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MacIntyre and the Indispensability of TraditionAuthor(s): J. B. SchneewindSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 165-168Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107831
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8/20/2019 J.B. Schneewind - MacIntyre on the Indispensability of Tradition
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Philosophy
ndPhenomenological
esearch
Vol. LI,No.
1, March1991
MacIntyreand the Indispensability
of
Tradition
J. B.
SCHNEE WIND
TheJohns
HopkinsUniversity
In
After
Virtue(1981)
Alasdair
MacIntyre
used the history
of thought
aboutmorality
as an aid
in
diagnosing
what he took
to be the
disastrous
condition
of modern Western society.
In
Whose Justice?
Which
Rationality?
(Notre
Dame, 1988;
abbreviatedhereafter
as
WJ; page
referencesgiven
in
text)
he claims
that we must draw
on the
historyof
ethics
for an additionalpurpose:
o findsolutions
o the moral
problems
whose insolubilityis a mark of the chaotic conditionof our present
culture.
He indicates heseproblems nly
briefly WJ,
p. 1) and offers
no
solution
to them. He
claims,
however, to have
accomplished
what
Descartes
was right in thinking
he
most difficulttask
of philosophy:
o
findout
howto
begin .
We, whoever
we are, can onlybegin enquiry
romthe
vantagepoint
afforded y our
rela-
tionship
o somespecificsocial
and intellectual
ast through
which we have
affiliated ur-
selves to someparticularradition f enquiry, xtendinghehistoryof thatenquirynto the
present.. (WJ, .
401)
The claim
is thatunless
we deliberately
easonfrom
withina
tradition-
as
Aristotelian,
as
Augustinian,
as
Thomist,
as
Humean,
as
post-
Enlightenment
iberal,or as something
else
(WJ,p. 402)-we
cannot
reason
at all.
MacIntyre'sposition,
which
I
shall label traditionalism,
as
two
components.First,we must understandhe resourcesof our traditionn
orderto use them
in
producing
our own solutions
to
particular
urrent
problems,
and
in
arguing
that
the solutionsour
traditionprovides
are
superior
o thoseprovided
by other
traditions. econd,
because
ours
is a
world
in
which
there
are
manyconflicting
outlooks,
controversy
over
particular
ssues
mustescalate o the level of
a
war of
traditions:
it is
no
MACINTYRE
YMPOSIUM
165
8/20/2019 J.B. Schneewind - MacIntyre on the Indispensability of Tradition
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longer possible
to speak except out of one
particular
tradition
in a
way
which will
involve conflict with
rival
traditions.
WJ, p.
401)
Has
Macintyre supported his
traditionalism?
Has
he shown that we
must begin
within an historically
specific
and
already constituted
tradition, and that our arguments cannot be fully resolved until one
traditionmakes
its rivals
capitulate?
I think
not.
First, MacIntyre
allows that
traditions have beginnings. Aristotle and
Augustine and
Aquinas,
he holds, were founders
of
traditions. Why
then
might there not be among
us today
those
who
are
originating
new
lines
of
thought?
Their
views may some day
come to be seen
as
having
started
a
tra-
dition;
but
even
if
this
occurs,
it
will
not be
right
to describe an initiator
as
working
within the tradition
she starts.
Second, MacIntyreallows that those who, as he puts it, inhabita social
and intellectual
tradition
in
good
working
order
(WJ,
p. 7)
need
not
articulate their
presuppositions
or
think
of
themselves
as
working
within a
tradition
ratherthan as
simply
conducting
inquiry.
It is
only
later
thinkers,
consciously
theorizing about
traditions,
who
take this
view of what
the
earlier members of a tradition
were
doing.
These
later
writers,
such
as John
Henry
Newman, can
use
a sharp antithesis
between tradition and
something else
...
which
was
unavailable to
the
earlier inhabitants
of
the
tradition.
(WJ,
p. 8)
But
if
a
tradition,
ike an
epistemological crisis,
may
only be
recognized
for
what
it
is
in
retrospect
(WJ,
p.
363) then we
ourselves may be
in
the
position of
early members of what will
eventually
be
described
by some historianas a
tradition.
f
we
are,
we
are
reasoning
n
a
tradition-specific
way without
being aware
of
it. But then we are not
consciously
calling
on
ourtradition
or our
resources.
Since
in
controversy
about particular ssues we
could
be
either initiating
a traditionor using the resourcesof one withoutknowing that we are doing
so,
MacIntyre has not shown
that we
are now forced to
begin
discussing
particular
moral
issues by
deliberate use
of
the
resources of some
already
identified, historically
constituted
tradition.Why might
he think
that he
has
shown this?
MacIntyre
holds that all rational
discussion
is situated within a
shared
frameworkof
beliefs and standards,
which
cannot be
transcended n favor
of
some eternal or
absolute
standpoint
untouched by change. I am in
considerable
sympathy with this
anti-foundationalist or
pragmatist
outlook, but
I
do not
see that it has any
force to
move us
toward
traditionalism.
Perhaps
MacIntyre
supposes
that
because the framework
within
which
disagreement takes
place is
itself a result of
historical
development,
any
use of
it counts as carrying
on a
tradition. But
if
the
existence
of
any set
of
shared beliefs shows
that those
holding them
are
166
J. B. SCHNEEWI
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operating
within a-tradition, the claim
that
we
must start
from
a
tradition
is extremely
weak. No historical arguments
are needed to
establish
it. One
need
only point
out that
since we must
share
some beliefs with
anyone
we
understand,
we necessarily start
from a tradition
whenever
we
engage
in
conversation. The anti-foundationalist or pragmatist who grants that
historical
processes
were involved
in shaping the framework
available to
participants
n
a
particular
discussion
is not forced
to the conclusion
that
the participants
must be appealing
to
and constrained
by some
specific
historical tradition.
This is
not only because
innovations
may
possibly provide
acceptable
solutions.
It
is also because
we share
a substantialcommon
vocabulary
and
set of assumptions
which cannot be
said to have come
from any
single,
specific historical tradition.These common assumptionsgo beyond matters
of
simple
fact and purelogic.
They enable
us
to
agree
on
many
matters
con-
cerned with
how to live peacefully
together.
It is
possible,
as
MacIntyre
says,
that
what we agree
on
is
insufficient
to resolve
our disagreements
(WJ,
p. 351),
but we cannot
know this a
priori.
We can
only
find out by
trying,
in
particular
cases,
to see
how far our agreements
will
take
us. But
this means that
in
embarking
on discussion
of
controversial
issues
it is
advisable
to start
from what
is
common. Beginning
from
what we
know
to
be
unique
to some special
tradition
would only
make a divisive
issue
harder
to resolve.
Saying
this is
not
saying
that there
is,
some set
of
startingpoints
beyond
our
historically conditioned
commonalities
which
is always
and
everywhere
sufficient
to
lead
to the rational
settlement
of
any
conceivable
issue. It is simply
leaving open the
possibility
that with respect
to
any
particular
ssue
either shared beliefs
or
new
ideas
may
enable us
to reach a
generallyaccepted resolution.To say that what serves this purpose in one
context must serve it
in
all
is to assume that
no issue
is satisfactorily
settled unless
there
is a more
or less comprehensive
principle
or
theory
backing
the settlement.
But this
is
an assumption
one need
not make.
On
practical
matters
a common understanding
may come
from different
people
for
different reasons,
and still be adequate
for the purposes
at hand.
We do
not
have to win the
kind of
dialectical victory
MacIntyre
describes
in
chapter
18-the surrender
of adherents
of one tradition to
the
superior
decisiveness,
inclusiveness,
and
explanatory power of another. In the
Rushdie
affair,
for instance,
it is not
necessary that Islam
admit
the total
superiority
of Western views. It would suffice
if
for
whatever reason
the
order to murderRushdie
were
formallyrescinded
and
the faithful
urgedto
leave
him alone. More
progress
towardresolving
important
disputes
may
MACINTYRE
YMPOSIUM
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be achieved
if total views are
ignored
than
if disputants always insist on
making converts of their opponents.
MacIntyre would not be happy with this.
For him
particular
solutions
must add up to a coherent theory if they are to be acceptable. This assump-
tion leads him to one of his more startlingassertions-that
the rival
claims
to
truth of contending
traditions
depend
for their vindication
upon
the
ade-
quacy ... of the histories which
the
resources
of
each
of those traditions n conflict
enable their
historians
to write.
(WJ, p. 403)
The historian is MacIntyre's non-foundationalist replacement
for a
timeless criterion
of
truth
because
only
the
historian
can see
whether
particular issues
have been
resolved
in
a
way
that fits into a
coherent
general theory.But the historian'sverdict is useless. If we must wait for it
in
order to know the solution to a problem, then that knowledge
will
have
no role
in
the actual give and take of life. What solves a problem
now is
what the parties to the dispute agree solves it.
If
later concerned
parties,
including historians of traditions, think their solution inadequate, they can
reopen the dispute. But their later resolution will itself always be open
to
reiterationof the same process.
Out
of
the
piecemeal
settlement
of
substantial numbers
of
disputes
there sometimes emerges a general outlook which is articulatedin classic
writings and thus generates a tradition.It is also possible
for
relative peace
and
stability
to be
achieved without this.
In
either
case
recognized
traditionsdo
not
constitute the whole of the resources we have for starting
discussions.
MacIntyre
has
failed to show that the historical study
of those
traditions,
to
which his book is
largely devoted, has anything special
to
offer toward the resolution of the current issues whose interminability
he took as his starting point. Only the genuine use of the resources of a
given tradition, showing that it actually yields a practical solution we can
all
accept,
could
do
this. And
even then those outside the tradition would
not accept the solution because it was generated by the tradition. They
would
accept it because it struckthem as reasonable.
168 J. B.
SCIHNEEW