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Drones Neg

T Substantial

There are 40 total drones in Afghanatan and IraqLubold 10 -Staff Writer (3/2/10, Gordon, CSM, As drones multiply in Iraq and Afghanistan, sodo their uses, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2010/0302/As-drones-multiply-in-Iraq-and-Afghanistan-so-do-their-uses, ngoetz)

Washington The Air Force will expand the number of unmanned drone aircraft flying over the

skies of Afghanistan and Iraq in the next three years, as a result of commanders' demand fordigital images useful in hunting down enemy forces. By 2011, the Air Force will be flying asmany as 50 drones, or combat air patrols in the war zones, and by 2013 that number will jump to65, say Air Force officials. Currently there are 40.

Solvency

Predator strikes will just be launched from surrounding countries

Byman, 9 - Director of the Center for Peace and Security Studies at Georgetown University, aSenior Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Saban Center for Middle East Policy (Daniel, AreTargeted Killings Inside Pakistan A Good Idea? , 3/18,http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/64901/daniel-byman/taliban-vs-predator)

The United States cannot always generate enough good intelligence to sustain Predatoroperations on its own, but, as The New York Times has reported, Pakistani intelligence has attimes given Washington detailed information on the location of militant leaders. Such support islimited, however, because Islamabad is playing a precarious double game. U.S. strikes onPakistani soil are deeply unpopular, so no political leader wants to line up publicly withWashington. In addition, the militants are tied to powerful Pakistani interest groups, and many inthe security elite hope to continue exploiting Islamic militants to serve Pakistani interests in bothAfghanistan and Kashmir. This often means that Pakistani officials condemn U.S. actions inpublic while assisting them in private -- risking blows to their already weak standing when theirhypocrisy is revealed (as it was last month, when Senator Dianne Feinstein [D-Calif.] disclosedthat Predator strikes were being launched from bases in Pakistan).
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Drone strikes are increasingly based in PakistanZenko, 10 - Fellow for Conflict Prevention, Council on Foreign Relations (Micah, Raising theCurtain on U.S. Drone Strikes, Interview with Greg Bruno, 6/2,http://www.cfr.org/publication/22290/raising_the_curtain_on_us_drone_strikes.html)

As the al-Yazid strike suggests, the Obama administration has picked up the pace of using

drones in Pakistan. How did the United States manage to expand its unmanned drone

program into a sovereign state that is not a declared warzone?The decision was made after 9/11 by President Bush to authorize the CIA to capture or kill asmall number of high-value al-Qaeda targets. This happens with CIA-controlled drones inNovember 2002 in Yemen, where a suspected mastermind of the //USS Cole// bombing istargeted and killed. And then in 2004 or 2005, the CIA also is put in command and control ofdrones only for Pakistan, as opposed to the Pentagon-controlled drones in Afghanistan. Today,some of the CIA-controlled drones are flown out of Pakistan and reportedly some others fromAfghanistan. But these are somewhat compartmentalized from Department of Defense strikes,

which happen in a declared warzone, which is in Afghanistan. Pakistan is not a declaredwarzone, but a sovereign country. So these can only happen with some level of cooperation withthe Pakistani government.What kind of cooperation?If you're taking off from Pakistani airfields, the Pakistani government knows this is going on.The Pakistani media has also shown photographs of drones [on the ground in Pakistan], andthere's lots of reporting of U.S. contractors and U.S. officials at some of these airfields. Early on,the U.S. government received permission from Islamabad to go after a very small number ofpeople, primarily Arabs or Uzbeks. Only non-Pakistanis were permitted to be targeted, and ifyou look at the people who were targeted through the first dozen drone strikes over the first threeor four years, they're almost all non-Pakistani. There was some intelligence support provided bythe Pakistani government reportedly at the time, but what happens is in the summer of 2008 theU.S. government starts pushing it and going after targets on their own.The Pakistani government can resist and say, "This is our own sovereign territory." But if theUnited States launches strikes without the Pakistani government knowing, it looks bad. So there'sa very careful dance where the United States then starts going after some targets which are athreat to the Pakistani regime in Islamabad. In the summer of 2008, the CIA becomes, in effect,the counterinsurgency air force of the government of Pakistan, going after individuals andorganizations that are dedicated to the overthrow of the regime in Islamabad, more so than theyare dedicated to attacking the United States or U.S. allies abroad. This is clear to the Pakistanigovernment, and they begin to provide greater intelligence; they provide a little more cover forthe United States to do more drone strikes. It's estimated that at the end of the Bushadministration, there were only six or seven Predator drones in Pakistan. Reportedly, this hasdoubled in the last year or so of the Obama administration, all with the explicit authorization ofthe Pakistani government.

Politics Link
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Powerful Lobbies, military and congress love UAVs in AfghanistanPolitico 9 (11/23/09, Jen DiMascio, Politico New drones net rosy skies for makers,http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=1F4CC9B7-18FE-70B2-A8EBF755CF2D87DA,

ngoetz)

The skillful use of earmarks reflects the success General Atomics has achieved maneuveringthrough Washington. "For our size, we possess more significant political capital than you mightthink," Blue was quoted as saying in a 2005 Defense News article. The company has beentraditionally generous in its campaign donations, and it far outspends larger defense contractorsLockheed Martin, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon when treating lawmakers and theirstaffs with trips to exotic locales. From 2000 to 2007, the company spent $683,734 on 100 tripsfor congressional members and staff, including jaunts to Sidney, Australia; Venice, Italy; andAnkara, Turkey, according to the online database Legistorm, which tracks congressional salariesand travel. All those skills came in handy after the end of the war in Bosnia, when the Pentagon

gave control of the Predator program to the Air Force, which reluctantly accepted. "The AirForce is made up of pilots. Why would you want a pilotless plane?" said one defense lobbyist,explaining the hesitance. But General Atomics held sway with members of Congress. When theysaw results from the Lewis-funded Pentagon program to make a research project into battle-ready technology, Cassidy said, "they started 'plussing up' Predator buys" - a defense insider'sterm for what's more widely known as an earmark. General Atomics - and the Predator - hadanother benefactor in then-Sen. John Warner (R-Va.), who helped direct policies forweaponizing UAVs and buying more robotics in the future. In 2000, Warner laid out his goalsfor the Pentagon: to make one-third of the aircraft unmanned by 2010 and to do the same withground vehicles five years later. "In my judgment, this country will never again permit the armedforces to be engaged in conflicts which inflict the level of casualties we have seen historically,"he told the National Journal at the time. "So what do you do? You move toward the unmannedtype of military vehicle to carry out missions which are high risk in nature." Defense SecretaryRobert Gates has embraced the use of UAVs, leaning heavily on the Air Force to increase theirnumbers to beef up intelligence-gathering efforts and aid the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. ThePentagon has been credited with culling information from UAVs to break up networks of bomb-layers during the war in Iraq - and Gates's challenge now is to adapt those tactics to the Afghantheater, where rippled terrain makes surveillance more difficult. That very likely means moregood years for General Atomics. The Air Force has asked for 24 Reapers next year. NorthropGrumman, which makes the Global Hawk, a high-altitude UAV, also stands to gain in the future.Hard feelings linger in the fighter-jet community, and retired generals continue to point out thatunmanned aerial vehicles don't stand a chance in war zones with better air defenses than themilitary has seen in Iraq or Afghanistan. And tensions between the Air Force and the Army overhow to manage the growing variety of systems in the skies remain. But the Air Force leadershipis committed to UAVs. Secretary Mike Donley is focused on training and preparing the teams ofpeople who operate each combat air patrol flown in theater - that includes piloting the UAVs,operating the sensors and distilling and analyzing the data and intelligence delivered, he toldPOLITICO.
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War on Terror DA

The use of Drones is key to the global war on terror

Rittgers 10 served in the United States Army as an Infantry and Special Forces officer

(February 25, 2010, David Rittgers, Appeared in The Wall Street Journal available online at

CATO, Both Left and Right Are Wrong about Drones, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?

pub_id=11257, ngoetz)

The Obama administration has significantly expanded the use of unmanned aerial drones to kill

al Qaeda and Taliban operatives. This decision has been criticized from both the left and the

right, but it fits neatly into a broader strategy of countering terrorists world-wide.

Advances in unmanned aerial vehicle technology allow the United States to reach around theglobe and target terrorists in areas where our troops cannot go for tactical or diplomatic reasons.

Drone attacks have increased significantly in Afghanistan and Pakistan in the past six months

while civilian casualties have decreased.

Liberal critics should refrain from erroneously labeling drone strikes as "nonjudicial killings."

Even the most controversial drone strikesthose that kill American citizens who have joined al

Qaeda affiliates overseasare permissible under the laws of war.

Neither Congress nor the courts should micromanage tactical decisions such as whether the

president can order soldiers to seize a particular hill or employ a certain weapon. Referring to

drone strikes as "nonjudicial" implies that the courts should be given the ability to rule out

specific drone attacks. Vetting these targets for accuracy of intelligence and minimization of

collateral damage is essential, and the record continues to improve on that front.

Criticism from conservatives is largely based on the logic that a live and talking terrorist is worth

more than a dead one. While this is true as a general matter, several factors make drone attacks a

good alternative to capture.

First, not all terrorists targeted in drone attacks can be feasibly taken alive. This is especially true

of those who reside in the many areas dominated by local insurgent groups and therefore out of

reach of national governments.

For example, putting troops on the ground in the Pakistani tribal areas, where numerous drone

attacks have been carried out, is both tactically and diplomatically problematic. Last May, CIADirector Leon Panetta called drones the "only game in town" when it comes to certain parts of

Pakistan, and this will remain the case for the long term.

Second, many terrorist leaders are captured and interrogated, but by their own governments

rather than U.S. forces. Cooperation with the governments who capture these terrorists serves

numerous purposes, and this should not be viewed as a loss. The recent interrogation of high-

level Taliban official Mullah Baradar by Pakistani agents is an example how U.S. personnel need
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from the lead-up to World War II that good people cannot sit by idly while evil is being planned

and perpetrated. We cannot afford to be passive and we cannot afford to be merely reactive. Just

as crime prevention is a means of protecting people from injury and loss of life, war prevention

means taking the measures that protect societies from the dangers posed by global terrorists.

Extinction

Corsi, 5 PhD in political science from Harvard. (Jerome, excerpt from Atomic Iran,

http://911review.org/Wget/worldnetdaily.com/NYC_hit_by_terrorist_nuke.html)

The combination of horror and outrage that will surge upon the nation will demand that the

president retaliate for the incomprehensible damage done by the attack. The problem will be that

the president will not immediately know how to respond or against whom. The perpetrators will

have been incinerated by the explosion that destroyed New York City. Unlike 9-11, there will

have been no interval during the attack when those hijacked could make phone calls to loved

ones telling them before they died that the hijackers were radical Islamic extremists. There willbe no such phone calls when the attack will not have been anticipated until the instant the

terrorists detonate their improvised nuclear device inside the truck parked on a curb at the

Empire State Building. Nor will there be any possibility of finding any clues, which either were

vaporized instantly or are now lying physically inaccessible under tons of radioactive rubble.

Still, the president, members of Congress, the military, and the public at large will suspect

another attack by our known enemy Islamic terrorists. The first impulse will be to launch a

nuclear strike on Mecca, to destroy the whole religion of Islam. Medina could possibly be added

to the target list just to make the point with crystal clarity. Yet what would we gain? The moment

Mecca and Medina were wiped off the map, the Islamic world more than 1 billion human

beings in countless different nations would feel attacked. Nothing would emerge intact after awar between the United States and Islam. The apocalypse would be upon us. Then, too, we

would face an immediate threat from our long-term enemy, the former Soviet Union. Many in

the Kremlin would see this as an opportunity to grasp the victory that had been snatched from

them by Ronald Reagan when the Berlin Wall came down. A missile strike by the Russians on a

score of American cities could possibly be pre-emptive. Would the U.S. strategic defense system

be so in shock that immediate retaliation would not be possible? Hardliners in Moscow might

argue that there was never a better opportunity to destroy America. In China, our newer

Communist enemies might not care if we could retaliate. With a population already over 1.3

billion people and with their population not concentrated in a few major cities, the Chinese might

calculate to initiate a nuclear blow on the United States. Wh at if the United States retaliated with

a nuclear counterattack upon China? The Chinese might be able to absorb the blow and recover.

The North Koreans might calculate even more recklessly. Why not launch upon America the few

missiles they have that could reach our soil? More confusion and chaos might only advance their

position. If Russia, China, and the United States could be drawn into attacking one another,

North Korea might emerge stronger just because it was overlooked while the great nations focus

on attacking one another.
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FATA residents support the drone program they want the Taliban to die and they dont

fear becoming collateral damage.

Fair, 10 - Assistant Professor, Georgetown Universitys Security Studies Program (C. Christine,

" Drones Over Pakistan -- Menace or Best Viable Option? ", Huffington Post, 8/2,

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-pakistan----m_b_666721.html)

But don't just believe the word of well-informed military officers overseeing the actual area of

operations and other Pakistani officials, listen to the locals of the areas of themselves.

While sitting in a meeting in a Peshawar sitting parlor with several Pakistanis from South

Waziristan and other agencies in FATA, one of my hosts articulated what he called a "criminal

conspiracy" among the politicians, the intelligence agencies, the media and even the military to

sustain a public narrative undermining the drone program while benefiting from the same.

These FATA residents are strong proponents of the drones. They report that the drones are so

precise that the local non-militants do not fear them when they hear the drones above as they areconfident that they will hit their target. Locals attribute this precision in part to the placement of

"targeting chips" which direct the ordinance to the exact location of the militants in their

redoubts. The accurate placement of these chips requires local cooperation to provide the

whereabouts of these militants. This has driven an important wedge between the locals and

militants with the former shunning the latter.

Another interlocutor explained that when children hear the buzz of the drones, they go their roofs

to watch the spectacle of precision rather than cowering in fear of random "death from above."

These observers are not alone. Professor Ijaz Khattak, in the Department of International

Relations at University of Peshawar explained to a popular television host Skaukat Khattak, that

"The drone attacks have proved effective and have targeted the terrorists and there had been littlecollateral damage in the US drone attacks."

The drones bad narrative is baseless, and Pakistani opinion is shifting to supporting the

drones



http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-pakistan----m_b_666721.html

Amidst allegations that the army was indiscriminate in its use of force, some Pakistanis began

arguing that Pakistan should have its own drones to allow Pakistani forces to have the same

accuracy as US forces. Increasingly Pakistani officials are requesting that the United States

provide drones or at least let them have a role in pulling the trigger. Advocates of Pakistani

drones or increased command and control over U.S. drones note that armed drones have neither

displaced millions of Pakistanis nor resulted in the destruction of homes on a large scale.

The August 2009 killing of Baitullah Mehsud catalyzed another shift in the Pakistani discourse.

This was the first drone strike that killed a Pakistani militant who was exclusively an enemy of
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Pakistan. As Baitullah Mehsud had no operational import for the U.S. mission in Afghanistan,

Pakistan understood that the United States was finally employing its use of force to contend with

Pakistan's own internal foes.

This shift in the drone debate is an important shift that few American interlocutors appreciate as

they sustain a baseless narrative that is deaf to the realities across Pakistan. Drones went

from being universally dismissed among Pakistanis as a horrific menace to an instrument of

significantly and comparatively humane lethality relative to other options.

Reports of civilian casualties are planted by militants themselves theyve never been

verified



http://www.huffingtonpost.com/c-christine-fair/drones-over-pakistan----m_b_666721.html)

While many locals seem to appreciate the value of the armed drones and are ostensibly aware of

who the militants are that are killed, the outrage of the Pakistani public intensifies as one moves

farther away from the place where the missiles land. Within the main provinces of Pakistan,

there is staunch popular outrage to the drones.

This antipathy towards the program is due in large measure to the collaboration of Pakistan's

media to sustain tenacious criticism of the program by spreading suspect civilian casualty reports

planted by the militants themselves or various "agencies." It makes no difference that none of

these reports can be independently verified because FATA's legal status precludes

independent media from traveling there. Nor does it matter that such high figures of civilian loss

of life would certainly lead to funerals in large numbers which have not been reported.

Terrorists think they have a religious duty to destroy usforce is the only option

Jones 8religion, psychology and terrorism, Rutgers. Snr Research Fellow, Center on

Terrorism, John Jay College. ThD, Uppasala U. Psy.D, dept of clinical psychology, Rutgers.

PhD in religious studies, Brown. (James, Blood That Cries Out From the Earth, 42-3, AMiles)

One of the most widespread beliefs of violent religious movements is their apocalyptic vision of

a cosmic struggle of the forces of the all-good against the forces of the all-evil ( Juergensmeyer,

2000; Kimball, 2002; Wessinger, 2000). Osama bin Laden says it clearly: there are two

adversaries; the Islamic nation, on the one hand, and the United States and its allies on the other.

It is either victory and glory or defeat and humiliation (quoted in Moghadam, 2006: 717).

Virtually all religious terrorists agree that they are locked in an apocalyptic battle with demonic

forces, that is, usually with the forces of secularism. We have seen how Sayyid Qutb denoted

secularism and the concomitant values of individual rights and the separation of religion and law

as demonic and the source of most of the misery of the modern world and demanded a jihad

against it (Berman, 2003). Continuing Qutbs diatribe, the founder of Hamas told a reporter,
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Theres a war going on not just against Israeli occupation but against all secular

governments including the Palestinian authority because there is no such thing as a secular

state in Islam ( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 76). Hamass arch enemy, Rabbi Meir Kahane, whose

Jewish Defense League was responsible for numerous attacks on Muslims in the United States

and Israel, said bluntly secular government is the enemy ( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 55). Asahara,

the founder of the Aum Shinrikyo, is reported to have shouted again and again at his followers,

Dont you realize that this is war (Lifton, 2000: 56) and to have insisted that his group existed

on a war footing (Lifton, 2000: 60). The Reverend Paul Hill, who shot and killed a physician

in front of a family planning clinic in the United States, wrote The battle over abortion is

primarily spiritual. The confl ict is between Gods will and kingdom and Satans opposing will

and kingdom (Hill, 2003: 8). Hills actions were justifi ed to an interviewer by his brother-in-

arms, the Reverend Michael Bray, who wrote the bible of the violent anti-choice movement,

entitled tellingly A Time to Kill, as the product of a Christian subculture in America that

considers itself at war with the larger society, and to some extent victimized by it. . . . This

subculture sees itself justifi ed in its violent responses to a vast and violent repression waged bysecular . . . agents of a satanic force . . . a great defensive Christian struggle against the secular

state, a contest between the forces of spiritual truth and heathen darkness, in which the moral

character of America as a righteous nation hangs in the balance.( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 36)

Juergensmeyer concludes in his investigation of religiously sponsored terrorism around the

globe, Terror in the Mind of God, that what is strikingly similar about the cultures of which

they [religious terrorists] are a part is their view of the contemporary world at war

( Juergensmeyer, 2000: 151). Qutb and the jihadists are not alone in declaring war on the secular

state.

Drones are devastating Al Qaeda nowDaily Telegraph 10British Newspaper (10/13, Al-Qaeda in crisis amid cash shortage,

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/6318787/Al-Qaeda-in-crisis-amid-

cash-shortage.html, Aly M)

In the first half of this year, al-Qaeda's core leadership was compelled to make four public

appeals for cash, complaining in one case of a "weakness in operations because of lack of

money". Part of the reason for this is that some funding is believed to have gone to the Taliban

instead. This financial squeeze has compounded the problems faced by "core al-Qaeda". Highly

effective attacks launched by American Predator drones have eliminated a raft of its most able

leaders. Experts believe that Osama bin Laden's network is under immense pressure inside its

last redoubts in the Tribal Areas lining Pakistan's north-west frontier. David Cohen, the assistant

secretary at the US Treasury responsible for countering terrorist finance, said that al-Qaeda's

recent appeal for funds showed its "financial predicament". He added: "We assess that al-Qaeda

is in its weakest financial condition in several years, and that, as a result, its influence is waning.

This success is important. It is a sign that we are moving in the right direction." America and its

allies have taken increasingly sophisticated steps to choke the movement of funds to all terrorist
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groups, principally by freezing assets belonging to "designated" individuals, banks and

companies. Traditionally, al-Qaeda's money has tended to come from the Gulf kingdoms, but

there is evidence that this flow is being blocked. Carrying out terrorist attacks is relatively cheap

- the bombing of the London Underground on 7 July 2005 probably cost only 8,000 - but al-

Qaeda also needs cash to train new operatives and buy the safety of its leading figures in the

Tribal Areas Without these funds, its ability to operate is severely constrained. Meanwhile, the

drone strikes are taking a steady toll of "core al-Qaeda". Pakistani authorities calculate that 14 al-

Qaeda figures died in 60 American drone attacks in the Tribal Areas between January 2006 and

April this year. Those who are left are forced to concentrate on securing their own safety and

hunting down informers, rather than planning attacks. "Operationally, it does look increasingly

difficult for them to hold together as a coherent, disciplined terrorist group," said Paul Cornish,

the head of international security at the Chatham House think tank.

Drones have totally jacked al Qaeda the plan causes a resurgence

Sageman, 9 - adjunct Associate Professor at the School of International and Public Affairs andformer case officer for the CIA (Marc, Confronting al-Qaeda: Understanding the Threat in

Afghanistan, Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 3 n.4,

http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php?

option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=92&Itemid=54)

5. Counter-terrorism is working. The escalation from a more limited and focused counter-

terrorism strategy to a larger combined counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency strategy (in a

country devoid of the al-Qaeda presence!) is predicated on the assumption that the terrorist threat

is either stable or increasing meaning that counter-terrorism has failed. The timeline graphs

clearly show that the threat is fading, from its high water mark of 2004. There has been no globalneo-jihadi terrorist casualty in the United States in the past eight years and none in the West in

general in the past four years. Of course, al-Qaeda is not dead as long as its top leadership is still

alive. This cannot be attributed to a loss of intent from al-Qaeda and its militant rivals. From all

indications, including recent debriefs of terrorist wannabes captured in Pakistan and the West,

the respective leaders of global neo-jihadi terrorism are still enthusiastically plotting to hit the

West and do not hesitate to proclaim their desire on the Internet. Nor is this due to the counter-

insurgency in Afghanistan because al-Qaeda and its allies all have their training facilities in

Pakistan. It is due to effective counter-terrorism strategy, which is on the brink of completely

eliminating al-Qaeda. A dead organization will not be able to return to Afghanistan. 6. The

reasons for the effectiveness of the counter-terrorism strategy so far are multiple. First and

foremost is al-Qaedas inability to grow. Unlike the pre-9/11/01 period, al-Qaeda leaders have

generally not incorporated new recruits among its ranks. The leadership of al-Qaeda still harks

back to the fight against the Soviets in the 1980s. Because he has been hiding full time, Osama

bin Laden has not been able to appoint and train a new group of top leaders and there is no

evidence that he trusts anyone whom he has not known from the anti-Soviet jihad. In the 1990s,

al-Qaeda incorporated the brightest and most dedicated novices who came to train in its network
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of camps in Afghanistan. They became its cadres and trainers. In the past five years, al-Qaeda

has not been able for the most part to incorporate new recruits among its ranks. Western novices

traveling to Pakistan in the hope of making contact with al-Qaeda have been turned around and

sent back to the West to carry out terrorist operations. Meanwhile, the success of the Predator

drone strike campaign on the Pakistani border has dramatically thinned the ranks of both al-

Qaeda leaders and cadres. Now it appears that these strikes are also targeting al-Qaeda allies with

a transnational agenda.

Futenma Neg Updates MBA

CP

Text: The United States federal government should do the following:

-- ratify a Free Trade Agreement with Japan that excludes trade in the

agricultural sector

-- pursue a bilateral agreement with Japan affirming a joint commitment to

a continued, long-term US air and naval presence at Kadena and Yokosuka

-- relocate Marine and Air Force training exercises to areas of Japanoutside Okinawa

-- revive efforts to revitalize Okinawas economy with foreign investment,

educational aid and exchanges, and infrastructure improvements.

Engagement solves the root cause of the basing conflict

Kliman, political science Ph.D., 10Daniel, visiting fellow at the Center for

a New American Security, Ph.D. from Princeton University, studied

political science and economics, was a Japan Policy Fellow at the Center

for Strategic and International Studies and an Adjunct Research Associate

with the Institute for Defense Analyses, AND Abraham Denmark, MA in

International Security, History and Political Science at the University of

Northern Colorado, and Denmark is a Fellow with the Center for a New

American Security-directs the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Award for

Excellence from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (05/21/2010,

http://www.cnas.org/node/4528, WITH CLINTON IN JAPAN, A CHANCE TO

SHOW THE ALLIANCES STRENGTH, ZBurdette)
http://www.cnas.org/node/4528http://www.cnas.org/node/4528


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Washington can also do more to strengthen the foundations of the

alliance, primarily via direct engagement of the people of Okinawa. It is

time for the United States to revive long-dormant efforts to revitalize

Okinawas economy with foreign investment, educational aid and

exchanges, and infrastructure improvements. Okinawa is Japans poorest

prefecture, and its resentment of its disproportional basing burden shouldnot be a surprise. Further, a major public diplomacy effort in Okinawa

one that explains the purpose of US bases, listens to local concerns, and

can be effective in addressing them is in order. With a more robust and

forthright engagement of Okinawa, the US can begin to address some of

the local challenges that has made a basing agreement so difficult to

conclude.

Relocation saves the alliance and reduces public opposition

Ennis 10, former member of the Council on Foreign Relations task forces

regarding Japan, former Research Fellow at Dartmouths Dickey Center for

International Understanding, long-time analyst of U.S.-Japan relations,

U.S. Correspondent for Keekly Tokyo Keizai, founder of The Oriental

Economist, 6-8-10 (Peter, Jeff Bader, Mike Green hit critics of Obama

Futenma policy, Dispatch Japan,

http://www.dispatchjapan.com/blog/2010/06/jeff-bader-mike-green-hit-

critics-of-obama-futenma-policy.html)

Its not too late for the US and Japan to turn the Futenma controversy into

a win-win situation, but that would require US willingness to discuss

significant restructuring of the Marine presence on Okinawa, beyond what

is already planned. The first, interim step would be a sincere effort by theUS to significantly relocate Marine and Air Force training exercises to

different parts of Japan.

Rather than spending political capital on promoting the wildly unpopular

Henoko plan, Kan would be better off pressing governors in other

prefectures to accept more US military personnel for basing and training

purposes.

Beyond that, the US and Japan should lock in a firm bilateral

understanding on the vital need for a continued, long-term US air and

naval presence at Kadena and Yokosuka respectively.

Japan should be fully part of US regional force structure planning for EastAsia, looking at opportunities for joint basing of US and SDF forces, and

for ways in which expanded Japanese operational capabilities could best

complement those of US forces and alliance goals.

Seen in that context, the Futenma issue becomes more of a manageable

irritant than a perilous fault line that threatens to shake the alliance to its

core.

The Obama administration shows no signs of seeing the issue this way,
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however, which unfortunately sets the stage down the road for renewed

tensions between Washington and Tokyo.

DA Politics -links

The plan would cause backlash from the China threat lobby.

Feffer 10co-director of Foreign Policy In Focus at the Institute for Policy

Studies (John, Mar. 6,

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html, twm)

Not surprisingly, China's bedazzlement policy has set off warning bells inWashington, where the People's Republic is still a focus of primary

concern for a cadre of strategic planners inside the Pentagon. The

Futenma base - and its potential replacement - would be well situated,

should Washington ever decide to send rapid response units to the Taiwan

Strait, the South China Sea, or the Korean peninsula. Strategic planners in

Washington like to speak of the "tyranny of distance", of the difficulty of

getting "boots on the ground" from Guam or Hawaii in case of an East

Asian emergency.

Yet the actual strategic value of Futenma is, at best, questionable. The

South Koreans are more than capable of dealing with any contingency on

the peninsula. And the United States frankly has plenty of firepower by air

(Kadena) and sea (Yokosuka) within hailing distance of China. A couple

thousand Marines won't make much of a difference (though the

leathernecks strenuously disagree). However, in a political environment in

which the Pentagon is finding itself making tough choices between

funding counterinsurgency wars and old Cold War weapons systems, the

"China threat" lobby doesn't want to give an inch. Failure to relocate the

Futenma base within Okinawa might be the first step down a slippery

slope that could potentially put at risk billions of dollars in Cold War

weapons still in the production line. It's hard to justify buying all the fancy

toys without a place to play with them. And that's one reason the Obamaadministration has gone to the mat to pressure Tokyo to adhere to the

2006 agreement. It even dispatched Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to

the Japanese capital last October in advance of president Obama's own

Asian tour. Like an impatient father admonishing an obstreperous

teenager, Gates lectured the Japanese "to move on" and abide by the

agreement - to the irritation of both the new government and the public.
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(See Gates gets grumpy in Tokyo, October 28, 2009) The punditocracy has

predictably closed ranks behind a bipartisan Washington consensus that

the new Japanese government should become as accustomed to its junior

status as its predecessor and stop making a fuss. The Obama

administration is frustrated with "Hatoyama's amateurish handling of the

issue," writes Washington Post editorial page editor Fred Hiatt. "What hasresulted from Mr Hatoyama's failure to enunciate a clear strategy or

action plan is the biggest political vacuum in over 50 years," adds Victor

Cha, former director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council.

Neither analyst acknowledges that Tokyo's only "failure" or "amateurish"

move was to stand up to Washington. "The dispute could undermine

security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of an alliance that has served

the region well," intoned The Economist more bluntly. "Tough as it is for

Japan's new government, it needs to do most, though not all, of the caving

in."

2NC DA PoliticsLinks

Powerful lobbies dont want to give an inch on Futenmathe plan causes

massive backlash, thats Feffer. Thats key to the agendaour evidence

says the reason Obama is trying to adhere to the relocation agreement is

because of pressure from the Chinese threat lobbystatus quo proves the

magnitude of the link

Plan costs substantial political capital

Ennis 10 (Peter, co-editors of The Oriental Economist Report, 1-30-2010,Response to Rod Armstrong,

http://nbrforums.nbr.org/foraui/message.aspx?LID=5&MID=36602

"PRO-FUTENMA" MOTIVATIONS: On the US side, many considerations

(aside from automatic pilot) went into the lingering hardline stance on

Futenma. ONE: Interservice rivalries. From the beginning, the US Air Force

and the US Marines heatedly argued against merging Futenma's

operations into the US Air base at Kadena. Skipping the (admittedly

existing) complications, I have no doubt that if the President said "get it

done," the Marines would be up at Kadena in no time -- and with no wherenear the reduction in operational capabilities they claim would be

entailed. In the late 1990s, Kurt Campbell argued in favor of the Kadena

merger. At the time, General Gregson was his aide. They lost. Simply put:

A Washington that is now sending young Marines into battle in

Afghanistan is not in the mood to tell the Marine Corps leadership to come

up with an alternative to Henoko. That is a legitimate point that Japanese

officials and politicians should take into account. TWO: The role of
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Congress. As it is, there are cost-overruns on the huge expansion of

military capabilities on Guam. It would not be easy -- short of spending a

lot of political capital -- to go back to Congress and say more Marines than

expected will be going to Guam.

Fierce bipartisan opposition to the planFeffer 10 (John, co-director of Foreign Policy in Focus at the Institute for

Policy Studies , 3-6-2010, Okinawa and the new domino effect, Asia

Times, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/LC06Dh02.html

And that's one reason the Obama administration has gone to the mat to

pressure Tokyo to adhere to the 2006 agreement. It even dispatched

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to the Japanese capital last October in

advance of president Obama's own Asian tour. Like an impatient father

admonishing an obstreperous teenager, Gates lectured the Japanese "to

move on" and abide by the agreement - to the irritation of both the new

government and the public. (See Gates gets grumpy in Tokyo, October 28,

2009) The punditocracy has predictably closed ranks behind a bipartisan

Washington consensus that the new Japanese government should become

as accustomed to its junior status as its predecessor and stop making a

fuss. The Obama administration is frustrated with "Hatoyama's amateurish

handling of the issue," writes Washington Post editorial page editor Fred

Hiatt. "What has resulted from Mr Hatoyama's failure to enunciate a clear

strategy or action plan is the biggest political vacuum in over 50 years,"

adds Victor Cha, former director of Asian affairs at the National Security

Council. Neither analyst acknowledges that Tokyo's only "failure" or

"amateurish" move was to stand up to Washington. "The dispute couldundermine security in East Asia on the 50th anniversary of an alliance that

has served the region well," intoned The Economist more bluntly. "Tough

as it is for Japan's new government, it needs to do most, though not all, of

the caving in."

Case
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Alliance

No impactthe alliance empirically fails

DiFilippo, sociology prof, 2 Prof Sociology, Lincoln (Anthony, The

Challenges of the U.S.-Japan Military Arrangement, p 13)

One thing that has not changed about the U.S.-Japan security alliance in

the fifty years that it has existed is that it is supposed to have maintained

regional stability. If stability is defined as a state where war or the high

level threat of war does not exist, then the alliance has not been terribly

effective. Although the Soviet Union never attacked Japan during the Cold

War, other serious destabilizing forces have appeared despite the

continued existence of the bilateral alliance. The Korean War, which began

in June 1950, did not end after the signing of the U.S.-Japan SecurityTreaty in 1951 nor after the accord went into effect in 1952. The alliance

did not prevent China from developing nuclear weapons-hardly a

stabilizing event in the region. The U.S.-Japan alliance did not prevent or

end the Vietnam War. More recently, the U.S.-Japan security alliance did

not stop the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) from

beginning a nuclear weapons program in the early 1990s, thwart

Pyongyang's missile development efforts, or discourage it from launching

a projectile over Japan without prior notice in August 1998. With the

bilateral alliance in effect for decades, China went ahead with nuclear

testing in 1995 to assure that its nuclear arsenal was capable of

neutralizing the threats it perceives from the other nuclear powers.

Futenma is no longer the centerpiece of the alliance

Kyodo News 11 (Kan U.S. trip communique to skip stand on Futenma,

Saturday, Jan. 1, 2011, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-

bin/nn20110101a4.html, ZBurdette)

The government will not seek inclusion of a settlement on the relocation

of a U.S. Marine base within Okinawa in a joint statement with Washington

to be issued during Prime Minister Naoto Kan's planned spring visit to

Washington, official sources said Friday.Following visits by Kan and Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara to Okinawa in

December, the government has judged it will be difficult to secure the

acceptance of local residents in a short time over the relocation of U.S.

Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, the sources said.

Japan hopes the document, expected to be issued by Kan and U.S.

President Barack Obama on the long-standing bilateral security alliance,
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will instead touch on other issues centering on three pillars security,

the economy, and human and cultural exchanges, they said.

Maehara wants to flesh out the three pillars in talks with U.S. Secretary of

State Hillary Rodham Clinton during his trip to the United States from next

Thursday.

Kan has reiterated his resolve to relocate the Futenma base withinOkinawa in line with a bilateral accord reached by Tokyo and Washington

in late May.

Futenma dispute is old newstensions are down and Japan has realized

the importance of US forces

Cheng 11/9 ( AND Bruce Klingner: MA in National Security Strategy, MA in

strategic intelligence, BA in political science, worked for the CIA and DIA

for 20 years in an Asian specific context, 3rd degree black belt, Senior

Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundations Asian

Studies Center, Dean Cheng: Research Fellow, Asian Studies Center, Ph.D.

political science from MIT,

November 9, 2010 http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/Do-

Not-Expect-Much-from-Japan-During-Obama-Visit, Do Not Expect Much

from Japan During Obama Visit, ZBurdette)

Mending U.S.Japanese Relations

Washington can take some comfort that the DPJ is showing signs that it

will be less obstreperous than it was upon first assuming office last year.

Most encouraging is the selection of Seiji Maehara as foreign minister,which places a pragmatic, resolute security strategist at the helm.

The DPJ government had a belated epiphany that Japan resides in a

dangerous neighborhood necessitating a strong security relationship with

the U.S. Of course, that realization necessitated the DPJ jettisoning its

prime minister, its corrupt party leader, and large parts of its election

platform and reversing itself on key security policies.

The DPJ now seeks to repair its strained alliance with the U.S. Simmering

bilateral tension is down, but Washington continues to await Japanese

implementation of an agreement on realigning U.S. forces on Okinawa.

Tokyo is now saying the right things, but it has been unwilling to moveforward until after the November 28 Okinawan gubernatorial election.

Most recent events prove alliance issues have been solved

Hayashi 11/12 (By CHESTER DAWSON and YUKA, Wall street journalist

staff writers, NOVEMBER 12, 2010, U.S.-Japan Relations Warm,

http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB100014240527487047568045756079

53039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html, ZBurdette)
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/Do-Not-Expect-Much-from-Japan-During-Obama-Visithttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/Do-Not-Expect-Much-from-Japan-During-Obama-Visithttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704756804575607953039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704756804575607953039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.htmlhttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/Do-Not-Expect-Much-from-Japan-During-Obama-Visithttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/11/Do-Not-Expect-Much-from-Japan-During-Obama-Visithttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704756804575607953039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.htmlhttp://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB10001424052748704756804575607953039811866-lMyQjAxMTAwMDEwMTExNDEyWj.html


18/32

The new tone of the alliance was evident on a recent cool November

evening, when civilian and uniformed officials from the U.S. and Japanese

military services filed aboard a 186-foot yacht in Tokyo Bay to

commemorate the 50th anniversary of the U.S.-Japan alliance. As a

Japanese navy band played softly and dainty hors d'oeuvres were served,U.S. Ambassador John Roos and Japanese Defense Minister Toshimi

Kitazawa politely exchanged mutual thanks and invoked the enduring

nature of the alliance.

The alliance is high nowFutenma is being resolved

Mainichi Daily News 1/7 (1-7-11, Japan, U.S. agree to start work on

setting new strategic goals,

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110107p2g00m0in021000c.html,

twm)

On bilateral relations, the two foreign ministers agreed to accelerate

consultations on deepening the bilateral security alliance to pave the way

for Kan's U.S. visit to meet with President Barack Obama, when the two

leaders are expected to release a joint statement on the matter.

On the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in

Okinawa Prefecture, Maehara and Clinton reaffirmed that Tokyo and

Washington will continue to seek the transfer based on the May accord to

move the U.S. base within the southern island prefecture.

Maehara also noted the need to reduce the base-hosting burden on the

people of Okinawa, referring to the importance of gaining the

understanding of local people, the Japanese official said.Clinton said, ''The United States is firmly committed to our alliance with

Japan, and we continue to work on the full range of significant issues that

are part of this bedrock security alliance, and of course Futenma is part of

that.''

At the press conference, Maehara stressed close communication with

Clinton, noting that he has met her four times since he became foreign

minister about four months ago.

The Marines in Futenma play a vital role in deterrence and rapid response

capabilitiesthe plan only kills the rest of the alliance and results inKadena closingcollapses U.S. regional credibility

Eldridge, Okinawan history professor, 10 Eldridge, Ph.D., a former

tenured associate professor of U.S.-Japan relations and Okinawan history

at Osaka University, AND Melton, a former marine attache at U.S. Embassy

Tokyo, currently serves as the assistant chief of staff, G-5, U.S. Marine

Corps Bases, Japan. (By Dan Melton and Robert D. Eldridge, Col., U.S.

marine presence in Okinawa Pref. essential, Mar. 4,
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19/32

2010,http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/columns/commentary/20100304dy01.ht

m, ZBurdette)

The opinion piece entitled "Putting Okinawa Air Base in Perspective" by

Michael O'Hanlon carried in The Daily Yomiuri on Feb. 3 is a thoughtful

discussion of the U.S.-Japan alliance. We fully agree with the "need to liftour sights above bickering over bases and put strategy and [dealing with]

the world's real problems back at the center of our alliance," but we

believe Mr. O'Hanlon does not fully appreciate the importance of Marine

Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma or understand the complex dynamics of

the so-called "Okinawa problem." Moreover, he downplays the vital role

that forward-deployed United States Marines fulfill in meeting the

obligations of the 1960 United States-Japan Treaty of Mutual Security and

Cooperation.

There is much to rebut in his op-ed, but we will concentrate on the

following four faulty premises: 1) that the functions of MCAS Futenma are

less important than Kadena Air Base (KAB) and thus can be forfeited as a

political pawn; 2) that sacrificing MCAS Futenma would make KAB less of a

political target and thus satisfy anti-base activists in Okinawa and

elsewhere; 3) that the U.S. government has not regularly "factored in local

sensitivities" into alliance management issues and has done nothing in the

past to alleviate local concerns; and 4) that a contingency basing formula

in which civilian airports are used is an operationally practical solution.

While both KAB and MCAS Futenma are co-located in central Okinawa,

they have fundamentally different roles and missions. Yet, there is an

important synergy between the two airfields in daily operations as well as

in a contingency if deterrence failed. A loss of the capabilities of eitherairfield could significantly impact operations during a crisis. When

discussing them, it is not an either/or choice but a clear requirement for

both. While scholars can hope for the best, planners need to prepare for

the worst. One airfield reduces contingency options and creates a military

planner's worst nightmare: a single point of failure.

We disagree that this option is a "tolerable one," as he suggests, by any

means, regardless of whether contingency access to other airfields is

improved or not. There are numerous political and operational challenges

to the concept of contingency use but the bottom line up front is: moving

or spreading the functions of Futenma outside of the main island ofOkinawa not only would critically affect the ability of the Marine Corps to

perform its daily operations and training to sustain combat readiness as

well as to ably and quickly respond to crises, but could also impair the

deterrence functions and credibility of our alliance and thus security in the

entire region.

The USMC takes seriously "local sensitivities" in all aspects of our training

and operations, and it was the U.S. and Japanese governments' efforts to
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20/32

address these concerns that were behind the 1996 and 2006 agreements

to return Futenma, which were conditioned on a replacement site being

found within the prefecture. A replacement facility then and now remains

important because the capabilities Futenma possesses are vital to the

mission of the Marine Corps and other U.S. forces in Okinawa, as well as

being a United Nations Command (Rear) Airfield and a diversion airfieldfor civilian aircraft. Not only do the Marines provide significant

contributions to deterrence and defense of Japan and peace and

prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region, but are also actively involved in

HA/DR missions and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC), which is designed

to build transparency and trust in this region. Significantly, there have

been hundreds of thousands of lives saved in the region by U.S. Marines,

such as during the 12 significant HA/DR operations in the past five years

alone, including the 2004 tsunami and the disastrous tropical cyclones in

2007 in Bangladesh and 2008 in Burma in which units from the III Marine

Expeditionary Force stationed on Okinawa either directly led or

significantly contributed to response efforts.

The implied argument in the op-ed--that the forfeiting of MCAS Futenma

and removal of all Marines from Okinawa would "preserve local support for

Kadena"--is misplaced. Regrettably, the fact is anti-base, anti-alliance

activists will only pocket concessions and continue to press for the next

one. Following the closure of MCAS Futenma without a replacement, as

recommended by Mr. O'Hanlon, the activists will likely turn their attention

next to closing Kadena Air Base, which would further degrade alliance

capabilities.

Fortunately, there has been a realization that the United States and Japan

need to do more at the political level to help ensure the smoothimplementation of the bilateral security treaty as well as to educate our

respective publics more on the importance of the alliance.

Equally important is that Japan's SDF be allowed to play a larger

operational role in the alliance and in the region. The proposal by Mr.

O'Hanlon for Japan to send "substantial numbers of peacekeeping troops

to Sudan and the Congo" is also good, but has no bearing on the strategic

situation in Northeast Asia or even the Asia-Pacific. Having only recently

adopted a "joint" approach to operations, the SDF is trying to operate

more closely with the military forces of its only ally to develop these

capabilities. Working with the U.S. and increasingly with the militaries ofother countries, the SDF is gaining experience and confidence. While it

was given a mandate to participate in more international HA/DR

operations abroad, the SDF is faced with a declining budget and

decreasing personnel numbers. In the interim, the U.S. Marines, being the

only truly rapidly deployable ground troops in Northeast Asia, will

continue to be the first responders--the 911 force--to any crisis and

continue to represent, along with the Navy, Air Force, and Army service


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components of U.S. Forces Japan and U.S. Pacific Command, the American

commitment to the region. The Marines' capabilities, experience, and

proven record of success are hard to replicate, something the SDF,

particularly the Ground Self-Defense Forces, look to as they further

develop their capabilities and jointness.

At the end of his opinion piece, the author refers to the late AmbassadorMike Mansfield's description of the U.S.-Japan alliance as being the most

important, bar none. We entirely agree. But we would also remind him

that out of all of Mr. Mansfield's accomplishments including educator,

senator, majority leader, and ambassador, he was most proud of his

service as a United States Marine and had written on his tombstone in

Arlington National Cemetery after his death in October 2001 the following

simple epitaph: "Michael Joseph Mansfield, Pvt. U.S. Marine Corps."

A2 Public Backlash

We wont get kicked outhistory, politics, and diplomacy provereject

their evidence as ungrounded media

Calder 10Director, Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, Johns

Hopkins University (Kent, The Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in

Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in 1995-97, 2005-06, May 17, 2010,

www.sais-jhu.edu/centers/reischauer/The%2520Politics%2520of%2520the

%2520Futenma%2520Base%2520Issue%25, CJin)

In recent months there has been a blizzard of journalistic commentary on

Futenmahundreds of op ed pieces and television specials on the issue,

replete with short-term forecasts on how it may affect the incumbent

Japanese administration or the U.S.-Japan alliance. Yet there has been

remarkably little serious researchand no at-length historical studies

covering the evolution of the controversy from its originson just how we

got to where we are today. This analytical gap is not only unfortunate

from a scholarly standpoint; it also blinds us to important political

dynamics, and policy options, that have been relevant in the past, andmay well shape the future.

We could not ask for a more appropriate analytical viewpoint on such a

hybrid policy-research question than that of Bill Brooks, a valued

colleague here at SAIS, wit njkh a Columbia Ph.D., with whom I worked

closely at US Embassy Tokyo a decade ago. Bill served for fifteen years,

until 2009, as head of the Office of Translation and Media Analysis at the

Embassy, monitoring and analyzing political-economic developments in


22/32

Japan, and Japanese reactions to them, for U.S. government officials in

both Tokyo and Washington. His research and advice were always well

respected, and his appreciation of subtle developments within Japan, as

an American fully fluent in Japanese language and culture, were

unequalled. Now, for the first time, we get his public view of fateful

events that Dr. Brooks witnessed directly and at close hand as a publicservant, although the analysis itself draws onlyBill is careful to addon

openly available sources. It is for the reader to decide how he or she views

this unique analysis, on an issue fraught with public controversy. It needs

to be read completely, and a brief summary cannot do it justice. That said,

there are recurring themes it is useful to stress from the outset:

(1) The Lessons of History. The Futenma controversy has been boiling on

for over fifteen years, but the basic optionsrelocation to the vicinity of

Henoko; choices among mobile basing, reclamation, land-based options

inside Camp Schwab, and the so-called QIP methodremain remarkably

constant. So do many of the political responses to each of the options.

(2) The Centrality of Politics. Time and again, political decisionsat the

national level and at the prefectural and local levels within Okinawa

have complicated resolution of what seemed originally to be a promising,

simple, and creative resolution to the pressing imperative of closing an

aging military facility in a crowded urban area, and moving it to a less

threatening environment. Interested parties transformed the initial,

relatively simple option of a heliport at Henoko, inside Camp Schwab, into

a variety of complex permutations. New administrations felt the need to

impose their own resolutions, even when doing so opened Pandoras

boxes. And within Okinawa itself, the preferred option again and again

was simply indecisionkeeping base issues in play, so as to extractmaximum benefit from all parties, without the downside of implementing

something distasteful.

(3) The Mission Creep Dynamic. The original proposal for Futenma

relocation was relatively simplea land-based heliport inside Camp

Schwab. For a variety of reasons, on both the American and the Japanese

sides, the plans that ultimately emerged were, time and time again, much

more elaborate. Technological change, and the related introduction of new

operating equipment and logistical requirements, was one reason;

political and economic pressures had their impact also.

History proves their evidence is just brinksmanship rhetoric

Brooks 10adjunct professor for Japan Studies AT Johns Hopkins, has 15

years of experience as head at the Embassy Tokyos Office of Media

Analysis, Ph.D. from Columbia in East Asian Studies (William L., The

Politics of the Futenma Base Issue in Okinawa: Relocation Negotiations in

1995-97, 2005-06, May 17, 2010, www.sais-

jhu.edu/centers/reischauer/The%2520Politics%2520of%2520the


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%2520Futenma%2520Base%2520Issue%25, CJin)

It is also evident from researching the Japanese press that politics played

a dominant role, sometimes for the better but more often for the worse,

during the various negotiations. But the political strategies and even

artifices that can be seen playing out at the central and local governmentlevels in the two earlier sets of negotiations seem oddly missing from the

efforts of the current political administration since last fall. Earlier sets of

talks practiced a kind of brinksmanship and sometimes threatened to

reach crisis proportions. But in the end, both sides always pulled away

from the brink to reach a compromise that eased tensions and ultimately

resolved the issue, often with the intervention of strong leaders, seeking

to balance alliance and Okinawa interests as best as possible. The U.S. in

the past was always closely involved these were bilateral negotiations --

unlike the current unilateral process done in isolation by a small group of

coalition leaders each with pet proposals, none of which had even been

vetted with others, not to mention the U.S. and affected local leaders and

communities. The outcome from such an unstructured and haphazard

process to most observers seemed doomed to failure from the start.

Public opposition will never kick the US military presence out

Yeo 10 (Andrew, Anti-Base Movements in South Korea: Comparative

Perspective on the Asia-Pacific, 14 June 2010,

http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew-Yeo/3373, ZBurdette)

Although anti-base movements may successfully mobilize, as witnessed in

Maehyangri and Pyeongtaek, they may not be equally successful inshaping policy outcomes. More often than not, activists face significant

structural constraints. In all anti-base movements, whether in Okinawa,

South Korea, Guam or the Philippines, activists face great challenges

when confronting U.S. base issues because political elites tend to

prioritize robust alliance relations with the U.S. Whether a progressive or

conservative-leaning government, regardless of who comes to power,

political leaders in Tokyo and Seoul generally accept in principle the

necessity for U.S. forces to provide regional stability in the mid- to long-

term. A pro-U.S. consensus among political leaders and bureaucracies,

particularly within the defense and foreign policy establishments, drownsout activist calls for an alternative security framework centered on a

reduction of U.S. forces. This ideological constraint makes it difficult for

anti-base movements to shift public discussion on U.S. base issues.

Moreover, host governments constantly receive a mixture of political

pressure and economic incentives to support U.S. alliance obligations.

While some government elites are genuinely sympathetic to the plight of

local residents, in most cases political and economic forces prevent these
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew-Yeo/3373http://www.japanfocus.org/-Andrew-Yeo/3373


24/32

actors from executing policy changes that would significantly eliminate or

ameliorate the negative effects of U.S. military presence.

No impact to public outcrythey cant force change

Telegraph 10 (Eye on the main chance, 6-20-2010, ZBurdette)

The DPJ has had limited success in its battle against recession; the

unemployment rate is still disturbingly high, but exports have slowly

picked up. Getting rid of the American base in Okinawa has turned out to

be a different story. Japan is, if no longer the second, at least the third

largest industrial economy in the world; it is a valued member of the elite

G-8 group of nations, its clout in both the World Bank and the

International Monetary Fund is much greater than that of China or India, it

has never strayed in international discourse away from toeing the

American line. And yet, on the demand for removing the US naval base in

Okinawa, neither its economic prowess nor its formal political sovereignty

has been of any avail. At the height of the anti-draft agitation in the

1960s, American youth, reluctant to go to Vietnam, would rent the sky

with the full-throated chant, "Hell, no,/ We won't go." The US response to

the notice served on them by the new Japanese administration to quit

Okinawa has been identical: no, the United States will not oblige; Okinawa

may be Japanese territory, Japan may be a fully independent and an

economically powerful nation, the Americans could not care less; never

mind the electoral verdict of the Japanese people, Okinawa will remain an

American naval base, maybe for eternity, just like the one at Guantanamo

in communist Cuba.

Theyre wrong80% of the public like military presence

Oros, political science and international studies prof, 10 (Andrew, The

50th Anniversary: Time for a Renewal of Vows, Asia Policy, Number 10

(July 2010), 1-41,

http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf,

ZBurdette)

At another level, though, Japanese voters and bureaucrats have clearly

indicated their preference for a continued close alliance relationship withthe United States. The fact that the latest annual poll conducted by

Japans Cabinet Office in December 2009 found the highest level of

friendly feelings toward the United States (78.9%) since the polling began

in the mid-1970s and that 81.8% of respondents held a favorable view of

U.S.-Japan relations should encourage leaders of both states. Voters have

criticized the DPJ for undermining U.S.-Japan relations, criticism the DPJ

must effectively address to remain in power. The latest Diplomatic
http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdfhttp://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf


25/32

Bluebook issued by Japans Ministry of Foreign Affairs in April 2010 also

underscores the importance of the alliance to Japans overall foreign

policy.

Alliance is strong nowall politics isnt local and 80% of the Japanese

public know the alliance is really important.Bader 10Director of the John L. Thornton Center (Jeffrey Bader, Senior

fellow at Brookings- Director of the John L. Thornton China Center, 6/7/10

[Keynote Speech: US-Japan Alliance at 50: Toward a Reenergized

Partnership http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdf)

The sinking of the South Korean naval vessel, Cheonan, by North Korea

served as a dramatic reminder that Northeast Asia is still a dangerous

neighborhood. The Japanese Cabinet noticed. The Japanese government

also experienced some difficulties in its relationship with China, in which it

had invested a considerable amount. The DPJ has come to understand with

increasing clarity that others in the region have been watching closely the

U.S.-Japan alliance, and Japan could not afford the impression of a rift to

gain traction. It turns out that all politics is not 100 percent local, as it

had been seen in Japan for some months before then. The decision came

against a series of other policy decisions by the Japanese government that

demonstrate that the alliance is about more than basing issues. Japan has

allocated $900 million in its current budget towards a multi-year, $5

billion, pledge to the Afghan Army and police, including for rehabilitation

and training of demobilized Taliban and important development projects.

Japan, like the United States, believes that peace and security in

Afghanistan depend significantly on stability in Pakistan, and Tokyo haspledged $1 billion in assistance to Pakistan and hosted a major pledging

conference. Japan has strongly backed the Republic of Korea, in the face

of aggression from the North, in the wake of the Cheonan incident. Its

solidarity with South Korea has been firm and public. Japan has sought

trilateral cooperation with the U.S. and South Korea, and taken a leading

role in fashioning a UN Security Council response. As a member of the UN

Security Council, this year, Japan is supporting the U.S.led draft of a

resolution on Iran. Prime Minister Kan Prime Minister to be Kan indeed

reiterated that support in his first conversation with President Obama,

this past week. Japans leadership has made clear recently that it favorsU.S. participation in an eventual East Asian Community, a change taken

from the DPJ position last fall. Japan strongly supported President

Obamas initiatives in the April Nuclear Security Summit and worked

closely with the U.S. delegation at the NPT Review Conference in May. So,

nine months after the DPJs electoral victory, the scorecard, from the U.S.

perspective, at last, is positive and improving. There has been lots of

attention to what a rough ride it has been, to the precipitous decline in
http://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdfhttp://stimson.org/japan/pdf/Transcript_Jeff_Bader.pdf


26/32

Hatoyamas polling numbers and, ultimately, his demise, his political

demise, to the difficulties of the DPJ government in getting its feet under

it. And now the as I said the resignation. Ill leave to experts on Japan

the analysis of these, but from the viewpoint of the U.S., the larger issue,

in conclusion, is this: That Japan has gone through the single most

dramatic political change in 50 years after 50 years of stasis in partyrule, and the U.S.-Japan alliance has emerged in sound condition, having

been scrutinized and ultimately validated by the new political leadership.

This is, in one sense, not surprising, since 80 percent of all Japanese, in

polling, support the alliance. That is the indispensible foundation for the

alliance.

Broader public support is for Futenma

MDN 9/15 (The Mainichi Daily News, Disappointment in Okinawa over

Kan's re-election as DPJ leader, 2010,

http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100915p2a00m0na004000c.html,

AMiles)

Kan won 249 of the 300 points allocated to rank-and-file party members

and supporters in the election, but Ozawa, who suggested further

negotiations with Okinawa officials over the Futenma issue, won 70

percent of the votes from Okinawa. "It was a result in which public opinion

in mainland Japan was quite different from that in Okinawa," commented

Sueko Yamauchi, deputy secretary-general of the DPJ's prefectural

chapter.

No special measures law internal link

1) It won't be usedno relocation now

Ito 11MA in political science, Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute

(Masami, staff writer for The Japan Times, Kan's foreign policy plate full,

waiting to be attacked, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-

bin/nn20110101f3.html, Saturday, Jan. 1, 2011, ZBurdette)

The relocation won't happen soon,'' Watanabe said, adding that this is not

necessarily an obstacle as long as the Japan-U.S. alliance continues to

move forward. So, what the Japanese government needs to do is talk toWashington about what to do in the meantime and to Okinawa to discuss''

future conditions and options, he said.
http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100915p2a00m0na004000c.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110101f3.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110101f3.htmlhttp://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20100915p2a00m0na004000c.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110101f3.htmlhttp://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20110101f3.html


27/32

Defense Integration

Overall defense integration now

Klingner 9MA in National Security Strategy, MA in strategic intelligence,

BA in political science, worked for the CIA and DIA for 20 years in an Asian

specific context, 3rd degree black belt, Senior Research Fellow for

Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundations Asian Studies Center (Bruce,

How to Save the U.S.-Japan Alliance, August 26,

http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-

Japan-Alliance, ZBurdette)

Despite its shortcomings, the alliance is critical to fulfilling current U.S.

strategic objectives, including maintaining peace in the region. The

forward deployment of a large U.S. military force in Japan deters military

aggression by North Korea, signals Washington's resolve in defending U.S.allies, and provides an irreplaceable staging area should military action be

necessary. Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. forces in Asia,

including the only aircraft carrier home-ported outside the United States

and one of three Marine Expeditionary Forces, as well as paying for a

major portion of the cost of stationing U.S. forces there. Japan is America's

principal missile defense partner in the world.

Washington and Tokyo have made significant progress in recent years in

evolving the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF). Alliance managers

and military personnel should be commended for achieving considerable

accomplishments despite often seemingly insurmountable political

obstacles. The two militaries now have enhanced and integrated their

joint training, intelligence sharing, and interoperability.

Cooperation on missile defense high now

Pyle, history and international studies prof and Ph.D. in Japanese history,

10 (Kenneth, lets be honest- this guy is way more qualed than your

bloggers, Ph.D. in Japanese history from John Hopkins, received the Order

of the Rising Sun from the Japanese government founding prez of the

National Bureau of Asian Research, received the Japan Foundation Award

for Japanese Studies, History and International studies prof @ University

of Washington, Troubled Alliance , Asia Policy, Number 10 (July 2010), 1-41, http://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf,

ZBurdette)

Fearing the undermining of the alliance, the five-year administration of

Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and his LDP successors began a steady

incremental remilitarization in order to respond to American impatience
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliancehttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliancehttp://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdfhttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliancehttp://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/08/How-to-Save-the-US-Japan-Alliancehttp://www.nbr.org/publications/asia_policy/AP10/AP10_B_JapanRT.pdf


28/32

and the changed international situation. Each incremental step, however,

was weighed carefully so as to preserve as much autonomy as possible

while still doing just enough to propitiate American impatience. By the

time of last summers election, all of what I have called the eight nos

had been steadily modified: the SDF were dispatched to aid in the Iraq and

Afghanistan conflicts; the principle of collective self-defense was about tobe acknowledged; the taboo on discussion of nuclear weapons ended;

power projection ability was quietly acquired through Boeing refueling

tankers and proto aircraft carriers; cooperation in ballistic missile defense

with the United States began in earnest, which breached the principles of

not exporting military technology; spy satellites were put up; and a new

law provided for a national security strategy relating to space and the

development of rockets and satellites for information gathering

communications. The LDP administrations in short began to remilitarize

and to become a stronger and more engaged ally, and in this way carved

out a new activist foreign policy. The question remained, however, could

these measures restore the independence and autonomy that Japan has

aspired to?

No internal linktheir OHanlon evidence says Japan might use funds from

Futenma to TMDhowever, the first AFP evidence they read proves

theres no will within the DPJ government to do so

No solvencyOHanlon is from 12 years ago and doesnt assume the

current economic crisis. There is no way Japan would start spending

money on missile defense in the status quo

Kans top priority is reigning in the deficit

IDSA 10The Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (Rajaram Panda,Foreign Policy and Domestic Challenges Before Kan Naoto, 9 JUNE 2010,

http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-

domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.html, ZBurdette)

Kan faces a moribund economy and a snowballing government debt. His

immediate task would be fiscal reconstruction and plug holes that have

led to debts increasing endlessly, amounting to some 180 per cent of the

gross domestic product. Hiking the consumption tax is one option but can

prove risky. Even the popular Koizumi was tempted for a while but

refrained from this step due to fear of a public backlash. Kan is likely tounveil in late June a national economic growth strategy and fiscal

discipline aimed at stimulating demand. As the deputy prime minister, Kan

had declared in November 2009 that Japan was in a state of deflation for

which liquidity crunch was the main reason since Japanese people and

companies have a great propensity to save money instead of purchasing

and investing. Being an advocate of a weaker yen, he has pressured the

Bank of Japan to adopt more aggressive monetary policies so that the
http://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.htmlhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.htmlhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.htmlhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/201006092885/foreign-policy-and-domestic-challenges-before-kan-naoto.html


29/32

pressure on the business community is eased somewhat.

Though foreign affairs are important, getting the economy back on track

would be Kans top most priority. With an image of a fiscal conservative,

he is in favour of raising Japans 5 per cent sales tax. Economists say that

this is vital to raise funds needed for meeting the huge social welfare

costs of a greying society. In particular, if Kan pursues his fiscal policiesaimed at keeping the yen weak, one can expect buoyancy in the stock

market in the coming months. A weaker currency will help the Nikkei to

inch closer to the 10,000-mark. If Kan can make that happen, one can

expect the Japanese economy to rebound slowly.

No impacttheir AFP card says at worst, TMD is delayed 3 monthsalso

they dont read a terminal impact, be highly skeptical of their solves

everything claims

No overpopulation

Goklany, PhD, 9Worked with federal and state governments, think tanks,

and the private sector for over 35 years. Worked with IPCC before its

inception as an author, delegate and reviewer. Negotiated UN Framework

Convention on Climate Change. Managed the emissions trading program

for the EPA. Julian Simon Fellow at the Property and Environment

Research Center, visiting fellow at AEI, winner of the Julian Simon Prize

and Award. PhD, MS, electrical engineering, MSU. B.Tech in electrical

engineering, Indian Institute of Tech. (Indur, Have increases in

population, affluence and technology worsened human and environmental

well-being? 2009,

http://www.ejsd.org/docs/HAVE_INCREASES_IN_POPULATION_AFFLUENCE_AND_TECHNOLOGY_WORSENED_HUMAN_AND_ENVIRONMENTAL_WELL-

BEING.pdf, AMiles)

The original Neo-Malthusian premise was that population would grow

exponentially. Indeed until the latter decades of the 20th century, these

concerns seemed well founded, as technological change increased the rate

of population growth by reducing mortality rates. However, the rate of

population increase has slowed in recent decades. In the five years from

1965 to 1970, the Worlds population grew by 10.6 per cent. By contrast,

the current rate of population growth has fallen to 6.0 per cent every fiveyears and is expected to fall further (UNPD 2007). Accordingly,

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