'_/ . '(j o • , .,... Mt " - LAwRENCE KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPlvlENT AND KANT' S MORAL PHlLOSOPHY by - LESLIE CSATARY A thesis submitted to' the ' Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research , in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Degree_o! Master of Arts (Education) DEPARTMENT OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH FAOùLoeX OF EDUCATION McGILL UNIVERSITY MONTREAL, QUEBEC • j • 7MfIIiP' ..... 1 AUGUST t 1980. ./ , \ " , , -J .. /
Transcript
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LAwRENCE KOHLBERG'S
THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPlvlENT
AND
KANT' S MORAL PHlLOSOPHY
by -
LESLIE CSATARY
A thesis submitted to' the ' Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
, in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the
Degree_o! Master of Arts (Education) ~~
DEPARTMENT OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH
FAOùLœX OF EDUCATION
McGILL UNIVERSITY
MONTREAL, QUEBEC
• j • 7MfIIiP' ..... 1
AUGUST t 1980.
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THESIS ABSTRACT
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THESIS TITLE. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG'S THEORY OF MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND KANT t S MORAL PHILOSOPHY '. .
DEPARTMENf, SOCIAL FOU~DATIONS OF EDUCATION
DEGREE. MaSTER OF ARTS
AUTHOR. LESLIE CSATARY
.,.'
·The purpose of this. thesia ia to draw \-----
attention to the relationship of Dmœanuel Kant's moral
philosophy te) that of Kohlberg' s -theory of moral'; aevelopment.
An attempt will be made to show a <
parallel hiera~chy of moral development in Kant t s moral
p~iloaophy t0:tnat of the six stages of Kohlberg's
theory df moral development. \
When dealing with Kohlberg' s stage six
of moral development, there o~ten exista, in the mind
-- " of the "Kahlberg reader. a lack ,.Of 1larity as to what is
expected of the moral a~e,nt at ~this stagè of moral
development. There ~so exista a1need to ~xpand the
" / moral philosophical implications of stage six
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moral reasoning. Kant provides us wi th a groundwork
for this in his moral philosophy when he di~cusseB the
concept of autonomy versus heteronomy.
An attempt will also be made to show the 1
implications for moral education of this interpretation
this complex phenomenon of morality in ~is taxonomy
of moral components, such as. PHIL, &MP, GIG, KRAT,
and DIKz
1. PHIL refers to the moral "component \
of an individual that enables him
to, have the concept of a "person"".
The individual also claims to use this
concept in an overrid~ prescriptive,
universalized principle. He has feelings
which support this principle, either of
a 'duty-oriented or. perso'n-oriented"
2. to having the concepts of
var'ous emotions (moods, etc.), and
bei able to identify emotions in
onese f. when these are at a conscious
or unà,pnscious level. This invol ves
being able to identify emotions in
othèrs, as well, whether at th~ conscious
or unconscious level. A tenu normally
, used for this component would be
"empathy" •
J. GIG refera to knowing other (hard)
fa~ts relev~t to moral ,decisi na.
Thia inv~lves knowing sources f facts,
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and knowing how to deal with moral
situations using these facts, as evidenced
in verb~ or non-verbal communication
with others. ;
4. KRAT refera to being, in practice,
relatively alert (noticing) to moral
situations, and seeing them as such.
It also involves tlescribing them in
terme of PHIL, EMP and GIG, and thinking
~horoughly about such situations, and
bringing to bear whatever PHIL, EMP and
GIG one hase As a reault of the
foregoing, KRAT makes an overriding,
prescriptive and universalized decision
to act in others' interests. This
implies being sufficiently whole-hearted ~
and free from unconscious
counter-motivation to carry out (when
able) th~ above decision in practice. 10
The educational implication here ia that :1
moral education cannot be limited to one subject f
educational setting, or time span. Rather, it must
take place simul taneously in formal and informal
educational settingsl on different grade levels, and
in many subject areas.
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William Frankena argues a aimilar point
in his writings on the philosophy of education, titled
Ethics. In his essay, ttToward a PhiloBophy of Moral
Education", Frânkena states that moral educ1..ion can be
outlined by the following factors 1
----a) the need to appeal to a child's reasoning in moral educatiQn.
b) the ability to handle confl.ic.ts of reason so as to he able to m~e decisions of principle. .
c)
d)
the ability to confront new situations openly, and to be guided, yet not chained by principles.
the ability to be an autonomous, freelY'choosing moral. agent. 11
Israel Scheffler has also dealt with the 0
,cômplex nature of moral education though in a less
exte~ye marmer than Wilson and Frankena. However, he .'
does malte a statement on the treatment of moral
education in Bchoolsl
The challenge of moral education is the challenge to develop critical thought in the sphere of practice, and it iS'continuous with the ) challenge to develop critical thought in all aspects and phases of schooling. Moral schooling is not, therefore, a thing apart, something to be embodied in a list of maxims. something to be reckoned as simply another subject or another activity,( curricular or extracurricular. ' It does indeed have to pervade the whole of the school expérience. 12
Thus. we see that moral education.
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according ,to the'previously mentioned researchers, is, , '
something that affects all aspectà'of schooling, and
therefore, must de al "with the entire per,son • . Lawrence Kohlberg is also one who is
concerned with the moral development and moral
education of the total persona He describes himself as .-r •
a modern psychologist concerned"wlth the deve~opment of
morali ty. He claims that his more relevant source is
not 'Freud, Skinner or Piaget, but P.la't9-" His method's
and conclusions differ from the writers just discussed, ...
but, at the sBlD:e time,' there are aspects of morali ty on
whiCh they agree, and which support as'sumptions of the
analytic perspective; 1~
Kohlberg' s work is, in a way, a
rejecti9n of previous approaches in moral psychology.
, Neither does he accept a Skinnerian notion of morality"<r
as reinforced l:)ehaviour, nor a Freudian '-notion of
morali ty as superego identification. In place'" 0 f these
approaches. he presents a developmental notion of
morallty, which ls composed of three levels and six ,
stages of development. 14
He also contends that a child's no~al
thinking must go through a development~ process.
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whereby morality is directly linked to previ.ous an~<
,more adv~ced stages of moral thoughtkand jUdgement.
Kohlberg cl~ims that such moral thinking is universal, '"
and is not culturally determine~. However, such moral , , ,
thinking is analyzable and testable only in specifie
cultui~ terms and settings.
The highest level of moral development ..r--- _
here is justice, and it i8 justicejwhich is the key to . ~ \
all levels of moral, life and education. The eoncern and
task of-moral education is, for Kohlberg, to have the '
young come to know'the idea of justice. 15
It is at this point that the Platonic
(ph"ilos~phy of Kohlberg is apparent. He believes that
"he who knows the good chooses the good" , and that
"YOUt{l8 who uriderst~d justice act more justly". 16
From this Platonic view, virtue is c'onsidered ul timately
one, and has always the same ideal :form, regardless of
climate or culture. The name of the ideal form i8
justice. Virtue is understood here as philosophical
knowledge, ' or inst~tut.i.on of the ~deal form of th,e good, ( ~.. 0
not merely èorrect opinion or acceptance of conventional
beliefs. This knowledge of the good can be t~t. but
tije teachers, according to Plata, must be philo~pher-, "kings. The teaching of 'virtue can be aecomplished by the
asking of questions. and the pointing of the way. not the
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Moral education is the leading of men upward, not the putting into the mind of knowledge that which was not there befo~e. 17
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This statement of the Platonic view,
however, is meant to be interpreted as a char~cterization
of self-chosen prJnciples at stage six. Kohlberg's
philosophical and psychological research presupposes
the ideal of justice as the central moral principle.
Furthermore, he stresses the importance of the
,individual to the moral process. He also adroits that
morality"is very much related to a person's individual
~ will, and, the process of ~oral reasoning becomes.jhe
ultimate criterion of an active moral agent. This process o
of moral r~asoninglbecomes the ultimate criterion of
morality, and is internalized within the will of a mor~
person.
Since Kohlberg states that justice i8
pot a character trai~ in the usual sense, one-cannat
make UPy behaviour tests for justice, as one can malte -
for honesty, service and self-control. The reason for
this is that justice, unlike the other vtrtues, does
not express itself in a concrete rule" of action. To
be honest means not to cheat, not to steal, and not to
lie. Justice is not a set of rulesl it is a moral »
principle. By a moral principle, we mean a mode of o~.. '
choosing in accordance with which the claims of,
competing rules can be resolved, and which we want all
people, to adopt a1ways in all situations. 18
There are exceptions to rules, Kohlbe}.g
says, but no exception ta principles. For example, it
ls permlssible to be dishonest and to steal in arder to
save a life because a man' s right to life comes bef'or~
another man's right to property. Such a decision could
be justified by the principle of justice. A moral
obligation is an obligation to respect the rights and
claims of another person. A moral principle 1s a
principle. for resolving competing 9laims, and the .,
, principled basis for resolving .claims i8 ,justice or
equaUty. Here, every man',B.::claim is treated
impartially,l regardless of' th~" man. A moral principle , Q
is not only a rule of action, but a reason for action.
As a reason for action, justice la called respect :for .
persons.
Using hypothetical moral situations, and . interviewing adults and children throughout the w~rld
about ~ight and wrong. Kohlberg has :found the same forms ,
of~ora.1 thinking in all cultures. There are six forms
of thinking. and they constitute ah invariant sequence
of~stages in each culture. These stages are s~arized
in the :f'ollowing table.
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Definition of Kohlberg' s Moral Stages
Preconventional Level
At this level, the child ia reaponsive to cul tural rules and labels 0 f good and bad, right or ,wrong, but interpret~ these labels either in terms of the physièal or the hedonistic consequences of action (punishment, reward, exchange of favours) or in terme of the physical power of those who enunciate' -the,~ rules and labels. The level ia di vided into
.the :f'ollowing two stages. - , . ;..,
stage 11
stage 2.
The punishment-and-obedience orientation. The physicâl consequences of action determine i te goodnesa or badnee's, regardless of the human melUling or value of these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not in te~s of respect for an unàerlying moral arder supported by punishment and authority (the latter.being Stage 4).
The instrumental-relativist orientation. Right action consista of that which .j.'nstrumentally Batiefies one's ôwn needs and occasionally the neede of others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of the marketplace. Elements of fairness, of reciprocity, and of equal sharing are present, but they are always interpreted in a physical, pragmatic way. Recippocity is a matter of "you scratch my back and l'll scratch 'Yours"', not of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II. Conventional Level ,
At thls level, maintaining the expectations o~ the individual's family, group, or nation ls -perceived as valuable in its own right, . regardless of imme~i~te and obvious consequences.
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The attitude ia not only one o~, conformi ty to' personal expectations and social order, but of loyalty ta it, of aetively maintaining, supporting, and justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons or group involved in it. At this level, there are the following two stagesi
Stage 31
stage 4.
The interpersonal concordance or "good boy-nice ~irP' or1.entation. Good behaviour 1.S that which pleases orhelps others. and is approved by them. There is much conformi ty to stereotypical images of what is majori ty or "natural" behaviour. Behaviour is frequently judged by intention -- "he meana well" becomes important for the tirat time. One " eams approval by being "niee".
The "law and arder" orientation. There is orientation toward aut90rity, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behaviour consists of doing one's dut Y , showin~ respect for authority, and maintain1.ng the gtven social order for its own sake.
III. Poatconventional, AutonomouB, or PrinciEled Level"'~
At this level, there is a clear effort ta define moral values and principles that have validi ty , and application apart from the authori ty of t~e groups or persons holding these principles and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level also has two stages •.
stage 51 ,
The soc ial-contract , legalistic orientation, generally with utilitarian overtones. Right action tends to be defined in terms of general individual rights and standards which have. been cri tically examined and agreed upon by the ,whole society. There ia a clear awareness of the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural .rules for·reaching consensus.
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Stage 6,'
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Asi.de tram what i t-. consti tutionally and democratically agreed upon, the right ia a matter of personal"values" and "o~inion". The result is an emphas~s upon the "legal po.i,nt of vitw", but with an emphasis upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational considerations of social utility (rather than treezing i t in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal re~, free ~reement and contract is t~~ b~ding element of obligation.
The univers al ethical-principle orientation. Right ia defined by the decision of conscience in accord with self-chosen ethical principles appealing to logical comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule, the categorical Imperative); they are not concrete moral rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are universal >
principles of justice, of the reciproci ty and equali ty of human right, and of respect for the dignity pf human beings as individual persons. 19
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The actual definition of these stages of
development is based on a treatment of 28 basic aspects
of morality (moral concepts or values) to be found in
any culture (See Appendix 1). A presentation of one
of these 28 conceptsl (the concept 0 f' the value of li.fe) ,
is outlined in Appendix II. It defines and gives
examples of .the way this value ia def'ined at each of
the six stages of devèlopment.
The progression, or set of stages, just
described implies more than age trends.
First of all, it implies invariant
sequence, which means that each child must go __ ,/ , 1
step-by-step through each of the kinds of moral
Judgement outlined. Even though a child may move at
varying speeds, ang stop or become Il f'ixated" at any
level of developmen~, he must move in accord wi th these
steps.
Secondly, stages define Il structured
wholes", or total ways of thinking, not attitudes
towards particular situations. 2Q The 28 different
aspects contributing to stage defini tions concern ,the
motives of moral action,- There is a distinétion here
getween moral fqrm and moral content. That is to say,
an individual at stage -six on a "cognitive" aspect \
(univer,salized value of life), ia also likely to be at ..
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26 l stage s~x on an "affective" aspect (motive for
difficult moral action in terms of internal
sQlf-conde~nations) • f\
Thirdly, a stage concept implies
~ universality of sequence under varying cultural
conditions. It implies that moral development is not
merely a matter of verbal values or rules of the
child' s culture,' but reflects something more universal
in development; something that would occur ~n any
cul ture : In general, the stage s in moral' j udgement
just described,appear to be culturally universal.
If one accepta that moral values are
universal, then Kohlberg states that one must also
con8ider that there ia a hierarchy of values. 21
An example concerning hierarchies' of . , --.-
value! is' the current North Amer~can problem of law and
arder versus justice. S9me people ~eel that, if there j
ia law and order, there ia no need for justice, while
others, at stages -five or six, are convinced that the
purpose of "law and.order i8 the maintenance of justice.
Development in conceptions of justice leads to a
hierarchical relation b'etween law and order and •
, justice. Because of' this accep~ance by Kohlbé'rg of a ~
hierarchy of values, there results a conclusion that . , i
the higher stage,s of\ judgement/are more m~ral than the
lower stages in the formal sense.
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Kohlberg' s claim.la that stage six , thought or'language is fully moral, that this stage
six iB a cloBer approximation to the charaeteristic
which philosophers such as Hare, have taken as dei'i~~ng 1
distinctively moral languag-:,. The claim, however'" that ,
stage six ia ~ more moral mode of' thinking than the
lower stages d~es not say that we should grade \ -
individuals as 'more or less moral. Kohlberg argues
that there is n~ v~id or final meanlng to judglng or
gràding persons as morally better or worse. Judgemen~
oi' persons as morally good or bad are judgements oi'
}ralse ând bl~e, and are not justified by the
existence of universal moral principles, as such.
+t the highest stage, the principle of justi~~ (or
the principle of' maximlzing human welfare) pre scribes
an obligation to act justly (to further human
welfare); it does not prescribe the dut Y ta blame the "
unjust, or give us rules f'or'giving out blame to the
unjust. Moral theory 1s not required to set up
standards for evaluating the moral worth ~,f persons,'
and the claim that stage six ls a more moral way oi' \' -~
thinking is not an assignment of higher moral wofth. to 1
the stage six individual.
W'e must now clarity why Kohlberg claÏDls
that the higher stages are more moral than the 10W~ stages. Like most philosophera, he claims that the ~
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term,. "moral" re fers to moral ~Udgéments or decisions ,
based on moral j udgements. The term, "moral", here, 18
referred to as a judgement, not a behaviour or ah
effect, such as "guil t". Like most moral. philosophers
since Kant defined in terms of a formal character of a
moral judgement or a moral point oÏ view, rather than in
terms of i ts content. j
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Impersonality, ideality,
unlversalizabili ty, and preemptiveness are among the
formal characteristics of moral judgement. These can
be seen in the reasons given for a moral judgement;
a moral reason being one which has these properties.
Moral judgements are judgements about
the right and the good of action. Not a11 judgements
of "good" or "right" are moral j,udgements, howeverJ
many are judgements of aesthetic. technological or
prudential goodness or rightness. Unlike judgements of
prudence and aesthetics, moral judgements tend ta be, or 1
are expected to be univers al , inclusive, consistent, and
grounded on objective. impersona.+. or ideal grounds. 22
The next stage is to examine the
characteristic of "invariance" in Kohlberg's stages.
Invariance can be best explained where ref'erence is
made to Kohlberg' s six 'Stages of moral development,
from the -lowest toward the highest leveI of maturi ty -
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stage six. Wlth respect to stage de~elopment, invariance ~eans that one must progress through the
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stages in arder, and one cannot get into a higher
stage without passing through the stage preceding it.
Therefore, for example, one can only arrive at
stage three after having passed through stages one "
and two. Moral development ia growth, and tîes 1
place according to a predetermined sequ~nce or
hierarchy.
Another factor inherent in Kohlberg's
theory 01' moral development ie that Bubjects cannot
comprehend moral reasoning at a ~tage more than one
~tage beyond their own. Yet, it ia interesting to note " \ that sûbjects are cognitively attracted to reasoning one
stage above their own predominant stage.
Also, movement through the stages ia
effect~d when cognitive disequilibri~ is created •
That ia, when a person's cognitive outlook is not
adequate to cope with a given moral dilemma. a
cognitive disequili~rium ~s cre~~ed. A p'erson will
look for more adequate"ways to resol ve dilemmas. That
iss If, in a given situation, onels cognitive 1'ramework cannot resolve a problem, the cognitive organism adjusts to a framework which does. , • '. When such a dlaequilibrlum ia provoked, it causes thinking about
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the inadequacies of one 1 s reasons and a search for better and more adequate reasons. 23
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Besides these qualities of stage
development, Kohlberg also points out that, up through -
stage four, each stage represents a wider and more'
adequate perception of the social system, and an
24 l~ abili ty to think more ~bstractly.
Thus, while--reasoning at the tirst two
stages involves quite concrete reasoning about
individual persons and events, with little or no
perception of a society, reasoning at the third and lhi
fourth stages invol ves gradually more abstract ' /
thinking, in which -a perception of society, its groups,
and its institutions developso In any case, it must be .r
understood at this point, that analysis of moral ..
development ia not baaed on the content of the
decision, but on reaaons for the decision.
In stage five, the individual peI'!ceives
the neoessity of laws, but he perceives laws as
reformable, sUQject to 'critical examination, and valld
only when agreed on by the'whole society. On the other
hand, in private mattera, which are matt~rs outside the , - ,
agreement of society, what is considered'right ia oiten
seeq as a question of personal values and opinions.
principles of justice, or reciprocity and equality of -
human rights, and of respect for the dignity of human
beings as individual persons. 2.5
This stage i8 the fUll-flowering ot the
morally mature individual, whereby the individual must
show understand~ng, autonomy, and a natural tendency
toward justice and equity. The mature person must also
understand that laws and conventions are not sacred in
their own right. There are optional ways ot living,
and alternative value systems.
This understanding can only come with
exposure to various value systems, and an appreciation
ot, the reasons for the existence ot these different
system.s. However, once an individual perceives' these
ditferent lite-styles, he will, in a sense, transcend
his own, and see i t. as just another lite-style or value
system alongside alternatives. This Will cause him to
make a deliberate choice concerning val;ues or
lite-styles. This is considered autonomy - when one 1
who \lnderstarids various options chooses to pursue one
or another. 0
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Still, according to Kohlberg, this
choice of values or life-styles is not made
arbitrarily, since the overriding limitation on any
choice is a concern for others. Self'-serving,
egotistic choices are always retrogressive·. In
chdosing for oneself alone, one opta out of moral life
.a1 together. Thus, the concern for others, which limits
the choice of justified options must, be, as a concern
for others, a concern for justice and equity. Kant \ t 1
emphaslzes here t the nee~ for respect and digni ty, . ' '
sinee one 0 who does not .respect or love himself can be
cruel to others 1 as well.l as ta himself rd still
satisty the "golden rule" ... /
It is also important ta note that moral
maturity does not come automatically with chronological ,
age. Moral development may be arrested or stimulated.
Thus , we flnd physically and chronol~gieally mature " "
adul ts who are at stages as- low as one or two. or whG- \)
never get beyond stage four.
"However,1 Kohlberg does state that the
sequence of m~ra1 development la universal. 26 ~hat o 16, the nature of ~he sequenèe ts not significantly
affect~ci by widely varyit;1g SQcial, cultural or "
reiigious conditions.
The only thing that la atteeted is 1 the
rate at whith individuals progress through the sequence'.
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For example, it was found that, although middle-class
and working,-class children move through the same
sequence, the middle-class children move faster and
further. 27
Neither is this sequence dependent on a ,
particular religion, or" a:ny religion at all, in the
particular sense. Kohlberg found no difference in the
development of moral thinking among Gatholics. • J
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Protestants, Jews, Buddhists, Moslems, and atheists.
Some of these universal aspects of morality are outlined
in Appendix I. •
In any~ event, stage. six 1 is difficul t to
compr~hend • Even Kohlberg h!mself admits that ,.,..
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interview data 1s qu1"te sp~se, and, to explain stage , ~
six, he usua~ly r'efers to examples of li terature 'or
words of contemporar,y heroes, aucb as Gandhi or Martin
Luthèr King. He cites the following passages from / c'
King' s no:t;es from a" Birmingham jall as an example of
stage six reasoninga
,
One may ask. 'How can you advocate breaking some lawa .and obeying others?' The answer lies in the fact that there are two 1
types of laws, just and unjust. One has not only a legal but a moral responsibility to obey just laws. One has the moral "" responsibilit~ to disobey unjust laws. Any law that URlift'B buman personal~ty i6 jus:t. any .lcaw, that. degrades human personality is unjust.
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An unjust law is a code that a numerital or power majority group compels a minority group to obey
f but does not make binding on itself. This is difference made legal. 28
34
This may be true principled thinking.
However, what in i t makes i t stage six? What maltes i t
a reasoning higher and better than stage five
reasoning'? What makes it morally and cognitively more
adequate?
This is a difficult issue indeed, and
i8 one Kohlberg has not succeeded in resol ving in his
own mind. "29 One si~ of this irresolution ia his
• recent theorizing about a stage seven, which is purely
hypothetical, an'd not based on data, as are the moral
stages. It (stage seven) is a post-conventional
religious orientation, both dependent upon, and
demanded by a stage six orientation to the ethical.
To blame this irresolutiôn on Kohlberg
alone would be unfair, Binee, in reaching' stage six, we
are, according to Kan~'s own dat~, probably leaving a
vast, major_ity of people behind. Even though the
latter may be the case, it is still possible to
analyze moral reasoning (at ât~e six) from various
p~ilosophic~er~pectives. . (
This, calls t.o mind an' examp~e of the
fundamental difference between the ethical theories of
methodologically, and Kohlberg 8eems to !Ully accept '-
Piaget's methodological attack. 35
We can identifY this content and concrete
o'rientation at stages one and two of the \
preconventional level of Kohlberg's theory in terms of
the physical or the hedonistic, consequences of action.
However, from an abstract point of view, we can see the
Kantian concept of fi imperfect dut y" •
It "perfect dut y" , for Kant. ia one which
admits of no exception in the interests of inclination. J
Kant uses the example of suicide here, by saying that
we are not entitled to commit suicide, even though we
have the strong inclination to do SOI Kant explain~
this in the following mannerl
A man feels Bick of life as the result of a series of misfortunes that has mounted to the point of
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despair, but he is still so far in possession of hie reason ~s to ask himself whether taking.his own life may not be contrary to nis dut y to himself. )6
40
Kant used the ,argument thatoit i5 from
self-love that a person makes i t hi~ principle to
shorten his life, . and that this ia in contradiction to
a system of nature whose function i t is to stimulate
the furtherance of life., Hence, this maxim can neither
subsist as a system of nature, no~ hold as a universal 4
law of nature, and is, therefore, opposed to the
• supreme principle of duty. This supreme principle of
dut y is that an action do ne from dut y has its moral
worth, not from the results it attains or seeks to \
attain, but from a .formal principle or maxim - the
principle of ~oing one's dut y, whatever ~hat may/be. ,
To act for the sake of dut Y is to act on a fomal
maxim, 'tf1rrespective of all objects of' the faculty of
desire" • - 1
As we have seen from our discussion of
stages one and two in Konlberg's theory, a person does .----not act out of a sense of dut Y in the Kantian sense at
thése stages, but rather, out of an, inclinatiop to
avoid IpuniShment (stage one), and ta instrumentally
satisfy his own ne~ds (stage two). Therefore, moral
judgemetlts here, are made on a basis of imperfect dut Y , )
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and ther~fore, cannot be consider~d
universal law of nature,
41
part. of the)
~t./ Furthermore, a'person a
two acts according to sUbjective conditi
one or
or practic~ ~eason. These subjeotive co ditions are
certain impulsions or "inclinations" that ftect the
will. An example of this would be the incl nation not
to do something because of physiCal conseque ces.
,On the otl1er hand, "objective
principles" are those on which a rational agen would
necessarily act. if reason had full control over
passion. These objective principles seem almost to
constrain or to necessitate the will. Where an
objective principle ia conceived as necessitating, it
may be described às a command or imperative, and i8
expreased by the words, "r ought". Kant classifies
these imperatives as followst
All imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. Hypothetical imperatives de clare a possible action to be practically necessary as a means to the attainment of someihing else that one wil~s. (or that one may will). A categorical imperativ~ would be one whic~/represented an action as objectively necessary in itself apart .t'rom its relation to a fUrther end. 37
The imperatives that would command the
will qf a stage one or, two judgement would be, in the
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Kantian sense, "hypothetical", since actions do ne at
this leve~ oI.moral reasoning are done as a me ans
toward the attainm~~t of sorne 'end, namely, avoiding \ \, "O>,t
punishment,Jlld patisfy~ng ,
are "pragmatie'II, sinee the
one's own needs. These ends
which eveiy rational
agent wills by his/very n,ture la his own happlness. 1
They are also 'tconditloned". s· ce they are based on
the willing of sorne end, whic , in this case, ia . , ,
happiness. The avoidance punlshment and sa~iBfylng
one's needs wo~ld, in Kan pragmatic and
"eonditioned" , sinee theYi are based,on a me ans toward 1
an en~, rather than on impersonal prineiple, valid
for others, as well as imself., exclusive of passion or
self-interest.
Thus, Kant's concept of dut y applies here
in the imperfect sense, and'does not adhere to the
Law of Nature as he describes it. It could be said
then, that stages one and two are expressions of
iœpertect dut y, because there is latitude for
more inclination. As an example o~ imperfect duty.
we may dec~de to adopt the max~ of deve~oping our
tale~ts, and of helping others, but we are, to sorne
lextent. entitled to decide arbitr~ly which talents we
will adopt, and which persons we will help.
The obed1ence and punishment orien~ation
is actuallY an egocentric deference ta superior power,
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prestige, or to a trouble-avoiding situation. The
objective form of responsibility depicted here would be
typified by a response such as that of a criminal who,
obèys a prison rule by statingl Il l'Il do i t because l
don' t \want to' do more time". This sarne person may
accept a rule because he wants to keep out of trouble".
We can see here the parallel between
wanting to keep out of trouble and Kant's notion of
pragmatic imperatives. The prisoner, in'a sense, is
prudent in not breaking any rules of the prison, so
that he does not end up "doing more time". Prudence in
not breaking rules avoids the physical consequence's of
punishment for not complying ta what is demanded by a
superior power. As an example, in every society, human
life is a basic value, even though cultures differ in. "
their definition of the universality of this value, or .
of the conditions underwhich it may be sacrified for
some other Value.)8 In stage one, the value of human • • 6 - •
life ls based on the soc~al status of phys~cal attr1butes
of its possessor'J The value of a healthy person's life,
in this case, would be more valuable than that of an'
elderly person who is fatall.y ill. Lf i t may be said
that the basic value of physical objects and social /' 1
status are pragmatic, then it may aiso be said that ,1 '
auah an end as the value of human life is a pragmatic
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imp.erative, and is one that every rational agent wills
by his very natur~.
- ~ motives for moral behaviour at this
stage may be due, howèver, to either physical or
psychological punishment experiences. Such punishment
experiences could be inflicted by a parent on a child
by either the use of an external punishment (i;e.1 the
spanking of a child), harsh words, or the withdr~wal ~ -.
of sorne desired object of an offender's well-being
(i.e., thè withdr~wal of a promised privilege, or love' ~-
by a parent). Therefo~e, the pragmatic possibility of . seme forro of punishment Ir influences" the rational agent
to perform a moral act.'
The first stage of moral development is,
it'!. _tn-i-s--way', a hypothetical imperati ve, 5ince an action !
here ls good solely as a means toward an end. which is
to avo'd punishment. There is an inherent interest or
motive ere ta do good for the sake of personal
From a Kantian perspective, there is a 1
strong t,' .fluence" of puilishment on the will to do good
in order to avoid punishment.
In any rase, a rational ag~nt must -regard himself as capable of acting on his own rational
principies. This presupposes·that his will is .free to
do what-is right, or do what is wrong, and suffer the
consequences. This, Kant __ says, puts us into a vicious
stag~ ls that of moral interests or motives for human
action. _ An interest only arises, according to Kant,
through a combination of"feel.ing and rèason.
Cansequently; interests are found only in·finite
rational agents who are sensuous.
Kant then states that there are two
types of interest. When the interest is based on thé :-~
feeling and desire ar~used by some object of exper~encet , ,
Qne May be said to have a mediate or pathologieal , CI
interest in an action appropriate to attain the. "-
object. 40 When,the interest is aroused by the idea of-l,
moral law, it may be said to take an immediate (or
practical) interest in the action willeq in accordance
with this idea. The baBie of the interest we take in ,~\
moral action is what is called "moral feeling".
In t~e case of stage two, the moral
interest would be based on a feeling or desire aroused
by some object of experience. This mediate int~rest is
aroused by the naively egoistic orientation ot stage 1
two. The object of experience would be èxpressed
through the needs of the self, and ~~casion~lYt
others' needs. ' The feeling or desire would be ~'
obtain an object o! experience by means of re~procity. This, again. ,is a case for the
,hypothetical imperative, whe eby'~ act ls motivateG
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by a means, rather than an end. The ends are sUbjective
or~relative, insofar as the moral agent at stage two'is /
mainly concerned with self-interest.
Two ~ajor advances occur at stage two
over stage one thinking, since there emerges a more
positive conception of what is good and a more ,
adequate view of ,society, tempered by egoism. The
stage two person can be considered a hedonist, or
plea,sure-seeker.
Although stage two thinking is
characterized more positively as the pleasant ,
consequences r~lated to actions, judgement is stil~
concrete, dealing with a particular action and its
expected.consequences. Therefore, ·it May be sa~d that
imperatives and goo~ wil~ are conditioned at this stage
of moral development ~
Therefore. based on what has been said
so far, we can see that, ft~ the Kantian philosophical
perspective, Kohlberg's stage two of moral development
invol ve s actions based on judgement,s due .to motive 6 0 f
fi imperfect dutylf. Such an imperative of imperfect dut Y
is to act on a certain motive with room left for the
dete~ination of the occasion and the specifie kind and <." 41
direction of the actibn. So far. we have not mentioned Kant' s
concept of heteronomy, which is important, in our
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investigation of the prec,onventional level of moral
development. Kant considera heteronomy of the will
, as the source of all spurious principles of morality,
and describes it in the fOllowing mannerl
/
If the will seeks the law that is to determine i t anywhere el se than in the fi tnes,s of i ta maxims for its own making of universal 'law -- if' therefore in going beyond itself it seeks this law in the character of any of its objects -- the result is a1ways heteronomy. In that case the will does not give itself the law, but the object does so in virtue of its relation to the will. This relation, whether based on
~inclination or on rational ideas, can give rise only to hypothetical imperatives. 42
In this case, a person would say.
"1 ought to do something because l will sornething
else" . The will is, in this manner, under the
influence of an inclination or alien interest, when
making judgements on principles of morality. Thus, for
example, thé reason why l ought to promote the
happiness of others is because thS realization of their
happiness is of consequence to.-myself. \
These ~eteronomous principles are either
empirical or rational. When they are empiricaa., their
pripciple is ~ways the pursuit of happiness, al though
'0 some of them may be based on natural feelings of
pleasure and pain, while others may be based on a ..l
supposed moral feeling or moral sense. When they are
rational, their principle i6 always the pursuit of'
perfect~on, either a perfection to be attained by our
own will. or one supposed to be already existent in the
Will of God, wllich imposes certain tasks upon our will.
Heteronomous principles would
characterize moral reasoning at Kohlberg's stag~s one
and two, because, in these cases, principles are guides \
for acting in a way that will a~hieve some desired
objectives. We follow them as long as we want the'
object, and think they are the best means of getting
it.
rt ia this self-interest that one ia
trying to secure at stages one and two of moral
reasoning. Since moral value at the preconventional
level resides in personal needs rather than in
persons and standards, then objective principles
become è~ocentric, and right action becomes that which "
instrumentally satisfies the sel!!s--nè-éds and, ~--
occasionally, othera.!- rreêds. The typical response of
an indi vi dual at this point of moral development would
be, "I 'm number one. l look after me. If you help
me out, maybe r'll help you sometime".
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This form _of reasoning not_ only reflects , ~.
self-interest, but also, heteronomoug principles that
would consider another individual as a means toward ~
some 'end. In other words, one may occasionally satisfy
o~bers' ne~ds as a meane toward an end of satisfying . . one' s own needs.
Now that we can say that Kant' s concept
of heteronomy ia applicable to Kohlberg's first two
stages, we can â.J.so see evidence of a: hierarchy of
moral reasoning and maturi ty that app;J.ies to the
concept of heteronomy, as well ~s to stages one and
two. ..
I~ iB at stage one'that a person is at .~-
the least mature stage of moral thinking, according to
Kohlberg, and it is this stage that is least
philoBophically adequate in comparison to higher stages.
That ia, each hig,her stage defines a more coherent and 1
rational 'way of resolving'moral conflict. 4)
Simarly, Kant states that a moral.
judgement bas~d on heteronomous principles ~annot
lead to a trulY moral ac~. Therefore, ainee stage
oneexhibits the greatest extent of heteronomous
reasoning, it ls also the least philosophlcally "
adequate folÎn of moral reasoning, in the' Kantian sense,
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Furthermore, 1 if we go on to stage two
moral reasoning, we ,can see that there is heteronomy
involved ,in making moral j~ements at t,his stage, but
the will making these jUdgements' is less heteronomous • here than at stage one. This is most evident in the
fact that stage two moral decisions are less egocentric
than at stage one. If we apply thi~~ to the concept of " the value of life, stage one is more' heteronomous than
" stage two, because, for the stage one reasoner, the ,
. value of human life is conf'used with the value of
physical abjects, and la based on the social statua
of physical attributes of its possessor. At stage two,
on the other hand, the value of a human life is seen as
instrumental to the satisfaction of the needs of its 44 possessor or of other persans.
'. In bath cases, however. moral reason~ng
is fundamentally rooted in "inclinations" and
"interests", 'whlch regard persans as means, rather than
ends in themselves in the Kantian perspective. Further
illustrations of this can be found in Appendix II.
The heteronomy of moral principles
discuased so far doe~.;not restrict i teelf to stages
one and two, but èontihues at the conventlonal'leve~ y
of stages t~ee an~ four. This leads us to the focus I~
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of Kohlberg' s theory of moral developme~t.
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CHAPT ER III 1 ~ "
HETERONOMY AND THE CONVENTIONAL LEVEL
At the conventional level of mO&.1
developmept, Kohlberg states that moral value resides
in performing good or right roI es, in maintaining the .-
conventional order and the expectations· of others. J
At stage three, there is a "good bOY/
nice-girl" orientation to seek approvaJ., please, or
help others. Therè la also a conform~ ty ta
stereotyPical images of the majorlty oi' natural role
behaviour, and jUdgement by intentions. 45
Kant saya, on the other hand, that, if
the will seeks the' universal law in tp,e character of ,
any of its abjects, the result ls always heteronomous. ,
In that case, the wlll does not give itself the law,
but the -abject does so, in virtue of i ts relation tri
the will. This relation. therefore, whether based on
inclination or on rational ideas, can give riee only to
hypothetical imperativee.
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In this- case. one might saya "I ought
not to lie if l want tQ maintain my reputation". This J
object J)f "maintaining a reputation" is now an
influence on the will. and practical reason administers
a matter of interest. Thus. the reason why one ought ,
to promote the happiness of others is because the 1
realization of their happiness is of consequence to
onesel!.
This i6 clearly a reasoning proce ss in
stage th~ee, since the inclination to be moral depends
on conventional arder or the exPectation of others.
The happiness of others, in this case. is of
consequence to onesel!. For example, if one does not
confonu to the wishes o! the majarity or its /
st~reotypical images. then that person is not
considered to be a "good boy/nice girl te. The influence.
therefore, on the stage three person is that reasoning ,
at this stage adheres to the moral standards set .1
by the majori ty. The object of the will of one,\s "
action is to seek approval, or ta be pleasing to others.
We must keep in mind, though~ that~oral .~-
~ stages are structures of moràl judgement or moral
/ "
reasoning, and must be distinguished from the content .-/
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of moral judgement. In a dilemma, for example, that
raises the issue of stealing a drug to save a dying
woman, the choiee endorsed by a subject (steall- do not
st-eal) is called the content of 'moral ju'dgement in' the ,
~i tuation., The reasoning about the 9hoice defines, the
structure of the moral judgement. This reasoning
cent ers around the universal moral values described in
Appendix I.
A moral choice involves choosing between
two (or more) of these values as they conflict in
concrete situations. j
The stage or structure of a
person's moral judgement deiines:
1. what he finds valuable in each of these .-
moral issues; and,
why he finds i t valuable. 46
As anexample, at stage three, life i5
valued in terms of the individual' s rela~ions with
others and their valuation of him. At' stage four, life
is valued in terms ,of social or religious law.
Having reviewed the nature of stages of
moral\ jUdgement., we must also consider the relation of
moral judgement to moral action. Kohlberg states that, .J
if logical reasoning is a necessary, but not sufficient
condition for mature moral judgement, mature ,moral
judgement la necessary t but not a sufficent condition for
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57 mature moral action. One cannot follow moral principles,·
if one doès not understand or believe in moral
prlnclples. HQwever, one can reason ln terms of
principles, and not live up to these principles. 1
Principles, as expialned' befo e, are to
be distinguished from rules. The conventiona morallty
of stages three and four ls grounded on rule
"thou shalt nots", such as represented by th
Commandments. Rules are prescriptions of ki \
primarily
" 1
actions. Principles, on the ,other hand, are \unlversal \ \
guides to making à moral decision, such as Kant' s
"categorical imperative", which We will discuss later .
Conventional morality, then, would involve heteronomy
of the will,-accordlng ta empirlcal principles.
Furthermore, Kant classes the
principle 9f moral feeling with that of happiness,
whereln every empirical principle of heteronomy
promises a contribution to our well-being, merely
trom the satisfaction afford~d by something - whether
this satisfaction ia given immediately and without \~Y \
consideration of advantage, or la given in respect o'f
such advantage. \
~his perspective demon~trates KOhlbet's
stage three, since a person at this stage is as good s \
possible in arder to conform to the expectations of
society. This could be due ta a possible effect of our
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will, not onl.y to be as good as necessary to seek
approval, but also, to attempt to reach an, ideal 1
maximum level of conformity or approval, so that one _may
be considered "one of the best" persons one can
possibly become naturally.
Taking the empiriCal principle into
-consideration, a stage three person would have a
natural or moral feeling, that being of good moral /
character leads to personal happiness, because it '
meets the approval of others. On the other hand, not
be~ng of good moral character would cause one to be
unhappy, because this would lead to di~approval.
The conventional ievel necessitates a
move from the concrete egoistic v~ew of the
preconventional to a cognitive perspective of the
.'values of the group, group practices, and group rules. 1
A~ions are, in this case, evaluated in terms of how
weIl they fulfill the expecta~ions of a group in their
own right, regardless of the consequences to oneself.
way.
,
Kohltierg descrfbes this' in the following
At this level, maintaining the expectations 0 f the indi vj.dual ' s family group or nation is perce.ived as valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate or obvious consequences. The attitude is not only of conformity to personal expectations and social orq,er, but loyal ty to it, of 'actlvely
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59
At the third stage, the person begins to
realize ,that the e steem and approval of others is
becoming more important than conerete rewards, and
approvaJ. comes only when one ia willing to do one' s
share. Belonging to a significant group, where one is
important, reinforces one' s sense of self-worth.
Sinee a feeling of ,self-worth is, in a sense, a pursui t
of happiness by creating a sense of 'wtÜl-being, then we -
should claasity i t as an empirical heteronomous /
prineiple. Kant says, however. that to be happy ls one
thing, but to be good ls anotherl and, to confuse the
two ia to abolish the distinction between virtue .and
vice. All these doc~rines of hete:ronomy suppose that p
,moral law has to bEi1 -derived from some ob~ect of the li
will, rather than f om the will itself, and must coÂsider
morally good aetio to be good, not in itself, but
merely as a means to an anticipated resul t.
50 i t is wi th the stage three person, .. whose object is to conform ta the approval of a group,
and who acts in a moral wey, in arder to receive an
anticipated result, which ia the approval of the group ;
itself, leading to a sense oftself-worth. If this , \ \
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group is a group that promotes the theological concept,
which derives morali ty trom a divine and supremely
perfect will (God), then the group May represent a
c~urch communi ty for the stage three perso'n. In any
case, the will does not give itself the law, but an
, allen impulsion of seeking approval does so through 1 \
the medium of' the subject' S own natur~ in order to
re alize self-worth.
Kant suggests here tl'\~t man is not
responsible to-hié reason alone. For, he is responsible ~I'
in an equal way to "his appetites and emotions. "
Reasan heads the claims of man's sensuous naturel it
operate~ in an instrumental, and hence, heteronomous
fashion. ' 48
From this statement, one deduces the
fact that there ia some de~ree of instrumentality that
extends into stage 'three :rrom .stage two, since one ia r
generall.y concerned 'with one's need to be ~pproved by a 1
group to achieve a sense ~f ~elf-worth.
At stage four, there is an authori ty and,
social arder maintenance orientation. This orientation
is to "doing dut Y " , and to showing respect for o •
authority. andoto maintaini.ng the given social ord~r for
its own sake. There ia also a rega,r.d for earned
exp~ctations of others. It would be as· if ~ayingJ
"Look, you r re supposed to help others. It 1 s l ike a
rule. -Without people doing their jobs, society
couldn' t function fi •
The question :ttiat arises now, i'rom a
K~tian perspect"ive, iB wh'ether this stage is what Kant
terms a sense of dut y or a reverence for law. Kant /
states that, under human conditions, wherein we have ta
strugglÈ~ against unruly impulses and desires, the good ""
will is manifested in -acting for the sake of dut Y , This
acting for the sake of dut Y may be perfect or
'- imperf'ect. as stated previously\,' Hence if' we are
ta understand human goodness at stage four, we must
examine how -the concept of dut Y relates to stage four
reasoning.
/
;).
Kant saysl
Human action ia morally good, not '-because it is done from immediate inclination -- still less because it iB done trom self'-interest -but because i t is done for the sake of duty. 49
An act' n is not considered by Kant to
be morally good of a sense of perfect dut y, if'
tt--i""s done out o~ sel
'incl~ned to attribute
We may, however, be
to right actions
" done solelY from some immedjJa.te inclination, ;for
example • .trom a direct- impulse o"t sympat,hy or
generos1ty'. -Tc test th!s. we must isolate 'Our reasons
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for acting, and consider fi~st an action done solèly
out of dut y, and not out' of inclination. "
In the case of a dut Y done out of
immediate inclination or natural sympathy, it may be
right and praisewo~thy, but it has no distinctively
moral worth in Kantian terms. It ia the motive of
dut y, for its own sake, not the doing of a dutiful .) /
action O'ut 01 some motive of inclination, that gives
moral worth to an action.
iSl
The formal principle of dut y, to Kant,
An action done ~rom dut Y has its moral worth, not from the results it attains or seeks -to attain, but' from a formal principle or max~ -- the principle of doing one' s dut Y , whatever that may be. 50
Thus, to act for the sak~ of ~uty is to
act on a formal maxim, irre~pective of all objects~f "
the- faculty of desire. Only such "dutiful" actions cano
have moral worth. according to Kant. c
If we consider the principle of dut Y for
the stage four person in Kohl berg' s theory, we see that
the basis principles of moral thinking fU'e not in line
with a sense of perfect dut y, as Kant defines duty.
The stage four pe;rson would be acting more out of a
sense of imperfect dut Y • be,cause such a person would be , .
inçlined ta follow the laws of society, since he Ihas an
moral development, Kohlberg states that moral value
resides.in conformity by th~ moral agent to snared
and ~harf§able standards, rights" or duties. Here is
where the moral phi"losOphy of Kant cames very close '
ta the ~hilosoph1cal basis of Kohlbefg's moral .
development theory. '\
\
The proximi ty of philosophy does
not comp~etely OCCur. 'however, at stage .five, ~ince
this stage is still based mainly on a conventional, • tJ ',,'" cont~~ctUal and legalistic orientation, àImilar to . . ~,
,< stage four môr~ity: Furthermore. there ls a
, .. \ , ~
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or starting ..,.POint in making rules or expectations.
Dut Y ia defined in terms of contract, general avoidance
of violation of the will or rights of others, as well
as the will and welfare of the lIlajority.
one could say that, at this stage 1
. ',. it'a a law that people coneented to. We all have an obligation to work through the agreed strllcture to get laws which appear wrong changed. When an ipjusttce ls committed, it is best to work through the system to end it. 59
Principl~d thinking, according to
Kohlberg, invol ves a postulation of principles t'o whieh
the society and the self ought to be co~. This
Invol ves a move toward moral theory, by which ia meant
not onl.y a concern for justitying particUlar laws or
rules, but a c'oncern for discovering the 'most basic
principles from which all laws are derived. 60 . This all.ows one to look at any system or
society, including one'e own; as a fact which may or
may not live- up ta an Ideal order. Reason is the basis
o;f jUdging what the ideal la toward whlch society ought
to etrive. 'l'he principles which reason furnishes _ are
the basis of èthical theory.
Such ~ state ie autonomous. sinee one îs
freed :rro~ soci~ty'· s viewsf ànd. accordiri to Koh~berg,
ls the most adequate e;thical or moral posi tian. as Is
~
•
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78
the case in Kantian moral philosophy. Thei:'e ia one
criterion for moral maturity in Kantian philoaophy,
and that criterion ià autonomy in Judgement. What thi~
means for Kohlberg ia that i t la deciding on the
basia of self-chosen principles, which is distinguished
t'rom aimply "making up one 1 s own mind" about what is
right gr wrong--
~f a person spends his entire life
, doing what he is told to do by an authori ty, merely
be~ause of fear of authority (stage one), or because - , .. 1 ",
it brings pleasure (stage two). or because it is
expected Dy a grou~stage three), or because it ls
the law '(stage four), he has never really made moral
decisions on his own. One must achieve autonomy in the
formulation of ethical prinoiples in order to be,
morally mature, and must develop onels own principles
of judge~ent and action.
Thua, Kohlberg describes the
po'st-conventional level, autonomous principled. level of
moral development as on'e where there is 1
•
• • • a clear effort to define moral values and princlples whioh have validity and application apart :t'rom the authori ty 0 f the groups or per~ons holding !hese pr1noip~es and apart .!rom the indi vidual' S own i4entitie-at1on with these groups. • • ~ 61
The autonomou8 per~on.must accept the ~ ,
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group only insofar as his own conscience ean live with
it. No group mind may aupplant his own conscience.,
Autono~y in Kantta éthics, on the other hand, is that
freedoro consisting in self-determination and
independ,.e'nce 0 f all external constrain.t. Kant def'ines 1
• - Î
autonomy of the will as subjection of the will to its
own.--law, the categorical imperative, in eontrast ta
héteronomy, its aUbjection to a law or end outaide of
th~ rational will. 62 This autonomy iB particularly
charaoteristie of the human will, Binee it involvea the
freedom of' the rational will to legislate to itself and
this ia that which constitutes the basis for the autono~y
of the moral law.
Autonomy of the will la that property'
of the wil.l by which it la a· law to itaelf, and al.ways
so chooses that the same volition (the act or power ,of
wlll.ing) shall comprehend the maxima of our choice as
a'universal law. 6; Maxims could be de,acribed here as.
1· a voluntary act that proceeds acoording .
ta a "subject~ve principle of action", ,
(e.g •• in breaking a promise. one has
as one's maxim, "Wh~n it ia to my ,
advantage t l will malte a promise and
nQt keep, 1t. ,,)
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right or
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80
can tell whether an act is
not by aSking whether\ one can .
maxim to be a universal law. 64
Th~re is a progression here, similar
ta that Qf Kohlberg's, in the order of the categories
of unit y of the form of the will (its universality),
plurality Qf matter (the objects, or the enda) , and the
totali ty of the sy:stem of the se. In forming our moral
jUdgement of actions" i t ia better to proceed always
from the general formula of the categqrical imperative,
\ \
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. ,
,Act according to a ma~im which can at the same time ,
make itself a universal law. 65 ,T~is general formula ,
of Kant'a categorical imperative iS,concerned witp the
formal principle of moral actions. ,'Bu,t rational actions
have endS' as well as" principles. For an action to have
true moral worth, its end must have uncondj.tioned or
ab'solute worth. Kant maintain's that on,ly rational agents ...
can have auch unconditioned'value. This is consistent
with his account of ~he good will as rationally self
determining, and with his postulation that.
It is impossible to conceive anything at all fn the world, or even out of it, which can be t~en as good without qualification, except a goodwill. 66
opposed to the fonnal principle of moral action, Kant
arrives at the formula. • 1
Act ~n' such a way that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in the person of all others, nevér as a means only but always equally as an end. 67
) In Kohlberg, the major di'fterence
çetween stages four and j'ive is in the beliet of the
fixity or tegiveness" of law, and the difference in the'
belié! of the existence of an authori ty to promulgate • 1
the laws.
. Stage five sees the law as something
which is created by man. based on what is seen as ;the
) common good. Law is man' S own invention,
democratically designed ta meet man' s needs. The stag~
being in a position ta challenge and ~
~
'critically examine a law,' ia, in a very important sense,
Cree of the l.aw~til hé c;lecides it ia rational, and,
consequently" decides to subjec.t himself to it. When
posltively-made law interferesj wlth thè person, it is
not meant to aid, and becomes self .. defeating~ • Î
Stage live think ing , although critical, /
la not arbitrary, aince one's reject,ion of exist'ing , ,
laws Fd the proposala of ne~ l.aws must be sUbj eet to 1
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rational conBideratio~s and critiques. They cannot be
rejected simp~y because ",they do not serve one' a interest,
or because they do not meet one' S own ideals.
Society' is "seen as absol.utely essential
and i ts preservation ia seen t9 re~t on \i1cri tical. appraisal'
of its rules and practices. Therefore, one has th'e legal
and moral obligation to obey just laws and to disobey unjust
laws. . Any law that uplif'ts human peraonali ty ià just, and <:
• any law that degrades human personality is unjust.
At stage t'ive, Kohlberg's moral development
theory approaehes a simUari ty to Kant' s canon of moral " \
judgement that" we should be able to wil.l that the maxim of' 'Olt;>
our action should bepome a universal law. However, ther:e
are stil.l. traces in the stage five person of hypothetical.
imperatives, sinee the objective principles of the common
good are condi tioned by a will for the end of the
~reserJation of' society. The wil.l of the moral person,
here, ia stlll. "conditioned"; and actio~s a~ this stage c" .
are stUI "good",' aS me ans to an end (the preservation i .,
of individual rights). 1 •
At stage t'ive, having a right has an
awareness of human or natural rights or liberties which ~
, are prior to soci~t,., '- and which society. ia supposed' t~
protect. It ls u$ually thouaht by a person at stage rive ~~ ~ 1
that fi"eedoms shoul~ be 111111 tad by soel.etlf and law_ only when
:they are ~comP!lt1ble Vli.th the 11ke 1è.Gè-domS of others (~. e",
to ful!'i1l in order to have one' s own rig s resP7cted
and protected- These obligations are efizied in terms
of a rational concern for the wel! e of others
(obligations that require rational t"éoncern for we1fare,
differentiated from fixed responsibLli ties. ) 68
(" , Moral princip,les, at stage five, are
still empirj.ea1. since reasoning at this stage involves
the pursuit of happiness.~ either baeed on natura1
feelings, sueh as pl~asure and pain, moral feelings, or
moral Bense. Hetero,nomouB .principles here ean be
def1ned as rational, in Kantian terms, sinee stage five , '
reasoning seeks perfeetfon in establishing iaws that
serve individual righta and thoae of the majority in
the best possible' manner.
To deseribe the ..,wUl at stage. t'ive as )
t'ree would be to B_8Y that it ean act c~usally, without
being cause4 to do sa by something other than i taelf .
. However, a stage' t.lve perso~ la ::t'ree ~o observe lawB,
not becauslI he--does so out of individual inclination,
but because i t· la the wUl of the' majori ty in a
society. Therefore. 'obec1ience of 'the will to a law
at stage five ls eaused by ~omething other than i teelf"
namely, by the will of the majority. and ie not truly .
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~ , ' 84 l::,--v trae in 'the Kantian sense. Thus one cannot f'ind the
moral law which Kant defines as leading to moral good
at stage five. We must look on te ,stage -six.
At stage six, m~rai decisions are
guided by self-chosen ethica:J, principles. Particular
laws or social agreements are judged valid because
they rest on such principles. When laws. violate these
principles, one acts .fh accordance with the latter.
Principles, in this case, arJ'univerSal
principles of' justice,' such as the equa1ity of human
rights and respect for the digni ty of the human being
as an individual person: These are not merely values
which are recognizedr ·they are principles used to
genera~e particular decisions,. The reason for doing ,
right is that, as a rat,ional person, the stage six
individual has seen the val.idity of principles, and
has' become comi tted to them.
The social perapectl ve la a perspective
of a "moral point of view". from, whlcli principles are
grounded. The perspective is that of any rational
individual. recognizing the nature of morality, or
, the basic moral~remise of respect for other pe'rsons ,. ,'69 1 •
,as ends, not means. This is ln acco,rd with Kant's ,-,,<.~> " .. , \ l ~
. formula which .bids ~s ta treat persons never mt!rely as . ' '
means~ but always as ends in themse.l ves. , Th;s is, the
th~ing that app,als to loglCal comprebensiveness.
" . .-
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universality, and consistency. Yet, stage six is 'concerned
with the logic of moral reasoning which also requires a \
valid proof. Thua, if one is willing to have everyone
adopt onels reason for doing something, one has_'a
genuinely univeraal, comprehensive, and consistent rule."
Having a right at stage six implies th~t ,
there are universal rights of juat treatmènt which go ,
~) beyond libertiea, and which repreaent ·up~~ers~izable
claims of one individu al upon .another., Obliga~ion. on
the other hand, involve.s 811Y right Qr just claiIrl by an' ~ , '
individual. glving use to'~a corresponding dut Y ,to
another individual. 70 ,"
"Obligation, for ,Kant, ia the: nece~aity
o~ a iree action under the categorical ~p~rative br reason. An acti?n is allowed if it is n~t opposèd ,'0 obligation, and this freedom that is not limited by any
~ . opposing imperatlve la oalled "competence .. fi . 71
~'"
"
Dut Y la that action to which a person i$
bound, and ïs, therefora, the content ~f obligation. • 0
Because obligation includes, not only partial
neces~~tYt but ala~\ c,onstraint" the imperative ls a law
according to whether the perfo~ance or nonperformance
ia represented,as a duty. An action which ls nelther
co~anded n~r prohibit!d la me~ly allowedj and la
conaldered morally indlfferent • ....
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If one is to 'consider stage slx of le
Kohlberg's theory to be prinbipled thinking, then it , .,
must include the ~oncepts of dut y and obligation ,in the
Kanti~ ,sense.
Our investigations of Kohlberg' s theory '.
show us that thls concept of obligation ,is parallel to'
Kant's phllosophy. s~nce Kohlberg states that obligation
at s'âlge six la any right or Just claim 'by: an.
indlvldual that gives ri se to a'corre~ponding dut y r
to another indi~dUal. 72
Onlyat stage six'are rights and duties
, compl~tely correlative. The meaning of correlative
righte is well defined bY,Raphael Dai-ches in the
"following passage 1
",,,
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We turn next to the nation oi: "rights tl
• T~ere are two senses of th~ word, the first meaning, "1 have no duty to refrain !rom sa acting", the second 1n which l describe thé same fact as l <taBcr!be by saying, "Someone else has. 'a' dut Y ta me". The second' kind of a 'X'i&ht might be called ·'8 rl.&ht of recipience". Whenever I have a right ot action, l also
,have a right of recipience. In vit'tue of the second definition of rights, the t'No forms pt . expression. "A has. a dutY to Bit and "B has a right (ot recipience) agaÛlst A" are' correlative in the -senae of analytically implying each other. They may l'lot be connotati vely tautologous,' in o~~,apeech. t~ough they are 1i1 the lIlOXIe precise language
pure will, the will of'ten opposes the senses. Moreover, . , toese moral laws are categorical. or' uncond~tional. ' From r - . this t we see tl)at certain actions, or ~heir oPPosites - )"
are, accopding to the se imperative,s,morally necessary ,
~. or obligatory. Hence, for such actions, there ar,ises j
the conc.ept 0 f a dut y . Thé transgress-tons 0 f such lawp ,.
( is combined wi th. a moral feeling that we can assume to
be a sense of guilt. However, we can take no açcount
of these moral-feelings, since they tend to vary'~om
one p'erson to thè n~xt,
, ,
So far, we have stIll not gi~en~a "
satisfa,ctoty ~interpret~tion for t~e concepts of
justice, which is important to consi,der" ,sirice
Kohlberg states his moral dev~lopment theory as oeing
formed on justice. ..
Kant presents us witr an excellent
framework of what justice ls in The Metaphysical
Elements of Justice when he states that the moral i
C&nCept of .justice apPlirS ,OnlY under the following
three condi tf01?-s 1
~)
--------
Justice ap~ieB only to tHe external ~d\practiCal relatiopship oi one person tOj anotherl, in which l their r~ctions . can in fact exert an influ.énce on each other directly or indirectly. \
. b) Justice applies only to the relationship of a will to another person'sGwi1l not to his wishes or desires, which are the con cern 0 f acts of benevolence ahd charity.
___________ r
c) The concept of justice doea .. not take into considerat.ion
the matter or content of the will, that is," the end that . a pers on intends to accomplish by means of the object'that he willsr 76 .
90
~om these. statements, we May d~duce ..
that justice ls the aggregate of thoae conditions under \
wh3:ch the will of one. pers on can be conjoined with tne
, will of a.rîothe,r, in accordance wl th the universa.l' la:-•
of freedom. 1'0 describe suèh a will as free would be
to saY that it can, act c~.U.Sally, without being caused
to do: so by something other than i tself. Every action,
therefore. ia .. juat", when. in i tself, or in' i ta Maxim,
. ia such that the freedom of the will of each can
coexist together with the freedom of everyone in
accordance with a 'universal. law.
~ ~ ~f my action can coê~ist with the
4",edom-of every<?ne in .acco~d~ee with 'a universal law,
then anyone who h1nder's me "in performing the action
\ .
. ~ ~ . does me an injustice sinee this opposition cannot
1 •
coeJÇist wi th freedom. in accordance wi th universal
laws. '.' Tnat l adopt acting justly as~. a maxim is a
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. 91
, .
At Kohlberg's stage six, just as in
Kantian ph!losophy, justice ia the body of principles
that can be made into external laws. It is justice
that supplies the a priori/or universal principles o'f l?<
possible legislatipn. However, for koh~berg, these
-universal principles can only be legi timate if any use
. of coercion accords wi th liberty.
The illegitimate use of eoercion to
legislate would., transgress liberty, and thus, be a
t'om of violence. It is man's right to be free t'rom
A( viole~c~, sinee it is an infringement of -+awful liberty,"
and the basic rights of the individu al are not ereated
by the state.' but proteeted by i t. The sourCé of law 1
is the will, and it becomes universal or
comprehensive when the will of each is the will of all.
Let me point out here that justice,
according to Kohlberg, is not,a char~cter trait in the
usual senQe. - You cannot malte up behaviour tests of ----justice as, 'you would for honesty, service or seLf-control.
One ç~t eonceive of a little set ot behaviour testa
that would indicate that Martin Luther King or Socrates . ----------.;-
were high on the trait of ju~tice. The reason for this .....
is that justice,is not a concrete rule of action,' such _ /
as that which lies behind virtues like honesty. ,,: '< (\
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John Rawis, in his work, A Theory 0t Justice,
.. discusses the concept 0.1' justice a la Kohlberg when he
states.
\.
The concept~on that a moral choice is a choiee made ,in terms of moral principles is related to the claim of liberal moral phil'OBophy tha:t mor~ principles are ultimately
,principles of justice. In essence, moral conf,licts are conflicts
1) between the claims 0.1' persons, and prineiples for resolving thes& cla1ms are principies of justice, Il :for gi ving each his due Il • Central to justice are the demands of liberty, equality, and reciprocity. At every moral stage. there is a concern" for justicè. The Most damning statement a school child can make about a teacher is tha t "he' s not fair. Il At each higher stage, however, the condeption of justice is reorganized. At Stage 1, justice is punishing the bad in terma of "an eye for an eye and . a tooth for a tooth, Il At stage 2, it is exchanging favours and goods in an
~ equal manner. A t Stage J and 4, i t i8 treating p~ople as they desire in te~s of the conventional rules. At stage 5, i t is recognized that all rules and laws floW from justice, from a social contract between the governors and the governed designed to~rotect the equal rights o~ all. AtjStage 6, pe;r:sonally chosen moral
\ principllas are also principles of justice, the principles any member of society would choose for that society if he did not know what his position was to be in thé-society and:in whicn me might be the least advanta,ged. ' Principles chosen from this point of view are, first, the maximum ,liberty compatible with the like- liberty
-~-of others and, second, no inequalities of goods ànd respect which are not to the bene fi t of all, including the least advahtaged. 78
.
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Specifically, in stage te~s;Kohlberg
seems to indicate that stage six is identifiable with
Kant's a priori knowledge, and all lower stages are
forms of empiricism leading to stage six a priori
knowledge. In one"s~nse, morality, in the Kantiari
t sense" begins at stage .aix, when a praqticai , .
reflec~ive process pas reached full maturity.
At this stage -six, moràl reasonihg ia
Most matu~e. because it is m~re differentiated and
integrated than lower stages. --In d.evelopmental terms, ..
this creates a more stable form of reaso~ing. a,ble to i
" deal with more situations. Moral reasoning and ethical
responsiveness is'present in all stages, but only at
the higher ones, as stage 'six, ls thiB reasoning fully , .
Act in such a way' that you always • treat humani ty, whether in your own -persan or in the person 0 l' any other. never simply as a means. but a.lways at the sarne time a's an end. 84. . ,
It would be at stag,e six that such a
suprerne princ.iple of a'ction could .'b,.e possible, At this
level of moral development, a person 1 s actions' would be
ends in thernsel ves. sinee a moral agent at this stage
would act as' he ought to, because of the absolute value
of an action. and not merely because of the resul t i t
produees. The actions of a person here, are not a .
me ans to attain some end, allah as happiness, weal th or
famé, ,!:>ut it is the moral worth of an act that ia of
sufficient value for a person to p,ursue i t . Thus., the
absolute or unconditionaJ. value of an action 'is an end • in itself. \
kru:t 1 S Formula of Autonomy arises from
the previous argument, inasmuch as an autonollfous moral
agent acta in auch a manner, that his wi1~ can regard,
i tsel:f' at the sarne -time as making uni versa1 law through
i ts maxim. This may seern as a repeti tian a f the
Fomula Qf the Univers al Law, but', here, the universal
law we follow autonomollsly ls the one we oursel ve s make
Peter Scharf (ed.). Readings in Moral Education (Minneapolis: winston Press, I~c., 1978). p. 27·
Lawrence Kohlberg, "Education :for Justice. A Modern statement 0 f the PlFltonic View", . In. N. Sizer and T. Sizer ,( ads. ), Moral Education (C'ambridge. filass. 1 Harvard University Press. 1970), pp. 71 - 72.
, John Kemp, The 'phllosophy of Kant" (New York. Oxford university Press, 1968). p. 60.
as
- 88.
R.M. Hare, The Language of Mor~s (Oxford The Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. }4 - 78 .
.. J. M. Gustafson. "Education fat Moral Responsibility". In: Moral Education. Nancy and Theodore Sizer (editors) Cambridge Mass~ 1 Harvard University' Press. 1970)~ pp, 11 - 28. d Barry Chazan; Who is MoraJ. Man? (Jerusalemz Hebrew University. School of Education, 1976). p. 4. (mimeographed·).
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9·
12.
15· 16.
17.
,18.
19·
20.
21.
22.
. 2;.
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R. S., Petera, Ethics and Education (Oakland, N. J.: Scott, Foresman' and Co., 1967.
John Wilson, et al., Education {Londonl pp." 1 90 - 195 .
William Frankena, "Toward a Philosophy of Moral 1;: du cation ", Harvard Educational Review., XVIII (Fall, 1958), pp. 300 ,- 31).
Israel Scheffler, Reason & Teaching Routl.edge and Kegan Paul., 1973L pp.
,144.
(Londonl 143 -
\
Chazan, op.cit., p.8. 1 1
Kohlberg-,- ,"Education for Justicel . A Modern Statement of the Platonic View", op. ci t. , p. 57· ,
Ibid., 'p. .58.
L. KOhlberg, "The Chil.d· as Moral Philosopher", Psychology1roday (Sept., 1968), pp. 2.5 - 30 ..
-
Kohlberg, "Education for Justice. ,A IViodern Statement of the Platonic Yiew", op. ci t. f
p. 58.
Ibid., p. 69.
SCharf, op.cit., p. 29.
Kohlberg, "Stagés of Moral Development as a Basis for Moral Education", oE.cit., p. ,36.
Ibid., p. 39.1 -. L. Kohlberg, "Moral Development" J International. Enc cIo edia of the Social Sciences Toronto: Crowell, Colller and MacMillian.
Inc'., 1968), pp. 490 - 491. J
R. Duska and M. Whelan, Moral Developmentl A Guide to Piaget and Kohlberg (New York, Paul.ist Press, 1.975), p. 49.
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27· 1
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30.
31.
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36.
37·
125 - •
ill,g., p. 50. ,
'L. Kohlberg and R.T. Selman, Preparing School Personnel to ValU~SI A Look at Moral Education in the iSchools (Washingt'on, D. C. t 1972), p. 16.
Kohl.berg. "Moral. Devel.opment" , op.cit., p. 48t·
L. Kohlberg, "Relativi ty versus Indoctrination in Value Educatiqn", In: Zygon (Spring, 1972), p. 303.
Martin Luther King, quoted in L. Kohlberg, "Moral Development and the New Social Studies", Social ' Education, Journal of the National Council. for the Social Studies (May, 1973), p. 146.
Duska and Whelan, op. cit., p. 76.
~·,p.77.
Will.ip.m K. Frankena, Three Historical Phil.o sophies 0 f Educa';;:;t-'i'-'o"'n"';"'""i(~G..,;ol-en';;"v"""".1.e-w=, nl~no16s ~cott, Foresman and Company, 1965), p. 9· '
Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of, Marals (New York, The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965) .
Immanuel Kant, "Groundwork of the lYletaphysics of Morals", Ln, The Moral Law, J. Paton (trans.) (London, Hutchison University LibFary, 1972). p. 102 .
Edmùnd V. Sullivan, Kohlberg· s Structural.ism: A Critical Appraisal (Torontol- The Ontarlo Institute for studies in Education. 1977),
/pp. 18 - 20.
Ibid., p. 20.
Kant. IIGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", op.cit •• p. 5J .
Ibid., pp. 39 - 40.
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39.
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43·
44.
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126
L. KOhlberg, "Moral Development lt, Ina
Collected Pa~ers on Moral Development and Moral Educatlon (Cambridge, ll1ass. Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 489.
Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", op.cit.,- p. 110
Ibid., p. 122.
R.P. Wolff (ed.), Foundationp of the . Meta{?hysics of Moraisl tmmanuel Kant (Ind~anapolisl Bobbs-Merrill Educational PUblishing, 1976), p. 137.
Kant, "Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals", op.oit., p. 102.
Seharf, op.cit., p. 28.
i Kohlberg, Collected Papers' of. Moral 1 Development and _Moral Education. op. ci t'. , : p. 489.
'Seharf, op. oit. , p. 29. i::y -
1 L. Kohlberg, "Cognitive-Developmental 1 Approach", Ina p. Scharf (ed. ), Readings in Moral Education (Minneapolis: Winston Press, Inc., 1978), p. 39.
Duska and Whelan, op.cit., p. 59.
'Wolff, op.cit., p. 126.
Kant, "Groundwork of the MetaphysicB of Marals", op.dt., p. 9.
Ibid .• p. 13.
Ibid., p. 1.5.
R.N. Tsujimoto and P. Nardi, liA Comparison of Koh.lberg' s and Hogan' s Theones of Moral Development~ In. Social Psychology~ Vol. 41, n. 3 (1978) ,- pp. 235 - 24.5 .
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54.
55·
.56.
57·
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
6).
64.
65· J 66 ..
67·
68.
127
L. Kohlberg, "The Claim to Moràl.· Adequaoy of the Highest Stage of Moral Developmerit" 1 Inl Journal of PhilosophY, Vol. 70, 637-38.
Ibid., p. 6)8.
R • J. Haier, "Moral Reasoning and Moral Gharacter. 'Rela~ionsh~ps between the Kohlberg and Hogan Models", In, Psychological Reports, Vol. 40 (1977), p. 215·
Charles White, "Moral Development in B~hamian School Children, A Cross-Cultural Examinatio~ of Kohl berg' s stages 0 f Moral Reasoningll, In. Developmental Psychology, Vol. 11
. (July, 1975), pp. .55.5 - 0536 '1
Nancy Eisenburg-Berg and Paul Mussen, ' "Empathy and Moral Development in Adolescence", In. < Developmental Ps:(chology, .. Vol. 14, n. 2 (197~), pp. 193 - 186-;
~" p. 186.
Scharf, op. ci t., p. 29 ,
Duska and Whelan, op. oit. ~ p. 68 .
Ibid., p . .59.
D. D. Ruhes, Dictionar~ oi' Philosoph;:[ (New Jersey. Littlefleld, Adams & Co., 197.5), p. 29·
Immanuel Kant, "FUndamental Metaphysics of Morals", In. an Introduction 0 (New York, Press, 1976), p. 429
.
Runes, op.cit., p. ,19l.
Principles of the , Moral Philosophl st. Martinls
Dùska and Whelan, op.cit., p. 69.
Kant, "Groundwork ~f the Me1;aphysic's of Morals", optcit., p. 1· ~
S. Korner, Kant {London, Penguin Books, 1974}, p. 1~
L. Kohlberg, "The Claim of Moral Adequacy of the Highest stage of Moral. Development" , op.cit., p. 6:39, ----
Interdiscipl;naq Approaches (Uplversi ty of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 88."
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, APPENDIX l, (Contintied)~j
UNlVERSAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY
CATEGORIES
ELEMENTS OR PRINC IPLES
Teleological elements "Prudential Social welfare
Attitudinal elements Love r'
.' Respect \
Rational elements / , , Justice as l.iberty
Justice as equality Justice as reciprocity
ISSUES OR INSTITUTIONS
Noms, " - Social rules of norms
Persona! conscience ,
1.31
Roles of affection and welfare
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Relations and r~les Authority Civil liberties Contractual reciprocity Institutions of punishment
Values '\ Lite property Truth Sexual /'
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APPENDIX l (Continue,d) , UNlVERSAL ASPECTS OF MORALITY
CATEGORIES
Judgement of acta
General Judgernents of rules
Ju~ements in situational conflict
Sociopolitical judgements
Norma~ive and metaethical theory judgements
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*APPENDIX II
SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE ,
MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE
, No differentiation between moral values of life and its physical or social-status value.
Tommy, age 10 (Why should the druggist give the drug to the dying woman when her husband couldn' t pay for i t? ) 1
"If someone important .ts in a plane and is allergie to heights and the stewardess won't give him medicine because she's only ~ot
. enough for one and she's got a sick one, a friend, in back, they'd probably,put the stewardess in a lady's jail because she didn't help the important one." (Is i;t better to save the life of one important person or a lot of unimportant people?) : "AIl the peopl'e that, aren' t important because one man just has 'one house, maybe a lot of furni'ture, but a whole bunch of people have an awful lot of furniture and ~pme of these
,poor people might have a lot of money and it doesn't look it ...
*C.oo. Beek, et al., Moral Educations ' Interdisciplinary A~proaches (University of Toronto
• Press, 197'1). pp. 8 - 90.
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. 1 APPENDIX Il ( Continued)
SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE 1
MORAL WORTH OF HUivlAN LIFE
The value a f a hurnan lif'e i8 seen, as instrumental ta the satisfàction of the needs of' i ts possessar or of other persans. Decision ta ~ave life is relative ta, or to be made by, i ts po ssessor. (Dii'i'erentiation of physiqal and interest value of life, differentiation ai' its value to self, and to other. )
Tommy, age 1 J (Should the doctor ttmerdy kill" a fatally ill woman, requesting death because of her pain?) 1 _
"Maybe it wOllld be good ta put her out of her pain, she'd be better off that way. But the husband wouldn't want it, it's not like an animal']. If a pet dies you can get along without it -- it isn't something you really need. Well, you can get a new wife, but it's not really the sarne. Il
Jim, age 13 (same question) 1
"If she requests it, it's really up ta her. She is in such terrible ~in, just the sarne as people' are always putt~ng animals out of their pain. ft - ___ J'
The value of hutnan life is based on the' empathy ·and affection of family members and others towards its possessor. (The value of human life, as base-d. on social sharil)g, community, and love, is differedtiated from the instrumental and hedonistic value of life applicable also to animal.s.)
Tommy, age 16 (same question) J
nIt might be best for her" but her husband it's a human life -- not like an animal, it just doesn't have the same rel~tionship that a human being does ta a. family. You can" become attached to a dog, but nothing like a
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APPENDIX II (Continued)
SIX STAGES IN CONCEPTIONS OF THE
" MORAL WORTH OF HUMAN LIFE
Stage Lh
Stage 5:
Life is conceived of as sacred in terms of its 'place in a categorical moral or religious order of rights and duties. (The value of human life, as a categorical member of a moral order, is differentiated from its value to specifie other people in the farnily, etc. Value of life i8 still partly dependent upon serving the group, the stage, God, however.)
Jim, age 16 (sarne question), tir don't know. In one way, it's murder, lit's, not a right or privilege of man to decide who shall live and who should die. God put life into everybo dy on earth and you' re taking away something from that person that carne directly from God, and you're destroying something that is very sacred, it's in a way part of God and it's almost destroying a'part'of God when you kill a person. There's something of God in everyone."
Life i8 valued both in terms of its relation to cornntunity welfare and in terms of being a universal human right. (Obligation to respect the basic right of life is differentiated from generalized respect for
Ithe aociomoral order. The general value of the' inde pendent human life ia a primary autonomous value not dependent upon other values.) ,
Jim, age 20 (sarne question), "Given the ethies of the doctor who has taken on responsibility of ~av~ng humanlife -- , from that point of view he probably shouldn't but there is another side; there are more and more people in the medical profession who are thinking it is a hardship on everyone, the person, the family, when you know they are going to die. When a person is kept alive by'an artificial lung or kidney it's more like being a vegetable than being a human
who is alive. If it's her .own-êhoice l think there are certain rights and privileges that go along w i th a human being. l am a human\ 1
be~ng and have certain desires for life and l think everybody else does, too. You have a ' world of which you are the centre, and \ everybody else does, too, and in that sense,\ we • re all equal."
'" Belief in the sacredness, of human life, as representing a universal human value of respect for the individual. ,(The moral valu'e of a human being, as an object of moral principle, is differentiated from a formal recognitioq of his rights.)
J~, age 24 (Should the husband steal the drug to save his ~ife? How about for someone he just knows?) l '
"Yes, a human life takes precedence over any other moral or legal--value, whatever it is A human life has inherent value, whether or not i t is valued by a particular indi vidual. ft (Wh)'" is that'?) 1 ! "The inherent worth of the individual human being is the central value in a set of values where the principles of justice and love are normative for all human relationsh-ips. Il
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1.37
*APPE
FORMAT OF A\§UGGESTED ,
MORAL EDUCATION
\
PART ONE, What is Moralij:y?
Chapter 1 . The Nature of Ethical 1nquiry
Chaptèr 2. Diversity of Moral Codes and the Prob~em of Objectivity
. Chapter J. The Purposeof Morality
Chapter 4. Justifying Moral Judgements
Chapter S· The Selt' and Others
Chapter 6. Favouring an 1nner Group
Chapter 7· Justice
~ Chapter 8. Morali ty and C0lJ!promise
J
*E. V. SUllivan, Moral Learning Press, 1975), pp. 37 - .38.
Kant, rmmanuel. The Metaphysical ~lements of Justice. New Yorkl Bobbs-lVIerrill Company, Inc., 1965.
1
Kant, i~anuel. The Metaphysics ot Morals. New York. The Library of Liberal Arts, 1965.
Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental principles of the> . Metaphysics of Morals and What ls Enlightenment?
New York. Liberal Arts Press, 1959. '
Kant, Immanuel. Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Ethics. New York. Longmans Green Co. J 1940.
Kay, William. Moral Development. London. George - Allen and Unw in Ltd., 1970.
Kemp, J. Reason l Action and Moralit~. New York. The Humanit~es Press, 1968.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. Collected Pa~ers on Mor~ 1 1 Development and Moral .t.duca t~on. cambridge, Mass 1
Harvard University Press, 1973. 1
Kohlberg, Lawrence. Moral Development and Behaviour. New York. Holt Rinehart and winston, 1976.
Kohlberg, Lawrence. "From ls to Ought. How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away with it in the Study of Moral Development"" In: Cognitive Develovment and Epistomology. New York. Academ1c Press, Inc., 1971.
• ! Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Educat1on, Moral Development and
Faith", In, Journal of Moral Education. 1974., • J
Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The' Domain and Development of Moral
J
Judgement". Ina 1 GibbS, J .• et al., 1976.
Kohlberg, Lawrence.. "Continui ties and Discontinui ties in Childhood at:ld Adul t Moral Development", 11')1 Human Development, 1969·
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K-ohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral. Education for a Society in Moral Transition, In& Education Leadership, 1975· ..
Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Development", Ina International RevJ:ew 0 f Social Sciences. Toronto 1 Crowell, Collier and MacMillan, Inc., 1968.
Kohlberg, Lawrence, and Selman, R.T. Preparing School Personnel to Values 1 A Look at Moral Educat~on in the Schools. Washington, Eric Clearinghoul;iè on, Teacher Eaucation, 1972.
Kohlberg, Lawrenc~. "Relativity versus Indoctrination in Value Education", Ina Zygon, Spr~, 1972.
~-;-/ Kohlberg, Lawrence. "Moral Development and the New
Social Studies", Inl Social Education, Journal of the National Council for the studies. May, 197)·
Kohlberg, Lawrence. "The Claim to MO,ral Adequa.cy of the Highest Stage of Moral Development", In:
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Kohlberg, Lawrence. ,"Stages of Moral Development as a Basie of Moral Education", In. Morà.l Educationl Interdisciplinary Approaches~ New York, Newman Pre s s , 1 971· ,
KOhlberg, Lawrence. "The child as Mpral Philosopher", Inl Psychology Today, September, 1968.
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Niblett, Il .R. Moral Education in a Changing Society. 'London. Fab,er, 1970., ! '
Pagliuso. Susan. Development.
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Peters, R.S. "Concrete Principles and Rational Passions", rnl l'1oral Education. Cambridge Mass. 1 Harvard University Press, .1901.
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