Jared E. Stolz Disciplinary Opinion

8/11/2019 Jared E. Stolz Disciplinary Opinion

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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERS

Disciplinary Review Board

Docket No. DRB 13-331

District Docket No. XIII-

0022E

IN THE MATTER OF

JARED E. STOLZ

AN ATTORNEY AT LAW

Decision

Argued: January 16, 2014

Decided: March 18, 2014

Timothy B. McKeown appeared on behalf of the Dis

Ethics Committee.

Respondent waived appearance for oral argu ment.

To the Honorable Chief Justice and Associate J

the Supreme Court of New Jersey.



recommendation for discipline greater than an admonitio

1:20-15(f)(4). The DEC’s recommendation for an admo

based on respondent’s violation of two counts o

(failing to treat with courtesy and consideration a

involved in the legal process), RPC 8.4(a) (violating

RP~C 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

misrepresentation), and RP~C 8.4(d) (conduct prejudi

administration of justice), which respondent stipula

hearing before the DEC. However, the DEC found n

convincing evidence to support the charges in the thi

the complaint: RPC 3.2 (presumably, by failin

reasonable efforts to expedite the litigation), RP__~

(knowingly making a false statement of material fact

tribunal), RP__~C 3.3(a)(5) (failing to disclose to the

material fact knowing that the omission is reasonably

mislead the tribunal), and RP__~C 4.1(a) (in representin

knowingly making a false statement of material fact

third person). Therefore, the DEC dismissed those cha

For the reasons set forth below, we determine t

three-month suspension on respondent for both the



charges, which, with the exception of RP__C 3.2, shou

been dismissed.

Respondent was admitted to the New Jersey bar i

the relevant times, he maintained an off ice for the

law in Bridgewater. He has no disciplinary history.

The ethics charges against respondent arose

representation of the defendant in a Superior Cou

captioned Stephen H. Joseph v. Bay State Insuranc

which was instituted as the result of Bay State’s h

the plaintiff’s claim for damages caused by a fi

residence. The plaintiff was represented by the

Robert Feltoon, who was assisted by his associate

Crawford. Respondent represented Bay State.

The DEC presided over a two-day hearing, durin

received testimony from respondent, his adm

assistant, Lilly Shebey,

I

Feltoon, Crawford, and re

character witness, attorney Jay Lavroff.

The t

established that there was a great deal of animosi

I Throughout the testimony, Shebey was referred

Bekir, her surname at the time the events giving ri



Feltoon and respondent, which was manifested thro

course of the litigation.

Before the first witness testified at the DE

respondent stipulated the allegations in counts one

the complaint. According to count one, at respondent

he and Feltoon served motions and discovery on each

communicated with each other electronically (via em

fax, and electronic media ). Respondent stated to F

he preferred this practice, because it reduced th

paper.

According to the ethics complaint, in response t

legitimate inquiries, comments, or questions to

during the course of the litigation, responden

following emails and fax to Feltoon on the following d

Don’t feel you have to email me daily an

let me know just how smart you are.

(November 3, 2009 email).

This will acknowledge receipt of you

numerous Emails, faxes and letters ...

In response thereto, Bla Bla Bla Bla Bl

Bla. (November ii, 2009 fax.)

Did you get beat up in school a lot?,

because you whine like a little girl.



I’d send you the delivery receipt, but I

put both your email addresses in my ’Junk

Mail’ box, because that is all I get from

you, JUNK. (Aug. 16, 2010 email)

What’s that girlie email you have.

Hotbox.com or something?

Sept 28,

2010

email).

[C¶I0.]

2

According to the second count of the complaint, on D

16, 2010, Feltoon and respondent appeared before the Ho

Michael J. Kassel, J.S.C., to argue various motions. Aft

motions were heard, counsel discussed the wording of the

in Judge Kassel’s chambers. On the way out of the j

chambers, respondent told Feltoon never to threaten him w

ethics complaint again. At the same time, physical c

between respondent and Feltoon occurred, causing Feltoon

to respondent, Don’t touch me, or words to that e

Respondent replied, Why would I want to touch a fag like

Both counts described respondent’s conduct as discou

and disrespectful and alleged that, by such conduct, resp

had violated RP__~C 3.2 and RPC 8.4 (a), (c), and (d).

2 C refers to the formal ethics complaint, dat



With respect to these charges, respondent s

following, at the DEC hearing:

I sent these five E-mails, I sent E-

mails to Mr. Feltoon as set forth in th

complaint that said don’t feel you have t

E-mail me daily, and let me know just ho

smart you are in November. I sent an E

mail, this will acknowledge receipt of you

numerous E-mails, faxes and letters. I

response thereto, blah, blah, blah, blah.

This is November 2009. I sent it. I sen

it to him. I intentionally sent it. It wa

venomous. I sent the E-mail four month

later, Did you get beat up in school a lo

because you whine like a little girl.

My apologies to the panel for readin

these, and to everybody in the room, and t

the court reporter. Seven months later

Why don’t you grow a pair. The fifth one

I’d send you a delivery receipt -- thi

was both to Mr. Crawford and to Mr. Feltoon

I’d send you a delivery receipt, but I pu

both your E-mail addresses in my junk mai

because that’s all I get from you, junk.

And then, finally, in September, What’s th

girlie E-mail you have, hotbox or something

with regards to problems sending E-mails.

This is inexcusable. I don’t have a

answer. It doesn’t matter. What happene

before, why I sent it. It wa

unprofessional, it was undignified, I was

wrong, it was not courteous, it was not --

and, I’m

sorry, I can’t

remember the

wording.

I want to track because this,

essentially, is an admission with regards t



Coming out of court several months --

year later, I called, and, again,

apologize, I don’t want to use the languag

over and over again. I called him a fag

It was the first thing that came to my mind

I have never said anything like that before

so forget about attorneys, but to people

It was not intended as a specific remark t

Mr. Feltoon. It was wrong. It wa

horrible. All I can do is say that I’

sorry, I should have said I’m sorry earlie

to Mr. Feltoon. But, as you’re going t

see, the end of this litigation did not en

well for me. They had me removed -- Mr

Feltoon had me removed and made a witness,

and that was the last of my involvement i

the case.

[IT13-14 to IT15-8.]

3

The third count of the compla int, which was the

the disciplinary hearing, alleged that, on October

Feltoon filed a motion seeking, in part, an order

that the rent Plaintiff was then paying for temporar

and the cost of renting furniture for that tempo

constituted reasonable additional living expenses as

law under the homeowners policy at issue. The

accompanied by transmittal letter s to the clerk’s of

3 IT refers to to the transcript of the Augu

ethics hearing.



Judge Kassel, a proposed form of order, a b

certifications of the plaintiff and Feltoon. On that

Crawford served the papers via five separate em

attachments.

Crawford testified that, prior to sending each

left a voice mail message for Shebey, informing he

motion would be served via email. Each of the emai

Shebey requested that she confirm receipt of both th

the attachments. After Crawford sent each email,

letter to Shebey confirming that he had sent the

requesting that she immediately advise either him or

she had not received them. On October 19, 20

confirmed receipt of all five E mails sent by Crawfor

Crawford also emailed the same five emails and d

respondent. Respondent never stated to Crawford that

receive them. Respondent did not object to serv

papers via email and Crawford did not receive any n

notices.

Seven weeks later, respondent submitted an op

the plaintiff’s motion, as well as a cross-motion o



hearing, Crawford conceded that, after respondent

his opposition papers, that he had not rec

certifications, Crawford did not provide him with co

Crawford did not believe respondent’s claim, part

light of the multiple references to the certificati

brief accompanying the plaintiff’s motion, and r

failure to ask for them. Rather, Crawford submi

court a reply certification, to which he had attache

the initial emails and faxes and the follow-up

respondent.

On December 16, 2010, the motion and cross-m

argued before Ju dge Kassel. The plaintiff’s motion

based on respondent’s claim that he had not re

supporting certifications providing the factual ba

relief sought from the court and, therefore, was

address the contents of the certifications in his

The following exchange took place before J udge Kassel

MR. STOLZ: Your Hono r, is the -- is th

inventory that Mr. Feltoon claims that h

sent us part of the moving papers? Becaus

I didn’t have the certifications.



chance to say, no, it’s no good, or it’s to

much. Give Bay State a chance to look a

it.

THE COURT: Yeah, but did you have -- di

you have Mr. -- the brief prepared by Mr

Feltoon on behalf of Mr. Joseph that sough

summary judgment on the issue of th

furniture expenses that are now bein

referenced to?

MR. STOLZ: I have a brief. It’s a 2

page brief, but it doesn’t have a

attachment for this additional furniture.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. STOLZ: And in this -- let me jus

see -- the certification that came -- tha

we had asked that be sent by regular mail

because some of their submissions wer

either put in the junk, or spam, or couldn’

be opened, I don’t see that

in this

submission. So, Judge, if you --

THE COURT: All right. Well --

MR. STOLZ: -- g ive us ten days.

THE COURT: Hold on. Hold on. Mr.

Feltoon, was the -- these new furnitur

bills sent to Mr. Stolz by e-mail?

MR. FELTOON: They were originally sen

to him by e-mail, and I asked him t

respond, and he refused. He said that the

-- they were not going to respond. I have

response to that.



pursuant to an agreement I had in writin

with his office, that we would agree t

exchange things by e-mail?

MR.

ago.

STOLZ: Which we withdrew a year

MR. FELTOON: And, so, I sent the entir

package to him. Your Honor has all of the

e-mails, including his office’s confirmatio

that he has them all.

As Your Honor pointed out, my brief

goes on for pages talking about Mr. Joseph’

certification. Mr. Stolz admits he had tha

brief on October 15th, and now he has the

audacity for two months later to stand here

and tell Your Honor he still doesn’t have

it.

He’s never asked me for it. I’ve never

mailed it to him. It’s just outrageous tha

he would have my brief, which mentions

Feltoon’s certification, Joseph’

certification, and then refused to respon

by saying I don’t have it, when he’s neve

asked.

THE CO URT: Well, let me ask Mr. Stolz.

Mr. Stolz did you put in your oppositio

brief that you were concerned that yo

didn’t have the certification -- you didn’

have some certifications that detailed th

furniture in question?

MR. STOLZ: I don’t know what the

certification -- how am I sup posed to say -

I’m sorry, Judge. How am I supposed to sa

I don’t have a certification that says this



certification, and says that this -- thes

$2,400 a month in furniture is at issue

then at least you’re on notice that you -

that you don’t have the certification tha

contains that information.

MR. STOLZ: Yeah. I think it’s the -- th

first counter statement. We do not [sic

either certifications [sic].

THE COURT: Hold on. Where -- well,

since the two of you have disagreed on s

many things that I’m not intimately familia

with in terms of the back, and forth, wher

-- where is that?

MR. STOLZ: The first page of the brief.

THE COURT: Right. Yeah.

MR. STOLZ: Plaintiff does not se

forth --

THE COURT: What -- what paragraph? Wha

MR. STOLZ: First paragraph.

THE COURT: plaintiff does not se

forth a statement of facts. I see that

Right. Where is there something that say

you don’t have the -- the --

MR. STOLZ: Three.

THE COURT: -- relevant informatio

concerning the furniture rental?

MR. STOLZ: No, Ju dge, I -- I didn’t sa



THE COURT: Well, where

that?

-- where is

MR. FELTOON: It’s the top of Page 3

Your Honor.

MR. STOLZ: No certification

response.

THE COURT: Top of Page 3? All right.

MR. FELTOON: Point Number 4 --

in

THE COURT: As in Count 7, additiona

living expenses. No certification provid

with regards to the motion.

MR. STOLZ: Well, here, I actually di

say it.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Feltoon, i

was -- I’m not going to disentangle why i

was the case, but it was -- it was briefed.

I’m going to order right now -- I’

going to sign the order as to what Bay Stat

previously paid on, and you can re-file a

to the new amount, and it’s incumbent upo

Mr. Stolz to respond accordingly.

I would request that both of you sen

everything formally, certified mail, et

cetera, et cetera.

[Ex.P5,p.132,1.14 to Ex.P5,p.137,1.5.]

4



According to the ethics complaint, r

representations to the court that he had not be

with the plaintiff’s certification were knowingly

to this issue, Shebey testifi ed that, after she had

attachment to Feltoon’s emails, she had saved it

drive on the office computer system and, it seems,

original in respondent’s incoming mail bin and an

directly into the file. Although Shebey could not

specifics of this particular motion, she testifie

general office practice, when handling motions.

practice to make sure that the office had actuall

attachments to emails. If something was missing, she

the attorney who had sent it to respondent.

According to Shebey, respondent never asked h

certifications and never told her that they were corr

At the DEC hearing, respondent stipulated t

received the five emails from Crawford:

I have not maintained from the openin

throughout this case that I -- that m

office did not get these five E-mails, tha

they didn’t get the attachments, that th

attachments were not put in the pleadings



was going on for those two months. Not

didn’t get them. I didn’t say to the cour

they were corrupted, I didn’t get them.

said I don’t have the certifications, giv

me ten days to look at them.

That’s what

the transcript says.

[IT141-17 to IT142-3.]

Although respondent admitted, at the ethics hea

he had received the certifications, he testified that

seen them at the time that he had sat down to p

opposition to the motion and the cross-motion. He

that he had not lied to the court.

Respondent testified that, between the time that

was delivered and the date of oral argument, he was o

the office. As stated previously, the motion was

October 15, 2010. The opposition and cross-motion w

on November 30, 2010. Respondent testified that

Ireland on a golf trip with his father, from October

2010, and in Punta Cana with his family, from Novembe

2010. He surmised that he had not worked on the opp

cross-motion until November 29, 2010. In addition, h

that the plaintiff’s motion was just one of ten-



Respondent explained that he had not requeste

the certifications from Crawford or Feltoon because

believe that the documents were important. Instea

assumed it [sic] was [sic] saying the same thing ov

again.

Respondent testified that, from December 1 to

was in Palm Beach.

s

At that point, he had a trial un

15, 2010. Therefore, he was not able to look at the

reply brief, which included the certifications, unti

before oral argument before Judge Kassel. Moreover,

his main concern was the summary judgment mot

plaintiff’s bad faith claim against Bay State, not t

payment for additional expenses.

Respondent continued:

I neglected my files, I played too muc

golf, I went to Punta Cana with my famil

all within two months. Was it wrong?

don’t know. This is the lifestyle that I’v

chosen, the practice I’ve chosen because

worked at Methfessel & Werbel for 15 year

in a cubical [sic] rising to managin

director. I didn’t want that anymore.





Attorney Jay Lavroff, a personal friend an

colleague of respondent, testified as his charact

Lavroff attested to respondent’s reputation as a s

honest, straightforward, meticulous practitioner,

zealous advocate, someone who plays it straight.

Lavroff served as chair of the District XII Ethics C

recommended respondent to serve on that committee.

Based on respondent’s admission to the alle

counts one and two of the ethics complaint, the DEC

he had violated RPC 3.2 and RPC 8.4(a), (c),6 and (d).

With respect to count three of the complaint, t

as follows:

After a review of the testimony, which wa

exhaustive with no less than 4 witnesse

testifying, it cannot be said that Mr. Stol

intentionally misrepresented a fact to th

tribunal given his plausible explanatio

regarding the alleged statement, take

together within the context in which it wa

made and given the circumstances, and a

6 The complaint does not identify which sta

respondent were

dishonest, fraudulent, dece

misrepresentations. Presumably, the complaint in

encompass all of

the pejorative and discriminator

within this charge.



defined within the meaning of RPC 3.2, 3.

(a)(5) and 4.1(a).

23. While we acknowledge that Mr.

Stolz is a sole practitioner, has a ver

busy schedule including various, multipl

out of state trips, we do not find that thi

representation on a matter of additiona

living expenses would warrant an intentiona

misrepresentation. It defies logic, an

appears that Mr. Stolz was perhaps sloppy,

or less than diligent in retrieving o

reviewing the email which his offic

undoubtedly received from grievant

However, what is most troubling is that th

grievant and respondent clearly were no

working to advance a cause in litigation,

but to show the other person up throug

certain statements. In fact, Mr. Stol

twice represented to the Court that he di

not have the Certification, once in writin

and once at oral argument. There was a tim

lapse in between those two circumstances

However, rather that resend th

Certification, Grievant sent him

confirmation sheet that it was sent. Again,

it did not appear by a clear and convincin

standard that an intentiona

misrepresentation occurred based upon th

facts and testimony. Possibly neglect o

lack of diligence,

but not

intentional

misrepresentation.

[HPR§IV¶22-¶23.]

7

7 HPR refers to the hearing panel report, dat



For these reasons, the DEC recommended the impos

admonition on respondent.

Following a de novo review of the rec ord, we ar

that the DEC’s finding that respondent’s conduct wa

is fully supported by clear and convincing evidence.

The allegations underlying the charges in the

second counts of the complaint, which respondent

clearly and convincingly establish that he violated R

8.4(a), and RPC 8.4(d). The sarcastic and sophomori

made in the emails and fax set forth in count one dem

failure to treat Feltoon with courtesy and consider

required by RP___~C 3.2. The wildly inappropriate

discriminatory -- comments set forth in count

demonstrated a lack of courtesy and consideration.

Moreover, even though respondent’s behavior was

written communications to Feltoon only (count one) an

communications outside the presence of anyone else (

such conduct violated RP___~C 8.4(d) because, as stated

in In re Vincenti, 114 N.J. 275, 281-82 (1989),

[C]onduct calculated to intimidate an



countenanced. The adversary system depen

on the effectiveness of adversary counsel

Our rules of procedure are designed in larg

measure to bring to litigation adversarie

who have an equal opportunity and comparabl

ability in the representation of opposin

parties in order to assure a just result

Thus, the undue and extraneous oppressio

and harassment of participants involved i

litigation can impair their effectiveness

not only as advocates for their clients, bu

also as officers of the court. An attorn

who consciously and intentionally engages

such conduct perverts advocacy. Suc

conduct redounds only to the detriment o

the proper administration of justice, whi

depends vitally on the reasonable balanc

between adversaries and on opposi

counsels’ respect, trust, and knowledge o

the adversary system. There cannot b

genuine respect of the adversary syste

without respect for the adversary, an

disrespect for the adversary system bespeak

disrespect for the court and the prope

administration of justice.

In that case, like here, the attorney had enga

acts of misconduct that had taken place, arguably,

However, the fact that the misconduct did not take

courtroom or during a proceeding or in the presence

or court personnel or parties or witnesses made no d

the Court in Vincenti. It makes no difference he

Respondent’s conduct was a violation of RPC 8.4(d).



Although respondent’s inappropriate comments a

led to a charge of RP___~C 8.4(c), in counts one and t

is not really applicable, under the circumstances.

falsity of the statements really is not the issue.

is the nature of those statements (offensive and dis

that makes them unethical.

under the RPC 3.2, RPC

Thus, these acts fall mo

8.4(a), and RPC 8.4(d)

Accordingly, we dismiss the RPC 8.4(c) charge as inap

As to count three, we are unable to agree wit

finding that there is no clear and convincing ev

respondent knowingly made a false statement of mate

either Judg e Kassel (RPC 3.3(a)(i)) or to Feltoon (

The same is true of the charge that respondent ha

disclose a material fact to the judg e (RPC 3.3(a)(5))

With the exception of RPC 3.2, and contrary t

finding, the clear and convincing evidence estab

respondent violated the RPCs charged in the third

complaint. Specifically, respondent testified

frequently out of the offic e at critical times and

periods, between service of the motion and the pre



argument. Nevertheless, when respondent answered Jud

questions about his knowledge of the certifications,

never stated that he was out of the office and, the

have overlooked them. Rather, he insisted, at ora

that [n]o certification [was] provided to him or

not have it. He requested that the judge grant hi

to give his client a chance to look at it.

Although it may be true, as the DEC obser

respondent had no reason to lie about the non-rece

certifications, his actions were so contrary

reasonable attorney would have done, if confronted wi

situation, that his story cannot be believed. Wh

would read both a motion, asking that the court order

to pay money, and a supporting brief, st

certifications were attached, and not do anything to

or obtain the certifications before proceeding

written opposition to that motion? Yet, even in t

Feltoon’s reply to respondent’s opposition, which

stated that the certifications were, in fact, sent to

and received by his office, respondent made no effor



He did not ask his secretary about th

certifications. He did not look for them, either in

K drive or in the file. He did not request the ad

the motion, which, admittedly, was likely imposs

eleventh hour. Instead, respondent simply did

certifications, assum[ing ] that the plaintiff was

same thing over and over again.

Moreover, how was respondent even able to submit

to the motion if he was unaware of the basis for

which would have been set forth in the certificati

view, he was indeed able to prepare written opposit

he did have the certifications. He just did not

time to devote sufficient attention to the matter

multiple vacations and the multiple motions (ten to

his estimation) that required a response on the same

in the Joseph case. So, he did what he coul d and dec

more time by claiming that he did not rec

certifications.

In short, respondent’s behavior could not hav

result of either inexperience or ineptitude. B



certifications, a violation of RP___~C 3.3(a)(i), RPC 3.

RPC 4.1(a). However, the record does not suppor

that, by seeking to gain more time to reply to t

respondent intended also to delay the litigation. Th

3.2 charge must be dismissed.

There remains for determination the appropriate

discipline to be imposed for respondent’s violation s

(in two contexts), RPC 3.3(a)(i), RPC 3.3(a)(5), RPC 4.

8.4(a), and RP___~C 8.4(d).

Attorneys who, in violation of RPC 3.2,

disrespectful or insulting conduct to persons invo

legal process, including clients and judges, are s

broad spectrum of discipline, ranging from an admo

term of suspension. Se__~e, e.~., In re Gahles, 1

(2005) (admonition imposed on attorney who, during or

on a custody motion, called the other party crazy,

artist, ....

a f r a u d , . . . a p e r s o n w h o c r i e s o u

and a person who belongs in a loony bin; in mit

considered that the attorney’s statements were n

intimidate the party but, rather, to acquaint the n



Matter of Alfred Sanderson, DRB 01-412 (2002) (

imposed on attorney who, in the course of representi

charged with DWI, made discourteous and d

communications to the municipal court judge and to t

court administrator; in a letter to the judge, t

wrote: How fortunate I am to deal with you. I lose

haven’t had [sic] made. Frankly, I am sick and ti

pro-prosecution cant; the letter went on to say,

lost on me that in 1996 your little court convicted

of the persons accused of DWI in Salem County. The

for this abnormality should even occur to you; in

we considered the attorney’s decades of service as

the bar and the fact that his conduct was motivated

representing his client); In the Matter of John J.

96-094 (1996) (admonition for attorney who engaged

exchange with a judge’s secretary; the attorney stip

the exchange involved loud, verbally aggressive, i

obnoxious language on his part; we noted that, at

the incident, the attorney had been admitted to prac

only one year and that, in the five years since the



who told the wife of a client in a domestic relat

that she should be cut up into little pieces . . .

and sent back to India; and in a letter to his

accused her client of being an unmitigated liar, t

prove it and have her punished for perjury, and thr

adversary with a Battle Royale and ethics charges;

factors included that the attorney had an otherwise

forty-year ethics history, that he recognized that

had been intemperate, and that the incident had occ

years earlier); In re Geller, 177 N.J. 505 (2003)

imposed on attorney who filed baseless motions a

judges of bias against him; failed to expedite litig

treat with courtesy judges (using profanity to chara

judge’s orders and, in a deposition, referring to tw

corrupt and labeling one of them short, ugly and

his adversary ( a thief ), the opposing party ( a

lies like a rug ), and an unrelated litigant (t

asked the judge if he had ordered that character wh

courtroom this morning to see a psychologist ); fail

with court orders (at times defiantly) and with



serious charges against two judges without any reason

made a discriminatory remark about a judge; an

certification filed with the court Fraud in Fre

mitigation, the attorney’s conduct occurred in the co

own child-custody case, the attorney had an unblemis

two-year career, was held in high regard pers

professionally, was involved in legal and community

and taught business law); the attorney also violat

RPC 3.4(c), RP__~C 4.4, RP_~C 8.2(a), RP~ 8.4(d), and RPC 8

re Milita, 177 N.J. 1 (2003) (reprimand imposed on a

wrote an insulting letter to his client’s former pa

complaining witness in a criminal matter involving

an aggravating factor was the attorney’s prior

suspension for misconduct in criminal pretrial negot

for his method in obtaining information to assi[st a c

re Lekas, 136 N.J. 514 (1994) (reprimand; while th

conducting a trial unrelated to her client’s matter

sought to withdraw from the client’s representatio

judge informed her of the correct procedure to follo

her to leave the courtroom because he was conductin



bench during the trial; ultimately, the attorne

escorted out of the courtroom by a police officer; t

struggled against the officer, grabbing onto the s

was being led from the room); In re Stanley, 102 N.J.

(reprimand; attorney engaged in shouting and other

behavior toward the court in three separate

attorney’s languag e, constant interruptions, arrogan

to rulings displayed a contumacious lack of respec

excuse that the trial judge may have been in er

rulings. ; we took into account, on the one han

attorney’s misconduct was not an isolated incident;

hand, we observed that the attorney had been a membe

for more than thirty years, with no prior history,

sixty-seven years old and retired from the practi ce

that there was no harm to a client or party as the re

misconduct); In re Mezzacca, 67 N.J. 387 (1975) (

attorney referred to a departmental review comm

kangaroo court and made other discourteous commen

the Court could not condone the attorney’s behavio

that he had been a practicing attorney for twelve ye



of having become so personally involved in the c

client and the alleged injustice he anticipated, he

emotional state to affect his judgment as an attor

Rifai, 204 N.J. 592 (2011) (three-month suspension i

attorney who called a municipal prosecutor an id

other things; intentionally bumped into an investiga

during a break in a trial; repeatedly had the trial

once based on a false claim of an accident on the Tu

was extremely uncooperative and belligerent with

committee investigator; the attorney had been reprim

prior occasions); In re Supino, 182 N.J. 530 (2005

suspended for three months after he exhibite

intimidating behavior in the course of litigatio

threatened the other party

police officers, and judges;

(his ex-wife), court

other violations in

3.4(g), RPC 3.5(c), and RPC 8.4(d)); In re Vincent

275 (1989) (three-month suspension for attorney who

opposing counsel and a witness to fight, used profan

abusive languag e toward his adversary and an opposi

called a judge’s law clerk incompetent, used a rac



imposed on attorney who, during a deposition, call

counsel stupid and a bush league lawyer; the at

impugned the integrity of the trial judge, by stat

was in the defense’s pocket, a violation of RPC 8.2(

several aggravating

disciplinary history,

reprimand; the absence

factors, that is, the a

which included an admonitio

of remorse; and the fact t

isconduct occurred in front of his two clients

plaintiffs in the very matter in which their lawyer

the judge of being in the pocket of the defense, were

losing confidence in the legal system); and In re V

N.J. 591 (1983) (one-year suspension imposed on a

displayed a pattern of abuse, intimidation, and cont

judges, witnesses, opposing counsel, and other att

attorney engaged in intentional behavior that includ

vulgar profanities, and physical intimidation con

among other things, poking his finger in another

chest and bumping the attorney with his stomach an

shoulder).

In this case, respondent’s conduct toward Fel



year. In addition, respondent’s conduct grew i

hostile, as time went on. It is true that he

modicum of remorse and contrition to the DEC for h

toward Feltoon. Nevertheless, as the presenter poi

oral argument before us, not once, before the di

hearing, did respondent acknowledge his wrongdoi

repentance therefor. As the presenter remarked,

The panel below, as part of th

mitigating circumstances, did indicate tha

the respondent showed contrition. Which i

true. He, did show contrition, at th

hearinq. If you look at the record i

response to the grievance that was file

against him, respondent was very combative

In fact, his position was that he did no

see any sort of ethics violation in th

conduct exhibited by him toward th

grievant. I think he should get some credi

for showing contrition at the hearing, but

don’t know if he should get full credit

only because he didn’t show read

contrition. It would be different if

during the course of the investigation, h

came back and said, ’You know what, I’

sorry.’ I think that would weigh a littl

more heavily in terms of a mitigatin

factor. He should get some credit, but

don’t think he is entitled to full credi

because of that.

[Transcript of oral argument before th

Disciplinary Review Board, January 16, 2014



We, too noted that respondent’s apologies surfa

the disciplinary hearing. In our view, the pr

generous in suggesting that respondent should be

credit for his admission of culpability to the hea

As we observed in In the Matter of Steven Sieqel,

(January 28, 1993) (slip op. at 16), [i]t was

respondent had the misfortune of being apprehen

showed contrition ....

In an earlier case, the

alluded to an attorney’s belated mea culpa:

Although respondent now admits hi

wrongdoing and professes contriti

therefor, it cannot be overlooked that thi

realization is all too recent .... [H]i

newfound remorse surfaced only when it wa

clear that he would be found guilty of mu c

if not all the charged professiona

misconduct and would consequently face

stern sanction.

[In re Stier, 112 N.J. 22, 25 (1988).]

Attorneys who make material misrepresentations

the court and to their adversaries are subject to

ranging from an admonition to a suspension. See, e

Matter of Robin Kay Lord, DRB 01-250 (September

(admonition for attorney who failed to revea l her c



court was not aware of the client’s significant hist

vehicle infractions; in mitigation, the attorney di

client’s real name to the municipal court the day aft

appearance, whereupon the sentence was vacated); In

122 N.J. 244 (1991) (reprimand for attorney who

disclose to a court his representation of a client

lawsuit, where that representation would have been

the court’s ruling on the attorney’s motion to file a

of tort claim); In re Whitmore, 117 N.J. 472 (1990)

for attorney/municipal prosecutor who failed to disc

court that a police officer whose testimony was crit

prosecution of a drunk-driving case intentional

courtroom before the case was called, resulting in t

of the charge); In re Chasar, 182 N.J. 459 (2005) (

suspension for attorney who, in her own divorce p

filed with the court a false certification in which

having made cash payments to her employees; she a

certification on behalf of her secretary, in which t

falsely claimed not to have received cash payments; t

who had no prior discipline, violated RPC 3.3(



of misrepresentations to a municipal court judge to

repeated tardiness and failure to appear at hearing

that, if not for mitigating factors, the discipline

been much harsher); In re Mark, 132 N.J. 268 (1993) (

suspension for attorney who misrepresented to a cou

adversary had been supplied with an expert’s repo

support of that statement, fabricated two transmittal

mitigation, the attorney was not aware that his sta

untrue, given the firm’s operating procedures, and, i

he was under considerable stress from assuming the

three attorneys who had recently left the firm); In

118 N.J. 361 (1990) (three-month suspension for a

failed to inform the court, in his own mat rimonial m

he had transferred property to his mother for no con

and for failure to amend his certification listing

the attorney had a prior private reprimand ); In re J

N.J. 504 (1986) (three-month suspension for

misrepresentation to a judge that his associate was

the attorney could get an adjournment); In re Forres

429 (1999) (six-month suspension imposed on attorn



the court, to his adversary, and to an arbitrator,

the surviving spouse not to voluntarily reveal the

attorney’s motive was to obtain a personal injury s

In re Telson, 138 N.J. 47 (1994) (six-month susp

attorney who concealed a judge’s docket entry dis

client’s divorce complaint, obtained a divorce ju

another judge without disclosing that the first judg

the request, and denied his conduct to a third jud

admit to this judge one week later that he had lied

was scared); In re Cillo, 155 N.J. 599 (1998)

suspension for attorney who, after misrepresenting

that a case had been settled and that no other attorn

appearing for a conference, obtained a judge’s sign

order dismissing the action and disbursing all escr

his client; the attorney knew that at least one o

would be appearing at the conference and that a trus

required that at least $500,000 of the escrow fund

reserve); and In re Kornreich, 149 N.J. 346 (1997)

suspension for attorney who, after being invo

automobile accident, misrepresented to the police,



operating her vehicle and who presented false evi

attempt to falsely accuse another of her own wrongdoin

Although none of these cases are really on

nature of respondent’s conduct is

attorney in Johnson. There, the

closest to tha

attorney lied

associate’s poor health in order to obtain an ad

Here, respondent

certifications in

adjournment.

lied about the non-receipt

order to obtain the equival

The attorney in Johnson received a t

suspension for his misconduct. We note, however, tha

was decided in 1986, which was six years before

created censure as a form of discipline, in 2002.

Thus, were Johnson before us and the Court after Ju

might have received a censure.

Here, given the totality of respondent’s misco

is, his insulting remarks to Feltoon, in writing and

his misrepresentations to Feltoon and to Judge K

respect to his non-receipt of the certification

obvious lack of early recognition of and regret for h

we determine a three-month suspension is the appropri





SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

DISCIPLINARY REVIEW

BOARD

VOTING RECORD

In the Matter of Jared E. Stolz

Docket No. DRB 13-331

Argued: January 16, 2014

Decided: March 18, 2014

Disposition: Three-month suspension

em ers

Frost

Baugh

Clark

Doremus

Gallipoli

Hoberman

Singer

Yamner

Disbar Three-

month

Suspension

X

X

X

X

X

X

Six-month

Suspension

Dismiss Disquali





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Jared E. Stolz Disciplinary Opinion

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