologies. Related plans and programs are
supplemented by direct funding from the state
budget and by governmental measures meant
to help us raise funds on the financial market. I
believe that, despite the difficult situation in the
world’s economy, these plans and programs
will materialize.
We are working to enlarger production output
of our primary civilian product, the Tupolev Tu-204
narrow body airliner. Its assembly line is set in
Ulianovsk. In the meanwhile, UAC is setting up
production of new-generation regional aircraft,
the An-148 in Voronezh and Superjet 100 in
Komsomolsk-upon-Amur. Next year we shall bring
these new aircraft into the marketplace and hand
their first deliverable examples to airlines. Thus,
with addition of those two models, our current
product range will expand considerably.
There are important programs going on in the
military aviation. Development of the Su-35 and
MiG-35 multirole fighters continues in full gear.
These new aircraft shall appear in the marketplace
in near future.
Ulianovsk is selected for production of the
Ilyushin Il-76 heavy air lifter in a much upgraded
version with modern avionics, onboard systems
and power plants. This aircraft is compliant to
all national and international requirements. It
can operate with the Armed Forces and com-
mercial airlines. Ulianovsk-built Il-76s of this
renewed version can fly around the world with-
out restrictions, since they are compliant to all
international regulations.
– These days, when people listen to the radio or watch TV, they hear about job cuts and eco-nomic downturn. When I hear you it seems that UAC lives in another world, with plans for higher production output and introduction of new prod-ucts. Why is that so?
– If we do not launch new projects then there
will be no future for the Russian aviation industry.
That’s why we have no choice but to continue with
all of our key projects. Corrections to our plans
may take place, in terms of funding available for
a certain project. When UAC Strategy was being
worked out, we thought it over very carefully.
Especially, what aircraft models should be pro-
duced in the next ten to twenty years? Selection
of suitable models was quire serious. We took
into consideration the overall market situation, our
ability to penetrate certain markets in the global
marketplace, development of new technologies.
Screening took time and was very serious. It was
rendered complete, though.
Now, we simply cannot put on hold programs
that are on the list approved by the government –
the list UAC submitted to government together
with its Strategy. We submitted it and won govern-
mental approval. Today, we are all set to achieve
every target set before us by the President of
Russia and the Chairman of the Russian govern-
ment. There is no alternative to this: we either
master new products or forget about the future of
the Russian aviation.
– How does our plan correspond to the general situation in the global aviation market?
– The situation in the global aviation market is
such that without development of new generation
aircraft, without fulfillment of investment projects,
there is no chance to ensure future of the Russian
industry. I do not exclude the very chance of intro-
ducing corrections into our ongoing programs.
Changes that would reflect current economic situ-
ation as far as production volumes are concerned.
Markets are contracting right now. Seemingly, in
the next two-three years there will be no solvent
demand for new aircraft. But understanding of
this reality does not eliminate the very need for
us to create new products. So, we will introduce
new products in the military sphere and in the
civil aviation. There is no doubt about that. It is
the only way for the Russian aviation industry to
stay in business.
– You said that UAC has a requirement for billions of dollars to be invested. Do you consider
state budget allocations as primary source? Are you also targeting private capital?
– At this stage, state financing is, of course,
the primary source of funding for UAC. Our
Strategy calls for three phases of company devel-
opment. The first one is anti-crisis management,
it runs till 2010. At this stage the focus is on
recovery of our plants and design houses. Later
on, in 2010-2011, we shall enter equity markets
through the mechanism of Initial Public Offering
(IPO). Since that time, we expect higher income
of private investments into UAC programs. The
Strategy also calls for the period of stabilization,
from 2011 till 2015. Private capital is expected
to take the lead that time. Then, in 2015, we shall
enter the period of profitable growth. Private capi-
tal prevails over state investments, with minimiza-
tion of the government’s role as investor. That time
we will live on our own money and hired private
capital. To achieve this, UAC plans to employ vari-
ous mechanisms and tools normally used for this
purpose in the developed world. This period of
time is expected to coincide with a rapid growth of
the international aviation market, both combat and
civil aviation. Our goal is to get properly prepared
and, when it is high time for it, move forward and
capture a sizeable portion of the market.
– How confident are you when you speak about chances of this great plan to come true? It is difficult to image that it will come true today, in the conditions of world-wide financial crisis.
– Issues pertaining to financial support for
our capability extension programs were discussed
at UAC council of directors on 30 December.
The council took place in the White House of the
Russian Government. It was chaired by the dep-
uty chairman of the Russian government Sergei
Ivanov. Council members gave their assessment
14
B I G B O S S T A L K I N G
of the current situation in the industry, voiced their
ideas and plans for the future. They also discussed
issues pertaining to corrections to the mecha-
nisms of state support to the aviation industry.
By far and large, these mechanisms have been to
do with subsidizing banking interest rates (the gov-
ernment “slashes” interest rates on credits taken in
commercial banks). When these mechanisms were
introduced, it was taken for granted that UAC would
enjoy rather easy access to hired capital (there was
every indication to this). There were positive deci-
sions made by the council of VneshTorgBank (VTB),
as well as leadership of other large banks, including
the Savings Bank and VTB. However, at the end
of 2008, all changed. It happened that access to
affordable credit lines became more difficult. In
fact, the access was severely limited. Because of
this, we have not managed to make use of a large
portion of government-promised subsidies. In other
words, the state support, which had been promised,
was not actually rendered to us because we did not
manage to arrange enough credits.
I believe that the mechanisms of state support
shall change in this New Year of 2009. The volume
of support may even stay the same, though. It is
necessary to introduce special measures of state
insurance for the industry. We have applied to the
government with respective initiatives. Today, the
state insurance becomes absolutely necessary. It
is an irreplaceable tool in the conditions of manual
control over the economy – something we have
today, in the time of the crisis. We believe that,
through successful employment of these mecha-
nisms, we shall be able to continue with technical
renovation of our core enterprises. Thus, we will be
able to increase production of our new airplanes.
My prediction is that the private capital will
be reluctant to take part in the long-term aircraft
manufacturing programs. Because of the risks
that are high enough and the fact that capital
turnover time is rather long. Therefore, for us it
is very important that the Government keeps vol-
umes of promised state support, while introducing
changes timely into the mechanisms of state sup-
port and insurance.
– You said that, in the New Year, the volume of state support would stay unchanged. What was the level of that support in 2008?
– In the period of 2009-2010 a total of some
26-28 billion Rouble is allocated for us in a num-
ber of Federal Target Programs. The lion’s share
of the government funding goes to us along the
lines of the Federal Purpose Programs entitled
“Development of civil aviation” and “Development
of Military Industrial Complex”. I hope that the allo-
cations in these Programs will remain unchanged
and that the money will actually be provided.
Aircraft manufacturing is one of the industries
that determine technical level of any large country
and its defense capability. Because of the economic
downturn the Russian government is considering
cuts in the state budget allocations for long-term
investment programs. But I believe these cuts will
not apply to aviation-related allocations.
Besides, there is a hope that the above named
Federal Programs will actually be revised for high-
er volumes of state investment into the aviation
industry. Current version of the Federal Program
“Development of Civil Aviation” expires in 2010. A
newer version is being put together right now. We
expect the renewed version of the Program to be
approved by the Russian government soon and put
into force in 2011. We also hope that this new ver-
sion would contain larger figures of state support
for the aviation industry.
– Mass media reports on job cuts both in Russia and abroad. Are you going to cut your staff?
– Unlike other industries, we plan neither cuts
to our staff, nor freezing or shelving of our key
programs. On the contrary, in 2009 we will create
some new jobs. Surely, we will make steps to opti-
mize structure of our staff. There are too many of
managers and auxiliary workers. At the same time,
we will increase numbers of those who actually
work in the shops. We will re-train people currently
employed in auxiliary areas.
– Perhaps re-training programs will address not only UAC staff, but also other industries. Are there any signs that people from other industries seek for jobs in the aviation industry?
– Yes, there are indications for that. Figuratively
speaking, UAC is a locomotive of a very large indus-
try. About 100 thousand people are employed on
UAC enterprises. With all of our supply chain taken
into account, the number of jobs in the whole of
Russian aviation amounts to half a million. We
need new technologies, and, respectively, skilled
personnel. In plain words, we need people who can
see to newly installed equipment, to ensure that
this equipment works to capacity and in an effec-
tive way. After UAC was established and started
working on ramping up production, we began to
feel shortage of skilled personnel. Our industrial
partners feel the same. They have also launched
restructuring process and invested a lot into new
technologies and equipment. Our industrial part-
ners feel shortage of skilled personnel, and so they
execute programs on training and re-training of
their personnel, and invite professional people to
take vacancies. All this requires a huge amount of
work. We have agreed to join forces. We have pre-
pared a list of measures that we would undertake
jointly with our suppliers, including those on train-
ing and re-training of aviation industry personnel.
– How does UAC product range look like? Does it differ much from the one that the Russian avia-tion industry had had before UAC was founded?
– Our product range was firmed up last year.
What we had in the beginning was a collection of
all the models that our plants were manufacturing
at that time, plus those that our design houses
were developing. Smaller half of these models
passed screening. Quite simply, the models that
made the larger half did not have prospects for
future. We focused on those models that had
15
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
some sales potential, those that could sell in the
open market, and those that were in demand with
our customers. It is still possible that UAC prod-
uct range changes somewhat, to reflect recent
changes in the global market for new aircraft
and in the view of the possibility that UAC joins
international alliances. We continue talking to
our European partners in EADS and also those in
Boeing of US. We are talking to the Indian aviation
industry. If we do join an international alliance,
some corrections to UAC production range may
become necessary.
– Does Russian industry lag behind the West in high technologies? If so, how big is the gap? How long will it take Russia to catch up with the West?
– In the sphere of combat aircraft, we are same
level with the world leaders. Sukhoi and MiG have
some fairly advanced models that meet expecta-
tions of our customers and compete successfully
on the international market. Roughly, we control
10-12% of the global market of frontline aviation.
New products are coming soon. They will further
increase our competitiveness and make it possible
to enlarge our market share, up to 15-16%.
The most problematic situation is with civil avia-
tion. There is certain technological gap here. We are
planning to catch up with the West by 2015. We are
going to do this by means of streamlining produc-
tion of the Superjet and selling it in large quantities
world-wide. Not just the baseline model, the Superjet
100 that is undergoing flight trials. We put faith into
the MS-21, a new design in the class of narrow
body commercial airliners. This airplane is meant to
make history. It shall be a real breakthrough for the
Russian aviation industry. Certification of this new
product is scheduled for 2016.
One more product with which we will be
positioning ourselves in the global marketplace
is a widebody short-to-medium haul airplane
(ShFBSMS). Development of this aircraft goes on
in accordance with a governmental order. This
new design is still under development, it is taking
shape. It is an open question whether UAC will do
this project alone or in a global partnership.
UAC plans to launch production of all of these
new types by 2015. We believe UAC will be a
worthwhile player in the global market for com-
mercial airliners.
– Does UAC have points of growth? Where are they?
– If we mean the places where production
of our new models is unfolding, then “yes”, UAC
does have “points of growth”. Sukhoi has plants in
Komsomolsk-upon-Amur and Novosibirsk where
Superjet production lines are being set up. Irkut
Corporation’s main production site in Irkutsk
installs new equipment and tooling for the MS-21.
Ulianovsk will make more aircraft, as we plan
expansion of the Tupolev Tu-204 family and com-
mencing production of the improved Il-76.
After the 70-seat Antonov An-148 is mas-
tered in Voronezh, the VASO plant in that city will
become the center of competence for regional
aviation. The plant in Kazan will remain the only
center in our country to make airplanes for the
Strategic Aviation.
I do not want to abuse other plants by not
naming them here, but those that I mentioned
above are the primary ones. They generate the
lion’s share of our industry’s production output.
They also work on new projects that UAC plans
to launch.
– Cooperation with other industries. What sort of influence do UAC activities produce on dwelling points and towns where your plants are located?
– All nine aircraft manufacturing plants that in
UAC structure are core enterprises for the cities
they are situated. Some of these are situated in cit-
ies with population as large as one million or more,
just to name Voronezh, Kazan and Novosibirsk.
Those enterprises play important role in the eco-
nomic life of their home cities. There are other
factories that are situated in smaller cities; they
are largest industrial enterprises there. Cities that
house those factories cannot live without them
economically. The plant in Komsomolsk-upon-
Amur provides a good example.
UAC is a head company on aircraft manufac-
turing programs. Great many enterprises of the
Russian aviation industry take part in those pro-
grams as suppliers. That industry is wide spread in
terms geographical, with hundreds of enterprises
located all over the vast territory of the Russian
Federation. A large part of those have been inte-
grated into the Rostechnologii State Corporation
(“Russian Technologies” headed by Sergei
Chemezov). Recently, we have signed a frame-
work cooperation agreement with Rostechnologii.
You see… It does not make sense to develop
aircraft manufacturing plants without develop-
ing their supply chain – plants that produce aero
engines, avionics and all sorts of onboard systems.
Developing only UAC plans is way to nowhere.
Rostechnologii has launched a huge effort on
consolidation of enterprises in the supply chain, on
their technical renovation, on specialization of cer-
tain enterprises and creation of new products. New
aircraft types require modern engines, avionics
and onboard systems. Only working hand-in-hand,
the United Aircraft Corporation and Rostechnologii
can both succeed. They can make Russian aviation
a success story of this century.
16
This year the Indian Air Force (IAF) will con-
duct comparative flight tests of combat air-
craft participating in the MMRCA (Medium
MultiRole Combat Aircraft) tender for deliveries of
126 new fighters to the service. For the contract
with estimated value of $7-10 billion the MiG-35
competes with the F-16, F/A-18, Rafale, Typhoon
and Gripen. Aero India 2009 air show will take
place in February at the Yelahanka Indian Air Force
Base near the city of Bangalor. It is expected that
there all major participants of the MMRCA tender
will do their best to present most favourably the
aircraft offered to the IAF. Regarding the MMRCA
tender the IAF is known to be most interested in
technology transfers, and, in particular, technol-
ogy of Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA)
antenna for the airborne radar.
The first Russian AESA radar has been devel-
oped specifically for the MiG-35 by Phazotron-NIIR
corporation, which developed airborne radars for
many MiG fighters, including MiG-21, MiG-23,
MiG-25 and MiG-29. In early December, 2008
results of the recent phase of ground and flight
tests of the new Zhuk-AE radar were disclosed.
According to Phazotron-NIIR’s statement, “the radar
is functioning steadily in various modes, providing
detection and tracking of aerial and ground targets.
Ground and flight tests have proved correctness of
the radar’s concept and major design decisions, as
well as fitness and efficiency of the radar’s subsys-
tems”. The Phazotron director general Vyacheslav
Tishchenko states that “the corporation will ensure
the demonstration of the MiG-35 in India”. “We also
confirm that we are ready to transfer all key AESA
technologies to our Indian partners”, he adds.
Mikhail Belyaev, test pilot of RAC MiG who was
at controls of the MiG-35 demonstrator together
with Nickolay Diorditsa during the test flights, com-
mented on the radar’s performance: “Already in
first flights the radar had showed very good results.
We are confident of its great potential”.
ZHUK-AE AESAZHUK-AE AESAIS READY FOR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE CUSTOMERSIS READY FOR DEMONSTRATIONS TO THE CUSTOMERS
Alexander Velovich
I N D U S T R Y
17
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
Prior to Aero India 2009 show we met with
Phazotron-NIIR corporation deputy director gen-
eral, chief designer of Zhuk-AE radar for the
MiG-35 Yuriy Nikolayevich Guskov. He told us
about the results achieved in the AESA flight
tests. The Zhuk-AE demonstration unit installed
in the MiG-35 prototype provides about 130-140
km detection range of a fighter-size target. With
beefing up the radar’s performance, in particu-
lar, increasing the number of transceivers in the
antenna array, it is planned to achieve 250-280
km detection range. This exceeds capabilities of
existing radars of heavy fighters.
The twin-seat MiG-35 program demonstrator
with 154 board number will fly to Bangalor. In
demo flights at the air show Indian pilots flying
board 154 will be able to familiarize themselves
with principal modes of the AESA radar: detection
and tracking of aerial targets head-on and tail-on
looking up and looking down as well as ground
mapping. The Zhuk-AE chief designer promises
that the Yelahanka air base and aircraft at the
static park of the air show will be seen on the
radar display.
While in the demo flights at the show the
crews will be joint Russian-Indian, in the tender
flight tests the IAF pilots will fly the MiG-35 by
themselves. One more MiG-35 prototype will be
provided to the IAF for tender flights tests. That
will be a derivative of the MiG-29K naval fighter
with which the new model has a high level of stan-
dardization. The flight test program will be highly
intense and versatile. Yuriy Guskiv comments: “We
are prepared for that, we have recent experience
of the flight tests of Kopyo radar for modernized
MiG-21s of the Indian Air Force. We know how
thoroughly the IAF conducts flight tests”.
The MiG-35 can be delivered in single-seat
as well as twin-seat configurations, everything
depends on the customer’s requirements. Guskov
explains: “The single and twin-seat airframes are
absolutely identical, even the cockpit canopies are
the same. There is just one more big fuel tank in
the single-seater instead of the back cockpit. There
is no strict distinction between pilot and naviga-
tor/weapons control officer in the twin-seater,
both pilots can fully control the aircraft and all its
systems from either cockpit. There is a Russian
saying “one head is good, but two are better”.
Pilots give hints to each other, and help mutually
in flight. This is especially important while flying
demanding missions when much attention must
be paid to watching cockpit displays”.
Telling about the AESA flight tests which
went not without overcoming certain difficulties
the chief designer recalls: “The RAC MiG design-
ers had made a stake on us, and while there had
been no results, there was some tension. Some
high ranking program managers had doubts,
they said that maybe it would had been better to
seek co-operation with French or Israelis. Even
more so because at first we did not see any aerial
targets, even when switching on the radar on the
ground. The preparation position of the aircraft
on the airfield was in front of a hill that shadowed
the airspace, so in ground tests when power was
applied the radar screen was absolutely blank,
there were no aerial targets of chance to be seen.
But when the flight tests began, everything came
to normal. In the very first flight all five encoun-
ters with the target provided stable detection at
the predicted range”.
Important conclusions can be made from
the results of the first test flights. Guskov says:
“The AESA radar has high reliability, higher than
any previous radar. In spite of the fact that it
is a new radar, still in development, we did not
have any failures as such. We keep an eye on the
trancievers’ parameters, watch how they perform
in flight, communicate with Micran of Tomsk,
the supplier of transceivers. Most of them stay
as soldiers in the line of columns, all parameters
remain unchanged. But some deviations occur, we
analyze them”.
Yuri Guskov, General Designer Phazotron-NIIR Corporation
18
The chief designer adds: “We implemented
modular design that allows to extract a transceiver
from the array just with a screwdriver, to check it
with test equipment and, if needed, to substitute
with another one. This design approach was abso-
lutely right, it proved itself very well. Once we had
a need to dismount some of the transceivers. So
we were able to do that, to take some transceivers
to the laboratory, verify their parameters in the
evening, and the next day to take them back to
the airfield, install in their places and continue the
flight tests without interruption. Such design adds
some weight, and our radar now weighs about 220
kg, but I consider that to be a justified trade-off for
modularity and convenience of maintenance”.
For radar developers a step to AESA is a quali-
tatively new phase. Probably it can be compared
only with the introduction of jet engines instead of
piston ones. Yuriy Guskov recollects his feelings:
“So the first Russian AESA is flying and perform-
ing. At last it has happened. Still for me it was
very unexpected when so many people began to
congratulate us. Then I understood how impor-
tant this event was. While there were no results,
some of the industry leaders reprimanded us. It
was hard to explain that it was an absolutely new
radar, nothing of that kind had been ever tested in
Russia. If it were traditional transmitter-receiver-
antenna, such a radar could have been developed
in half a year. And here, with AESA, every step was
made with difficulty. Just an easy example: how to
measure sensitivity? It’s an easy task if you have
separate transmitter and receiver. Then you could
apply a calibrated signal to the receiver’s input and
just measure the sensitivity by noise coefficient.
But in AESA all amplifiers are inside the antenna!
And there are several hundreds of them, and their
sum provides the needed performance. So we
had to measure sensitivity by substitution method
with a horn antenna, comparing results with the
MiG-29K radar with ordinary slot antenna. Hence
we had to develop relevant equipment that would
be able to verify every radar. It was the same with
transmitting power. In ordinary radar you could
apply load to transmitter and just measure the
output. And in AESA demonstrator there are 680
transmitting channels, and you have to measure
the integral transmitting power. So new method-
ology is needed that would be able to determine
how the emission pattern is formed. The AESA
can have different transmitting and receiving beam
patterns. You can emit in one direction and receive
from another. And now you understand that you
have an absolutely new instrument at hand, and
you have to learn how to use it”.
The Phazotron specialists feel deserved pride
for the results achieved. Yuriy Guskov says: “When
everything began to function, it gave a powerful
emotional impulse for all those involved in the
program. There was no need to hurry up anybody,
each person did best and worked with utmost
intensity. And everybody felt joy. When I was
reporting the results of the first flight to our regu-
lar management meeting, I thanked everybody,
and quite of a sudden those gathered burst with
applauses. People had seen the results of many
years of their work”.
Now Phazotron-NIIR together with the trans-
ceiver developers, Micran JSC and Semiconductors
Research Institute, both of Tomsk, is refining
technologies of serial production of the AESA
radar. Major tasks are to increase reliability and
to decrease cost of transceivers. Guskov stresses:
“We can say that we have mastered the AESA
technology. There were several critical positions
there, and in course of research and development
program we had to solve these problems. And we
have done that. Now we are just clearing up some
points, refining technology, expand its capabilities.
It is fortunate that we work with Micran of Tomsk
as one team. And there was no blaming each other
even in the most difficult situations, and we had
some of those, no attempts to transfer responsi-
bility to a partner. We analyze the results of the
development together, look for solutions, find
them and advance further”.
Russia has additional trump cards in the IAF
tender. First, it is vast experience of military-
technical co-operation between our two countries.
Second, it is readiness to equal partnership on
the basis of most modern technology transfer.
Dmitry Medvedev, the President of Russia, said
during his visit to New Delhi in December 2008:
“we count that together with our Indian colleagues
we will be able to offer new forms of co-operation:
these could be technology transfers, creating joint
venture production enterprises and other forms of
partnerships beneficial to both sides”.
Recently Yuriy Guskov visited India and got
thoroughly acquainted with capabilities of the Indian
electronic industry. He has opinion that it is ready
to acquire and master industrial technologies of the
AESA radar, including those of monolithic integral
chips (MIC), and Russia is ready to transfer these
technologies. And it is very important that the
indigenous Russian AESA Zhuk-AE radar has only
indigenous components. At the same time British,
French and Swedish AESA manufacturers to some
extent rely on American suppliers. And it is known
that Americans usually are reluctant to transfer to
anybody key defence technologies.
It is important to mention that if Russia shared
technologies with India, it would not loose any of
them. All that is being done to win the IAF tender,
will be used to the benefit of Russia’s defence as
well. The MMRCA tender is of utmost importance to
Russia. The Russian President Dmitry Medvedev,
speaking at the meeting of the Commission on
Military-Technical Co-operation, said: “Defence
export strengthens our reputation as one of the
leading industrial powers of the world”. The head
of the Russian state stressed that “weapons export
is an important channel of income to the state bud-
get”, and the significance of military-technical co-
operation grows especially in the time of financial
crisis. Phazotron has made all than depends on
the corporation to ensure Russia’s high chances
in the competition with the leading combat aircraft
manufacturers of the world.
I N D U S T R Y
19
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
15-19 NOVEMBERJEBEL ALI, DUBAI,
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES WWW.DUBAIAIRSHOW.AERO
Dubai Airshow 2009Leading the Aerospace Industry
HOST SPONSOR
With 850 exhibitors at 2007, where will you be on show in 2009?
850show offs.
20
UAC and its subsidiaries invited prominent
Russian journalists and representatives of the
international media working in Moscow to “New
Year tree” sort of event. It happened in the premises
of the Museum of Vehicles located west of Moscow
city. Here is typescript of the speeches the Russian
aviation leaders made at this assembly.
Alexey Fedorov, President, chairman of the Executive Board, United Aircraft Corporation (UAC).
Today, in this Museum of Vehicles, we have
assembled for a meeting of aircraft developers and
manufacturers with those people who create the
image of our industry, who write, take photos and
produce reports about the Russian aviation and our
Corporation.
Absolutely fantastic and remarkable this place
is! I am honored to be here with you today, to
speak about our achievements in the passing year.
And to wish you every success in the New Year
of 2009! I am amazed of what I have seen in this
museum today. Honestly, I had not expected that
there could be some good people among us who
do not only grow their business, but also do this
wonderful, important work for next generations.
This is a great deed! There is much goodness in
it, which makes our war veterans satisfied. Also, it
pleases those who work in the sphere of aviation.
Hopefully, you will agree to me saying that the year
of 2008 – and we have assembled to say “goodbye”
to that year – was not easy for the aviation industry
and the airline industry. I think it is possible to say
with confidence that the next year is going to be
even more difficult, if not critical. At the same time,
a lot has been done, many good happenings have
occurred. I will not spend much time naming all
of the achievements we have had. Just one thing:
this year some newly built Russian aircraft took to
the air for the first time. Great changes occurred
in the sphere of aircraft manufacturing and the air
transportation system. I want you to remember
the passing year as a good one for the sphere in
which we work, the sphere of aviation. As for the
New Year of 2009, let me wish that all of you here
will have many good happenings in your life, so
that we would be proud of the profession we have
chosen, and the job we have been having. I wish
that the family life will make us happy more often
than dissatisfied. Well, from all of my heart, let me
wish you all the best in the New Year! Please never
forget that we do have one thing in common, those
of us who create new aircraft, who develop onboard
systems, who actually makes new aircraft, and who
write about aviation, who create public image of
our aviation. Good things to all of you, all the best
in the New Year!
Mikhail Pogosyan, UAC first vice-president for program coordination, general director of Sukhoi Company.
The passing year was quite eventful. Most
important things that happened were the follow-
ing: the Sukhoi Superjet 100 prototype made its
maiden flight; the Su-35 fighter entered trials.
Those are most important, but not the only events
that happened. I want to draw your attention to,
perhaps, not so visible event as maiden flight of
a new aircraft, but still very much an important
event. We have improved mutual understanding of
the common goals that we, at UAC, have set before
us. We have been watching how, step by step, the
United Aircraft Corporation is gradually becoming a
workable team with good coordination and mutual
support. Not so long ago we were just a collec-
tion of independent companies, which were put
together on a list… that’s it, the UAC was formed
UNDER NEW YEAR TREESpeeches of Russian aviation industry leaders before Russian media representatives, 20 Dec. 2008
Vladimir Karnozov
E X H I B I T I O N
21
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
that way. Now, we are a team. UAC structure is
taking shape, with business units being formed
inside of it. I think that for those of us who work in
UAC, these changes and trends are very important.
This is a good indication that we have been moving
forward. I hope the passing year helped us become
more understandable to mass media. I think there
is a growing understanding between those who
work in aviation and those who report on the events
that happen in the sphere of aviation. I do not think
that it is necessary that we all think similarly. But
what we do need is feedback, so that we would
understand the situation better. We need feedback
so that we would apply the common sense when
analyzing chain of events. Let me say a word of
thanks to all journalists here present. I thank them
for the work they have done and for the attention
they have paid to us and our aviation. Secondly, I
would like to raise this glass to unity between us
and for understanding between us, those who work
in aviation, who make aircraft and whose, who
make reports covering aviation events. Aviation is
something we have in common. All the best to you
in the New Year!
Alexander Roubtsov, Ilyushin Finance Company general director, UAC Executive Board member.
In the passing year we delivered a record num-
ber of airplanes to airline customers. Less than we
had planned, though. Still, one more step has been
made towards restoration of series production of
Russian commercial airplanes. UAC has made this
new step. Production rate at Ulianovsk factory is
reaching one airframe each month. It is, of course,
not something that makes us happy, but it is far
better that we used to have in not so distant past.
For us as a leasing company, it is important indeed.
Because our private investors trust us, they invest
their money into our aircraft acquisition and leas-
ing programs. These are investors that come from
Russia as well as other countries. The private capi-
tal stays with us. And all these good people come to
us prepared. They come prepared because of you,
the journalists who produce reports, who put into
light some bright things in aviation, and also not so
bright. For us who work in the financial sphere, who
see to sales of the domestic industry products, it is
very important. And it is certainly so because the
financial analytics and the airlines read every day
that come out in the press. That’s why they are well
prepared. I want to raise this glass to partnership
of the team that is assembled here today. In the
coming year, which is going to be not an easy one,
it is so important to keep trust and understanding
among us. Your experience and knowledge, your
vision of the situation, understanding of the issues
that our industry has, are important. I wish the New
Year to be beautiful to all of you. Let it make you all
happy! I wish you great holidays, so that you have
some rest and then come back with your batteries
recharged. So that, in the New Year, we would have
more power to fight for a better world. The world
that would see more Russian aircraft flying and
more airplanes coming out of assembly shops. Let
our production rates double and triple! I wish you
all every success in the New Year!
22
China’s aircraft industry is a rapidly grow-
ing branch, gradually catching up (not
without Russia’s hand) with technical and
engineering lagging behind western countries.
The biggest country in the world with the popula-
tion of 1,3 bln releases today competitive fourth
generation fighters, places into orbit manned
spaceships and earth satellite vehicles, creates
regional passenger liners and unmanned flying
vehicles of different designation. Strong evidence
of China’s high level aircraft industry was shown
at the seventh aerospace show Airshow China. It
started November, 4 in Zhuhai airport Guangdong
Province.
The exhibition demonstrated that modern
China has achievements in the aerospace area it
can be proud of. “And should be”, – thinks party-
economic head of the country. Unlike the previ-
ous shows this one differed in the huge number
of high-ranking officials for Zhuhai. Suffice it to
say at the opening ceremony there were four
members from the Political bureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party of China
(CC CPC). At the tribune Army, Air Force and
Navy Commanders of People’s Liberation Army
of China (PLAC) took their places near deputy
Prime-minister Zhang Dejiang and Minister of
defense Liang Guanglie.
In the presence of such respectable audi-
ence PLAC Air Force which presence at previous
exhibitions was formal showed its beauty. The
pilots displayed the aircraft that had never been
shown before in public. We’ll give you the most
important of the full-scale exhibits:
Vladimir Karnozov
E X H I B I T I O N
AIRSHOW CHINA 2008AIRSHOW CHINA 2008
The Rostov Helicopter Production Complex (Rostvertol) signed a contract for the delivery of a
Mi-26TS helicopter, the best-selling helicopter in the world, to China at Airshow China 2008. A num-
ber of documents connected with helicopter deliveries were also signed.
“This is the second contract for the delivery of Russian Mi-36 helicopters to China,” Rostvertol
general director Boris Slyusar told Interfax. “The first was signed in August 2006 for the leasing of a
Mi-26 helicopter to a Chinese company for three years. Later, the Chinese company bought it outright.
We signed the transfer for it today too.”
23
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
– Two J-10 light multifunctional fighters
known as Dragon;
– Two J-8-II interceptors;
– FBC-1 Attack aircraft (another designation
– FH-7A) known as Flying Leopard;
– Cargo tanker aircraft on the basis of the
H6K bomber (developed Soviet Tu-16);
– Z-8K heavy lift helicopter (“cloned” French
Super Frelon);
– Z-9WE medium combat helicopters
(Chinese edit of Dolphin);
– Z-11W light helicopters (Equreuil /
Fennec).
Especially should be mentioned that the lat-
ter two were shown equipped with guided missile
weapon.
Separately there was shown Mi-171 medium
transport helicopter. Though there were no expla-
nations of this vehicle, it is supposed to be the first
of this type manufactured in China (at the aircraft
factory in Sichuan Province) using kit of parts pro-
duced at the plant in Ulan-Ude.
To this impressive “composite squadron” of
flying vehicles the industry added air prototype of
the L-15 supersonic operational trainer (based on
the Jak–130 with AI-222 augmented engines) and
Modern Arc 600 turboprop air carrier (developed
An-24/MA60 with Canadian engines and American
avionics), that made its first flight in October 2008.
The demonstration flights began right after
the greetings of the exhibition organizers and
Guangzhou governor. It was started by the new-
est J-10 fighter main exhibit of Sirshow China
2008 and the “face” of Chinese aircraft industry.
Manned by a combat pilot Dragon showed perfect
maneuverability and all that at 30 degrees heat
and high humidity. It didn’t show any breathtak-
ing exercises such as Pugachev’s cobra, hook or
tail-dive. It limited the show only to the classic
exercises – combat turns, low speed nose-up
pitch run. Judging by the demo flights turn rates
and momentary time-to-climb shown by J-10 on
the whole equaled F-16 and MiG-29 level. Dragon
pilot steadily showed difficult exercises on his
vehicle unavailable to Chinese planes before. Small
deviation angles of the pressurized instrument
section and careful operating afterburning brought
to the thought that Dragon pilot didn’t force out
the vehicle.
Two-three years ago foreign specialists told
me: “J-10 is still thing in itself, it’s difficult to
say if real fighter will come out of it or not”.
Today the same specialists say as one: “J-10 is
born”. Chinese military are very satisfied with the
vehicle. The project has thoroughly defended all
not small financial, manufacturing and intellec-
tual resources invested in it. Dragon can not only
fly perfectly. It can also successfully use guided
weapon in the training area – guided bombs with
optical or TV guidance, and also guided missiles
with radar head, television “eye” and infrared
eye. At their stands Chinese firms continuously
showed videos about work of J-10 crews at train-
ing areas.
Western sources say one hundred J-10s
have been built. Some Russian sources bring
this number to 300. According to the available
information our country hasn’t imported such
number of AL-31FN engines to China yet. But it’s
worth remember there is also Tai Hang Chinese
“clone” of AL-31F. J-10 was shown exactly with
this engine before the scrupulously selected
journalists at the first official presentation of this
plane last winter.
According to the information available the
work on the upgrade J-10 sometimes nominated
Super-10 is on. Maybe this vehicle is being devel-
oped for Chinese Navy for flights from aircraft
carriers. Its difference is in using more power-
ful engine – either AL-31FM2/3 or augmented
Tai Hang. There is also possible replacement of
standard radar with slot array (worked out by
Chinese specialists on the basis of British, Italian
and Israeli models delivered to China in 1990s,
A famous British magazine Flight International
published the Directory: World Air Force review
giving the numbers of the military aviation of all
the countries in the world for mid-2008. For today
this is the newest analysis of this subject. Though
in this review (as well as in other publications of
such kind) there is quite much inaccuracy and
frank “information noise”, it gives quite good idea
of the current aviation condition in different states.
And through some supplementary material it’s also
possible to get information about the changes of the
size of aviation in some states.
According to the review, the Chinese Air Force
currently includes 120 H-6 strategic bombers
(Tu-16 manufactured in China under Soviet license
at the aviation plant in Harbin) and 250 H-5 tactical
bombers (Chinese Il-28 modification). And if H-5 is
an outdated one capable to carry only “iron” free-
fall bombs, H-6s are actively converted into cruise
missile carrier, tanker aircraft and EW aircraft.
Its possible to suppose these vehicles will be in
service next decade.
Today the main combat aircraft of the People’s
Republic of China tactical aviation is the Q-5
supersonic day-time light attack aircraft (deep
modernization of the MiG-19 tactical fighter made
by Chinese specialists in early 1960s). There are
about 500 aircraft of this type in service mainly
equipped with free-fall bombs and unguided air-
to-surface missiles.
The J-7 tactical aircraft (the MiG-21) is the
most extended Chinese fighter produced in PRC in
some modifications: day-time J-7-I and J-II (devel-
opment of the MiG-21F-13) and also all-weather
J-III (MiG-21ML). On the whole PLAC Air Force has
392 J-7 aircraft of all modifications.
AIR POWER OF CHINA IN NUMBERS
Zhang Dejiang, Chinese Vice-premier and Boris Slyusar, Rostvertol General Director on Airshow China 2008
24
and also experimental board radar unit Jemchug
from Phazotron – NIIR corporation) for a new one
with electronic scanning. Its construction is likely
to use the technology given to Chinese partners
from Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of
Instrument Design in the late 1990s, when experi-
mental copy of Pero aerial was sent to People’s
Republic of China.
Having created a good J-10 lightweight
fighter China is still not so good in developing
a heavy one. While the perspective vehicles are
worked on hard, industry continues producing
time-tested J-8-IIМ. At the posters of the con-
solidated corporation AVIC (created through the
fusion of AVIC1 and AVIC2 before the very open-
ing of Airshow China 2008) there was shown a
new upgraded modification of this veteran. Its
tests will begin in one or two years. And while
the homeland industry is creating its own fourth
generation heavy fighter, China can continue buy-
ing such kind of aircraft in Russia.
By the end of the second day of Airshow
China 2008 PLAC Air Forces commander general-
colonel Siui Tsilan appeared at Russian exhibition.
FGUP Rosoboronexport deputy CEO Aleksandr
Mikheev met him. The commander attentive-
ly examined the exhibits of Rosoboronexport,
Vertolety Rossii, ANK Sukhoi, NPK Irkut, NPO
Saturn, SPARK and UOMz. Telling him about the
main offers from Russian firms Mikheev espe-
cially noted Mi-26 and Ka-52 helicopters, Be-200
amphibious plane and also SPARK equipment.
The most time Siui Tsilan spent near Sukhoi
stand at the large-scale model of the newest
Su-35 4++ generation fighter. The PLAC Air
Force commander asked Aleksander Mikheev and
Sukhoi deputy director general Sergey Sergeev
one question after another. He asked about Su-35
combat capabilities, operational range with full
combat load, targeting complex and munition
stockpile. Siui Tsilan highly estimated combat
capabilities and aircraft specifications but at all
this he pointed out to Russian guests that J-10
flies not worse than Su aircraft and also China
has “something” from perspective researches.
The secret of Chinese success is simple.
Monthly average salary of workers and engineers
varies from 200 to 300 US dollars which is much
less than in Russia and gradually less than in
Western countries. At all this it’s quite possible
to live on it in People’s Republic of China using
the advantages of socialistic state structure. In
the 1960s-70s China founded the basis of its
own aircraft industry school. It was reserved in
the 80s and was forced at the end of the century.
Today the country is strong on its way to indus-
trialization and economic cooperation with global
companies which gives money to the treasury
and makes possible mass investment into aircraft
industry. At first the main work was concentrated
in “cloning” good foreign models. But gradu-
ally Chinese are coming to its own “free art”.
Patience and labor peculiar for Chinese turn the
question of reaching world aircraft manufacturing
heights into the question of time and maybe not
so long.
Second in the number of China Air Force’s
vehicles is Su-27 type fighter. There are 151
Su-27SK tactical aircraft and Su-30MK multifunc-
tional two-seater fighters imported by Russia and
also 98 J-11 (Su-27 copy produced in PRC). Thus,
on the whole China has 248 Su-27 aircraft and its
modifications. It’s worthy to note that this is the
biggest group of Su-27s beyond Russia.
The number of J-10 fighters (Chinese 4th gen-
eration aircraft equipped with one AL-31F engine)
is according to Flight International 140 vehicles.
It is possible that in the nearest future J-10 will
become China’s main fighter instead of J-6 and Q-5
1st generation vehicles.
The number of J-8 interceptors (close to the
Su-15 in their weight dimension characteristics
and performance) has reduced a bit and now is
only 96 aircraft. The reduction is likely to have been
done through discarding early modifications J-8
and J-8-I. At the same time small-batch manufac-
turing of J-8-II probably continues even today.
Though, the reduction of J-6s (MiG-19) looks
most radical. If in 2001 there were 2800 vehicles
of this type (which made Chinese tactical aviation
almost the most numerous in the world), now,
according to Flight International, there remained
only 25 J-6 fighters.
And finally J-5 (MiG-17) 1st generation fighters
absolutely disappeared from the AF, having been
manufactured in big amounts by Chinese aviation
industry in the 1950-60s and also imported by the
Soviet Union to PRC. It’s worthy to mention that
still in 2001 there were more than 1700 J-5 tactical
fighters of different modifications in the PLAC Air
Force combat and reserve units.
Thus there are currently 1770 combat aircraft
in the PLAC AF, which is some times less than
there used to be at the beginning of the decade. At
all this, the part of “4” and “4+” generation aircraft
complexes (Su-30MK, Su-27, J-11 and J-10)
makes 22%, 3rd generation aircraft (J-8) – 5%,
2nd generation (J-7) – 22% and 1st generation
(H-5, H-6, J-6 and Q-5) – 51% .
To compare, according to the Flight International,
today the Russian Air Force numbers more than
1900 combat aircraft, US Air Force– more than
2300 (and 390 in reserve). And Indian Air Force (the
second Asian nuclear power) numbers 740 combat
aircraft, 23% of which are “4” and “4+” generation
vehicles (Su-30 MKI, MiG-29 and Mirage2000),
47% – 3rd generation (Jaguar, MiG-23 and MiG-27)
and 30% – thoroughly modernized 2nd generation
fighters (MiG-21 bison). There are 53 Su-39MKI in
the Indian AF. Another 177 aircraft of this type will
be imported in the nearest future.
The main potential rival of China is Taiwan
which Air Force numbers 484 combat aircraft, 45%
of which are “2+” generation fighters (F-5E/E), and
the rest are 4th generation vehicles (F-16, Csingo,
Mirage2000-5).
In the nearest years, the Chinese Air Force
will receive another 135 Su-27/J-11 aircraft,
some J-10 fighters and maybe FC-1 light fighters
(mainly manufactured for exporting). At the
same time all the H-5, Q-5, J-6 and partly J-7
aircraft of early year of manufacture are likely to be
discarded. H-6 aircraft will stay as nuclear weapon
carriers. Thus by the middle of the next decade the
Chinese Air Force will number 1000-1100 combat
aircraft, about 50% of which will be modern “4”
and “4+” generation vehicles.
To solve EW tasks there are two Il-78 reequipped
aircraft at China’s disposal. In the short term the Air
Force will get also eight IL-78 cargo tanker aircraft.
The review doesn’t give any data about the number
of Chinese airborne early warning aircraft, though
it’s known that PRC works hard in this direction.
Military transport aviation of China has gradu-
ally reduced because of discarding numerous Li-2
and Il-12 reciprocating military transport aircraft
manufactured in 1940-50s. An-2 not long ago in
service with the Air Force also disappeared. As
a result today PLAC military transport aviation
has quite modern flying stock consisting of 5
Boeing-737, 5 An-12, 83 An-26, 5 An-30, 27 Il-76
(with another 30 having been ordered), 4 MA-60, 4
Tu-154 (and another 9 in reserve) aircraft.
In the Air Force’s helicopter fleet there are 31
Mi-8/171 assault support helicopters and 7 SA321s.
The training aircraft are represented by 170 new
JL-8 (K-8), also 149 JJ-6 (two-seated operational
trainer modification of J-6) and 39 JJ-7 (on the
basis of J-7) vehicles.
On the strength of relatively small army aviation
there are 3 Mi-6s, 198 Mi-8/17/171s, 22 S-70Cs,
and also 6 SA342s and 99 Z-11s, part of which is
equipped with assault antitank weapon. As trainers
there used 22 HC-120 helicopters (with another 6
ordered) and 48 Z-11s.
Obviously the weak point of Chinese Air Force
is practically full absence of specialized attack
helicopters.
PRC naval aviation has 30 H-6 missile bomb-
ers, 150 H-5 torpedo bombers, 23 Su-30MKK and
MK-2 (another 50 have been ordered) multifunc-
tional fighters, 98 J-6 fighters, 30 J-7s, 124 J-8s
and 100 Q-5 attack aircraft. Despite that the Navy
disposes 20 newest JH-7 bomber-fighters, which
Flight International on some reason put into the
training aircraft category.
Despite that Chinese Navy disposes a Jak-42
cargo aircraft and helicopter inventory including
3 AS-565s, 8 Ka-28s, 8 Mi-8s, 3 SA365s and 19
Z-9Cs.
The substantial negative side of naval aviation is
absolute absence of antisubmarine aircraft.
E X H I B I T I O N
25
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
«In the summer of 2007 a Chinese J-10 fighter “Tzianbin-10”, created on Israeli Lavi basis with Russian engines АL-31FN, managed to shoot down an American multipurpose fighter of the 5th generation F-22 Raptor above the Taiwan Strait. During the incident subflight Su-30 blocked other American Air Force aircraft off the “Feathered Raptor”. The shot down Raptor fell down the continental part of China and after that was taken to pieces “for spare parts” by the locals. And the successfully catapulted F-22 pilot was “quietly” – by mutual consent of the parties – sent by the Chinese to the American Command…».
This message as well as other ones of the kind
appeared in the mass media and in the Internet in
the autumn of 2008, having caused great anxiety
in aviation related circles. Chinese aircraft industry
was traditionally discussed as something inferior
and ineffective, incapable of manufacturing battle
planes that can compete with those produced by
USA or European aircraft industry. Now a number
of commentators have radically changed their
point of view evaluating Chinese fighters as almost
the best in the world, being capable of shooting
down the newest American “invisibles” of the
5th generation. So, we’ll try to figure out what
«Tzian-10» (the very plane that is said to have
shot down F-22A) actually is and to what extent it
is dangerous to American “Raptors” (and not only
to them)?
An image of any armament system has
a reflection of the time when it was created.
Speaking about J-10 manufacturing it should be
mentioned that by the middle of 1980-ies Chinese
Peoples Republic had Air Force though almost
the most numerous in the world but outdated.
The front-line aviation НОАК consisted of several
thousands of fighters of the 1st generation MiG-17
(J-5) and MiG-19 (J-6), and also fighter-bombers
Q-5, slightly «diluted» with two – three hundreds
of a bit more modern (but, nevertheless, hope-
lessly outdated as well) J-7 planes (variations of
«MiG-21F-13») and J-8 (increased double-engine
«clone» of the same MiG-21). All the equipment
correlated at best with the technology and concept
of the early 1960-ies and couldn’t stand up with
modern foreign aircraft systems.
CPR started attempts to create own, purely
Chinese fighter as far back as late 1950-s, i.e.
almost right after aircraft industry establishment
and production start of the first Chinese series
fighters «Tzian-5» (MiG-17). But the only true
success in the sphere could be considered J-8
interceptor development in 1970-ies that was an
enlarged double-engine version of the very same
MiG-21. Since 1960-s China worked at designing
of a most ambitious J-9 fighter project, based on
Russian and (less) European technologies, and
also accomplished considerable modernization of
J-8 fighter (later on resulting in J-8-II occurrence,
also comprising a number of 3rd generation MiGs
elements). However, considering their general
properties these planes were way behind MiG-29,
F-16, «Mirage»2000 and other aircrafts of the 4th
generation that had already been in series produc-
tion by that time. It was more and more obvious for
the Chinese authorities that a considerable push is
required which would at least substantially reduce
if not eliminate the gap between CPR and the USA,
and Western Europe in the sphere of military avia-
tion construction. And this push was only possible
with foreign technical assistance.
In the middle of 1980-s Ministry of Defense and
Central Military Committee CDC of CPR decided to
stop working at «Tzian-9» fighter. This project,
still being under development, was accepted out-
dated and prospectless. Instead, main efforts were
concentrated on a new project – «Tzian-10», that
was thought to be created on J-9 interceptor tech-
nological basis, that started being developed as
far back as 1964. This single-engine 13 ton plane,
made upon the scheme «duck» and designed for
М 2.5, represented a Chinese version of Sweden
Saab JА.37 «Viggen» with a number of solutions
borrowed from the Soviet MiG-23. However, J-10
had Israeli roots as well (the Chinese were not so
confused with “the 5th item” of the questionnaire
as their Soviet colleagues then).
It should be mentioned, that by the early
1980-ies Israel aircraft industry level increased
considerably compared to 1950-s, when the indus-
try started literary from nothing. That was due
to high professionalism of people employed in
aircraft construction (a lot of Israeli engineers
used to work in European, American and Soviet
aircraft construction industry), as well as due to
the experience, accumulated at constructing quite
a successful for its time «Kfir» plane on the basis
of French «Mirage»5 fighter. All the abovemen-
«THE DRAGON» IS READY TO FIGHT«THE DRAGON» IS READY TO FIGHTVladimir Ilyin
26
tioned enabled the Israeli to start solving a more
complicated problem that is the construction of
a battle plane of completely unborrowed design,
that would eliminate Israeli Air Force dependence
on foreign aircraft supply. The new fighter, which
was named «Lavi» («Lionet»), was designed for
striking tasks (immediate aircraft support and
battle field isolation), as well as for fighting air
supremacy together with more powerful planes of
F-15 type. It was to substitute for attack aircrafts
Douglas А-4 Skyhawk and fighter-bombers IAI
«Kfir» С.2/ С.7 in Israeli Air Defence.
One-place single-engine «Lavi», constructed
according to aerodynamic configuration «beskh-
vostka – tailless» with horizontal tail surfaces»
(this configuration is often called «duck», though
it’s not perfectly right, considering ailevators on
the wing of «Lavi») with a triangle low-positioned
wing and belly fixed air scoop a la F-16, had
modern airframe design, 22% of which (by mass)
accrued to structural components. I’d like to
note, that as for the amount of composite materi-
als used, «Lavi» was almost not inferior to the
American F-22А plane of the 5th generation that
appeared much later. The Israeli fighter was fit-
ted with digital wire-guidance 4-channel system
without duplicate mechanical wire, developed by
the Israeli company МVT jointly with American
Lear Astronics. For its time the system was a great
technical achievement.
The on-board RADAR system of «Lavi» con-
sisted of 70% Israeli developed elements and was
not inferior to the best foreign analogs. In par-
ticular, on-board multimode pulse-Doppler RADAR
Elta EL/M-2035 with slot array was comparable
by its characteristics to the newest American sta-
tion АN/APG-68, designed F-16С fighter. It could
trace air targets on «by-pass», field mapping and
avoidance of ground obstructions. Target detection
range of «light fighter» type was 55 km.
The Israeli plane cockpit was equipped with
three multifunctional indicators on electron-beam
tube: one coloured and two monochromes, as well
as with wide-angle windshield indicator. Especially
for «Lavi» the first in the world helmet-mounted
rear-sight indicator was also developed (further
used on Israeli F-15 and F-16). Fighter weap-
onry was placed on 11 joints of external store and
switched on both non-guided and guided defeat
weapon of ”air-to-surface”» and “air-to-air” type.
The plane was equipped with single engine
Pratt-and-Whithey PW1120 (with thrust 8440 kilo-
gauss on experimental samples and 9200 kilo-
gauss – on series aircrafts), providing maximum
speed for «Lavi» that is М=1.85. The engine was
created on the basis of the turbojet engine F100,
being smaller and lighter. PW1120 series produc-
tion was to be organized in Israel at American
authorization. Empty plane mass was 7070 kg
(somewhat less than F-16С), non-equipped take-
off weight – 9990 kg, maximum take-off weight
– 19230 kg, and maximum combatant load mass
on external suspension – 7260 kg (record number
for aircrafts of the type). I.е. «Lavi» was designed
as a light fighter-bomber, first of all oriented at
striking tasks solution above the battle line and in
tactical background. At that the plane had excel-
lent maneuver characteristics (stable bank angular
speed at altitude 4.5 km – 13.2 deg./s, unstable
bank – 24.3 deg./s), provided by high specific
parameters (thrust-to-weight ratio at normal take-
off mass 0.83, nominal wing pressure 336 kilo-
gauss/m2) and perfect aerodynamics. All that,
together with high performance on-board weap-
onry system, made the «Lionet» a dangerous rival
for 2nd and 3rd generation fighters. At the same
time rather low fuel effective output (0.37) limited
battle action radius of the plane that actually was
suitable for the Israeli having the neighbouring
Syria as a basic potential rival.
The fighter detailed engineering was started
in October 1982, and on December, 31, 1986 on
Israeli aircraft construction company IAI flight-test
base the first flight of «Lavi’s» prototype took
place. The aircraft was piloted by a famous test
pilot Menahim Shmul. The first Shmul’s flight was
followed by others, after a year the second plane
was ready, five more experimental aircrafts were
being built, and also a series of 300 fighters was
being prepared with supply start in 1990. However,
on August, 30, 1987 Israel Cabinet voted 12 votes
«for» and 11 «against» and closed the program.
The reasoning mentioned trivial budget difficulties,
but everybody understood that «Lavi» was merely
sacrificed to the economical interests of the USA:
American corporations, producing F-16 и F/А-18
fighters, felt in the «novice» potential threat to
their interests in international weaponry market,
and «Lavi» was to a great extent developed on
American money sent to Israel as financial aid...
Program shutdown actually put an end to
Israeli pilot-controlled military aircraft engineering.
But they were very well aware of high market price
for technical solutions acquired during «Lavi»
development. And if real planes sale appeared
impossible because of political and financial pres-
sure on the part of the USA, it was possible to
try selling at least «paper», technical documents
for the new fighter, thus recovering part of the
finances spent on the plane development. Having
considered all «pros» and «contras», Israel gov-
ernment made such an offer to China.
As a result Tel-Aviv signed a secret (first of all
– for the Americans) agreement about cooperation
with CPR in the sphere of development of a new
fighter for НОАК, on the basis of «Lavi» project.
The Chinese party, greatly interested in newest
western military aircraft construction technolo-
gies acquisition, and having no specifically warm
relations with most orthodox Arabic regimes, was
eager to extend defense technological cooperation
with Israel. In September 1988 the concept of
W A R P L A N E S
27
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
new aviation system was confirmed at the joint
session of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee, aviation ministry, and scientific tech-
nical committee of the ministry of defence of the
People’s Republic of China. And in October of the
same year the first batch of technical documenta-
tion received from the Israel party, was directed for
deep examination to 601-st and 611-th research
institutes (however, a number of sources indicate
601-st institute only). At this stage the program got
official name «Project 8810» (or «Project 10»).
The history of Chinese aircraft construction is
a most secret theme. Many events and solutions of
20 years old can be discussed in supposition mode
even today, based on far and away incomplete
and rather contradictory information, coming,
to a great extent, from Taiwan and Hong-Kong
sources, often providing unchecked information.
Nevertheless, even on the basis of this kind of
information one can draw a conclusion that J-10
was from the very beginning considered not as
a destroyer of air supremacy fighting (as it is
introduced even today in a number of Chinese
and foreign publications), but as a tactical striking
plane, fighter-bomber, aimed at substitution for
numerous Q-5 fighter-bombers produced at the
beginning of 1960-s on the basis of Soviet 1st
generation MiG-19 fighter.
As Dimitry Regentov wrote in his article pub-
lished in the magazine «World’s aeroshows» (pub-
lishing house «Intervestnik») No. 6/2002, and
perhaps most completely (at least in Russian
mass media) illustrating the process of program
J-10 formation and establishment, «initially the
new fighter project development was assigned
to aircraft construction company in Sian (Shensi
province). But as long as it got an order for
heavy fighter-bomber FBC-1 «Feibao» develop-
ment («Flying leopard»), in 1991 Shenyan aircraft
construction company «Shanfei» (Lyaonin prov-
ince) and the «Chanfei» aircraft construction com-
pany from the city of Chandu (Sychuan province)
got the right to participate. But soon the project
leaders, considering the fact that «Shanfei» was
busy with J-8 plane park modernization, fully
transfer J-10 project to «Chanfei» company, which
includes one of the leading battle planes develop-
ment centers — 601-st research institute. So,
why the decision was taken for the benefit of the
«Chanfei» company?
The thing is that as far back as in 1980 by
the decision of State Council, CDC and scientific
technical committee of the ministry of defence of
PRC research institute № 601 in the city of Chandy
is defined as the general developer of J-7-III fighter
project (Chinese version of the Soviet all-weather
MiG-21МF). The staff was successful at perform-
ing the task that is why the Chandy Company was
also chosen this time, as they had good working
experience with relatively modern aero techniques.
According to the CDC decision, the project also
involved a number of other Chinese leading aircraft
construction companies. 606-th research institute
(aircraft engines), 607-th research institute (on-
board RADAR development) and other branch-
wise centers were enlisted as well...»
At the end of 1990 – beginning of 1991 they
started building real metal model of the plane
«8810» in Chandy. By that time 606th and 607th
research institutes finished bench-top labour-
rent of power plant and on-board RADAR for the
8810th model.
Perhaps, initially J-10 plane (as well as «Lavi»)
was to be equipped with the Pratt-and-Whitney
PW1120 American engine. But after the events of
1989 on Tyananmyn square in Beijing, any defense-
technical aid from the USA and their NATO allies was
out of the question and China had to apply for own,
far less perfect engines. Even within the frames of
J-9 program in CPR an engine with thrust of 12400
kilogauss was created, known as WS-6 (probably,
at its manufacturing «unauthorized» construction
elements of American F100 were used). However,
later the program was shut down.
In 1990, after 25 years break, Soviet-Chinese
defense-technical cooperation was renewed. As a
consequence, Chinese high-ranking military men
(most of them started their career at the time of
«great friendship» and were brought up in Soviet
school spirit) were detailed enough acquainted
with recent native designing in aero techniques,
capable of rising interest of the Chinese party. In
particular, they were shown a project of perspec-
tive S-37 attack-fighter. This one-placed single-
engine plane, developed both to suit the require-
ments of domestic Air Force and for export, to
greater extent, than «Lavi», met the requirements
of the Chinese Air Force, developing in the Soviet
tradition spirit. Multifunctional, perfectly equipped
and protected, possessing high characteristics on
low altitudes and high handling qualities, provid-
ing possibility of usage from airfield, S-37 made
the greatest impression on Chinese Air Force
authorities, literary penetrated by the ideology of
the indeed extraordinary project. Under the cir-
cumstances, when the cooperation negotiations
on S-37 program started with the USSR, fighter-
bomber on the «Lavi» basis was likely not to have
seemed that promising to the Chinese. Agreement
in principle was reached, according to which China
was to receive the 1st batch of 180 Soviet planes.
Later on, obviously, «Chinese» S-37 authorized
construction was meant.
But in December of 1991 the Soviet Union col-
lapsed. Altogether Soviet aircraft industry started
collapsing as well. The hope to bring project S-37
to a flight sample was vanishing, and the Eltsin
Russia seemed to China a much less reliable
defense and trade partner than the USSR. As a
result, the Chinese again had to rely basically on
own strength, as well as on «half-legal» foreign
assistance (bought, it should be mentioned, for
big money). Under the circumstances considerably
«promoted» «Project 10» acquires priority again.
At the end of 1993 aircraft construction plant
in Chandy finished assembling flight-demonstra-
tional sample of the new fighter. Its appearance
was not much different from the original «Lavi».
It was a one-placed plane with engine «V-13C»
(WP-13C, 7000 kilogauss, Chinese accelerated
version of the Soviet turbojet engine Р-11) and
series catapult seat of Chinese manufacture, but
with aircraft equipment and on-board RADAR
designed in Israel.
In the first part of 1994 aircraft-demonstrator
completed the first successful test flight. After for-
tunate debut J-10 got a name «Tczyanbin» («The
Winged Dragon»).
However, in 1993 there appeared a threat to
Chinese – Israeli defense – technical cooperation.
Mass media revealed information about “Lavi’s”
documents having been given to the Chinese that
caused indignation of the USA. At the beginning
of 1995 American Secretary of Defense William
Perry «suggested» to Itshak Rabin, Israeli Prime-
Minister that Tel-Aviv should stop participating
in Chinese fighter development. The suggestion
remained unanswered. But further cooperation still
had to be ceased: already by the middle of 1995 a
small note glimpsed in western mass media about
Israel official assignment of “Lavi” aircraft docu-
ments to China. Having considered the results of
cooperation, the parties seemed to have taken a
satisfactory – both to Beijing and Tel-Aviv – deci-
sion to separate on having achieved an important
intermediate goal – aircraft-demonstrator con-
struction. Further Israel participation in the J-10
program was fraught with relationship aggrava-
tion with the USA, and China was likely to have
felt powerful enough to victoriously accomplish
28
the program without Israeli participation. Since
then «Project 10» started its independent, purely
Chinese, life.
Probably to a great extent under the influence
of deep investigation and critical consideration
of S-37 project, they started in 601-st research
institute redesigning the initial «Tczyanbin» proj-
ect. Striving to make J-10 «even more strik-
ing» resulted in considerable enlargement of
the Chinese aircraft (that enabled to increase
fuel tanks capacitance and probably undertake
additional measures for battle survivability sys-
tem perfection), change in tail unit construction,
reconfiguration of cock-pit that became more
spacious. Airframe construction hardness had to
be improved, wing surface – increased. This con-
figuration made the fighter heavier that is why it
became even more urgent point for the designers
to invent a new, more powerful engine.
The engine development for J-10 was per-
formed by 606-th institute together with a num-
ber of adjacent structures since 1990. Turbojet
engine was identified as WS-10 and was presum-
ably accounted for the thrust about 10000-11000
kilogauss. There is evidence, that for «Tczyanbin»
equipment alternative engine was also created,
WP-15, but this engineering seems to have been
further stopped.
In the meantime, in the middle of 1996, test
fighter, constructed according to the corrected proj-
ect, performed its first test flight. It was assigned
number «8810—01». Half a year later they finalized
plane «8810-02» construction, which design was
considerably changed. In particular, cock-pit was
again reconfigured, air scoop design was changed,
it got adjustable, and to reduce RADAR detection
waveguide channel was altered to S-shape. But as
well as the demonstrator-aircraft, the first test fight-
ers seemed to have had the same «non-nominal»
WP-13C engine, that enabled to develop subsonic
speed only.
At the end of 1997 the first loss happened:
during the test flight aircraft with board number
«8810-02» suffered a crash. Flights were discon-
tinued and the best Chinese specialists started
investigating the causes of the accident. Integrated
study of wreckage on flight test range of research
institute 611 was performed, at that in western
and Taiwan mass media appeared statements that
the Chinese party turned for assistance to Russian
specialists, with whom they jointly managed to
puzzle-out the case.
On March, 23, 1998 the third prototype of the
plane performed its first test flight, «8810-03»,
that had modified tail unit as well as new, Chinese
developed weaponry control system and catapult
seat. In the spring of 1998 this fighter was after
all equipped with «nominal» WS-10 engine, which
made it possible for the first time to develop super-
sonic speed during horizontal flight in the middle
of 1998 (applicable to J-10). Actually, this engine-
upgraded fighter «8810-03» was considered the
first “true” J-10.
By the autumn of 1998, after two years of
intensive tests, the first stage of program J-10 was
finalized. The ceremony devoted to the event was
visited by the first State person – General Secretary
of China Communist Party Central Committee
Tszyan Tszemin. Sparkling newly painted fighters
from «8810-03» to «8810-06» were lined up on
the ground, and the aircraft with board number
«8810-04» performed a show flight demonstrat-
ing stunts.
At the beginning of 2000 the second stage
of «Tczyanbin» flight tests was over, and in May,
2002 information appeared about the first batch of
four pre-series fighter-bombers – with index J-10А
– disposal to НОАК Air Force. On March, 10, 2003
the aircraft was officially army-accepted. Six one-
placed fighter-bombers were directed to Air Force
flight-test center, where tactical tests went on up
to the beginning of 2004.
On December, 26, 2003 two-placed exercise-
battle J-10S aircraft got off first that was different
from J-10A, besides new cock-pit with extended
W A R P L A N E S
29
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
hood, longer fuselage that made it possible to pre-
serve one-placed aircraft fuel tank capacity.
The first series batch of J-10A aircraft was
disposed to the Air Force of the People’s Liberation
Army of China in 2004-2006. And by the middle
of 2008 Chinese Air Forces and Navy count-
ed, according to the most optimistic estimation,
approximately 100 – 140 J-10А fighter-bombers,
and also two-placed exercise-battle J-10S air-
crafts. All in all, from non-official sources, Chinese
Air Force is supposed to be increased up to 300
aircraft of the type by the middle of next decade.
Moreover, up to a hundred fighter-bombers will be
army-accepted by Chinese Naval coast aviation.
Some more dozens (or maybe hundreds) of the
aircrafts can be exported.
So, what is the new fighter that was so labori-
ously and persistently created by Chinese aircraft
industry?
It certainly should be mentioned that the plane
can be absolutely free called a great achievement
of CPR aircraft constructors, who managed to cre-
ate almost new battle plane on the basis of a for-
eign prototype that is not inferior to the best world
analogs. J-10 program embraced a number of
most modern technologies, including quite perfect
aerodynamics, airframe construction with wide
application of composite materials, digital remote
control system, and modern data-controlling cock-
pit field. Design and production of J-10A were held
applying computer assisted CAD/CAM systems.
Thus, if earlier Chinese battle planes were
technically about a generation behind their foreign
analogs, now after «Tczyanbin» series production
started this gap was almost overcome.
As it was mentioned above, J-10A is designed
as fighter-bomber, meant to act jointly with J-11
(Su-27) battlefield fighter (Air supremacy fighter).
I.е. here we can guess approximately the same
«duet» that Americans formed in 1980-ies by
aircrafts F-15 and F-16 and today they apply for
F-22 and F-35.
«Tczyanbin», having lateral static unsteadi-
ness, constructed according to aerodynamic con-
figuration delta with horizontal tail surfaces» with
a triangle middle-positioned wing, having lead-
ing edge flap and ailevators, arrow-type, wing-
attached all-movable horizontal tail surface and
single-fin vertical empennage, complemented by
two belly small surface fins. Main landing gear
with relatively narrow track gage is retracted into
fuselage, into «pockets» on the sides of air scoop
channel. Rectangular adjustable air scoop with
movable upper air inlet wedges is placed under
fuselage. There is a four-channel digital wire guid-
ance system that is likely to be the developed ver-
sion of the same system in IAI plane «Lavi».
Airframe construction is basically made of alu-
minum alloys with wide application of carbon plas-
tics. Though initially the measures of «Tczyanbin»
RADAR detection reduction were of quite limited
nature, they can be developed further (in particular
– modern radio absorbing coverings and materials
implementation, metal coating of cock-pit glass
cover, etc), that will enable to decrease J-10 abso-
lute cross-section from present 5 – 6 m2 to the
level of planes like «Rafael» or «Tayfun» (i.е. up to
1.5 – 2.0 m2 in SHF-range radio waves).
The first five pre-series J-10 aircrafts were
equipped with WS-10А engines(11200 kilogauss)
of Chinese design, and all the following fighters
were equipped with more powerful, light and
efficient Russian turbofan АЛ-31FN (12500 kilo-
gauss), that were modification of АЛ-31FN with
low-position drive gearbox. Now China has pur-
chased from Russia 180 engines of the kind. 100
of them were manufactured (or are manufactured)
in Moscow, in the «Salyut» plant, and 80 – in the
Ufa City. This number of engines gives a good
image of the amount of the first J-10A aircrafts
batch ordered by Chinese Air Force.
In 2006 «Salyut» offered to China an upgraded
version of turbojet engine, АL-31F-М1, with thrust
13500 kilogauss, increased life-cycle, digital con-
trol system of FADEC type, and also with multi-
angle УВТ system. It should be mentioned, that the
engine upgrade designed for «Su-27» aircrafts, is
already army-accepted by Russian Air Force.
There is also a reserve (mobile) version of
power plant for «Tczyanbin» – upgraded WS-10А
engine with FADEC control system and thrust,
increased by two tons (up to 13200 kilogauss), cer-
tified in China in 2006. Regardless of lower thrust,
as well as bigger, than of АL-31FN, dry mass and
size, these engines, being non-limited by Russian-
Chinese contract, are likely to be applied for export
fighter versions.
Experimental planes «Type 10» seem to
have been equipped with Israeli on-board RADAR
EL/M-2035, designed for «Lavi» aircraft. There
was information about the Chinese version of the
RADAR – JL-9. There is information about JL-10A
RADAR station on experimental and pre-series
aircrafts (China manufactured as well).
However the first series J-10A were most likely
equipped with Russian stations «Zhemchug» (man-
ufacturer – «Phasotrone-RRI») mass 180 kg, that
were developed version of on-board RADAR station
«Zhuk», partially made on western element base
and having higher characteristics (several stations
of the kind were supplied to China at the beginning
of current decade). The following fighters batches
are equipped, according to Chinese mass media,
with on-board RADAR station «Type 1471» (KLJ-1),
that are obviously Chinese version of «Zhemchug»
having improved characteristics while «working»
with ground targets. The station can detect target of
«fighter» class in front hemi-sphere at range up to
80 km and provide for «air-to-air» missile homing
at the distance up to 60 km.
According to some statements, at the begin-
ning it was intended tо equipped J-10 aircraft with
the 23-mm high firing speed six barrels gun. But
in current configuration it is equipped with the
23-mm conventional two barrels built in gun “Type
23-3” (the Chinese version of our GSH-23 gun). It
is located on the left side of the fuselage, in front
of the main landing gear wells.
30
As it was already mentioned above, the first
J-10 test samples had the same airframe, as the
“Lavi” fighters. That is why aircraft dry weight
(equipped with WS-6 type engine) probably was
from 7100 to 7300 kg (let’s remind, that “Lavi”
fighter dry weight is 7030 kg). Further on the
aircraft was considerably increased in dimen-
sions and therefore it become heavier. So, the
airframe weight was also increased. According
to the different sources it is now not less than
8000-9730 kg. In some sources, particularly in
Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft reference guide
for the period from 2008 to 2009, the dry weight
of the J-10A aircraft is mentioned as 8750 kg.
Probably this weight must be taken as the most
realistic one.
The fuel tanks capacity of the J-10A aircraft in
comparison with the “Lavi” aircraft was increased
nearly two times and reached the level of 4500
kg. As a result of this the ratio of the fuel weight
to the dry weight of the aircraft became 0.51. And
now it reaches the same ratio (It should be men-
tioned that it is quite high) as F-35A (0.55) and
F-35C (0.61) fighters. That is why the flight range
without external fuel tanks at high altitude, which
is for J-10A equal to 1850 km (in accordance
with Jane’s All the Worlds Aircraft reference guide
2008-2009) looks to be quite realistic or even
marked down a little bit. According to the mass
media the ferry distance of 3000 km for the J-10A
with three external fuel tanks (two of them with
the capacity of 1600 kg each and one with the
capacity of 800 kg) also looks quite realistic (or
marked down).
Quite heavy and various assortment of combat
load, it is equal to 4000-4500 kg (in some sources
– up to 5500 kg), seemed to be an advantage of
the J-10A as the aircraft primarily task is to attack
ground targets. It is installed on the eleven external
pods. Six of the pods are under the wings and five
of them are under the fuselage. The external fuel
tanks can be installed on the internal wings pods
and on the central fuselage pods. Two front under
fuselage piers are used for mounting various con-
tainers with optoelectronic and aiming-navigation
equipment.
However, “Tczyanbin” really being a multipur-
pose combat aircraft, also does not relinquish to
any up to date European aircraft in fighter pos-
sibilities. It has maximum speed equal to Max
M2.1-2.2 and service ceiling (17000-17500 m).
These characteristics exceed the characteristics of
the analogue European aircrafts of the fourth gen-
eration “4+”. J-10А possesses practically equal
with the French fighter Dasso “Rafael” of the “4+”
generation thrust-to-weight ratio and also nominal
pressure on the wing (0.90 and 358 kgs/m2 in
French fighter and 0.87 and 360 kgs/m2 in Chinese
aircraft, respectively).
American fighter-bomber F-16C Block40 and
J-10A are designed to accomplish nearly the same
type of combat tasks. So it makes sense to com-
pare the characteristics of both aircrafts. This most
mass modification of the F-16 fighter-bomber,
which came to service within the US Air force
in 1990 and was equipped with the augmented
double-blow turbojet engine F100-PW-220(10800
kgs), primarily was designed to attack ground
targets. F-16C is equipped with the airborne radar
AN/APG-68 (weight is 160 kg; antenna’s diameter
is 0.38 m). It provides mapping mode, and also
can detect air targets, such as “light fighter” at
the range up to 45-50 km. Moreover, Block 40/42
is equipped with suspended containers with the
aiming-navigation equipment LANTIRN and also it
is equipped with the helmet-mounted acquisition
system (analogue of Russian “Schel” system).
The American aircraft is not as heavy as the
Chinese one (F-16C dry weight is 8300 kg, nor-
mal take off weight is 12600 kg). Fuel weight in
the internal fuel tanks of the F-16C is 3100 kg,
maximum combat load is 5500 kg. Chinese air-
craft maximum speed (corresponds to M=2.1-2.2)
is rather higher than F-16C (which possesses
M=2.00). The efficient flight range of J-10A with-
out suspended fuel tanks is more than (1850-1900
km in comparison with 1600 km of the F-16C).
Action radius at the minimum flight level with the
normal combat load (for J-10 A is 460 km that is a
little higher, than F-16C has (400 km).
Takeoff thrust-to-weight ratio of both aircraft,
while the takeoff weight is normal, is nearly the
same (F-16C – 0.86 and J-10A – 0.87). Steady
state theta displacement rate of the comparing
aircraft is nearly the same: for “Lavi” it is 13.2
degrees per second, for J-10A it differs little,
and for F-16C it is 12.8 degrees per second. At
the same time the rate of momentary roll-out for
“Tczyanbin”, designed as “bes’hvostka with PGO”,
is considerably higher (nearly 23-24 degrees per
second in comparison with the American aircraft
– 17.3). For F-22A fighter it is 27-28, for “Rafael”
and “Tayfun” it is 24.8, for SU-30MKI it is 22-23,
and for F-15C it is 16-17 degrees per second.
Later modifications of «Freedomfighter» –
F-16C Вlock 50/52 and F-16C Block 50/52+, that
were supplied to armament already in XXI, almost
simultaneously with J-10A, are equipped with more
powerful engines F100-PW229 or F110-GE-129
(13000-13200 kilogauss), probably providing for
American fighters inconsiderable dynamic advan-
tage to the Chinese aircraft.
One more foreign analog (and potential rival)
of J-10A is Japanese (American-Japanese, to be
exact) multipurpose fighter Mitsubishi F-2, that
was being created since 1987 to substitute for
fighter-bombers Mitsubishi F-1. The prototype
of the plane performed its first flight in October
1995, and the first series fighter was disposed
to Japanese Self-defense Forces in 2000. By the
middle of 2008 Japan had at disposal 76 F-2 out
of 94 ordered. The cost of a series F-2, according
to Japanese mass media, is $108 mln.
As well as J-10A, F-2 is based on a foreign
prototype – «never realized» American project
W A R P L A N E S
31
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
«Agile Falcon», pro-actively developed by the
company General Dynamics in 1980-1990-ies as
a considerable upgrade of F-16С aircraft, pos-
sessing improved maneuver characteristics (in
particular, unstable roll-out speed should be 21-22
degrees per second). However, opposite to «Agile
Falcon», Japanese fighter is oriented at, first of
all, not for air supremacy fighting and air defense,
but on striking tasks solution (in particular – “air-
to-ship”).
F-2 is somewhat enlarged (with «Agile Falcon»
wing surface 34.84 m2) F-16 with hardened air-
frame, which is designed with wide application
of modern composite materials. As a power plant
American double-blow turbojet engine General
Electric F110-GE-129 (13200 kilogauss) is applied,
providing М=2. Dry aircraft mass is 9530 kg, fuel
mass in inner tanks – 3600 kg, and maximum
take-off mass – 22100 kg. Action radius at «anti-
airborne» tasks solution (with two “air-to-ship”
missiles ASM-1/2, two guided missiles AIM-9 and
ПТБ) is 840 km.
As far as we can see, the Japanese equipped
their aircraft with more powerful and heavier
engine (dry mass АЛ-31Ф is 1530 kg, where-
as F110-JE-129 – 1740 kg). At the same time
inner tanks capacity in F-2 is much less than in
“Tczyanbin”. As to relative fuel mass (0.51 without
ПТБ) the Chinese plane is considerably superior to
its Japanese rival (0.38), which provides for J-10A
better range characteristics. The Japanese aircraft
has a similar to “Tczyanbin” thrust-to-weight ratio
(0.88 – 0.90), that seems to explain similar break-
down characteristics and ascensional rate of both
planes.
It should be specified that the Japanese air-
craft is less known than the Chinese analog,
though even 10 years ago F-2 construction pro-
gram was rather broadly highlighted in Japanese
mass media, herewith some editions even called
the plane «the second «Zero» (meaning the
famous Japanese fighter of the Second World War
Mitsubishi А6М «Reisen», more famous under
American «nickname» «Zero»). But as far as we
can judge by the present, quite scanty press infor-
mation, as well as by the decrease in the number
of F-2 fighters ordered by Japanese Self-Defense
Forces from 130 to 94 units (non-reasoned by any
noticeable changes in Japan foreign-policy posi-
tion since the beginning of the current decade),
«the second «Zero» far and away not completely
supported hopes of its designers, that conditioned
rather moderate present «PR» of the aircraft.
It should be mentioned that F-2 – is the first
in the world series battle aircraft, equipped with
on-board RADAR station with АФАР. But this is
just the very case when «you must spoil before
you spin». Japanese RADAR station having ultra-
modern structure and element base (as well as no
less «modern» cost), even today after almost 8
years of aircraft system operation, doesn’t match
design parameters: according to Japanese mass
media, detection range of air targets for this on-
board RADAR station is less than it was even of
the archaic station AN/APQ-120 of F-4EJ aircraft
«Phantom» II, equipped with dish aerial.
Considering all that, all in all, regardless of
a bit more conservative «board», J-10A today
seems to possess better combatant facilities than
its Japanese analog.
Of course, in its competition with the American
fighter – as to air supremacy fighting – F-22A
«Raptor», also equipped with on-board RADAR
station with АFАR, the Chinese fighter-bomber
has few chances to win both in close and distant
missile combat (however, as well as most of other
fighters of «4» and «4+» generations). That is why
the described at the beginning of the article air
combat, supposedly having taken place in 2007
above the Taiwan Strait between J-10A and F-22A,
is likely to be related to the category of newspaper
or Internet «fakes».
But for the fighter-destroyer of the 5th genera-
tion F-35A the new Chinese aircraft can be quite
a dangerous rival. And if to consider that number
ratio F-35А and F-22А, according to the existing
plans of the USA Air Force, must be approximately
9:1, than air combat between “Tczyanbin” and
“Lightning” II can appear a usual thing in hypo-
thetic Chinese-American conflict of 2010-2020.
It’s out of the question that unfeatured F-35A
equipped with on-board RADAR station AN/APG-81
with АESA and «built-in» in the integrated digital
data-control system, will be considerably superior
to the Chinese fighter in missile combat in non-
visual range, «playing» with it, almost “one-sided”
(enough to mention that “Lightning” II can detect
its rival, having ERS in heading flatten surface,
equal to several meters, at the range of 160-170
km, and “Tczyanbin” can «see» F-35A with ERS
=0.5 m2 at range of only 15-20 km. However in the
close maneuver air combat lighter and more flex-
ible J-10A will have all the advantages.
But all the speculations are only true for
unlikely «duel» combat between the two fighters.
In real life it’s not single aircrafts that fight but
aircraft groups. That is why in the conditions of
large-scale armed conflict simpler, cheaper and
wholesale “Tczyanbin” is likely to have additional
«bonuses» in front of more expensive and more
complicated «Lightning»II.
It should be also pointed out that the most
probable equipment of the Chinese aircraft with
perspective on-board RADAR station with ESA or
AESA, as well as undertaking additional measures
to reduce J-10А RADAR detection must come by
the second half of 2010-ies (i.е. when the mass
army-acceptance of F-35 is to start) should equal
the chances of both fighters in remote air combat
as well.
The striking armament of J-10A today mostly
includes aerial bombs and non-recurrent bomb
holders gauge 250 or 500 kg, as well as НАР.
Thus, in one of the standard striking configura-
tions the aircraft can carry up to eight free-falling
bombs gauge kg 250 кг, two suspended tanks and
two «air-to-air» missiles PL-8/9/13 of small range.
However lately China develops up-tempo guided
aviation ammunition, which is first of all to equip
the newest multipurpose fighters J-10A.
In 1998 tests of the first Chinese series
GB LT-2 finished, which was created in LOEC
32
(Luoyang Electro-Optical Technology Development
Center) based on the Russian CАB-500L. Presently
this ammunition is produced in series. They equip,
besides J-10A, new light bombers JH-7A (army-
accepted by CHINA Air Force), upgraded fighter-
bombers Q-5G, multipurpose fighters J-8-IIМ, and
also light fighters JF-17 («Super-7»), supplied to
Pakistan. Guided bomb has the standart deviation
3 – 5 m, semi-active optical homing duration 20
sec and capture range homing head system, equal
to 4 km.
GB-1 is army-accepted as well, manufactured
by the state corporation Sichong Group and seem-
ingly being a developed version of GB LT-2. It is
equipped with optical semi-active homing head,
providing КВО of about 3 m. Ammunition mass –
570 kg, besides J-10A it is also carried by light
fighters JH-7А.
LOEC Center in 2006 finished guided gliding
aviation bomb tests that were indicated as LS-6. The
ammunition is equipped with optical semi-active
homing system. Its mass 540 kg, warhead mass
is 440 kg, shell diameter is 377 mm, wing span –
2.46 m. LS-6 wing is made of carbon plastics. They
inform that during the tests the bomb showed stan-
dart deviation 7.5 m. It should be mentioned that
bombs LТ-2 and LS-6 were publicly demonstrated
in 2008 within the weaponry of J-10A.
LOEC is as well developing high-precision
aviation ammunition of the second generation,
that have bigger tonnage, interference protection
and application flexibility. If КАБ of the 1st gen-
eration LT-2 had only optical semi-active homing
head, in the new ammunition, LT-3, it will be com-
plemented with composite inertial-satellite guid-
ance system. Aviation bomb, by its composition
reminding of the American CАB GBU-31 JDAM,
has a tail quickly-mounted unit with aerodynamic
controls and control system module as well as
plated aerodynamic surfaces, meant for gliding
characteristics improvement.
On GB LT-3 new optical coordinator is applied
as well, substituting for wind direction indica-
tor type coordinator, used on GB LT-2. The
new ammunition is conceptually close to GB
GBU-54 and «Upgraded Payvuvai» IV, also having
combined (inertial-satellite + optical) guidance
systems.
CASC (China Aerospace Science and
Technology Corporation) creates a set of high-
precision aviation weapon «Fay Teng», in particu-
lar – guided aviation bombs FT-1 and FT-3 with
inertial-satellite guidance. Bomb FT-1 (500 kg)
has crosswise wing small elongation and cross-
wise developed tail unit with controls, having
electric drive. It can glide (depending on the alti-
tude of bomb-dropping) on range of 7-18 km and
hits the target with the precision up to 30 m.
FT-3 is small gauge ammunition (250 kg);
the shell is fitted with folding wing module. On
the tail module (inside which there is a unit of
inertial-satellite guidance system) four aerody-
namic small empennage tops are installed, behind
which Х-shaped tail unit is fitted. Manufacturers
state, that this type of aerodynamic configuration
provides for better gliding stability, as well as con-
tributes to application range increase (according to
some sources it reaches 60 km).
Heavier than FТ-3, GB FТ-2 mass 440 kg (con-
ceptually similar to the American GB Boeing Long
Shot) is equipped with new folding wing module
with large elongation. They inform, that КВО of the
ammunition is 20 m.
CASC also created unique, having no analogs
in the world, superlight (mass – 35 kg) GB FТ-5,
aerodynamically similar to the American 500-kg
aviation bomb Мк.83 mass 500 kg. Ammunition of
the kind can be applied not only at pilot aircrafts
(in particular J-10А), but also at small combat UAV,
that are sure to be investigated in China as well.
To fight over-water targets J-10А can be
equipped with new light “air-to-ship” missile
С-704, developed by CASIC (China Aerospace
Science and Industry Corporation). Guided missile
is equipped with tele-homing head and is capable
of effectively hitting boats and small ships in
daytime, in plain weather conditions. Solid fuel
“air-to-ship” missile with start mass of 300 kg has
range of 35 km. It is produced according to regular
aerodynamic scheme with trapezoidal crosswise
wing and tail unit. The upgraded version of the
missile – С-704KD – is equipped with infra-red
all-day homing system.
To fight small-sized moving targets in com-
bat CASC creates «air-to-surface» missile AR-1.
Guided missile, as to its dimensions similar
to the American helicopter missile AGM-114
«Hellfire», has optical semi-active homing sys-
tem. Optical axis of the laser corrector has angle
with longitude missile axis, which facilitates
surface targets capture.
J-10A weaponry will be also supplied with
antiradar missiles– Russian Х-31П or Chinese
guided missile of the similar type. At the same time
a disadvantage of the Chinese fighter consists in
the absence of strategic-tactical cruise missiles in
its ammunition, similar to the Russian Х-59М and
Х-59М2, American JASSM or European «Storm
Shadow» and KEPD-350. However, China will pos-
sibly purchase the weaponry for J-10A in Russia.
For missile air combat of intermediate
range the Chinese fighter can be equipped with
«Шаньдян-10» (SD-10) missiles, that are the
authorized version of the Russian missile of Р-77
type with combined (inertial + active RADAR)
guiding system. Guided missile of the type must
be basic weaponry of «air-to-air» type for Chinese
multipurpose fighters Su-30МКК and Su-30МК2
(J-13), as well as upgraded Su-27СК (J-11).
But the standard aircraft ammunition is
Chinese missiles of intermediate range «Пили-11»
(«Удар молнии-11», PL-11) and «Pili-12»
J-10A FIGHTER AND ITS PROTOTYPE THE IAI”LAVI” AIRCRAFT CHARACTERISTICS
Type of the aircraft “Lavi” J-10A
Wing span, m 8.78 9.70
Length, m 14.54 15.50
Height, m 4.78 4.78
Wing area, sq.m 33.00 39.00
Dryweight,kg 7070 8750
Takeoff normal weight, kg 9990 11440
Takeoff, mаximum weight, kg 18370 19300
Маximum combat load, kg 7300 4500
Fuel capacity, kg:
In the internal fuel tanks 2625 4500
In the external fuel tanks 4165 4000
Маximum М 1.85 2.20
Maximum ground-level М 1.20 1.20
Climbing capacity, м/s 254 –
Economic range without external fuel tanks, km - 1850
Ferry range, km - 3000
W A R P L A N E S
33
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
(«Thunderbolt-12 (Удар молнии)», PL-12). The
first one is a bit altered Italian missile Alenia
«Aspid»1А. Its development started in 1992, and
PL-11, equipped with semi-active mono-pulse
radar homing head, has the starting mass 220
kg, maximum speed, correlating with М=4, and
shooting range in front hemi-sphere up to 40 km.
They informed about successful manufacturing of
its upgraded version – PL-11A – with active radar
homing head.
PL-12 missile is the newest Chinese develop-
ment among the weaponry of “air-to-air” type, per-
formed jointly with Russian specialists. Its devel-
opment started in 1999, and in that second half of
current decade « Pili-12» was army-accepted by
PEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMY OF CHINA. Missile
with double-mode hard-fuel engine has starting
mass of 220 kg (according to other data – 180
kg) and aerodynamic configuration similar to
«Pili-11». It is equipped with composite guidance
system similar to Р-77, and can use the so-called
«plunging» trajectory, providing shooting range
up to 80 km. they also informed that the missile
was developed with air-burning engine, having
maximum range increased up to 150 km.
Besides, the fighter can carry intermediate
range missiles with ТGS PL-13 or PL-13M, that
are authorized versions of the Russian missiles
of Р-73М type capable of hitting air targets at the
range up to 20-30 km. Missiles, equipped with
thrust vector control system, can fly with 40-times
overload and developed the speed relative to
М=2.5. Starting mass of PL-13 is 105 kg, and
PL-13М – 115 kg.
Nominal J-10A armament also includes small
range thermal missiles PL-8, PL-9 and PL-9С
(starting mass 115-123 kg), that are developed
version of the Israeli guided missile «Piton»3
(Chinese-Israeli defense-technological cooperation
heritage of 1980-1990-ies). Missile weapon can be
used in different combinations, for example – four
missiles PL-11/PL-12 and two PL-8/PL-9 or two
missiles PL-11/PL-12, two PL-8/PL-9 and three
suspended fuel tanks. As we can see, as far as
guided weaponry of “air-to-air” type is concerned
the Chinese fighter is almost not inferior to the
best foreign analogues.
The updating of “Tczyanbin” is running on.
Most probably the evolution of this advanced
aircraft will be continued in the direction of further
increasing of its air characteristics due to install-
ing more powerful engine with UVTAL-31 FN-M1,
and also due to decreasing of radar and thermal
detection ability, adaptation of the up to date avi-
onics and armaments. It was mentioned in mass
media with citation of “the circles being closed
to Chinese aircraft industry” that in 2006 airborne
radar “Type 1473” was created in China for J-10A
aircraft. This radar is able to detect J-11 (Su-27)
at a range exceeding the range of detecting J-10
aircraft by airborne radar N001E, which is installed
on “Sukhoi” aircraft. If you take into consideration
that ERS of Su-27 several times larger than the
same of J-10A, then you can supposed that the
new Chinese radar is able to detect an air target
“light fighter” type (ЭПР=3м2) at the range of
80-90 km, and the range of detecting a target
like Su-27, will exceed 100km. Probably they are
talking about the radar with ФАР of passive type,
that is developed in China independently (but with
Russian specialists as consultants) since 1990.
The other way of possible J-10A upgrading
is installation of Russian airborne radar on the
aircraft.
In prospect it is possible to equip “Tczyanbin”
aircraft with Chinese or foreign made (first of all
with Russian) radar with EASA.
Although F-10aircraft is delivered now to
Chinese Air force and Navy only, a number of other
foreign countries have already taken interest in this
fighter. It is quite natural that the first would-be
customer, most probably, will become Pakistan,
the main China partner on military-technical coop-
eration. In April 2006 it was told that the Pakistan
government approved the plans of acquisition
of 36 fighters J-10 type in export version (it is
called FC-20, and it is going to by 100 more air-
craft. Thereat according to Mass Media the prime
cost of one fighter was appreciated as 41 million
US dollars. Possibly, these fighter-bombers (in
case contract for aircraft delivery will be made)
will be equipped with Chinese double-flow turbo-
jet afterburner WS-10A engines and west made
airborne radars (the most possible version is
GRIFO2000 radar with slot antenna).
In October 2007 there was information about
Iran’s intention to purchase 24 planes of “Tczyanbin”
type. Though later the Iran party officially declined
the fact of negotiations with the Chinese about
J-10 purchase, it can still be presumed that some-
thing was done in this direction. Among other
potential purchasers Thailand, Nigeria, Angola and
Sudan were also mentioned…
On the whole it can be stated, that on the
international aircraft market “Tczyanbin” rep-
resents a new product of good quality, capable
of competing with aircraft industry production
of the USA and Europe. As to our country, I’d
like to remind of the fact that F-10 is to a great
extent the result of native aircraft industry (in
any case, engine, as well as pert of avionics and
armament there are Russian). And if the USA
once ignored the prototype of “Tczyanbin” – the
Israeli aircraft «Lavi» – for the benefit of own
aircraft industry (indeed, what is small Israel in
comparison with the large USA?), it would be
very stupid of Russia to behave like that towards
the Great eastern neighbour. “Tczyanbin” air-
craft is already created, series manufactured
and (whether anybody likes it or not) will inevi-
tably join world aircraft market. Under these cir-
cumstances the position of our aircraft industry
supporting J-10A program and participating in
the aircraft production, looks like perfectly right.
As smart managers say: «If you can’t prevent
the booze-up, you should head it…».
34
India, the second world’s most populous coun-
try and a nuclear power, has today one of the
largest and rather modern air force of 740
aircraft with 23% of them belonging to 4th and
4th+ generations (Su-30MKI, MiG-29, and Mirage
2000), 47% are 3rd generation (Jaguar, MiG-23,
and MiG-27), and 30% are 2nd generation MiG-21
fighters with half of them made of MiG-21bison
deeply upgraded aircraft advanced to nearly 4th
generation. One can assess the quality level of
the Indian Air Force aircraft fleet knowing that in
the middle of 2008 it totaled 53 Su-30MKI aircraft
with a combat potential exceeding that of any
foreign batch-produced fighter with the sole pos-
sible exception of F-22A. The high level of training
performed by Indian pilots is recognized by those
of the U.S. Air Force, who are not at all bad in the
profession, but have been repeatedly “beaten” by
Indians at international war games.
All the fighters of the Indian Air Force, however,
have been developed and often built abroad, in
Russia, France, and the U.K. Despite the consider-
able success made by the Indian aircraft industry
within the past decades, until recently the Indian
were unable to learn a complete cycle of making a
combat aircraft from look to batch production. India,
though, has been making efforts in this direction for
about 50 years now, ignoring financial predicaments
and occasional failures. The history tells us that this
type of persistence is inevitably rewarded…
The first “nearly homemade” Indian aircraft
was the HF-24 Marut fighter-bomber (Spirit of the
Tempest) designed under the supervision of Kurt
Tank, who is an outstanding German designer,
who made FW 190 and Ta-152 piston fighters,
which were among the best in the world. Marut
made its maiden flight in the March of 1961 and
was initially designed for the top speed of Mach 2.
The British license-built Rolls-Royce Orpheus Mk
703 turbojet the Indian aircraft makers had avail-
able was underpowered and a super sound speed
could be reached only in dives.
The Indian aircraft industry manufactured 147
Marut jets. The fighter-bombers were used during
the India-Pakistan war in 1971. Some attempts
were made to build an advanced and more speedy
HF-73 fighter-bomber based on HF-24, but the
sole prototype was lost during tests. One series-
built Marut aircraft can be now observed in the
polytechnic museum of the city of Bangalore.
Among the Indian designs of the 1960-1980
was the Ajeet air superiority aircraft made in 1975
based on the Folland Gnat subsonic fighter. India
also made Kiran jet trainers, and a number of
piston trainers.
In the late 1970s, the Indian Air Force Staff
worked out AST 201technical requirements for
development of a light fighter to replace MiG-21
and Ajeet. The primary task of the future aircraft
was air defense, and the secondary – direct air
support of land forces and (partial) insulation of
combat zone. The aircraft was to be small, travel
at a supersonic speed, have high maneuverability
and advanced arms systems.
ADA LCA LIGHT MULTIPURPOSE FIGHTERADA LCA LIGHT MULTIPURPOSE FIGHTERVladimir Ilyin
W A R P L A N E S
35
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
The initial development program of the new
jet under implementation in the “depth” of the
Air Force was called Super Gnat, which in a way
mainly positioned the future fighter as a successor
to Gnat-Ajeet. The affordability and cost effective-
ness were the widely used criteria for the program.
Under the long-term Indian Air Force development
plan adopted in 1981, the new Indian aircraft were
to replace 11.4% of fighter squadrons by 1991
with the goal of 40% to be reached by 1994-1995.
The Air Force determined its total demand of the
aircraft at 250 jets.
The preparatory work for creation of the air-
craft that could be called a fourth generation com-
bat jet was launched in 1980. A group of Indian
Air Force and Industry experts drafted a report
then saying that a such-like program was techni-
cally and economically feasible. At the same time
the authors of the report thought that some parts
of the new aircraft (some onboard equipment,
systems, and construction materials, including
onboard radar, flight-by-wire control system, and
composite materials) would have to be purchased
abroad. A bit later (likely in the middle of 1983)
similar reports (with alike conclusions) made on
the Indian government’s order were provided by
four west-European aircraft builders: BAE, MBB,
Dornier, and Dassault-Breguet. In the very year of
1983, the government made a fundamental deci-
sion to launch the program. The Indian new gen-
eration fighter was finally given the green light!
In the May of 1985, the Aeronautical
Development Authority (ADA) founded in 1984,
as it seems specially to implement the fighter pro-
gram, presented the government with a detailed
report on the perspectives of the new aircraft
based on previous research. A month later, the Air
Force made customer technical specifications for
the fighter and a group of HAL experts was teamed
up in the ADA to perform the pre-draft preparation
of the project called LCA (Light Combat Aircraft.
Indian Defense Minister N. Rao told the parliament
commenting on the event that the “completely
Indian aircraft developed by Indian experts with
minimal help provided by foreign firms…will not
lag behind aircraft of other countries in the level of
applied technical solutions.” According to the min-
ister, the LCA was to be prepared for the maiden
test-flight as soon as 1989.
Expulsion of various designs of the new fighter
started in the aerodynamic tunnel of the National
Aeronautical Laboratory (NAL), as did research
for selecting specification requirements for the
main aircraft systems. The initial development of
the LCA multipurpose onboard radar project was
jointly carried out by the Electronics and Radar
Development Establishment (LRDE) of the Indian
Defense Ministry and HAL. The choice of a power
plant for the LCA is of primary importance. At the
early stages of the program prototype fighters
were supposed to be fitted with foreign engines
(the RB199 bypass turbofan engine with after-
burner was mentioned among others), and the
series-produced aircraft were to be powered by a
future GTX Indian engine.
In accordance with initial calculations, the new
aircraft was to have tailless configuration, a delta
wing with a front edge curve (both completely tail-
less configuration and tailless configuration with
small-surface foreplane located close to the wing
were considered), an aerodynamically unstable
structure, and a digital flight-by-wire control sys-
tem. Composite materials were supposed to be
widely used in the airframe design.
The specification demands were also gradu-
ally clarified. Under preliminary estimates, the
LCA empty weight was to be around 6,000 kg,
and the max takeoff weight was to total 10,500
kg. So the weight of the fighter was to be close
to that of the main Indian combat aircraft of the
time MiG-21. Media reports would repeatedly say
that LCA was to have better performance than the
F-16 U.S. fighter.
The LCA production was supposed to be
arranged in Bangalore. There was a reservation,
however, that if the wing of the aircraft was to be
made of coal-plastic, the console production could
be relocated to one of western firms, possibly British
Aerospace. As N.Rao put it, the cost of the project
development was estimated at $500 million.
The project works on LCA were lead by
the ADA headed then by Dr. Kota Harinarayana,
a renowned Indian aircraft builder. Hindustan
Aeronautics Limited (HAL) became the leading
contractor to take charge of the main part of
the program with its research and development
department located in the Indian “city of science”
Bangalore. The construction of the first prototype
was to be launched in 1990 with the first aircraft
to be ready a year later, in 1991.
As it has been mentioned before, the LCA was
intended to be an aircraft meeting rather strict
speed and maneuverability requirements. It was
to be very stable and steerable, reliable, easy and
cheap to use, and also demand a relatively short
take-off and landing strip. The latest aircraft tech-
nology was to be integrated in the fighter’s design:
reduced static stability structure, composite mate-
rials of key design elements, digital multichannel
flight-by-wire control system, integral “board”
with microprocessors, “glass” cockpit, up-to-date
onboard radar, automated breaking control sys-
tem, etc.
The French impact on the LCA look resulted
in the aerodynamic structure of the aircraft. The
tailless scheme, which was profoundly advanced
by Dassault’s Mirage aircraft, was chosen. Though
the use of foreplane would improve maneuverabil-
ity, it would also result in a 0.76 m longer fuselage,
as well as to greater weight and radar signature.
On January 7, 1986, the Defense Research and
Development Organization presented a detailed
fighter construction plan to Prime-Minister
R.Ghandi and the minister of defense. The plan
laid the basis for the LCA program. It is noteworthy
that the Indian government, traditionally avoiding
putting all eggs in one basket where military and
technical cooperation is concerned, simultane-
ously collaborated with the Soviet Union and
western countries. The LCA program was explicitly
“focused” on the West. Besides Dassault other for-
eign firms were engaged in the program, including
Alenia providing assistance in manufacturing coal-
plastic panels for wing coating, Martin Marietta
(control system), and BAE (consultancy for devel-
oping the aircraft automatic control system).
36
In the March of the very 1986, a U.S. Defense
Department delegation came to India, which com-
prised 20 experts working in military R&D facilities
specialized in aircraft and engine building and
radio-electronic systems. Cooperation between
India and the U.S. in the LCA program was dis-
cussed, including such issues as building the
fuselage, development and construction of avia-
tion electronics. Pentagon officially announced its
intent to support India’s HAL in the LCA aircraft
development.
Looking ahead we will say that the fuselage
finally remained to be Indian, but the Americans
further received contracts for deliveries of engines,
advanced alloys, and composite materials, as well
as for development of the LCA digital flight-by-wire
control system. The development of the system is
worth focusing on. The Indian gave up the idea of
making this crucial element of the aircraft them-
selves at early stages of the program. In 1988,
Dassault offered its analogue flight-by-wire control
system. For a number of reasons the system din
not satisfy the Indians and in 1993 the U.S. General
Dynamics (currently Lockheed Martin), which had
obtained a lot of experience in the field while cre-
ating and upgrading F-16, was chosen to create a
four-channel digital flight-by-wire control system.
The digital flight-by-wire control system final
adjustments were carried out in the U.S. through
modeling at a special NT-33 aircraft with additional
checks performed at the F-16 fighter. The works
were completed in 1996.
In 1986, India concluded a contract with the
U.S. General Electric for the delivery of F404-GE-
F2J3 engines to be used for LCA prototypes. It was
supposed to be a temporary measure with further
prototypes and series-produces aircraft to be fit-
ted with Indian engines. It is common knowledge,
though, that there is nothing as permanent as
temporary measures…
The LCA outline design started in 1987 and
finished in 1988. The works were carried out with
Dassault’s technical support (the support price
was $10 million). The aircraft under construc-
tion was to closely meet the requirements of the
local theatre of operations and fully integrate the
national combat expertise, including that obtained
during the India-Pakistan war in 1971.
The analysis carried out by Indian experts
showed that the new multipurpose fighter was to
be close to MiП-21 (which proved perfectly effec-
tive in air fights with Pakistani F-86, F-104, and
F-6) in its main features. It also was to have better
maneuverability, farther range, increased variety
and number of weapons, as well as new avionics
equally effective against air and ground targets.
The LCA concept was close to the follow-
ing aircraft: JAS 39 Gripen (Sweden), Ching-
Kuo(Taiwan), and FC-1 (Super-7, China/Pakistan).
The look of the new fighter was influenced not only
by technical, but also political issues: India, which
was gaining international importance, needed not
only an aircraft, but also a kind of a symbol
of national independence in the field of high
technology.
It is noteworthy that, though, the Indian fighter
was designed for the Air Force, at the early stages
of the program a deck-landing aircraft based on
it was also considered: the Indian Navy bought a
British-built Vikrant in 1961 (19,500 metric tons),
which proved highly effective in the war of 1973.
A more powerful Viraat (former Eagle) ship was
bought in the U.K. in 1996. It had a deadweight of
28,700 metric tons and had Sea Harrier fighters.
India had plans of further upgrade of aviation and
aircraft fleet of deck-landing aircraft.
On March 31, 1990, the new fighter project
was officially approved. At the end of the year a
LCA prototype construction was to be launched.
Note that the maiden flight of the new Indian
fighter was initially and optimistically planned for
1991, but later postponed until 1992. In 1990,
the Indian Defense Ministry announced that the
construction of the “demonstration” aircraft was
delayed until 1993 citing technical reasons so that
the wheeling-out was to take place in 1994 with
the maiden flight to follow no sooner than 1995.
All that meant that the beginning of series produc-
tion of the Indian fourth generation fighter would
start most optimistically in 1997 with the first
batch-produced jets to enter service not in 1996
as it was planned, but in the XXI century.
The Indian chief of staff said commenting
these decisions that “the delay of the LCA fighter
program can prompt the armed forces to consider
fielding a new type of an “intermediate” fighter
to replace MiG-21 and MiG-23”. As a possible
replacement both General Dynamics F-16 and
Saab JAS 39 Vigen supersonic aircraft and sub-
sonic AMX (AERITALIA, AERMACCHI, EMBRAER)
and BAE Hawk 200 were considered. The subsonic
aircraft would result in considerably reduced costs
while maintaining a high strike potential, but the
Hawk 200 or AMX fighting potential was evidently
not enough for winning air superiority formerly
performed by MiG-21.
Another possibility is that the combat field
insulation task could be performed by additionally
ordered MiG-27M fighter-bombers, whereas direct
air support could be carried out by 80-90 AJT
upgraded combat trainers purchased by the Air
Force. Looking ahead, the Indian Air Force gave
up the idea of subsonic attack planes rather soon
due to low combat potential and survivability, the
supersonic F-16 and JAS 39 jets are considered by
the Indians as the LCA “gap fillers” in the frames
of the MMRCA program in 2009, 20 years after
the described events. It is really true that unlike
Europeans, who are always in a hurry, the sons of
the most ancient Indian civilization don’t take two
W A R P L A N E S
37
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
or three decades for a long period of time even in
the dynamic field of military aircraft building.
In the late 1980s – early 1990s, the further
LCA strategy implementation was considered for
changes. For instance, a simplified version of the
fighter deprived of some earlier planned technical
solutions was offered to be built as soon as pos-
sible with minimum costs. And no sooner than at
the second stage of the program, when a simpli-
fied version was launched into series production,
extended work on a “full-fledged” LCA was sup-
posed to start. Besides, a number of squadrons
initially planned to be fitted with LCA aircraft
were then to receive advanced MiG-21. Looking
ahead, it is noteworthy that we can see today this
scenario implemented: 125 MiG-21UPG entered
service of the Indian Air Force partly filling the
LCA “gap”, the LCA Мk.1, which “do not entirely
meet the requirements of the Air Force” are being
batch-produced and the work on “full-fledged”
LCA Mk.2 completely satisfying the customer
demands have started.
Another LCA’s alternative to appear in 1991
is also worth mentioning. A project of a new
S-37 fighter combining high striking potential
and good “fighting” capabilities was offered dur-
ing the U.S.S.R. Air Force commander-in-chief E.
SHaposhnikov visit to India. After the collapse of
the Soviet Union followed by the fall of the Soviet
aircraft building, though, the offer quickly became
irrelevant.
In 1993, the Indian government finally sanc-
tioned the construction of a flight-demonstration
(experimental) LCA item. In the May of 1995,
the fuselage was launched into production, and
in December that year the coal-plastic wing fol-
lowed. The ceremonial wheeling-out of the LCA
TD1 (technological demonstrator, first) took place
on November 17, 1996 lagging nine months
behind the schedule. But the customizing of the jet
proved to be longer than expected and no sooner
than April 1997, test-pilot Rakesh Sharma, the
first Indian spaceman, who visited the Mir Soviet
Orbital Station, started the ground tests of the jet.
On January 4, 2001 the LCA fighter made
its maiden flight and was later named Tejas
(Radiance). On August 1, 2003 the jet exceeded
the sound speed for the first time. On August 14,
1998, the second TD2 prototype was wheeled out
from an assembling workshop. Just like TD1, it
also had the F404-GE-F2J3 U.S. engine. Its flight
tests started no sooner than 2002.
The TD1 and TD2 were first publically demon-
strated at the international air show Air India 2003,
which took place at the Yelahanka Airbase near
Bangalore on September 5-9, 2003 (the author of
the text was also present at this even historic for
the Indian aviation). The LCA flight let the Indians
feel justified pride.
Many of the Bangalore citizens to visit the
show were engaged in the aircraft industry so the
flight of the new fighters made them also proud of
their work. From the “aerobatic” point of view, the
LCA flight resembled that of a MiG-21. The Indian
aircraft showed a rather good rate of climb. The
Indian printed media said later that the LCA TD
“has a rate of climb exceeding that of MiG-29,”
which has the initial rate of climb of 300-330 mps
depending on the variant. But these claims are
likely to be invented by the authors.
Along with the creation of the aircraft itself, an
unhurried but purposeful work on the development
of the LCA onboard radar was under way. In 1991,
the design of the onboard radar for the aircraft
was launched. Under initial plans, the fighter was
to be fitted with an Indian version of the Swedish
Ericsson/GEC-Marсoni PS-05/A, pulse-doppler
multipurpose onboard radar developed for JAS 39
Vigen based on the Blue Vision radar of the BAE
Sea-Harrier.
But then some problems of adjusting the
Swedish radar to the Indian “board” emerged and
in 1997 a decision was made that the LCA radar
with features close to those of PS-05/A be made
by HAL’s radio electronics department on its own,
which did not exclude possible technical support
provided by foreign partners. Two test-bed aircraft
based on HS478М were fitted to flight-test the
onboard radar.
Two matrix color displays were used to show
flight and tactical information at the test aircraft.
They were MFD-55 crystal based and made by
the French firm Sextant Avionics. The resolution
of the displays was good enough to show a great
number of special signs and symbols neces-
sary during the flight. It is woth mentioning that
similar displays of the firm were installed at the
Mirage-2000-5 and Rafal French aircraft, as well
as at the Franco-German Tiger helicopter. Foreign
composite materials were used to build the LCA TD
and PV aircraft to make 30-34% of the airframe,
which resulted in reduced weight and bearable
g-loads of between +8 and -3. A ten-year program
was initiated to have these materials produced by
national chemical companies and until it ended the
materials were imported.
According to the Indian media reports, the
R&D works on the LCA program and construction
of TD1 and TD2 pilot aircraft cost India 21,880
38
million rupees ($730 million at 1992 financial
yea’s exchange rate). The overall costs of the
development of the new fighter, including the
engine development expenditures and excluding
series production were estimated at 50,000 million
rupees ($1.4 billion).
The opinion of the U.S. experts about the LCA
aircraft is also of some interest. Having studied the
features of the aircraft, they said it was “the next
generation of F-5 type aircraft.” They mentioned
that the design features of the fighter were high
enough with the small size and relatively low cost,
which would provide a good demand for it on the
world market. The Americans said, though, that
“the fighter has a relatively small specified life,
which will make it operational within 14 years,
whereas the advanced western fighters had the
same feature was much better.” The ADA chiefs
said to clarify the point that the LCA operating life
was calculated based on heavy climate conditions
and if the aircraft is used in countries with a milder
climate, the specified life could be extended.
Due to the fast tempo of mastering the lat-
est technology in aircraft building showed by the
Indians, the LCA design specifications looked
impressive. So, while at the initial stage of the
program the design empty weigh was estimated
at 6,000 kg, then due to optimism in wide coal-
plastic use the Indians decreased the weight to
the record low for a fighter of the class – to 5,500
kg, which seamed rather possible. The composite
materials were supposed to be used in the wing,
empennage and control surface design.
The percent of the composite materials used
in the LCA roughly twice exceeded that of the U.S.
F-22A Raptor fifth generation fighter and its Soviet
analogue MiG-MFI jet. For a comparison, the Saab
JAS 39 Gripen with a structure close to that of
the LCA and a similar engine (Svenska Flygmotor
RM12 based on the same F404) and a radar was
6,620 kg, that is 1,120 kg more. At the same
time, the internal fuel tanks of the Indian aircraft,
according to advertizing brochures, was to accom-
modate 2,400 kg of fuel compared to 2,270 kg of
the Saab aircraft. The LCA fuel efficiency was 0.44
compared to 0.34 of the Jas 39. The LCA prede-
cessor in the Indian Air Force, MiG-21bis (empty
weight – 5,350 kg), was fitted with the R-25-300
augmented turbojet engine with the thrust of 7,100
kgf and had only 1,790 kg of fuel in internal tanks
(fuel efficiency also 0.34). It is little surprise that
the LCA practical range of 2,000 km was to be
close to that of heavier fourth generation foreign
fighters (F-15 and F-16) and be much better than
that of not only MiG-21bis (1,250 km), but also of
Gripen (1,700-1,800) km.
The LCA thrust-to-weight ratio with the F404
with a normal takeoff weight was to be 0.91
compared to 0.81 of JAS 39 and 0.87 of MiG-
21bis, which would in theory give the Indian
aircraft acceleration and maneuverability features
exceeding foreign aircraft of the same class.
The LCA design speed and height features were
slightly worse than those of MiG-21 (Mach 2.0,
17,000-19,000 m compared to Mach 1.7 – 1.8,
16,000 m), but were good enough for effective
fight with up-to-date foreign tactical aircraft. In
general, the Indian Air Force was to receive an
aircraft comparable with the best similar foreign
jets and exceeding some of their features.
The construction of the first two prototype
vehicles PV1 and PV2 was launched in 1998.
The traditional natural model of the fighter was
replaced by a virtual model, which was a 3D data
base of detailed information on the configuration
and design of the aircraft (a similar approach was
first used in the U.S. for the development of the
Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit low observable stra-
tegic bomber, and was later used for F-22, F-35,
and T-50 fighter programs.
PV1 took off on November 25, 2005, and
the PV2 followed on December 1, 2005. Exactly
a year later, on December 1, 2006, flight tests of
the PV3 started. The fourth pre-series aircraft PV4
initially built as s prototype of the LCA-Navy carrier
fighter was further delivered as the second series
jet LSP2. Then an prototype of the PV5 two-seat
combat trainer was launched, as well as navy
prototypes NP-1 and NP-2, which have not started
flight tests as of today.
It should be mentioned that the takeoff weight
of empty demonstrator aircraft LCA TD was far
from the announced record low figure for the
series aircraft and totaled according to the Indian
media 6,800 kg. The pre-series LCA PV1 had more
carbon-plastic and the weight reduced to 6,300 kg.
The LCA PV2 had the design composite material
figure of 43%. But this fighter was also fitted with
some organic electronic equipment, armament,
as well as some onboard systems, which were
not installed on previous versions. It was likely to
increase the weight again. The exceeding weight
became one of the crucial problems for the Tejas
makers…
On April 12, 2007, the first series Tejas Mk.1
fighter LSP1 made its maiden test flight. On June
16, 2008 it was followed by LSP2 (former PV4).
Another six series aircraft (LSР-3 – LSР-8) were
supposed to be tested until the end of 2008, but
when the article was being written the information
on LSР-3 – LSР-8 flights was not available.
Unlike the fighters of other developing nations,
which are powered by engines made in Russia, the
U.S., France, or the U.K., a decision was made to
develop a specific engine for the Indian fighter,
which would compete with fourth generation
bypass turbofan engines with afterburner. The
development of the engine called Kavery with the
design static thrust in the full afterburning mode
was 8,500-9,000 kgf (a bigger figure was also
announced – up to 9,200 kgf), was entrusted to
the Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE)
ESTIMATED PERFORMANCE OF SERIES-BUILT TEJAS
Wingspan 8.9 m
Length with pressure head bar 13.20 m
Height 4.40 m
Wing surface 38.40 m2
Empty weight 5,500 kg
Internal tanks capacity 2,400 kg
Takeoff weight
Air superiority derivative 9,000 kg
Strike derivative 12,500 kg
Max combat load 4,000 kg
Max Mach number 1.6-1.8
Service ceiling 15,200-16,000
Operational range 2,000 km
Ferry range 3,000 km
Max exploitation g-number +9.0/-3.5
W A R P L A N E S
39
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
in Bangalore. The French firm SNECMA decided to
provide technical assistance to the Indian experts.
The bench test of the Kavery bypass turbofan
engine with afterburner started in 1996. The engine
was supposed to power five PV1 – PV5pre-series
aircraft. But the works on the engine development
started to delay. As a result, another 17 F404-JE-
F2J3 General Electric engines (7,300 kgf) were
bought in the U.S. to power demonstration and
pre-series jets. All the aircraft are now receiving
new and more powerful F404-GE-IN20 General
Electric bypass turbofan engines with afterburner
(8,200 kgf) developed on the Indian order with
design elements of the Swedish RB12 F404-400
bypass turbofan engine with afterburner and with
a digital control system of the F414.
Despite delayed works, the Indian Air Force
seemed to be optimistic about the perspectives of
the “national” engine in the first half of the current
decade. According to announcements made by
Indian government in 2005, the LCA series aircraft
were to start receiving Kavery engines in 2009. In
early 2005, an engine of the type developed 96%
of the maximum design thrust during tests.
Flight tests of the bypass turbofan engine with
afterburner installed at an LCA were planned to
begin in December 2006 and January 2007. The
problems to occur during the final engine adjust-
ments seem to have not been solved. As a result,
in February 2006 ADA concluded an agreement
with the French firm Snecma for support with
works on the engine so as to make it flight-capable
in 2009-2010. The goal was not achieved either
and despite the official continuation of the Kavery
program, the idea of installing the engine at Tejas
aircraft, at least in the mid-term planning, seems
to have been finally refused.
In the 1990s, the Indian Air Force were going
to buy at least 200 LCA fighters and 20 two-seat
combat trainers (while optimist would announce
300 or 500 jets) with the initial combat readiness to
be reached in 2003 with the full combat readiness
to follow in 2005. One LCA of the 220 item series
was expected to cost the humble $21 million. The
sum later escalated to $22.6 million, which is also
very little compared to other 4+ generation aircraft.
According to unofficial data, though, an aircraft of
the 220 item series would cost $35 million, which
seem much more true to life.
The Tejas planes were planned to start enter-
ing the Indian Air Force inventory in 2008 replacing
MiG-21FL, and MiG-21ML. It is noteworthy, that
the Indian Air Force currently has 19 air squadrons
of MiG-21 aircraft produced on a Soviet license.
A total of 125 MiG-21bis were upgraded to MiG-
21UPG(bison) and the rest, which are both morally
and physically outdated, are to be replace in the
near future.
In 2005, the Indian Air Force concluded a 20
billion rupees (over $445 million) contract with
the HAL for the delivery of the first 20 series
Tejas aircraft Mark 1 with F404-GE-IN20 General
Electric bypass turbofan engines with afterburner,
including 16 single-seat fighters and four two-
seat combat trainers. The agreement also had an
option for the purchase of another 20 aircraft. HAL
ordered a total of 24 F404-GE-IN20 engines cost-
ing over $100 million at General Electric in early
February 2007.
Let us focus on technical features and design
specifications of the Tejas Mk.1 first Indian series
supersonic aircraft.
The light single-engine multipurpose fighter
has the tailless aerodynamic structure with a high
delta wing variable-swept on the fore edge, single-
fin tail unit and one bypass turbofan engine with
afterburner installed at the fuselage rear. The static
stability of the aircraft is reduced. The Tejas fea-
tures, the designers claim, are to be as follows:
– high maneuverability;
– multifunctionality;
– all-weather day and night capability;
– compatibility of cockpit instrumental equip-
ment with night vision goggles;
– low radar echo, which is one third of that of
similar size fighters (that is about 2 m2).
The aerodynamic structure of the aircraft is
claimed to provide minimal wind resistance, little
specific wing load, high rate of turn for bank, yaw and
pitch, as well as good takeoff and landing features.
About 43% of the series-produced LCA air-
frame is made of composite materials. The fighter
skin is 90% composite materials. The use of large
coal-plastic panels provided a much lighter design,
as well as a reduced use of fasteners with 5,000 of
rivets necessary compared to 10,000 of a similar
size fighter with an all-metal riveted design. The
use of composite materials saved the necessity of
drilling 2,000 holes in the airframe inevitable for a
usual all-metal design.
The wing is made of composite materials
(longerons, wing ribs and skin), fuselage skin
and air inlets, as well as the elevons, keel, rud-
der, and air-brakes and undercarriage flaps. The
coal-plastic skin is 2.4-2.7 mm deep. The airframe
design largely incorporates aluminum– lithium and
titanium alloys.
As a result of implementation of some new
constructional materials (first of all composite
materials) and the latest technologies the duration
of manufacturing period of one LCA aircraft had to
be reduced from 11 to 7 months.
40
The fighter’s wing has reduced sweep in the
root which is made in order to provide the pilot
with forward and downward lookout as it is stated.
A three-piece wing-slat is situated on the wing
leading edge and the wing trailing edge is occupied
with two-piece elevons.
As it was mentioned previously the wing con-
struction is almost entirely made of composition
materials. Most of the longerons and stringers,
upper and lower one-piece skin panels which are
fastened with screws to the longerons are made of
these materials as well. The slit vortex generators are
mounted in the wing and fuselage matching joint.
The aircraft’s fuselage is semimonocoque
type. Two speed brakes are situated in its tail-end
on both sides of the vertical stabilizer and made
of carbon fiber-reinforced plastic. Two fixed hemi-
spheric section air intakes are placed on the sides
of the fuselage.
Though dimensions of «Ajita» are brought to a
minimum that together with the use of composite
materials provides it with small optical and radar-
tracking signature. In the aircraft design a number
of additional measures on decrease of radar cross-
section are implemented. Such measures are:
– Giving to channels of the air intake of the
bent Y-shaped form, aimed to shield compressor
blades from direct radar tracking;
– Rather wide application of radio absorbing
materials and coverings;
– Use of passive sensors and tracking
devices.
TD1 and TD2 test fighters are equipped with
the General Electrics F404-GE-F2J3 (1х7300 kg(f)
augmented dual-flow turbojet. Serial planes were
supposed to be equipped with the Indian GTRE
GTX-35VS “Kavery” engines (1х8500 – 8800 kg(f)
with the Douti/Smith KADECU digital control sys-
tem, however this engine never passed through
the test stage. As a result the MK1 fighters have
been equipped with the US F404-GE-IN20 aug-
mented dual-flow turbojets (8200 kg(f) and were
updated specially for the requirements of the Air
Forces of India (tropical edition).
The internal tanks of the aircraft volume is
3,000 liters. Five external fuel tanks with the vol-
ume of 800 or 1200 liters can be placed under a
wing and the fuselage. In the long term the under-
fuselage fuel tank was planed to be replaced with a
conforming external fuel tank of the same volume
which provides considerably smaller aerodynamic
resistance and smaller radar cross-section.
On the right side of the fuselage at cockpit
windscreen a fixed inverted-L type aerial refueling
receiver is mounted.
The plane having reduced static stability is
equipped with the Martin Marietta four-channel
digital electronic remote control system with the
higher level of protection against external elec-
tromagnetic influences. There are no duplicating
analogue or mechanical systems onboard.
The basis of the onboard radio-electronic
equipment complex makes a duplicated computer
(32 bit, ADA programming language), integrated
with other elements radio-electronic equipment
and weapons via three digital data buses which
correspond to MIL-STD-1553B standard.
In fuselage nose section the X-range MMR
(Multi Mode Radar) multipurpose coherent pulse-
doppler radar station is placed. It was designed
on the basis of the Ericsson PS-05/А radar sta-
tion. The station is capable to track up to 10 air
targets, allocate two most priority targets among
them and ensure launch of two “air-to-air” active
radar homing missiles for one of the targets. In the
“air-to-earth” mode the radar carries out district
mapping, provides detection of small targets, their
engagement with onboard weapons, flight in the
terrain avoiding land obstacles fly-by mode. The
slit antenna has small weight – less than 5 kg.
The development of the station was carried out by
the HAL company together withERDE (Electronics
Radar Development Establishment).
Besides onboard radar (the basic onboard
information mean) the aircraft can be equipped
with external multichannel (thermal, television,
laser) Lightning container tested onboard one of
LCA aircrafts in 2007.
The aircraft has modern information and con-
trol board of pilot’s cockpit corresponding to
the requirements to aviation complexes of «4 +»
generation. The basis of this complex are two
liquid crystal multipurpose full-color display (the
size of the screen is 125х125 mm) with a push-
button frame as well as the wide-angle indicator
on the windscreen with holographic optics. In the
twin-seater variant of LCA there are four displays
(125х125 mm) as well as two multipurpose con-
trol panels which have liquid crystal displays.
For conducting near air fight the aircraft is
equipped witha helmet-mounted visor manufac-
tured in Ukraine. The works on integration of
the Israeli helmet-mounted sight-indicator with
avionics were conducted. The controls of “Tejes”
are made by HOTAS principle that allows to pilot a
fighter without releasing control levers.
Radio-electronic warfare and communication
means are integrated with other elements of avion-
ics into the joint «Mayavi» (“Fokusnik”) onboard
complex. There are both built-in electronic warfare
equipment (station of detection of a radar and
laser irradiation, containers with shoot off heat
flares and chaffs) and external containers with
active jamming equipment.
The remarkable feature of the aircraft weapon
system is presence of both Russian and the west-
ern aviation weaponsin its structure. The Lightning
container with thermal and television (with high
definition) positioning and targeting equipment as
well as laser range gauge and target designator
(that provides possibility of application of guided
aviation bombs (KAB) and other precision weapon
without any external means of illumination) is sup-
posed to be mounted on the special (eights) under
fuselage suspension joint.
The plane is equipped with a built-in GSH-23L
gun (23 mm) with the allowance of am munitionof
220 rounds, placed under the fuselage (it is similar
to MiG-21bis fighter). On the seven external joints
of a suspension (six under wings and one under
PART OF CONSTRUCTIONAL MATERIALS (BY WEIGHT) IN LCA AIRCRAFT
Technical demonstrator (ТD) Pre-production vehicle (PV)
Aluminum alloys 57,0% 45,0%
Carbon fiber-reinforced plastic 30,0% 43,0%
Steel 5,0% 4,5%
Titanium 6,0% 5,0%
Other materials 2,0% 2,5%
W A R P L A N E S
41
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
fuselage) according to the initial projectvarious
weapons with the total weight of 400 kg including
short and medium range “air-to-air” missiles (of
Russian, French and American manufacture) could
be mounted.
The Russian R-77 guided missile (till 2010
India should receive 1600 missiles of the kind from
Russia) and Indian DRDO ASTRA missile which
will go through flight tets in 2011 are themedium
range missiles with the active radar homing sys-
tem. The ASTRA guided missile of the 1st stage
should have the maximum range of fire equal to
45 km. And more sophisticated missile of the
2nd stage should engage the targets on counter
courses at a distance of up to 80 km.
Short range missiles with TGS are represented
at “Tejas” with the Russian R-73 and French Matra
“Majic”. The “air-to-surface” weapon includes
Russian Х-59МЭ, Х-59МК, Х-35 and Х-31. The
craft should carry guided aviation bombs (up to
KAB-1500), unguided air-to-surface missiles, free-
falling bombs and bombing cartridges of various
types. However at “Tejas” Mk.1 the weight and the
weapons designation on external joints of suspen-
sion may probably be essentially reduced.
By the middle of 2008 two LCA demonstration
aircrafts three test aircrafts and two planes of Mark
1 first series had been constructed and transferred
to flight tests (six more are under construction).
Their total time in the air exceeded 1000 hours in
December, 2008 . The first serial fighter accord-
ing to the Minister of Defence of India should be
transferred to the Air Forces in 2011, and the first
squadron of 20 LCA combat aircrafts is expected
to reach initial battle readiness in 2012.
It seemed after many years of delays that LCA
at last came to the “home straight” and the Indian
Air Forces have received the “national” fighter.
However as it turned out the optimism was prema-
ture: in the autumn of 2008 referring to the national
Ministry of Defense it was declared, that the serial
craft possesses «superfluous weight». The exact
figure of the overweight was not pronounced,
however it is possible to assume, that it appeared
to be rather essential. As a result the “Tejas” Mk.1
aircrafts as it turns out, possess underestimated
(in comparison with the estimated) flight charac-
teristics and do not correspond even to «minimal
requirements of the customer for combat load».
It was reported, that the weight of empty
“Tejas” MK.1 aircraft exceeds the estimated one
by 1500 kg, i.e. makes not less than 7000 kg (and
probably more). It is necessary to say, that the
growth of the craft’s weight during its designing
is quite usual. For example Mig-29 became 1.13
times heavier during the period between the initial
project and the first serial fighter (from 9,670 to
10,900 kg) that however didn’t make any remark-
able consequences for the program. Probably
the weight of the US F-35 grew even more sig-
nificantly but also did not result in any troubles
for the designers. However the increase of this
major characteristic by 1.27-1.30 times neverthe-
less forced the Air Forces of India reject further
purchases of this “overweight” fighter. Excessive
weight of the LCA can be possibly explained
with too optimistic belief of the developers in the
composition materials design of the glider and
overestimation of their ability to work with carbon
fiber-reinforced plastic. Probably, the acquiring
of extra weight appeared during the design of a
number of systems also took place.
Thus, serial «Tejas» weighs much more than
its Swedish analogue «Gripen». It has inevita-
bly caused correction of other characteristics of
the fighter. So, thrust/weight ratio of the fighter
(0.75-0.78 at normal take-off weight) became a
little bit less than at MiG-21bison. Maneuverability,
acceleration characteristics and climbing capacity
also decreased. Combat load of 4000 kg became
unattainable for «Tejas» Mk.1. Now it may reach
1500-2000 kg as its best (not exceeding the cor-
responding parameter of Mig-21). Most likely,
these aircrafts became comparable in the criterion
of «range – combat load».
In various sources it was specified, that the
maximum speed of LCA should be М=1.6-1.8.
However during tests, judging by the media reports,
the value of M did not exceed 1.4. Probably this
value is also maximum for serial «Tejas».
As a result of all these disappointments in
the end of 2008 the MoD of India took a serious
decisionfor itself to refuse further purchases of the
«Tejas» Мк.1 fighters, having limited the number
of serial fighters with 20 units (i.e. one squadron).
It has endangered the further continuation of the
whole program. It is possible to assume with a
high level of probability, that after similar delays
and technical failures any European, US or Russian
program in the field of military aircraftwould be
stopped (enough to remember a sad destiny of
US programs of F-111B, А-12 (АТА), RAH-66
«Comanche» or our program called MFI). However
for India the «Tejas» aircraft is nevertheless more
than just an aircraft. «Shining» is a symbol of
appropriation of entire independencein such major
for national defense area as military aircraft engi-
neering by the state. For such country as India
which has ancient cultural traditions, huge human
potential and thus some centuries were under a
colonial heel, it has not only defensive, but also
huge political value. Therefore it is possible to
expect, that program the LCA program neverthe-
less will be continued and led to victorious end.
Though it was decided to abstain from further
serial orders of the “Tejas” Mk.1 aircrafts, the
Indian Air Forces and the HAL company work
on the sophisticated version of the craft called
«Tejas» Мk.2. However the new contracts for
the serial production with the ADA agency will
be signed only after it is obvious, that this craft
meets the minimal requirements of the country
Air Forces.
It is supposed, that in “Tejas” Mk.2 design a
number of the improvements directed on optimiza-
tion of aerodynamic characteristics and weight of a
glider will be implemented. Replacement of some
elements of design, in particular – the chassis
42
(that indirectly testifies to considerable increase
of weight of «Tejas» Mk.2) is supposed also.
However the most essential part of moderniza-
tion will be installation of the new, more powerful
engine chosen in the framework of the interna-
tional competition. In December, 2008 the ADA
agency planned to direct to the General Electric
andEuropean consortium Eurojet Turbo an offer on
participation in this tender.
The F414 engine (10000 kg(f) applied in F/A-
18E/F) or EJ200 (9200 kg(f) installed in EF2000)
are expected to allow providing performance of
primary requirements of aircraft performance
characteristics which were initially required for
the LCA craft by the Indian Air Forces. The com-
petition winner-company will delyver 99 engines.
The agreement will include an option for addi-
tional delivery of 49 more augmented dual-flow
turbojets as well, that, taking into account the
reserve engines should provide manufacture of
125 «Tejas» Mk.2 fighters.
After the winner in the tender of engine manu-
facturers is chosen the modernization of the LCA
fuselage for the chosen engine will be performed.
At the same time the “Tejas” Mk.2 twin-seater
crafts will still be equipped with the F404-GE-IN20
engines (probably, using the option of 20 aug-
mented dual-flow turbojets of this type).
One more basic difference of «Tejas» Mk.2
from Mk.1 can be a new radar complex. By 2004
after many years of delays two MMR test radar
stations were constructed. However in 2006 it
became known that works on creation of this air-
craft radar met serious problems which questioned
terms of completion of the program. And the radar
station itself corresponded to the requirements of
the early 1990s could not be considered modern
any more in second half of this decade. In 2007 the
agreement providing rendering to the Indian party
help in operational development of the station by
an Israeli company Elta was signed. Searching for
a new onboard radar station corresponding to the
requirements of the present day was begun at the
same time.
Presently the possibility of equipping “Tejas”
Mk.2 with Israeli radar station with automatic
phased array called ELTA EL/M-2052 is observed.
The model of this station was shown at the
international exhibition «Air India – 2005» in
Bangalore. It is necessary to say, that very little is
known about this station intended for equipping
of F-16 class crafts (its weight makes «130 – 180
kg»). It has a small rectangular antenna. And the
information presented in exhibition booklets, to
put it mildly, raise certain doubts. In particular,
the declared ability of EL/M-2052 to detect to
64 air targets simultaneously looks colored (in
the US radars AN/APG-77 installed at F-22A this
parameter makes, on various information, 20-28
targets). At the same time it is possible to assume
that the characteristics of this station (which most
probably is just going to be created) will be at the
level of the latest European and American onboard
radio stations with automatic phased array. In
particular, the declared range of enemy’s light
fighters detection for EL/M-2052 of148 km looks
quite convincingly.
In January, 2009 the ADA agency signed the
contract with the European concern EADS, provid-
ing rendering to the Indian party help in updating
«Tejas». Thus the main attention will be paid to
struggle for weight decrease and measures for
chassis strengthening as well. The program is cal-
culated for 48 months. Thus the first «Tejas» Mk.2
in the serial configuration will take off not earlier
than in 2014, i.e. practically simultaneously with
the India-Russian fighter of the 5th generation.
We remind that initially it was planned, that
the LCA aircrafts first of all will replace the fighters
of MiG-21 type and «Ajit». However «Ajit» “quit-
ted the stage” in 1991 still before the prototype
of «Tejas» took off for the first time. Later the
MiG-23BN fighter-bombers (entered the service f
the India AF after the failure with “Marut”) were
added to the list of aircrafts submitted for replace-
ment for LCA. However and these crafts left the
service in 2007 not being replaced with a new
Indian multipurpose fighter. The MiG-21Ml and
MiG-23MF aircrafts also should be replaced since
2012 not with «Tejas» but with the multipurpose
MMRCA fighter: 126 crafts of this type should
enter the service (with transfer of the first vehicle
to the customer in 2012) following the results of
the international competition in which generation
“4 +” fightersparticipate such as MiG-35, F-16I,
F/A-18E/F (F-18IN), «Rafael», EF2000 and JAS 39
«Gripen».
Chronic prolongation of implementation terms
of the LCA program made in the mid-nineties
the Indian Air Forces begin search of alternative
variants of modernization fighter park allowing
to support necessary qualitative level before the
“national” fighter enters service.
In 1996 the Russian-Indian contract providing
modernization of 125 MiG-21bis fightersto the
level of MiG-21-93 has been signed. The modern-
ized MiGs which got an Indian name MiG-21UPG
(sometimes they are called MiG-21bison) started
to arrive in the Indian Air Forces in 2002, and by
2008 the program had been practically finished.
Modernization concerned basically the onboard
radio electronic equipment and weapons of the
aircraft. «Bison» has received new pulse-dopler
radar «Kopiyo-21I» with slit antenna, practically
not conceding to the MMR station created for LCA
(target detection range with radar cross-section
of 3 м2 is 57 km, simultaneous tracking of eight
and engagement of two targets), modern weapons
control system, allowing to use the guided “air-
to-air” and “air-to-surface” weapons, the inertial
navigation system upgraded with the module of
satellite navigation and also the complex of weap-
ons practically identical with the corresponding
complex of LCA. Thus the modernized aircraft
completely kept the high flight characteristics of
the MiG-21bis fighter whichnot concede to the
characteristics of «Tejas».
After 125 MiG-21UPG practically corresponded
to the level of generation «4 +» became part of the
Indian Air Forces the problem of the 2nd genera-
tion fighters replacementbecame much less sharp.
It may have allowed the management of the Indian
Air Forces to take easy the regular delay of the LCA
program connected with the necessity of creation
of a new modification of this fighter, deprived of
the disadvantages of the 1st generation fighters.
Most likely the modernized Swedish fighter
«Gripen» NG which started flight tests in 2008 will
become the nearest analogue of «Tejas» Mk.2. This
aircraft equipped with a new onboard radar with
automatic phased array has the extended fuselage
with the volume of the fuel tanks increased by 40
% and the F414G engine (10,000 kg(f), allowing to
fly with supersonic cruiser speed (up to М=1.2).
The weight of the empty aircraft has increased by
400 kg (i.e. to 7000-7100 kg), the maximum take-
off weight has made 16,000 kg, and ferry range
with full fuel tanks is 4070 km.
Besides the basic single-seater variant of the
«Tejas»fighter intended for the Air Forces, the
working out of other modifications of this aircraft
is conducted. In particular the training-combat
twin-seater variant of the fighter was being cre-
ated. There is a twin-seater training-combat pro-
totype PV5 is under construction. This aircraft in
general is similar to the single-seater. It carries
similar to «Tejas» Мк.1 onboard equipment and
weapons. The difference is in absence of a fuel
W A R P L A N E S
43
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
tank for 410 l behind the cockpit instead of which
the cockpit of the second pilot is created. Thus
part of fuel is moved to the additional capacities
located in other places of the glider. As a whole
the twin-seater at insignificant reduction of range
practically completely keeps the potential of the
single-seater.
Works on the deck-based variant of the fighter
called LCA-Navy are going on. In due time together
with the pre-series LCA crafts two prototypes of
this plane – NP1 and NP2 were laid down. Their
construction was essentially prolonged, and now it
is reported, that NP1 can be presented not earlier
than the end of 2009.
It was reported, that the generality in avionics
of the deck-based and land-based fighters makes
99 %. At the same time LCA-Navy should have
insignificantly changed control system, reinforced
chassis with the increased course of the shock-
absorbers ensuring landing to the deck of the
Aircraft carrier with a big vertical speed and
take off from a launching-ramp. In the design of
the glider of the deck-based fighter the corrosion-
resisted materials are used.
One of the constructional features of LCA-
Navy which distinguish it from other deck-based
fighters is the fuselage nose section with radio
transparent cowling of the onboard radar which
descends at take off and landing (as it is at Tu-144
or Т-4) by 4 degrees. That improves the lookout of
the pilot at actions on the aircraft carrier deck.
In the root of a deck-based aircraft wing
the additional rotary surfaces are supposed to
be installed. All these changes have resulted in
increase in weight of the glider in comparison with
the weight of a coast-based fighter.
Essential changes have also been made in the
fuel system of LCA-Navy: new means of quick fuel
draining for emergency landing to the deck soon
after take off are provided.
Take off of a deck-based fighter should be
carried out by means of a launching-ramp habitual
to the Indian ship pilots, without use of catapult.
Landing to the deck will be carried out by means
of three-barrier arrester and brake hook. The small
size of the fighter allows to do it without the sys-
tem of the wing folding complicating a design. This
system is regular for the majority of other modern
deck-based fighters with large dimensions.
Any characteristics of LCA-Navy were not
announced but it is known that the weight of this
fighter is 800 kg more than the weight of «Ajita»
Mk.1 (i.e. should make about 8,000 kg).
The deck-based variant of the LCA fighter is
planned to be used from the board of a perspective
light aircraft carrierproject «Vicrant» (the second
with such a name) laid down at the shipyard of
Cochin Shipyard Limited in Cochin on October,
7th, 2005. Creation of this ship was conducted
since the middle of 1990s in the framework of the
ADA program(Air Defense Ship). Initially developed
as a light aircraft carrier with the displacement of
25000 т, ADS (project 71) has gradually grown to
the sizes approximately equal to the sizes of heavy
aircraft carrier “Kiev”. The help in creation of the
Indian aircraft carrier was rendered by a number of
foreign (including Russian) organizations, and the
ship project was performed with the assistance of
an Italian firm Fincantieri SpA.
The ship with the displacement of 37,500 т,
the length of 252 m and the width (by a flight deck)
of 58 m is supposed to be equipped with four
gas-turbine engine with total capacity of 108,000
h.p., providing speed of up to 28 knots. According
to initial plans, the aircraft carrier should become
operational in 2012, and in 2017 it was supposed
to transfer the second practically the same ship
to the Naval Forces. However later the plans were
modified and the term of the «Vicrant»’s entering
service was prolonged at least till 2015.
It is supposed that the new Indian aircraft car-
rier will carry 12 fighters and 12 helicopters. It was
originally planned, that those fighters will be LCA-
Navy, however the mixed plane park consisting of
LCA-Navy and MiG-29К (the first aircraft of this
type have been transferred the Indian Naval Forces
in 2008) was being discussed later. Taking into
consideration the long terms of construction both
in the LCA program and in the construction of the
Indian aircraft carrier, it is possible to assumethat
real appearance of LCA-Navy on deck the Indian
ship can take place not earlier than in the end of
next decade (if it in general will take place).
Thus it is required to add changes in the
design of the deck-based aircraft similar to the
changes in the design of«Tejas». As a result the
weight of the deck-based craft will grow even
more, that will inevitably require more increase
the wing area. The power-plant problem may also
require resolving: even at transition to the F404
augmented dual-flow turbojet (10,000 kg(f) the
thrust/weight ration of the deck-based aircraft
can appear insufficient to take off with full com-
bat load from a launching-ramp. Apparently, the
Indian designers will encounter many difficulties
in order to to deny the Americans convinced, that
it is almost impossible to make a good deck-based
aircraft of an land-based fighter...
The Air Forces of India together with the indus-
try considered also plans of further development of
LCA which possibly can be partially implemented
in the «Tejas» Мк.2 project. In particular, it was
supposed to lower radar signature of the fighter
essentially by applying some new, more effective
radio absorbing coverings developed in India in the
conditions of high secrecy since 1980s.
The works on advanced, more powerful vari-
ant of the “Kavery” augmented dual-flow turbojet
were conducted. At the expense of application of
monocrystal blades developed by Metallurgical
research laboratory of MoD of India, it was planned
to increase gas temperature behind the turbine to
1850 degrees. According to the estimations the
new engine would allow LCA to fly with supersonic
cruiser speed. The works on a three-dimensional
thrust vector control with a axe-simmetrical nozzle
control system, and on a digital control system
with the full responsibility intended for modernised
augmented dual-flow turbojet as well. Application
of thrust vector control, according to the Indian
experts, allowed to create a variant of LCA without
vertical plumage in the long term, that essentially
reduced its radar signature.
On the basis of the “Kavery” engine it was
planned to develop an unboosted variant with the
increased degree of limbation intended for the
perspective training and combat aircraft. However
today after an actual failure of the «Kavery» pro-
gram these plans will hardly be implemented in
the near future.
In 1996 the financing of research works on
creation of a larger multipurpose fighter MCA
(Medium Combat Aircraft ) on the basis ofLCA
were started. MCA had to replace the “Jaguar” and
“Mirage 2000” aircrafts in 2010s. This aircraft was
intended to complement the Su-30MKI heavy mul-
tipurpose fighters. However after the signing of the
India-Russian agreement on jointwork on creation
of a fighter of the 5th generation, theМСА program
might have lost the urgency for India.
44
First brand-new A330-200 entered Russian
service in the last month of the past year.
On December 10 Aeroflot – Russian airlines
hold ceremony of meeting the aircraft arriving from
Airbus plant in Toulouse where it was built. Many
dignities and ordinary people gave their attendance.
Among them there was minister for transporta-
tion Igor Levitin. But the minister did not spoke
before audience. Why? Reasons were many. Here
are just a few of them. The deal on ten A330s for
Aeroflot was a part of a bigger one that involved the
Russian government, United Aircraft Corporation,
EADS, Airbus, Aeroflot and AerCAap – to name
only big players. It was arranged in spring 2008.
The Kremlin permitted purchase of new European
widebody jets in return for its maker’s obligations
to provide some work for the ailing domestic indus-
try. That work was meant to be additional orders
for manufacturing of parts for Airbus mainstream
models such as A320 family of narrow body jets,
A330, A380 widebodies and, in the future, for
A350. The Russian industry was also promised a
work share in the A350 project, which will spend
in development a few years. Aeroflot insisted on
replacement of A330s for A350s when the latter
becomes available. Airbus accepted this, yet not
through its own leasing arm, but via AerCap leas-
ing company. The Russian flag carrier placed order
for 10 A330s, with a rider of their replacement for
A350s. Shortly after AerCAP agreed to serve launch
customer for A320P2F converted freighters – the
joint program of EADS, Airbus, UAC and Irkut.
CEO Klaus Heinemann applied his signature at the
respective agreement at Farnborough Aerospace
International 2008. It seemed that AerCap was
very much involved in the cooperative programs
between the European and Russian industries.
Therefore, it came as a big surprise when the
very first A330-200 for Aeroflot appeared to be…
owned by quite another proprietor! When the
side VP-BLX landed in Moscow – Sheremetievo,
Aeroflot distributed press-releases which stated
that the deal for this particular airplane was signed
in March 2008 (in other words, a year after the big-
ger deal), with Wahaflot Leasing 1 Limited based
in Cyprus. But this was not the end for surprises.
Speaking on behalf of owner at the acceptance
ceremony in Sheremetievo was Erik Dahmen. He
introduced himself as senior director with Waha
ARAB CAPITAL FOR AEROFLOTARAB CAPITAL FOR AEROFLOT
Vladimir Karnozov
45
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
Capital, an Abu-Dabi leasing company. Little was
heard about both of those, which sparked our inter-
est. Below is the interview with Mr. Dahmen gave
our correspondent at the delivery ceremony on
December 10, 2008. Waha Capital traces its history
to Oasis Capital (In Arab language, “waha” means
“oasis”). To many of the non-natives, waha sounds
similar to the name of the religious leader of the 18
Century, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab an-Najdi
(1703–1792) who started a new flow in Islam. Now,
this flow is prevailing in certain countries, including
Saudi Arabia. Men calling themselves Wahhab’s
followers fought against Russian army and law
enforcement forces in Northern Caucasus and are
answerable for many terrorist activities in Russia’s
homeland territories. While “waha” and “Wahhab”
may sound markedly different to the native dwellers
of the Arabian peninsula dwellers, it does not for
most of the outsiders. And this puts them on their
guard. This is one of the reasons why the Russian
minister for transportation preferred to keep mum
at the ceremony. Apparently, he had not expected
this sort of challenge, perhaps not merely linguistic.
There was another reason for Levitin to stay silent.
The new Aeroflot airplane is actually registered well
off the Russian coasts, on the islands of Bermuda.
Hence its registration: VP-BLX. The ministry made
it clear that it prefers Russian carriers to put
their aircraft in the Russian register and get “RA”
registration. Aeroflot does not seem to have been
listening to the authority. But let us go back to the
lessor. Waha Capital calls itself “diversified invest-
ment company”. It holds some 40% in Addax Bank
based in Bahrain and has “interests” in Malaysia,
Ireland, US, Liberia and Cyprus. About 15% of
company’s shares are in hands of Mudaba sover-
eign wealth fund based in Abu Dabi, and 3% – in
that of Goldman Sachs. The rest belong to public
and unnamed private individuals. On 18th February
2008 Waha Capital, the Abu Dhabi-based and Abu
Dhabi Securities Exchange -listed holding com-
pany, announced that its investments in aviation,
finance, real estate, infrastructure and maritime
and logistics sectors will exceed AED 20 billion
over the next three years. This and other news
from the group can be found on their corporate
site http://www.wahacapital.ae/. On 19 October
2008 Waha Capital reported a net profit of AED 40
million for the third quarter of 2008, an increase of
34 percent over the corresponding period last year.
These figures were given by HE Hussain Al Nowais,
Chairman of Waha Capital.
AerCap’s involvement in Russian programs is
longer and greater than Waha’s. Late last year the
company had a total of 24 aircraft contracted for
lease with Russian airlines. Five of these aircraft
were delivered to the airline customers. “This
shows how important the Russian market is for
us”, commented Frauke Oberdieck, Vice President
Corporate Communications with AerCap. Most of
aircraft are intended for Aeroflot – Russian Airlines
and its subsidiary Aeroflot-Nord. As of late 2008,
Aeroflot operated six A320 family aircraft. First
AerCap-owned A320 was delivered to Aeroflot in
July 2008. Remaining five deliveries are due by
March 2009. The Russian flag carrier also has on
order ten A330s. Deliveries started in December
2008. These shall complete in April 2010. Aeroflot-
Nord signed for six B737-500s, of which two were
delivered in 2008. The remaining four aircraft are
owned by the securitization portfolio AerCo, for
which AerCap acts as servicer/marketing agent.
Deliveries of these airplanes started in September
2008, in the view of completion in February 2009.
Apart from Aeroflot, AerCap has it aircraft placed
with SkyExpress (one B737-500) and Transaero
(one B737-400). Again, these transactions involved
the securitization portfolio AerCo, for which AerCap
acts as servicer/marketing agent.
46
Interview with Waha Capital, Erik Dahmen, senior director, marketing.
– Mr. Dahnen, could you please tell us about your company?
– Waha Capita is Abu Dhabi-based and Abu
Dhabi Securities Exchange -listed holding company
that invests in in aviation, finance, real estate, infra-
structure and maritime and logistics sectors. Waha
is just registered in Abu Dabi; it is actually owned
by the Arabs. So, it is a truly Abu Dabi company.
We are based there and have very close ties to
the Abu Dabi government and other companies
there and the United Arab Emirates. It is a stable
company, professional. It has strong shareholders.
We are based in the country where there is a lot of
strategic views. Well, everybody heard of Abu Dabi
and Dubai, what they are doing in the world. We like
to think that we are part of this process, part of that
strategy, that of growth and the future.
– How many aircraft does it have in its fleet?– I do not know what is above the top of my
head. But we have an internet site – when people
can check this. Our corporate site is http://www.
wahacapital.ae/.
– Is the A330-200 being handed over to Aeroflot a good asset for your company?
– It is a fantastic aircraft and a good asset, too.
Besides, Aeroflot has a very good name in the mar-
ket. So, for us, it is all round good transaction.
– How many aircraft has Waha placed in Russia so far?
– For the moment Waha has only two aircraft
for Aeroflot. This A330, and one A320 which was
delivered to Aeroflot two weeks ago. We are open
for discussions for some more, but we have no
transaction apart from those two aircraft we have
already purchased. We do not have anything else in
Russia right now. But while I am here in Moscow,
of course I will to our friend in Aeroflot about
opportunities to do more business in the future.
– What are the Russian airlines you are going to speak to?
– I do not really know. As a leasing company
based in Abu Dabi, we are very interested in the
Russian market. I am here to find out if there is
something more we can do. We have spoken to
some in the past. I have spoken to Transaero, as
well as Sibir. But these are people we do not have
business with.
– How did it happen that AerCap signed the original agreement with Aeroflot for ten A330s, but the first aircraft was actually provided by quite another leasing company?
– I do not know. The company in question is
called AerCap. That’s not my company. AerCap
bought and leased ten A330s to Aeroflot. Our com-
pany, Waha capital, purchased one of the A330s,
plus an A320, from AerCap, with a lease to Aeroflot.
So, we did not buy aircraft directly from Airbus –
instead, we bought it from AerCap.
– What’s in common between AerCap and Waha?
– We are a leasing company and like AerCap,
we are also listed on stock exchange. Both of our
companies has a fleet of aircraft that we own and
lease to airlines worldwide. That’s all.
– Why AerCap sold Aeroflot’s aircraft to Waha?
– I do not know exactly why AerCap sold the
aircraft. My guess is that AerCap always had an
intention to sell their aircraft. Which, I think, is a
strategic move. Thereby, you use your purchasing
power, and do a transaction in the view that you in
the future will be able to sell the aircraft. Obviously,
with a whole intention to make a profit.
– Was the sale of Aeroflot aircraft caused by the world-wide financial crisis?
– No, it is not related to the crisis, not at all.
In fact, we agreed that would buy this aircraft well
before the crisis even started. We bought these
aircraft and placed with Aeroflot.
– Once we touched on the crisis, does it affect your company’s business?
– It affects everybody. For sure, it affects us.
Sometimes you see that some of our airline cus-
tomers are having financial difficulties, or having
difficulties like many other airlines in the market.
These are difficulties with the financial market, fuel
prices etc. For us as a leasing company I think the
crisis brings new opportunities. As it always does.
Smaller people selling, fewer investors… so, it
brings opportunities for whose who stay in this
business.
The crisis brings opportunities, but on the
funding side, the financing side, it brings chal-
lenges, including us. I think that in future transac-
tions you will find that there are fewer banks that
are lending money. In our discussions with banks
we have already found that. We have already found
that people are less willing to lend money. It is not
so much for Waha, but it is the case with some
other leasing companies.
– It seems that the aviation market contracts. Do you agree with this?
– Yes, I believe that there are fewer inves-
tors and fewer buyers. So, you are right, it is a
narrower market now. On the other hand, I think
that there is a good hope that in the New Year the
crisis will loose up a little bit. Banks, for example,
are optimistic. Banks that are now having liquidity
problems, that will in the New Year sort themselves
out. And will be more readily available for the leas-
ing companies like us and others.
C I V I L AV I AT I O N
47
A I R F L E E T · 1 . 2 0 0 9 · ( 7 5 )
48
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