Jain Ethics

mc-1/D/Buddhism/ETHICS/ETHICS Compose-2.p65 (46) (3rd Proof)

Dedicated

to

My Esteemed Philosopher and Guide

Professor Ramaranjan Mukherji

the Doyen of Indological Studies.

Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics

TUSHAR KANTI SARKAR

I. INTRODUCTION

The set of metaphysical assumptions and the conceptual net-work that underlie and support the philosophical system of Jainismform a very intricately woven integral whole. Their physics (studyof space, t ime, matter and motion), their metaphysics(anekøıËntavøıËda, syøıËdvøıËda, nayavøıËda), their philosophical methodol-ogy (conceptuo-linguistic analysis or vibhajyavøıËda) and finally theirethics are, so to speak, mutually-supportive intertwined strandsof a network. Hence, I find it extremely difficult to write onJaina ethics in isolation from the rest of their system, especiallytheir physics i.e., their theory about the universe or cosmos. Ishall call it 'Jaina cosmology' for short.

Jaina cosmology starts with a scheme of classification of thedifferent kinds of things that are there in the universe. 'Things',in this context, should be taken to include real entities, theoreticalentities as well as explanatory principles. According to the Jainas,such 'things' constitute all that is there in the universe and theytogether form a system, having sufficient explanatory power toaccount for all cosmic phenomena involving mind, matter andconsciousness. Ethical theory of the Jainas forms an integral partof Jaina cosmology in this sense.

Since the original works on Jaina philosophy are all either inPrøıËk–˝Át or in Sanskrit, or it is often very difficult to find suitableexpressions in English for many of the technical terms used bythe Jaina thinkers. A few remarks about the translation of someof the technical terms of Jaina philosophy may not be out ofplace here. Some terms, expressing key concepts, such as 'apøıËna',

'arhat', 'siddha', 'keval¤ıÂ', 'le—˜ÁyøıË' etc. have been left untranslated(into English) in this essay, in order to minimise the risk ofintroducing unintended distortions through translation. How-ever, when any one of these technical terms occurs for the firsttime in this paper, the nearest English equivalent of it (which Iconsider appropriate) has been given. For some other technicalterms, I have given 'sense-translations' rather than literal trans-lations. For example 'dravya' has been translated as 'entity', 'tattva'as 'theoretical constructs' or simply as 'constructs', 'aj¤ıÂva' as 'physi-cal entities' and 'pudgala' as 'proto-matter', or simply 'matter' forshort. It is obvious that I consider it important not to conflatethe notion of materiality with that of physicality. Finally, I haveused the term 'real(s)' as a generic term for both dravya andtattva of the Jainas.

II. COSMOLOGY

The Jaina theory of the universe i.e., their cosmology (in thesense already indicated in the previous section) starts with twobroad classificatory schemes__one listing six (or seven) dravyasand the other listing nine tattvas.

The seven dravyas are: j¤ıÂva, aj¤ıÂva, øıËkøıË—˜Áa, dharma, adharma, kalaand pudgala. Some writers lump j¤ıÂva and aj¤ıÂva together and countthem as one. This reduces the number of dravyas from seven tosix.1

The nine tattvas enumerated in Jaina cosmology are the fol-lowing: j¤ıÂva, aj¤ıÂva, øıË—˜Árava, puÃ˝Èya, pøıËpa, bandha, samvara, nirjarøıËand mok—˝Áa.2 Not all Jaina writers include pøıËpa and puÃ˝Èya in theirlist. That exclusion reduces the number of tattva to seven. How-ever, since some of the oldest Jaina texts include puÃ˝Èya and pøıËpain their list, we shall discuss all nine of them here.

A couple of points about the two schemes of classificationmay be noted here. First, there is no rigid uniformity about theuse of the terms 'tattva''''' and 'dravya' .' .' .' .' . What we have called 'dravya'are called 'tattva' (and vice-versa) in some Jaina works.3 Secondly,although the basic scheme of classification is accepted univer-sally, yet the principle of classification may differ. Thus some

SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 7 1 7 2 ETHICS : An Anthology


writers prefer to follow a dichotomic scheme of division andput everything either under the heading j¤ıÂva (i.e., entities whichare consciousness-incarnate, called øıËtmøıË or soul in other systemsof Indian philosophy) or under the heading 'aj¤ıÂva' (other thanj¤ıÂva). For such writers tattvas are of just two kinds, j¤ıÂva and aj¤ıÂva4.

Keeping the above points in mind we may now proceed tobriefly elaborate the nature and philosophical significance ofeach of the six items listed under dravya and the nine items listedunder tattva.

A) SIX DRAVYAS

i) The first dravya mentioned is j¤ıÂva. Capability of reflectiveawareness (upayoga))))) is the mark or characteristic feature ofj¤ıÂva.5 Some Jaina texts add the capabilities of acquiringknowledge (jÃıÈøıËna), abstract conceptualisation (dar—̃Áana), moralcharacter (cøıËritra), bliss (øıËnanda), etc. to upayoga as charac-teristic marks of J¤ıÂva.6 In its intrinsic nature all j¤ıÂvas are ofthe same status.7 In its pure and essential nature j¤ıÂva is char-acterized by infinite knowledge, infinite wisdom (dar—˜Áana),infinite power (v¤ıÂrya) and infinite bliss (øıËnanda). These fourinfinite potentials (ananta catu—˝Á“˝Âaya) are actualised, as limitingcases, only when a j¤ıÂva attains liberation (mok—˝Áa) and be-comes a keval¤ıÂ.8 However, worldly souls (j¤ıÂvas) are, as a matterof fact, always far removed from that ideal potential statebecause, all such j¤ıÂvas are, so to say, enwrapped in multiplelayers of shells of impediments or imperfections. The greaterthe number of such shells already unwrapped or discardedby a j¤ıÂva, the higher it is in the scale of evolution towardthe ideal limit of perfection. From this standpoint, depend-ing on the stage of spiritual evolution in which a j¤ıÂva pres-ently is, the Jainas assign different status to different j¤ıÂvasand classify them into different types. All j¤ıÂvas are classifiedinto two types__immobile (sthøıËvara) and mobile (trasa). Mo-bile j¤ıÂvas again are classified into single-sensed (ekendriya)two-sensed (dv¤ ı Ândriya) and so on upto f ive-sensed(paÃıÈcendriya). Man is paÃıÈcendriya i.e. endowed with fivesense-organs. Only five-sensed j¤ıÂvas are fit to have thepotential of attaining mok—˝Áa because it is only they that can

be endowed with the capacity of critical reflection aboutmoral values and other things. Such a j¤ıÂva which has thiscapacity of critical reflection is called samanaska∆̋Ë, those whichlack it are called a-manaska∆˝Ë.

'J¤ıÂva' in Jaina philosophy may mean a soul or øıËtmøıË as such;it may also mean a besouled creature i.e. an embodied con-sciousness. Specific contexts of use would clearly indicate theintended sense.

Abstractly considered, j¤ıÂva is infinitely divisible but it is nei-ther actually decomposable nor is it composed of pre-existingparts.9 The infinitesimal elements of j¤ıÂva are non-segregable likethe two poles of magnet or like the two sides of a page. Suchnon-decomposable but infinitely divisible wholes we shall callmereological wholes (in contrast to a compositional [samghøıËta]whole like a table or a chemical compound, say, H

2O). So j¤ıÂvas

are mereological wholes. They also have three main characteristicfeatures10 viz., not having any perceptible form (ar”ıËp¤ıÂ), sponta-neously dynamic in nature (sakriya) and capable of affectivity(bhoktøıË).

Everything else (other than j¤ıÂva) fall under the category aj¤ıÂva.There is an infinite number of aj¤ıÂvas in the universe.

ii) §Ò‡køıË—˜Áa or space is the second dravya. It is characterised bythe following features :

a) It is ar”ıËp¤ıÂ,b) It is an infinitely divisible mereological whole,c) It is only one in number,d) It is inactive or lacks dynamicity (ni—˝Ákriya),e) It is the receptacle of everything real,f) It provides the gap or void (vivara) which is a precondi-

tion of the very possibility of change of position or mo-tion of things in space.

g) It comprises of two regions__operative space (lokøıËka—˜Áa)and trans-operative or absolute space (alokøıËkøıË—˜Áa). LokøıËkøıË—̃Áais the limit beyond which all laws of motion and causalsequence become inoperative and lose all operationalmeaning.11



iii) Dharma is a technical term, having a unique meaning inJaina philosophy. It may be paraphrased as 'the auxilliarysupportive condition for the continuation of any given stateof motion'. It is roughly what the law of inertia of motionwould be without Newton's first law to back it up. Thusdharma, by itself, does not cause motion, it only helps thestate of motion to continue unimpeded. In short, dharmais the auxilliary facilitating condition of continuation ofmotion just as water is the facilitating condition of themovement of a fish or swan.12 The role of dharma is likethat of the basal stone of a potter's wheel in the produc-tion of a pot.

iv) Adharma as a concept may be regarded as the dual ofdharma. If we replace the expressions 'inertia of motion','motion' and 'dharma' by the expressions 'inertia of rest','rest' and 'adharma' respectively, we get the correspondingcharacterisation of adharma. In every other respect the twoshare the same features. For example, both dharma andadharma are :

a) Formless (ar”ıËp¤ıÂ),b) Mereological wholes,c) Each is a unique single entity,d) They lack dynamicity (ni—˝Ákriya),e) They are the udøıËs¤ıÂna hetu (non-causative, auxilliary, sup-

portive conditions) of motion and rest repectively,f) They are needed to account for any state of motion or

rest or changes therein of an entity be it that of a soul(jiva) or of matter (pudgala) in any of its forms,

g) The sphere of application of both dharma and adharmais lokøıËkøıË—˜Áa in which they are located like j¤ıÂva and pudgala.13

v) KøıËla (time) comes next. It is postulated as a principle with-out which, the Jainas claim, we would not be able to ac-count for the change of state of a thing (e.g., the changeof colour of a mango from green to yellow) or the changeof state of a motion. KøıËla is the cause of such changes inthe sense that it alone can generate the sense of simultaneity

and succession which makes the notion of any change in-telligible. There is a controversy among the Jaina thinkersabout the objective reality of time. UttarøıËdhyana-s”ıËtra de-scribes køıËla as a real, characterised by vartanøıË.14

Some §Ò‡gama texts deny the objective reality of time,15 whilesome scriptures consider time as the objectively real sixth dravya.16

Time has the following characteristics:

a) It has no spread or extensity (tiryag pracaya)óit has onlyone dimension (”ıËrdhva pracaya),17

b) It is the cause of any change in state of motion or ofrest. But unlike dharma/adharma, time is not an udøıËs¤ıÂnahetu. It is a participating cause like the potter's wheel.18

c) It is anastikøıËya i.e. lacks summable extensionality.d) It is one and single,e) It is formless (ar”ıËp¤ıÂ), inactive (ni—˝Ákriya) time non-

terminating,19 i.e. without beginning or end,f) It is located in the lokøıËkøıË—˜Áa only.20

Some Jaina thinkers distinguish between phenomenal time(vyavahøıËra køıËla) and noumenal time (pøıËramøıËrthika køıËla), and re-gard the latter as the foundation of the former. For such think-ers phenomenal time (vyavahøıËra-køıËla) has a beginning and anend. So, it is not non-terminating in nature.21

vi) Pudgala (matter) is the last of the six dravyas. Its definingcharacteristic is that it goes through a ceaseless process of dynamicchange of state through accumulation and dissolution of parts.

22

Other characteristic features of pudgala are the following :

a) It has form (r”ıËp¤ıÂ),b) It has atoms (paramøıËnu) as its ultimate constituents,c) It is active (sakriya),d) The five sense organs, mind (manas), karmic (material),

prøıËÃ˝Èa (biological vitality), apøıËna are all forms of pudgala,23

e) Sound, light, shadow, hot radiation, darkness, colour, taste,smell, touch etc. are marks of pudgala.24

'Pudgala' is used to signify both single material atoms as well astheir combinations. Like j¤ıÂva, pudgala is essentially dynamic (sakriya)



and innumerable in number. But unlike j¤ıÂva, it is rup¤ıÂ, lacks af-fectivity (not a bhoktøıË) and has a natural tendency to fall down-ward, while j¤ıÂva naturally tends to move upward.25

The characteristics of the other aj¤ıÂvas fall in-between those ofj¤ıÂva and pudgala. In so far as each one of them viz., adharma,øıËkøıË—˜Áa or køıËla is a unique singular inactive entity, they differ fromboth j¤ıÂva and pudgala (which are infinite in number and activein nature). On the other hand, they (other aj¤ıÂvas) share the prop-erty of 'lacking consciousness' with pudgala and they also shareone property with j¤ıÂva in so far as they are ar”ıËp¤ıÂ like j¤ıÂva.

26

Again all the dravyas except køıËla are called astikøıËya i.e., entitieswith extensive magnitude. Time or køıËla is unique and distinctfrom all the other entities because it lacks extensive magnitude.So køıËla (time) is technically called anastikøıËya dravya. It should bekept in mind, however, that not all astikøıËya dravyas are astikøıËyain exactly the same sense. A precise definition of 'astikøıËya' inJaina context may be put thus:

X is an astikøıËya, if X is (a) either a mereological whole or (b)a compositional whole or else (g) X is itself of an extensiveatomic magnitude.

It should be clear from the above definition that j¤ıÂva, dharma,and øıËkøıË—̃Áa are astikøıËya because they all satisfy requirement (a);pudgala is astikøıËya because it satisfies (b) above in so far as it isa composite chunk of matter and satisfies (g) when consideredas individual material atoms (pudgaløıËnu). Time is not astikøıËya (i.e.anastikøıËya) because it can be neither a mereological whole nor acompositional whole, since different ultimate units of time (i.e.instants) do never exist simultaneously to be collected togetherinto a whole at any given moment.

Trivial technicalities apart, the above characterisation of astikøıËyahas important philosophical implications, particularly in the con-text of Jaina theory of eternality and their theory of destruction.Since, Jaina cosmology provides the conceptual foundation ofJaina ethics, the distinction between mereological and composi-tional wholes has direct relevance to Jaina ethics.

B) NINE TATTVAS

The six (or seven) dravyas discussed above constitute the totality

of the types of entities that are present in the universe. However,just an enumeration of the entities in the universe is not enoughfor a systematic explanatory model of the universe. On top ofthe entities (e.g. space, time and matter in modern physics) wealso need some explanatory principles and dynamical laws whichwould give a systematic account of the patterns of interactionamong the entities. The Jaina scheme of nine tattva does providejust such an explanatory model. Just as the laws of motion inmodern physics necessarily rely upon the notions of space, timeand matter, similarly the explanatory principles and the dynamicallaws of Jaina cosmology have, of necessity, to bring in the notionsof the basic entities (dravya) admitted in Jaina cosmology. Broadlyspeaking, according to the Jainas, the dravyas are of two types-conscious ones (j¤ıÂva) and those lacking in consciousness (aj¤ıÂva).It is roughly analogous to the consciousness_matter dichotomyin modern philosophy. Accordingly, j¤ıÂva and aj¤ıÂva are repeatedand mentioned in the list of nine tattvas. It is clear therefore,that, of the nine, only seven are new concepts. Out of theseseven again, some thinkers exclude pøıËpa (demerit) and puÃ˝Èya(merit) as independent notions and drop them out of the list oftattvas. On doing so, the number of new concepts in the list oftattvas come down to only five. In our exposition we shallconsider puÃ˝Èya and pøıËpa as derivative, secondary concepts.Accordingly, the two will be discussed rather briefly in this paper.We are, therefore, left with the following seven basic tattvas viz.j¤ıÂva, aj¤ıÂva, øıËsrava, saÀ˝flvara, bandha, nirjarøıË, mok—˝Áa. Of these, thefirst two have already been discussed. So, we shall start withøıË—˜Árava, after making some brief remarks about a few basicpresuppositions of Jaina philosophy in general and Jaina ethicsin particular.

1) J¤ıÂva (soul or self or locus of consciousness), per se, hasunlimited jÃˆÈøıËna (knowledge), dar—˜Áana (wisdom), v¤ıÂrya(power/prowess) and øıËnanda (bliss). It is also free of allsorts of externally imposed constraints__causal or other-wise. In such a constraint-free state a j¤ıÂva is called mukta.In all other states it is called baddha (bound/in a state ofbondage). A j¤ıÂva can be baddha in different degrees. Thedegree of bondage is an index of a j¤ıÂva's fallen-ness or



deviation from its ideal state of perfection i.e. its intrinsicnature. Such bondage (of any degree) is a defect or im-perfection. It is the cause of making a j¤ıÂva susceptible tosufferings and miseries by subjecting it to the cycles ofdeath and birth.

2) The ultimate aim of every j¤ıÂva in this world is to shakeoff its defects with a view to getting back to its originalstate of ideal perfection. Such a state is called mo…˝È—˝Áa(liberation). Every j¤ıÂva has the potential of attainingmok—˝Áa27.

3) Any change of state or of motion (from its initial state)of any entity (dravya) requires and does have an explana-tion in accordance with an inviolable, uniformly univer-sal, autonomous and mechanistic (i.e. not requiring inter-vention by a conscious super-being like God) principleor law of causation.

4) The dichotomy of consciousness (j¤ıÂva) and matter {pudgala)is ultimate and the state of segregation between the twois natural.

5) Bondage i.e., deviation of a j¤ıÂva from its ideal nature, iscaused by the break-down of the natural boundary ofsegregation between j¤ıÂva and pudgala and the resultingintermingling of j¤ıÂva with one kind of aj¤ıÂva viz., karmapudgala. Such an intermingling is described more pictur-esquely as an infusion of a special sort of pudgala par-ticles into the interstices of j¤ıÂva. The special kind ofpudgala particles that penetrate the interstices of a j¤ıÂva(under specific conditions only) are called karma pudgalaor karmic matter or karma-particles.

Keeping the above background information in mind we maynow discuss the nature of the seven tattvas (excluding j¤ıÂva andaj¤ıÂva) which are postulated by the Jaina thinkers to give a rationalexplanation of the dynamical interaction between j¤ıÂva and pudgalain one of its forms.

i) §Ò‡—˜Árava

'§Ò‡—˜Árava' literally means influx or infusion.28 It denotes the firststage of a multistage process of interaction between j¤ıÂva and

karma-pudgala or karma-particles or karman, for short. As itsvery name suggests, øıË—̃Árava is the process whereby karman entersinto the j¤ıÂva through different inlet channels, so to say. Analogyof a piece of sponge (j¤ıÂva) being soaked with water (karma pudgala)through three inlet-pipes (viz., body, mind and speech) seems tobe an appropriate one. This analogy is quite appropriate becauseit naturally suggests a few questions which need to be answeredfor the model to be acceptable and adequate.

First, what are the channels ?

Second, when did this process of influx i.e., ø ıË— ˜Áravabegin ?

Third, what active role, if any, does a j¤ıÂva have to play toget øıË—˜Árava started ?

Fourth, what conditions does a j¤ıÂva (the sponge, here) haveto fulfill so that it absorbs karma-pudgala (water) andundergoes bondage (i.e., gets wet, in terms of the anal-ogy used here)?

Fifth, what is the process, if any, whereby the inlet pipescan be turned off, so that there is no more inflow (øıË—˜Árava)of water (karman) into the sponge (j¤ıÂva)?

Sixth, supposing that the influx has been stopped, how isit possible to squeeze the water (karman) out of thesponge-pores (interstices of j¤ıÂva) completely?

Last, supposing such a complete squeezing out (nirjarøıË) ofwater (karma-pudgala) from the sponge (j¤ıÂva) is achieved,what would be the condition of the sponge (j¤ıÂva) whichhas thus been squeezed dry, so to say?

As I shall try to show, each one of the tattvas has been postu-lated by the Jaina thinkers to answer one or more of the abovequestions.

In order to answer the first question, it has been postulatedthat there are three channels of influx viz. body (køıËya), mind(manas) and speech (vøıËk).29 The rationale for this is not far toseek. We, as subjects of experience (j¤ıÂva), can interact with ourenvironment (i.e. with others) either physically (using our body),or mentally (through our thoughts) or communicationally



(through language). Clearly, if one can shut off these channelsthen øıË—˜Árava will be stopped. Now, all the three modes of inter-action between a j¤ıÂva and its environment requires some effortor activity. Hence, if there is no activity on the part of the j¤ıÂva,then there is no interaction with the 'others' (neither bodily normental nor lingual) as all the channels are inoperative now.Consequently, there can be no øıË—˜Árava (inward flow) either. TheøıË—̃Árava-generating activity is technically called 'yoga' by the Jainathinkers.30

Therefore, we can say that in order to stop øıË—˜Árava, one mustrestrain the influx channels and desist from yoga. The act ofrestraining the channels of influx is technically called gupti. Sothere are three kinds of gupti__(køıËya-gupti, mano-gupti and vøıËk-gupti) which are essential for stopping øıË—˜Árava. The notion ofyoga had been brought in to provide an affirmative answer tothe third question listed above. Naturally, corresponding to thethree restraints or gupti there are three yoga or unrestrainedactivity viz., køıËya-yoga, mana-yoga and vøıËk-yoga.31

As regards the second question the Jaina thinkers hold thatthe intermingling of karma-pudgala and j¤ıÂva is coming downfrom eternity.32 It has no beginning in time (anøıËdi). Gold-orecontains pure gold as well as its baser impurities right from thevery a beginning. Similar is the case with j¤ıÂva-karma complex.This implies that we cannot think of a point time when j¤ıÂva inits purity and karma particles by themselves were in a sort ofper- intermingling stand-off position. Given the rigidly invio-lable theory of causation of the Jaina thinkers, the beginningless-ness of j¤ıÂva-karma intermingling is an indispensable requirement.If there were point of time before which there was no intermin-gling, then the later occurrence of intermingling would require acausal explanation. But no such explanation could be given withinthe Jaina framework because, according to them, j¤ıÂva in its purestate cannot have any reason to indulge in any activity {yoga)and as such there would be no øıË—˜Árava and hence no influx ofkarma pudgala into the structure of j¤ıÂva.

I have used the term 'øıË—˜Árava' in one of its various senses. Theother senses in which it is used in Jaina literature may be indi-cated briefly.

a) §Ò‡—˜Árava as the collective name for the three inlet channelsor channels of karma-influx. Here, I have used it in thatsense and it also happens to be most common usage.For brevity and future reference we call it øıË—˜Árava-as-chan-nel view.

b) Instead of the channels, øıË—̃Árava may also mean the pro-cess of influx as such. We call it øıËsrava-as-a-process view.

c) Again øıË—̃Árava may not be used in any of the above twosenses. Instead, it may be used to denote that which getsinto a j¤ıÂva through the inlet channels. Here, 'øıË—̃Árava' meansthe karma-particles themselves.

d) Sometime øıË—˜Árava is used to denote the state of a j¤ıÂvawhich has been infused with karma-particles to any de-gree whatsoever. In this sense, 'øıË—˜Árava' becomes inter-changeable with 'bandha'__the tattva that we are going todiscuss next. The virtual equivalence of 'øıË—˜Árava' and'bandha' are justified on the ground that the causes oføıË—˜Árava are the same as the causes of bandha, and alsobecause of the fact that øıË—̃Árava as a state-description ofj¤ıÂva is invariably correlated with a certain degree of bond-age (bandha) of the j¤ıÂva concerned.33 This is somewhatanalogous to equating the concavity and convexity of agiven surface because the two expressions denote thesame curvature from two different points of view.

e) Lastly, 'øıË—˜Árava' is often used by Jaina thinkers to denotethe cause that lead to the process of øıË—˜Árava34. In otherwords, those causative factors which initiate any processof influx at one point of time or another, may be calledøıË—˜Árava.

The third, the fourth and the fifth senses of øıË—˜Árava shall bereferred to as øıË—˜Árava-as-a-state-description view, øıË—˜Árava-bandha-equivalence view and øıË—˜Árava-as-a-cause view respectively.

ii) PøıËpa and Punya

From the account given above it follows that any influx ofkarma-particles into the structure of j¤ıÂva causes deviation fromthe j¤ ıÂva's ideal perfection resulting in its bondage. However,there is a difference of opinion on this point among the Jaina



thinkers. All of them agree that any karma-influx causes bond-age and ultimately all karma-particles need to be purged fromthe j¤ıÂva in order that liberation be possible. However, not all ofthem think that each and every karma-influx is equally harmfulto j¤ıÂva's moral uplift. So, some thinkers distinguish between twotypes of karma__good and bad. Influx of good karma (puÃ˝Èya) iscalled puÃ˝ÈyøıËsrava and that of bad karma (pøıËpa) is called pøıËpøıËsrava.From this point of view puÃ˝Èya and pøıËpa are treated under øıË —˜Árava35

On the other hand, texts like PancøıËstikøıËyasøıËra36 tend to treatthem independently. Some other Jaina thinkers consider puÃ˝Èyaand pøıËpa as forms of bandha.37 Given the øıË—˜Árava-bandha equiva-lence view it is only natural that some writers would go for onealternative and others for another. Manibhadra's commentaryon Sat-dar—˜Áana samuccaya elucidates nine kinds of puÃ˝Èya andeighteen kinds of pøıËpa. A closer look at the entire of the listwould unmistakably reveal the socio-humanitarian concern ofJaina ethics. However, in this essay I will not go into the discus-sion of that aspect of Jaina ethics.38

Some Jaina writers did make a sort of detailed fine-grainanalysis of the topic and put forward a list of forty-two channelsof øıË—̃Árava. Seventeen of them are more important. They includefive sense-organs (bodily factors), four mental attitudes, calledka—˝Áaya, (mental factors), non-pursuance of the five mahavrata(combination of bodily, mental and lingual factors) and threegupti (already mentioned). It is obvious that the list involvessome repetitions under different labels. We shall frequently comeacross similar instances.

iii) Bandha39

As I have already pointed out, bandha is a state-description ofthe level of purity of a j¤ıÂva which has been infused with karma-particles through the process of influx or øıË—˜Árava. However, theremay be different kinds and degrees of influx of karma-particles.Accordingly, depending on the nature, extent and type of karma-influx into a j¤ıÂva, bandha or bondage is categorised into fourtypes; prak–˝Áti bandha (nature of the state of bondage), sthiti bandha(based on the staying power of bondage), anubhøıËga bandha (basedon its affective depth or intensity) and prade—˜Áa bandha (spread

or extensity).40 Of these, two types of bondage viz., prade—˜Áabandha (extensity) and prak–˝Áti bandha (nature) are caused by yoga(improper activity), while the other two are caused by ka—˝ÁøıËya.

The four mental attitudes viz., anger (krodha), greed (lobha),pride (moha or ahamkøıËra) and deluded vision (møıËyøıË) are calledka—̋ÁøıËya because, they function as a sort of sticky glue pertainingto a j¤ıÂva. Whenever j¤ıÂva is under any one or more of those fourmental attitudes, ka—˝ÁøıËyas arise in it. Ka—˝ÁøıËyas are comparable tomoisture in a wet cloth, because, ka—˝ÁøıËyas make the infused karma-particles stick to the self, just as moisture makes dust-particlesstick to the wet cloth.41 If there were no ka—˝ÁøıËya, the infusedkarma-particles would drop off the j¤ıÂva, instead of staying stuckto it. In that case, despite øıË—˜Árava, there would be no state ofbondage (bandha) of j¤ıÂva.42

iv) Samvara

The notions of yoga and ka—˝ÁøıËya discussed above are, clearly,theoretical constructs (like the. Freudian 'libido' or 'unconscious')introduced in Jaina philosophy for the purpose of finding arational answer to the third and the fourth questions that aresuggested by the water-inlet model of øıË—˜Árava and bandha.

Now, granted that bondage is a deviation (from the idealnorm) caused by the influx of karma-particles into j¤ıÂva (basicpresupposition #5) and that the ultimate aim of every j¤ıÂva is toshake off or purge out the karma-particles from its core (basicassumption #2) it follows that if liberation is to be possible thenthere must be a way of flushing out the karma-particles from aj¤ıÂva. Samvara is the first step in that direction. 'Samvara' literallymeans 'putting on hold'. If we take the wet-sponge model ofjiva-in-bondage, and our aim is to squeeze the sponge dry, thenwe must admit that before we start squeezing it, we must makesure that no more water trickles in through the inlets (therebycausing the sponge stay wet) as we struggle to squeeze it dry.Similarly, the Jaina thinkers maintain that before the process ofpurging or squeezing out of karma-particles from a j¤ıÂva starts,we must be able to put the process of inflow/influx to an end.This putting-to-an-end of øıË—˜Árava is called samvara. It is a kind offorce that counter-balances and neutralizes the force of influx

SARKAR: Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 8 3 8 4 ETHICS : An Anthology


i.e. øıË—̃Árava.43 That is why it is said that if, at any given moment,a j¤ıÂva attracts neither good nor bad karma-particles (puÃ˝Èya orpøıËpa karma) then at that moment it (j¤ıÂva) is said to have attainedthe state of samvara.44

Like 'øıË—˜Árava', 'samvara' is also a word with more than onesense. Samvara, as we just saw, can be viewed as a force thatcounter-balances the force of øıË—˜Árava. We have also seen thatthere are some improper mental attitudes (cruelty, anger, greedetc.) which cause øıË—̃Árava. Hence, samvara must be construed as asort of psychical counter-force generated by the adoption of propermental attitudes (there are sixty-two of them) which prepares theground for holding the process of influx (øıË—˜Árava) in check. Asa result, there is stoppage of actual influx of karma-particles intoa j¤ıÂva. Thus samvara has two aspects__a ground (i.e. generationof the required psychical counter-force) and the consequence (i.e.actual stoppage of the influx of karma-particles). Accordingly,Jaina thinkers classify samvara into two types__the psychicalground-condition which is called bhøıËva-samvara, and its actualphysical consequence which is called dravya-samvara. Clearly, bhøıËva-samvara45 is the more fundamental of the two.

There are sixty-two ways of achieving bhøıËva-samvara i.e. thepsychical ground-conditions. These sixty-two are categorised underseven groups46

:

1. Five kinds of samiti i.e. manifest intra-community behaviourof proper types,47

2. Pursuance of the five vrata (moral vows),48

3. Three kinds of gupti or restraintful use of body (køıËya),mind (mana) and language (vøıËk),49

4. Ten types of dharma50 (collectively called '''''da—˜Áa yatidharma')i.e. states of excellence to be achieved with regard to one'sbody, mind and language,

5. Twelve kinds of anuprek—˝ÁøıË or deep reflection,6. Twenty-two kinds of par¤ıÂ—˝Áahajaya (endurance of hard-

ships),51

7. Five kinds of cøıËritra or moral conduct.52

Each item under any of the seven categories has been minutely

analysed by the Jaina philosophers. Since they are more relevantfor studying the social relevance of Jaina ethics (and not somuch relevant for an understanding of the basic structure ofJaina ethics as a theory of morality) I shall not go into thosedetails here. Instead, shall now move on to discuss the nexttattva viz., nirjarøıË.

v) NirjarøıË

An answer to the fifth question suggested by the water-inletmodel is found in terms of the notion of samvara. Suppose thatone has been able to plug the dripping fawcet of øıË—˜Árava (i.e.samvara has been achieved)__what next, if he wants to get thewet sponge back to its dry state ? If the model proposed is aproper one, there can be only one answer-'squeeze it dry bywringing out water completely from it'. The analogue of it inJaina ethics is the concept of nirjarøıË. It is the last but one tattvaor theoretical construct in the Jaina model of moral causation.NirjarøıË therefore, is defined as the act or process of segregatingj¤ıÂva from those karma-particles which trickled into j¤ıÂva and stayedstuck to it.53

One other alternative of getting the wet sponge dry again isto leave it in the open to dry naturally in course of time. Thefirst alternative requires human effort but is less prolonged, theother alternative requires human effort but may be a quite pro-longed process. But still, both are theoretically feasible alterna-tives. Analogously, the Jaina thinkers speak of two types of nirjarøıËviz., vipøıËkaja (involving no effort) and avipøıËkaja (requiring posi-tive effort).54 The former takes place after the karma-particlesdrop off the j¤ıÂva in due time after coming to maturity. The latterrequires human effort in the form of tapasyøıË (steadfast pursu-ance of the goal of mok—˝Áa by enduring all sorts of hardships).55

TapasyøıË again is of two kinds internal and external. InternaltapasyøıË is more effective than external tapasyøıË for achievingnirjarøıË.56 Each one of these two types of tapasyøıË is further clas-sified into six sub-types each.

The six kinds of external tapasyøıË are the following :



1) Ana—˜Áana (fasting),2) Avamaudarya or uÃ˝Èodar¤ıÂ (partial fasting),3) V–˝Áttisamk—˝Áepa (curtailing the greed for various things of

enjoyment),4) Rasa-tyøıËga (giving up of enjoyment of delicacies like butter,

honey etc.),5) køıËyakle—˜Áa (undergoing self-imposed physical hardship),6) saml¤ıÂnatøıË (overcoming temptation by controlling mental

attitudes e.g. the ka—˝ÁøıËyas, bodily actions like indiscretemovement, choice of living conditions etc. and control-ling speech which is improper or indiscrete. Saml¤ıÂnatøıË isjust the three guptis and a few of the samitis repeatedunder a different garb).

The six types of internal tapasyøıË, on the other hand, are thefollowing:

1. PrøıËya—˜Ácitta (atonement for moral wrong-doing like non-pursuance of the five vratas etc.)

2. Vinaya (modesty and reverance)3. Vai◊Û›øıËv–˝Áttya (rendering humanitarian service to others)4. SvøıËdhyøıËya (study of relevant scriptures)5. Vyutsarga (renunciation, i.e. giving up the sense of posses-

sion by overcoming the feeling of mine-ness)6. DhyøıËna (mental concentration), which again is subdivided

into four types viz., øıËrta-dhyøıËna, røıËudra-dhyøıËna, dharma-dhyøıËna and —˜Áukla-dhyøıËna,57

Here, again we skip the details as they are not directly relevantfor our purpose.

vi) Mok—˝Áa

It is the last tattva in the list of nine. Mok—˝Áa means transcendenceof the state of bondage leading into the realm of ideal freedom.This state is achieved when even the last bit of karma-particle ispurged out of the j¤ıÂva. At this stage, mundane morality ceases tohave any relevance for the liberated self. State of liberation ormok—˝Áa is a trans-ethical or metaphysical concept and therefore,does not directly bear upon the moral issues in the ordinarysense. Hence, we shall make only a few such very brief com-

ments about it as would have some relevance to our line ofapproach.

First, mok—˝Áa is defined as that state where all causes of bond-age have been destroyed through the process of purging (nirjarøıË)of all karma-particles and thus freedom from all karma has beenachieved. It brings all sufferings to an end and leads to bound-less bliss.58

Secondly, mok—˝Áa is of two types viz., bhøıËva-mok—˝Áa and dravya-mok—˝Áa which roughly correspond to the concepts of j¤ıÂvan-muktiand videha-mukti respectively.59

Thirdly, a liberated self or j¤ıÂva can never be subject to thecycle of birth and death again.60

Finally, after dravya-mok—˝Áa the liberated j¤ıÂva resumes its naturalupward movement and continues to move up until it reaches theupper boundary of lokøıËkøıË—˜Áa,61 where it stays for ever. A liberatedself cannot, however, move further up into the alokøıËkøıË—˜Áa for thesimple reason that according to the Jainas there is no dharma oradharma62 (the indispensable auxilliary conditions of motion andrest) in the alokøıËkøıË—˜Áa.

One who has attained mok—˝Áa is called a keval¤ıÂ in Jaina litera-ture.63 Since such a j¤ıÂva is free of all trammels that may act as im-pediments to achieving its four original potentialities {anantacatu—˝Á“˝Âaya), a keval¤ıÂ attains infinite knowledge, wisdom, bliss andpower.64

According to the Jaina thinkers, a keval¤ıÂ is an acme of perfectionand, as such, he can be viewed as God i.e. as the noblest object ofworship.65 Other than that, there is no God. The postulation ofGod is a needless hypothesis according to the Jainas. 'Law (vidhih),creator (sra—˝Á“˝Âa), legislator (vidhøıËtøıË), destiny (daiva), previous karma(karma purøıËkrtani) and Isvara (God) are synonymous,' says the Jaina§Ò‡dipurøıËÃ˝Èa,66

III. CAUSATION AND KARMA

Jaina theory of causation and their view about the nature of law ofkarma form the theoretical foundation of Jaina ethics. In thissection we discuss them one after the other.



A) CAUSATION

Jaina theory of causation has some peculiar features, the significanceof which can be best appreciated by looking at them from a broaderperspective. Probably the earliest attempt to give a systematicaccount of the regularities found in the universe was in terms of∂˝flta, postulated as a cosmic ordering-principle. Its range ofapplication was universal in so far as it ranged over both the physicalas well as the psychical spheres. ∂˝flta, however, always had ananthropocentric orientation. This notion of ∂̋flta was taken up andlater modified with sophistication into the comprehensive conceptof køıËrya-køıËraÃ˝Èa-vøıËda by the later Indian thinkers. The generaltendency, however, was to adapt it to a dichotomic approach.KøıËrya-køıËraÃ˝Èa (causality in the restricted sense), was invoked as anexplanatory principle pertaining to the physical events. Acorresponding causal principle, called ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa (or some equivalentnotion) was invoked to explain the transphysical (including bothpsychological and moral) events. Ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa usually brought with itthe notion of a moral dispensor (vidhøıËtøıË or God with a supervisoryrole) to ensure that ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa works without glitches. It was probablyone of the first attempts to adopt a dualistic (consciousness andmatter) model of the universe. In the process, there was abifurcation of the explanatory principle ∂̋flta into køıËrya-køıËraÃ˝Èa-vøıËda(causality in a restricted sense) applying to physical phenomenaand ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa (destiny) applying to the non-physical, especially moral,phenomena. The Jaina model of causation was an attempt to revertto a unified scheme of explanation like the ∂̋flta but the model differsfrom it in being a rigidly mechanistic (but not deterministic)67 andnon-anthropo-centric principle of explanation.68

Keeping the above background in mind, we may note a fewsalient features of Jaina theory of causation.

i) The Jainas divide causes into three types

a) Material cause (upøıËdøıËna køıËraÃ˝Èa) e.g. gold in a ring,b) Efficient cause (kartøıË) e.g., goldsmith who makes the ring,c) Instrumental or auxiliary cause (søıËdhana or køıËraÃ˝Èa) e.g. the

hammer of a goldsmith.

Jaina concept of instrumental cause (søıËdhana) is wider than thecorresponding notion used by the NaiyøıËyikas in so far as the Jainas

drop the requirement that any instrument has to be somethingwhich is used by a conscious agent. An instrumental cause may,however, still be viewed as any indispensable (but not always con-sciously effected) condition of an effect. Thus even the role of thebasal stone of a potter's wheel in the production of the effect potor the role of warmth of fire as a cause of easier concentration instudy during the winter, would count as auxiliary causes (søıËdhanaor køıËraÃ˝Èa) according to the Jainas. It is in this sense that dharmaand adharma are considered by the Jainas to be causative factorsinstrumental to the production of motion and rest respectively.

69

Such a view implies that something may be causally explained with-out postulating a conscious manipulator.

ii) No change without a cause

Every origination (as a new state coming into being) involves achange of an existing state of affairs. Hence, every originationrequires an explanation, which must be a causal one according tothe Jainas. But causal explanation need not entail a purpose orconscious intervention. Jaina theory of origination and destruc-tion were developed in keeping with this requirement. They di-vided all processes of creation/destruction into two types__(a)prøıËyogika (involving conscious effort) and (b) vaisrasika (naturali.e. without requiring conscious effort). Production of a pot (or itsdestruction on purpose) are examples of prøıËyogika creation anddestruction respectively.

Similarly, the origin of a mountain or of changes in the statesof dharma (of a thing in motion) are examples of natural (vaisrasika)creation. So is the case of cloud-formation in the sky. Dissipationof a cloud or of a wind-swept sand-dune are examples of natural(vaisrasika) destruction.70

iii) All effects must end in a finite time

Another important theoretical presupposition underlying the Jainatheory of causation needs mention here. Although it is nowhereso explicitly stated in the Jaina literature, yet it is unmistakablyimplied by what other things are explicitly stated in some of



them. The presupposition is this: No effect which is of thenature of a deviation (from an initial or pure state of anything)can continue for ever. Thus if we throw a stone, its state ofmotion (which is a deviation from its initial and natural state ofrest) will be gradually dissipated and completely lost after a finitespan of time. On the other hand, once the stone is set intomotion, if we want to bring it to a stop before due time, wehave to apply some motion-opposing or retarding force to it.The stronger the retarding force applied, the sooner the previ-ous effect is counter balanced or neutralized. This principle orpresupposition is quite analogous to the principle of increase ofentropy of a natural system. It says that in natural states entropy(disorder) tends to increase towards a state of equilibrium. If theentropy of a natural system is artificially decreased by consciousintervention, then the system naturally tends to revert back to astate of higher entropy as soon as it is left to itself withoutintervention. No effect (decrease of entropy) can continue forever (being a deviation from the initial state of perfect equilib-rium). The point of this analogy is difficult to miss. Hence, weshall call this specific presupposition of the Jaina theory of cau-sality 'the entropy principle'.

B) THEORY OF KARMA:

i) General Features

Jaina theory of karma is an aspect of their more inclusive theoryof causation. The important features of the Jaina concept ofkarma are the following:

i) Karman is a special form of pudgala71 and atomic in nature,ii) It has the natural property of adhogurutva, (downward gravi-

tation) in contrast to the upwardly gravitation or levity(”ıËrdhagurutva) of souls,72

iii) Karman interacts with a soul through the channels of body,mind and speech,

iv) Karman is the root of birth and death and of all worldlysufferings and enjoyments,73

v) The status and the type of being that a j¤ıÂva is in this life isdue to its own karman.74

vi) Depending on its own karma a j¤ıÂva may be born as aworm, as an insect, as an ant, either as a k—˝Áatriya or as acandøıËla or in a mixed caste,75

vii) The law of karma is inexorable i.e. there is no exception toit. No one can avoid undergoing the effects of his karma,76

viii) Effects of karma are non-sharable and non-transferable77

i.e. the doer alone is to bear the whole impact of the effectsof his own karma. On the other hand, the consequences ofno one else's action can be thrust on him,

ix) There are eight types of karman viz., jÃ ˆÈø ı Ënø ı ËvaraÃ˝È ¤ ı Âya,dar—˜ÁanøıËvaran¤ıÂya, mohan¤ıÂya, vedanlya, antarøıËya, øıËyu∆˝Ë karman,nøıËma karman, and gotra karman.78 Of these, the first fourare called ghøıË“ıÂi (destructive) karma, because they obstructand destroy true knowledge and faith and thereby destroya j¤ıÂva's chances of emancipation (mok—˝Áa). The last four arecalled non-destructive (aghøıËt¤ıÂ), because although they pro-duce effects on a j¤ıÂva's state of existence yet they do notadversely affect its chances of mok—˝Áa,79

x) There are two ways in which the so-called karma- contami-nation of a j¤ıÂva can come to an end. In due course, whentheir potency is used up, the karma-particles fall off natu-rally. This is purgation (nirjarøıË), through maturity (vipøıËkajøıËnirjarøıË). Alternatively, one may, through conscious effort,(e.g. tapasyøıË, prøıËya—˜Ácitta, etc.) flush the infused karma-par-ticles out of j¤ıÂva. This is effort-based flushing of karma-particles (avipøıËkajøıË nirjarøıË). That there must be a vipøıËkajøıËnirjarøıË follows as a corollary from the entropy principleitself,

xi) The law of karma is autonomous i.e. it does not require thepostulation of any superhuman consciousness or God, be-cause it is a special case of their non-anthropocentric, mecha-nistic theory of causation. Law, creator, karma, God all referto the same inexorable principle80 according to the Jainas.

ii) Common mechanistic framework

I claimed earlier in this paper that Jaina cosmology and ethicsshare a common mechanistic (but non-deterministic) framework.Now we may note some of the more significant points of con-vergence between their cosmology and their ethics.



i) J¤ıÂva is utterly different from pudgala, yet its nature is mod-elled mechanistically in so far as j¤ıÂva is characterised as amereological whole, having interstices into which karma-particles may percolate,

ii) J¤ıÂva has ”ıËrdhvagurutva (levity),iii) It requires the help of dharma for its motion just as any

other material object does,iv) It has spatial extension (de—˜ÁaparimøıËÃ˝Èa), though it does not

fill or occupy any volume of space,v) Sense organs (indriya), mind (manas), life force (prøıËÃ˝Èa) and

apøıËna are all material (paudgalika) in nature. Not only that,karman also has form (r”ıËp¤ıÂ) according to the Jainas,81

vi) Both j¤ıÂva (at its mundane level) as well as pudgala (matter)are subject to the same set of mechanistic laws viz., that ofcausality and karma,

vii) The inlet-channel-cum-wet-sponge model of the nine tattva,as we saw, is a fully mechanistic one in which the causes oføıË—˜Árava and bandha can be viewed as forces of attractionacting on karma-particles whereas causes of saÀÛflvara andnirjarøıË are the corresponding repulsive forces acting on them,

viii) Pursuance of the five mahøıËvratas (ahiÀÛflsøıË, asteya, amithyøıË,arati and aparigraha) and their ritualistic details are prescrip-tions for generating the karma-repelling forces,

ix) Non-pursuance of the five vratas and indulging in the mentalattitudes of greed, anger (the ka—˝ÁøıËyas) etc. are ways of lettingthe karma-attracting forces to become operative and therebyof preparing the ground for bondage of self.82 The socio-ethical aspects of these are enormously important but arenot discussed here,

x) Ka—˝ÁøıËya (the stickiness-producing property pertaining to aj¤ıÂva) are coarsely mechanistic-physicalistic in nature,

xi) Not only that, a j¤ıÂva, according to the Jainas, can even takeup colouration (red, blue, white etc.) depending on the typeof karma-pudgala infused into it. Such colouration of a j¤ıÂvais technically called 'le—˜ÁyøıË,83 in Jaina philosophy,

xii) Finally, it may also be noted that the Jaina classification ofkarman into three different types (on the basis of their period

of fructification) nicely fits in with the well-known physical-istic model that depicts the transformation of potential energyinto kinetic energy.84 The first of the three types of karmanis sattøıË i.e. such karman as were acquired by a self in the pastbut are yet to start bearing their fruits. Second comes bandhakarman (i.e. karman currently being acquired which will bearfruit only in future). Last, there is udaya karman i.e. karmanwhich has already started bearing its fruit. The analogy be-tween these and a previously wound-up spring (in its vari-ous stages of unwinding) very naturally comes to mind here.This and similar issues I plan to develop later.

C) CONSEQUENCES OF THE MODEL

Philosophical implications of the mechanistic-physicalistic modelof Jaina cosmology and ethics are quite interesting. The worthof any model is measured in terms of its power of systematizationand explanation. How well does our mechanistic-physicalisticmodel (MP-model, for short) fare by this criterion?

i) Physicalistic ethics

If the parallelism drawn earlier between Jaina cosmology (i.e.physics in a broad sense) and their ethics has any plausibilitythen it follows that in Jainism physics and ethics should beunified within a common physicalistic framework. As a matterof fact, that happens to be the case too. In nineteenth centuryphysics Joule's famous experiment was prompted by a concep-tual framework in which the principle of conservation of energywas sacrosanct. Similarly, among a number of other things, theJaina hypothesis about the transmigration of souls was a logicalconsequence of their theory of karma85 (which clearly fits theMP-model). This is certainly very interesting. However, whatbestows uniqueness on Jaina ethics is not its physicalistic orien-tation (which the cøıËrvøıËkas and some twentieth century reduc-tionists did have) but the fact that Jaina ethics, despite beingphysicalistic (yet non-materialistic) in a broad sense, is a non-reductionist and non-deterministic (but strictly causalistic) system.



Instead of going for a physicalistic reduction of self, what theydid may be called a 'transductive physicalism'__a sort of physical-ism where physical elements (like earth, water, plants etc.) areplaced at the lower end of the continuum of be-souled reals86

which are, in principle, transducible (upgradable) to the level ofa full-fledged j¤ıÂva.

ii) Godless world of human dignity

It is a historical fact that any worldview dominated by a physi-calistic orientation would tend to look for the explanatory prin-ciples it needs within the physical world itself. Naturally, in suchworldviews, world-transcendent things like God, creator etc.would become redundant and dispensable. If the law of karmabe universal and inescapable and every individual difference oftype and status in the present state of existence is to be ac-counted for in terms of differences in previous karma, then aworld-creator God can have no place in such a system. Natu-rally, in Jainism there is no God in the ordinary sense of atranscendent being. With no God, there is no question of re-demption (attaining mok—̋Áa) through divine grace alone.87 Beinginexorable, non-sharable and non-transferable their law of karmaensures that man's open-future is shaped by his own karmaalone. There is nothing called a 'free-ride' or a 'forfeited' paidticket in a universe in which the law of karma reigns supreme.So one owes respectful submission only to this supreme law ofkarma which even Gods (if there be any) cannot disobey.88

Now God being dead every man becomes the maker of hisown destiny by his own karma. Those beings who by dint oftheir own efforts and karma reach the ideal limit of perfection(mok—˝Áa) become the embodiments of all the divine virtues, forthe alleged possession of which the so-called God is worshipped.Such self-perfected beings are called keval¤ıÂ, siddha, arhat etc. bythe Jains. It follows as a corollary that such men (rather than asuperstitiously hypothesised God) should be the proper objectof worship. It is very clearly expressed through the sacred chantof worship used by the Jainas.89 Thus it is the Jaina ideal of

moral perfection that defines the object of worship or Godheadinstead of a transcendent hypothetical notion of perfection (viz.God-hood) defining the goal of moral perfection. It is a sort ofCopernican revolution insofar as instead of viewing man as aforever-imperfect copy of divine perfection, Jainism regards Godas man-perfected. So man plays a more central role than Godin Jaina ethics. This primacy-of-man orientation of their ethicscomes out more explicitly when, in addition to equating Godwith a liberated self called a 'siddha' they maintain that amongthe different types of siddhas, the position of a tirthankara ismore exalted because he continues to serve humanity (by way ofpropounding dharma) after liberation.90 Not only that, Jainismfurther holds that 'Each self can become paramøıËtman by self-culture and self-effort', that every man is God, potentially.91 Evenmore radically homocentric is the Jaina claim that 'Liberation isattained through human body only. Heavenly Gods....[cannot]attain the supreme state of liberation directly from their state ofgodhood'.92 Gods have to be born as man in order to be eli-gible to achieve mok—˝Áa. Mok—˝Áa must be an achievement by theliberated rather than an endowment thrust on him.

Had the law of karma not been supreme and inexorablymechanistic, extolling the dignity of man above that of Godwould not be a logical corollary of Jaina ethics. It is unmistak-ably clear that only an MP-model of ethics (dovetailing physicswith ethics) could provide the required foundation.

iii) Loneliness of man

From the MP-model of Jaina ethics the inexorability of themechanistically rigid impersonal nature of law of karma followsas a corollary. This corollary, in its turn, entails that in Jainaethics there is no scope of getting 'forgiveness' for one's sinsthrough divine grace. As one sows, so he must reap. Man aloneis fully responsible for his own actions and he is the lone fighterto struggle his way up to mok—˝Áa__a sort of transcendence of hisstate of fallen-ness. Unlike in Christianity this state of 'fallen-ness' is not original, it is a sort of self-inflictment caused by one'sown karma. This view is very succinctly stated in various texts.



UttarøıËdhyana S”ıËtra93 clearly states:

a) '...people in this life and the next cannot escape the effect oftheir own actions'. (4.3)

b) 'One's relations cannot share the fruits of a person's actionswhen they mature'.(4.4)

c) 'Alone he accumulates merit; alone he enjoys happiness inheaven; alone he destroys karma; alone he attains mok—˝Áa.' 94

Moreover, it may also be noted that of the sixty-two ways of achievingsamvara arranged in seven groups, the fifth group consists of twelveanuprek—˝ÁøıË (deep and meditative reflection). Of them one is a—̃ÁaraÃ̋Èaanuprek—˝ÁøıË (reflection on helplessness of man in the face of deathand suffering). Another is, ekatva anuprek—˝ÁøıË (reflection on man'saloneness). It requires one to reflect thus: 'I am alone, the doer ofmy actions and enjoyer of the fruits of them. No one can helpme, nor can I expect help from others.'95 This emphasis on therecognition of man's helplessness and aloneness is strongly sugges-tive of an existentialistic undertone in Jaina ethics. Man's beingthrown into this world, his helpless and aloneness remind one ofthe existentialist notion of facticity96

with the important differencethat man himself is responsible for his being thrown into the worldaccording to Jaina philosophy, while in existentialism this 'thrown-ness' is painted as due to a cosmic conspiracy against hapless man.

iv) Non-deterministic causalism

Let us suppose that (a) our proposed MP-model, is an adequatelypowerful model of the structure of Jaina ethics, that (b) the karma-particles, mind (manas), principle of vitality (prøıËÃ˝Èa) etc. are mate-rial in nature97 and that (c) the law of karma is rigidly causal, inflex-ible and mechanical-physical in nature.98 What kind of view aboutthe criterion of moral responsibility and about freedom of willshould we expect to encounter in a system of ethics based on theabove three assumptions ? Well, what do we expect to happen ifwater drips on a dry sponge from a tap ? Irrespective of whetherthe tap was turned on intentionally or just happened to be turnedon purely accidentally, the result is the same, the sponge gets water

soaked. Similarly if our MP-model is correct then even uninten-tional actions (good or bad) would cause an influx of karma-par-ticles (here, water particles) into the j¤ıÂva (here, the dry sponge)causing the j¤ıÂva to be permeated by the karma-particles. This willcause j¤ıÂva to lose its state of purity (corresponding to the loss ofdryness of the sponge due to the influx of wet water particles intoits pores). The sponge-getting-wet is a useful analogy of j¤ıÂva laps-ing into a state of bondage because the sponge analogy suggeststhat even unintentional actions may cause bondage to the self andwhen it does, the onus of freeing itself of such bondage-producingkarma-particles rests on the j¤ıÂva concerned. That is what, accord-ing to the Jaina theory of morality , really happens. In short, theJainas maintain that unintentional actions need not be morality-neutral i.e. non-moral actions. They should, instead, be countedeither as 'moral' or as 'immoral' actions depending on the natureof the unintended action.99 This is a radical departure from thestandard Western scheme of classification of all actions into moral,immoral and non-moral ones.

Moreover, the Jainas distinguish between bhøıËvøıËsrava (øıËsravainduced by ka—˝ÁøıËya-inducing psychological attitude) anddravyøıËsrava (actual influx of karma as a consequence). The rela-tion between bhøıËvøıËsrava and dravyøıËsrava is that of ground andconsequence (rather than a straightforward cause-effect relation),where bhøıËvøıËsrava. being the ground, plays a more significantrole in setting the process of influx (øıË—̃Árava) in motion. Themoral-theoretic consequence of this is that according to theJaina theory of evil (or good) intentions by themselves are potentenough to generate moral consequences (pøıËpa or puÃ˝Èya) therebymaking the agent morally responsible for his evil (or good)intentions, even if such intentions are never carried out intoaction.

To sum up, according to the Jaina view (a) even an unin-tended accidentally done action can be morally good or bad;100

And (b) even a non-action (e.g. intention to harm someonewithout really doing any harm to him) can make the agentresponsible for moral wrong-doing.101 The degree of suchresponsibility, however, is less than what it would be if the saidevil intention were followed by causing actual harm. The first



feature (a) implies that intention is not a necessary condition forimputing moral responsibility, while (b) implies that it is asufficient condition by itself. This is a unique position whichdoes not fit in well with any standard Western framework.Clearly, such a radical departure would make a system of crimi-nal justice, based on Jaina moral theory, significantly differentfrom those based on another (e.g. the Western) kind of moraltheory. Some of the penological102 consequences of Jaina ethicsI have discussed elsewhere.103

That even in the absence of any overt action the mere inten-tion to act in a particular way can make the agent morallyresponsible is a logical corollary of the MP-model of Jaina eth-ics. If karma-particles are material in nature, and operate mecha-nistically, and if yoga (any activity of body, mind or speech) in-evitably causes influx (øıËsrava) then mere evil intention, beingwhat it is, a sort of mano-yoga (i.e. an activity of mind) musthave moral consequences. That is why the Jainas interpret ahiÀ˝flsøıËin a very broad sense to exclude from it not only actual acts ofcruelty but also all thoughts involving cruelty (e.g. cruel intentionof killing someone). S. K. Maitra gives specific examples of suchactions from a Buddhist source. He points out that inMøıËdhyamikav–˝Áiti of Candrak¤ıÂrti virtues are classified into fourkinds of which the fourth viz., CittøıËbhisamskøıËrøıËmanaskarma arethe examples in point. CittøıËbhisamskøıËrøıËmanaskarma ëis the merit(or demerit) arising from manaskarma, a conscious resolve... ofthe mind in the direction of righteousness (or unrighteousness)... this conscious determination is a mental act (manaskarma)without objective or physical manifestation.'104

The above account makes one thing very clear. In Jainaethics moral virtue (also moral vice) is a function of two inde-pendent variables__intention (mental aspect) and overt action(physical consequence). Just as unintended destruction of life(e.g. trampling on an ant) can be morally bad, similarly the planto kill a beef-cattle for food (but ultimately dropping the plan)can also be morally bad. So intention and execution, the twovariables of an action are delinked from one another. This leadsto a queer consequence. What if an action with good conse-

quence gets done with an evil intention (e.g. setting up a chari-table trust with a view to tax-dodging) ? Or what if an actionwith bad consequence gets done with morally good intention(e.g. handling an accident victim improperly at a desolate placecausing his death despite the good intention to help him sur-vive) ? Until a few years ago, as per Canadian criminal law, suchan act was a crime, for which well-meaning do-gooders of theabove type could be sued and punished. Now, the law has beensensibly modified. However, the basic point is clear__moral is-sues of the type discussed above are too complex to have easysolution. The Jainas classified such complex cases into four types:(1) good actions coupled with good intentions (punyøıËnubandh¤ıÂpunya),(2) good actions done with bad intentions (pøıËpøıËnubandh¤ıÂpunya),(3) bad actions done with good intentions e.g. robbing Paul tohelp Peter (punyøıËnubandh¤ıÂpøıËpa), (4) bad actions with bad inten-tions (pøıËpøıËnubandh¤ıÂpøıËpa).

Of these four, (1) and (4) are pure or non-problematic casesof morally right and morally wrong actions respectively, while(3) and (2) are of mixed type and may be called cases of virtue-laced-with-vice and vice-laced-with-virtue respectively.105

There is one more conceptual problem here. If the law ofkarma is so rigidly mechanistic that even a mere bad intention oran unintended action with bad consequences sullies the moralcharacter of a j¤ıÂva, then what happens to our freedom of will ?And without it how can any sense be made of moral account-ability or responsibility ? May be, just as drinking does not gowith driving, a mechanistic physicalistic causalism cannot go withany adequate theory of morality. But is it really so ? To find ananswer to this question we move to the next point pertaining tothe MP-model of Jaina ethics.

v) Causalism, freedom and suffering

It is a very common practice in philosophy to lump togetherexpressions which are similar in meaning. Normally, it workswell. Sometimes, however, not paying heed to the subtle nuancesof meaning causes confusion. Lumping 'physicalism' with

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'materialism' and 'mechanistic' with 'deterministic' often causes alot of conceptual confusion. I have already indicated that wemust not equate 'physicalism' with 'materialism' or 'mechanistic'with 'deterministic'. A mechanistic explanatory framework is onewhich does not allow any mentalistic notion as an explanatoryparameter. Any such scheme, when it is strictly causal (i.e. assumesthat every event that needs an explanation can be explainedcausally) we shall call a 'causalistic' scheme. The framework ofJaina ethics is in this sense, mechanistic-causalism, rather than amechanistic-determinism. If it were deterministic, there would beno scope for freedom of will in it. An analogy may be used toillustrate the distinction between determinism and causalism.Think of an infinitely long row of vertically standing bricks,arranged faces parallel and each placed half a brick-length apartfrom the next. Now think of starting a domino effect (pushingdown a brick on to the next) as the beginning of a causalsequence. The process will continue in a predictably fixed linearorder, (if it is sealed off from all external interceptions). This isdeterministic. On the other hand, allow the possibility of exter-nal intervention (e.g. by lifting two successive bricks away fromthe row) then the domino effect stops at that gappy stretch.From that point onward another domino effect may be startedanew or the arrangement of bricks at the tail-end may be modi-fied by altering their position, face-angles etc. If intervention ofthe type is allowed at any arbitrarily chosen point of time afterthe start of the initial domino-effect, the sequence of fallingbricks would be regular but not predictable for all time to come.So, in such a case the domino effect is regular but not predictablebecause, it can be modified at any time during the process. Suchinterminable, unpredictable but regular (i.e. not haphazard) se-quence would be a model of mechanistic-causalistic sequence orsequential causalism but not of mechanistic-determinism.

The Jaina model of causation, (which includes their law ofkarma) being a type of mechanistic causalism, can easilyincorporate in it the notion of free will and that of man'scontrol over his own action (karma) without any inconsistency.This possibility leaves open the scope of Jaina ethics being amechanistic causalism without lapsing into inflexible

determinism__a system in which no man can be held morallyresponsible for his action.

The dialogue of Lord MahøıËv¤ıÂra with SaddøıËlaputta inUvøıËsøıËgadasøıËo-sutta clearly shows that MahøıËv¤ıÂra considered de-terminism (niyativøıËda))))) unacceptable, as it leads to idleness, dull-ness and hypocrisy but at the same time emphasized that onecan never deceive the well-established order based on causa-tion.'106 The same anti-deterministic view is also found inS”ıËtrak–˝ÁtøıËnga 1.2.2. which 'attacks the teaching of the niyativøıËdinsthat oneís suffering is not due to one's actions but due to fate(predetermined destiny)'.107 Similarly, Siddhasena in his Sanmati-tarka says that none of time, nature, fate (daiva), past actions(karma-phala) and human effort (puru—˝ÁakøıËra) is the sole deter-mining factor. The role of each one is to be duly emphasized (asdeterminers of man's state of existence)108. Haribhadra in hisYogavindu goes a step further, first emphasizing the mutualdependence between karma and human effort and then explic-itly stating that weak fate or destiny can be overcome by humaneffort.109

However, eulogising human effort is one thing and outlininga concrete method of making puru—˝ÁakøıËra win over destiny (asshaped by one's own karma) is another. Does Jaina ethics haveany such concrete scheme to offer ? Yes, they do.

If we look deeper into the details of Jaina law of karma wefind the following :

(i) No karman starts to produce its effect right after it is done.There is a specific time-lapse between a karman and itseffectuation. This is called avøıËdhakøıËla (latency period). Untilthe specific avøıËdhakøıËla for a karma is over, it cannot startbearing its fruit.

(ii)Every effect of karman has a finite span of duration. It mustwear itself off in course of time. Let us call it the 'stayingperiod' of a karma.

( iii) Depending on how indelible the effects of a karma is, thereis a classification of stages of karma into different types viz.nidhatti, nikøıËcanøıË etc. Karma in its nikøıËcanøıË stage is called'nikacita karma'. Effects of such karma, according to the

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Jainas, are most indelible, but still, according to Jaina think-ers like UpøıËdhyøıËya Ya—˜Áovijaya, even the virtually unalter-able (nikacitøıË) karma can be altered and even destroyed(neutralised) by human effort.110 The nikacita karmas can bedestroyed by tapas (austerity).111

(iv) The staying period of a karma can also be modified (pro-longed or shortened) by human effort. Prolongation ofstaying-power is technically called udvartanøıË, while its short-ening is called apavartanøıË.112

(v) Not only that, the effects of karma can even be prematurelyactualised by human-effort. This is called ud¤ıÂranøıË.113

(vi) From (i) to (v) above it follows that for any given action(karma) there is a fixed amount of consequences(karmaphala) which has to be endured for a fixed (butfinite) duration by the agent of action. However, the agenthas a choice. He can have the period of suffering pre-dated(ud¤ıÂranøıË) as well shortened (apavartanøıË) provided (a) thetotal amount of suffering to be undertaken remainsconstant, and (b) the austerity (tapasyøıË) practised [which isthe human-effort component] is of required matchingintensity. This point is illustrated by Hemacandra in a slokahon D–˝Á¬˝›haprahøıËri114 in Yoga—˜ÁøıËstra, 1.12.

TapasyøıË, as we saw, is a possible means of nirjarøıË (flushing outof karma-particles from the core of j¤ıÂva). One of its six externalforms is køıËyakle—˜Áa (self-inflicted torturing of body). Similarly,one of the requirements for sanivara (checking the influx ofkarma-particles) is pøıËr¤ıÂ—˝Áahajaya (overcoming mental distractionsdue to physical hardships) which includes staying naked inwinter, being indifferent to bodily uncleanliness etc. How comethese sorts of crude discomforts of body be considered by theJainas as conducive to moral progress ? Should we not take it assymptomatic of something quite perverse in there ?

It should be kept in mind here that Jainism does notrecommend austerity (self-inflicted hardships) just for the sakeof austerity. It has to be practised with a view to cultivate thepower of endurance and of maintaining mental peace, tranquilityand equanimity.115 If mortification of body (austerity) isundertaken with a view to simply causing pain to the body or

just for drawing public attention etc. it would be a product ofignorance lacking any moral-spiritual value. Thus Ya—˜Áovijaya inhis Tapo'—˝Á“˝Âaka, says that one should practice austerities in such away that the powers of mind, speech and body do not dwindleand bodily organs may not become weak. We should not subjectthe body to pointless hardships and sufferings nor should wepamper it with undue indulgence. We should abandon the twoextremes and adopt the middle path.116

Now, let us assume that the bodily suffering of the typementioned are practiced in right spirit. How can it have anyrelevance to morality ? First, we should keep in mind that bothsanivara and nirjarøıË are forces opposed to the forces of øıËsravaand bandha and the Jainas believe that austerity helps to generatethese karma-dispelling forces. Secondly, through austerity weundergo voluntary suffering. Since the total amount of sufferingdue for each one of us is a function of his/her actions and sois already fixed and constant, by undergoing self-inflicted suffer-ing ahead of the time when the results of one's actions are dueto come into effect, one may finish his term earlier (ud¤ıÂranøıË) andquicker (apavartanøıË).117 It is like working overtime during theweek in order to earn a paid long weekend.

Like the Jainas, Schopenhauer also views suffering not assomething to be shunned but as something having a positivevalue which can bring in welcome changes in our customaryworld-orientedness. Though Schopenhauer starts from a com-pletely different philosophical orientation, yet what he says hasmore than surface-similarity to the Jaina view of suffering. Thisis not very surprising in view of the fact that he himself claimedaffinity between his views and Buddhist philosophy. As Miripoints out, 'true wisdom, according to Schopenhauer, lies in therenunciation of life, in the denial of will. The man who reallydenies the will welcomes suffering since it purifies him...'118

Schopenhauer's own thought contained, by his own admission,"the triple tradition of quietism, (i.e. the giving up of all willing),asceticism, (i.e., intentional mortification of one's will), and mys-ticism,,,,, (i.e., consciousness of the identity of all beings, or withthe kernel of the world."119



vi) Relativistic contextualism in ethics

Jaina ethics is based on a rigid (inexorable) mechanisticcausalism. Such a system is usually expected to yield a very rigidsystem of moral codes and moral evaluation. However, when welook at Jaina ethics in its applications, we see that their moraldoctrines are highly flexible and accommodative. Let us take afew examples.

First, Jaina ethics insists that moral progress is possible onlyby strictly pursuing the five primary vows (panca mahøıËvrata) viz.ahiÀ˝fl søıË, amithyøıË, asteya, aparigraha and brahmacarya. Then theydefine hiÀ˝flsøıË, satya (i.e., amithyøıË) etc., so broadly that no activityremains theoretically free from violence120 and even telling afictional story to a child counts as telling a lie (mithyøıË).121 But,Since neither ahiÀ˝flsøıË nor satya in such a sense can be practicablefor ordinary people, the Jaina theoreticians distinguished be-tween two degrees of pursuance of the vows: one strict and idealmeant for the søıËdhus (ascetics), the other loose and practicalmeant for the householders. These latter weakened forms ofvows are called mini-vows (anuvrata) in contrast to the primaryvows (mahøıËvrata). First the anuvratas (or mini-vratas) enjoin oneonly to avoid gross cruelty. Next, the Jaina theoreticians narrowdown the original and very broad definition of hiÀÛflsøıË so thatfarming, killing of the lowest type (one sensed) of creatures etc.are exempted from being counted as hiÀÛfl søıË. When even this isfound wanting, hiÀÛflsøıË is classified intoí four types viz. those un-avoidable for leading a domestic life (g–˝ÁhøıËraÀÛflbh¤ıÂ) hiÀÛfl søıË ; thoseunavoidable in certain professions (e.g. in fishing, farming etc.)(udyog¤ıÂ hiÀÛflsøıË); those necessitated by the cause of justice, protec-tion and self-defence (virodh¤ıÂ hiÀÛfl søıË) and premeditated inten-tional violence (saÀÛflkalp¤ıÂ hiÀÛflsøıË). Of these only the last is prohib-ited while the other three are conditionally permitted.

Similarly, concession is made with regard to telling of truth.Not telling the truth or even telling a lie is made morally permis-sible if it results in greater benefit of living beings.122

Similar is the case with the remaining three vows, mutatismutandis.

Again it is found that not all aspiring søıËdhus (ascetics) havethe ability to follow the five mahøıËvrata with absolute rigidity. So

exception is made again by distinguishing between jinakalp¤ıÂ(those who are required to pursue the vows very rigidly withouteven minimal deviation) and sthavira kalp¤ıÂ søıËdhus (those whopursue them in a milder form).123

As if these were not climb-downs enough, the Jainas evenpropose to contextualise/relativise the very criterion of moralevaluation. Bhagavat¤ıÂ-s”ıËtra mentions an incident where Jayanfiasks MahøıËv¤ıÂra whether lying asleep (most of the time) is goodor is it good to stay awake ? MahøıËv¤ıÂra's answer is that stayingasleep is good so far a habitual wrong doer or criminal is con-cerned but for a saintly man (who devotes his life for the benefitof mankind) staying awake for longer periods would be good.124

Clearly, one can substitute 'telling a lie' or 'killing a man' for'lying asleep' and their opposites (viz, 'telling a lie' or 'saving ahuman life') for 'staying awake' in Jayant¤ıÂ's question and onewould still get true (relativised) statements of Jaina ethics.

This is not all. There is historical evidence that in south India,at one time, there originated a martial class the members ofwhich were all devout Jainas.125

All these go to show that despite being based on a rigidmechanistic-causalistic framework, Jaina ethics was a veryflexible, keenly context-sensitive and highly adaptive system.How can this relativistic flexibility of Jaina ethics be reconciledwith its rigid mechanistic-physicalistic framework ?

Without going into the details here, we may just point outthat the whole tenor of Jaina ethics was determined by theirmechanistic-physicalistic cosmology on the one hand and bytheir metaphysical doctrines (syøıËdvøıËda, anekøıËntavøıËda, nayavøıËdaand vibhajyavøıËda) on the other. The rigouristic aspects of Jainaethics were prompted by their causal-mechanistic cosmology;while the catholic-relativistic aspects of it have their roots inJaina metaphysics, especially syøıËdvøıËda and anekøıËntavøıËda.

IV. A BRIEF CHARACTERISATION OF JAINA ETHICS

Many of the conceptual issues raised in Jaina ethics have directrelevance to some contemporary views about morality and



moral values. For example Jaina ethics has significant points ofcontact with Existential Ethics, Christian Ethics, Situational Eth-ics, Minimal and Maximal Ethics, as well as with what may becalled Discourse Ethics (of Habermas) besides having points ofsimilarities with as well as divergence from modern types ofutilitarianism (ëa la J. L. Mackie, John Rawls etc). A separatepaper can be devoted to a comparative study of this type. Pend-ing that, a brief and non-misleading (but not necessarily ad-equate) way of characterising Jaina ethics could, I think, be this:Ii is a relativistic-humanistic system of ethics based on the jointfoundations of mechanistic-physicalism and metaphysics ofanekøıËntavøıËda (non-one-sidedness) carried to its logical end.

NotesNotesNotesNotesNotes

1. a) JivøıË∆˝Ë pudgaløıËkøıËla dharmøıËdharmau tathaiva øıËkøıË— ˜ÁaÀ˝fl (TAS, 1.4).b) Cidacid dve pare tattve (SDS. Ch. 3).c) Aj¤ıÂva puna∆˝Ë jÃˆÈeya∆˝Ë pudgala∆˝Ë dharma∆˝Ë adharma∆˝Ë øıËkøıË— ˜ÁaÀ˝fl (BDS, 15).

Also see UttarøıËdhyana S”ıËtra 28/7.2. J¤ıÂvaj¤ıÂva bhøıËvøıË puÃ˝ÈÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl pøıËvaÀ˝fl ca øıËsavaÀ˝fl tesim. Samvara-nijjara-

bandho mok—˝Áo ya havanti a“˝Â“ ˝ÂhøıË. (PaÃˆÈcøıËstikøıËya—ıÁara∆˝Ë 108).3. J¤ıÂvøıËjivøıËsravøıË-bandha-saÀ˝flvara-nirjarøıË-mok—˝Áa∆˝Ë tattvaÀ˝fl (TAS 1.4).4. Cidacid dve pare tattve vivekastad vivevacanam. (Padmanand¤ıÂ).5. Upayogo lak—˝ÁaÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl J¤ıÂva∆˝Ë (TattvøıËrthasutra 2/8).6. ≤˝fløıËÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl ca daÀ˝flsaÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl ceva caritaÀ˝fl ca tapo tahøıË. V¤ıÂriyam upa-oga ya

eyam J¤ıÂvassa lakkhaÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl. (Uttr. Su 28/11).7. 'EkavidhøıË∆˝Ë øıËtmøıËna∆˝Ë'óquoted by Sinha (1990) from AbhidhøıËna

RøıËjendrako—˝Áa.8. a) Mok—˝Áa k—˝ÁayøıËd jÃˆÈøıËnadar—˜ÁanøıËvaraÃ˝ÈøıËntarøıËya k—˝ÁayøıËd kevolam (TAS 10).

b)Sa sarvajÃˆÈanadar—˜Á¤ ıÂ labhate sukhamanindriyaÀ˝fl anantam (PKS).9. "The space-points of the above mentioned four non-material substances

are of a special type. They are... absolutely inseparable and form aperfect unity." Shah (1998), p.15.

10. a) §Ò‡køıËsa-køıËla-j¤ıÂva dharmøıËdharmau ca m”ıËrti parih¤ıÂnøıË∆˝Ë, m”ıËrtaÀ˝fl pudgala-dravyam, j¤ıÂva khalu cetanøıËste—˝Áu (PKS 97).b)Caitanya svar”ıËpa parinøıËm¤ıÂ kartøıË søıËk—˝ÁøıËt-bhoktøıË svadehaparimøıËÃ˝Èa∆˝Ëpratik—˝ÁetraÀ˝fl bhinna paudgalikøıËd–˝Á—˝ÁtavøıËn ca ayam. (PNT 7.5).

11. a) J¤ıÂvøıË ceva aj¤ıÂvøıË ya esa loe viyøıËhi e. Aj¤ıÂva desamøıËgøıËse alo. e sc viyøıËhie (Uttr. Su 36/2).b)LokøıËkøıË— ˜Áam alokøıËkøıË— ˜Áam iti dvividhaÀ˝fl (BDS 19).c) DharmøıËdharmau køıËla∆˝Ë pudgala-j¤ıÂva∆˝Ë ca santi yøıËvatike øıËkøıË— ˜Áe sa loka∆˝Ë,tata∆˝Ë parata∆˝Ë øıËloka∆˝Ë ukta∆˝Ë (BDS).

d)YathøıË haÀ˝flsa jalaÀ˝fl avagøıËhate ... tathøıË j¤ ıÂva pudgaløıË∆˝Ë øıËkøıË— ˜ÁaÀ˝flavagøıËhante. [Quoted by Sinha (1990) from TattvøıËrtharøıËja-VøıËrtika].

12. a) Na cøıËsya hetukart–˝ÁtvaÀ˝fl ni—˝Ákriyasya viruddhate. yato nimittamøıËtrepihetu kart–˝Átvam i—˝Áyate (TS 3.4).b)PadøıËrthøıËnøıËÀ˝fl kumbhakøıËracakrasya øıËdhøıËra—˜Á¤ ıÂlø ıËvat s¤ıÂtakøıËløıËdhyayanaagnivat. [Quoted by Sinha (1990) from BDS].c) GatimatøıËm gate∆˝Ë sthimatøıËÀ˝fl sthite∆˝Ë upagraho dharmøıËdharmayorupakøıËra∆˝Ë ( TAB 5.17).

13. "... dharma is without any form ... It exists in the lokøıËkøıË—˜Áa, ... but notin the alokøıËkøıË—˜Áa." Sinha (1990), p.56.

14. VarttanøıË lak—˝ÁaÃ˝Èa—˜Áca køıËla∆˝Ë (PKS 24): varttanøıË pariÃ˝ÈøıËma kriyøıËparatvøıËparatve ca køıËlasya. (TAS 5.22).

15. See quotation from Bhagavati-s”ıËtra in Shah (1998), p.226.16. "AnuyogadvøıËra-s”ıËtra refers to køıËla as addhøıË samaya... The UttarøıËdhyana-

s”ıËtra describes køıËla as real characterized by vartanøıË." Sinha (1990) p.54.Also see Shah (1998) p.228 for further textual references.

17. a) KøıËle prade—˜Áa-pracayo yasmøıËt nøıËst¤ıÂti nirdi—˝Á“ ˝Âam (GS).b)M”ıËrtte trividha∆˝Ë prade—˜ÁøıËh køıËlasya eka∆˝Ë na tena sakøıËya (BDS 25);køıËlasyatu nøıËsti køıËyatvøıËÀ˝fl (PKS 102).

18. See note 12 above. Also cp. Dharma gatikøıËraÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl. gatikriyøıËyuktøıËnøıËÀ˝flkaraÃ˝Èabh”ıËta∆˝Ë svayaÀ˝fl akøıËrya∆˝Ë (PKS 84).

19. "KøıËla is one and not produced by the combination of parts. It is non-conscious. formless, inactive and infinite." Sinha (1990), p.54). Also seenote 10(a) above.

20. See note 11(c) above.21. "Foundation of phenomenal time is noumenal time known differntly

as ni—˜Ácaya-køıËla, dravya-køıËla or pøıËramøıËrthika-køıËla." Sinha (1990), p.54.22. PuraÃ˝ÈøıËd galanøıËdapi pudgalanøıËÀ˝fl svabhøıËvajÃˆÈai∆˝Ë kathyate pudgaløıË∆˝Ë (TS

3.55).23. ∑Ófiar¤ıÂra-vaÃ˝Èmana∆˝Ë prøıËÃ˝Èø ıËpøıËna∆˝Ë pudgalaÀ˝fl (TAS 5.19).24. SaddaÀ˝fldhayøıËra-ujjao-pahøıË-chøıËyøıË-tøıËvei vøıË. Vannarasa-gandha-phasa

puggaløıËÃ˝Èam tu lakkhaÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl. (Uttr. S”ıË. 28/12)25. a) πÒ‡rdhagat¤ıÂ svabhøıËvøıËt ”ıËrdhaÀ˝fl eva øıËrohati (TRV 10.7.6).

b) TadanantaraÀ˝fl ”ıËrdhaÀ˝fl gacchati øıËlokøıËntøıËt. (TAS 10.5).26. See note 10 above.27. §Ò‡cøıËrya Hemacandra in his Tri—˝Áa—˝Áth—˜ÁatakøıË Puru—˝Áa caritra (I. 3.474) says:

niyantrana tatra naiva vikathøıËna køıËcana. Also cp. mok—˝Áa prøıËptiÀ˝fl pratina ve—˜Áa prøıËdhøıËnyaÀ˝fl, kimtu samabhøıËva eva niv–˝Átti hetu. (GuÃ˝Èavinaya'scommentary on Sambodha Saptati, verse 2).

28. PuÃ˝Èya pøıËpøıËgama dvøıËralak—˝Áana øıËsrava. (TRV 1.4.16).29. "Yoga is the activity of body, speech and mind. Yoga causes the inflow

of karmic matter in the soul.î (TattvøıËrthøıËdhigamas”ıËtra of UmøıËsvøıËti 6.1-2),Quoted by Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.83.

30. YathøıË sara∆˝ËsalilavøıËh¤ıÂ dvøıËram tadøıËsravanakøıËranatvøıËt øıËsrava iti øıËkhyøıËyate,tatha yoga prøıËnøıËlikayøıË øıËtmanø˝Ë∆˝Ë karma øıËsravati iti yoga øıËsrava itivyapade—˜Áam arhati. Also cp. j¤ıÂvasya ya hi —˜Áakti∆˝Ë karmøıË-gamana-køıËranaÀ˝fl



yoga∆˝Ë (GS 216)31. KøıËya vøıËÃ˝Èmana∆˝Ë karmayoga∆˝Ë (TAS 6.1).32. "...we cannot say that first the soul was alone and only afterwards the

karma came into existence. Nor can we say that first the karma alone wasthere. ... Thus, when these two alternatives are found untenable, theonly third alternative that the soul and the karma both are boundtogether from the beginningless time gets automatically established."Shah (1998), p.20. [Therefore] "both were bound together from timeimmemorial", Ibid, cp. Kundakunda in his PravacanasøıËra (2.77).

33. "... yoga (activity) is the cause of both the influx and the bondage.Similarly, mithyøıËtva etc. which are the causes of bondage can also beregarded as [causes of] øıËsrava (influx). ... In this way, the identity ofinflux and bondage is shown to us." Shah (1998), p.280. A verse (IV.78) from AcøıËrya Hemcandra's Yoga—˜ÁøıËstra with his own commentary isquoted in support.

34. See reference to Yoga—˜ÁøıËstra in (30) above.35. See note (26) above.36. a) Sutha parinøıËmo puÃ˝ÈÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl, asuha pøıËvo ti havadi J¤ıÂvassa. DonhaÀ˝fl

poggalosatto bhøıËvo kammaoÃ˝Èa patto. (PaÃˆÈcøıËstikøıËyasøıËra 13).b) ∑Ófiubha pariÃ˝ÈøıËmo puÃ˝Èyam, a—˜Áubha∆˝Ë pøıËpaÀ˝fl. (PKS 132).

37. "Punya and PøıËpa are, really speaking, types of bandha. Hence, manyinclude pøıËpa and puÃ˝Èya under bandha and speak of seven tattvas."(Translated from Introduction of JayøıËcøıËryer Anu—˜ÁøıËsanøıËval¤ıÂ, p.49).

38. For a detailed discussion see my paper 'Social Dimensions of JainaThought'.

39. a) Saka—˝ÁøıËyatvøıËjj¤ ıÂva∆˝Ë karmaÃ˝Èo yogyøıËn pudgaløıËn øıËdatte sa bandha∆˝Ë (TAS8.2.3).b)§Ò‡tmakarmaÃ˝Èoranyonya prade—˜ÁøıË nu prave—˜Áa lak—˝ÁaÃ˝Èo∆˝Ë bandha∆˝Ë (TRV1.4.17).c) MithyøıËdar—˜ÁanøıËvirat¤ıÂ pramøıËda-ka—˝ÁøıËyayoga∆˝Ë bandhahetava∆˝Ë (TAS 8.1).

40. Prak–˝Áti-sthiti anubhøıËga prade—˜ÁabhedøıËt tu caturvidho bandha∆˝Ë. (BDS33).

41. YathøıË øıËrdraÀ˝fl vastraÀ˝fl samantøıËd vøıËtøıËn¤ıÂtam reÃ˝ÈujøıËtøıËm upøıËdatte, tathøıËka—˝ÁøıËya-jalardra øıËtmøıË yogøıËn¤ıÂtam karma sarvaprade—˜Áai∆˝Ë g–˝ÁhnøıËti. (SDSch.3).

42. a) "The karmas cannot bind in the absence of mental influx [and theka—˝ÁøıËyas]": Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.92.b)§Ò‡srava-bhøıËva abhøıËve na pratyayøıË-bandhakøıË bhanita∆˝Ë. Also cp. øıËsravabhøıËvena vinøıË hetava∆˝Ë na pratyayøıË bhavanti. (SamayasøıËra)

43. See note 32 (b) above.44. Yassa yadøıË khalu punnaÀ˝fl yoge pøıËvaÀ˝fl ca natthi viradassa. SamvaraÃ˝ÈaÀ˝fl

tassa tadøıË suhøıËsuhakadassa kammassa. (PKS 140).45. CetanøıË pariÃ˝Èamo ya∆˝Ë karmaÃ˝Èa∆˝Ë øıËsrava-nirodhane hetu∆˝Ë sa bhøıËva-

samvara∆˝Ë (BDS 34).46. Vrata samiti guptayo dharmøıËnuprek—˝ÁøıË∆˝Ë par¤ıÂ—˝Áahajaya∆˝Ë ca cøıËritram

vahubhedaÀ˝fl. (BDS 35).

47. ¨ÒÊryøıËbhøıËsaisaÃ˝ÈøıËdøıËna nik—˝Áepotsarga∆˝Ë samitaya∆˝Ë (TAS 9.5).48. HiÀ˝flsøıËn–˝Áta steyøıËbrahmaparigrahebhyo viratirvrataÀ˝fl (TAS 7.1).49. Samyag yoganigraho gupti∆˝Ë (TAS 9.4).50. Uttamak—˝ÁamøıË møıËrdavøıËrjava satya —˜Áauca saÀ˝flyaÀ˝fla tapas tyøıËgøıËkiÃˆÈcanya

brahmacaryøıËÃ˝Èi dharmøıË∆˝Ë (TAS 9.6).51. MøıËrgøıËcyavan nirjarøıËyøıËÀ˝fl par¤ıÂ— ˝ÁorhavyøıË∆˝Ë par¤ıÂ— ˝ÁahøıË∆˝Ë (TAS 9.8). For a list

of 20 par¤ıÂ— ˝Áasaha see V, Samgvi, pp.35-36.52. SøıËmøıËyika chedopasthøıËpana parihøıËra vi—̃Áuddhi s”ıËk—̋Áma samparøıËya yathakhyøıËtam

iti cøıËritram. (TAS 9.8).53. Ekade—˜Áa karmasam—˜Áaya lak—˝ÁaÃ˝ÈøıË nirjarøıË (TRV 1.4.19). Also cp. UpøıËtta∆˝Ë

karmaÃ˝Èa∆˝Ë pøıËto nirjarøıË dvividhøıË ca søıË. §Ò‡dyøıË vipøıËkajøıË tatra dvit¤ıÂyøıË ca avipøıËkajøıË.(TS 7/2).

54. See note 46 above.55. YathøıËkøıËlena tapasøıË ca bhuktarasaÀ˝fl karmapudgalam yena bhøıËvena sa¬˝›ati

jÃˆÈeya tat sa¬˝›anaÀ˝fl ceti nirjarøıË dvividhøıË (BDS 36)56. NirjarøıËkaraÃ˝Èe vøıËhyøıËcchre—˝Á“ ˝ÂhaÀ˝fl øıËbhyantaraÀ˝fl tapa∆˝Ë (YogasøıË— ˜Átra IV 91).57. For an elaboration of the different types of tapasyøıË and stages thereof

see Shah (1998) pp.133-139.58. a) Vandha-hetvabhøıËva nirjarøıËbhyøıËÀ˝fl k–˝Átsnakarma-vipramok—˝Áo mok—˝Áa∆˝Ë

(TAS 10.12).b)Savva dukkhøıËÃ˝ÈøıËÀ˝fl antam karenti (US 29.1).c) Atulam sukhaÀ˝fl samprøıËpta∆˝Ë (US 37.67).

59. "Liberation is of two typesó bhøıËva-mok—˝Áa and d–˝Áavya-mok—˝Áa. ... BhøıËva-mok—˝Áa accepted by the Jainas is identical with j¤ıÂvanmukti." Sinha (1990),125-127.

60. "It is free from bodily entanglement and from the circle of birth and death."(Sinha (1990) 129). Also cp. Dagdhe v¤ıÂje yathøıË atvantaÀ˝fl prøıËdurbhavatinøıËnkura∆˝Ë karmav¤ıÂje tathøıË dagdhe na rohati bhavøıËnkura. [Quoted by Sinha(1990) p.149] from Manibhardra's commentary on SDS 46).

61. Tadanantaram ”ıËrdhaÀ˝fl gacchati øıËlokøıËntøıËt (TAS 10.5).62. "Thus, going upwards, the liberated self reaches a place lying at the top

of ... lokøıËkøıË—˜Áa ... it (i.e.. liberated self) [cannot] enter into the alokøıËkøıË—˜Áa,for there is no principle of motion there." (dharmøıËstikøıËyøıËbhøıËvøıËt) (TAS,10.8)óSee Sinha (1990) p. 127: also Shah (1998) pp.12-13 and p.229.

63. Mok—˝Áak—˝ÁayøıËt jÃˆÈøıËnadar—˜ÁanøıËvaraÃ˝ÈøıËntarøıËya k—˝ÁayøıËcca kevalaÀ˝fl (TAS 10.1).64. Sarvam tato jøıËnøıËti pa—˜Áyati ca ... bhavati anantasukh¤ıÂ k–˝ÁtøıËrtha; sa

sarva»ÒÂø ıËnadar—˜Á¤ ıÂ labhate sukham anindriyam anantam (PK.S 28).65. See Sinha (1990) pp.148-149: Shah (1998), pp.152-153. cp. devo

arhanparame—˜Ávara∆˝Ë (SDS, ch. 3)66. Vidhi sra—˝ÁtøıË vidhøıËtøıË ca daivam karma purøıËk–˝Átam ¤ıÂ— ˜Ávara—˜Áceti paryøıËya

vijayøıË∆˝Ë karma vedhasa∆˝Ë. §Ò‡dipurøıËÃ˝Èa IV.3.67. As Y. Krishnan observes, "The s”ıËtrak–˝ÁtøıËÃÛÈga 1.2.2 attacks the teaching of

the niyativøıËdins that one's suffering is not due to one's action (na te sayamka¬˝›am dukkham) but due to fate. The S”ıËtrak–˝ÁtøıËÃÛÈga 1.12.1.4 says:sayameva kadehim ghøıËhanti na tassa muccejja aputhayam. (Persons) goround (in the cycle of existence) for the acts done by themselves; without



experiencing their results, there is no release." Jainthology (1991) p.87.68. The controversy between the schools of M¤ıÂmøıËÀÛflsøıËk regarding category-

distinction between moral-causality and physical-causality is worth not-ing here. As Maitra puts it, "The PrøıËbhøıËkaras rightly point out thatcausality as an ethical category is to be distinguished from causality asa psychological or physical category. The BhøıË“ ˝Â“ ˝Âas however do notrecognize any essential difference between the two." Maitra (1963)p.232.

69. See note 12 above.70. For further details see Sinha (1990) 44-45 and 53-59.71. PaÃˆÈcøıËstikøıËya 82 is very specific about the material character of mind

and karma. It says that things enjoyable by the senses, the five sensesthemselves, the bodies, the mind, the karmas and other materialobjects_all this is known as matter (pudgala). Also see note (22) above.

72. "According to the Jainas, karman is a form of matter, pudgala andatomic in nature. It has the property of downward gravity. adhogurutva"Y. Krishnan in Jainthology (1991, 81.

73. See S”ıËtrak–˝ÁtøıËnga 1. 2. 3. 18. "All living beings own their present formof existence to their own karman; Due to their karma j¤ıÂvas happen tobe, timid, wicked suffering latent misery, subject to birth, old age anddeath". Ibid., 85.

74. See note (63) above.75. UttarøıËdhyana s”ıËtra 3.4 and 3.376. Haribhadra Suri's SDS 48: ∑ÓfiubhøıË— ˜Áubha karmakartøıË bhoktøıË

karma_phalasya ca.77. a) Na tassa dukkham vibhayanti nayio na mittavagga na subha na

bandhava ... kartøıËramevam anujai kammam. (US 13.2)b)Ikko kavedi kammam ikko vi yiya pavaye mokkham. (Quoted byKrishan from KøıËrt¤ıÂkeyøıËnuprek—˝ÁøıË-76

78. UttarøıËdhyanas”ıËtra 33. 1-15.79. Shah (1998) points out that there is another expression for 'aghøıËti' viz.

'bhavopagrøıËh¤ıÂ'. It literally means 'that which sustains the cycle of birthand death and the associated body'. Footnote 2, 28.

80. "Jainas hold that the whole process is mechanical: no intelligent prin-ciple is required for its guidance.': Sinha (1990) p. 138. Also see: Atha∆˝ËsvabhøıËvata∆˝Ë tarhi acetanasyøıËpi jagata eva svabhøıËvata∆˝Ë prav–˝Áttirastu, kimtat kart–˝Átva kalpanayøıË ? (TRD p. 122). Quoted in Sinha (1990) p.151and S. N. Dasgupta, HIP, Vol. I, 205-6.

81. "They argue that formless entities like sky, space, etc. have no action,while karman has as it is proved by the fact that the fruits of karma inthe form of happiness and misery are experienced by the self. That iswhy karman must be regarded they say, as having some form". Sinha(1990) pp.69-70. For textual support see PKS, 133: TRY, 2. 36. 9.

82. Those socio-ethical issues are enormously important, but are not discussedhere.

83. "That whereby the soul is tinted, identified with merit and demerit (punya

and pøıËpa) is called le—˜ÁyøıË". [G S-489]. Quoted and translated by Krishnan inJainthology (1991), 82.

84. I have a plan to devote a separate paper to this and similar other issues.85. Shah (1998) 17.86. See Shah (1998), 8-10 for classification of different kinds of j¤ıÂva e.g.

earth-bodied, vegetative-bodied, water-bodied etc. Also see JayøıËcøıËrya(1982) 3.

87. "According to the Hindu idea there can be not only no vicarious sin andpunishment but also no vicarious redemption". Maitra (1963), 9. This isequally true of Jainism.

88. The following verse quoted in Sinha (1990) is relevant here_namastatkarmabhyah vidhirapi na yebhyah prabhavati. (∑ÓfiøıËnti—˜Áataka, Verse 1, Vi—˜ÁvaTattva PrakøıË— ˜Áa, 56.)

89. "The idea of God as the world-creator is not to be found in Jaina literature.... Tirthankaras are not messengers of God. They are human beings justlike us. They attained liberation by developing their selves to the state ofimmaculate perfection through steadfast contemplation. (JayøıËcøıËryerAnu—˜ÁøıËsanøıËval¤ıÂ, 31. Translated by the present author.) According to theJainas the arhats themselves are Gods. That's why the mantras used by theJainas as ovation were composed keeping the arhats at the center of thefocus. Cp. ëSarvajÃˆÈo jita røıËgøıËdidos-astrailokyap”ıËjita∆˝Ë, yathøıËsthitøıËrthøıËvøıËd¤ıÂca devo'rhan parame—˜Ávara∆˝Ë'.

90. See Shah (1998), 31, footnote.91. Sinha (1990), 149; also see note (78) above.92. Shah (1990), 30.93. Taken from Krishnan's article in Jainthology (1991) 88-89.94. See note (67b) above.95. See a—˜ÁaraÃ˝ÈøıËnuprek—˝ÁøıË and ekatvøıËnuprek—˝Áa in Shah (1998), 88-91.96. See notes 67, 76 and 84 above.97. See PKM 4.10.98. "It is a consequence of the material character of the karmas that intent is

not the only ingredient in committing a lapse or offence; the Jainas recogniseunintentional lapses. This also made the law of karma comparatively in-flexible and partially mechanical." Y. Krishnan in Jainthology, p.93. Alsosee note (70b) above.

99. TAS. 6.6; Krishnan in Jainthology (1991), 83.100. a) "In Jainism intent is not an essentinl precondition of sin or wrong

conduct. Evil intent forms only one of the modes of committing sin.... TheS”ıËtrak–̋ÁtøıËnga 2. 2. 4-23 specifies thirteen kinds of sinful actions, of these... sins done through accident and error of sight (leading to error of fact)and not involving the mind actively also attract bad karman."Y. Krishnan in Jainthology (1991), 89-90.b)"The S”ıËtrak–̋ÁtøıËnga 2.6.26-27, sets out with disapproval the Buddhist viewthat a person cannot be guilty of murder if he has committed it as a resultof mistake of fact". Ibid

101. "The S”ıËtrak–˝ÁtøıËnga 1. 1. 2. 29 says: manasaje paussantiputtam tesi na vijjai:



a man who bears ill-will, his mind is not pure" Ibid. The point is statedeven more clearly in VidyøıËnanda's classification of virtues in hisA—˝Á“˝Âa—˝ÁøıËhasr¤ıÂ which maintains that 'morality and immorality do not arisemerely from results.... But depends on subjective intention orabhisandhi.... ë Such an abhisandhi, when impure, (saÀÛflkle—˝ÁøıËnga) caus√ÛËsunrighteousness (pøıËpa). For details see Maitra (1963), pp.217-221.

102. "In its original structure, penology studies and analyses the history,theories, purposes and effects of punishment in relation to crime-causation and crime-prevention. In its modern outlines ...penologywould require a new definition in its confrontation with the....Jainascriptures." R. C. Laler in Jainthology, p.73.

103. In my paper, 'Social dimensions of Jaina thought'.104. Maitra (1963), p.224.105. For details see Shah (1998) pp.102-106.106. The dialogue is given on pp.232-233 in Shah (1998).107. See note (57a) above.108. "§Ò‡cøıËrya Siddhasena in his Sanmati says of the five, viz., Time, Nature, Fate,

Past Action and Human Effort, to favour one alone is the wrong view", butto accept all of them giving them their due place is the right view". ó Shah(1998) p.223.

109. §Ò‡cøıËrya Haribhadra in his Yagavindu, verse 327 says that sometimes karmacan weaken daiva and vice-versa:daivani puru—˝ÁakøıËreÃ˝Èa durbalam hy upamanyate, daivena cai—˝Áa'p¤ıÂty eta...

110. "UpøıËdhyøıËya Ya—˜Áovijayaji shows as to how one can destroy even the unalter-able (nikøıËcita karmas) in the following verse of his 27th Dvatrini—̃Á¤ıÂkøıË: nikøıËeitøıËnøıËmapi yah karmaÃ̋ÈøıËm tapasøıËh k—̋Áaya∆̋Ë so'bhipretyottamaÀÛfl yogam ap”ıËrvakaranodayam.Taken from Shah (1998), p.276.

11l. See note (99) and also note (103).112. See Shah (1998). pp-296-98 for detail.113. Ibid., p.298.114. Brahma-str¤ıÂ-bhr”ıËÃ˝Èa-goghøıËtapøıËtakøıËn narakøıËtithe∆˝Ë|

D–˝Á¬˝›haprahøıËriprabh–˝Áter yoga hastøıËbalambanam || Yoga—˜ÁøıËstra of Hemacandra. 1.12.

115. This emphasis on fortitude, equanimity and tranquility of mind as precon-ditions for spiritually motivated proactive of austerity takes up specialsignificance in the context of the Jaina concept of sallekhanøıË (self-termi-nation of life). We may use autothanasia' for 'sallekhanøıË' to underline theradical difference between sallekhanøıË on the one hand and suicide andother-assisted termination of life i.e. euthanasia, on the other.

116. a) A søıËdhu aspiring to become a J¤ıÂna voluntarily undergoes a great deal ofsuffering; why should we then wilt under sufferings that are nothing butunsignificant ? (Translated from JayacøıËrya's annu—˜Áø ıËsana, 333).

b) Ability to stoically undergo suffering with calm and inward balance is thebasis of true happiness, destroyer of many pøıËpa and producer of manypuÃ˝Èya. (Translated from JayachøıËrya's annu—˜Áø ıËsana-338. p.31). The quotations above clearly show the Jaina belief that voluntarilyundergoing suffering is a way of burning down/destroying the effects ofbad karma.

117. Miri (1976). p.57; Victor Frø˙Ënkel's view that one can go through tremendoussuffering if he/she sees a meaning in it, explains how existential ethics was

SARKAR : Some Aspects of Jaina Ethics 1 1 3

lived through by some inmates who survived a Nazi concentrationcamp. Frø˙Ënkel (1984).Kierkegaard considered suffering as a criterion of authenticity. Accord-ing to him there are two kinds of suffering: (a) redeeming suffering and(b) dark suffering that leads to death.

118. Quoted in Miri (1976), 63, from Edward Conze: Thirty Years of BuddhistStudies.

119. See Shah (1991), 48.120. Ibid., 115.121. When telling the truth is likely to cause greater harm. §Ò‡cøıËrangas”ıËtra recom-

mends that man must simply maintain silence or say that he docs notknow even if he knows. This is closely parallel to what we find inManusm–˝Áti and also in the MahøıËbhøıËrata:

Ukte'n–˝Átc bhaved yatra prøıËÃ˝È¤ ıÂnøıËÀÛfl prøıËÃ˝Èarak—˝ÁaÃ˝Èasan–˝ÁtaÀÛfl tatra satyaÀÛfl syøıËt satyamapi an–˝ÁtøıËÀÛfl bhavet.

122. See V. Samgvi, 45 for the classification of Jaina søıËdhus.123. See S. Jain's article in Jainthology (1991), 129-133.124. See Vasantha Kumari : 'Power and Tranquility' in Jainthology (1991)

171-177 for details.125. Some of these points have been discussed in my paper 'Social Dimen-

sions of Jaina Ethicsí, in K. Roy (cd.), 'Fusion of Horizons', Calcutta.(2000).

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Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1973).4. Bhattacharya, H. S. Reals in Jainism (Bombay: Seth H. S. Santidas Khetry

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Parisad, 1994).17. Shah, N. J. Jaina Philosophy and Religion (New Delhi: Motilal

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1990).19. Sinha, K. P. The Philosophy of Jainism (Calcutta: Punthi Pustak, 1990).20. Sogani, K. C. Epitome of Jainism (Sholapur: 1967)21. Stevenson. S. The Heart of Jainism. (New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal,

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AbbreviationsAbbreviationsAbbreviationsAbbreviationsAbbreviations

[AS] §Ò‡cøıËrøıËnga-s”ıËtram & S”ıËtra-k–˝ÁtøıËnga-s”ıËtram. Sudharma Swami. New Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1978.

[BDS]Brhad-dravya Samgraha of Nemichandra. Agas: Srimad Rajacandra§Ò‡—˜Árama, 1967.

[GS] Gommata-SøıËra of Nemicandra. Agas: Srimad Rajacandra §Ò‡—˜Árama,1978.

[JTB] Jaina Tarka BhøıË— ˝Áø ıË of Ya—˜Áovijaya. Ed. and tr. D. Bhargava. New Delhi:Motilal Banarsidass, 1973.

[PKM] Prameya-kamala-møıËrtaÃ˝È¬˝›ya of PrabhøıËcandra. Edited by M.K. Shastri.Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1967.

[PKS]PaÃˆÈcøıËat¤ıÂ-køıËya-søıËra of KundakundøıËcøıËrya. New Delhi: Bharat¤ıÂyaJÃˆÈøıËnap¤ıÂtha, 1975.

[PTNL] PramøıËÃ˝Èa-naya-løıËtvøıËlokøıËlankøıËra of VøıËd¤ıÂdeva S”ıËri. Edited by H. S.Bhattacarya. Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1967.

[PS] Pravacana-s”ıËta of KundakundøıËcøıËrya. Edited by A. N. Upadhye. Agas:S. R. §Ò‡—˜Árama, 1984

[PSU] Puru—˝ÁøıËrtha-siddhyupøıËya.[SDS] Sat-dar—˜Áana-samuccaya of Haribhadra S”ıËri with Gunaratna's commentary.

Edited by Suoli. Calcutta: Asiatic Society, 1991.[SDS] Sarva-dar—˜Áana-samgraha of SøıËyana MøıËdhava. Pune: Bhandarkar Oreintal

Research Institute: 1978.

[SM] SyøıËdvøıËda-manjari of Mallisen. Edited by A. N. Dhruva. Bombay:Bombay University Press, 1933.

[SS] Sarvartha-siddhi of P”ıËjyapøıËda. New Delhi: Bharatiya JÃˆÈøıËnapithPublication,1985 (a Commentary on TSU).

[TAS] TattvøıËrthøıËdhigama-s”ıËtra of UmøıËsvøıËt¤ ıÂ. Agas: Srimad Rajacandra §Ò‡—˜Árama,1932.

[TS| TattvøıËrtha-søıËra of Amritacandra-s”ıËri.[US] UttarøıËdhyayana-s”ıËtra.[VTP]Visva-tattva-parikromøıË. Sholapur: 1964.[TSU] TattvøıËrtha-s”ıËtra of UmøıËsvøıËt¤ ıÂ. Edited by J. L. Jain. Arah: Bibliotheca

Jainica, 1920.


Sankhya Theory ofBondage and Liberation

TAPAN KUMAR CHAKRABARTI

In the SøıËnkhya system, bondage is said to arise out of aviveka jÃˆÈøıËna,i.e., non-discriminative knowledge of puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti. Libera-tion, therefore, is arising out of viveka jÃˆÈøıËna or discriminativeknowledge of them. Before discussing what is meant by discrimina-tive or non-discriminative knowledge let us consider another causeof bondage, and so of liberation, that we find in SøıËnkhya philoso-phy. The SøıËnkhya philosophers point to our existence in the bodilyframe as the cause of our threefold sufferings. Hence bondage isdue to the continuation of sufferings in earthly existence. So longas we enter into saÀ̋fl søıËra and continue to suffer, we are in chains.Liberation can come only out of cessation of sufferings for ever.Let us first of all try to analyse the twofold causes of bondage, andalso of those of liberation, that we find in SøıËnkhya literature. We willtry to explain subsequently whether the twofold causes are ultimatelyreducible into one.

I

In the SøıËnkhya system, puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti, the two ultimate realitiesare viewed as heterogeneous and diverse in nature. Puru—˝Áa standsfor pure consciousness, is inert or inactive and does not undergoany sort of transformation or change. Prak–˝Áti, on the contrary,being composed of three guÃ˝Èas of sattva, rajas and tamas held ina state of equilibrium (søıËmyøıËvasthøıË) is always active, does undergochange at every moment but is an unconscious material (jada oracetana) principle. It has been compared with a blind man (andha)

as opposed to puru—˝Áa who is but a lame man (khanja or pangu).Puru—˝Áa, being lame, cannot perform any activity whatsoever. It is amere witness (søıËksi) or seer (dra—˝Á“˝ÂøıË). It is absolutely indifferent(nirlipta) about what is going on in the world. It is prak–˝Áti whichunfolds and manifests itself into the things and beings of the worldand is thus solely responsible for the evolution of the world. Ofcourse, prak–˝Áti needs the assistance of puru—˝Áa just as a blind manrequires the co-operation from a lame man to achieve a goal. Butpuru—˝Áa being akartøıË (devoid of activity) does nothing. Its merepresence will help disturb the equilibrium of prak–˝Áti. As a resultprakr“˝Âi starts manifesting itself first as mahat or buddhi, then asahaÀ˝flkøıËra, then as ekøıËda—˜Áa indriya (five sense-organs, five motororgans and manas), paÃˆÈca tanmøıËtra (five subtle elements) and finallyas paÃˆÈca mahøıËbh”ıËta (five gross elements). The following diagramwill help remember the products of prak–˝Áti better.

Prak–˝Áti

Mahat or Buddhi

AhankøıËra

PaÃˆÈca jÃˆÈøıËnendriyas PaÃˆÈca karmendriyas Mana PaÃˆÈca tanmøıËtras

PaÃ̂Èca mahøıËbh”ıËtas

A casual look to the above diagram will help us understand thatPrak–˝Áti is the root cause (m”ıËla køıËraÃ˝Èa) of everything but itself has nocause (am”ıËlaÀÛfl). It is, according to SøıËnkhya, the material cause(upøıËdøıËna køıËraÃ˝Èa) of the world. And material cause, for SøıËnkhya, isthe true cause. It gets repeated in the effect (anub–˝Átta) and thereforeits absence in the effect is impossible. For example, m–˝ÁttikøıË (lumpof clay) is said to be the material cause of the effect, say, jar (gha“˝Âa).It is inherent in jar; for the jar is also a m–˝Ánmaya padøıËrtha orearthen entity. The clay cannot be absent in the jar. On the contrary,the nimitta køıËraÃ˝Èa or efficient cause of jar is said to be thekumbhakøıËra or the potter. According to SøıËnkhya, the nimittakøıËraÃ˝Èa is necessary (prayojana) only to remove the obstacle whichhinders manifestation of the effect in the cause. The effect is already

CHAKRABARTI : SøıËnkhya Theory 1171 1 6 ETHICS : An Anthology


present in the cause even prior to its effectuation. Hence the effi-cient cause does nothing, really speaking, except manifesting whatremains unmanifested in the cause. Nobody can produce somethingout of nothing. That which is not inherent in the cause in someform or other cannot be made manifest. That is why, the conceptof nimitta køıËraÃ˝Èa in SøıËnkhya philosophy differs substantially fromother Indian systems which advocate it. For SøıËnkhya, nimitta køıËraÃ˝Èais responsible only to remove the obstacles on the way to manifes-tation which is implicit in the cause already. It cannot do anythingto produce effect from the cause where it is not present, as thenaiyøıËyikas believe. As VøıËcaspati says that even hundreds and thou-sands of artisans cannot transform blue into red for the simplereason that red is never present in the blue. This is why the SøıËnkhyaphilosophers do not attach much importance to the notion ofefficient cause. That the efficient cause is not to be regarded as acause proper or cause worth the name can be shown from anotherstandpoint. The SøıËnkhya philosophers look upon prak–˝Áti and itsevolutes as well as puru—˝Áa from another angle. They claim that tattvaor reality can be classified under four heads, viz, (1) prak–˝Áti or thatwhich stands for a cause only, but never an effect; (2) vik–˝Áti or thatwhich stands for an effect only, but never a cause, (3) prak–˝Áti-vik–˝Átior that which is of the nature of both, i.e., to say which can beregarded as both a cause and an effect; and (4) aprak–˝Áti-avik–˝Áti orthat which is neither a cause nor an effect. In Tattvakaumudi, prak–˝Átiis defined as that which produces other tattvas but is itselfunproduced_tattvøıËntarapras”ıËti but not tattvøıËntarapras”ıËta. In theSøıËnkhya theory of evolution cited before, we have seen that prak–˝Átiwhich heads all its evolutes, and is thus the cause of everything butitself remains uncaused is to be considered as no (1). Vik–˝Áti whichstands for sixteen types of effects only, viz, paÃˆÈca jÃˆÈøıËnendriyas(cak—˝Áu, karna, jihvøıË, nøıËsikøıË and tvak), paÃˆÈca karmendriyas (vøıËk, pani,pøıËba, pøıËy”ıË and upastha), manas (which stands for both ajÃˆÈøıËnendriya and marmendriya) and paÃˆÈca mahøıËbh”ıËtas (k—˝Áiti, ap,teja, mar”ıËt, byom) are tattvøıËntarapras”ıËta, but not tattvaÃıÈtarapras”ıËti.Vik–˝Áti thus is to be considered as no (2). Prak–˝Áti-vik–˝Áti stands forseven entities viz, mahat or buddhi, ahaÀÛflkøıËra and paÃˆÈca tanmøıËtras(r”ıËpa, rasa, —˜Áabda, gandha and spar—˜Áa). These are both of the natureof causes and effects_tattvdntara pras”ıËti and tattvøıËntarapras”ıËta.

Mahat or buddhi which is an effect of prak–˝Áti causes ahaÀÛflkøıËra inits turn. Therefore, it is both a cause and an effect. Similar is the casewith ahaÀ̋flkøıËra (a product of buddhi but the producer of √ıËkøıËdasaindriya and paÃˆÈca tanmatra) and paÃˆÈca tanmøıËtra (a product ofahaÀ̋flkøıËra but the producer of paÃˆÈca mahøıËbh”ıËta). This is repre-sented in no. (3). But that which can stand for neither a cause noran effect_neither tattvøıËntarapras”ıËta nor tattvøıËntarapras”ıËti_is thepuru—˝Áa. This aprak–˝Áti-avik–˝Áti is represented in no. (4). It may beargued by some that paÃˆÈca mahøıËbh”ıËtas are not to be considered aseffects only. For, gha“˝Âa (jar) etc. arises out of k—˝Áiti (earth) etc. But theSøıËnkhya philosophers point out that gha“˝Âa is non-different from itscause in respect of gurutva (weight) and other properties and hencea similar tattva but not tattvøıËntara. What remains unquestionable isthat puru—˝Áa is neither a cause nor an effect, according to SøıËnkhya.It becomes now evident that though puru—˝Áa is looked upon asnimitta køıËraÃ˝Èa, it is not that essential. Hence in SøıËnkhya philosophy,the material cause is the real cause. What we call an efficient causeis but a cause by courtesy so called.

From the above discussion it follows that puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti arein essence antagonistic and opposed to each other. But sometimesprak–˝Áti assumes to have the property of consciousness which is notreally belonging to it. As a result, buddhi or ahaÀÛflkøıËra appears to beconscious though as a matter of fact they are really unconscious.What happens in such cases, according to SøıËnkhya, is that the con-sciousness of puru—˝Áa gets reflected in the sattva element of buddhior ahaÀÛflkøıËra. Of the three guÃ˝Èas, sattva is light (laghu) and ofilluminating character (prakøıË—˜ÁakaÀÛfl). Being transparent (svacchva),reflection of consciousness on it becomes possible. This is the causeof caitanyøıËbhimøıËna (pseudo-sense of consciousness) in prak–˝Áti. Butthis knowledge is simply accidental (øıËbhimøıËnika) and not its essentialnature. Similarly owing to its association and proximity with prak–˝Áti,puru—˝Áa assumes the property of kart–˝Átva as it were. Thiskart–˝ÁtvøıËbhimøıËna is simply accidental to it as it is devoid of all activi-ties whatsoever. Puru—˝Áa being pure consciousness and consciousnessbeing self-illuminating, reflection of the activity of prak–˝Áti is taken tobe its own activity. Hence at the time of creation, this dual processof caitanyøıËbhimøıËna in prak–˝Áti and kart–˝ÁtvøıËbhimøıËna in puru—˝Áa isbrought to existence out of non-discrimination between them, re-



sulting in saÀ̋flsøıËra. And this is the cause of our bondage. Puru—˝Áacontinues to enjoy (bhoga) at that time, giving rise to all sorts ofsufferings. Its real nature gets lost. Liberation from this state takesplace when discriminative knowledge between puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Átitakes place. That is to say, when puru—˝Áa or prak–˝Áti realizes its respec-tive nature, liberation is attained. That is why it is held in SøıËnkhyaphilosophy that prak–˝Áti starts creating the world for the dual pur-pose of enjoyment of puru—˝Áa (puru—˝Áasya dar—˝ÁanøıËrtham) and subse-quent liberation (kaivalyartham) to be attained. Whether and howpuru—˝Áa who is devoid of all the guÃ˝Èas (nistraigunya) and inactive canenjoy is but another question. Further puru—˝Áa is looked upon bySøıËnkhya as nirlipta or indifferent. How one who is indifferent canenjoy is very difficult to answer. Again, puru—˝Áa who is nitya mukta,i.e. liberated eternally can aspire after freedom may appear to be anAchiles' heel. These problems apart, non-discrimination betweenPuru—˝Áa and Prak–˝Áti is the sole cause of bondage.

II

In SøıËnkhya, we find another trend which explains our bondage andliberation. It is stated that every j¤ıÂva or embodied soul is subject tothreefold sufferings__øıËdhyøıËtmika, øıËdhibhautika and øıËdhidaivika.The first only relates to our sufferings from body and mind. InSøıËnkhya, øıËtmøıË stands for subtle and gross bodies, manas and otheranta∆˝ËkaraÃ˝Èas. Hence øıËdhyøıËtmika du∆˝Ëkha is either bodily or mental,i.e., intraorganic in nature. Though every kind of suffering is causedby manas and felt by manas and in that sense manomøıËtrajanya, yetbodily suffering is not simple manomøıËtrajanya but arising out ofbody besides manas. Body or —˜Áar¤ıÂra, according to SøıËnkhya, is con-stituted by three elements of vøıËyu, pitta and —˜Ále—˝Áma. When theseelements are in a state of equilibrium, we are said to possess soundhealth. When the equilibrium is lost out of the preponderance ofany of the elements, we have bodily suffering or —˜ÁøıËr¤ıÂra du∆˝Ëkha. Itis also called byøıËdhi as distinguished from øıËdhi or møıËnasa du∆˝Ëkha.Mental suffering or møıËnasa du∆˝Ëkha is arising out of frustrated desireetc. In Tattvakaumudi it is aptly put as: møıËnasaÀÛfl køıËma-krodha-lobha-moha-bhaya-¤ıÂrsyøıË-vi—˝Áø ıËda-vi—˝ÁayøıËvi—˜Áe—˝Áø ıËdar—˜Áananibandhana.It is to be remembered here that both these kinds of suffering are

due to interal causes__either of disturbance in the equilibrium ofthree elements (dhøıËtuvai—˝Áamya) or of køıËma, krodha etc. In theformer case, the gross body undergoes changes while, in the lattercase, it is the subtle body that undergoes transformation. However,øıËdhyøıËtmika du∆˝Ëkha is arising out of either byøıËdhi or øıËdhi and hencethe name. A word of caution here. We will see presently thatøıËdhibhautika and adhidaivika du∆˝Ëkha are also due to ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa whichis also an internal cause. Hence to distinguish them from theøıËdhyøıËtmika variety, we should say that the latter is øıËntaraupøıËya-møıËtrasøıËdhya, i.e., to say, is arising out of internal causes alone. Butneither øıËdhibhautika nor øıËdhidaivika are øıËntaraupøıËyamøıËtrasøıËdhya.They are no doubt arising out of ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa or unseen internal cause butthey require some other causes as well besides ad–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa. Herein lies thedifference. Be that as it may, øıËdhibhautika du∆˝Ëkha arises out ofeither man, beasts etc. or five elements of earth, water, fire, air andether. The word 'bh”ıËta' means both mobile objects like men, ani-mals etc. or immobile objects like earth, water etc. Hence our suf-fering due to harsh words uttered by other men or from snake-bite,etc., is an instance of øıËdhibhautika du∆˝Ëkha. Similarly, suffering dueto ativ–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âi or anav–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âi etc. may be regarded as instances oføıËdhibhautika du∆˝Ëkha. But it must be remembered here that yak—˝Áa,røıË…˝È—˝Áasa etc. are also mobile, yet the SøıËnkhya philosophers use theword 'jangama' (mobile) here only in the sense of man and sub-human animals. §Ò‡dhidaivika du∆˝Ëkha, according to SøıËnkhya, iscaused by devajoni, i.e., vidyøıËdhara, apsarøıË, yak—˝Áa, røıË…˝È—˝Áasa,gandharva, kinnara, guhyakasiddha, bh”ıËta etc. Sometimes our suf-ferings due to the different planetary bodies (graha) are also in-cluded within this fold. Some SøıËnkhya philosophers, however,mention our sufferings from ativ–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âi, anøıËv–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âi, siløıËv–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âi, ulkøıËpøıËt,jhanjhøıËvøıËt etc. as instances of øıËdhidaivika du∆˝Ëkha.

That every j¤ıÂva suffers from this kind or that kind of sufferingis a positive fact of experience. Du∆˝Ëkha is pratyøıËtmavedaniyam i.e.,experienced by every soul. Hence no one can deny its existence. InSøıËnkhya literature, du∆˝Ëkha has been looked upon as raja∆˝Ëpari-nøıËmabhedah i.e., arising out of some sort of transformation ofrajah. A word of caution here. For the SøıËnkhyas, du∆˝Ëkha is notpresent in øıËtmøıË (øıËtmav–˝Átti) which is pure consciousness. It is presentin anta∆˝ËkaraÃ˝Èa (antahkaranav–˝Átti). By antahkaranav–˝Átti is meant a



kind of relation of the property of antahkarana as posed on puru—˝Áabeing reflected in antahkaranav–˝Átti. However, according toIsvarak–˝Á—˝Ána this continuation of suffering gives rise to an enquiry(jijÃˆÈøıËsøıË) in our mind whether there is a way to remove this suffering.He points out first of all that there are d–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âa and øıËnu—˜Áravika waysof removing these sufferings. But these ways, though easy, cannotput an end to all sufferings forever. They are only temporal remedialmeasures and therefore cannot be depended upon. The surest andthe only way how we can stop all sufferings for ever is to take resortto SøıËnkhya søıËstra with the acquisition of knowledge of vyakta,avyakta and jÃˆÈa. Let us explain this point.

The SøıËnkhya philosophers believe that if there are easier ways toremove suffering, no one endeavours for a harder one. If honey isavailable in the corner of the house, no one makes an attempt atgoing to a forest for its acquisition. Who is there to dig a pond inorder to quench his thirst if thirst can be quenched by the easilyavailable water in the house? Thus we can put an end to our bodilysuffering by consulting a physician and taking medicine as advisedby him. Similarly the mental suffering too can be removed by easiermeans by making available palatableí dish, good wife etc. But theSøıËnkhyas point out that these are only temporary means. No onecan guarantee that a man who has overcome disease by medicinewill not fall prey to it again. Similarly mental suffering which isremoved by this or that means may again re-appear. There is nosure way to remove these øıËdhibhautika du∆˝Ëkha for ever. This is truewith regard to other varieties of sufferings as well. The SøıËnkhyasalso point out that the øıËnu—˜Áravika or vaidika way of removingsuffering by attaining svarga (heaven) by means of sacrificial rites isbut temporary. For the enjoyment will not be there for ever. It islooked upon as k—˝Áay¤ıÂ, i.e., destructible in nature. Svarga will beenjoyed for a period after which one will have to be born again.Moreover, it is avi—˜Áuddha or impure. For the performance of vedicrites one has to indulge in some sort of violence, thereby attainingpøıËpa or du∆˝Ëkha. Further, there is difference in the happiness inheaven enjoyed by different persons. This may lead to some sort ofuncomfort, i.e., du∆˝Ëkha in the mind. That is why, øıËnu—˜Áravika upøıËyacannot be taken to be a solution for ever. The SøıËnkhyas use twoterms viz., øıËtyantika du∆˝Ëkha niv–˝Átti, i.e., cessation of sufferings for

ever and aikøıËntika du∆˝Ëkha niv–˝Átti, i.e., there will be no furtherchance of the suffering re-appearing which merit serious consider-ation. This is why, the path shown by the SøıËnkhya philosophers,though very difficult to attain, is the only path of removing suffer-ing. According to them, it is the knowledge of vyakta, avyakta andjÃˆÈa that helps one overcome suffering for ever. Vyakta stands forthe effects which are all manifested. Even a casual look at theSøıËnkhya theory of the evolution of the world will make us convincethat the entities beginning with mahat or buddhi down to paficamahøıËbhutas are looked upon as vyakta. Avyakta stands for the causeor the Great Unmanifest. It is no other than Prak–˝Áti who is viewedas am”ıËlaÀÛfl m”ıËla køıËraÃ˝Èam, i.e., the cause of everything but itself hasno cause. Hence by vyakta and avyakta they mean prak–˝Áti and all itsevolutes. The rest is jÃˆÈa, i.e., pure consciousness which is no otherthan puru—˝Áa. Here the SøıËnkhya philosophers do not specifically usethe word vivekajÃˆÈøıËna which alone helps us to distinguish betweenpuru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti. But they use the expression 'vijÃˆÈøıËnøıËt' i.e., out oftrue knowledge of vyakta and avyakta, on the one hand and jÃˆÈa, onthe other, that we can finally overcome all sorts of sufferings forever. A moment's reflection will reveal that the two answers that wefind in SøıËnkhya literature to put an end to our sufferings are atbottom one.

III

Let us now look at an interesting but apparently inconsistent aspectof the SøıËnkhya theory of bondage and liberation. Initially it washeld that puru—˝Áa was baddha (in fetters) and mok—˝Áa (liberation)finally arose out of vivekajÃˆÈøıËna between puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti. Butalmost at the end of SøıËnkhyakøıËrikøıË it was argued that really puru—˝Áawas neither baddha nor mukta. It was really prak–˝Áti which wasbaddha owing to conjunction (saÀ˝flyoga) with, or semblance ofconjunction (samyogabhøıËsa) with or mere proximity (søıËnnidhyamøıËtra) with puru—˝Áa. This prak–˝Áti becomes mukta when suchvivekajÃˆÈøıËna dawns. To elaborate: in verse 21 of SøıËnkhyakøıËrikøıËIsvarak–˝Á—˝Ána argues that creation or evolution of the world out ofprimordial prak–˝Áti starts for the fulfilment of twin purposes ofenjoyment of puru—˝Áa and ultimate release of Him from the clutches



of prak–˝Áti. ∑Ófiankara rightly observes that neither enjoyment norliberation is ever possible on the part of puru—˝Áa. For puru—˝Áa isutterly inactive and enjoyment is never possible without some kindof activity. Moreover, if puru—˝Áa is said to continue to enjoy, therewill be no cessation of enjoyment. Prak–˝Áti will continue to createobjects ceaselessly for the enjoyment of puru—˝Áa and puru—˝Áa will getentangled in such enjoyment for ever, thereby making liberationimpossible. Again, puru—˝Áa being mukta from the very beginning,cannot be truly said to be liberated. Mukti, being its swar”ıËpa, is notobtainable but is always obtained. Again, if for argument's sake, theliberation of puru—˝Áa is at all admitted, it will continue for ever,thereby making the cycle of creation impossible. SøıËnkhya seems torealize the untenability of its own position when it emphaticallydeclares in verse 62 that bondage, liberation and migration do notaffect puru—˝Áa at all. In reality, puru—˝Áa is not bound at all__na ka—˜Ácitpuru—˝Áa vadhyate. Nor is it migrated to the world and assumesaÀ̋flsøıËra__na ka—˜Ácit saÀÛflsarati. Nor is it ever liberated__na ka—˜Ácitmucyate. As a matter of fact, bandhana, saÀÛflsøıËra and mok—˜Áa are notthe essence of puru—˝Áa at all. A person who is in real bondageendeavours to put an end to his bondage and thereby seeksliberation. Truly speaking puru—˝Áa can never be in a state of bondage,for kle—˜Áa, karma and øıË—˜Áaya are not possible in puru—˝Áa who is utterlyindifferent, unchanging and devoid of guÃ˝Èas. As VøıËcaspati rightlyobserves: savøıËsanakle—˜ÁakarmøıË—˜ÁayøıËnøıËnca vandhanasamakhyøıËnøıËÀÛflpuru—˝Áe aparinøıËminyasambhavøıËt. By 'VøıËsanøıË' is meant saÀ̋flskøıËrawhich arises out of previous impressions. By kle—˜Áa is meant avidyøıË,asmitøıË, røıËga, dve—˝Áa and abhinive—˜Áa. 'Karma' stands for dharma andadharma arising out of our good or bad deeds. §Ò‡saya means citta.Puru—˝Áa being nirlepa (untouched by any of these) aparinøıËmi (beingunchangeable) and ni—˝Ákriya (being utterly devoid of any activity)remains unaffected by vøıËsana, kle—˜Áa, karma and øıË—˜Áaya. Hence,vandhana, saÀÛflsøıËra and mok—˝Áa are not puru—˝Áa's real nature. Theseare only attributed to puru—˝Áa secondarily (aupacøıËrika). Thisattribution is comparable to a process whereby an army's success ordefeat is attributible to a king whose army it is. As a matter a fact,it is prak–˝Áti which is bound or liberated. Prak–˝Áti is nøıËnøıË—˜Áraya i.e.,related to different puru—˝Áas by virtue of its close proximity withthem. Bandhana etc. are the results of threefold guÃ˝Èas which

belong to prak–˝Áti. It is due to the absence of non-discriminativeknowledge of puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti and also its close proximity withPuru—˝Áa that the nature really belonging to prak–˝Áti appears to bebelonging to puru—˝Áa. In truth however, bhoga and apavarga aresecondarily attributed to puru—˝Áa who is above everything.

In verse 55, the author of SøıËnkhyakøıËrikøıË explains this fact ofattribution by saying that jarøıËmaraÃ˝Èak–˝ÁtaÀÛfl du∆˝Ëkham prøıËpnoticetana∆˝Ë puru—˝Áa∆˝Ë. Puru—˝Áa appears to suffer from misery broughtabout by old age and death. We know from SøıËnkhya literature thatpuru—˝Áa is visuddha caitanya__pure consciousness. It is thus nitya,—˜Áuddha, baddha and mukta and therefore jarøıË and maraÃ˝Èa cannotbe its dharma or property. From the etymology of the word puru—˝Áa(Puri linge sete iti) we come to know that puru—˝Áa rests in the subtlebody. And that which is primarily connected with the body seemsto be related to puru—˝Áa as well. Hence so long as puru—˝Áa getsassociated with the subtle body, there is no deliverance from pain,misery and the like. JarøıËmaraÃ˝Èa which really affects this body seemsto be attributed to puru—˝Áa which rests in the body but is untouchedby the affections of the body. That jarøıË or old age disables ourbody, cripples our memory and affects many bodily and mentalchanges is a positive fact of experience. Its influence is universal andinescapable. Similarly, the influence of maraÃ˝Èa cannot be overcome.No one can get rid of this suffering. Hence if one is born, one mustsuffer from old age and death and there is no avoidance from this.This bodily suffering is attributed to conscious puru—˝Áa who out ofnon-discrimination looks upon the suffering of the body as its own.In truth, however, puru—˝Áa in its purity remains untouched by bodilyaffections.

A note of caution here. It may be asked why Isvarak–˝Á—˝ÁÃ˝Èa leavesaside janma which is generally regarded as a cause of suffering aswell. Does not puru—˝Áa get affected by birth also along with old ageand death ? To answer to this query, it may be submitted thatsuffering due to birth is not universal. Human beings and loweranimals suffer from birth no doubt. But the divine beings are notsubject to this. Moreover, there is a difference between these twokinds of sufferings__sufferings arising out of birth and sufferingsarising out of old age and death. In the former case, only the



victim__the mother and the child__seem to suffer but not therelatives of the victim. They are rather eager to celebrate and enjoythe appearance of the new-comer. In the latter case, however, boththe persons, in death-bed or jarøıËgrastha and their relatives equallysuffer.

The evolution of prak–˝Áti is spontaneous just as milk flows fromthe udder of the cow. But prak–˝Áti has no interest of its own butlooks upon the interest of another as its own. This is comparableto the nourishment of the calf as the interest of the cow itself. Asa matter of fact, prak–˝Áti being devoid of consciousness altogethercannot plan evolution at all. So the evolution of prak–˝Áti for thesalvation of puru—˝Áa cannot be admitted. The truth is that prak–˝Átievolves spontaneously without being guided or controlled and therelease of puru—˝Áa arises only as a result. As the activity of prak–˝Átiprecedes and the release of puru—˝Áa succeeds it is said that prak–˝Átievolves for the emancipation of Puru—˝Áa. In truth however, the ac-tivity of Prak–˝Áti for the release of Puru—˝Áa is not real but apparent.Prak–˝Áti evolves for the benefit of Puru—˝Áa and looks upon his benefitas her own. Prak–˝Áti never expects her spirit of self-sacrifice to bereciprocated by Puru—˝Áa. Just as the cook prepares the food for thesatisfaction of his master and turns away from the kitchen when thefood is cooked, similarly prak–˝Áti evolves for the emancipation ofeach puru—˝Áa__pratipuru—˝Áavimok—˝ÁøıËrthaÀÛfl__and looks upon the in-terest of puru—˝Áa as her own__svøıËrtha iva parøıËrtha. Incidentally itmay be mentioned here that SøıËnkhya philosophers like most otherIndian philosophers admit both jivanmukti and videhamukti. Themoment the discriminative knowledge between puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Átidawns, a puru—˝Áa becomes liberated here and now. But his bodilyexistence may still continue on account of the momentum of thepast deeds, i.e. prøıËrabdha karma. As the liberated puru—˝Áa thoughembodied, feels no association with body owing to vivekajÃˆÈøıËna andso does not reap any further fruit of karma henceforth. Thevidehamukti or final emancipation however, arises as an outcome ofdeath when the body gets completely dissociated from the Spirit.

The SøıËnkhya philosophers bring about the exact nature of therelation of puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti by means of three analogies. The firstis that of a dancing girl who entertains the audience or the specta-tors and desists from her art or skill as soon as the audience gets

satisfied. This analogy, however, has an obvious disadvantage. Forthe dancing which ceases at present may recommence afterwards bythe request of the enthusiastic audience. But the activity of prak–˝Áticannot recur. It must be final. For otherwise, there will be no pos-sibility of the emancipation of puru—˝Áa. This is why the SøıËnkhyaphilosophers take recourse to a second analogy of a modest bashfullady who takes special precautions never to re-appear within thesight of the stranger after accidentally exposing herself to him forthe first time. But this analogy too is imperfect and should not bepushed too further. The bashful lady intends to protect herself notonly from the sight of a particular stranger but also from all strang-ers. But the cessation of the activity of prak–˝Áti relates only to thatpuru—˝Áa who has chanced to see her. This is possibly the reason whythe SøıËnkhya philosophers refer to the third analogy of the blas√˜Ëcouple who being tired of pleasure from intimate union have ceasedto care for each other. They may live together being present to theother constantly. But there remains no impulse for creation at all.According to MøıËthara, this is comparable to the unproductive unionof an elderly couple. When discriminative knowledge is attainedbetween puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti, their co-presence yields no result. Atthat time puru—˝Áa attains the vivekajÃˆÈøıËna as puru—˝Áa realises himself tobe different from prak–˝Áti. Similarly, prak–˝Áti being seen by puru—˝Áadesists from creation. As aviveka or discriminative knowledge doesnot exist at that time, the conjunction of Puru—˝Áa and Prak–˝Áti thoughpresent does not lead to the desired creation. In other words, theavivekajÃˆÈøıËna which is one of the causes of creation (besides thesaÀ˝flyoga of puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti) being absent, the effect, i.e., cre-ation, is likewise absent. This discriminative knowledge is pure(vi—˜Áuddham), being entirely free from doubt (saÀ˝fl—˜Áaya) and error(yiparyaya). Such a kind of knowledge is further characterised asapari—˜Áe—˝Áa (residueless), for there remains nothing to be left known.Even a bit of ignorance which binds one in saÀÛfl—˜ÁøıËra cannot existat that time as a residue. This pure discriminative knowledge ischaracterised in SøıËnkhya køıËrikøıË as 'nøıËsmi, na me naham iti'. Thethree forms of this negative knowledge are differently interpreted.'Na asmi', i.e., 'I do not exist' means I do not act. All activity belongsto primal matter or prak–˝Áti. Consciousness, being pure and devoidof any form, is also devoid of all sorts of activity. 'Na me', i.e.,

CHAKRABARTI : SøıËnkhya Theory 1271 2 6 ETHICS: An Anthology


'Nothing is mine' means absolute indifference (udøıËs¤ıÂnatva) on thepart of puru—˝Áa which is pure residueless consciousness. As puru—˝Áa isni—˝Ákriya (devoid of activity) it is also devoid of enjoyment(bhokt–˝ÁtvabhøıËva)__mat sambandhi na kincit. When puru—˝Áa realizeshimself to be akartøıË in the true sense, he realises himself also asnirlepa or asanga. That is to say, nothing belongs to him and he isnot possessor of anything. 'Na aham' or 'I am not' means 'I amnot the agent' as activity does not belong to puru—˝Áa. Thus puru—˝Áafirst realizes himself to be inactive (ni—˝Ákriya). Being inactive he thenconsiders himself to be akartøıË (not the doer). And being akartøıË, hefinally realizes that he does not get associated with anything. Foronly the kartøıË can become the possessor (swøıËm¤ıÂ). VøıËcaspati offersan alternative explanation. For him 'ni—˝Ákriyatva møıËtra' i.e., mereinactivity cannot be understood to mean by the expression 'nasmi'If activity is merely denied by this expression then the subsequentexpression 'nøıËhaÀ˝fl' turns into repetition and thereby useless.Hence 'Na asmi' should be taken to mean 'NøıË asmi' i.e., to say,'I am not' Puru—˝Áa in the sense that I am prasavadharmøıË i.e.,capable of producing anything. As puru—˝Áa realizes himself to bepuru—˝Áa, he knows him to be k”ıËtastha. He does not undergo anychange__aparinami. Kart–˝ÁtvabhøıËva is explained from the fact ofaparinøıËmitva—˝Át. 'Naham' is the expression standing for thiskart–˝ÁtvabhøıËva. Further this Kart–˝ÁtvabhøıËva leads to aswøıËmitva orsaÀÛflbandas”ıËnyatva. This sort of realization is the true realization.Only when such realization dawns mukti or liberation follows.That is why vivekøıËgraha or non-difference is regarded as one ofthe causes of liberation.

IV

A close look at the SøıËnkhya theory will make us convince atonce that it is riddled with inconsistencies. The SøıËnkhyaphilosophers began by cutting off all links between puru—˝Áa andprak–˝Áti and declare that they both are eternal, absolute andindependent. If prak–˝Áti were really independent, i.e., needed noassistance from puru—˝Áa, then the cycle of creation (svarga) anddestruction (pralaya) would remain unexplained. For, the

difference in effect cannot be brought about by the same cause.According to SøıËnkhya, prak–˝Áti is the real material cause andpuru—˝Áa does nothing except helping manifestation of that whichwas already present in the material cause. It is commonknowledge that if manifestation does not take place without theassistance of somebody, then that somebody should beregarded as one of the causes. Otherwise manifestation wouldbecome impossible. To hold that manifestation is spontaneous,like the flowing of milk from the udder of the cow, is tooverlook the brute fact that the cow is a conscious agent andflowing of milk is conditioned by the motherly affection andlove towards its offspring. But puru—˝Áa is utterly unconscious andso its spontaneous changes are ruled out. If for argument's sakesuch spontaneous movement is at all admitted, then it remainsto be explained how and why prak–˝Áti evolves the world in onecase and destroys them in another. In other words, theequipoise (søıËm◊ı›avasthøıË) of prak–˝Áti needed to be disturbed for theevolution of the world by the presence of puru—˝Áa__whether thatpresence is real, apparent or mere proximity is not thatimportant. The important fact is that there must be somecontact between puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti so that the equilibrium getsdisturbed and the subsequent preponderance of one guÃ˝Èa overthe rest becomes possible, resulting in creation. How then canprak–˝Áti be absolute or independent ? It may be asked further ifboth puru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti are eternal (nitya) and all-pervading(bibhu), their contact must also be viewed as eternal. As a result,creation will continue endlessly and dissolution will not takeplace at all. If, on the contrary, dissolution is regarded as thesvarupa of prak–˝Áti for in that state alone prak–˝Áti is in a state ofsøıËm◊ı›avasthøıË which is its real nature, then prak–˝Áti will refuse toundergo changes being afraid of loosing its real nature (svarupapranøıË—˜Áa bhayøıË“˝Â). Hence creation and destruction cannot beexplained in terms of prak–˝Áti alone. For that, we require acontact or semblance of contact or mere proximity or absenceof that contact etc. with Puru—˝Áa. This convinces us that prak–˝Áti isnot absolute (nirapek—˝Áa) or independent (svøıËdh¤ıÂna). Again,consider why and how an absolute or independent prak–˝Áti cansubserve the purpose of puru—˝Áa. If somebody cares to serve the



purpose of another, as a cook for his master, then he becomessubservient to that other. This curtails the independence ofprak–˝Áti over which the SøıËnkhya philosophers beat their drum somuch. To say that prak–˝Áti serves the interest of puru—˝Áa in a spiritof detachment without minding her own interest or receivingany acknowledgement from him is not to explain how suchprak–˝Áti can be called blind. It is true that a blind person cannotexecute perfectly what he plans. But the fact that he is able toplan goes against his unconscious nature. As a matter of factboth a lame man and a blind man are conscious agents andboth are capable of doing certain activities. The lame man maynot walk but is certainly capable of verbal utterances which guidethe blind man, and these utterances are undoubtedly hisactivities. Moreover, the lame man is capable of carrying outmovement through his hands and other organs and of courseto a certain extent through his feet. Hence the simile of a lameman for puru—˝Áa who is utterly inactive and that of a blind manfor prak–˝Áti who is utterly unconscious does not bear scrutiny.Moreover, if prak–˝Áti is viewed as blind and non-intelligent,evolution should have been mechanical and devoid of purpose.But the world which prak–˝Áti evolves is full of harmony design,order and purpose. How can then prak–˝Áti be blind ? Againprak–˝Áti is compared to a dancing girl who exhibits herperformance before an audience and thereby becomesconditioned by them. Further, the claim of the SøıËnkhyaphilosopher to the effect that prak–˝Áti vanishes for that puru—˝Áawho has seen her but continues to exist for others does reallymake prak–˝Áti relative. In that case, we have to posit multiplicityof prak–˝Áti or think of different prak–˝Átis to enable one puru—˝Áaliberated and others in bondage. In other words, if prak–˝Átivanishes for one puru—˝Áa and continues to exist for others, thenprak–˝Áti becomes relative and many instead of one and noteternal in the true sense. Does not this fact curtail the independentnature (anapek—˝Áa svabhøıËva) of prak–˝Áti ?

Moving on to puru—˝Áa we are beset with all sorts of confusionsand contradictions. Puru—˝Áa is looked upon as pure consciousness(vi—˜Áuddha caitanya or caitanya kevalaÀÛfl) and is untouched by bond-age or liberation or transmigration. Yet the SøıËnkhya philosophers

speak of plurality of puru—˝Áas on the flimsy ground of birth, deathand activity (janaÀÛflamaraÃ˝Èa karanøıËnøıËm). Even a casual look willmake us feel that birth etc. cannot affect consciousness as suchwhich is nitya and ni—˝Ákriya. Hence birth etc. may be regarded as thequalifications of the phenomenal ego or jivatmøıË who is a productof the reflection of puru—˝Áa in buddhi. Puru—˝Áa, on the contrary, istranscendental to all these. Yet the SøıËnkhya philosophers nevermake a distinction between these two kinds of self__puru—˝Áa properand j¤ıÂva. If we look closely at the argument advanced for the ex-istence of puru—˝Áa, we will be convinced, sooner than later, that allof them proves the existence of j¤ıÂvas and none of them puru—˝Áaproper. It is beyond one's comprehension why SøıËnkhyas fail toreduce the many j¤ıÂvas into one absolute puru—˝Áa in the manner ofthe manifold material entities being reduced into one primal matter,called prak–˝Áti ? What is the harm of applying the same logic in thecase of puru—˝Áa as it is applied in the case of prak–˝Áti ? It is notperhaps out of place to mention that this inherent inconsistency hasled certain commentators like GaudapøıËda, VøıËcaspati and VijÃˆÈøıËnaBhik—˝Áu to abandon the multiplicity theory of the puru—˝Áa and acceptthe theory of one puru—˝Áa instead. Again, consider the inconsistencythat one finds in the beginning and later comes across at the end.The SøıËnkhya philosophers emphatically declare at the outset that themovement of prak–˝Áti for the evolution of the world is arising outof the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of puru—˝Áa. Subse-quently, however, the SøıËnkhya philosophers retrace their steps bydeclaring that puru—˝Áa is not really bound, liberated and migrated. Itis prak–˝Áti which really binds herself, liberates herself and migratesherself. The so-called bondage of puru—˝Áa is simply secondary orattributed falsely (aupacøıËrika) because of the close association ofpuru—˝Áa and prak–˝Áti. These two accounts are not in keeping witheach other and the SøıËnkhya philosophers are making a mess out ofthem. If activity belongs to prak–˝Áti and enjoyment to puru—˝Áa thenit overthrows the moral law of karma altogether, prak–˝Áti performsactions and puru—˝Áa has to reap .their fruits. Again prak–˝Áti bringsabout different enjoyable objects without being able to enjoy them.This brings in the charge of vicarious liability. Consider also the facthow enjoyment on the part of puru—˝Áa is possible at all. Puru—˝Áa is



passive, inactive and indifferent. It is formless. How can then enjoy-ment be possible ? Enjoyment (bhoga) certainly requires some activ-ity (kriyøıË) and some form (øıËkøıËra). Puru—˝Áa having none is not surelythe enjoyment. That the SøıËnkhya philosophy is riddled with inher-ent contradictions has been well-shown by ∑Ófiankara in his commen-tary on Brahmas”ıËtra. Any interested reader is advised to look into∑Ófiankara's commentaries on 2.21. to 2.2.10

Suggested ReadingSuggested ReadingSuggested ReadingSuggested ReadingSuggested Reading

1. SøıËnkhyakøıËrikøı ed. Suryanarayan Shastri (Madras: University of Madras, 1973).2. SøıËnkhyakøıËrikøıË by Iswarak–˝Á—˝ÁÃ˝Èa, ed. Purnachandra Vedantacancu (Pascimbanga

Rajya SiksøıË Parsad).3. SøıËnkhyatattvakaumudi by VøıËcaspati Misra, Translated and elaborated by Narayan

Chandra Goswami (Calcutta: Sanskrita Pustak Bhandar, 1982).4. YuktidipikøıË (Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing & Publishing House, 1938).5. SøıËnkhøıËya - Pravacana - BhøıË—˝Áy∆˝Ë.6. MøıËtharav–̋Átti.7. VedøıËnta Dar—̃ÁanaÀ̋fl, Dwitiya AdhyøıËya. Ed. & elaborated by Swami ViswarupøıËnanda

(Advaita Ashrama).8. A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy by Chandradhar Sharma (New Delhi:

Motilal Banarsidass, 1987).

The Anomaly in Hindu Culture

KANAKPROBHA BANERJEE

Hindu culture is not of a piece, its speculative basis and its socio-political practice being completely out of step. This is a commonmalady affecting nearly all known cultures__Christian, Islamic,Buddhist etc. But I shall confine my studies within the limits ofthe one culture which is known to me first-hand and the goodof which is my primary concern as affecting my life directly. Tostart with I intend to make a study of the Hindu speculativeframework and then I shall pass on to an analysis of the Hindusocio-political set-up.

But, first, a warning: Hindu philosophy is a blanket term withno corresponding exact referent. Hindu culture has a long his-tory, intellectually virile and analytic. The result is that we findMonism, Deism, Dualism, Dualistic Pluralism, even Nihilism ofa sort__all under the canopy of Hindu culture. But in spite ofthis diversity there is an underlying unity of spirit, and that isrelevant to our discussion.

A second point to be remembered is the continuity of ourculture through the ages. Unlike the Greek, Roman andEgyptian cultures Hindu culture has retained a living contactwith its past. So we have to go back to our ancient philosophicalsystems to understand the theoretical basis of Hindu culture. Fornearly three to four thousand years Hindu culture evolved on itsown, more or less isolated from other cultures and retaining itsidentity. Whatever changes there were emerged from within itsown fold. Later, exposure to Islamic and Christian cultureschanged it no doubt, but these new cultures were absorbedsuccessfully, the Hindu culture still retaining its identity. TheIslamic and Christian Strands in modern Indian culture deserve


BANERJEE : The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 3 1 3 4 ETHICS : An Anthology

competent handling by thinkers more intimately acquainted withthem. Of course, my handling of the Hindu speculative systemsalso will necessarily be sketchy for my interest does not lie incritically analysing the theories but in pointing out thecontradiction between theory and practice in our culture.

I

Vedantic monism (Advaita VedøıËnta) has long been mistaken asthe representative Indian philosophical system. So it shouldcome first in our discussion. It may very sketchily be presentedas follows. There is only one reality__pure consciousness.Through a temporary misapprehension it takes on the appear-ance of a material world of multiplicity. MøıËyøıË is at the root ofthis evil. This false cognition is sublated by a complete realizationof Brahman as the only reality. The active social individual j¤ıÂvaalso will be cognised, at that level, as what it is in reality, viz.brahman. The duty of the social individual is to live a life ofdetachment and non-involvement. Joy and sorrow are equallyillusory. Karman does not affect the øıËtman and heaven with itslure of enjoyment is an illusory end. The end should be brahma-vihøıËra with a firmly established comprehension of truth. In theG¤ıÂtøıË there is a description of such a state:

yah sarvatra anabhisneha tat tat prøıËpya —˜Áubh-øıË—˜Áubham |nøıËbhinandati na dve—˝Á“˝Âi tasya prajÃˆÈøıË prati—˝Á“˝ÂhitøıË ||1

SøıËmkhya is very similar to VedøıËnta, except that it admits twoultimate realities:

1. Pure consciousness, the eternal inactive viewer, millions ofit as separate points of view.

2. Ever-active mechanical energy, constantly presenting theworld of motion to the puru—˝Áa or conscious points ofview.

The first is absolutely different from the second. Puru—˝Áas arefalsely identified with prak–˝Áti specially at the level of buddhi andahamkøıËra, intellect and ego-sense. This leads to bondage. The

G¤ıÂtøıË has given a proper description of the puru—˝Áa as:

Acchedyo'yam abhedyo'yam akledyo a—˜Áo—˝Áya eva ca|Nityah sarvagatah sthøıËnuracaloyaÀ˝fl sanøıËtanah.||2

Prak–˝Áti alone evolves, suffers and entices. It is fallacious to thinkthat the puru—˝Áa acts or is acted upon.

Ya enaÀ˝fln vetti hantøıËram yascaibaiÀ˝fl manyate hataiÀ˝fl |Ubhau tau na vijøıËn¤ıÂto nøıËyaÀ˝fl hanti na hanyate.||3

What then is the duty of this puru—˝Áa ? It is to get detached fromprak–˝Áti and attain discriminatory cognition__VivekakhyøıËtióandremain as the eternal viewer of this universe.

The pluralistic systems of NyøıËya and Vai—˜Áe—˝Áika also do notadmit determining qualities in the ultimate ontological spiritualentitiesóexcept for special funds of merit and demerit puÃ˝Èya andpøıËpa, dharma and adharma and these are kept in abeyance in theøıËtmøıËs at the time of periodic mahøıËpralayas (complete withdrawalof the universal process)__to bear fruit at the next phase of unversalprocess. The øıËtmøıËs then acquire bodies befitting their dharma andadharma and enjoy and suffer according to their deserts. Thedisembodied souls have neither cognition nor desire, neitherattachment nor aversion. The body stands in the way of the finalgood__the end of all misery for ever. Understanding the true natureof reality, helped by divine grace leads to final liberation__theattainment of a state where all the irrelevant features of cognition,happiness, misery, desire, attachment and aversion are shed by theøıËtmans. The aim in life should therefore be to get rid of falseknowledge which is at the root of all evil.

A discussion of Jaina and Bauddha attitudes would be relevanthere as they are very near in spirit to the systems already discussed.The Jainas, for example, support a thesis similar to the Hindupluralistic one, except that according to them virtue and vice donot wait as potentialities but immediately transform themselves intomaterial particles, which cover up the transparent spiritual atomsleading to their embodiment and consequent suffering. Thespiritual atoms have infinite comprehension and infinite power.They can grasp all the partial views in the synthetic whole. The aim


BANERJEE : The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 5 1 3 6 ETHICS: An Anthology

in life is to shed the material covering of the spiritual particlesthrough the practice of ahiÀ˝flsøıË, satya, asteya, brahmacarya andaparigraha. Women have, first of all, to shed their feminine bodies,get reborn in male bodies and then attain final liberation.

The Buddhists think that the universal process, starts fromavidyøıË i.e. wrong knowledge. This wrong knowledge leaves be-hind a deposit of mental potentialities leading to streams ofconsciousness which are bemused and kept in bondage by theworld of multiplicity and finitude, misery and rebirth. The aimis to attain complete comprehension, and the stoppage of thisstream of consciousness. The prescribed method is one of re-nunciation of the world, and leading a cloistered life in themonastery, practising austerity and meditation and finally attain-ing nirvøıËÃ˝Èa. Though theoretically there was no bar to womenalso striving for this end, Buddha was hesitant to allow womento enter the fold. Very unwillingly, he permitted separate nun-neries to function, but kept them subordinate to the dictates ofthe superior monks.

The above is a very sketchy presentation of the differentschools of Hindu thought. There has been no conscious devia-tion from the authentic version in any case though many pointsmust have been left out. We may summarise the common strandof thought running through all the systems viz., the øıËtman orøıËtmas, j¤ıÂvas or vijÃˆÈøıËna santøıËnas or even —˜Á”ıËnya, call it by any nameyou like is essentially pure free from all determinations and suf-fering. It bears no discriminatory marks of caste or gender.Suffering or misery starts with embodiment, illusory or real. Toliberate oneself one must inculcate the attitudes of tyøıËga andvairøıËgya and attain true comprehension.

II

We shall now take up Hindu practice as embodied in the socio-political set-up and its principles as codified in the SaÀ˝flhitøıË texts.A hierarchical system of social organisation called VarÃ˝ÈøıË—˜Áramadharma was prescribed and practised for ages in our country.

This aimed at social harmony and spiritual progress. A verymutilated form of this is still rampant in the rural areas. A hi-erarchical system need not necessarily be unjust and essentiallybad. Provided there are sufficient checks and balances to stopfavouritism and injustice a hierarchical system may be morecompatible with empirical evidence regarding human nature.Men are temperamentally and physically unequal. Abilities andpotentialities vary from individual to individual. Nor is it pos-sible for all men to pursue the same profession. A properlyorganised society is based on a division of labour. VarnøıË—˜Áramawas an attempt at social organization based on such consider-ations. Society, as well as the life of the individual were dividedinto four well-marked classes and four distinct stages. The Brah-min had the duty of learning the Vedas and imparting the Vediclearning to disciples. He had the duty of performing the Vedicrituals according to tradition and Vedic principles. K—˝Áatriyaslearnt the military arts and protected the Vedas, the Brahminsand people in general from enemies. The vai—˜Áyas had to producewealth and practise commerce. The —˜Á”ıËdra's sole duty was toserve the other three groups. Life, for the members of thedifferent classes, excepting the —˜Á”ıËdras, passed through the stagesof brahmacarya, gøıËrhasthya, vøıËÃ˝Èaprastha and sannyøıËsa. The well-organised society was supposed to look after the good of theindividual as a member of society as well as his good in heavenafter death and ultimate good (mok—˝Áa) beyond this cycle ofbirth and death. Such a system could have served its purpose,provided,

i) it kept avenues for spiritual and material progress open forall,

ii) it did not allow social stratification to fossilise and did notmake such stratification dependent on irrelevant consider-ations,

iii) it acknowledged the spiritual dignity of all individuals, andiv) was guided by the principles of equity and justice.

The supporters of VarnøıË—˜Árama dharma quote the Lord K–˝Á—˝ÁÃ˝Èawho said in the G¤ıÂtøıË CøıËturvarÃ˝ÈyaÀ˝fl mayøıË s–˝Á—˝Á“˝Âam


The Anomaly in Hindu Culture 1 3 7 1 3 8 ETHICS: An Anthology

gunakarmabibhøıËga—˜Áah. Commentators try to prove the inherentflexibility of the system by laying emphasis on the guÃ˝Èakarmapart of the saying. This may have been the case in a very distantpast when brothers from the family took up different profes-sions and came to be regarded as brahmins, k—˝Áatriyas or vai—˜Áyasaccording to their temperament and profession. But this state ofaffairs did not last long. Manu Samhita__that very old and au-thoritative treatise (date circa 800-900 A.D. for the latest editedversion drawing inspiration from a much earlier tradition aboutby a thousand years at least) which even today rules Hindupractice to a large extent, gives a different picture. I shall try toprove with the help of quotations from the Manu SamhitøıË howHindu practice fails to meet requirements mentioned above. Thisresults in an unjust and divided society which holds out falsehopes to the exploited. I shall confine myself to those prescrip-tions in the Manu SaÀ˝flhitøıË which, i) grant special prerogativesand extra protection to brahmins, ii) which support discrimina-tory behaviour towards studies, iii) which take away the basicrights of women and support discrimination against them.

III

BR§Ò‡HMINS: A brøıËhmin, according to Manu, is born thebest among all, and everything__his own belongings as well asthose of others, belong to him by right. He is the best of all andowner of all (MS, I. 96-100). Of course, the learned among themare better than the rest. Having the exclusive right (others arebarred) to study and teach the Vedas the brøıËhmin is the bestguide and law giver for all. Universal love was supposed to bethe mark of a brøıËhmin. He is to be amply rewarded and main-tained by the king and the community. As a learned class theBrøıËhmins made the best advisers to the rulers. The king re-warded the advisers by allowing a half share of his booties andgiving him special exemption even when he broke the laws ofthe land. This went to the extent of condoning even murderscommitted by brøıËhmins. A death-sentence could never be

passed against a brøıËhmin, the highest punishment was to banishhim, but even then he was allowed to carry away the whole ofhis property.

Na jøıËtu BrøıËhmaÃ˝ÈaÀÛfl hanyøıËt sarvapøıËpe—˝Ávapi sthita∆˝Ë |RøıË—˝Á“˝ÂrøıËdenÀ˝fl bahi—˝ÁkuryøıËt samagra dhanam ak—˝Áatam ||

(MS VIII, 380)

It was admitted that there were bad BrøıËhmins also__thieves,non-believers, addicted to vices, infected with vile disease, en-gaged in inferior professions like medicine and dramatics__dancing, singing etc. married to a woman from a lower class,charging fees for teaching the Vedas, admitting —˜Á”ıËdras as dis-ciples, torching other peoples' houses, administering poison toothers etc. Manu condemns them. But__and this is a big but__even such BrøıËhmins remained pure because they were thehighest of all by birth.

EvaÀ˝fl yadyapi ani—˝Á“˝Âe—˝Áu vartate sarvakarmasu |SanvathøıË BrøıËhmaÃ˝ÈøıË∆˝Ë p”ıËjyøıË∆˝Ë paramaÀ˝fl daivatam hi tat ||

One can go on continuing in this vein, but what has been said,I hope will, establish my point.

∑ÓfiπÒ‡DRAS : 'The ∑Ófi”ıËdras' sole duty is to serve the upper threeclasses without malice:

Ekameva tu —˜Á”ıËdrasya prabhu dharma samøıËdi—˜Áat |Ete—˝ÁøıËm eva varÃ˝ÈøıËnøıËm —˜Áu—˜Árumanas”ıËyayøıË ||

(MS 1/91)As devoted servants they deserve to be given,

Ucchi—˝Á“˝ÂamannaÀ˝fl døıËtavyaÀ˝fl j¤ıÂrÃ˝ÈøıËni vasanøıËni ca |PulakøıË—˜Á caiva dhøıËnyøıËnøıËÀ˝fl j¤ıÂrÃ˝Èa—˜Ácaiva paricchadøıË∆˝Ë ||

(MS 10/125)

The ∑Ófi”ıËdra had no right to the upanayana sanskøıËra or agnihotra.This means his initiation into all cultural activities was effectivelybarred. At the nøıËmakaraÃ˝Èam ceremony any pejorative wasdeemed good enough for a —˜Á”ıËdra, k–˝Ápanaka, døıËna, sø˜Ëbaraka etc.The —˜Á”ıËdra was not to amass wealth even when capable, lest he



insulted a member of an upper caste through pride of wealth.∑Ófi”ıËdras could not act as judges and the king was to see to it thatthe —˜Á”ıËdras never became a majority in his kingdom. Among the—˜Á”ıËdras some were døıËsa or slaves. The slaves could belong to anyof the seven class mentioned below:

i) DhawajøıËh–˝Áta: prisoners of war.ii) BhaktadøıËsa: enticed by the promise of food.iii) G–˝Áhaja or garbhadøıËsa: children of slave women forced to

pregnancy by the master.iv) Kr¤ıÂtadøıËsa: bought from a previous masterv) Datrima: donated by such a master in the hope of amassing

puÃ˝Èya or out of love.vi) Paitrika: slaves who remain so through generationsvii) Dan¬˝›adøıËsa: one who opts for slavery in lieu of some other

punishment.

These dø ı Ësas could not own anything. Whatever they earnedbelonged to their masters.

Of course Manu advises the masters not to quarrel with theservant. This was a covert admission of the usefulness of —˜Á”ıËdras inthe social system. Yet, however useful, they were not granted anydignity.

BrøıËhmanasya mukhamøıËsid vøıËhu røıËjanya k–˝Áta∆˝Ë |πÒ‡ru tadasya yad vai—˜Áyam padøıËbhyøıËÀ˝fl —˜Á”ıËdro'ajøıËyata∆˝Ë ||5

Such a person could not have any right to enter the learnedfold__for who then was to do the menial jobs ? This is parallel tothe argument against female education__who is to tend to themenial jobs if women also took to learning?

WOMEN : It is often claimed that women were highly respectedin our society. If providing them with jewels and costly apparelbut denying them the right to education, the right of any indepen-dent choice of profession, the right to property__even when earnedby her own labour__are marks of respect, then of course, womenwere highly respected. The main aim in life for a woman was toget married, preferably to a man of 30 when she was 12. The

bridegroom was to be chosen by her parents and all through lifeshe was to be under the control of men__father in her childhood,husband in her youth, son in the old age. Women according toManu are over-sexed and bent on chasing and misleading evenpure and learned men. Women should remain loyal to theirhusbands even when they were drunkards, adulterers etc. Afterthe wife's death, the husband could remarry but not the wife afterthe husband's death. Women, in short, were treated as commodi-ties, not as equal partners.

ATITHIS OR GUESTS : As for the dignity of the human soulthe prescription for the proper treatment of atithis or guests willshow how the poison of caste vitiated the humanity of both thehost and the guest. For instance, if a k—˝Áatriya was the guest of abrøıËhÀÛflin, the host should first of all feed the brøıËhmin guests andthen only the k—˝Áatriyas were to be fed. As for vai—˜Áyas and —˜Á”ıËdras,they were to be fed with the servants. They were not proper atithisbut were to be treated as objects of compassion.

As for varÃ˝ÈasaÀÛflkaras or cross-breds born of inter-caste mar-riages, they were to be treated as the most despicable of all fruitsof crime, specially if the female partner came from a higher caste.

Thus it was that a set of selfish guidelines codified by an inter-ested group for its own benefit, struck at the root of high spiritualprinciples to be found in the dar—˜Áana —˜ÁøıËstras. Politicians and law-givers have often been shrewd self-seekers ('self' here might meana whole group). But the Indian law-giver has gone one better. Hehas been seeking his own self-interest, and at the same time, mouth-ing hypocritical professions of loyalty to higher principles. ThusManu at the conclusion of his SaÀ˝flhitøıË says:

EvaÀ˝fl ya∆˝Ë sarvabh”ıËte—˝Áu pa—˜ÁyatyøıËtmøıËnanøıËtmanøıË |Sa sarvasamatøıËmetyøıË brahmabhyeti paraÀ˝fl padam ||

(MS 12/125)

If it is objected that such criticism is invalid and irrelevant, hav-ing reference only to past practices and prescriptions, today'ssociety being free from such discrimination and injustice, theanswer is that though there has been a regeneration and spiri-



tualization of our culture in recent times yet we should not for-get the vast rural population of India, still steeped in our ancientlaws and prejudices, taking them to be sacrosanct. Howeverunpalatable it might be we must admit that it was our contactwith the outer world, even though through colonial imperialismthat brought a change in our mental make-up and general atti-tude. We should now formulate a new ethics for the neo-Hindusociety which will shun the bad and retain the good in ourculture. Rabindranath and Vivekananda might give us properguidance.

NotesNotesNotesNotesNotes

1. G¤ıÂtøıË II 572. Ibid II 243. Ibid II 194. G¤ıÂtøıË (IV, 13)5. ∂̋flgveda (10.90.12)

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Jain Ethics

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