Japan’s ODA assistance scheme and Central Asianengagement: Determinants, trends, expectations
Timur Dadabaev a,b
a Graduate School of Social Sciences and Humanities, University of Tsukuba, Japanb Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology, University of Tokyo, Japan
A R T I C L E I N F O
Article history:Received 13 May 2015Accepted 1 October 2015Available online 31 October 2015
Keywords:ODAOVOP schemeWater Users’ AssociationCentral Asia plus Japan ForumJapanese Central Asian Diplomacy
A B S T R A C T
As demonstrated in this paper, Japan over the years has grown to become the leading ODAprovider in Central Asia (CA). ODA has served as a foreign policy tool and as the most sig-nificant tool for maintaining cooperation ties. Although the focus of Japan’s ODA assistanceover the years has been on East Asian countries, CA is growing to become another frontierfor more proactive Japanese policies.
The Japan-supported initiatives of recent years tend to favor more pragmatic cooper-ation schemes. As is exemplified by water-related assistance in Uzbekistan and support forlocal capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, Japanese assistance of a more focused character canbetter contribute to development both in these societies and in the region in general. Thesetypes of initiatives can successfully complement government-to-government assistanceschemes and Japanese investments into large scale projects. The focus on local communi-ties will also ensure that beneficiaries of the Japanese assistance projects will include notonly governmental institutions but also the general public at large.
Japan is searching for its own mode of engagement inCentral Asia. Japanese efforts to effectively engage CA coun-tries started with the time of CA states’ independence,including such initiatives as PM Ryutaro Hashimoto’s Eur-asian (Silk Road) Diplomacy (1996–1997), Keizo Obuchi’smission to Eurasia even before he became PM, JunichiroKoizumi’s Central Asia plus Japan Forum initiative (2004),visit by PM Koizumi to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2006,Taro Aso’s initiative called Arc of Freedom and Prosperity(2006) as well as CA tour of PM Shinzo Abe of October 2015(Dadabaev, 2013, 2014; Rakhimov, 2014).
Japan’s standing in the region has strengthened signifi-cantly in the decade after the collapse of the Soviet Unionin that Japan has provided large contributions, both in terms
of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and financial loansto regional countries.1 However, there is an understandingboth in Japan and majority of Central Asian countries thatthe potential for cooperation between Japan and CentralAsian countries is not being fully and properly realized. Theimpact of its assistance and cooperation programs often fallsshort of the expectations by Central Asian governments andthe general population.
What can Japan do to make its involvement and ODA as-sistance in this region more effective? What are the factorsthat influence these cooperation frameworks? These are thequestions that are examined in this paper.
This paper is divided into six main parts. First, it will de-scribe how the Official Development Assistance scheme
1 For a number of recent examples, see Dukha (2007), Uzreport.comBusiness Information Portal (2007), and Mamytova (2007). For a generaldescription and data, see Yagi (2007).
came to become a tool of Japanese foreign policy. The secondpart will then argue that Japan’s ODA was an important de-velopmental tool for engaging CA countries. The third sectionanalyzes how Japanese engagement is perceived by thegeneral public in the region. For this purpose, the socialpolling outcomes of the Asia Barometer for 2005 will becompared with a similarly worded poll that was con-ducted in 2015 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japanto demonstrate the public expectations regarding Japa-nese involvement in this region. The fourth part details theJapan Human Development Center initiative as a pillar ofJapan’s human capacity development scheme. And the lasttwo sections focus on Japanese initiatives which benefit bothgovernments and general public in Kyrgyzstan (One village–One product program) and Uzbekistan (Water UsersAssociation support). This paper concludes by hypotheti-cally suggesting more focused and narrower project-based approaches to engaging CA countries for greaterefficiency in Japan’s involvement in CA.
2. ODA as a tool of cooperation in Japanese foreignpolicy
In conducting bilateral andmultilateral cooperation, Japanuses Official Development Assistance as a tool that helpsJapan achieve its goals and simultaneously aims to assistdeveloping countries to achieve the tasks in their develop-mental agendas (see Bobrow & Boyer, 1996; Orr, 1990;Yasutomo, 1989-1990). Japan has grown from being acountry that was extended assistance in its post-WorldWarII reconstruction to becoming a top donor to developingcountries in the 1990s. In Japan’s becoming such a donor,the primary mission of the country’s assistance (aside fromits own interests) to developing nations was to offer bothfinancial stimulus for development and a model of devel-opment that would enable these countries to move fromthe ranks of economic assistance recipients to the ranks ofcountries that can sustain their development without ex-ternal financial assistance. Japanese interests were mainlyfocused in Asian countries because Asia was conceptual-ized as the region of primary interest to Japan. Therefore,its ODA assistance has also been mainly channeled to Asiancountries (see Togo, 2005, p. 317). The composition of Japan’sODA assistance has long consisted of the ratio of 70% bi-lateral aid to only 30% assistance channeled throughmultilateral institutions. Many observers and practitio-ners connect this ratio to the idea that the heavier emphasison bilateral aid works for both the donor and the recipi-ent, presumably creating a better image for the donorcountry and also offering a clearer picture of the donor cou-ntry’s goals (Togo, 2005, p. 331; also see Bobrow & Boyer,1996, pp. 105–6).
Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs divides the ODA de-velopment process into stages. The first stage is classifiedas system development, from 1954 to 1976, when thesystem of overseas assistance was set in tandemwithWorldWar II reparations. The second stage dates from 1977 to 1991and refers to systemic expansion, during which Japan as-sisted with basic human needs and grassroots projects. Thethird stage was the period of policy and philosophy en-hancement, dating from 1992 to 2002, when the ODA charter
was adopted, which prioritized certain sectors for assis-tance and identified multiple (bilateral, regional) levels ofassistance. This was the period when many policy makersemphasized the need for qualitative changes that symbol-ized moving away from simply providing large volumes ofODA assistance to offering assistance that would make a dif-ference in the development of Asian countries. The finalperiod in ODA’s development is the period when the newchallenges (human security, peace maintenance, terror-ism, etc.) appeared that required adopting the ODA schemes.This period dates from 2003 to the present.2 The ODA charterwas also renewed during this period, emphasizing Japan’sresponses to newly arisen issues. This period also demon-strated that as Japan attempted to adjust itself to newchallenges, it also attempted to redefine its internationalimage under conditions when its economicmight wasweak-ened (Government of Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, &Economic Co-operation Bureau, 2003).
The official start date of Japan’s ODA is October 6, 1954,when Japan became a part of the cooperation plan titledthe Colombo Plan, the first agreement of which concludedwith India in 1958.3 In addition, theWorldWar II defeat alsohad consequences for Japan in that it was obliged by theSan Francisco Peace Treaty to pay reparations for postwarreconstruction and development to the Asian countries thatsought these payments. Some of these reparations were paidin services and goods from the Japanese government, whichhad an impact on the way ODA assistance schemes werestructured in the following years. In particular, some of theaid assistance was referred to as “tied” assistance and re-ferred to the recipient’s obligation to purchase Japan-produced goods and services as a part of the assistancepackage (Togo, 2005, p. 320). In 1957, Prime Minister Kishireaffirmed Japan’s commitment to improving its ties withneighboring countries and assisting these countries toimprove their welfare. In addition, it was assumed that thismove would to lead to developing Japan’s economy(Matsuura, 1981). In the years when Japan’s economy re-corded high economic growth, the country established anagency that was primarily responsible for supervising Japan’sassistance and cooperation, namely, the Japan Internation-al Cooperation Agency (JICA), in 1974. JICAwas chargedwithsupervising and implementing technical cooperation andgrant assistance. Prime Ministers including Tanaka andFukuda also maintained high levels of ODA assistance toAsian countries. This culminated in the adoption of the so-called Fukuda doctrine in 1978, which pledged full supportfor ASEAN countries and significant financial assistance(Yasutomo, 1989-1990, p. 492).
In 1978, Japan also announced a plan to double its ODAin three years in the First Medium-Term ODA Target. DuringPM Ohira’s administration, the government announced its
2 For theMFA’s periods of classification, refer toMinistry of Foreign Affairsof Japan (n.d.).
3 The Colombo Plan for Cooperative Economic and Social Develop-ment in Asia and the Pacific was conceived at the CommonwealthConference on Foreign Affairs held in Colombo, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) inJanuary 1950 and was launched on 1 July 1951 as a regional intergovern-mental organization that would further the economic and socialdevelopment of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia; seehttp://www.colombo-plan.org/history.php.
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intention to play a more proactive role in multilateral in-ternational institutions and defined foreign aid as a majorinstrument for achieving this task. Since then, every PM ofJapan has entertained the idea of Japan’s becoming “an activecreator” (Bobrow & Boyer, 1996, p. 101). At the end of the1970s, theMinistry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) defined Japan’sinterests in providing ODA using rhetoric on the impor-tance of interdependence and preserving peace and stability.4
The use of Japanese economic aid has been limited to non-military purposes, and Japan has attempted to compensatefor its inability to contribute to international efforts throughmilitary means by providing economic assistance to thecountries in conflict-prone regions (Yasutomo, 1989-1990,p. 494). In 1988, the Takeshita administration announcedincreased Japanese ODA assistance (Yasutomo, 1989-1990,p. 491). This increase implied diversifying ODA recipientsand expanding regional representation in the Japanese as-sistance programs. This meant including larger countries inthe Middle East, Africa, South America and Oceania whileAsia still remained the main area of Japan’s ODA focus.Therefore, gradually, Japan’s ODA assistance graduallybecame a tool of Japan’s foreign policy representationoverseas.
In the mid-1990s, as if to reflect on the economic stag-nation in Japan’s economy, the country’s governmentconsidered reducing ODA economic aid. PM Hashimoto firstannounced reducing aid by 10% and called for additionalreductions and the need to reconsider the impact of eco-nomic aid for Japan’s economy.
Furthermore, in the years after 2000, the government ofPM Koizumi reconsidered the ODA charter while morestrongly emphasizing the importance of Japanese inter-ests in proving ODA assistance. The new ODA charter alsocalled for increased efficiency in Japan’s assistance schemes,which was important for both Japanese taxpayers and ODArecipients abroad.
Japan’s ODA is structurally divided into bilateral andmul-tilateral assistance provided to developing nations. Thebilateral assistance is normally granted by the Japanese
government to the governments of developing nations andis categorized into grants-in-aid with no interest rate, tech-nical assistance aid or grants-in-aid to NGOs. In most cases,this assistance is administered by the Japan InternationalCooperation Agency (JICA). Although Japan’s assistance todeveloping countries is decreasing because of the cou-ntry’s slow economic growth, it still remains among theworld’s leading powers that offer assistance to developingcountries.
There are three main categories of Japanese ODA assis-tance that are extended to receiving countries. As wasmentioned above, these are yen-based loans and grants, no-interest grants-in-aid and technical assistance.
The purpose of yen-denominated loans is to support eco-nomic and social infrastructure development in the receivingcountry. These loans have frequently been requested andused by receivers to construct airports, electricity-generatingstations, and dams. In terms of social infrastructure devel-opment, these loans have been used to finance medicaldevelopment projects as well as underground water infra-structure development and education projects.
No-interest grants-in-aid have been mostly used in theleast developed countries in the fields of medicine, povertyeradication, agricultural development and provision of basichuman needs.
The projects that have received no-interest grants-in-aid in Central Asia and the Caucasus have been mostlyrelated to these fields as well as to education and humandevelopment.
Technical assistance projects mostly consist of thosethat involve dispatching experts in a particular field fromJapan to a receiving country to build that country’s foun-dations of expertise in strategically important fields. Inaddition, these types of funds have also been used to trainvarious specialists in both recipient countries and Japan,and these funds have also been used to fund in-depth studiesof certain challenges faced by ODA receiving countries toidentify the underlying causes of these problems and es-tablish strategies for resolving them. In the region of CAand the Caucasus, these funds have been used to send Jap-anese experts to CA as well as to support legal, medical,energy and agricultural infrastructure development proj-ects and to support the activities of Japan centers in theregion (Table 1).
4 In 1978 MOFA published “The Current State of Economic Coopera-tions and its Outlook: The North-South Problem and DevelopmentAssistance” and in 1980 “The Philosophies of Economic Cooperation: WhyOfficial Development Assistance,” see Togo (2005, p. 334).
Table 1Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member-states’ assistance to countries of CentralAsian and Caucasus.
The percentage of assistance to CA countries in the overall assistance offered to all countries is in parentheses.Source: Compiled from the data made avail-able by theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2011 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Official Development AssistanceBy-country Data-book 2011 (Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/shiryo/kuni/11_databook/pdfs/03-00.pdf (last accessed on April 18, 2012).
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In the first years following the collapse of the SovietUnion, Japan indicated a considerable long-term commit-ment to helping Central Asian nations in their first steps ofnation-building. These were conducted within the frame-work of various Japanese initiatives in CA such as EurasianDiplomacy (1996–1997), CA plus Japan initiative (2004) andArc of Freedom and Prosperity (2006) (Dadabaev, 2013). Theassistance projects of the most significant impact were inthe fields of humanitarian relief, infrastructure develop-ment and technical assistance, which are partly based ongrant allocations and partly on policies to generate eco-nomic opportunity. These are the much-needed projects forproviding equipment (PCs, projectors, etc.) for local edu-cational institutions, making educational grants, and grantingtechnical assistance to agricultural producers, to name onlya few. The achievements of Japanese engagement in CA areoften considered striking and unquestionable, in terms oftheir necessity, their grant totals, and the number of proj-ects conducted.5 Japan has also contributed to the CAdevelopment through a substantial financial support forprojects ranging from infrastructure development relatedto the transport of goods and services, to tourism (Table 2).6
Japan has implemented a range of projects designed toimprove people’s standard of living through community de-velopment and support programs in themost impoverishedparts of the country. The primary purpose of these programs
was to empower local communities andenhance their profit-generating capacity in areas thatwere historically developedin those communities, as documented in Japanese Inter-nationalCooperationAgency (JICA)documents (Proekt, 2011).Such programs were based on amodel introduced in Japanitself, namely, “one village–one product” (Isson Ippin). Themain purpose of these activities is to identify the capacityof each participating community and a product each com-munity produces thatmay enjoy significantmarket demand.This process is typically advanced through a cooperation andco-funding scheme between JICA and local governments. Asa rule, the Japanese provide short-term training, informa-tionondistribution techniques, and somefinancial assistanceto facilitate production of an advantageous product that hasthe potential to generate profits and employment in eachcommunity. In the period since independence, several dozenKyrgyz communities have been involved in these types ofgrass-roots assistance programs. Examples include the fa-cilitation of rare-herb collection and marketing, honeyproduction and distribution, and the development of localcraft workshops. The schemes in the Issuk-kul Oblast (Prov-ince) of Kyrgyzstan are particularly well known.
In other cases, Japan provided much needed assistancefor Water Users Associations and their formation as de-scribed in the sections below, using partly the case ofKyrgyzstan and heavily building on empirical data ofJapanese involvement in Uzbekistan.
Japanese ODA is instrumental in all of the economic de-velopment and humanitarian projects.7 The Japanesegovernment defines as the primary purposes of ODA5 For an interesting analysis and outline of the achievements of Japa-
nese policy in Central Asia, see Yagi (2007, pp. 13–16).6 Japan primarily provided assistance with modernizing infrastructure
such as airports and related facilities. Some of these transportation fa-cilities remain inefficient and largely underused; see Ibragimov (2008).
7 For details on Japanese ODA and changes to it, see Söderberg (2002).Also, see Furuoka (2007).
Table 2Central Asian countries’ exports/imports to and from Japan.
(a)
Country Trade Japanese companiesin the country
Export to Japan Import from Japan Balance
2013 (in million yen) 2013 (in million yen) 2013 (in million yen)
aCurrent rate for calculation is 124 Yen = 1 US dollar.Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, SeifuKaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuou ajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Official Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014 (Region of CentralAsia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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disbursements the following: humanitarian assistance, in-creasing the economic interdependence of different markets,and bolstering environmental preservation. The main prin-ciples for disbursement eschewed the use of ODA formilitarypurposes or to promote conflict. Instead, it was primarilyaimed at economic development, with an emphasis on en-vironmentally friendly, sustainable development models;enhancing peace and stability around the world and tocontain and prevent the development of weapons of massdestruction; and promoting democratization, the transi-tion to market economies, and respect for human rights inthe recipient countries (Tables 3 and 4).
Nonetheless, several cautionary lessons can be drawnfrom Japan’s involvement in the CA region. First, on the basisof previous Japanese economic and humanitarian engage-ment, one can conclude that the improper identification offields of cooperation will cause Japanese involvement to beinefficient, irrespective of the volume of financial re-sources devoted to such projects. In addition, Japaneseengagement seems to have a larger and more significantimpact in the region when it aims to assist in developinglocal capacities, as opposed to emergency or short-term hu-manitarian assistance schemes. Capacity building (in formsthat generate benefits for individuals to an equal extent tothose enjoyed by governments) implies empowering localpopulations to generate wealth. Therefore, improving localcapacities for societal development is more efficient, becausethis approach also implies a degree of sustainability afterJapanese assistance ends. Humanitarian assistance proj-ects of the type Japan has provided (technical, medical, etc.)largely duplicate those run by international or nationalorganizations.8
There seems to be an understanding within JICA andother aid agencies of the Japanese government that prior-ity should go to projects that ideally help establishproduction or service cycles that local actors will beable to maintain on their own.9 Moreover, the projects
currently underway in the region reflect Japan’s limitedresources and a mutual awareness of the need to supportinitiatives that cannot be managed by local governmentsand non-governmental institutions alone.10
4. Expectations of Central Asia’s general public towardJapan
On par with Japan’s interests in the region, CentralAsian leaderships and public societies have considerableexpectations for Japan. In particular, leaders of regionalcountries would like to see the Japanese government moreactively encourage direct investment by Japanese corpora-tions and companies, especially in the fields of energyresource development and the transportation of these re-sources. In this sense, the interests of regional countriesand their Japanese counterparts coincide in that both sideswant to see an intensification of business and trade ties.Additionally, there is an expectation of Japanese supportthrough the Central Asia plus Japan scheme for strength-ening regional integration, creating a common market inthe region, and promoting regional cooperation in watermanagement. In return for Japan’s assistance, the leadershipsof Central Asian countries have continuously and consis-tently expressed their support for Japan’s bid for permanentUN Security Council membership and joined in support-ing Japanese concerns about the situation on the Koreanpeninsula.
These expectations from Central Asian leadership forJapan contrast with the general public’s confused attitudetoward Japanese initiatives in the region. On the one hand,
8 Author’s field research findings during the “Survey on Agricultural andRural Development based on Population Issues” in 2003 with the AsianPopulation and Development Association (APDA). Some results of the survey(without the interviews cited in this article) are available in printed formin Japanese and English. For the English-language version, see AsianPopulation and Development Association (APDA) (2003) and AsianPopulation and Development Association (APDA) (2002).
9 In an interview with a Japanese Embassy official in a Central Asiancountry, the author was informed that current Japanese government policyregarding the provision of technical assistance is that contracts are grantedon a competitive basis. Local contractors are given the same privileges as
Japanese contractors. It was also emphasized to the author that local con-tractors are preferred in certain situations, because using local suppliersmakes providing technical assistance easier and more sustainable in thelong term. The only concern in this case is that local contractors are fre-quently not completely familiar with the documentation procedures andproper formalities for participating in tenders for contracts and they donot always have the capacity to provide the necessary equipment. This in-adequacy puts foreign-based and Japanese companies in a better position,resulting in the situation referred to in the paper. Author’s personal com-munication, Embassy of Japan, March 2008.10 One example of these projects is the support for and training of themembers of the Water Users’ Associations in Uzbekistan. For details, seeJICA materials on Mizu Kanri Kaizen Projekto [Improvement of the WaterManagement Project] (Tashkent: JICA, 2011). The project is still active.
Table 3Japanese ODA offered to the countries of Central Asia on a bilateral basis by country (in million US dollars).
Source: Compiled from the data made available by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Seifu Kaihatsu Enjyo (ODA) Kunibetsu de-tabuku 2014 (Chuouajia/kokasasu chiiki) [Official Development Assistance By-country Data-book 2014 (Region of Central Asia and Caucasus)], Tokyo, Japan, available athttp://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/oda/files/000072593.pdf (last accessed on July 15, 2015).
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Japanese involvement is accompanied by relatively signif-icant public support among populations in Central Asia. Inautumn 2005, the University of Tokyo conducted the AsiaBarometer poll throughout Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, 40percent of respondents thought that Japan has had a goodor rather good influence on their country (10.4 percent, good;30.3 percent, rather good).
In Uzbekistan, the numbers who considered Japanese in-fluence to be good or rather good stood at 52.2 percent (15.9percent and 36.3 percent, respectively) (Figs. 1–4).11
However, Russia received ratings of 80 percent good orrather good in Kazakhstan (38.9 percent and 41.1 percent,respectively), and in Uzbekistan, Japan ranked third afterRussia (56.8 percent and 34.1 percent) and South Korea(28.6 percent and 40.1 percent). These higher ratings canbe attributed to Russia’s proximity and historical linkagesand the large resident minority groups of Russians andKoreans in Central Asia. In addition, aggressive Koreanindustrial and business expansion in the region, increas-ing labor migration to Russia and increasing economicties with China have added to the popularity and aware-ness of Central Asian countries about contributions totheir economic development from countries other thanJapan.
Nevertheless, in 2015, a similar poll conducted by theMinistry of Foreign Affairs of Japan found that CA can beconsidered a Japan-friendly region, with the majority of itspopulation feeling strong or relative closeness to Japan, asseen in Figure 5.
When asked what makes people feel close to Japan, theresponses mainly centered around notions of Japan’s beingattractive because of its level of economic development, itsculture and the high quality of goods produced there, as seenin Figure 6. Additionally, the country’s long Asian historyand its certain rules and cultural traditions that comparedwith those in CA also contributed to the feeling that therewas closeness between Japan and CA.
Among the qualities that attract the general CentralAmerican public toward Japan and the Japanese people, themajority of those who were asked highlighted personalqualities such as the Japanese being polite, neat in work,punctual and responsible as the primary image of thecountry (Figs. 6 and 7).
Mainly because of this sympathy toward Japan, the ma-jority of respondents considered their countries’ relationswith Japan to be good (Uzbekistan 79%, Tajikistan 56%,Kyrgyzstan 52%, and Kazakhstan 59%) or rather good(Uzbekistan 13%, Tajikistan 24%, Kyrgyzstan 23%, andKazakhstan 42%). Such views may represent awareness ofthe current state of affairs and also reflect wishful think-ing and the respondents’ desires to consider their countriesas being Japan-friendly (Fig. 8).
Although extensive Russian influence in the region is un-derstandable and to some extent even unavoidable, the
11 For the results of the Asia Barometer project regarding Central Asia,see Dadabaev (2004, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b). For the full 2005 data set,see Inoguchi (2008). For the 2003 data set, see Inoguchi, Basanez, Tanaka,and Dadabaev (2005).Ta
Fig. 1. What is the influence of the following countries on Kazakhstan (2005)?
Fig. 2. What is the influence of the following countries on Uzbekistan (2005)?
What is the influence of the followingcountries on Kyrgyzstan (2005)?
14.08.6
3.511.8
4.0
62.9
2.0 5.3 2.4 2.512.1
18.320.6 24.6
12.1
23.417.6
27.6
8.015.4
10.6 11.3
33.340.4
Good Rather Good
Fig. 3. What is the influence of the following countries on Kyrgyzstan (2005)?
30 T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
strong performances of China and South Korea and theirpopularity not only among the leadership but also amongthe general public can primarily be explained not throughtheir historical ties but largely through their economic
expansion into the region and their contribution in gener-ating economic wealth and lifting the population’s livingstandards. A number of plants that produce productsranging from automobiles to electric devices and house-hold appliances throughout the region have made a largeimpact on the public’s perception of these countries(Figs. 9, 10).
What is the influence of the followingcountries on Tajikistan (2005)?
19.0
38.344.8
65.6
10.82.6 2.1
13.621.5
4.510.311.5
28.8 29.4 27.3
13.5 11.4
40.9 34.237.725.6
33.635.540.0
Good Rather Good
Fig. 4. What is the influence of the following countries on Tajikistan (2005)?
Fig. 5. Do you feel closeness to Japan?Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/files/000076282.pdf.Method: Subcontracted polling conducted by Business Information, Socialand Marketing Research Center (BISAM) and Central Asia Company inrespect to 1200 people 18 years and older in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.
Kazakhstan
Uzbekistan
Kyrgyzstan
Tajikistan
Level of EconomicDevelopment 56 34 42 51
History and Culture 49 37 40 20Quality of goods 46 12 26 32Contribution to CA 5 25 3 20
The Japanese competitive advantage in comparison withRussia, China and other countries is that it is considered tobe impartial and that Japanese motivations to enter CA arenot connected to the neocolonial images of Russia or China.Because of its distance from the region and the general imageof the Japanese as beingmore honest and punctual and gen-erally contributing to CA development, the mood among thegeneral public toward Japan is more welcoming and friend-ly, as demonstrated by the following answers to a recentsurvey (Figs. 11, 12, 13).
Despite these expectations of the general public and thewelcoming attitude toward Japanese business, the pene-tration into CA by these companies has been slow. Thereasons for this slow penetration primarily rest with CA gov-ernments because they have been slow and not sufficientlyflexible to provide proper legal protection to foreign inves-tors, establish mitigation mechanisms and enact lawsregarding economic activities.
However, there are also additional factors behind thelow level of Japanese economic penetration, namely, thehesitancy of Japanese businesses, which can be explainedby the slow decision-making processes in Japanese
Fig. 13. Among the listed areas, which are the ones to which you wouldlike Japan to contribute to develop your country and region?
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corporate culture and government agencies, a lack ofrelevant information, and the CA countries’ lack of thetype of infrastructure Japanese companies typically expectwhen they invest abroad. This assessment is supportednot only by scholars but also by career diplomats whoare actively involved in implementing Japan’s CA policy(Kawato, 2008, p. 16). This slow penetration has meanttraining an excessivenumber of individuals in the Japa-nese language, but the limited employment opportunitieseventually produced doubts about the usefulness of thistype of education and spurred a decrease in interest. Oneresult was a vicious cycle for these programs because thelow efficiency levels and decreasing numbers of studentstogether discouraged Japanese authorities from beginningnew programs, often leading them to question the needfor Japan-focused or Japan-initiated programs in the CAregion.12
As was indicated in the previous section, the capacitydevelopment initiatives of the Japanese government serveas a good background for assisting Japanese companies toenter CA markets. As was explained in the section onJapan centers, these training centers and language courseswere initially established to bolster Japanese initiatives byencouraging local leaders to support, among other goals,more intensified economic interactions. However, the lackof economic ties between Japan and these states and thehesitancy on the Japanese side (in both economic circlesand the government) to play more active roles in thisregion make the political and cultural initiatives incom-plete. PM Abe during the tour of CA in October of 2015attempted to encourage Japanese businesses to partici-pate in CA economies as well as to secure support forthem from CA governments.
This again brings to light the importance of redefiningthe fields and how Japan participates in the region’sdevelopment. Functionalist approaches may be useful infurther enhancing Japan’s standing in the region. Suchthinking might help Japan in formulating regional pene-tration policies with higher degrees of effectiveness andthat would have a greater impact on the lives of thegeneral population. Such support for a more focused ap-proach to supporting CA capacity building can be seen inthe PM Abe-announced support, during his visit to CAin 2015, for several educational initiatives like those inTurkemistan on the Japanese participation in a buld-up ofJapan-supported University and in Uzbekistan on estab-lishment of Youth Innovation Center to be sponsored andrun jointly by Japan and Uzbekistan. The examples of theJapanese assistance through Japan Centers, through OVOPinitiative in Kyrgyzstan and Water Users Association inUzbekistan can be representative of the kind of activitieswhich are expected of Japan and which benefit CA generalpublic.
5. Japan Human Resource Development Centers ashuman capacity development tool
Another case involves Japan-initiated educationalprograms. The education provided by Japanese institu-tions is a very important part of the capacity-buildingprocess. One of the pillars of Japan’s educational activitiesin theregion is the Japan Human Resource DevelopmentCenters in these countries, which provide Japanese lan-guage classes and classes on Japan’s expertise in businessdevelopment and which assist local educational institu-tions in providing Japanese education and languagetraining.
In addition, the promotion of cultural interactions amongthe general public was considered a step toward smootherpolitical, economic, and social cooperation between Japanand its CA counterparts. One tool for fostering this mutualunderstanding was establishing cultural centers and reg-ularly holding cultural events in Japan and CA to introducethe cultures of these societies to one another. Just as certainJapanese educational institutions focus their studies on CA,the Japanese government established Japan Centers forHuman Development and supported Japanese Studies de-partments across CA. These were tasked with introducingJapanese culture and fostering the development of Japan-friendly attitudes among future policy makers andpractitioners in the region.
A typical example is the center established in Tashkentin August 2001. The Japan Center for Human Develop-ment in Uzbekistan was established based on an agreementbetween the governments of Uzbekistan and Japan thatconcluded in October 2000. The main purpose of this centeris to enhance mutual understanding and strengthen friend-ly relations between the two countries throughcommunicating a variety of information and introducingthe culture and language of Japan. The center’s activitiesfocus on Japanese language courses and assistance to variousinstitutions in language training. In addition, another im-portant facet is business courses that include Japanesetrainers with certain backgrounds and experience in cor-porate environments who are specifically invited from Japanto teach these courses. Other activities include computerliteracy classes for those with disabilities, including thedeaf and hearing impaired, events promoting cultural ex-change with the participation of Japanese center staff, suchas book sales, classes in Shodo, open seminars, film dem-onstrations, exhibition of toys from all corners of Japan,classes on ikebana, origami and karaoke, tea ceremonies,digital camera use, Japanese cuisine, and playing tradition-al instruments. Similar activities are held in Japan centersestablished within university premises in Almaty andBishkek.
The creation of the Japan centers was often in contrastto the similar institutions created by other countries thatwere interested in increasing their “soft-power” potential.These are exemplified by China’s Confucius Institute,German’s Goethe Institute, the British Council and othersimilar organizations. Although the essence of these insti-tutions’ activities may differ to some extent, their essentialgoals are the same, representing their respective culturesand countries and creating positive images tied to their
12 During an evaluation hearing on the Special Program for Central Asiancountries at the Japanese Ministry of Education, Science Sports and Tech-nology, the committeemembers questioned the necessity of such programsconducted in Central Asia, September 2011.
33T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
national interests. It should be noted that the Japan centers’Japanese courses became an important tool for increasingthe number of peoplewhowere proficient in Japanese, someof whomwere later recruited to become language trainersand teachers.
These centers often offer language training, an intro-duction to Japanese culture, and vocational training. Thelatter primarily focuses on business management coursesand promoting small- and medium-scale entrepreneurship.At the center in Tashkent, the admission is competitive: threetimes as many individuals apply as there are available spots.This is significant, especially because those who are admit-ted must pay a rather high fee of US$800–$1000 for a five-month course. These classes have produced 140 graduatesper year, totaling nearly 800 people.13
The centers have been very successful in their first decadeof operation, with the numbers of CA students fluent inJapanese, working for Japanese businesses, and attendingJapanese universities spiraling to unprecedented levels. Sincethe center in Tashkent was established, the average numberof monthly visitors (including both those who enrolled incenter courses and those who visited it to use the libraryand PC/video equipment) increased from 2331 in 2001 to5933 in 2011. The average number of visitors per year in-creased from 4662 in 2001 to a peak of 74,045 in 2007,which decreased to 62,395 visitors in 2010 but still remainshigh.14
In addition, the number of people in CA societies whoregard Japan as contributing to their countries’ develop-ment grew to the extent that Japanwas considered a leadingcountry in this respect, as demonstrated in the survey datain the next section of this paper. This evidence again dem-onstrates that Japan’s commitment to promoting mutualunderstanding with the people of CA has had a positiveimpact, thus contributing to developing Japanese soft powerin these societies.
However, Japan faces certain challenges in promotingits culture and language in CA. The first concerns the impactof the Japan Centers for Human Development, which hasexperienced a decline in public interest in recent years asexemplified in both Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. AlthoughJapan actively established and promoted the centers andsimilar institutions for many years, the applicability ofthe information received at these institutions is increas-ingly being questioned. This has arisen because Japanesecompanies and institutions that represent Japanese eco-nomic interests in CA are not yet as numerous as thosefrom other countries (China, South Korea, etc.).15 There-fore, the opportunities for the graduates of the Japan centers,Japanese language departments, and business courses toapply their knowledge while working with the Japanese
business community are rather limited. As noted above,Japanese foreign policy goals in CA and the region’s signif-icance for Japan are poorly defined, which is another factorthat is slowing Japan’s economic and political penetrationthere. As a result, many graduates of Japanese languagedepartments and courses at the Japan centers have endedup in local tourism industries, which benefited from anincrease in Japanese tourism in the initial years followingthe collapse of the Soviet Union. The graduates went toJapan to receive their education and found employmentthere or were forced to look for unrelated jobs. Those whowere educated in Japan often found themselves overquali-fied for local work, as exemplified by medical doctors whowere trained in Japan and then had to work in poorlyequipped CA clinics.
The issue of supporting community-based initiatives hasalways ranked high on the agenda of international donorinstitutions due to the assumption that support to the com-munities would have a direct impact on the well-being ofthe population. In this regard, Japan has also implementeda number of projects aiming to provide empowerment topeople at the community level to have a direct opportuni-ty to improve the livelihoods of people. As mentioned above,one such project is the “one village–one product” assis-tance scheme in Issyk region of Kyrgyzstan, which is anongoing project.
The role of JICA in the process of implementing theOVOP has been a complicated one. On the one hand, itwas the task of JICA to encourage and facilitate the processof creating OVOP participating groups. On the other hand,it was also the task of JICA not to over-patronize partici-pants so that participants feel a sense of responsibility forthe outcomes of this project. In addition, the final aim ofJICA was to accomplish the task of making these groupsself-sustainable after the end of the project.
The role of JICA in this project, therefore, was limitedto the following functions. First, JICA provided financialassistance necessary for setting up the production cycle.Second, JICA organized training that was deemed neces-sary for people who have never had any experience inorganizing production on their own. Third, JICA also pro-vided training for marketing skills and an initial marketingstudy for those who considered starting their own produc-tion so that these individuals could learn about the potentialsof establishing such productions cycles and groups. Forthose intending to launch a production of felt products,there was a special training devoted to the issues of pro-duction and packaging of such products. Additional trainingwas devoted to improving the quality of the products.These trainings were supervised by the instructors dis-patched from Japan. All of the trainings were conductedin the locations where the production cycles were to beestablished, providing both expertise and practical advice.JICA also assisted members in negotiating the possibilityof selling their products in the shops in Bishkek and otherareas.
13 Figures are based on information provided during the author’s inter-view with a high-ranking official at the Japan Center for HumanDevelopment in Tashkent on May 26, 2011.14 Figures are based on information provided during the author’s inter-view with a high-ranking official at the Japan Center for HumanDevelopment in Tashkent on May 26, 2011.15 Centers exist in Tashkent (Uzbekistan), Almaty (Kazakhstan) andBishkek (Kyrgyzstan).
34 T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
OVOP implementation chart
Regional Government and JICA
Kyrgyz Government
OVOP Producers
OVOP Producers
OVOP Producers
AO
OVOP Areas Expositions
Research shops
NGO Service Providers
Shops
MarketingAdvisory, technical and financial support
Cooperation and assistance
Source: “Yapon El Aralyk Kyzmattashuu Agenttigi”, 2010; further modified by Akbermet Nurmanbetova (2012).
In terms of management of the OVOP scheme, JICA’scounterpart in this project was the administration of theIssyk Kul region. For the purposes of managing this project,JICA published a manual for prospective and currentmembers, which explained the purposes of the OVOP im-plementation not merely as an economic enterprise but alsoas a community-building initiative, which is expected to leadto confidence building and enhancing initiative among com-munity members through joint economic activity.
The initial mission to define the needs and importanceof such a project was launched in 2003 in Kyrgyzstan in co-operation with the State Commission on Architecture andConstruction and the State Service of Geodesy and Cartog-raphy under the title “The Study on Integrated DevelopmentPlan of Issyk-Kul Zone.” The study was conducted from 2003to 2006 and aimed to reveal the prospects for developingthe Issyk Kul region’s potential in terms of both tourism andsustainable community development (JICA, 2006). As aresult, this study developed a proposal in which four mainareas were identified as crucial for sustainable develop-ment of the Issyk Kul region. These four areas werecommunity empowerment, agricultural rehabilitation andrecovery, development of touristic potential and invest-ment, and safeguarding environmental security.
Among these four areas, the one targeting communityempowerment was identified as a priority area for Japa-nese ODA support. Assistance to this initiative was extendedunder the overall goal of assisting economic growth-generating projects and was launched in 2006.
Introduction of the OVOP scheme in Kyrgyzstan was nota conceptually new practice for JICA. Prior to Kyrgyzstan,this scheme of community empowerment has been intro-duced in other countries, such as Thailand, Vietnam andCambodia. Initially, the OVOP was a scheme practiced in theOita prefecture in Japan. The main idea of the OVOP schemeis that communities would receive assistance in enhancing
their capacity to produce, develop andmarket products thatthey can successfully develop to generate profit and sustaintheir community life.
In rural Kyrgyzstan, the issue of providing support to pro-ducers in remote areas with non-existent or weak producerassociations and poor infrastructure and to local residentsin encouraging them to find and develop a product thatwould allow them to successfully sustain their lives is crucial(JICA, 2006). Therefore, this project attempted to organizemembers of certain communities in the Issyk Kul area intoproducers of certain goods for which local environment ortraditions serve as competitive advantage (JICA, 2006).
After the first steps of the project were completed andthese groups launched their products, 60 more groups wereadded as participants in the project. At the follow-up stageto the first phase of the project, the process of developingan Issyk Kul brand was launched. The brand was regis-tered with the national authority for brand registration, andits product line was expanded to include not only jams anddried fruits but also products from leather, wood and stone.In addition, to promote exports of these products, JICA con-ducted a competition among the OVOP projects conductedinternationally. As a result, the OVOP projects from Kyr-gyzstan and Kenyawere selected as partners for the Japanesebrand Muji, enabling them to merchandise their productsusing Muji’s network (Ryohin Keikaku Co., Ltd). In 2011,during the MUJI Christmas Market event alone, OVOP pro-ducers received orders for 10,000 items produced inKyrgyzstan. Since 2011, such events have been taking placeannually.
The second phase of the OVOP project in Kyrgyzstan isdesigned to last from January 2012 to 2015 with the par-ticipation of 60 groups that participated in the first phaseof the project. If successful, this example might lead tofurther enlargement of the project to include more partici-pating members. In some unsuccessful cases, however, the
35T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
project members left the OVOP project after they lost furtherinterest in it.
7. Japanese support to the Water Users Association(WUA) building strategy
One of the main points in the agenda of reforming anagricultural sector is the issue of how to address buying andselling land, which are prohibited in Uzbekistan largelybecause of the unresolved issue of water privatization. Oneof the initiatives undertaken to address these issues in Uz-bekistanwas the creation ofWater Users Associations, whichwere initially government-subsidized, as an alternative togovernment-runwater-distribution schemes. These schemesremain under heavy government control, but they are nowmore accessible to local water consumers, offer larger self-governance incentives for local agricultural producers andinvolve a higher level of local community participation inthe alleviation of water shortages. The overall aim is to de-crease water consumption in several stages. The first stagewould be accomplished through a reduction of unproduc-tive water losses (which currently cause at least 20% of thetotal water uptake). A later stage would be accomplishedthrough higher technologically advanced forms of irriga-tion, which require an improvement of financial capacitiesof both the Government and water users (Dukhovnyi, 2003,p. 17).
The final goal of creating Water Consumers Associa-tions is two-fold. First, it is to reduce the level of waterconsumption. Second, this measure is not simply to provideagricultural producers with water but rather to create aninstitution through which local producers themselves canfacilitate their own effective consumption and accumula-tion of excess water and accomplish the task of enrichingtheir own land.
By helping establish such a system, Japan aimed to stim-ulate local agricultural producers to use less water and atthe same time reduce the burden of governmental controlover this sector of agriculture.
One of the main problems of such associations is thatthey are critically under-funded. Small and medium-sizedagricultural producers such as farmers or dehkans are notyet able to cover all of the costs related to the installationof new technology, maintenance and extension of existingwater networks. They do not draw sufficient profit from theirproduction to make investments in the water distributionnetwork. As a result, these associations are effective in usingexisting water distribution networks but are not self-reliant because they still receive funding from thegovernment.
The joint Uzbek–Japanese project aimed to improvewatermanagement, starting with the pilot WUAs in the targetareas, by improving the training systems within the BasinIrrigation System Management (BISM) and the IrrigationSystems Department. As part of the project, the appropri-ate technologies for water distribution and maintenance ofirrigation and drainage facilities were designated to be dis-seminated to the pilot WUAs.
What was intended within the project was first tostrengthen the training system for WUAs in locations inwhich farmers have never experienced this type of system
of water management. Second, the project attempted tostrengthen the capacity of WUA staff members. Third, theprojected attempted to provide expertise not only for WUAoperations but also for maintaining the irrigation and drain-age facilities that were overlooked in the years after thecollapse of the Soviet Union.
The project started with the Tashkent Region (underChirchik-Ohangaran Basin Irrigation System Manage-ment), the Syrdarya Region (under Lower Syrdarya BISM)and the Djizak Region (under Lower Syrdarya BISM). Japancommitted to a 300 million Yen investment for these ac-tivities, providing 4 experts who were dispatched for long-term assignments and 6 experts who were dispatched forshort term assignments to oversee these activities. TheJapanese government also delivered equipment worth 70million Yen and provided for local operation costs worth110 million Yen and operational costs of 7 million Yen(161,825,000.00 Uzbek Som), exclusively for offices andfacilities at the Project Office at Tashkent and offices andfacilities for pilot WCAs.
The Japanese engagement, which aimed to develop grassroots capacity building for WUAs, has had both achieve-ments and shortcomings. First, the evaluation of the outputsof the project indicated that although the indicators set atthe beginning of the training have been achieved, the ca-pabilities of BISM and ISD staff have not yet been satisfactoryto the point of being able to run a WUA sustainably and in-dependently. In terms of tangible outcomes, the Project hasdeveloped training modules for the improvement of tech-nical and managerial skills of WCAs, with 7 textbooks and3 additional manuals in addition to preparing a number oftrainers. Although the training was conducted in 194 train-ing sessions and attended by a cumulative total of 570 staffof the pilot WUAs, the extent to which these individuals canapply their knowledge must be further assessed.
Second, the training for water measurement was suc-cessfully conducted, with participants learning how tomonitor water allocations and register water supplies fortheir respective WUAs. However, when checked for com-pliance with the training criteria for keeping records, manyof those who attended training did not keep the properforms once they returned from training to their duties, thusnecessitating further supervision of proper record keepingof water supplies in the cropping season.
Third, the training provided expertise in how to makeplans for irrigation and drainage maintenance and repairs.Although at the level of training, the majority of those par-ticipating displayed a fair level of ability to draft and properlydefine irrigation and drainage facilities repairs and main-tenance, these plans were properly implemented only in alimited number of cases. Nine of the 27 plans for canalrepairs were actually implemented and completed. Eightplans were only partially implemented, and 10 canals wereleft completely unattended.
Fourth, the goal of capacity building for maintenance ofWUA functioning was partially achieved. The indicatorsof the collection rate of water and other service fees andof the implementation of water distribution could not fullyreach the defined targets due to logistical problems relatedto the non-implementation of irrigation and drainagefacilities.
36 T. Dadabaev / Journal of Eurasian Studies 7 (2016) 24–38
Although the outcome’s success was limited, the overalleffect and importance of these activities can be character-ized as very high because this project provided expertiseto farmers that has never before been available to them. Inaddition, the indirect effect of the project is that the ex-pertise provided to farmers is projected to be transmittedto those who were not part of the training by word of themouth, thus multiplying the effect of the training.
There have also been positive effects from the Project onthe agricultural production and economic conditions of thefarmer beneficiaries and on the reduction of salinity prob-lems. There have been positive changes in terms of theorganizational and financial aspects of the pilotWCAs. Socialchanges were also noted by the beneficiaries, such as in-creased trust in WCAs by the members, closer relationshipswith ISD officials, and favorable recognition by and in-creased support from local authorities such as khokimiyat.Spontaneous diffusion of technologies such as flume repairto other WCAs in the vicinity was also reported. Thus, ahighly positive effect is expected from the Project. In fact,there was no negative effect of the Project reported or ob-served as of the time of the Evaluation.
8. Conclusion
As demonstrated in this paper, Japan over the years hasgrown to become the leading ODA provider in Central Asia.ODA has served as a foreign policy tool and as the most sig-nificant tool for maintaining cooperation ties. Although thefocus of Japan’s ODA assistance over the years has focusedon East Asian countries, CA is growing to become anotherfrontier for more proactive Japanese policies.
As described above, a number of Japanese initiatives havein general brought positive development to CA and are highlyvalued by the CA public. This appreciation is transmittedboth at official meetings and also frequently at the ordi-nary public level, as indicated by public survey data from2005 and from 2015. Yet as seen from respondents’ answers,there is tremendous potential for Japanese penetration intothe CA region, primarily through cultural and economic di-plomacy. Unfortunately, this potential is not yet being usedto accomplish this task. In this regard, more focused, tar-geted, functional approaches might hypothetically assist inmaking the Japanese engagement in CA more efficient andresult oriented.
The potential areas of cooperation both within the regionand with partners from outside of the region include stimu-lating economic development, resource development andutilization, and water-management policies and strate-gies. These areas in particular are considered to impact thelong-term economic sustainability and interstate securityin CA.
The Japan-supported initiatives also tend to emphasizenarrower, more specific approaches to cooperation bothwith and in Central Asia. As was outlined above, theseprimarily include cooperation in energy resourcetransportation and production as well as support forcommunity-based water, educational and sustainabledevelopment-related projects. This is also a clear move infavor of more pragmatic cooperation in this region. As isexemplified by water-related assistance in Uzbekistan and
support for local capacity building in Kyrgyzstan, Japa-nese assistance of a more focused character can bettercontribute to development both in these societies and inthe region in general. These types of initiatives can suc-cessfully complement government-to-government assistanceschemes and Japanese investments into large scale proj-ects. The focus on local communities will also ensure thatbeneficiaries of the Japanese assistance projects will includenot only governmental institutions but also the generalpublic at large.
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