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The Fall of Yugoslavia

and the Rise of Milošević

The Unintended Consequences of Western Intervention

Jeff Wheeler

Dr. Katalin Fabian

Honors Thesis in International Affairs

Lafayette College

May 1, 2016

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Acknowledgements

I would first and foremost like to express my gratitude to my thesis advisor, Professor

Katalin Fabian, for her commitment to helping me draft and re-draft my thesis over the past year.

She was the first to inspire my interest in post-communist transitions in Central and Eastern

Europe and the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Without her wisdom and our many animated

conversations, I certainly would not have come to write this Honors Thesis.

I would also like to thank the other members of my committee, Professor Joel Shelton

and Professor Rachel Goshgarian, for their insight and their willingness to read and provide

constructive feedback on this thesis. I had the pleasure of taking my introductory courses with

both of these professors my very first semester at Lafayette College. Their passion for their

subject matter and commitment to excellent teaching put me on an early track to conducting

research in international affairs. It is fitting that they are now the readers of my Honors Thesis in

my final semester at Lafayette.

Thanks also goes to Professor Angelika von Wahl, Professor Michael Nees, Dr. Orli

Fridman, and Dr. Mirjana Kosić, all of whom have provided me with opportunities to hone my

research skills over the past four years in a variety of interdisciplinary projects. I must also thank

my fellow International Affairs Honors Thesis students, Rowan Cunningham, Jenna Gowell,

Rebeka Ramangamihanta, Amanda Furtado-Sampaio, and Andrea Rastelli for the moral support

they have shown me as I crafted my thesis. I wish them all the best in their current and future

research endeavors.

I also owe a great deal of thanks to my parents for supporting me financially as I pursued

my B.A. in International Affairs at Lafayette. They also gave me constant moral support as I

worked on my thesis all this year.

Last but not least, I must thank Sunčica Vučaj, my homestay host during my semester in

Belgrade. I still miss our many long conversations that would carry on late into the evenings. It

was from my talks with her that the original idea for this thesis was born.

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CONTENTS

List of Acronyms .......................................................................................................... 4

Chapter 1: Introduction ................................................................................................ 5 1.1. Thesis Structure .................................................................................................................... 8

1.2. Yugoslavia: A Socialist, Multiethnic Federation ............................................................... 10

1.3. Goodbye Tito, Hello Milošević .......................................................................................... 14

1.4. Intervention from the West ................................................................................................ 17

1.5. Shortcomings of Western Intervention: Unintended Consequences .................................. 18

1.6. Lessons from Western Intervention in Yugoslavia ............................................................ 20

Chapter 2: Yugoslavia’s Post-Socialist Transition of the 1990s ....................................... 22 2.1. Similarities between Yugoslavia and Other CEE Countries .............................................. 23

2.2. Differences between the Post-Communist and Post-Socialist Transitions ........................ 31

2.3. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 34

Chapter 3: Domestic Forces and the Rise of Milošević ................................................... 36 3.1. Pillar I: Uncertainty ............................................................................................................ 37

3.2. Pillar II: Traditionalism ...................................................................................................... 47

3.3. Pillar III: Nationalism ......................................................................................................... 58

3.4. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 62

Chapter 4: International Forces and Intervention from the West ................................... 64 4.1. Major International Actors Involved in Yugoslavia........................................................... 66

4.2. Main Objectives of Western Intervention: Human Rights, Capitalism, and Democracy .. 70

4.3. Western Intervention during the 1990s: Increasingly Direct Strategies ............................ 73

4.4. Controversy Surrounding Western Intervention in Yugoslavia ......................................... 86

4.5. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 88

Chapter 5: The Unintended Consequences of Western Intervention in Yugoslavia .......... 90 5.1. Shortcomings of Western Intervention: Incomplete Arguments ........................................ 91

5.2. Accounting for Western Intervention’s Unintended Consequences .................................. 93

5.3. Western Intervention Strategies: An Analytical Framework ............................................. 96

5.4. 1990-1995: Unintended Consequences of Political Intervention Strategies .................... 101

5.5. 1992-1995: Unintended Consequences of Economic Intervention Strategies ................. 106

5.5. 1999: Unintended Consequences of Military Intervention Strategies.............................. 111

5.6. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 115

Chapter 6: Lessons from Yugoslavia .......................................................................... 117 6.1. Main Findings of the Present Research ............................................................................ 117

6.2. Applying the Lessons from Yugoslavia to Other Cases of Western Intervention ........... 122

6.3. Yugoslavia as a Case Study: Reflecting on Unintended Consequences .......................... 131

References ................................................................................................................ 134

Appendices ............................................................................................................... 147

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List of Acronyms

CEE - Central and Eastern Europe

EC - European Community

EU - European Union

FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992-2006)

GDP - Gross Domestic Product

ICC - International Criminal Court

ICTY - International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia

IMF - International Monetary Fund

JNA - Yugoslav National Army (Jugoslavenska narodna armija)

NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization

SFRY - Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1946-1992)

SKJ - League of Communists of Yugoslavia (Savez komunista Jugoslavije)

UN - United Nations

USA - United States of America

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Chapter 1: Introduction

The 20th century ended with a bang. The 1900s, already a dynamic century full of large-

scale wars and economic booms and busts, had some final surprises in its last decade. In 1989,

the Berlin Wall opened, and the divided world of the Cold War—with the capitalist West on one

side and the communist East on the other—entered a new era. In 1991, the Soviet Union, the

most powerful political actor in the communist world, collapsed. Systems of communism

unraveled, and capitalism and democracy quickly spread into Central and Eastern Europe,

Russia, and Central Asia. To proponents of capitalism and democracy, the end of the Cold War

promised a new age of human history, an age of global peace and prosperity. However, the

alleged utopia of global capitalism and democracy did not rise as some had hoped it would. On

the contrary, some countries witnessed political violence and economic collapse bordering on

dystopia. During the 1990s, one particular collapse garnered intense media attention in the

Western world: The breakdown of Yugoslavia.

Starting in 1991, Yugoslavia began to fracture along ethnic and religious lines as many

Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, and members of other ethnic groups opted for national solidarity instead

of allegiance to Yugoslavia as a whole. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA)

descended upon the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia, as well as the

autonomous province of Kosovo, as they threatened to secede from the federation. Non-military

violence also became widespread in rural parts of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo where people of

many different ethnicities had lived together peacefully for decades. From 1989 to 1999,

Western media coverage of the Yugoslav conflicts expressed its horror at the bloodshed and

chaos that seemed to have arisen so suddenly. Some scholars argue that Yugoslavia, based on its

Cold War history as a peaceful and open federation, was the last place anyone would have

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expected war to break out (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). However, as surprising as the

Yugoslav conflicts were, the many political, economic, and social forces that produced the

conflicts were embedded within a much broader context. Much can be learned about how the

world was changing in the 1990s by studying what produced the conflicts in Yugoslavia. The

breakdown of Yugoslavia was a complex phenomenon that had both domestic and international

dimensions.

Simple explanations for the breakdown of Yugoslavia abound. Western media were

prone to blame the conflicts in Yugoslavia on one man in particular: Slobodan Milošević

(Sherman, 1993). Milošević was elected President of the Republic of Serbia in 1990 and was re-

elected in 1992. After reaching his two-term limit, Milošević then ran for and was elected

President of Yugoslavia, or at least what remained of Yugoslavia after four other republics—

Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina—had seceded by 1993. Since Milošević

came to power through democratic elections, some scholars argue that his regime was a product

of a popular nationalist movement among the people of Serbia (Levitsky and Way, 2010). Others

are skeptical of Milošević’s actual popularity among Serbs. Many scholars have accused

Milošević of rigging elections so he could remain in power under the guise of democracy

(Glenny, 2006; Golubović, 2004). The question of how Milošević gained and maintained power

is a compelling one, and that question has not yet been fully answered. The era of destruction

that prompted international horror during Milošević’s time in power warrants a very specific

question: How did the Milošević regime remain in power, when the violence it sponsored

contrasted so starkly with Yugoslavia’s prior era of peace?

The question of how the Milošević regime maintained power and exercised it to such

destructive ends goes above and beyond accusations of electoral fraud. A wide array of forces

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led to the rise and maintenance of the Milošević regime. Some of these forces arose within

Yugoslavia itself, while others originated from outside of it. Domestic forces and international

forces are equally important when studying the breakdown of Yugoslavia, and they should not be

weighed against one another to determine which were more significant. They must be examined

in tandem, because domestic and international forces can interact—and they almost always do.

Even though the Milošević regime developed within Yugoslavia itself, domestic forces alone do

not explain how it gained and maintained power. It was not just domestic or international forces

alone but rather a combination of the two that maintained the Milošević regime during the

breakdown of Yugoslavia in the 1990s.

To implicate international forces, and thereby the actions of international actors, in

maintaining the Milošević regime sounds counterintuitive. Many countries in the so-called

“West,” like the United States of America (USA) and several Western European countries, took

action through international organizations like the United Nations (UN) to intervene in

Yugoslavia against the violence occurring under the Milošević regime. To understand how the

international forces of intervention worked in tandem with domestic forces to maintain

Milošević’s government during the 1990s, one must first recognize how and why Western actors

chose to intervene in Yugoslavia as the conflicts of the 1990s escalated. Western intervention

provided disincentives for the Milošević regime to continue its military campaigns against

seceding republics, which allowed for conflict negotiations to establish peace among the

Yugoslav successor states. However, Western intervention also had profound destructive effects

on the people of Yugoslavia, such as economic collapse under sanctions and threats to life and

limb under bombings. In light of these destructive consequences, Western intervention

strengthened some of the domestic forces that had turned some people towards the Milošević

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regime in the first place. This interaction of domestic and international forces produced a

feedback loop that allowed for the Milošević regime to maintain its support base during the

1990s by pitting popular opinion against the perceived attacks from the West. The Milošević

regime therefore remained in power not only despite Western actors’ attempts to undermine it,

but in some ways because of those intervention attempts as well.

1.1. Thesis Structure

A detailed explanation of how Western intervention produced unintended consequences

in part strengthened domestic support for the Milošević regime requires several analytical steps.

The present research narrows its focus over the next four chapters. Chapter 2 analyzes

Yugoslavia as a case study for the political, economic, and social transitions occurring in the

Eastern Bloc during the 1990s—the Eastern Bloc also including the Soviet Union’s republics in

Eastern Europe and Central Asia, as well as its buffer states in Central Europe. Yugoslavia’s

period of political, economic, and social transition during the 1990s differs from the transitions

of other countries in the Eastern Bloc in two ways. First, countries in Central and Eastern Europe

worked to dismantle strict systems of communism that, in many cases, had been imposed upon

them. Meanwhile the unwinding of Yugoslavia’s system of self-managing socialism—a more

flexible and open version of communism—meant the deconstruction of a home-grown system of

economic and social values. Second, Yugoslavia’s political and economic transition away from

socialism coincided with its political and social breakdown. The 1990s in Yugoslavia were

therefore fraught with violence, more so than the relatively peaceful dissolution of the Soviet

Union. These differences justify researching Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and social

transitions as an individual case study.

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Chapter 3 analyzes the short-term and long-term domestic forces in Yugoslavia that led

to its breakdown during the political and economic transition of the 1990s. These domestic

forces produced a home-grown support structure for the Milošević regime. The regime in turn

manipulated these domestic forces to raise itself upon three metaphorical pillars: Uncertainty,

traditionalism, and nationalism. The regime proved itself adept at exploiting and strengthening

those forces with political tools like widely publicized speeches and state-controlled radio,

television, and newspapers.

Chapter 4 investigates the objectives of Western actors when they intervened in

Yugoslavia between 1992 and 1999 in opposition to the Milošević regime. Western intervention

had two main goals: To promote systems of capitalism and democracy in Yugoslavia and to

protect human rights. While Western intervention helped to mitigate violence and establish peace

in Yugoslavia, they did not undermine the power of the Milošević regime to continue

perpetuating violence. As the 1990s wore on, Western actors began using increasingly direct and

destructive forms of intervention. While intervention primarily relied on indirect political and

economic tools up until 1992, Western actors resorted to more direct economic and military tools

between 1993 and 1995 and then in 1999, most notably economic sanctions and bombings.

Chapter 5 examines the interaction of international forces—Western intervention—with

domestic forces—the support structure of the Milošević regime. As Western intervention

strategies became more direct and destructive, they began producing unintended consequences.

In particular, economic sanctions and military bombings were devastating to the people of

Yugoslavia. Instead of inciting people to overthrow Milošević, however, widespread economic

and military destruction strengthened the domestic support for Milošević while weakening

domestic opposition. Meanwhile other less direct intervention strategies, like providing funding

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for civil society organizations and opposition media, were effective at strengthening popular

dissent toward Milošević in the long term.

It is important to clarify the historical background, terminology, and premises on which

the present research is based. First and foremost, to understand how Yugoslavia broke apart in

the post-Cold War era, one must first consider how the federation originally came to be.

1.2. Yugoslavia: A Socialist, Multiethnic Federation

The federal structure of Yugoslavia was established in 1918 through the merging of the

three kingdoms of Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia. The new country was initially called the

Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, until 1929 when its name was changed to the Kingdom

of Yugoslavia (the name Yugoslav meaning Southern Slav). In 1941, the country came under

Nazi occupation. Upon declaring independence in 1944, it was renamed the Federal People’s

Republic of Yugoslavia. In 1946 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (SKJ) replaced the

monarchy of the federation, and the name of the country became the Socialist Federal Republic

of Yugoslavia (SFRY). This form of Yugoslavia lasted until 1992, when its socialist institutions

were dismantled and it became known as the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)—which

lasted until 2003. To minimize technical confusion in the present research, the name Yugoslavia

is used to refer to both the SFRY and the FRY (Lampe, 1996).

Because of its history of communist ideologies during the Cold War, Yugoslavia is often

associated with the Soviet Union and its buffer states in Central and Eastern Europe (Åslund,

2013). Including Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and buffer states in one homogenous group

has its advantages for studying the communist East both before and after the opening of the

Berlin Wall. However, simplifying the region under one term de-emphasizes some crucial

differences among Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and the buffer states. During its 70 years of

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power in Yugoslavia (1919-1990), the SKJ pursued a modified interpretation of communism that

implemented its own political, economic, and social systems (Djilas, 1957). Where Soviet buffer

states endured the imposition of strict planned economies and a secret police institutions—such

as the Ministry for State Security (Stasi) in East Germany—Yugoslavia’s experience with

communist ideologies was significantly more open and peaceful (Grandits and Taylor, 2010).

Much of what set Yugoslavia apart from the Soviet Union and its buffer states can be

traced back to one charismatic leader and two ideological re-interpretations of communism. The

Yugoslav leader was Josip Broz Tito, a prominent member of the SKJ who helped to liberate

Yugoslavia from Nazi occupation and establish the SFRY in 1946. Tito remained the head of

state in Yugoslavia, first as Prime Minister, then as President, and eventually as President for

Life until his death in 1980. Widely regarded as a benevolent dictator, Tito helped to establish a

vision for Yugoslavia based on two interrelated ideological re-interpretations of communism,

one economic and one social in nature (Swain, 2011).

Economically, Yugoslavia embraced a system of self-managing socialism, a more

flexible version of communism that allowed for cooperation between private and state-owned

enterprise. Unlike Soviet communism, which was imposed upon many societies, especially the

buffer states in Central Europe, Yugoslav socialism was a home-grown system that provided

some of the benefits of both socialism and capitalism (Grandits and Taylor, 2010; Swain, 2010;

White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013). Most notably, citizens of Yugoslavia were allowed to travel

outside of Yugoslavia to Western Europe (Howard, 2001). This openness allowed for the people

of Yugoslavia to explore other parts of the world, and for people in other countries to come and

experience Yugoslavia’s self-managing socialism (Oleszczuk, 1981; Velikonja, 2012).

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Yugoslavia’s social re-interpretation of communism revolved around a slogan of

“Brotherhood and Unity” within the federation. Yugoslavia under Tito consisted of six Yugoslav

republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter referred to as Bosnia for brevity), Croatia,

Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia. The federation also included two semi-

autonomous provinces, Kosovo and Vojvodina. These provinces were historically tied to Serbia,

but each had a large population of Albanians and Hungarians, respectively. Appendix 1 provides

a geographic and ethnic map of Yugoslavia in 1982.

The ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity” called for all ethnic groups to live peacefully

with one another, and it was an extension of the unifying work overseen by King Aleksandar

between the First and Second World Wars (Nielsen, 2014). People throughout the federation

were encouraged to marry across ethnic lines and identify as Yugoslav, rather than as a particular

nationality such as Serb, Croat, Albanian, or Hungarian. Survey data from the 1980s suggest that

Yugoslav identity appealed to many people in the federation, particularly children from

interethnic marriages (between 5 and 25 percent of marriages), people who were in the ethnic

minority in their Republic—e.g. a Croat living in Serb-majority Serbia—and members of the

Communist Party (Smits, 2010; Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, 1994). Yugoslav identity grew

more popular between the 1960s and 1980s, but still only a minority of the population chose to

identify as Yugoslav. People were least likely to identify as Yugoslav in the autonomous

province of Kosovo, where up to 90 percent of the population was ethnic Albanian (Sekulić,

Massey, and Hodson, 1994; Babuna, 2000). Degrees of integration therefore differed across the

Yugoslav republics and provinces. The limited rise of Yugoslav identification between the 1960s

and 1980s is presented in Appendix 2.

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Self-managing socialism and “Brotherhood and Unity” set Yugoslavia apart from the

Soviet Union and its buffer states in the communist Eastern Bloc. Starting in the 1950s,

Yugoslavia represented the so-called “Third Way,” both politically and economically, by

presenting an alternative to both Western capitalism and Soviet communism (Swain, 2011).

Yugoslavia also helped found and was an important member of the Non-Aligned Movement, a

third bloc of post-colonial countries that, as early as the late 1940s, avoided identifying with the

East or the West (Misković, Fischer-Tine, and Boskovska, 2014). At the 1961 Belgrade Summit,

Yugoslav leaders worked closely with leaders from Egypt, India, and Indonesia to unify many

countries from all over the world within the movement. The Non-Aligned Movement was an

alternative to the rigid East-West communist-capitalist paradigm. It allowed for formerly

colonized countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia to pursue their own political and

economic self-determination during the Cold War period (Rist, 2014).

The historical, political, economic, and social differences between Yugoslavia and the

Soviet Union during the Cold War period precipitated further differences after the Cold War.

While countries throughout Central and Eastern Europe underwent political, economic, and

social transitions during the 1990s, including privatization and democratization, Yugoslavia’s

violent fragmentation further complicated its transition away from socialism. The unraveling of

the federation’s guiding ideologies resulted in the rise of new authoritarian leadership after Tito’s

death. Many political transitions throughout Central and Eastern Europe, as well as Russia and

Central Asia, produced authoritarian leaders who often extolled nationalist ideologies (White,

Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Åslund, 2013). Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and ideological

breakdown produced similar authoritarian leaders. However, leaders in Yugoslavia like

Milošević used nationalist ideologies to sponsor and justify widespread violence.

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1.3. Goodbye Tito, Hello Milošević

After Tito’s death in 1980, it was uncertain if or for how long Yugoslavia and

“Brotherhood and Unity” would continue to exist. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the

unraveling of communism in the early 1990s further increased this uncertainty. In the years

following Tito’s death, political elites from different republics saw the opportunity to establish

themselves as strong leaders in their own republics and in Yugoslavia. One rising leader was

Slobodan Milošević, a prominent Serb member of the Yugoslav Communist League (SKJ) in the

1980s.

Milošević became prominent in the public eye in Yugoslavia as well as in international

media when he gave a speech at Kosovo Polje on April 24th, 1987. Milošević addressed a crowd

of Serb protestors who claimed they were being discriminated by the Albanian majority in

Kosovo. A staged brawl with Kosovar Albanian police, instigated by Kosovar Serbs but blamed

upon the police, interrupted Milošević’s speech. As news cameras filmed the alleged attack on

Kosovar Serbs, Milošević declared he would fight to protect the rights and lives of Serbs

wherever they were under threat, especially in Kosovo (Silber and Little, 1996). In 1989,

Milošević delivered another speech at Kosovo Polje to mark the 600th anniversary of a battle

between the Kingdom of Serbia and the Ottoman Empire in Kosovo. The speech itself bore a

threatening undertone, as the autonomous province of Kosovo had been threatening to secede

from Yugoslavia since the 1970s (Silber and Little, 1996). The commemoration of the battle at

Kosovo Polje, featuring prominent Serb politicians, served as a reminder of the Republic of

Serbia’s deep geographical and historical connections to Kosovo (Glenny, 1992). Not only was

this a defining moment in Milošević’s political career, but it was also a threat against Kosovar

Albanian forces attempting to sever ties with Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia.

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After his declaration to protect Serbs in Kosovo, Milošević rapidly gained popularity

among Serb nationalists. He was elected President of Serbia in 1990, a position he kept until

1997 when he reached his term limit. He then ran for and became President of Yugoslavia, where

he remained in power until the election of 2000. When Milošević claimed he had won re-election

despite massive protests in Belgrade, the protestors declared there had been electoral fraud.

Within a week, Milošević heeded protestors’ demands and resigned from the presidency. In

April of 2001, Milošević was arrested and transported to the International Criminal Court (ICC)

in The Hague to be tried for war crimes. He died of a heart attack while still in prison in 2006.

In the present research, Milošević’s 10-year tenure in power is referred to as the era of

the Milošević regime. The regime itself consisted of not just Milošević himself but also the

institutions of his government, including the JNA and state-owned media like Radio televizija

Beograd (RTB) (Seierstad, 2006). Some scholars may question the use of the term “regime” to

describe a government, as it is often a vague and poorly defined term. The present research

distinguishes between the Milošević “government” and the “regime.” Some democratic reforms

occurred under Milošević, such as the establishment of an electoral system and more leeway for

opposition parties. These strong political institutions and norms would justify calling Milošević’s

power structure a “government” based on rules. However, the widely held suspicion that

Milošević oversaw infractions against these rules—like strict media and education laws and

electoral fraud—highlights the dual nature of Milošević’s power structure as both a

“government” and a “regime.” Since the present research focuses on the maintenance of

Milošević and others in power, which included fraudulent means, it is appropriate to refer to his

power structure as a “regime” that contrasted with its theoretical principles of “government.”

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The lifespan of the Milošević regime was relatively short compared to that of Tito’s

government. However, the destruction that occurred under the Milošević regime had tremendous

impacts on the people of Yugoslavia. The armed ethnic conflicts that the Milošević regime

sponsored resulted in thousands of deaths and displacements. The most infamous examples of

violence that the Milošević regime promoted were the massacre of Vukovar in Croatia and the

genocide of Srebrenica in Bosnia. While these mass killings received the most media attention,

they were but two prominent incidents in a pattern of violence throughout Yugoslavia as it broke

apart. Over the course of the 1990s, massacres and forced migration occurred throughout Bosnia,

Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Serbia. The changing ethnic make-up of Yugoslavia’s

republics and provinces during the 1990s is presented in Appendix 3.

The armed ethnic conflicts of the 1990s also coincided with widespread economic

collapse. Tito had accumulated a mountain of debt from borrowing money from the USA,

Western Europe and the Soviet Union. Unlike other indebted post-communist countries in

Central and Eastern Europe, Yugoslavia did not receive assistance from the European Union to

pay off the debts (Campos, 1999). This debt proved to be an enormous burden as Yugoslavia

began its already strenuous post-socialist transition towards a free market economy. Inflation

reached a peak at the end of 1989 with a rate of 200 percent per quarter (Lahiri, 1991).

Appendices 4 presents illustrates the rising unemployment in Yugoslavia during the 1980s.

Economic tensions compounded on top of political, social, and ethnic tensions. Thus the

disintegration of “Brotherhood and Unity” paralleled the collapse of Yugoslavia’s economy as its

system of self-managing socialism unraveled.

The uncertainty of Yugoslavia’s present and future in the 1980s and 1990s became ideal

for the rise of a new authoritarian regime like that of Milošević. Milošević’s regime used

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political rhetoric and media publications to identify and shape three pillars for its support base:

uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism. First, the regime capitalized on the political,

economic, and social uncertainty in the midst of Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and

ideological collapse. Second, the regime appealed to traditional values among Serbs—

particularly the values of the Serbian orthodox church—to offer a semblance of familiarity in the

time of uncertainty. Third and finally, the Milošević regime stoked fires of nationalism among

Serbs to provide a new guiding ideology that would replace “Brotherhood and Unity.”

The rise of the Milošević regime and the atrocities it sponsored prompted reactions from

other countries. Some powerful countries, like Russia and China, expressed support for

Milošević, especially in 1999. Meanwhile other actors, particularly Western actors like the USA,

the UN, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), chose to intervene in

Yugoslavia—in particular during the wars in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo—in an effort to

mitigate the ongoing violence.

1.4. Intervention from the West

Intervention against the Milošević regime was not the first instance of Western

involvement in the Eastern Bloc in the late 1900s. Starting in 1989, many Western actors became

heavily involved in Yugoslavia, the former Soviet Union, and its buffer states to help build

functioning systems of capitalism and democracy in those countries. Some actors were nation-

states like the USA and members of the European Union (EU). Others were international

organizations like the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Bank. These

actors also assisted in restructuring Yugoslavia’s economy and establishing institutions of

democracy like elections and multi-party political systems.

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The widespread violence in Yugoslavia that began in 1992 prompted Western actors to

intervene more directly than before. Western actors like the USA, the UN, and NATO declared

the armed violence in Yugoslavia, which resulted in confirmed acts of genocide in Bosnia, were

crimes against humanity (McAllister, 2015). According to these Western actors, the atrocities in

Yugoslavia meant that the Milošević regime posed a threat to both universal human rights and

international security (Petersen, 2011). Over the course of the 1990s, Western actors intervened

with many different political, economic, and military strategies. Some forms of intervention were

relatively indirect and non-violent, like stationing peace-keeping forces and negotiating a peace

deal in Bosnia. Other forms of intervention, like strict economic sanctions and military

bombings, were more direct and had much more destructive consequences on the people of

Yugoslavia.

Western intervention helped to achieve its goal of protecting human rights by de-

escalating conflicts and bringing an end to the armed ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo

(McAllister, 2015). However, as Milošević remained in power and continued to sponsor violence

in the mid-1990s and again in 1999, Western intervention resorted to increasingly direct and

destructive forms of intervention. With the escalation of intervention efforts, the devastation to

people living in Yugoslavia began to elicit counter-productive side-effects.

1.5. Shortcomings of Western Intervention: Unintended Consequences

Western actors sought to protect human rights and promote international security by

ending the armed ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia. They also aimed to build systems of capitalism

and democracy in Yugoslavia, which involved weakening and replacing Milošević’s

authoritarian regime (United States Institute of Peace). As the 1990s wore on, Western actors

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resorted to increasingly direct intervention strategies in an effort to weaken the Milošević regime

and turn its supporters against it. During the armed conflict in Bosnia, EU countries placed heavy

economic sanctions on Yugoslavia, which laid waste to its already fragile economy in the midst

of restructuring. These sanctions began in 1992 and lasted until 1995 when Milošević signed the

Dayton Peace Agreement to end the conflict in Bosnia. When conflict erupted in Kosovo four

years later, Western actors—mainly NATO and the USA—unleashed their most direct and

immediately destructive form of intervention. NATO dropped bombs on military outposts in

Kosovo and on Serbia’s capital city, Belgrade, in an effort to end Serb military aggression

against Kosovo as it attempted to secede (MccGwire, 2000).

Economic sanctions and bombings produced more immediate, salient effects than peace-

keeping forces and diplomatic negotiations. They aimed to go above and beyond relatively

indirect intervention strategies. By dropping bombs on strategic political and military targets,

Western actors attempted to limit the Milošević regime’s ability to operate politically and

militarily (Johnstone, 2002). By weakening Yugoslavia’s economy, Western actors also hoped to

put pressure on the Milošević regime by reducing its access to financial resources and turning

people in Yugoslavia against him (Escriba-Folch and Wright, 2010).

However, these direct intervention strategies produced several counterintuitive effects.

Economic sanctions and bombs, in Belgrade especially, disrupted every aspect of daily life and

reinvigorated the feelings of tension and uncertainty that had helped to produce the Milošević

regime in the first place. The unintended consequences of direct intervention strategies were

twofold. First, sanctions and bombs helped Milošević rally his supporters around him in

opposition from the perceived attacks from the West. Second, the disruption of daily life

prevented sociability and the development of civil society organizations to actively oppose

20

Milošević. In both these ways, sanctions and bombs helped the Milošević regime maintain its

strength. Direct intervention from the West thereby interacted with and strengthened the

domestic forces that had thus far produced and maintained the regime.

1.6. Lessons from Western Intervention in Yugoslavia

Western intervention’s interaction with domestic forces highlights the importance of

understanding the domestic situation into which international actors choose to intervene.

Yugoslavia was not the first country where Western actors like the USA, the UN, and NATO

chose to become involved, as they did so on many occasions during the Cold War in opposition

to the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia has also not been the last case of Western intervention. Since

2001, the “War on Terror” has led Western actors, especially the USA, to intervene politically,

economically, and militarily in several countries in South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The

direct intervention strategies that produced immediate, salient physical and economic effects in

Yugoslavia, i.e. sanctions and bombs, have been repeated in many other intervention campaigns.

In many cases, Western actors have sought to weaken and even replace authoritarian regimes—

as well as non-state political actors—that sponsor violence both domestically and internationally.

In the cases of Iraq, Iran, and Syria, the use of sanctions and air strikes against governments and

non-state actors recalls the direct intervention strategies that Western actors used to combat the

Milošević regime in the 1990s. The repetition of history is readily apparent.

In Belgrade, the 20th century ended with a very real bang, with 78 days of intermittent

NATO bombings. The explosions represented the final and most direct form of Western

intervention in Yugoslavia. However, in retrospect they symbolized the beginning of a new era

of Western intervention campaigns in the interest of global security, human rights, capitalism,

21

and democracy. The question of whether Western actors should continue such campaigns is

difficult to answer. The present research only scratches the surface of that discussion. However,

given that Western intervention campaigns continue in countries around the world, the lessons of

intervention in Yugoslavia and its unintended consequences must be kept in mind. The present

research demonstrates why knowledge of intervention’s unintended consequences is

indispensable.

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Chapter 2: Yugoslavia’s Post-Socialist Transition of the 1990s

The early 1990s were a period of rapid change as the Cold War came to an end. The

future of the Eastern Bloc in particular became uncertain, as communist ideologies began to

disintegrate. The political, economic, and social transformations that unfolded during and after

the fall of communist systems were complex. Even after 25 years, scholars have still not fully

disentangled the many dynamics of these transformations. Scholars continue to study the

changes that occurred in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) towards the end of the 20th century.

The political, economic, and social dimensions of the post-Cold War transitions varied greatly

throughout the CEE region. How was Yugoslavia’s transition during the 1990s similar to the

transitions occurring in other CEE countries, and how was it different?

The political, economic, and social transitions in Yugoslavia and other CEE countries

shared many historical, structural, and theoretical similarities. However, there are two reasons

why Yugoslavia’s transition stands out from the post-Cold War transitions in other countries.

First, Yugoslavia’s home-grown system of self-managing socialism was more open and flexible

than the communist systems that the Soviet Union imposed upon many CEE countries. To

underscore this difference, I refer to Yugoslavia’s political, economic, and social system as one

of socialism, in contrast to communist systems in other CEE countries. Second, Yugoslavia’s

economic transition toward capitalism and democracy coincided with an abrupt transition from a

federation to a war-torn collection of successor states. These qualitative differences influenced

the particular trajectory of Yugoslavia’s post-Cold War transition.

This chapter presents the similarities and differences between the post-socialist transition

in Yugoslavia and the post-communist transitions in other CEE countries. I start by analyzing the

major similarities, which are threefold. First, Yugoslavia and other countries in CEE experienced

23

a shared history under communist political and economic institutions during the Cold War.

Second, these countries undertook structurally similar political, economic, and social transitions

after the Cold War. Third, the transitions these countries undertook can be explained through

three overlapping international relations theories: Liberalism, realism, and constructivism. After

analyzing these three major similarities, I examine the factors that set Yugoslavia’s post-socialist

transition apart from the post-communist transitions of other CEE countries. The differences are

twofold. First, the unwinding of Yugoslavia’s home-grown system of socialism, which was more

open and flexible than other communist systems, implied both a physical and an ideological

fracturing of Yugoslavia. Second, the collapse of Yugoslav “Brotherhood and Unity” caused

political and economic devastation that interfered with the processes of transition like

privatization and democratization. Because of these differences, Yugoslavia’s post-socialist

transition stands out from the post-communist transitions of CEE countries.

2.1. Similarities between Yugoslavia and Other CEE Countries

Before one can understand what made Yugoslavia’s post-Cold War transition different

from other transitions in CEE, one must first acknowledge the many similarities among those

many transitions. How was the post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia similar to the post-

communist transitions in other CEE countries? Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition and other

countries’ post-communist transitions during the 1990s were similar in their Cold War histories,

the structure of the transitions—politically, economically, and socially—and the ideological

forces at play in those transitions. These three major similarities originated in the shared history

among Yugoslavia and other CEE countries of influence from the political, economic, and social

aspects of communism.

24

2.1.1. A Shared History: The Cold War and the Post-Cold War Period

Why were Yugoslavia and CEE countries considered part of the same region, namely the

Eastern Bloc? The unifying similarities between Yugoslavia and other CEE countries have many

historical roots. The origins of both Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition and CEE countries

post-communist transitions are rooted in the division of Europe during the Cold War and the

influx of Western political and economic systems that came afterwards starting in 1989.

For almost 50 years, since the end of the Second World War, Europe was divided

politically and economically between East and West. The countries of Western Europe embraced

economic systems of free market capitalism and political systems of democracy. Meanwhile the

countries of the Eastern Bloc—namely the republics of the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe and

Central Asia, the Soviet Union’s buffer states in CEE, and Yugoslavia—ascribed to various

systems of communism with planned economies managed by centralized authoritarian

governments (Djilas, 1957). During the half-century known as the Cold War, these two blocs of

countries remained strictly separate from one another with few political and economic

cooperation between them. The seemingly impenetrable border down the middle has been

referred to metaphorically as the Iron Curtain.

During the Cold War, communism was the predominant influence on societies

throughout the Eastern Bloc, in CEE countries as well as in Yugoslavia. For roughly half a

century, communist ideas and systems shaped the political, economic, social, and cultural

systems of these societies. Both Yugoslavia and other CEE countries featured planned

economies, centralized authoritarian governments, and civil societies that embraced charity

work, social services, and education (Åslund, 2013). Communism remained the reigning

ideology in Yugoslavia and other CEE countries until close to the end of the 20th century. On

25

November 9, 1989, the Berlin Wall opened, and the strict division between East and West began

to disappear.

In the years after the end of the Cold War, the former Iron Curtain became a selectively

permeable membrane. While the exchange of people, goods, and communication between the

two sides of Europe increased dramatically, ideas did not flow equally between East and West.

Western political and economic values diffused rapidly into the former Eastern Bloc. Communist

systems quickly began to unravel, and Western systems of capitalism and democracy started to

replace them. The transition from communism to capitalism and democracy took place through a

variety of economic and political reforms, such as the privatization of formerly state-owned

industries and the creation of multi-party electoral systems (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013;

Åslund, 2013). As these political and economic reforms took place throughout the 1990s and into

the early 2000s, formerly communist and socialist systems began to resemble Western capitalist,

democratic systems. In both Yugoslavia and other CEE countries, the processes of political,

economic, and social transition followed similar structural guidelines.

2.1.2. Similar Structures of Transition

What structural form did the post-Cold War transitions in the Eastern Bloc assume? The

transitions in Yugoslavia and other CEE countries shared many common structural themes as

their communist-based systems unraveled. Both in Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition and in

other CEE countries’ post-communist transitions, reforms centered around three forms of

transition. First, a transition from weak institutions to strong state institutions that enforced the

rule of law. Second, a transition from centrally planned economies to free markets. Third, a

transition from authoritarianism to democracy (Offe and Adler, 1991).

26

These three forms of transition overlapped with one another, since processes central to

each form of transition relied on each of the other two forms (Subotić, 2015). For example,

institution-building and democracy-building were profoundly linked through the establishment

of effective electoral systems (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). Political and economic nstitution-

building also overlapped with economic transition through the restructuring of planned

economies and the privatization of state-owned firms. Finally, democracy and free-market

systems shared a deep ideological bond through the principles of individual freedoms and rights,

as advertised by Western capitalist systems. These three forms of transition also overlapped

temporally, as none of the three could be fully completed before the others began. The post-Cold

War transitions were therefore a balancing act of dismantling and rebuilding institutions while

they still needed to function politically and economically. Because of this challenge, the

transitions of the Cold War era in the Eastern Bloc have been referred to metaphorically as

“rebuilding the ship at sea” (Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998).

The restructuring of planned economies to create free markets and the process of

democratization are the two most commonly discussed structural themes in academic literature

on both the post-communist and the post-socialist transitions (Åslund, 2013). Further

commonalities between the transitions in Yugoslavia and other CEE countries included reducing

corruption among elites and beginning the process of EU integration (White, Lewis, and Batt,

2013). In pursuing these political and economic goals, the post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia

and the post-communist transitions in other CEE countries shared in an overarching discourse

about political, economic, and social transition towards systems of capitalism and democracy.

27

2.1.3. Similar Discourses of Transition: Liberalism, Realism, and Constructivism

Why did formerly communist and socialist societies change toward capitalism and

democracy? Three potential explanations for the post-Cold War transitions in the Eastern Bloc

arose under separate but overlapping theories in international relations: Liberalism, realism and

constructivism.

Liberal scholars believe post-communist and post-socialist transitions are part of the

inevitable progress of humanity towards the most effective systems of government and

economics (Huntington, 1991). Realists believe external actors—such as the EU, the USA, and

the UN—are using tools of power politics to produce and perpetuate these transitions for their

own benefit (Tudoroiu, 2008). Constructivists combine these two opposing perspectives, arguing

that the actions of powerful actors are instrumental for the spread of political and economic

norms around the world (Galbraith, 2014).

Together, these three theories explain how and why Yugoslavia and other CEE countries

transitioned from communist-based systems to capitalism and democracy during the post-Cold

War era. Realism explains how external—primarily Western—actors used political, economic,

and normative tools to implement capitalist and democratic reforms in Yugoslavia and CEE

(Åslund, 2013; Galbraith, 2014). Western actors justified their involvement under a liberal

narrative that capitalism and democracy would improve living standards for people in

Yugoslavia and CEE countries (Tudoroiu, 2008). Constructivism explains how Western actors’

use of liberal narratives to justify their use of realist power tools to spread capitalist and

democratic systems and values produced a “cascade” of democratization and privatization

around the world in the 1990s (Galbraith, 2014: 50).

The claim that capitalist and democratic reforms will make societies in the Eastern Bloc

better off, in terms of economic growth and the number of parties represented in government, is a

28

normative statement. In liberal theory, the goals of post-communist and post-socialist reforms,

i.e. free markets and democracies, are often accepted and defended without question (Fukuyama,

2006). According to liberal theorists, the end of the Cold War presented the people of the Eastern

Bloc with the opportunity to build better governments and economies for themselves (Erdogan,

2013). Scholars who adopt a liberal perspective often refer to the post-communist and post-

socialist transitions as part of a “Third Wave” of democracy around the world—after two

previous waves of democratization in North America and Western Europe in the past few

centuries (Huntington, 1991; Levitsky, 2015). The narrative of the “Third Wave” is highly

teleological, as it implies that all governments in the world will eventually assume an optimal

democratic structure.

The belief that post-Cold War transitions will inevitably produce systems of capitalism

and democracy is entirely subjective (Rist, 2014; Lindblom, 2001). Realist scholars are apt to

disagree with the teleological “Third Wave” narrative. The term “transition” implies only that

countries in the Eastern Bloc were moving away from their previous political, economic, and

social systems. The term does not imply that the systems that would come to replace communism

and socialism would be necessarily better than communism or socialism (Ramet, 2013). Realists

argue that the post-Cold War transitions are open-ended processes that could produce many

different political or economic systems. According to realism, ower politics, i.e. competition

among actors seeking to influence these transitions, eventually decide what political and

economic systems emerge (Tudoroiu, 2008). The realist school of thought does not assume that

all societies will eventually embrace capitalism and democracy. The spread of these originally

Western systems relies instead on the efforts of powerful actors to perpetuate the systems

themselves (Nye, 2011).

29

There is a large amount of empirical support for the realist interpretation of the post-

communist and post-socialist transitions. For one, these transitions have not always produced

capitalism and democracy. On the contrary, some countries have produced new dictatorships,

rather than consolidated democracies. Such has been the case in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other

countries in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Holmes, 2013; Åslund, 2013; Cooley, 2012).

Other states have produced multi-party systems, but with little political stability (White, Lewis,

and Batt, 2013). Still others have installed new leadership under a guise of democracy, yet the

same systems of power and corruption remain from the communist period, just with new faces

attached—Russia would be a good example (Wegren, 2013).

Scholars who interpret the post-communist and post-socialist transitions from the realist

perspective would not necessarily classify these outcomes as failures or retrogressions in global

progress towards democracy. Rather, realists would tend to define such transitions as merely the

process of a country replacing an old political or economic system with a new one, with no

assumption that the new system must be democratic or capitalist in nature. The narrative of a

Third Wave towards democracy and free markets is absent from the realist interpretation of the

post-Cold War transitions.

Liberal and realist theories have greatly contrasting interpretations of the post-communist

and post-socialist transitions. However, these theories are not complete opposites of one another.

Constructivist theory identifies the overlap between liberalism and realism (Galbraith, 2014). As

liberal theorists expected, many post-Cold War transitions have resulted in free markets, free and

fair elections, and EU integration in CEE (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013). This trend toward

capitalism and democracy provides evidence for the Third Wave narrative of liberal theory

(Huntington, 1991; Levitsky, 2015). However, many post-Cold War transitions have produced

30

new systems of authoritarianism instead, providing a counterargument to liberal theory’s

teleological narrative. Realism argues that many countries in the Eastern Bloc have trended

toward capitalism and democracy during the post-Cold War era not because those are optimal

systems of economics and governance but because of the influences of outside actors. Realists

argue that powerful Western actors have been actively spreading systems and norms through

their own institutions—like the EU and NATO—and intervention strategies—like economic and

political reforms (Tudoroiu, 2008). Western actors used international institutions and reforms to

spread capitalist and democratic norms under a liberal theory. This interpretation of the post-

Cold War transitions lies at the heart of constructivist theory.

Western involvement in countries of the Eastern Bloc to build systems of capitalism and

democracy was paradoxical. Liberal theory reasons that the post-Cold War transitions provided

an opportunity for Yugoslavia and other CEE countries to advance politically and economically

toward democracy and capitalism. This vision served as the justification for Western actors to

become involved in the Eastern Bloc to help implement capitalist and democratic reforms.

However, Western actors’ decision to intervene to build systems of capitalism and democracy in

the Eastern Bloc undermines the liberal narrative that the rise of those systems was inevitable.

Western actors maintained the liberal narrative of the Third Wave of democracy, yet they

chose to direct the reform processes through their own institutions and reform efforts. Realist

theory explains why Western actors saw the need to become involved in the post-communist and

post-socialist transitions. The USA, the EU, the UN, and other actors implemented political and

economic reforms to ensure that free markets and democracy would develop in the Eastern Bloc

and provide Western countries with more access to markets (Irwin, 2002; Harvey, 2005). Yet

while Western actors engaged in economic restructuring and democratization to enhance their

31

own economic power, they maintained the liberal narrative that capitalism and democracy were

optimal systems that would allow countries in the Eastern Bloc to prosper.

Constructivism untangles this paradox. According to constructivist theorists, capitalism

and democracy did not begin to replace communism in the Eastern Bloc because they were

superior systems of economics and democracy. Rather, powerful Western actors used their own

institutions and reform efforts to build capitalist and democratic systems and promote capitalist

and democratic norms in the Eastern Bloc. The observed trend toward capitalism and democracy

in this region, as well as in other parts of the world, is therefore due to powerful Western actors

using realist power tools to pursue liberal goals.

The post-Cold War transitions in the Eastern Bloc shared many historical, structural, and

theoretical similarities. The collapse of communist systems and the influx of capitalist and

democratic norms occurred in many CEE countries, as well as in Yugoslavia. However, not all

post-Cold War transitions assumed similar trajectories. Several aspects of Yugoslavia’s post-

socialist transition set it apart from the post-communist transitions of other CEE countries.

2.2. Differences between the Post-Communist and Post-Socialist Transitions

Which factors set the post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia apart from the post-

communist transitions in other CEE countries? Two particular differences make Yugoslavia a

compelling case study for research. First, the people of Yugoslavia found their experience with a

home-grown system of self-managing socialism—a more open and flexible variation of

communism—was far more positive than many other countries’ experiences with the type of

communism that the Soviet Union imposed upon them. Second, Yugoslavia’s post-socialist

transition coincided with its abrupt and violent breakdown into a collection of successor states.

32

The armed conflicts that broke out in Yugoslavia interfered with the political and economic

reforms for building strong institutions, prospering economies, and democratic political systems.

Both differences that set Yugoslavia apart from other CEE countries originated in Yugoslavia’s

Cold War history as a multiethnic federation that implemented its own version of communism.

2.2.1. Different Experiences with Communism in Yugoslavia and CEE

How did Yugoslavia’s experience with communist ideologies differ from the experiences

of other CEE countries? In the 1950s, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union—which had previously

shared strong diplomatic ties—underwent a political and ideological split. Tito’s government

began reforming its communist-based political and economic systems. The aim of these reforms

was to avoid some of the shortcomings of the Soviet Union’s strict version communism, such as

economic rigidity in the face of changing supply and demand (Swain, 2010). These reforms

created a hybrid economic system called self-managing socialism that incorporated features of

both communist and capitalist economies. Self-managing socialism differed from Soviet

communism in many ways. It allowed for some free market mechanisms like property rights and

competition in marketplaces. The system was also much more open than Soviet communism, and

people in Yugoslavia were free to travel to other countries, including countries in Western

Europe (Grandits and Taylor, 2010).

Yugoslavia’s self-managing socialism was considered a home-grown system, and it was

at once a political, economic, and social way of life that many people in Yugoslavia considered

to be their own (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Velikonja, 2012). The economic system of self-

managing socialism was also intertwined with Yugoslavia’s social ideology of “Brotherhood and

Unity.” This narrative, of many ethnic groups living together in a multiethnic federation,

33

enhanced the belief that Yugoslavia—as a multiethnic society with its own federal and economic

systems—was a home-grown inclusive project.

Communism, on the other hand, was imposed upon many countries, especially in CEE, at

the end of the Second World War. By the 1980s, civil societies in many countries like the Czech

Republic and Hungary were up in arms against the communist system that many people

considered oppressive (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). These protests helped lead to political

reforms under the Soviet Union’s General Secretary of the Communist Union Mikhail

Gorbachev. Gorbachev implemented new policies of glasnost (openness) and perestroika

(restructuring), which effectively granted the buffer states in Central Europe a means for self-

determination. These same reforms also soon spelled the end of the Soviet Union in 1991

(Åslund, 2013). To the protestors in Central Europe, these reforms were a reprieve from an

oppressive political and economic system.

The same was not true in Yugoslavia. As socialist state structures unraveled in the wake

of Tito’s death in 1980, many people in Yugoslavia lamented the dismantling of their home-

grown economic system that had produced several decades of peace, relative prosperity, and

openness in Southeast Europe (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). The dismantling of Yugoslavia’s

central ideologies, including not only self-managing socialism but also “Brotherhood and Unity,”

produced many more devastating effects than in CEE countries. As socialism began to crumble,

so too did the federation itself.

2.2.2. The Post-Socialist Transition and the Breakdown of Yugoslavia

How did the disintegration of Yugoslavia affect the federation’s post-socialist transition?

The violent breakdown of the federation interfered with the already complex processes of

34

political, economic, and social transition during the 1990s. Yugoslavia was already in the midst

of restructuring its economy, establishing a system of democracy, and building new political and

economic institutions (Offe and Adler, 1991). Like many countries, Yugoslavia experienced a

significant drop in GDP during the restructuring process, with an almost 12 percent economic

contraction between 1989 and 1990 (UN Statistics Division, 2015). This struggle underscored

the difficulty of undergoing many transitions while still trying to maintain stable economies and

political parties, i.e. the metaphor of rebuilding the ship at sea (Elster, Offe, and Preuss, 1998).

As the multiethnic federation of Yugoslavia started to splinter, a series of wars of

secession broke out as first Slovenia, Croatia, and Macedonia (1991), then Bosnia (1993), and

then later Kosovo (1999), each declared secession from Yugoslavia. In each case, severe

political, economic, and social turmoil quickly ensued. These additional transitions, of peace to

war and of federalism to secession, further complicated the already shaky process of

transitioning from socialism to capitalism and democracy as the federal structure of Yugoslavia

splintered into pieces (Subotić, 2015).

2.3. Conclusion

How was Yugoslavia’s post-Cold War transition similar to and different from the

transitions in other CEE countries? While the post-Cold War transitions throughout the Eastern

Bloc shared many historical, structural, and theoretical similarities, several important factors set

the transition in Yugoslavia apart from the transitions in other CEE countries during the 1990s.

The post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia and the post-communist transitions in other

CEE countries share many similarities in their historical origins, their structured processes, and

their theoretical explanations. All of these transitions stemmed from histories of communist

35

influence before and even during the Cold War and the influx of capitalist and democratic forces

from the West once the Cold War had ended. These Western forces enacted many similar types

of reforms throughout the Eastern Bloc, including establishing free markets and electoral

systems. The international relations theories of liberalism, realism, and constructivism together

explain the involvement of Western actors in the reform processes in the Eastern Bloc.

Western actors assisted in economic restructuring and democratization to extend their

own political and economic power into the former Eastern Bloc. While they thus demonstrated

their own vested interests in promoting capitalism and democracy around the world, Western

actors justified their involvement with a liberal narrative that capitalism and democracy were

optimal systems that would make societies in the Eastern Bloc better off. Constructivist theory

reconciles the paradox of Western actors using realist power tools to achieve liberal goals that

were allegedly inevitable. According to constructivists, capitalism and democracy developed in

the Eastern Bloc because Western actors used their own institutions and reform efforts to spread

capitalist and democratic systems and norms.

Despite these historical, structural, and theoretical similarities, two additional factors set

Yugoslavia’s transition apart from other CEE countries’ transitions. First, the collapse of

Yugoslavia’s home-grown system of self-managing socialism undermined the stability of the

federation itself. Second, the additional problems of wars of secession and armed conflicts

further complicated Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition. These additional complications

resulted in dramatic and destructive consequences—politically, economically, and socially. One

major consequence was the rise of authoritarian regimes in Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. The

next chapter explains the rise of the Milošević regime in the Republic of Serbia.

36

Chapter 3: Domestic Forces and the Rise of Milošević

The political, economic, and social transitions occurring in Yugoslavia during the late

1980s and early 1990s produced several new leaders in the wake of Tito’s death. With no

predetermined successor for Tito, political elites in many Yugoslav republics and provinces took

the opportunity to expand their respective political influences (Jović, 2001). In the Republic of

Serbia, the most prominent of these ascending leaders was Slobodan Milošević. Between 1987

and 1989, Milošević gathered a massive following of Serbs to protest against the then President

of the Republic of Serbia, Ivan Stambolić. In 1988, Stambolić was forced to resign, and in 1990

Milošević himself became President of the Republic of Serbia. Milošević remained president for

eight years, after which he became President of Yugoslavia in 1997. Milošević’s rapid rise to and

lengthy tenure in power is remarkable (Silber and Little, 1996). How was Milošević able to

garner such ardent support from people in Serbia in only a few years and then maintain that

support for almost a decade?

Milošević did not single-handedly create his regime. Not only did a ring of political and

military institutions surround him, but the protests of everyday people allowed the regime to

claim democratic legitimacy (Andrejevich, 2005). The Milošević regime rallied this crucial

popular support from everyday people by tapping into three key patterns of domestic forces in

Yugoslavia: Uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism (Golubović, 2004; Guzina, 2003).

This chapter examines the domestic support base of the Milošević regime, which can be

visualized as a house resting on three pillars: uncertainty (Pillar I), traditionalism (Pillar II), and

nationalism (Pillar III). Each pillar originated in patterns of domestic forces within Yugoslav

society. The Milošević regime proved itself adept at manipulating those domestic forces to its

advantage. First, I explain how the rapidly changing political, economic, and social landscape of

37

Yugoslavia produced a sense of uncertainty and provided a window of opportunity for the

Milošević regime to emerge. Second, I analyze traditional systems of politics and values in

Yugoslavia which made Milošević an appealing candidate for leadership in this time of

uncertainty. Third and finally, I investigate the ideology of nationalism at the core of the

Milošević regime’s narratives and policies. I shall begin with Pillar I, uncertainty, which

provided the opportunity for the Milošević regime to emerge.

3.1. Pillar I: Uncertainty

How did the Milošević regime arise from a period of uncertainty? Pillar I of the three-

pillar model represents the political, economic, and social forces pulling Yugoslavia apart during

its post-socialist transition. The causes of this period of tense and even violent uncertainty in

Yugoslavia are many and varied. After Tito’s death in 1980, political, economic, and social

uncertainty began to pervade people’s lives in Yugoslavia. This uncertainty manifested itself in

the wars of secession in the 1990s, as Yugoslav affiliation dwindled in favor of national

affiliations. Uncertainty has also persisted until the present day as the future of the Yugoslav

successor states remains in flux (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). Despite the complexity of

uncertainty’s origins, the Milošević regime proved itself adept at manipulating the uncertainty to

its advantage.

3.1.1. Origins of Uncertainty: Crisis and Transition

The period of crisis that gripped Yugoslavia at the end of the 20th century was as complex

as it was devastating. The 1990s in particular were a decade of chaos because of the four wars of

secession and the resulting armed ethnic conflicts. The inciting incident for the violent

38

breakdown of Yugoslavia is often said to be the death of Tito in 1980 (Silber and Little, 1996).

Without its leader of almost half a century, Yugoslavia’s future as a multiethnic federation was

suddenly hanging in the balance.

Many scholars, if not most, are skeptical of this theory that Tito’s death alone caused

Yugoslavia to break apart (Jović, 2001). Divisions among Yugoslavia’s republics and provinces

can be traced back to even before Tito’s death. Two related developments created deep rifts

among Yugoslavia’s republics during the 1970s and 1980s. One, economic crises with uneven

effects across Yugoslavia. Two, latent but growing political narratives of separatism within

individual republics and provinces (Golubović 2004).

The first division was the unequal spread of the effects of the economic crisis that hit

Yugoslavia during the 1980s (Woodward, 1995). As Yugoslavia’s system of self-managing

socialism began to unravel, its economy sagged with debt, which produced overall stagnation

and even outright collapse in many economic sectors. Appendix 5 compares the economic output

in several sectors between the poorer and richer portions of Yugoslavia, demonstrating how

some republics were far more prosperous than others. The unemployment data in Appendix 4

also demonstrate how these inequalities only became wider when crisis struck in the mid-1980s.

Slovenia, the richest of the republics, weathered the crisis fairly well, with its unemployment rate

remaining below 3 percent. Meanwhile Bosnia, a less wealthy republic, saw its unemployment

rate rise from 16 percent to almost 25 percent. The autonomous province of Kosovo, the poorest

territory in Yugoslavia of all, suffered the worst. Between 1980 and 1988, Kosovo’s already high

unemployment rate of 40 percent shot up to more than 57 percent (Woodward, 1995; Petak,

2003).

39

The unequal effects of the economic crisis called Yugoslav unity into question. It was

clear that economic integration within Yugoslavia had not prevented—and perhaps even had

exacerbated—economic inequality among republics and provinces (Petak, 2003). Slovenia, for

example, was known for importing Kosovo’s plentiful natural resources and profiting off of

cheap labor in the province. This dynamic economic power would help explain why Slovenia

was much more resilient to the economic crisis than Kosovo (Jović, 2001). While economic

inequality among republics and provinces existed for decades, the economic crisis of the 1980s

further highlighted the unequal power different republics and provinces had in their integrated

economy (Woodward, 1995).

The second major division among republics and provinces was political in nature, as

elites debated the future of Yugoslavia’s federal structure. A steady increase in the “aspirations

of the national political elites to rule in ‘their’ states,” threatened to undermine Tito’s multiethnic

federation of Southern Slavs (Golubović, 2004: 84). Tito is often hailed a political hero for

creating harmony among Southern Slavs under the motto of “Brotherhood and Unity”

(Velikonja, 2012). However, scholars often question whether the federation, beneath its

rhetorical surface, actually created a deep sense of unity between people in Yugoslavia (Silber

and Little, 1996). The violent breakdown of the federation after Tito’s death raises doubts about

the underlying integrity of “Brotherhood and Unity.” Some scholars even argue that the fall of

Yugoslavia was inevitable, because its unity was imposed by its founders. The Yugoslav project,

these scholars argue, was therefore doomed to collapse once its original founders had passed

away, at which point Southern Slavs would re-separate into several smaller nations (Sekulić,

Massey, and Hodson, 2013).

40

Many people argue that the ideology of “Brotherhood and Unity” did trickle down

through all levels of society. Some scholars cite the increase in interethnic marriages in socialist

Yugoslavia to argue that the multiethnic federation of Southern Slavs produced a deep sense of

interethnic social cohesion (Smits, 2010). Other scholars reference the camaraderie of workplace

unions and other charity organizations that united people of all ethnicities in Yugoslav civil

society (Velikonja, 2012). Census data also support the argument that “Brotherhood and Unity”

influenced the lives of everyday people, including their processes of identity construction. Up

until the 1980s, thousands of people in Yugoslavia reported they considered themselves

ethnically Yugoslav, rather than Serb, Croat, or another individual nationality (Gordy, 2010). In

many ways, the Yugoslav project produced very real on-the-ground effects that brought many

groups of people together within a multiethnic federation.

Other scholars disagree. Some argue that “Brotherhood and Unity” did not always trickle

down, particularly not to local elites or the intelligentsia (Guzina, 2003). Historical narratives of

Yugoslavia that emphasize interethnic social cohesion may be ignoring this rejection of the

Yugoslav project within some circles (Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, 2013). Rejection of

“Brotherhood and Unity” did not always remain latent in the time of Yugoslavia. Tito had to

make serious efforts to quell separatist uprisings from all corners of Yugoslavia during the mid-

1900s (Silber and Little, 1996). Despite the eventual failure of such uprisings, separatist voices

persisted.

The persistence of religious institutions in a secular socialist society is also evidence that

some groups within Yugoslavia posed alternative ideologies to “Brotherhood and Unity.” In

many cases in Yugoslavia, religious identity and ethnic identity were tightly intertwined. Thus

the Catholic Church in Croatia and the Serbian Orthodox Church, which were allowed to exist as

41

part of Yugoslavia’s experimentation with flexible communism, posed challenges to

“Brotherhood and Unity” across ethnic lines within a politically secular federation (Ramet, 1982;

Buchenau, 2005).

Intellectual and religious challenges to the Yugoslav project and the ideology of

“Brotherhood and Unity” lead some scholars to argue that Tito’s government manufactured

interethnic solidarity in a top-down political process. By this logic, the ideology of “Brotherhood

and Unity” would only last as long as Tito and the institutions of the Yugoslav federal

government were there to perpetuate it (Guzina, 2003; Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, 2013).

Many scholars still disagree, particularly in the post-socialist period as “Yugonostalgia”—a

nostalgia for the traditions of the socially cohesive multiethnic federation—afflicts many people

living in the Yugoslav successor states (Velikonja, 2012: 13).

No matter the strength of Yugoslavia’s ideology of unity among Southern Slavs, the

intellectual circles pushing for separatism gained significant leverage in the 1970s. In 1976, the

federal government of Yugoslavia drafted a new constitution. The document granted republics

and provinces more autonomy from the central government (Jović, 2001). The 1976 constitution

was both a product of separatism and a push for more of it, as it gave elites in the Yugoslavia

republics and provinces “both the form and the substance of national existence and political

power” (Guzina, 2003: 95). In the following decades, particularly after Tito’s death, the

republics’ new-found national existence quickly led to the complete breakdown of the federation

by the early 2000s. In 2006, Montenegro and Serbia, the last two republics of Yugoslavia, finally

severed ties.

Tito’s death alone did not produce the economic and political dilemmas which called the

feasibility of the Yugoslav federation into question. Rather, both underlying discontent with

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economic inequality and the new rise of authoritarian leaders were apparent long before Tito’s

death. The push for less centralized governance resulted in a new constitution in Yugoslavia in

1976, granting more autonomy to the individual republics, four years before Tito died in 1980.

The uncertainty of Yugoslavia’s future therefore did not stem solely from the death of its

figurehead. Rather, uncertainty and disagreement about whether Yugoslavia could or should

continue to exist grew out of many long-term political and economic developments. Tito’s death

did play an important part in the equation, as it removed even more of the limitations preventing

elites from further deconstructing Yugoslavia. The unwinding of the central government,

combined with economic stagnation and inequality, set the occasion for other centripetal forces

within Yugoslavia to produce new leaders once Tito had passed away.

While the period of uncertainty and chaos of the late 1980s and the 1990s arose from

forces predating the Milošević regime, the regime took advantage of uncertainty and its ripple

effects. With no more Tito and no clear direction for the future of the federation, the emerging

Milošević regime manipulated widespread uncertainty to its advantage.

3.1.2. The Milošević Regime’s Manipulation of Uncertainty

How did widespread uncertainty help the Milošević regime ascend to power? As

economic inequality and separatism exacerbated divides among republics and provinces, the

future of Yugoslavia, and particularly the future of power relations among the Yugoslav

republics and provinces, remained open. For the Milošević regime, widespread uncertainty

meant that people in the Republic of Serbia were looking for a new form of leadership. To gain

power, the Milošević regime used political rhetoric and media to present itself as the new

leadership that people in the Republic of Serbia needed.

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By the late 1980s, the political and economic situation in Yugoslavia could easily have

been termed a crisis (Gorodetskaya, 2013). There is a feature of crisis of which political leaders

are often aware: It is a period not only of challenge but also of opportunity (Bozić-Roberson,

2004). A society facing a multifaceted and possibly even existential crisis is ripe for transition to

an entirely new political, economic, or social system. In cases like the breakdown of Yugoslavia,

the competition of elites and their ideologies would decide what that transition would produce.

Political leaders who can claim they enjoy popular support and have the people’s best interests at

heart have a better chance of steering the transition in a direction which suits their own

preferences and will allow them to maintain power.

One strategy for seizing and strengthening popular support entails identifying with large

groups of constituents on national or ethnic grounds, and providing them with ‘targets’ of sorts

towards which they can direct their political attention. In a time of uncertainty, people tend to

seek out, not necessarily consciously, two major targets (Bozić-Roberson, 2004). The first target

is a charismatic leader whom they can trust and rally around to represent their interests,

especially a leader who appeals to some component of their personal identity. The second target

is often a scapegoat for the problems that are causing their uncertainty, particularly a group of

people whom they consider ‘others,’ who do not share that part of their political, ethnic, or

national identity which binds them to their leader.

In a period of crisis and uncertainty, an ascending political leader can choose to gain

support by “creat[ing] fear and hate and direct[ing] major frustrations of … people against

specific groups” (Bozić-Roberson, 2004: 396). Painting the target group of ‘others’ as the

villains more than satisfies the need for someone to blame for uncertainty. A political leader who

can identify such a group of ‘others’ and convince people to blame that group for the current

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struggles of the time, has an advantage for gaining power in a period of crisis. The political and

rhetorical power that a leader accumulates is instrumental for guiding a transition into the future,

a transition that allegedly will end the period of crisis for the leader’s supporters.

The two-target theory—of people seeking both a charismatic leader and a scapegoat—

applies to many other cases of ascending authoritarian leaders in history. The most notable

example would be Adolf Hitler in post-Weimar Germany when the National Socialist (Nazi)

party garnered support by appealing to pride in German ethnicity and vilifying countless groups

of “others,” most notably Jewish immigrants from Russia and Eastern Europe. The two-targets

theory also applies to more current cases, in both Europe and the USA. In contemporary cases,

extreme right-wing political candidates use anti-immigrant narratives to gain political support,

laying the blame for economic stagnation or unemployment on immigrants or other ethnic or

religious minority groups (Bleich, 2011).

Milošević’s strategy for accruing power is a prime example of the two-targets theory. In

the midst of the post-Tito transition away from “Brotherhood and Unity” and self-managing

socialism, the Milošević regime called upon Serb identity to attract supporters and convert their

feelings of uncertainty into actions of hostility towards other ethnicities within the Yugoslav

federation—primarily Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians. In light of the political

and economic crises of the 1980s, the Milošević regime popularized ethnic rhetoric by blaming

the problems that Serbs faced in their republic on their original incorporation into the Yugoslav

project (Golubović, 2004).

Milošević argued that Serbs should focus on promoting the welfare of their own ethnic

brothers and sisters, in part through the establishment of a Serb nation-state. He blamed the

suffering of Serbs in past decades on other ethnicities weighing the Serbs down, as well as on

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Serbs’ own disunity throughout history. In his speech at Kosovo Polje in 1989, Milošević drew

parallels from what he called a Serb defeat during the battle with the Ottoman Empire to the

political crisis that plagued Serbia within Yugoslavia. In both cases, he blamed Serb disunity for

their alleged suffering:

If we lost the battle, it was due not only to the Turkish military superiority, but also to the

tragic discord of the Serbian state. The discord, the evil fate, followed the people

throughout its history... and later, in socialist Yugoslavia, [when] the Serbian leaders

remained divided, prone to compromises at the expense of their people. (Milošević 1987,

noted by Bozić-Roberson, 2004: 402)

Milošević criticized Serb participation in the Yugoslav project of “Brotherhood and

Unity” among Southern Slavs. He argued that Serb involvement in the creation of a multiethnic

state had compromised the interests and general welfare of Serbs. He called for Serbs to learn

from historical mistakes and to unite against other ethnicities, particularly in Croatia, Bosnia, and

Kosovo, during a time of uncertainty in which they had the opportunity to choose a new future

for themselves. By mobilizing Serbs around himself—roughly a third of Yugoslavia’s

population, Milošević capitalized on the collapse of “Brotherhood and Unity.” The crowds of

Serbs who came out into the streets to protest against Stambolić and other moderate politicians

were evidence that Milošević’s rhetoric and charisma were provocative (Andrejevich, 2005).

Protesters echoed Milošević’s accusations that Stambolić and other moderate leaders were so

invested in preserving Yugoslav unity that they were neglecting to protect the interests of Serbs

like themselves (Stevanović and Filipović, 2004).

Milošević’s manipulation of uncertainty produced its most dramatic effects during the

early to mid-1990s as four Yugoslav republics—Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Bosnia—

announced their secession from the federation. In each case, the Serb-dominated JNA stepped in

under Milošević’s oversight as the Republic of Serbia campaigned to keep those republics with

46

Serb minorities—especially Croatia and Bosnia—in the federation. The same pattern of events

occurred again in 1999 when Kosovo claimed it would secede as well. While the JNA sought to

prevent republics from seceding, the Milošević regime was simultaneously expanding his

political influence into other Yugoslav territories that had not yet declared secession. The

government in Serbia re-strengthened its political control over the autonomous provinces of

Kosovo and Vojvodina closer, denying them the additional freedoms they had been granted

under the new constitution in 1976. The Milošević regime also maintained close connections

with the government in the Republic of Montenegro, which many scholars have called a puppet

government for the Republic of Serbia (Silber and Little, 1996). Even as the JNA failed to

prevent other republics from seceding in the end, the Republic of Serbia still came to dominate

the rump of Yugoslavia by 1995. In a matter of six years, the Milošević regime had ascended to

become the most powerful political force in what remained of Yugoslavia.

Uncertainty was not a latent characteristic of Yugoslav society. It was most salient

towards the end of the 20th century, which contrasted dramatically with the period of peace,

stability, and openness under Tito. However, the roots of the uncertainty were fairly deep. The

political, economic, and social uncertainty that gripped Yugoslavia after Tito’s death can be

traced back to at least the 1980s. The domestic forces which produced the next two pillars of the

Milošević regime’s support base, traditionalism and nationalism, had even deeper historical

roots. Uncertainty, the product of a period of crisis, set the stage for Milošević to gain power.

But he could not have done so without strengthening two more pillars. Even in a period of

uncertainty, crisis, and tension, some domestic systems of politics and values remained intact.

Milošević took advantage of traditional patterns of political and social organization to continue

building his power once he had established himself as a charismatic leader.

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3.2. Pillar II: Traditionalism

How did long-standing political and social traditions assist in the creation and

maintenance of the Milošević regime? The regime formed its second supporting pillar by

exploiting traditional sociopolitical patterns within Yugoslav society. Two major political and

social forces in particular benefited the Milošević regime as it gained power: First, a long-

standing preference for authoritarian heads of state like Grandfather Tito; and second, a

historically underdeveloped civil society not directly engaged in political activism (Golubović,

2004).

This historically skewed preference for authoritarian styles of governance over strong

civil society participation in politics was central to the Milošević regime’s strategy as it rose to

power. The Milošević regime appealed to traditional preferences for authoritarian, father-like

leaders by shaped Milošević’s role as a political figurehead to emulate Tito (Golubović, 2004).

As the regime developed, it also benefited from and perpetuated the historical underdevelopment

of civil society in Yugoslavia. Opponents to Milošević had few avenues to organize against the

regime, and for many years the regime prevented opposition in civil society from developing.

Appealing to political and social traditions offered a semblance of familiarity in the face of

uncertainty in Yugoslavia. The narrative of all Serbs living in one state under the Milošević

regime’s rule also provided clear leadership and security to people in the Republic of Serbia

during the period of crisis gripping Yugoslavia.

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3.2.1. A Preference for Authoritarian Leadership

The death of Tito and the end of the Cold War spelled a rapid end to some of

Yugoslavia’s central ideologies like self-managing socialism and “Brotherhood and Unity.”

However, some political, economic, and social aspects of Yugoslavia persisted through the post-

socialist transition. Chief among these aspects appeared to be a continued preference for

authoritarian leaders and an authoritarian style of government. The political tradition of

authoritarianism in Yugoslavia centered around a powerful, even father-like figurehead, most

notably “Grandfather” Tito during the mid-1900s. Tito in particular developed a personality cult

for himself that made him a larger-than-life leader (Velikonja, 2012). Some scholars refer to this

style of rule as not just a form of authoritarianism but also a sort of paternalism (Golubović,

2004). In the 1980s and ‘90s, emerging political leaders like Milošević and Tudjman emulated

this style of rule.

The persistence of authoritarianism in Yugoslavia during the post-socialist transition

contrasts with the experiences of other post-communist countries, particularly those in Central

Europe. Some scholars suggest that the political histories of individual countries under

communism determined what sort of political regimes emerged in those countries after the end of

the Cold War. In countries that had been organized around authoritarian regimes with prominent

figureheads during the Cold War, authoritarian patterns of rule continued to persist into the

1990s (Lewis, 1997). This was particularly true of many countries in Eastern and Southeastern

Europe, including Yugoslavia, Ukraine, and Belarus (White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013).

The persistence of authoritarianism in countries like Yugoslavia contrasted with the

relatively more rapid shift towards democracy and multiparty systems seen in Central European

countries like Poland and the Czech Republic (Åslund, 2013). Historically, Central European

countries saw more resistance and civil society action against their governments and the strict

49

systems of communism and censorship those governments imposed than occurred in Yugoslavia

(Lewis, 1997). The major reason for this regional difference was the different roles that the

ideologies of communism and socialism played in these countries. In Central Europe,

communism was imposed during Soviet occupation. In Yugoslavia, on the other hand, the

system of self-managing socialism was home-grown and did not present itself as a kind of

foreign imposition (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Åslund 2013).

In the case of Yugoslavia, the rise of a new authoritarian leader in the form of Milošević

was reminiscent of the previous authoritarian regime under Tito. Tito’s and Milošević’s of

course bore significant differences. On the one hand, Milošević’s regime has been associated

with chaos because of the armed ethnic conflicts of the 1990s. Meanwhile Tito’s rule was

associated with peace and openness for several decades during the Cold War. On the other hand,

the institutions of Milošević’s regime claimed to be a reformed version of Tito’s single-party

dictatorship. As Yugoslavia’s socialist systems were deconstructed in the late 1980s, political

leaders implemented new democratic procedures, such as opposition party and regular free

elections (Levitsky and Way, 2010). The election of 1990, Milošević’s first victory, was the first

multiparty election held in the Republic of Serbia since the Second World War (Alexander,

2003). The integrity of these democratic reforms have come under significant scrutiny. Scholars

and journalists have questioned the election process in particular, ever since Milošević won re-

election in 1992. Many suspected him of rigging the elections in his favor (Glenny, 2006).

Democratic reforms still set Milošević’s government apart from Tito’s, however. Under Tito, the

KPJ had remained in power with very little opportunity for other parties to gain representation

(Seierstad, 2006).

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The inclusion of democratic elements in Milošević’s government such as more political

parties and elections may have made the Milošević regime sound more democratic, as it

appeared that people had more opportunities to participate in choosing their political leaders.

However, in the fifteen years since his fall from power, scholars have portrayed Milošević as an

obstacle to democratization in Yugoslavia and its successor states (Glynn, 1992; US Institute for

Peace, 1998). Scholars have also reported at length on the questionable integrity of Milošević’s

presidential elections and the orders his government made for opposition party leaders and media

to be fined, imprisoned, or killed (Glenny, 2006; Seierstad, 2006). The Milošević regime’s

“draconian media law” of 1998, which strengthened the power of the police to imprison, fine,

evict, or confiscate equipment from media deemed a danger to the regime, was a major example

of the regime’s direct opposition to freedom of the press and other institutions of democracy

(Armatta, 2003; Seierstad, 2006).

While armed ethnic conflicts, economic collapse, and NATO bombings do set the 1990s

apart from the decades under Tito, the structure and style of governance under Milošević was not

entirely different from what Yugoslavia had experienced throughout the 20th century. Under

Tito, many people in Yugoslav society adhered to “an authoritarian mentality, prone to

submission to the state-party authority” (Golubović, 2004: 83). Tito, as the so-called

“Grandfather of Yugoslavia,” was the epitome of a father-like leader, and as the acting head of

the state, the military, and the one and only major political party, his government can easily be

classified as one of centralized authoritarianism (Velikonja, 2012; Swain, 2010). While Tito

presided over a period of peace and relative openness in Yugoslavia compared to life in the

shadow of the Soviet Union, his government was still known for sending its political dissenters

to an island prison (Seierstad, 2006). Local and international narratives of Tito and Milošević are

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drastically different because of the peace that Tito maintained, versus the chaos that unraveled

under Milošević. However, the structures and tools for maintaining order that Tito and Milošević

both used bore many similarities.

The preference for authoritarian regimes in Southeast Europe, as well as elsewhere, is

rooted in traditions of collectivist values. In the Republic of Serbia, these values centered heavily

around the teachings of the Serbian Orthodox Church (Seierstad, 2006). In the case of Tito and

Milošević, authoritarianism transcended to paternalism. Paternalism refers to a type of

authoritarianism that “[not only] demands subordination to the goals of a supreme collectivity at

the expense of needs and interests of individuals, [but also encourages] respect for the authority

of the leader and the state as the pater familias” (Golubović, 2004: 89). This definition of

paternalism certainly conjures up memories of Grandfather Tito. It also recalls Milošević’s

rhetoric of “Greater Serbia” as a supreme collectivity. Because their rhetoric and charisma shared

many paternalistic traits, Milošević capitalized on many of the same values and rhetorical

strategies for gaining power that Tito had implemented under socialism. One particular strategy

both leaders used was the proliferation of a “personality cult,” a public image of being the

destined hero of the people (Golubović, 2004; Velikonja, 2012).

Positive forces of traditionalism—i.e. the presence of institutions and ideologies—in

Yugoslavia, including the preference for a powerful, father-like leader, were particularly strong

in rural areas with generally lower levels of education, a trend reflected in many other societies

across space and time (Seierstad, 2006). Age and gender affected adherence to traditional values

and structures as well. Yugoslavia’s older generations, especially men, were more apt to

prioritize political traditions when choosing which leaders to support (Golubović, 2004). Not

surprisingly, Milošević drew a significant amount of support from people in rural areas with

52

lower levels of education, especially men. Young people in urban centers such as Belgrade,

many with some university education, comprised much of Milošević’s opposition (Gordy, 2010).

The role of illiteracy in fueling the Milošević regime also comes into play when

investigating the positive forces of traditionalism. In the mid-20th century, Yugoslavia reached a

literacy rate of between 80 and 90 percent, slightly lower than in neighboring countries

(Golubović, 2004, Lampe, 1996). Those who had less experience reading would have gained

most of their political knowledge from state-owned television broadcasting. Meanwhile, even

those who could read were still exposed most often to state-owned media, including newspapers,

which consistently promoted support for the ruling regime. Rural populations, with less access to

opposition media and higher levels of education, were more susceptible to the rhetoric that the

Milošević regime was touting, and to look to Milošević as the political father in line with their

traditionalist values.

A traditional preference for authoritarian leaders explains the widespread support for

Milošević in the Republic of Serbia, particularly in rural areas. However, the flipside of the coin

is missing: What about those who rejected traditionalism and opposed Milošević? The pillar of

traditionalism supporting Milošević included the inverse correlate of traditional authoritarianism:

A reduced emphasis on civil society participation in politics rooted in the one-party system of

Tito’s Yugoslavia.

3.2.2. A Politically Underdeveloped Civil Society

How did a lack of civil society participation in politics help the Milošević regime to gain

power? The long-standing preference for authoritarian patterns of rule in Yugoslavia goes hand-

in-hand with a deficit in direct civil society opposition to authoritarianism. Civil society in

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Yugoslavia, after decades of less engagement in politics when compared to civil society

organizations in Central Europe, was not in a position to produce a coherent opposition to the

Milošević regime during the 1990s (Solioz, 2011). A lack of organizations for people to express

discontent with the political leaders, such as media and activist groups, meant dissenters of the

Milošević regime had fewer avenues for organizing against the regime.

The function of civil society and its overlap with politics is widely debated. Some

scholars see civil society from a structural functionalist perspective, defining it as a social

practice by which individuals and groups organize their non-governmental activities to satisfy

their needs (Tucker, 1987: 2). By this definition, civil society is a diverse field of activism

outside of the government, and political activism is one of its many subfields. Other scholars

disagree, defining civil society as the sphere of activity in which people satisfy their personal and

communal interests and develop skills of solidarity and group action as a way of preparing for

participation in politics (Pelczynski, 1995). This second definition focuses more on the

development of sociability as a precursor to political engagement. It claims that civil society

prepares individuals, through community and charity work, before engaging directly in the

political sphere. This definition thereby removes politics from civil society.

A different definition of civil society from those presented above is necessary to

understand the relationship between Yugoslavia’s politically underdeveloped civil society and

the Milošević regime. To evaluate how a lack of political organizations in Yugoslav civil society

helped maintain the Milošević regime, one must see civil society as a profoundly political

process. Civil society is “the autonomous sphere of private and public action not monitored by

the state […] the sphere of extra-institutional activities” (Golubović, 2004: 86). This alternative

definition positions civil society as a complementary, even oppositional, force to the state and its

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institutions. The main function of civil society is to restrain the tendency of states and their

institutions to expand their influence into many aspects of daily life (Golubović, 2004). Politics

are therefore an essential and necessary component of civil society activism.

This political definition of civil society explains the interplay, and often conflict, between

a ruling regime and civil society organizations. When government and civil society organizations

are viewed as opposing forces, it becomes clear how strong civil society participation in politics

can challenge a ruling regime. Just as a regime can claim its own legitimacy by citing

widespread public support, civil society organizations can amass their own public support in

opposition to the regime.

Civil society in Yugoslavia was incredibly active with workplace camaraderie and charity

organizations (Savic, 2004; Velikonja, 2012). However, historically it did not pose this

oppositional political force to ruling regimes. In socialist Yugoslavia, some scholars argue, the

centralized power of the KPJ “blocked—more than just through censorship—the emergence of a

free and critical public opinion” (Solioz, 2011). As Yugoslavia’s socialist structure broke apart in

the 1980s and 1990s, new governments in individual republics introduced reforms that allowed

for more media freedom and independent organization (Savic, 2004). However, the Milošević

regime’s crackdowns on opposition media during the 1990s demonstrated its continued attempts

to limit political opposition from civil society organizations (Seierstad, 2006). In continuing to

suppress political opposition from civil society, the regime identified the historical political

deficits in Yugoslav civil society and exploited them to limit opposition to the regime.

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3.2.2. The Milošević Regime’s Manipulation of Traditionalism

How was the Milošević regime able to capitalize on and perpetuate tradition? The

Milošević regime used rhetoric and media tools to perpetuate forces of traditionalism and

maintain power in two ways. First, the regime appealed to many Serbs’ preferences for

authoritarian, paternalist styles of rule. Second, the regime exploited civil society’s historical

political deficit. Popular support thus swayed heavily towards the regime instead of oppositional

political forces in civil society. Oppositional civil society organizations like media groups

remained ill equipped to tackle the state-owned media. Voices of dissent were therefore barely

audible over the public rhetoric of the Milošević regime.

This conflict between the Milošević regime and civil society in the Republic of Serbia

was evident in the media publications both sides produced. A ruling regime uses mainstream

media to influence public knowledge, beliefs, and actions to convince more people to favor the

regime (Golubović, 2004). To acquire this power over popular opinion, a regime designs a

strategy of political communication, including public speeches by political figureheads and the

manipulation of mass media (Bozić-Roberson, 2004). It is in the best interest of a ruling regime

to not only utilize media tools to manipulate public opinion but also to capitalize on weaknesses

in civil society that will make rhetoric and media more effective in garnering support (Nimmo

and Swanson, 1990). Targeting sensationalist media to a rural working class with relatively low

literacy rates—compared to the urban working class—is a prime example of building public

support through carefully structured political communication with the general population. State-

owned media encouraging people to support the regime were most effective in regions where

people had less access to opposing or dissenting information (Seierstad, 2006). The Milošević

regime thus fortified its support base by strengthening its power over popular opinion, one of the

most important types of power a regime can secure (Carr, 1964).

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The manipulation of public opinion is most effective when the regime stresses that its

political actions, such as waging interethnic conflicts, are done according to the will of ‘the

people’ (Nimmo and Swanson, 1990; Andrejevich, 2005). Ethnic identification was crucial to the

structure of the Milošević regime’s political communication with its supporters, as Milošević

called for ethnic Serbs to support him if they wished to prioritize their own welfare in their own

nation-state. The appeal to Serb identity, and to the historical and then-contemporary suffering of

Serbs in particular, was central to the Milošević regime’s political narrative, and it proved an

effective strategy. It was therefore in the regime’s best interest to claim it was responding to the

calls of his people, i.e. the Serbs with whom Milošević shared a connection through ethnicity.

Golubović refers to the Milošević regime’s appeal to popular support as a “guise of the

democratic” (2004: 95). This sort of democracy is also often called populism, in which the ruling

regime’s political actions are marketed as decisions that the people themselves have called for

and are in the people’s best interests, as in an ideal democracy (Bozić-Roberson, 2004). The

major difference is that the political consequences of the regime’s actions, like the interethnic

conflicts, were products of a top-down procedure of ethnic entrepreneurship, rather than a

bottom-up procedure of democracy (Bozić-Roberson, 2004). The semblance of popular support

for those actions was not necessarily inherent to the so-called will of the people, but rather was in

part produced and perpetuated by state-owned media propaganda calling for the creation of

Greater Serbia. The regime’s manipulation of information and use of popular beliefs aimed to

further its agenda. However, part of the regime’s agenda, in the case of power politics, was to

maintain power and secure more of it, regardless of the actual economic or social needs of the

people. The ideal political strategy was therefore to convince people that something on the

regime’s agenda, such as creating an autonomous Serb nation-state, was a priority for all Serbs,

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not just for the regime. To achieve such an end, the regime had to take action to steer public

opinion. Doing so is much easier when the regime commands significantly more power over

popular opinion than do oppositional organizations in civil society.

Milošević’s regime constructed a guise of democracy by encouraging people on the

streets to rally in support of Milošević as their leader and even to oust other politicians like

Stambolić in the late 1980s. Milošević transformed his top-down ethnic entrepreneurship into

something that resembled a bottom-up uprising in the name of Serb identity, such that: “For the

first time in modern Yugoslav history, the masses on the streets [appeared to be] guiding the

country” (Andrejevich, 2005: 42). Milošević’s government also popularized his nationalist

rhetoric by monopolizing popular media, silencing opposition groups with fines and jail

sentences while popularizing state-owned and government-controlled groups, including the

magazine Politika and the broadcasting network RTB (Nenadović, 1996; Seierstad, 2006). RTB

broadcasted Milošević’s speech at Kosovo Polje in 1987 and the staged fight with Kosovar

Albanian police that followed. The broadcast popularized a belief that Kosovar Albanians were

systematically attacking Serbs in Kosovo, despite little evidence from police records to

substantiate that claim (Silber and Little, 1996). This event was a landmark moment in the

manipulation of public information and beliefs to encourage support for Milošević and his

rhetoric. Meanwhile, little voice was afforded to groups who supported Kosovo’s separation

from Serbia or wished to maintain Yugoslavia’s multiethnic federation (Seierstad, 2006).

Milošević’s authoritarian style of rule capitalized on traditional preferences for father-like

figureheads, as well as on the political deficits in civil society that prevented people from

opposing a ruling regime. The final key of Milošević’s strategy was ethnic entrepreneurship, the

top-down utilization of nationalist narratives, masquerading as a bottom-up representation of the

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will of the people, to cultivate popular support. The Milošević regime was not the only, or even

the original, producer of ethnic narratives of Serb suffering and the need to have all Serbs in one

state.

3.3. Pillar III: Nationalism

The third pillar supporting the Milošević regime was the alternative ideology to

collapsing “Brotherhood and Unity” it presented: Nationalism. Why was nationalism an effective

tool for the Milošević regime to gain and maintain power? The nationalism that the regime

touted arose from latent sentiments of separatism and ethnic identification that had persisted

within Yugoslavia since its founding. These long-term sentiments provided fuel for the regime’s

rhetoric of all Serbs in one state. The Milošević regime was also in large part responsible for

stoking the fires of nationalism to make nationalist fervor more mainstream.

The appeal to Serb nationalism was the central tool of Milošević’s rhetoric. He advertised

a narrative that Serbs should abandon the Yugoslav project, unite only amongst themselves, and

in the process construct a nation-state based on their shared ethnicity. The political consequences

that resulted from Milošević’s nationalist rhetoric were incredibly destructive to not only

Yugoslavia’s ideologies but also to human life. In the eleven years that Milošević remained in

power, he mobilized the JNA and supported many other militant groups in other republics by

proxy—offering equipment and solidarity, rather than direct manpower and leadership—to wage

ethnic wars in Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo. Tens of thousands of people

of all ethnicities were killed, particularly Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims, as defined in Bosnia’s

new constitution in 1995) in the eastern portion of Bosnia—almost 130,000 Bosniaks were

killed, more than 75 percent of the deaths in the Bosnian war (Tabeau and Bijak, 2005).

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Thousands more were forced to flee from their homes, many never to return. Political and

military elites encouraged the extension of Serbia’s borders, but Serb manpower, often militants

who were not enlisted soldiers, on the ground made expansionist violence and ethnic cleansing

possible (McCallister, 2015). Serbs too were killed or displaced as other nationalist fires arose in

Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

The devastation of the 1990s is often credited to the work of a handful of powerful elites,

especially Milošević and Ratko Mladic, the Serb military general in Bosnia. However, while the

ideological culprit of the ethnic wars is undoubtedly nationalist extremism, the story of how such

a destructive form of nationalism emerged in Yugoslavia and wrought such devastation is more

complex. Nationalism was a latent domestic force that existed before the time of federal

Yugoslavia and persisted under Tito. Just like uncertainty and traditionalism, nationalism

predated the Milošević regime. The Milošević regime’s strategy for gaining power used the

latent domestic force of nationalism to its advantage.

3.3.1. Origins of Nationalism

Where did Serb nationalism originate? Milošević did not invent nationalism, or even just

Serb nationalism. Nationalism existed in a discursive form among intellectuals in the Republic of

Serbia during Yugoslav times. However, scholars disagree on the extent to which nationalism

existed on an individual level in Yugoslavia (Guzina, 2003; Silber and Little, 1996). The central

question is whether nationalism is “psycho-cultural,” that is, a psychological trait that drives

people to protect those with whom they share a common history, identity, language, religion,

etc., or if it is politically produced by the suggestions of powerful elites. Many scholars argue

that nationalism is not a purely psychological phenomenon and does not exist on an individual

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level. Rather, the production and shaping of nationalism is a profoundly political process (Dević,

1998). Leaders who rally support based on a platform of shared ethnicity emphasize differences

between their supporters and people of other ethnicities, encourage animosity towards those who

are ethnically different, and utilize that animosity to fortify their support base and achieve

political ends. Scholars often refer to this strategy as ethnopolitics, effectively ruling out any

psycho-cultural explanation for nationalism. In essence, “ethnic assertiveness and violence are

not the result of some primordial aspect of ethnicity, but rather is the product of ethnic

entrepreneurship” (Bozić-Roberson, 2004: 395).

The Milošević regime’s strategy renegotiated the rhetorical understanding of what it

meant to say nationalism was a “latent” force. Statistically speaking, sentiments of separatism

and nationalism were “latent” in the time of Tito because a relatively small number of people

embraced the idea of nationalism, and nationalism occupied little space in public discourse

outside of elite circles (Silber and Little, 1996). The Milošević regime presented nationalism as a

psychologically latent, practically subconscious, desire that Serbs had been repressing while

under what he called the tyranny of Yugoslavia’s multiculturalism (Dević, 1998). By

misconstruing the origins of nationalism, the Milošević regime shaped the old idea of

nationalism into a new alternative ideology to “Brotherhood and Unity,” which became the core

of his domestic support base.

3.3.2. The Milošević Regime’s Manipulation of Nationalism

How did the Milošević regime exploit nationalism to gain and maintain power?

Milošević used political rhetoric, most notably his speech at Kosovo Polje, to bring ethnicity and

questions of national allegiance into the political spotlight, in contrast to allegiance to the

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multiethnic Yugoslav federation. By pointing fingers of blame at other ethnicities as well as at

Serb disunity, Milošević popularized a feeling of animosity towards other groups in Yugoslavia,

particularly those that allegedly encroached upon territory that had been historically Serbian,

especially in the eastern portion of Bosnia and in Kosovo.

Milošević was one of the first political leaders in Yugoslavia after Tito’s death to identify

the power of nationality and work it to his advantage. Milošević was of course not the only

leader to exploit nationalism. Other nationalist leaders rose up in other republics, particularly

President Franjo Tudjman in the Republic of Croatia. It was through Milošević’s rhetoric that the

separatist tendencies buried within the Republic of Serbia, as in the other republics, came to

light. In the Republic of Serbia in particular, this rhetoric manifested itself via an authoritarian

regime built on a new ideology that differed significantly from Yugoslavia’s legacy of

“Brotherhood and Unity.” Instead of a community of all southern Slavs, Milošević popularized

the motto of “All Serbs in One State,” a geopolitical entity defined not by a diversity of

ethnicities but by one dominant ethnicity alone.

Ethnonational identification reached new heights under Milošević. Survey data from the

late 1980s suggested that many citizens of the fracturing Yugoslavia, though by no means all of

them, expressed strong attachments to their nationality as a primary group, prioritizing national

identity over other identities such as political party, profession, other social groups, or being

Yugoslav (Golubović, 2004; Gordy, 2005). The difference from Tito’s time is clear, since

narratives of Yugoslavia in the time of “Brotherhood and Unity” stressed Yugoslav identity, as

well as camaraderie in the workplace, as primary unifiers (Velikonja, 2012; Smits, 2010).

Milošević’s politicization of ethnicity was therefore part of a trend away from celebrating the

multinational to appealing to the strictly national. To say Milošević alone produced the shift

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would be an oversimplification. Rather, the Milošević regime capitalized on burgeoning

nationalist sentiments and “consciously manipulated Serb feelings of discontent with Yugoslavia

and other constituent nations” (Bozić-Roberson, 2004: 405).

The Milošević regime’s appeal to national solidarity and nationhood set it apart from

other potential political leaders in the wake of Tito’s death (Engelberg 1991). As the Milošević

regime built its political platform by stoking the already flickering flames of nationalism, it

reaped the rewards of a strong support base that cleaved to Milošević’s charisma and political

rhetoric. In the end, Milošević’s strength was not so much hoodwinking his constituents to listen

to him, but rather tapping into the opinions of what may very well have been a minority of the

population and construing them as the latent desires of all people in Serbia, and then convincing

those people that he was right.

3.4. Conclusion

How did the Milošević regime rise to power and then maintain that power for more than a

decade? The regime built itself upon a domestic support base resting on three main pillars:

Uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism. Uncertainty—political, economic, and social—

arose in the late 1980s and early 1990s after Tito’s death, exacerbated by economic crises and

the steady unwinding of Yugoslavia’s federal structure. Uncertainty led many people in the

Republic of Serbia to seek out a new leader that would reduce the uncertainty and provide a new

guiding ideology. In 1987, Milošević appeared as an ideal candidate to fill this role. Milošević

appealed to traditional preferences among many people in the Republic of Serbia for

authoritarian patterns of rule under a revered figurehead like Tito. A preference for authoritarian

patterns of rule coincided with a civil society that had not been very active in the political sphere

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during the time of Tito. In addition to capitalizing on these traditional patterns, the Milošević

regime also provided a new ideology for the people of Serbia to replace “Brotherhood and

Unity.” Milošević appealed to discourses of nationalism that had existed underground in

Yugoslavia and used public rhetoric to make those undercurrents more mainstream.

The three-pillar framework for understanding the domestic support base for the Milošević

regime is not meant to be exhaustive. One could argue that hundreds of forces helped fuel the

rise of the Milošević regime. Not all of these forces fit cleanly into a simple three-pillar model.

The three pillars of the Milošević regime’s support base—uncertainty, traditionalism, and

nationalism—focuses on the domestic forces most often discussed in academic literature. The

rising tide of nationalism in Yugoslavia, above all other domestic forces, is well-documented and

discussed in literature on the breakdown of Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to the Republic

of Serbia (Dević, 1998; Bozić-Roberson, 2004).

Even an exhaustive list of domestic forces would not constitute the entire picture of the

forces that maintained the Milošević regime. As the Milošević regime came to power, it

promoted violence in the form of armed conflicts as the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia, Croatia,

Macedonia, and Bosnia declared they would secede from Yugoslavia—as did the autonomous

province of Kosovo in 1999. As secession led to armed conflicts, many international actors took

action and became involved in Yugoslavia, either in support of or opposition to Milošević. The

roles these international forces played were just as crucial for understanding the breakdown of

Yugoslavia and the maintenance of the Milošević regime as domestic forces.

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Chapter 4: International Forces and Intervention from the West

The violence unfolding in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s and early 1990s sparked many

reactions from various actors around the world. Starting in the early 1990s, international actors

from many directions began to engage in the political, economic, and social affairs of

Yugoslavia—which by 1996 comprised Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina, and Kosovo. Some

actors, like Russia and China, expressed their support for the Milošević regime and its ideology

of Greater Serbia. Others actors, such as the USA and the EU, declared their opposition to the

increasingly authoritarian Milošević regime. On several occasions, many of these actors who

opposed the Milošević regime chose to intervene in Yugoslavia to curb the violence the regime

was perpetuating.

Some of Western powers’ strategies for intervening in Yugoslavia were strikingly direct,

such as bombing strategic political and military targets during the wars in Kosovo. Other

strategies, such as negotiating conflict resolutions and funding anti-Milošević regime civil

society organizations in Serbia, were more indirect. The ripple-effects of many intervention

strategies added to Yugoslavia’s growing instability as it broke apart. During the 1990s, wars of

secession and Western intervention together produced two waves of political, economic, and

social chaos in Yugoslavia. The first wave lasted from 1992 to 1995, when the UN levied strict

economic sanctions on Yugoslavia to end the war in Bosnia. The second wave came in 1999

when NATO forces dropped bombs on Belgrade until the Milošević regime withdrew its troops

from Kosovo. Given the additional destruction intervention caused, why did many Western

actors choose to intervene in Yugoslavia, and how did their intervention strategies change over

the course of the 1990s?

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Western actors had two main objectives when they intervened in Yugoslavia: First, to

help build systems of capitalism and democracy in Yugoslavia and its successor states; and

second, to protect human rights. Over time, Western actors resorted to increasingly direct and in

many cases destructive intervention strategies to continue pursuing these objectives. The

destruction that direct intervention strategies like economic sanctions and bombs wrought have

sparked debates among scholars over the ethical implications of Western intervention in

Yugoslavia. Discussion of Western intervention in Yugoslavia focuses primarily on the direct

political, economic, and military strategies that Western actors implemented during the 1990s.

Since these strategies dominate the discourse on Western intervention, less attention is given to

indirect forms of intervention, like providing international funding for opposition groups in

Yugoslavia.

This chapter discusses the intended aims of Western intervention in Yugoslavia during

the 1990s and the strategies Western actors used in their attempts to achieve those aims. First, I

identify the major international actors that were involved in Yugoslavia during the breakdown.

While my analysis focuses primarily on Western actors who opposed Milošević, I also consider

the roles of other actors who supported the Milošević regime, namely Russia and China. Second,

I analyze the two major objectives of Western intervention—the protection of human rights and

the promotion of capitalism and democracy Third, I present the chronology of events during the

1990s as Western intervention became increasingly direct and destructive. Fourth, I discuss the

controversy surrounding Western intervention in Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

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4.1. Major International Actors Involved in Yugoslavia

Which international actors were most heavily engaged in the breakdown of Yugoslavia?

A wide diversity of international actors became involved in Yugoslavia during the wars of

secession (1991-1995 and 1999). Some international actors expressed support for the Milošević

regime and the project of Greater Serbia, while many others, primarily from the West, outwardly

opposed the regime. International actors who opposed Milošević often worked in concert in a

complex network, especially when levying sanctions and stationing peace-keeping forces in

Yugoslavia. Some international actors were sovereign states, such as the USA and Germany.

Other actors were supranational organizations, such as the EU—called the European Community

or EC until the signing of the Maastricht treaty in 1992—and NATO.

Still other international actors were intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the

UN, the IMF, the World Bank, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former

Yugoslavia (ICTY). While these IGOs were composed of representatives from individual states,

including the USA and EU member-states, the IGOs acted as relatively separate entities.

Sometimes IGOs that shared members disagreed with one another on how to intervene in

Yugoslavia. For example, NATO dropped bombs on Belgrade during the war in Kosovo despite

the UN’s dismissal of that proposal (Campos, 1999).

Within this diverse collection of actors, three main groups can be discerned: primary

intervening actors, secondary intervening actors, and actors who opposed intervention against the

Milošević regime. The first group, primary intervening actors, consists of three members: the

USA, the EU, and NATO. Most of the discussion in the literature on Western intervention in

Yugoslavia tends to focus on these three actors. Members of the second group, secondary

intervening actors, tend to receive less attention in the literature, but they also played significant

roles in Western intervention campaigns in Yugoslavia. Major actors in this group were the UN

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and many of its affiliated agencies, including the IMF, the World Bank, and the ICTY. One must

also not ignore the influences of the last group, actors who opposed intervention against the

Milošević regime. The majority of the literature regarding these actors focuses on the roles of

two countries in particular: Russia and China. These two international actors stood in solidarity

with the Milošević regime, opposing the Western actors who intervened many times to weaken

the regime.

4.1.1. Primary Intervening Actors: The USA, the EU, and NATO

Why were the roles of the USA, the EU, and NATO particularly significant in Western

intervention campaigns in Yugoslavia? The involvement of these three actors in Yugoslavia

made Western intervention in Yugoslavia salient and effective. The intervention strategies they

used were incredibly varied and included many political, economic, and military policy tools.

The US government became involved in Yugoslavia early on in the 1990s, as it attempted to

influence the presidential election in the Republic of Serbia in 1992 (Sherman, 1995). The USA

also captained the negotiation process that produced the Dayton Peace Agreement in Bosnia in

1995 (Szasz, 1996).

EU member-states, particularly Germany and France, added much of their economic

weight to Western intervention efforts when they placed economic sanctions on Yugoslavia in

accordance with a UN declaration in 1992. Since even the 1950s, Yugoslavia had depended on

reliable trade relationships with Western EU states (Obadić, 2014). The severing of those trade

relationships proved highly destructive to Yugoslavia’s economy, even years after the sanctions

were lifted (Lamotte, 2012).

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NATO’s involvement was military, and its involvement has been widely disputed

because of the death and destruction its bombing campaigns in Belgrade and Kosovo caused

(MccGwire, 2000; Nambiar, 1999). Scholars often discuss the role of the US government in

steering NATO towards the bombing campaign, even after the UN had forbidden dropping

bombs on Yugoslavia (Lindberg, 2013; Mandelbaum, 1999; Steinberg, 1999; Campos, 1999).

Western intervention was not limited to these three actors. Their efforts were buttressed

with intervention strategies from many other secondary international actors that tend to receive

less attention in popular media and literature.

4.1.2. Secondary Intervening Actors: The UN and its Associated Organizations

How did other international actors contribute to Western intervention efforts in

Yugoslavia? The interaction of secondary intervening actors with one another as well as with the

primary actors further diversified the array of Western intervention strategies. The role of the UN

was as complex as it was important. On the one hand, the UN was heavily involved in stationing

peace-keeping forces in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia during the early to mid-1990s, declaring

the conflicts in those seceding Yugoslav republics a “threat to international peace and security”

(Popovski, 2002: 39). On the other hand, the UN Security Council notably opposed the 1999

NATO bombings of Belgrade (Campos, 1999; Talmon, 2014; Bowker, 1998). This opposition is

not too surprising, because Russia and China, who have permanent seats in the Security Council,

expressed support for the Milošević regime and vetoed the USA’s proposal of dropping bombs

on Belgrade (International Crisis Group, 1999).

The World Bank and the IMF, financial organizations under the UN, assisted Yugoslavia

and its successor states through their economic transition after the collapse of the Yugoslav

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system of self-managing socialism. This process involved renegotiating how Yugoslavia would

repay its longstanding foreign debts, which the EU insisted be paid (Campos, 1999). The

resulting mountain of debt obligations made the Yugoslav economy more vulnerable when the

EU levied sanctions during the mid-1990s (Žižmond, 1992). Renegotiating Yugoslavia’s debt

may not sound like a form of Western intervention at first. It was certainly not a direct form of

intervention. However, the attempt to integrate Yugoslavia further into the European economy,

which included paying its debts to the EU, was part and parcel to the restructuring of

Yugoslavia’s economy to resemble a more capitalist, Western model.

Primary and secondary intervening actors together constituted the framework of Western

intervention against the Milošević regime. Not all international actors who became involved in

Yugoslavia opposed Milošević, however. Russia and China stood in solidarity with Milošević

and opposed Western actors’ attempts to dismantle his regime.

4.1.3. Actors Who Opposed Western Intervention: Russia and China

Why is it important to note the role of international actors who supported the Milošević

regime? Western actors who intervened in Yugoslavia found themselves up against two

formidable friends of Milošević’s Yugoslavia, Russia and China. Opposition between the

Western members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom [UK], and France)

and the Eastern members (Russia and China) clashed especially hard over the USA’s proposal to

intervene militarily in Yugoslavia (Sell, 2002; Mandelbaum, 1999).

A variety of factors tied Milošević’s Yugoslavia to Russia and China in ways that

garnered their support for the Milošević regime. Russian sympathy for the project of Greater

Serbia was particularly strong due to the many ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties linking the

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Russian and Serb nationalities (Bowker, 1998). Chinese opposition to NATO’s attacks on Serbia

escalated after NATO mistook one of its targets and accidentally bombed the Chinese embassy

in Belgrade, killing three Chinese journalists in the process (Shen, 2004). Russian and Chinese

support for the Milošević regime also challenged Western actors’ assertions that they had the

power to intervene in Yugoslavia. From the perspective of Russia and China, military

intervention from the USA and NATO infringed upon Yugoslavia’s sovereignty (Mandelbaum,

1999).

Influences from international actors quickly escalated the chaos of Yugoslavia’s domestic

breakdown. Many layers of international involvement compounded upon the domestic pillars

supporting the Milošević regime. While some actors lent their support to the Milošević regime,

many others, particularly Western actors, intervened in an attempt to dismantle the regime in by

political, economic, and military means.

The timeline of Western intervention is not uniform. Between the rise of Milošević in

1989 and his fall in 2000, Western actors intervened in Yugoslavia on several occasions. Each

intervention attempt made use of different collections of policy tools—including political,

economic, and military intervention strategies—as Western actors’ geopolitical focus on

Yugoslavia as an international security concern increased (Barša, 2005). The longer the

Milošević regime remained in power and conflict continued to occur in Yugoslavia, the more

direct and destructive intervention strategies became.

4.2. Main Objectives of Western Intervention: Human Rights, Capitalism, and Democracy

Why did Western actors continue to intervene in Yugoslavia over the course of the

1990s? Western actors who intervened in Yugoslavia aimed to achieve two overarching

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objectives: To assist in building functioning systems of capitalism and democracy and to protect

human rights. The international relations theories of liberalism and realism are both helpful in

explaining how and why Western actors intervened in Yugoslavia. Liberalism points to the

narratives of protecting universal human rights and promoting idealized systems of capitalism

and democracy in the post-Cold War era. Realism highlights the policy tools of Western

intervention, which indicate how power politics buttressed the modernization theory of

liberalism.

Western actors relied on real-world power tools, from peace-keeping forces to sanctions

to bombs, to achieve their goals of protecting human rights and spreading capitalism and

democracy into Yugoslavia. At the same time, Western actors relied on the liberal narratives of

protecting human rights and promoting systems of capitalism and democracy to justify their

intervention efforts in Yugoslavia.

4.3.1. Promotion of Capitalism and Democracy

How was Western intervention in Yugoslavia part of a broader trend of Western actors

promoting economic restructuring and democratization in the former Eastern Bloc? The initial

goal of Western involvement in Yugoslavia was to assist in building systems of capitalism and

democracy after the decline of Yugoslavia’s system of self-managing socialism under Tito

(Herman and Peterson, 2007; Kearns, 1999). Western actors called for Yugoslavia and its

successor states to re-organize their political and economic systems around principles of

capitalism and democracy—the alleged systems of modernity (Holmes, 2013). The influx of

capitalist and democratic forces into the former Eastern Bloc resulted in the deconstruction of

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Yugoslavia’s socialist state by 1992, but free market reforms and democratization continued for

decades afterwards.

Promoting systems of capitalism and democracy were heavily bound up in the ideologies

of liberalism and realism. Liberalism provided the theoretical justification for why Western

actors should intervene in Yugoslavia. Western actors claimed their intervention efforts would

make Yugoslavia better off by enforcing respect for universal human rights, strengthening the

Yugoslav economy, integrating Yugoslavia and its successor states into the EU, reducing

corruption, and strengthening the rule of law (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Åslund, 2013).

Realist theory understands that the will of the people alone would not produce capitalist and

democratic reforms by nature. Instead, external actors had to become intimately involved in

economic restructuring and democratization. The involvement of the IMF and the World Bank in

renegotiating Yugoslavia’s debt and scheduling its payments to the EU demonstrated Western

actors’ deep level of engagement in Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition.

4.3.2. Protection of Human Rights

How did the conflicts in Yugoslavia alter Western actors’ objectives when intervening in

Yugoslavia? Once the wars of secession broke out, Western intervention in Yugoslavia began

striving to achieve a second goal: To end the violence and human suffering the Milošević regime

was perpetuating in seceding republics and provinces (Barša, 2005; Daalder and O’Hanlon,

2000). The protection of human rights quickly started serving as the immediate public face for

intervention efforts (Parenti, 2000). As conflicts arose in Croatia (1991-1992), Bosnia (1992-

1995), and Kosovo (1998-1999), Western actors sought to put an end to the wars that were

causing mass displacement and bloodshed throughout much of Yugoslavia.

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The narratives of promoting human rights provided justification for Western actors to

intervene in Yugoslavia. Liberal theory justifies Western intervention into Yugoslavia by arguing

that Western actors had a moral obligation to protect universal human rights in states that did not

respect those rights themselves (Barša, 2005). The liberal rationale thus rejects the argument that

Yugoslavia had a right to sovereignty within its own borders, regardless of what harm the actions

of its government inflicted on its people (Brun and Hersh, 2012). Realist theory however

indicates the irony that in several cases Western actors resorted to destructive intervention

techniques, including bombs, on the pretext of saving lives. Many scholars argue that direct

economic and military intervention strategies, which were responsible for an unknown number

of deaths, were human rights violations in and of themselves (Parenti, 2000; MccGwire, 2000).

According to realist theory, this apparent contradiction exists because Western intervention

relied on tools of power politics. Many of these tools themselves entailed violence to achieve

their goal of ending conflicts and preventing further bloodshed.

These two goals, of promoting Western systems of capitalism and democracy and

curbing the Milošević regime’s violations of human rights, constituted the main objectives of

Western intervention into the Yugoslav conflicts during the 1990s. To achieve these goals,

Western actors had to engage in battles of power politics. Between 1989 and 1999, Western

actors’ intervention in Yugoslavia to promote capitalism, democracy, and human rights became

increasingly intense.

4.3. Western Intervention during the 1990s: Increasingly Direct Strategies

How did strategies of Western intervention change over the course of the 1990s? The

chronological sequence of events in Yugoslavia during the 1990s reveals a striking trend. Over

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time, as the Milošević regime remained in power and continued to sponsor violence, Western

actors resorted to increasingly direct and even destructive forms of intervention to achieve their

goals of protecting human rights and promoting capitalist and democratic reforms.

The timeline of Western intervention in Yugoslavia can be divided into three phases.

First, during the conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia (1991—1992), Western actors relied entirely

on indirect political and economic intervention strategies. Second, during the war in Bosnia

(1992—1995), Western actors, particularly the UN and the EU, resorted to more direct

intervention strategies in the form of peace-keeping forces and economic sanctions. Third, during

the conflicts in Kosovo (1999), Western actors, mainly the USA and NATO, resorted to direct,

highly destructive military strategies by dropping bombs on outposts in Kosovo and on the

capital city of Belgrade. Indirect intervention strategies still persisted throughout the 1990s,

including the funding of civil society organizations that opposed Milošević. This form of indirect

intervention contradicts the trend of increasingly direct intervention strategies, but it was

instrumental in helping to finally overthrow Milošević in 2000 (Seierstad, 2006).

Western intervention in Yugoslavia began with fairly indirect forms of intervention

similar to Western involvement in the post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe.

The introduction of increasingly direct intervention strategies began when the USA attempted to

influence the presidential election in the Republic of Serbia in 1992.

4.2.1. 1991-1992: Indirect Political and Economic Intervention

What did Western intervention in Yugoslavia look like at the start of the 1990s? Western

intervention in Yugoslavia, as well as in formerly communist countries, began with relatively

indirect political and economic strategies that did not imply the use of force. Throughout Central

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and Eastern Europe, Western actors organized reforms in formerly communist—and socialist—

countries, shaping their political and economic systems so they would more resemble Western

systems of capitalism and democracy (White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Åslund, 2013). The

formal deconstruction of socialism in Yugoslavia was completed in 1992 when the SFRY

became the FRY. However, restructuring Yugoslavia’s economy and encouraging democratic

norms took significantly longer—and in many cases is still ongoing in the 2010s (White,

Stewart, and Batt, 2013; Tiersky and Jones, 2014). Economic restructuring and democratization

in Yugoslavia made use of relatively indirect forms of intervention. For example, the IMF and

the World Bank renegotiated the debt Yugoslavia had accumulated under Tito and provided a

plan for Yugoslavia to repay its debts to the EU (Campos, 1999). This form of intervention can

be classified as indirect because it did not resort to the use of violence or force to encourage

economic reform.

On June 25, 1991, the Republics of Slovenia and Croatia both declared they would

secede from Yugoslavia, and the official breakdown of the federation began. The fracturing of

Yugoslavia quickly complicated Western intervention campaigns as the political, economic, and

social structure of Yugoslavia became unstable. After a bloody massacre outside of the Croatian

town of Vukovar, Western actors began insisting the need to protect human rights in Yugoslavia

as interethnic violence escalated (Silber and Little, 1996; Johnstone, 2003). Many Western

actors, particularly the USA, identified Milošević as a major culprit for the violence and asserted

that the deconstruction of his regime would help to end the conflicts among the Yugoslav

republics (Waller and Sandford, 1999). If Milošević was to be removed by democratic means,

the presidential election of 1992 was the ideal opportunity to deconstruct his regime.

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In 1992, Milošević was up for his first re-election as president of the Republic of Serbia.

One of his primary challengers was his recently appointed prime minister Milan Panić, a

Serbian-American dual citizen born in Belgrade and a successful businessman who had lived in

California for many years. The US government expressed its support for Panić who, leaders in

Washington hoped, would undermine Milošević’s authoritarianism and help Yugoslavia on its

journey towards democratization (Sherman, 1993).

Panić built his election campaign on the promise of ending Serbia’s ethnic crusade in

seceding republics like Croatia and Bosnia and acknowledging the independence of all former

Yugoslav republics (Panić, 1995; Doder and Branson, 1999). If Serbia allowed for its fellow

republics to go their separate ways, he argued, the international community would remove the

economic sanctions they had placed Yugoslavia in May of 1992. Panić promised that allowing

Yugoslavia to come apart peacefully would allow the Republic of Serbia to begin a new age of

peace and prosperity. Panić also promised to redevelop Serbia’s economy and “re-integrate itself

into the rest of the world” to gain more respect and support from the USA and the EU (Thomas

1999: 144). Furthermore, he called for the more rapid democratization of the Serbian

government in contrast to its authoritarian traditions under Tito that had persisted and in some

ways even intensified under Milošević (Panić, 2015).

When the election took place in December of 1992, Milošević emerged the victor with 56

percent of the vote, while Panić received 33 percent. It is widely disputed whether these results

were valid, considering that both pre-election and exit polls predicted that Panić would receive as

much support as Milošević, if not slightly more (Thomas, 1999). Some scholars dismiss all of the

elections that Milošević won. These scholars argue that Milošević only won because he rigged

the elections, including the one election in 2000 that resulted in his resignation (Glenny, 2006;

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Seierstad, 2006). To say that Panić did not receive a large body of support would therefore not

necessarily be accurate. Nevertheless, the attempt to unseat Milošević in 1992 and reform the

government of the Republic of Serbia was ultimately ineffective.

The US government’s outward support for Panić in opposition to Milošević was more

direct than prior economic and political reforms because it involved the USA taking a stance

against the Milošević regime in particular. However, political support for Panić still fell into the

domain of indirect intervention strategies because it did not resort to the use of force. Sources are

not clear regarding the extent to which Washington provided support for Panić beyond moral

solidarity—such as financial or staffing support as well (Sherman, 1993). The full extent of the

US government’s involvement in Panić’s election campaign itself may never be widely known,

as it likely included a large amount of classified information not released to the public.

Some scholars point to a tell-tale sign that leaders in Washington showed more direct

support for Panić by bending some strict rules regarding his American citizenship. Some

researchers argue that US Constitutional policy should have demanded Panić be stripped of his

US citizenship for even accepting a government position in a foreign country (Botsford, 1992;

Sherman, 1993). In short, Milošević should have lost his status as a naturalized US citizen when

he became Serbia’s prime minister, before he even ran for president. The US government,

however, appeared ready to make an exception if it meant an American businessman and

politician could have a central position in Milošević’s government.

As Yugoslavia continued to break apart throughout the 1990s, bloody conflicts arose in

two other seceding territories: in Bosnia (1992-1995); and in Kosovo (1999). Seeing the

devastation these conflicts caused, including a heavy toll on human life and massive forced

migrations of people, Western actors argued they should intervene to minimize further trauma to

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the people of Yugoslavia, especially Bosniaks and Kosovar Albanians (Mirković and Gibbs,

2009; Glenny, 1996). The increasing levels of violence in Bosnia starting in 1992 prompted more

direct forms of Western intervention, including peace-keeping forces and economic sanctions.

4.2.2. 1992-1995: More Direct Military, Political, and Economic Interventions

How did Western actors’ approaches to intervening in Yugoslavia change as conflict

escalated in Croatia and Bosnia? Starting in 1992 and 1993, the UN, the EU, and the USA

resorted to more direct intervention strategies to mitigate conflicts and prevent further bloodshed

in the seceding republics of Croatia and Bosnia. Some of these strategies were military in nature,

such as stationing peace-keeping forces in both republics. Peace-keeping forces were however

still a fairly indirect form of military intervention, as peace-keeping troops did not implement

full military force. Other more direct strategies were political in nature, especially the diplomatic

negotiations that led to the Dayton Peace Agreement and the end of the war in Bosnia in 1995.

The most direct intervention strategies between 1992 and 1995 were economic in nature, as the

UN placed heavy economic sanctions on Yugoslavia. These sanctions proved destructive to

Yugoslavia’s economy, as well as to basic aspects of daily life for people living in Yugoslavia.

Economic sanctions therefore relied more heavily on the use of force than any other intervention

strategies thus far.

Bosnia declared it would secede from Yugoslavia in February of 1992. As in the cases of

Slovenia and Croatia, the Serb-dominated JNA mobilized in Bosnia to prevent the secession.

Violence soon proliferated among Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosniaks. Between 1992

and 1995, the UN stationed peace-keeping troops in Bosnia to protect local populations of

Bosniaks against armed forces of Serbs. While the stationing of peace-keeping forces falls into

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the category of military intervention strategies, it was still a relatively indirect form of

intervention that did not resort to full-scale force (Silber and Little, 1996).

Peace-keeping forces in Croatia and Bosnia during 1992 and 1993 indicated that Western

actors were beginning to intervene more directly into the Yugoslav conflicts than they had done

in 1991 and early 1992. The ICTY was another example of the increasingly direct role Western

actors were playing in Bosnia. Established in 1993, the ICTY created a procedure for capturing

war criminals from the conflict in Bosnia and transporting them to The Hague for prosecution in

an international court. The ICTY demonstrated Western actors’ intent to play a more direct role

in managing and de-escalating conflict in Bosnia (McAllister, 2015), more so than attempting to

influence an election in the Republic of Serbia.

The ICTY was a form of direct political intervention in Yugoslavia. An even more

notable example of political intervention was the creation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which

was signed in Dayton, Ohio, in 1995 and ended the war in Bosnia. The Dayton Peace Agreement

not only brought armed conflict in Bosnia to an end but also established significant Western

influence over many political, economic, and even social aspects of Bosnia’s future. On a

superficial level, the Dayton Peace Agreement was concerned with geography. The agreement

re-established the external boundaries of the Republic of Bosnia as they had been in 1992, before

Serbia and Croatia began waging proxy wars to lay military and political claims to the

multiethnic territory, killing and displacing thousands of people in the process. The agreement

further carved Bosnia into two separate entities, the Republika Srpska (with a Serb majority) and

the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (with a mixed majority of Croats and Bosniaks).

On a deeper level, the Dayton Peace Agreement was profoundly political and economic

in nature. The agreement drafted a new constitution for the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

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and it designed a new government based on the equal representation of three “constituent

peoples” (Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks). The agreement also established a new currency, the

Convertible Mark, which was pegged first to the German Mark and then to the Euro after

Germany converted its currency in 2003. The agreement, as well as the new constitution, were

written in English, as opposed to any version of the local Serbo-Croatian. Even after more than

twenty years, the constitution governing Bosnia still has still not been translated. Direct political

intervention from Western actors—particularly the USA—in a Yugoslav successor state was

thus practically written into the constitution itself.

The most direct intervention strategies implemented during the war in Bosnia were

economic sanctions, which the UN placed on Yugoslavia starting in 1992 in an attempt to cut off

the Milošević regime’s access to resources. Western sanctions came in waves as the Milošević

regime continued to support armed attacks against non-Serbs in Bosnia. Economic sanctions

resulted in complete embargoes on both the Adriatic Sea and the Danube River. As a result,

Yugoslavia’s already stagnating economy—due to its post-socialist transition and mountain of

debt—quickly crumbled. Appendix 6 illustrates the rapid drop in Serbia’s GDP in the early

1990s under economic sanctions. By the end of 1993, after the first two years of sanctions,

Yugoslavia’s GDP per capita had dropped by nearly 50 percent since 1991, from 1,766 USD to

908 USD (Stamenković and Posarac, 1994, as noted in Delević, 1998).

The effects of the economic sanctions were many and varied. International sources of

goods dried up, including everything from automotive parts to medications (Tesanović, 1999).

Gasoline was almost nowhere to be found, and where it could be found its price was

skyrocketing. Schools and hospitals ran out of resources, causing many of them to close. Public

transportation ground to a halt. Yugoslavia’s once lively tourist industry all but disappeared, and

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its only remaining customers were UN representatives and foreign journalists documenting the

chaos (Sherman, 1999). The effects of economic sanctions were therefore much more salient and

destructive to the people of Yugoslavia than the indirect political and economic interventions

Western actors had implemented thus far.

Economic sanctions from the EU and the USA must not be analyzed in a vacuum. UN

sanctions were the most salient events within a timeline of economic burdens falling upon an

economically vulnerable Yugoslavia. When sanctions came into effect, they unleashed chaos in

an already economically weakened environment, thanks to severe debts and economic stagnation

that had emerged over the past few decades (Jović, 2001).

Some of Yugoslavia’s economic vulnerability can be attributed to its ongoing transition

away from socialism—as was observed in post-communist countries throughout Central and

Eastern Europe and Central Asia (Åslund, 2013; Cooley, 2012). Western actors—especially the

EU, the IMF, and the World Bank—played a significant role in creating and exacerbating

Yugoslavia’s economic vulnerability. As Yugoslavia’s previous system of self-managing

socialism unraveled and many ideals of Western capitalism diffused into Southeast Europe,

Western actors like the EU and the IMF steered economic development in Yugoslavia towards

free market systems and democratization. Foreign debt and economic contraction due to

structural adjustment made Yugoslavia’s economy more vulnerable to outside influences

(Campos, 1999). As Yugoslavia’s economic vulnerability increased, so too did the propensity for

economic sanctions from Western actors to wreak havoc.

Western intervention subsided after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995.

The USA and other Western actors continued to keep a close watch over Bosnia, but economic

sanctions on Yugoslavia were lifted. However, 1995 was not the end of Western intervention in

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Yugoslavia. In 1999, conflict broke out in Kosovo, resulting in the most direct and destructive

form of intervention yet: military bombings.

4.2.3. 1999: The Most Direct Forms of Military Intervention

How did Western intervention become even more destructive during the war in Kosovo?

The USA and NATO were primarily responsible for Western intervention’s most direct and

destructive strategies. When the Milošević regime again sponsored violence, this time sending

Serb military forces into Kosovo to prevent the province from seceding, Western actors resorted

to direct military strategies far more salient than peace-keeping forces stationed in conflict zones.

Over the course of more than two months, NATO staged more than 50 attacks on strategic

political and military structures in Kosovo and the capital city of Belgrade (NATO Aggression,

1999, 2010). The NATO bombings, above all other forms of Western intervention, relied heavily

on the use of force to end the violence that the Milošević regime was continuing to sponsor in

Yugoslavia.

In 1998 and 1999, the Republic of Serbia resorted to military force to prevent the

secession of the formerly autonomous province of Kosovo. Serb nationalists called Kosovo the

“cradle of Serb civilization” and refused to allow it to extract itself from the state of Serbia into

which it had been reabsorbed once Milošević came to power (Silber and Little, 1996). Serbia’s

military action in the province brought violence upon ethnic Albanians, who made up the

majority of Kosovo’s population. Estimates suggest that before the conflicts started in 1998,

roughly 83 percent of the population identified as ethnic Albanian (Brunborg, 2002). In the

process of trying to quell the separatist movements, Serb forces not only clashed with members

of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) but also displaced and killed countless ethnic Albanians

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in Kosovo. More than 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians fled their homes, and hundreds of

thousands sought asylum in nearby Macedonia and in Western European countries (Agovino,

1999; Daalder and O’Hanlon, 2000).

As in the war in Bosnia, Western actors, particularly the USA, called for the Milošević

regime to withdraw its military forces from Kosovo. The USA attempted to negotiate such a

withdrawal at the Rambouillet negotiations in March of 1999, but the Serbian delegation

representing Milošević refused to sign any agreement. The USA responded militarily with the

help of NATO by bombing strategic targets in Serbia. Many of NATO’s targets were buildings

in Belgrade that were pertinent to the Milošević regime’s physical and administrative

infrastructure, from the military headquarters to the state-owned media tower (Seierstad, 2006).

NATO also bombed military outposts in the territory of Kosovo. The USA aimed to weaken the

Milošević regime’s capacity to operate militarily on a national scale, to discourage further

military action in Kosovo, and to turn Milošević’s constituents against him (MccGwire, 2000;

Mandić, 2008). The NATO bombing campaign, dubbed “Operation Allied Force,” lasted for 78

days, from March to June of 1999 (Manolache, 2015). The bombs finally stopped falling when

the Milošević regime agreed to pull its military forces out of Kosovo.

While there was a notable increase in direct intervention strategies in Yugoslavia over the

course of the 1990s, many indirect forms of intervention still persisted below the surface. An

important form of indirect intervention was international funding for civil society organizations

in Yugoslavia that opposed Milošević. Support for these organizations played a significant role

in the final years of the Milošević regime’s tenure in power.

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4.2.4. Indirect Forms of Intervention: Funding Civil Society Organizations (1989-2000)

How else did Western actors intervene in Yugoslavia aside from their increasingly direct

and destructive forms of intervention? During the late 1990s, small amounts of back-door

funding from international aid agencies like the United States Agency for International

Development (USAID) trickled into Yugoslavia and into the hands of civil society organizations

that opposed Milošević. The USA alone donated a total of $41 million to civil society groups in

Yugoslavia (Beissinger, 2006). Two prominent civil society organizations that benefitted from

international funds were Otpor (Resistance) and B92. Funding for these organizations was an

indirect form of intervention whereby Western actors continued to encourage democratization

and to facilitate political engagement within Yugoslavia’s civil society.

One of the key organizations that led to the mass uprising against Milošević in 2000 was

Otpor a non-violent youth resistance movement (Tunnard, 2003). Otpor began in 1998 after the

Milošević regime passed a controversial university law. The law allowed the regime itself to

appoint university deans and coerced university professors to sign contracts that reduced their

teaching autonomy, or else face being forced into “early retirement” (Stone, 2000). A collection

of students from the University of Belgrade and the University of Arts decided to form a non-

violent civil disobedience organization to protest for academic freedom, which they named

Otpor, the Serbian word for resistance.

Members of Otpor prided themselves on their non-violent means of protest in opposition

to the violence the Milošević regime perpetuated. To many students in the organization, the key

to deconstruct the power of the Milošević regime was not to use physical violence but to inspire

widespread civil disobedience and noncompliance with the regime’s rule (Mrvos, 2010). Since

the growing organization was up against a heavily armed regime, funding from outside sources

was crucial for helping it function. Otpor received hundreds of thousands of dollars between

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1998 and 2000 to help protest against Milošević, from US organizations like USAID and the

National Endowment for democracy (Beissinger, 2006; Mrvos, 2010).

Another organization that received funding from international donors was B92, an

opposition media organization founded in Belgrade in 1989. B92 promoted Western media in

Yugoslavia through television, radio, and in the late 1990s the internet. The organization also

served as an outlet for opposition news stories about the Milošević regime. B92 struggled in its

early years, as its staff of 35 people with little funding paled in comparison to the massive state-

owned media organization Belgrade-TV, which had over 5,000 employees (Tunnard, 2003). The

Milošević regime also fined B92 journalists, confiscated their equipment, threatened to imprison

them, and evicted them from their recording studio on several occasions (Seierstad, 2006). From

its beginning, B92 received funding from USAID and the Soros Foundation to finance its

operations and overcome the obstacles the Milošević regime used to limit its capacity to function

(DellaVigna,Enikolopov, Mironova, Petrova, and Zhuravskaya, 2011).

Otpor and B92 were instrumental in organizing against the Milošević regime and

sparking the political protests that eventually led to a revolution in October of 2000 and

Milošević’s resignation from office. Funding from international organizations like the NED and

USAID were crucial in providing these organizations with the capacity to oppose the regime and

encourage others to do the same. Funding for civil society organizations is an indirect form of

intervention that involved no violence or physical destruction. In this way, USAID funding for

Otpor and B92 contrasted significantly with the economic sanctions and military bombings that

Western actors unleashed upon Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

Funding for many anti-Milošević regime organizations in Yugoslavia occurred secretly

and without mass media coverage in the West. Hence, this form of indirect Western intervention

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tends to receive less attention in discussions on intervention in Yugoslavia. The devastation of

economic sanctions and military bombings has sparked much more debate over the ethics of

Western intervention in Yugoslavia. The damage that direct intervention wrought on human life

in Yugoslavia has prompted many scholars to question whether Western intervention was

justifiable, or whether it violated Yugoslavia’s national sovereignty.

4.4. Controversy Surrounding Western Intervention in Yugoslavia

What debates have arisen over Western intervention in Yugoslavia, particularly with

regard to the most direct and destructive forms of intervention? Western attempts to steer the

political, economic, and social events in Yugoslavia during its breakdown have been discussed

with a mixture of praise and criticism (Simms and Trim, 2003). Politicians and scholars have

long questioned Western actors’ justification for the policy tools they used when intervening in

Yugoslavia during the 1990s. Many people have heralded Western intervention as an ethical

necessity to save lives and promote peace in Yugoslavia (McAllister, 2015; Barša, 2005). At the

same time, many others have criticized Western intervention for its infringement on

Yugoslavia’s sovereignty as Western actors sought to influence the post-socialist transition

(Parenti, 2000; Herman and Peterson, 2007).

4.4.1. Theoretical Justification for Western Intervention

How were Western actors able to justify their sometimes violent intervention campaign in

Yugoslavia? A commonly accepted narrative in both popular media and academic literature

asserts that Western intervention, combined with popular uprisings by the people of Yugoslavia

itself, was instrumental for ending the ethnic wars and eventually removing Milošević from

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power (Kearns, 1999). Scholars generally agree with this perspective, arguing that intervention

tactics like bombs and sanctions eventually weakened the regime’s capacity to operate and

provided opportunities for civil resistance to dismantle it (Bujosević and Radovanović, 2003).

Western actors like the USA and the EU also provided back-door support to civil society

organizations, such as Otpor and B92 to assist in building popular protest movements against

Milošević (Seierstad, 2006). The long-term effects of Western intervention into the Yugoslav

conflicts, scholars argue, have overall been positive, and the long-term effects can be used to

justify the violence that was necessary during the 1990s to weaken the Milošević regime

(Mallias, 2008).

Many Western actors still argue that much political and economic progress must still be

made. Remaining objectives include building fully functioning democracies and capitalist

economies in the Yugoslav successor states and integrating those states into the European Union

(White, Lewis, and Batt, 2013). Nevertheless, the peace, stability, growth, and prosperity

currently seen in the Balkans, many contend, could not have been achieved without first ending

Milošević’s reign of terror as the President of Yugoslavia (Đorđević, 2012). This justification of

Western intervention has however been made post hoc, and Western actors’ definition of success

in the Balkans rests heavily upon the modernist theory that was behind Western intervention all

along (Holmes, 2013).

4.4.2. Theoretical Criticism of Western Intervention

How have some scholars criticized Western intervention in Yugoslavia? Western actors,

especially the USA and NATO, have been criticized from many angles in the decades since they

intervened in Yugoslavia. Many scholars argue that the actions of the USA, Germany, NATO,

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and others—actions which the UN often did not approve—were not just forbidden but also

infringed upon Yugoslavia’s national sovereignty (Campos, 1999; Talmon, 2014). Other scholars

claim that the economic sanctions Western actors levied and the bombs they dropped on

Yugoslavia were contradictory to their intended mission to save lives, protect human rights, and

above all “do no harm” in the spirit of peaceful intervention (Mirković, Gibbs, 2009; Barša,

2005). It is not uncommon for scholars to even argue that Western intervention, particularly from

NATO, was just a new form of imperialist expansion into the former East, dressed in the

trappings of conflict negotiation (Brun and Hersh, 2012; Lischer, 2007).

4.5. Conclusion

Why did Western actors choose to become involved in Yugoslavia during the 1990s?

Western actors had two main objectives when they intervened against the Milošević regime: to

promote Western systems of capitalism and democracy in Yugoslavia and its successor states

and to protect human rights. Three major categories of actors became involved in Yugoslavia

during the 1990s: primary intervening actors, secondary intervening actors, and actors who

oppositional intervention against the Milošević regime. Over the course of the 1990s, primary

intervening Western actors resorted to increasingly direct and destructive forms of intervention.

The destruction that Western intervention caused in Yugoslavia prompted significant

controversy. Some scholars argued that the necessity of saving lives and promoting peace

justified the violence to which Western actors resorted. Other scholars contend that Western

intervention was an unjustifiable affront to Yugoslavia’s sovereignty in favor of Western

objectives of spreading capitalism and democracy, particularly by military means through

NATO.

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The next chapter analyzes the unintended consequences of Western intervention

strategies in Yugoslavia. In their efforts to protect human rights, restructure economies, and build

democracy, Western actors intervened with little consideration for the domestic pillars

supporting the Milošević regime. Many of the side-effects of Western intervention, especially

direct economic and military intervention, served to further strengthen the domestic pillars of the

Milošević regime.

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Chapter 5: The Unintended Consequences of Western Intervention in Yugoslavia

Western intervention in Yugoslavia began in the late 1980s and early 1990s with

economic and political reforms. Intervention quickly escalated to include conflict negotiations,

sanctions, and eventually bombs as the wars of the 1990s broke out in Yugoslavia. Despite

Western intervention, however, the Milošević regime remained in power until 2000. Many

scholars argue that Western intervention took almost a decade to unseat Milošević because it was

not until the late 1990s that Western actors implemented strategies that actually weakened the

Milošević regime, especially bombs (Lindberg, 2013). This argument has a large hole in it.

During the NATO bombings of 1999, thousands of protestors flooded the streets of Belgrade in

support of the Milošević regime (Stevanović and Filipović, 2004). It was not until October of

2000, more than a year after the bombings, that popular protests led to Milošević’s resignation

(Seierstad, 2006). Given this evidence, it appears that even the most direct Western intervention

strategies did not always weaken the Milošević regime. Instead, the regime gained additional

support when international forces intersected with domestic forces. How did Western

intervention interact with the domestic forces that were supporting the Milošević regime?

Many of the political, economic, and military strategies that Western actors implemented

when intervening in Yugoslavia had unanticipated side-effects. Direct, destructive intervention

strategies in particular, like economic sanctions and bombs, produced two major unintended

consequences: First, direct attacks on Yugoslavia fed into the Milošević regime’s narrative that

the people of Serbia were under attack from the West. Second, economic sanctions and

bombings produced a climate of uncertainty, particularly in Belgrade, which made it more

difficult for people to participate in civil society and oppose the Milošević regime. Direct

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intervention strategies from the West thereby reinforced the domestic pillars of uncertainty,

traditionalism, and nationalism keeping the Milošević regime in power.

This chapter analyzes how several of the shortcomings of Western intervention originated

from the interactions of domestic and international forces in Yugoslavia as it broke apart. First, I

present common arguments about the shortcomings of Western intervention and explain why

they are incomplete. Second, I highlight the overlap between domestic and international contexts

in Yugoslavia—which receives little attention in academic literature—and further explain the

notion of unintended consequences as they relate to Western intervention. Third, I provide an

analytical framework for discussing the particular types of Western intervention and their effects.

Fourth, I identify and explain the major unintended consequences of Western actors’

increasingly direct and destructive intervention strategies during the 1990s.

5.1. Shortcomings of Western Intervention: Incomplete Arguments

Why did the Milošević regime remain in power despite nearly a decade of Western actors

intervening to destabilize it? Throughout the 1990s, ethnic conflicts persisted in Bosnia and

Kosovo, Yugoslavia’s economy struggled to grow, and Milošević’s government shut down

media organizations and imprisoned leaders of opposition groups. There are many potential

explanations for why it took so long for the Milošević regime to fall. However, the explanations

that scholars have offered thus far are incomplete because they fail to consider the interaction of

international and domestic forces within Yugoslavia during the 1990s.

One popular argument for why the Milošević regime remained in power for more than

ten years suggests that Western actors hesitated for several years before using their most

effective intervention strategies, namely economic sanctions and bombs (Đorđević, 2012; U.S.

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News and World Report, 1992). This argument singles out sanctions and bombs alone as

effective forms of intervention and disregards the many other ways in which Western actors

intervened in Yugoslavia during the early 1990s. The argument that Western actors deliberated

before choosing to intervene directly in Yugoslavia dismisses the effects, both positive and

negative, of peace-keeping forces, economic restructuring, international funding for civil society

organizations, and other less direct intervention strategies.

A related argument proposes that the intervention strategies Western actors implemented

during the early 1990s, like peace-keeping forces and the establishment of the ICTY, were too

passive. Proponents of this argument say Western actors relied too heavily on non-violent forms

of intervention while the JNA continued slaughtering people in Bosnia (Lindberg, 2013). Just as

with the first argument, this second argument claims more lives could have been spared if only

Western powers had not waited until 1999 to start dropping bombs, but instead had done so in

1993 when the JNA laid siege against Sarajevo, the capital city of Bosnia (Đorđević, 2012). The

lingering question is why Western powers for a time did not intervene as directly and with as

destructive means as possible.

A third argument attempts to answer this question by pointing to the involvement of

Western actors in other conflicts prior to those in Yugoslavia. Many researchers hypothesize that

during the early 1990s Western actors, particularly the USA, were focused more on intervening

in conflicts in the Persian Gulf than in Yugoslavia (Lindberg, 2003). Supporters of this argument

suggest that hesitation and passivity are not the end of the story. Rather Western actors were

engaged in a series of intervention campaigns worldwide during the Cold War, especially in

Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf. Western actors preferred to direct the brunt of their

intervention efforts towards the political hotspot deemed most important at the time, based on

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where human rights and democracy appeared most under threat (Gordy, 2010). Western actors

thus chose not to intervene directly in Yugoslavia until the war in Bosnia started to receive more

demand for their intervention than did the Persian Gulf. This delay was arguably too late for

many people in Bosnia, especially after the genocide in Srebrenica (McAllister, 2015).

The above arguments suggest that Western powers could have destabilized the Milošević

regime more quickly if they had intervened earlier and more directly. It was not until Western

actors used their most effective policy tools, especially economic sanctions and bombs, that

peace was made in Bosnia in 1995, that armed forces were withdrawn from Kosovo in 1999, and

that popular discontent for Milošević grew strong enough to oust him in 2000 (Đorđević, 2012).

But as compelling as the above three arguments are, they are incomplete. They tend to treat

Western intervention as a necessarily positive endeavor in and of itself. Thus they are

problematic in two ways. First, they ignore the widespread controversy over the ethics of

Western intervention into foreign conflicts despite questions of national sovereignty. Second,

they fail to consider Western intervention’s own unintended consequences and how those

consequences may have been counter-productive to the intervention project as a whole. The very

nature of many Western intervention strategies produced unintended consequences in

Yugoslavia’s domestic context.

5.2. Accounting for Western Intervention’s Unintended Consequences

How do the unintended consequences of Western intervention help to explain the

longevity of the Milošević regime? The discussion of Western intervention’s unintended side-

effects brings together the domestic and international approaches to understanding the

breakdown of Yugoslavia and the rise of the Milošević regime during the 1990s. The domestic

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pillars of uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism within Yugoslavia provided home-grown

support for the Milošević regime. Some international actors, namely Russia and China, became

involved in Yugoslavia to support the Milošević regime and oppose Western actors who

intervened against the regime.

Support for the Milošević regime was strong on both domestic and international fronts.

Even if one rejects the common arguments that Western intervention was too late or too passive

when intervening in Yugoslavia, it is still not surprising that it took more than a decade of

intermittent interventions from the West before Milošević resigned. Intervention efforts had to

compete with the domestic forces keeping Milošević in power, as well as international support

from Russia and China (International Crisis Group, 1999). Considering these domestic and

international sources of support, it would have been unreasonable to expect Western bombs and

economic sanctions to dismantle the Milošević regime overnight.

Western actors who intervened in Yugoslavia against the Milošević regime also played a

role in strengthening support for the regime. Scholars tend to focus on the domestic side of the

breakdown of Yugoslavia, with less attention to the international dimensions that contributed to

the chaos of the 1990s (Herman and Peterson, 2007; Velikonja, 2012). Perhaps this omission is

due to an unwillingness to recognize the unintended impacts that many international, especially

Western, actors had when they intervened in Yugoslavia. A more in-depth analysis of what these

unintended impacts looked like is in order. I have already mentioned the supporting roles that

Russia and China played in supporting Milošević from abroad. In my further analysis, I examine

how Western actors who intervened in Yugoslavia against the Milošević regime, reinforced the

regime’s domestic pillars via the unintended consequences of intervention.

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To imply that some Western actors, especially the USA, Germany, and other members of

the EU, in any way helped to support the Milošević regime may be surprising. These actors,

which are cornerstones of the Western world, are remembered for their intervention in

Yugoslavia to try to limit the power of the Milošević regime (Kearns, 1999). To ask how

intervention on the part of these Western actors could have helped keep Milošević in power is

counterintuitive. Yet the question is necessary when analyzing the effectiveness of Western

intervention. The intended objectives of an intervention campaign cannot be the only

determinant of how effective the campaign was. A full evaluation must also account for

intervention’s effects on people on the ground, both short-term and long-term, both intended and

unintended. This critical evaluation of Western intervention in Yugoslavia is especially

necessary if Western actors continue to use intervention strategies like economic sanctions and

bombs when protecting human rights or building capitalism and democracy in other parts of the

world.

My review of Western intervention strategies and their effects in this chapter is not meant

to be exhaustive. I seek to demonstrate how the persistence of the Milošević regime was not due

solely to domestic support or direct international support alone. Many international actors who

opposed Milošević indirectly strengthened support for the Milošević regime in ways that were

neither intentional nor immediately obvious. I identify two unintended consequences of Western

intervention in particular that helped to maintain the Milošević regime. First, intervention

reinforced Milošević’s claims that Western powers were waging war on the people of Serbia and

that he alone had the courage to defy the West. Second, destructive side-effects of some of the

most direct intervention strategies, like economic sanctions and bombings, further weakened the

already underdeveloped mechanisms of civil society to organize against the regime.

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Thus far I have referred to Western intervention as a large, almost homogenous project

guided by several major actors. In the next section, I shall break the concept of intervention

further down into its major types: political, economic, and military. After analyzing the

topography of Western intervention—i.e. which strategies Western actors used when trying to

limit the power of the Milošević regime—I explain how exactly intervention produced

unintended consequences which in part strengthened the Milošević regime.

5.3. Western Intervention Strategies: An Analytical Framework

How can Western intervention be dissected to better understand how it produced

unintended consequences in Yugoslavia? Simplifying the diverse field of Western intervention

strategies in Yugoslavia can help focus in upon the particular strategies of Western intervention

that produced the most severe unintended consequences. The purpose of my analytical

framework is to identify which intervention strategies produced the most destructive effects on

the ground in Yugoslavia. Destruction—physically, economically, and socially—played a key

role in turning some people toward Milošević and limiting other people’s abilities to organize

and oppose the regime.

To construct my analytical framework, I first sort the many different intervention

strategies into three major categories based on the policy tools they used: Political intervention

strategies, economic intervention strategies, and military intervention strategies. I arrange these

three categories along a spectrum between hard-power and soft-power politics, based on the

extent to which policy tools in each category resorted to the use of force. Second, I measure the

destructive effects of the policy tools in each category of intervention strategies. Intervention

strategies that fell closer to the hard-power end of the spectrum, especially economic sanctions

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and bombs, produced more destructive effects than less direct intervention strategies like peace-

keeping forces. Some indirect intervention strategies, such as funding for civil society

organizations, even produced constructive effects by building political opposition to the

Milošević regime (Mrvos, 2010). The destructive effects of hard-power policy tools like

economic sanctions and bombs produced the most significant unintended consequences in

Yugoslavia.

5.3.1. Categories of Intervention Strategies

How can Western intervention strategies be categorized based on the policy tools they

used? Western intervention in Yugoslavia can be understood as Western actors exercising their

power—which existed in many forms—in opposition to the Milošević regime’s power (Silber

and Little, 1996). Literature on power politics provides three useful categories for understanding

Western intervention strategies in Yugoslavia: 1) political strategies; 2) economic strategies; and

3) military strategies.

These three categories of intervention strategies mirror Carr’s (1964) theoretical model of

state power, which he splits into three categories: military power, economic power, and power

over opinion. This singular model from the 1930s is does not exactly apply to the Yugoslav case.

Not all of Western intervention in Yugoslavia relied on military or economic tools. I have

therefore incorporated Nye’s (2011) theoretical model of power politics in the late 20th and early

21st century. Nye distributes methods of exercising power along a spectrum from “hard” power

(including military power) to “soft” power (including power over opinion). When Nye’s

spectrum is superimposed onto Carr’s initial categories, the category of political power emerges

from an overlap of military power and power over opinion. Political intervention strategies in

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Yugoslavia included stationing peace-keeping forces and organizing conflict negotiations, which

did not necessarily rely on hard-power military tools.

Military intervention strategies in Yugoslavia fall at the hard-power end of Nye’s

spectrum, while political intervention strategies like conflict negotiations and peace-keeping

forces fall farther toward the soft-power end. Economic power usually falls into the middle of

Nye’s spectrum. However, in the case of Western intervention in Yugoslavia, economic

intervention strategies, particularly economic sanctions, fall farther to the hard-power end of the

spectrum. Economic sanctions were an example of hard-power policy tools that had profound

destructive effects on Yugoslavia’s economy and society (Babić and Jokic, 2002).

5.3.2. Direct vs. Indirect Intervention Strategies

How do the terms “hard-power” and “soft-power” policy tools apply to Western

intervention in Yugoslavia? In my analytical framework, I describe individual intervention

strategies as either direct or indirect, based on the extent to which Western actors resorted to the

use of force when implementing those strategies. Direct forms of intervention, like dropping

bombs on the military headquarters in Belgrade, were examples of hard-power policy tools

against the Milošević regime (Manolache, 2015). Indirect forms of intervention, on the other

hand, like stationing peace-keeping forces in Bosnia to mitigate conflicts, were examples of soft-

power tools for opposing the Milošević regime that did not resort to the blatant use of force

(Herman and Peterson, 2007).

Over the course of the 1990s, Western actors resorted to increasingly direct, hard-power

intervention strategies, which were primarily economic and military. At the same time, Western

actors also implemented more indirect forms of intervention, such as providing funding for civil

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society organizations that opposed the Milošević regime. Funding for civil society organizations

however received less media attention than did economic sanctions and bombs. Sanctions and

bombs, as very direct forms of intervention, also produced the most significant destructive

effects on the ground in Yugoslavia.

5.3.3. Destruction and Unintended Consequences

How did direct intervention strategies in particular, like economic sanctions and bombs,

produce unintended consequences in the domestic context of Yugoslavia? Sanctions and bombs,

fall further toward the direct, hard-power end of the spectrum in my analytical framework. These

direct intervention strategies had blatant destructive effects, both in the short term and in the long

term. In the short term, economic sanctions produced shortages of material goods, and bombings

caused damage to metropolitan infrastructure in Belgrade. In the long term, economic sanctions

also destroyed the formal economy in Yugoslavia (Sherman, 1993). Both sanctions and airstrikes

also perpetuated an atmosphere of fear and uncertainty in Belgrade in the long term (Parenti,

2000).

Both the short-term and long-term effects of direct Western intervention strategies

produced unintended consequences in Yugoslavia that strengthened the domestic support for

Milošević. These consequences, because they stemmed from such a complex interaction of

Western intervention strategies and domestic forces already supporting Milošević, have received

less attention in the literature than other simpler explanations of Western intervention’s

inefficiencies—such as the arguments that Western intervention was too slow or too passive to

weaken the Milošević regime.

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In the following sections, I address each of the three categories of intervention strategies

in my analytical framework: political, economic, and military. The ordering of these three

categories also demonstrates the increasingly direct and destructive nature of Western

intervention over the course of the 1990s. In the process, I discuss in further detail the two major

unintended consequences that these intervention strategies produced. First, for Milošević’s

supporters, direct political, economic, and military intervention strategies reinforced Milošević’s

claims to legitimacy as the protector of Serb interests in defiance of the alleged attacks from

Western actors on the people of Serbia. Second, for Milošević’s dissenters, military and

economic intervention in particular weakened civil society mechanisms for people to organize

against the regime. Both of these unintended consequences produced a common result: The

persistence of the Milošević regime, despite Western actors’ attempts to undermine it.

The unintended consequences of Western intervention throw a contrasting light against

the narrative that Western actors were instrumental in destabilizing the Milošević regime, and

that the delay in the fall of the regime was due to Western actors’ hesitation to use its most

effective policy tools for intervention. That is not to deny that intervention strategies like

sanctions and bombings were both salient and effective in weakening the Milošević regime and

ending the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo (Đorđević, 2012). However, the unintended consequences

of Western intervention strategies had counteractive effects on Western actors’ ability to

undermine the Milošević regime. Intervention to protect human rights and promote capitalism

and democracy resulted in part in the further strengthening of the Milošević regime’s domestic

pillars of support. With additional domestic support, Milošević continued to sponsor armed

ethnic conflicts, to fine and imprison opposition media, and to maintain a monopoly on political

power in the allegedly multiparty electoral system (Silber and Little, 1996; Seierstad, 2006). The

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unintended consequences of Western intervention were therefore in part responsible for

continued violence, authoritarianism, and economic turmoil during the breakdown of

Yugoslavia.

The process by which Western intervention partially compromised its own objectives was

different in each of the three categories of intervention strategies in my analytical framework.

Unintended consequences were most prominent when intervention strategies were direct and

destructive to buildings, people, and the Yugoslav economy. Economic sanctions and bombs, the

most direct and destructive of all policy tools, were therefore the most responsible for producing

unintended consequences. Political intervention strategies in the early to mid-1990s were not as

direct as sanctions and airstrikes, but some political strategies produced unintended

consequences as well. Because political intervention was prominent in the earlier years of

Western intervention (1990-1995), I address the unintended consequences of political

intervention strategies first.

5.4. 1990-1995: Unintended Consequences of Political Intervention Strategies

How did political intervention strategies, even if they were not as direct as economic and

military intervention strategies, produce unintended consequences in Yugoslavia? The USA is

the most important actor in the discussion of political intervention strategies in Yugoslavia. Two

major instances of political intervention from the US government into Yugoslav affairs provide

evidence of unintended consequences that helped strengthen domestic support for the Milošević

regime. The first instance was the US government’s attempt to influence the 1992 presidential

election in the Republic of Serbia through the Serb-American candidate of Milan Panić. The

second instance of US political intervention in Yugoslavia was the negotiation process that

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ended the war in Bosnia and created the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995. These cases best

demonstrated the unforeseen effects of political intervention strategies when they mixed with the

domestic forces supporting the Milošević regime.

5.4.1. 1992: US Influence in the Serbian Presidential Election

How did the USA’s influence in the presidential election of 1992 in the Republic of

Serbia produce unintended consequences that strengthened support for Milošević? In expressing

support for Panić over Milošević in the election, the USA appeared to be infringing upon

Yugoslav sovereignty and political processes in the Republic of Serbia. For supporters of

Milošević, US involvement in the election reinforced the belief that the USA wanted to exert

political and economic control over Serbia. (Sherman, 1993).

The US government’s political intervention into the 1992 election in Serbia aligned with

Western actors’—particularly the USA’s—long-term goals of guiding Yugoslavia and its

successor states towards a more democratic, capitalist system resembling their own. The

campaign platform Panić advertised was heavily flavored with Western ideals of capitalism and

democracy, which thus far had only been partially embraced in Yugoslavia as its previous

system of self-managing socialism was unraveled (Sherman, 1993). As a wealthy businessman

who had already purchased several pharmaceutical firms in other Eastern European states since

the demolition of the Soviet Union, Panić’s approach to his work in the post-communist and

post-socialist space, including potentially becoming the president of Serbia, smacked of capitalist

values (Doder and Branson, 1999).

The US government’s willingness to allow Panić to retain his US citizenship, despite his

serving as prime minister of a foreign country, is intriguing to say the least. It suggested that

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leaders in Washington had a vested, rather symbolic interest in allowing Panić to serve as a head

of state in the Republic of Serbia specifically as an American citizen (Sherman, 1993). When

Panić rose to challenge Milošević in 1992, the continued moral support he received from the US

government implied that the symbolism of a Panić presidency in Serbia would have been a

further extension of the US government’s vested interest in having a hand in Serbian politics.

Panić as a candidate could represent US political and economic interests in Yugoslavia as it

transitioned away from socialism.

Panić lost the 1992 presidential election, to the skepticism of many (Glenny, 2006). Even

if Milošević’s party did rig the election, however, the fact that Panić lost and Milošević’s claims

to legitimacy went largely unquestioned bore an important lesson for the USA and its attempts to

influence elections in Yugoslavia. The US government’s involvement in the 1992 election, with

its distinct support for Milošević’s major opponent, reinforced a large portion of Milošević’s

support base. Sherman (1993) writes that: “By showing so much prejudice in favor of one

candidate against the others … Washington succeeded in appealing to the national sentiments

and patriotism of every Serb man and woman” (88). Panić’s US citizenship and support from the

US government were in part detriments to his campaign, especially among older populations in

rural areas who saw his vision as a dramatic break from the traditional politics they supported

(Sherman, 1993).

The USA’s choice to support Panić thus had profound unintended consequences on the

ground in Yugoslavia. The regime Panić sought to dismantle remained intact, if not slightly

stronger once some of Milošević’s supporters saw their fears confirmed that the USA was trying

to intervene in Serbian politics. In 1992, however, Western intervention was still in its early

days. As conflict intensified in Bosnia, the USA and other actors began to intervene politically in

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other ways, under the guise of curbing bloodshed and preventing crimes against humanity. The

most notable form of political intervention during the conflict in Bosnia was the peace

negotiations that the USA oversaw in Dayton, Ohio in 1995.

5.4.2. 1995: The Dayton Peace Agreement

How did the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement perpetuate the unintended

consequences of the USA’s political intervention into the 1992 election in Serbia? The Dayton

Peace Agreement was another symbol of US, as well as EU, intervention in the affairs of both

Yugoslavia and its successor states in many ways. While the agreement had profound effects on

the future of Bosnia, the terms of the agreement also affected

For people in Bosnia, the Dayton Peace Agreement displayed many tangible signs of

Western intervention into the political affairs of Yugoslavia and its successor states. Bosnia’s

new constitution was written in English, and the new national currency was pegged to European

currencies—the German Mark until 2003 when Germany converted to the Euro. The peace talks

themselves were also hosted in the USA, which was a blatant reminder that Western actors had

become deeply involved in overseeing the deconstruction of federal Yugoslavia.

More subtle signs of Western political intervention existed as well, many of which

suggested that the USA and EU countries intended to prevent the Milošević regime in the

Republic of Serbia from sponsoring any further proxy wars in Bosnia. One example was the

establishment of the Brčko district, a province not belonging exclusively to either the Republika

srpska or the Federation of Bosnia-Hezegovina. Though neutral, the Brčko district split the entity

of Republika srpska into two pieces, thereby posing an obstacle to further coherent military

activity in the region inspired by Serb nationalism. The new geopolitics of Bosnia thereby hinted

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that the US was interested in not only halting the war in Bosnia but also in decapitating the

project of Greater Serbia—i.e. the fight to claim territory in eastern Bosnia that had led to

countless war crimes (Avdić-Küsmüş, 2015).

Supporters and dissenters of President Milošević interpreted the outcomes of the Dayton

Peace Agreement differently, particularly with regards to the role they believed he USA and

other Western actors were playing in the Balkans. For Milošević’s supporters, intervention by

the USA, the EU, and the UN to end the conflicts in Bosnia and stop the dream of Greater Serbia

in its tracks sent a clear message that the West was attempting to interfere in the affairs of the

people of Serbia. To Milošević’s dissenters, however, it appeared as though the USA had

decided to shake Milošević’s bloody hand, rather than pursue ousting him as they had tried to do

via Panić in 1992 (Sherman, 1993). Many opponents of Milošević and his nationalist rhetoric

were left with the impression that Western powers, the USA in particular, had by 1995 given up

on trying to undermine Milošević and had opted to side with him in the end (US Institute of

Peace, 1999).

The USA’s attempts to influence the 1992 presidential election in Serbia had already

helped to bolster support for Milošević. In 1995, its apparent decision to negotiate with

Milošević instead of to undermine him reinforced further support for the regime. President

Milošević presented the Dayton Peace Agreement to his supporters as his own victory. The

agreement paved the way for peace in the Balkans, for sanctions to be removed, and for

Yugoslavia to be re-integrated into the international community. In essence, Milošević boasted

that he had accomplished the same objectives Panić had laid out during his election campaign in

1992. Milošević’s success in achieving peace, albeit a temporary one until 1999, demonstrated

his competence as a nationalist leader to his supporters. He had addressed the core political and

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economic crises which Panić had cited when arguing that the people of Serbia needed new

leadership.. Milošević also emerged from the negotiations over Bosnia as the alleged “guarantor

of peace in the Balkans” (Thomas, 1999: 251). Milošević’s claim to this title implied that he had

not only successfully negotiated with Western actors but had also somehow tamed them by

refusing to give in to their manipulation until they agreed to leave him in power.

During the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, Western actors also intervened economically in

Yugoslavia to reduce conflict and bloodshed. The member-states of the EC/EU played a

significant role in this endeavor by placing sanctions on Yugoslavia in accordance with UN

declarations. Economic intervention strategies, especially sanctions, were a more direct form of

Western intervention, and the effects they produced were more destructive in the short term and

the long term than the USA’s political intervention strategies had been. Therefore, the

unintended consequences that economic sanctions produced were more significant than those

produced by political intervention.

5.5. 1992-1995: Unintended Consequences of Economic Intervention Strategies

How did economic intervention produce more serious unintended consequences than

political intervention during the early 1990s? Economic intervention strategies made use of hard-

power policy tools that fell under the umbrella term of economic sanctions—including many

different kinds of measures, from embargos to travel bans (Gladreeper, 1999). Sanctions came

into force as a response to the Milošević regime’s military involvement in Croatia and Bosnia.

Western actors joined forces when enforcing these sanctions to exercise more economic clout

when trying to stop Milošević’s ethnic conflicts. Economic sanctions, like restrictions on exports

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and imports on gasoline, were rolled out in packages, as Milošević continued to ignore Western

demands to end to the devastation he supported in the seceding republics.

Under the sanction regimes, the people of Yugoslavia experienced a “series of threats and

crises” that threatened their daily welfare and security (Thomas, 1999: 5). Some of these crises

escalated to a matter of life and death for some people, as thousands experienced rapidly

dwindling access to food and medical care. The general feeling of fear and uncertainty that

continued to rise with each new package of sanctions was similar to the insecurities later invoked

by the NATO bombings in 1999. And just as in the case of the bombings, the suffering people

experienced under Western economic sanctions became a rich source of fuel for the nationalist

rhetoric of the Milošević regime. Milošević called for Serbs to blame Europe and the USA for

their suffering. He argued that the West was punishing the people of Serbia, and he as the chosen

leader of the Serbs would continue fighting to protect his people. In effect, the economic

sanctions produced the exact opposite effect of what Western actors had hoped they would

(Sherman, 1993). Instead of inciting rebellion against Milošević, economic destruction only

stoked the fires of nationalist mobilization even more.

5.6.1. Economic Sanctions on Yugoslavia

What unintended consequences did economic sanctions produce in Yugoslavia? For more

than three years, economic sanctions ravaged Yugoslavia’s economy and disrupted many aspects

of daily life on the ground. Widespread economic destruction produced two unintended

consequences. First, the economic devastation at the hands of Western actors perpetuated the

belief among Milošević’s supporters that the USA was punishing the people of Serbia, and that

Milošević was their spokesman in the face of Western oppression. Second, the disruption of

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daily life, from grocery shopping to health care, reduced the capacity of people in Belgrade to

participate in civil society and build an oppositional force to the Milošević regime.

The immediate effects of sanctions, i.e. the shortages of tangible goods and services,

quickly led to even more devastating long-term effects. With international trade almost

nonexistent, hyperinflation destroyed the value of the Yugoslav dinar. By January 1994, the

inflation rate was 62% per day, the highest so far recorded in human history (Stevanović and

Filipović, 1995). Wages and social protections plummeted, while unemployment soared. Young

unemployed people began leaving Yugoslavia by the thousands, bound for Western Europe and

North America (Vukovic, 2005; Tesanović, 1999). State-owned industrial firms suffered the

hardest, with little access to foreign resources or markets. Agricultural production remained

somewhat steady by comparison, but the rapidly depreciating value of the dinar discouraged

farmers from selling their goods to city markets, since the money they would make from selling

their products would be nearly worthless in less than a week (Thomas, 1999: 163). Bartering and

black marketeering replaced the formal economy in nearly every sector. Foreign currencies and

even gasoline were used as new media for exchange (Seierstad, 2006).

Daily life in Yugoslavia, especially in the city of Belgrade, became chaotic, and people in

many parts of Yugoslavia were left in a state of disarray. Some scholars reason this was the

implicit intent of economic sanctions, to “produc[e] economic chaos and instability […] to cause

political upheaval” (Sherman, 1993: 109). According to this theory of sanctions, the EU and the

USA hoped that, if the Milošević regime did not choose to end the conflicts by itself, enough

economic chaos in Yugoslavia would turn people against the regime and dismantle it.

If sparking rebellion was the EU’s and the USA’s plan, it did not come to fruition. For

three years, the armed conflicts in Bosnia did not desist, no mass revolt occurred in Serbia, and

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the Milošević regime remained in power. The theory that economic chaos would spark rebellion

did not appear tenable. Some scholars have an alternate theory which better explains why the

sanctions did not have their full desired effect. These scholars argue that the fundamental flaw of

sanctions is they do not target the proper groups of people, i.e. the wealthy, powerful elites

(Early, 2015; Ashford, 2016). Economic devastation due to sanctions on Yugoslavia fell

primarily on the poor, the young, and the old. The economic devastation, on top of the stagnation

since the 1980s, also deterred any economic and social development that could lead to peaceful

coexistence in Yugoslavia like what had existed under Tito (Øberg, 1993).

Most importantly, the sanctions “confirm[ed] the Serbian picture that the entire world is

against the Serbs. […] They [Serb nationalists] favor politicians who take up a negative attitude

to the rest of the world and fight for the Serbian cause” (Øberg, 1993; Sherman, 1993). Serb

nationalists perceived the West’s involvement in destroying Yugoslavia economically betrayed

open hostility towards the people of Serbia. Instead of turning against their own government and

demanding that Milošević put an end to the conflicts, therefore, Serb nationalists chose to blame

the USA and the EU for their suffering. In effect, the hostility that Western actors hoped to stir

up against Milošević was directed back at them as Milošević’s supporters strengthened their

resolve and continued to regard Milošević as the leader who had their best interests at heart.

Strengthened support for Milošević was therefore an unintended consequence of not only

political and military intervention, but also economic intervention as well. And just as in the

cases of political and military intervention, economic intervention had another major

consequence. While many people still opposed the Milošević regime and regarded Milošević as

the real culprit for the economic devastation, the disruption of daily life weakened their capacity

to actively oppose the regime and take steps towards creating a feasible alternative to its rule.

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The unintended consequences of economic sanctions can be better understood by

adjusting Gordy’s (2010) theory of the “destruction of alternatives” in authoritarian societies.

Gordy argues that an authoritarian regime like Milošević’s makes use of political tools that

“close off avenues of information, expression, and sociability” (2010: 2). Free access to

information, expression, and sociability are essential for a strong civil society (White, Lewis, and

Batt, 2013). Gordy argues that authoritarian regimes dismantle people’s access to information

and sociability and thereby destroy civil society’s ability to pursue alternatives to the regime.

Under the economic sanctions, Western intervention, rather than the Milošević regime

itself, indirectly limited civil society in Belgrade. Economic sanctions contributed to the

elimination of the basic resources for civil society, particularly sociability. The economic and

societal suffering that the USA and the EU caused limited the capacity of members of civil

society in Yugoslavia to pursue alternatives to Milošević. People became occupied in tending to

their daily survival and trying to sustain their basic needs, and thus they could no longer

participate in civil society, or any other means of organization against the regime. While the

EU’s and the USA’s intent may have been to incite rebellion, the economic chaos their sanctions

unleashed resulted in major unintended consequences. Not only did the sanction regimes lend

more validity to Milošević’s nationalist rhetoric in the eyes of his supporters, but it also

destroyed civil society mechanisms for dissenters to organize against the regime.

Sanctions were lifted in 1995 after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement. However,

the end of the war in Bosnia did not mean that Western intervention in Yugoslavia was finished.

In 1998 and 1999, armed conflict in Kosovo prompted Western actors to intervene once more.

This time, the primary actor was NATO, and the intervention strategies fell into the military

category. Just as with Western actors’ political and economic intervention strategies, NATO’s

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military intervention strategies also produced severe unintended consequences that strengthened

the domestic support structure of the Milošević regime.

5.5. 1999: Unintended Consequences of Military Intervention Strategies

How did NATO’s military intervention in Yugoslavia in 1999 contribute to the wealth of

unintended consequences Western intervention had thus far produced? Even more so than with

political and economic intervention strategies, the two-month-long NATO bombings of Belgrade

illustrated the profoundly destructive effects Western intervention had upon the people of

Yugoslavia. The chaos NATO wrought in the spring of 1999 demonstrated how a direct,

aggressive intervention strategy could produce severe unintended consequences, which could

serve to strengthen, rather than weaken, a ruling regime.

5.5.1. 1999: The NATO Bombings of Belgrade

What were the unintended consequences of the 1999 NATO bombings? While the

bombing campaign ultimately resulted in the end of the conflicts in Kosovo, the physical

devastation that NATO wrought on the city of Belgrade produced two serious unintended

consequences that closely resembled the unintended consequences that economic sanctions had

produced. First, supporters of the Milošević regime perceived the bombings as a Western attack

against the people of Serbia. Second, the disruption of daily life, including threats to personal

safety, discouraged sociability and limited people’s access to civil society.

In response to the NATO bombings, Milošević announced he would declare war upon the

“rest of the world,” with the exceptions of Russia and China (Stevanović and Filipović, 2004:

153). Milošević’s choice of a blanket declaration of war revealed his intention to again portray

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Serbia as the victim of international abuse and manipulation. The primary targets of his

indignation were Western nations, particularly the USA. Russia and China were exempt because

historically they had stood in solidarity with the Milošević regime and other non-Western powers

in an alliance against the influence of NATO (Campos, 1999). Thus, in one act Milošević made

it plain who he and his government considered to be the friends and the enemies of the people of

Serbia.

Responses to the NATO bombings within Serbia fell into two camps. On the one side,

there were people who supported Milošević in blaming Western powers for victimizing and

terrorizing Serbia. On the other side, there were those who blamed Milošević for persisting with

his ethnic crusades to the point where Western powers saw no other choice but to respond with

violent means (Gladreeper, 1999; Parenti, 2000).

Milošević’s supporters rallied around their president, defending the fight for Greater

Serbia, denying Kosovo’s wishes to secede, and blaming Western actors, especially the USA, for

interfering in Yugoslav affairs and inflicting pain upon the people of Serbia (Gladreeper, 1999).

Pinter (1999) explains how many called the bombings “another blatant and brutal assertion of US

power” (35) in the Balkans, after the USA and other actors had already become engaged in the

past to mitigate Serbia’s violence against its fellow Yugoslav republics. Many scholars of the

time agreed with Milošević’s supporters, arguing that NATO had overstepped its bounds by

intervening in Yugoslavia. Scholars of this mindset argued that the bombings were not truly

about protecting human rights but instead were part of a NATO-led war against Yugoslavia.

Some even went so far as to say the bombings were just the most recent step in the expansion of

NATO’s military influence around the world (Campos, 1999). To people who adopted this

perspective, the NATO bombings were not merely an act of retaliation for Serbia’s misdeeds.

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Rather, NATO was allegedly using military power tools in Kosovo as an excuse to attack Serbia

as part of its imperialist campaign to steer geopolitics around the world.

The Milošević regime and its supporters responded to NATO’s attacks by organizing

public rallies, where protestors wore T-shirts with targets on them to mock NATO’s targeting of

Serbia as part of its military imperialism. The goal of these actions, which the Serbian

government even sponsored with outdoor festivals and concerts, was to “personalize the conflict

and make NATO see whom it was killing” (Stevanović and Filipović 2004: 155). Considering

the massive turnouts at these public protests, it is clear that the US decision to bomb Serbia

presented an opportunity for the Milošević regime to rally more support. As with the election in

1992, Milošević repeated his clarion call for Serbs to unite and show defiance in the face of the

Western actors that were out to destroy Serbia.

In his nationalist rhetoric, Milošević positioned himself as the natural leader of the people

of Serbia in opposing acts of NATO (i.e. US) terrorism in Serbia. He claimed to have the power

of the Serbian people at his back and that no amount of violence from the West could destroy the

nationalist pride which had inspired the dream of Greater Serbia. In so doing, Milošević

reinforced his claims to legitimacy among Serb nationalists and positioned Western powers, the

USA in particular, as the enemies of not only his government but of the people of Serbia as a

whole. The popularity of pro-Milošević, anti-NATO protests demonstrates one of the major

unintended consequences of Western military intervention. Rather than maligning Milošević as

the dictator who brought military attacks upon his own country, thousands of his supporters saw

all the more reason to rally around Milošević as the celebrated protector of Serb interests

(Mandić, 2008). The indirect effects of the NATO bombings thus reinforced the domestic forces

of nationalism and traditionalism to keep Milošević in power.

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Not all people living in Serbia looked to Milošević for guidance during the bombings.

Dissenters of the regime chose instead to blame Milošević for the violence NATO was inflicting

upon Serbia. Opposition to Milošević’s nationalist rhetoric however did not amount to an

organized revolt against the regime during the bombings. Instead, citizens of Belgrade, who were

in closest proximity to the government and, in comparison to people in rural areas, had the

greatest capacity to mobilize a protest against the regime, worried for the safety of themselves

and their families. While the death toll during the bombings was low, threats to life and limb

were still a waking nightmare for many residents of Belgrade (Tesanović, 1999). Each time

NATO announced it would soon drop more bombs, alerts went out, schooldays were cancelled,

and a state of emergency was declared (Fridman, 2015). For more than two months, daily life in

Belgrade ground repeatedly to a halt as the threat of more destruction loomed overhead.

The disruption of daily life in Belgrade highlights another unintended consequence of

Western military intervention strategies. A cloud of fear and insecurity settled over Belgrade,

leaving its inhabitants in a perpetual state of anxiety. Many researchers have uncovered the

shocking effects of this period of terror. A study of thousands of babies born shortly after the

NATO bombings, for example, discovered a significantly lower average birth weight due to the

constant prenatal stress on the babies’ mothers during those two-and-a-half months (Marić,

Dunjić, Stojiljković, et al. 2010). Dissenters of Milošević, who otherwise might have searched

for opportunities to protest Milošević’s insistence on defying the West’s demands for him to

withdraw armed forces from Kosovo, retreated into protecting themselves and their loved ones

(Seierstad, 2006).

The aura of fear surrounding Belgrade during the bombings is not well captured in

academic literature. Sometimes more personal works like journals and other primary sources are

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more helpful in painting the full picture of how Belgrade society changed in early 1999. In her

memoir of the late 1990s, Tesanović (1999) recalls not only her disgust for the suffering that

Milošević’s ethnic war in Kosovo had brought upon the people of Belgrade but also her distinct

inability to take action into her own hands when she woke up every day fearing for her own life.

The title of her memoir, Diary of a Political Idiot—meaning one who does not involve him- or

herself in political discourse—depicts how the weight of danger and destruction deflated

whatever energy Milošević’s dissenters could muster to oppose the regime.

Western military intervention not only provided additional fodder for nationalist rhetoric

but also weakened the capacity of civil society members to organize a campaign to oppose

Milošević and call for Serbs to blame him instead of NATO for the bombings. Two of the major

domestic forces that helped propel the Milošević regime to the height of its power were, first, a

traditional, unquestioning preference for authoritarianism, and second, a historical political

deficit in the organization of civil society. If Western actors hoped to suddenly reverse these

long-term domestic trends by dropping bombs on Belgrade, they were disappointed. The

persistent threat to life and limb during the NATO bombings only served to further accentuate

Serb traditions of rallying around paternalistic leaders instead of building up their own civil

society in opposition to those leaders. It should therefore come as no surprise that, when

Milošević finally did call an end to military activity in Kosovo in June of 1999 and NATO’s

bombs stopped falling, his regime still emerged intact.

5.6. Conclusion

There is no shortage of explanations for the longevity of the Milošević regime and its era

of destruction, despite Western attempts to limit its power. Many scholars argue that Western

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intervention in the early 1990s relied too heavily on passive strategies like diplomacy. The

argument follows that Western actors did not deal the Milošević regime any real blows until they

enacted more direct, destructive intervention strategies like economic sanctions and bombs in the

mid- to late-1990s. Nevertheless, it was a popular uprising, the October revolution in 2000,

which finally ousted Milošević, not the direct consequences of sanctions or bombs. Therefore,

there is little evidence to support the argument that Western intervention was only successful in

ousting Milošević when it employed its most direct and destructive intervention strategies. When

direct, destructive intervention strategies came into effect, Milošević still remained in power on

top of his well-fortified domestic pillars of support.

Western intervention battled support for the Milošević on both domestic and international

scales. A strong network of domestic forces produced and maintained the Milošević regime

within Yugoslavia during the 1990s, and the regime received support from powerful

international actors, including Russia and China. However, Western intervention was also forced

to compete with its own unintended consequences, namely unforeseen side-effects that indirectly

and unintentionally supported the Milošević regime. Intervention from Western actors produced

two major unintended consequences that temporarily undermined their initial intentions to

reduce popular support for Milošević. First, the Milošević regime was able to portray Western

intervention as a series of unprovoked attacks from the West, which underscored Milošević’s

claims to legitimacy as an anti-West, nationalist leader in the eyes of his supporters. Second, the

destructive side-effects of Western intervention deprived the Milošević regime’s struggling

opposition of much of its capacity to organize properly against the regime. In sum, these

unintended consequences of Western intervention strengthened the domestic forces already at

work in maintaining the Milošević regime throughout the 1990s.

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Chapter 6: Lessons from Yugoslavia

A combination of domestic and international forces produced and supported Slobodan

Milošević’s regime during Yugoslavia’s breakdown and transition of the 1990s. A wealth of

research has investigated Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition, the armed conflicts of the 1990s,

and Western intervention to end those conflicts. However, prior research has not emphasized the

interaction of domestic and international forces in supporting the Milošević regime. Qualitative

data demonstrate how Western intervention produced unintended consequences that strengthened

domestic support for the Milošević regime. Why is it important to acknowledge the unintended

consequences of Western intervention in Yugoslavia? What lessons from the Yugoslav case may

be applied to cases of Western intervention in other countries in the 21st century?

6.1. Main Findings of the Present Research

In my research, I unearthed the unintended consequences of Western intervention in

Yugoslavia in four steps. First, I analyzed how the violence of Yugoslavia’s breakdown made its

post-socialist transition more destructive—politically, economically, and socially—than the post-

communist transitions in other CEE countries. Second, I examined the domestic forces before

and during the breakdown of Yugoslavia that produced the Milošević regime and allowed it to

propagate violence. Third, I analyzed Western actors’ intended goals when they intervened

against Milošević, as well as how their intervention strategies became more direct and

destructive over the course of the 1990s. Fourth and finally, I explained how Western actors’

direct political, economic, and military intervention strategies produced unintended

consequences by strengthening some of the domestic forces keeping Milošević in power.

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6.1.1. Yugoslavia’s Post-Cold War Transition Was More Violent than Other Transitions in CEE

How was Yugoslavia’s post-Cold War transition during the 1990s similar to and different

from the transitions in other CEE countries? The post-socialist transition in Yugoslavia and the

post-communist transitions in other CEE countries share many similarities. They shared a history

of communist influence before and during the Cold War. After the opening of the Berlin Wall,

the countries of the Eastern Bloc began a process of multiple transitions that took on similar

structures, including institution-building, economic restructuring, and democratization. The

international relations theories of liberalism, realism, and constructivism together explain how

and why Western actors became heavily involved in these transition processes in the Eastern

Bloc. Constructivist theory reconciles a contradiction between realism and liberalism. Western

actors used realist power tools to spread capitalist and democratic systems and norms under the

guise of a liberal, teleological narrative that people around the world would inevitably embrace

those systems.

Despite these historical, structural, and theoretical similarities, Yugoslavia’s post-Cold

War transition stands out from the transitions of other CEE countries for two reasons. First, the

collapse of Yugoslavia’s home-grown system of self-managing socialism resulted in not only

economic but also political and ideological instability within the federation. Second, the wars of

secession and armed conflicts that arose during Yugoslavia’s breakdown complicated the

political and economic transition away from socialism. Because Yugoslavia’s post-Cold War

transition was more violent than the transitions in other CEE countries, it is important to consider

the roles of authoritarian regimes that arose in Yugoslavia during the 1990s, particularly the

Milošević regime in the Republic of Serbia.

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6.1.2. Domestic Forces Produced and Maintained the Milošević Regime

How did the Milošević regime come to power? The regime built itself upon a domestic

support base that consisted of three main pillars: Uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism.

Feelings of political, economic, and social uncertainty became prominent in the late 1980s and

early 1990s after Tito’s death, leading many people in the Republic of Serbia to seek out a new

leader that would address economic crises and provide a new guiding ideology. Milošević

appeared as an ideal candidate because he appealed to a traditional preference among many

people in the Republic of Serbia for authoritarian, even paternalistic, leaders like Tito. A

preference for authoritarian patterns of rule coincided with a civil society that had not been very

active in the political sphere during the time of Tito’s regime. In addition to capitalizing on these

traditional patterns, the Milošević also provided a new guiding philosophy for the people of

Serbia by appealing to discourses of nationalism that had existed underground in Yugoslavia.

As the Milošević regime came to power, it sponsored violence in the form of several

armed conflicts as several Yugoslav republics, including Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, and

Bosnia—and later the autonomous province of Kosovo—declared they would secede from

Yugoslavia. The violence that arose as Yugoslavia fractured prompted responses from many

international actors.

6.1.3. International Actors Became Increasingly Involved in Yugoslavia

Why and how did Western actors become involved in Yugoslavia during the 1990s?

Some actors, particularly Russia and China, expressed support for the Milošević regime. Many

Western actors, however, intervened against the Milošević regime with two goals in mind: To

promote systems of capitalism and democracy in Yugoslavia and its successor states and to

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protect human rights. Over the course of the 1990s, some Western actors—particularly the USA,

the EU, and NATO—resorted to increasingly direct and destructive forms of intervention. Given

the destruction that Western intervention caused in Yugoslavia, many scholars disagree on the

ethical nature of Western intervention. Some scholars have argued that the necessity of saving

lives and promoting peace justified destructive intervention strategies like economic sanctions

and bombs. Other scholars say Western intervention violated Yugoslavia’s sovereignty and

demonstrated imperialist tendencies of Western actors, particularly the USA and NATO.

Western intervention showed little knowledge of the domestic pillars supporting the

Milošević regime. Many direct intervention strategies, especially economic sanctions and

military bombs, produced side-effects that further strengthened the Milošević regime’s domestic

support base and weakened its domestic opposition.

6.1.4. Western Intervention Produced Unintended Consequences in Yugoslavia

Given the large number of Western actors who became involved in Yugoslavia and the

many strategies they used, how was the Milošević regime able to remain in power? Many

incomplete arguments attempt to explain the longevity of the Milošević regime. These arguments

typically suggest that direct intervention was necessary to bring down the Milošević regime, and

it took more than a decade because Western actors took many years to use the most direct and

destructive intervention strategies they could, particularly economic sanctions and military

bombs. However, domestic civil society organizations in Serbia—not the direct effects of

sanctions and bombings—were responsible for bringing down the Milošević regime in 2000.

This suggests that civil society organizations—which relied heavily on international funding—

were more effective at dismantling the domestic support base of the Milošević regime in the long

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term than were sanctions and bombs. What were the shortcomings of direct, destructive

intervention strategies?

Western intervention, particularly sanctions and bombs, produced unforeseen side-effects

that indirectly and unintentionally supported the Milošević regime. Two major unintended

consequences helped to fortify the domestic support base of the regime. First, many people

turned toward the Milošević regime, believing it would protect them from an onslaught of

attacks from the West. This unintended consequence provided the Milošević regime with more

supporters and underscored the regime’s democratic claims to legitimacy. Second, the physically

and economically destructive side-effects of sanctions and bombs deprived the opponents of the

Milošević regime of much of their ability to organize properly against the regime. This

unintended consequence weakened domestic opposition to the regime. It was this domestic

opposition that eventually dismantled the Milošević regime in 2000, more than a year after the

sanctions and bombings from the West had ended.

Western intervention thereby produced unintended consequences when it interacted with

the domestic forces that were supporting the Milošević regime. These research findings provide a

new lens for understanding and evaluating Western intervention strategies in Yugoslavia. Instead

of arguing that Western actors were too slow to implement direct and effective intervention

strategies, one must also consider the side-effects of those strategies. In the short term, economic

sanctions and military bombs were influential in ending armed conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo.

However, in the long run, international funding for civil society organizations like Otpor! And

B92 was more helpful for inspiring regime change in Yugoslavia. This contrast between direct

intervention strategies—which are effective in the short term but less so in the long term—and

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indirect intervention strategies has important implications for other cases of Western intervention

around the world.

6.2. Applying the Lessons from Yugoslavia to Other Cases of Western Intervention

How do the findings of the present research provide a new lens for evaluating Western

intervention in other countries in the 21st century? Yugoslavia is an important case study for

understanding how direct and destructive intervention strategies—more so than indirect

strategies—can produce unintended consequences. In particular, direct and destructive

intervention can exacerbate domestic forces that have produced authoritarian regimes that

sponsor violence.

Each step in my research lends itself to explaining how my findings can be applied to

Western intervention campaigns across time and place. First, Yugoslavia’s particularly violent

political transition in the post-Cold War era represents an overlap between post-communist

transitions and the rise of authoritarian regimes that sponsor violence. Second, the formula for

the rise of the Milošević regime serves as a framework for understanding how authoritarian

governments gain power and use it to propagate violence. Third, Western actors’ strategies for

intervening against the Milošević regime, as well as their reasons for doing so, have recurred in

many intervention campaigns against violent authoritarian leaders since the 1990s. Fourth and

finally, the knowledge of how Western intervention in Yugoslavia in part strengthened the

Milošević regime must be applied to these other Western intervention campaigns. If Western

actors intervene against violent authoritarian regimes like that of Milošević, using the same

intervention strategies as they did in Yugoslavia, it is possible that similar unintended

consequences may unfold.

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The significance of Western intervention’s unintended consequences in Yugoslavia

begins with the particularly destructive nature of Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition. It was in

Yugoslavia that political, economic, and social transformations in the post-Cold War Eastern

Bloc overlapped with a rise of authoritarianism and state-sponsored violence. The violence of the

1990s in Yugoslavia contrasts starkly with the period of peace and openness under Tito. This

dramatic change in Yugoslavia’s political stability paved the way for Western actors, particularly

the USA and NATO, to play a new role in promoting international security.

6.2.1. Political, Economic, and Social Transition can Produce Conflict

Yugoslavia is not the only country to experience a violent breakdown. How is the

Yugoslav case similar to other instances of state failure and armed conflict in the post-Cold War

era? Many other federations and states, such as Syria, have built themselves on principles of

unity and diversity similar to those of Yugoslavia (Brahimi, 2016). The civil war in Syria in the

2010s therefore shares many similarities with the breakdown of Yugoslavia. Both Yugoslavia

and Syria were home to wide diversities of ethnic and religious groups. Both also experienced

widespread violence and mass bloodshed within short periods of time. Yugoslavia’s federation

crumbled during the 1990s, but at present the history of Syria’s political infrastructure remains in

limbo (Brahimi, 2016).

Some scholars argue that ongoing processes of globalization in the late 20th and early 21st

centuries have posed a political threat to diverse nation-states like Syria and multinational

federations like Yugoslavia (Scholte, 2005; Rodrik, 2012). As national sovereignty decreases in

an era of increasing dynamic and transnational connectivity, micronations have attempted to

claim their right to self-determination and secede from larger nation-states (Scholte, 2005). In the

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case of Syria and other countries in the Middle East, millions of ethnic Kurds have campaigned

to separate from countries like Syria and Turkey to form their own nation-state of Kurdistan

(Brahimi, 2016; Cooley, 2012). The desire for a new nation-state is not too different from

Milošević’s calls for a Greater Serbia.

The breakdown of Yugoslavia during its post-socialist transition demonstrates how

periods of transition can produce authoritarianism in conflict. In Yugoslavia, authoritarian

regimes like that of Milošević arose in the early 1990s and sponsored interethnic violence as part

of their political agendas. The rise of Milošević in particular provides a detailed explanation of

how regimes gain power and exercise it to destructive ends in periods of transition.

6.2.2. Conflict can Produce Authoritarian Regimes that Sponsor Violence

How can the rise of the Milošević regime in Yugoslavia be compared to the rise of

authoritarian governments in other countries? The building blocks of the Milošević regime

provide more knowledge than just of how the regime was constructed. The rise of Milošević and

the institutions of his regime provide insight into how authoritarianism can take hold in a society

that is undergoing political, economic, and/or social transitions. The three domestic pillars that

supported the Milošević regime—uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism—provide a useful

framework for understanding how authoritarian governments gain power in transitioning

societies.

The domestic forces that built Milošević’s authoritarian regime parallel developments in

many other countries in the 21st century. In a rapidly globalizing world, uncertainty is

widespread as economic instability, mass movements of people, and rapid flows of ideas pose

threats to societies and their traditional structures and norms worldwide (Scholte, 2005; Rodrik

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2012). Globalization has ensured that the rapid period of change after the opening of the Berlin

Wall has never stopped. In the face of this uncertainty, many groups of people stand to lose their

livelihoods, their feelings of security, or even their senses of self (Scholte, 2005). Many people

who feel this sense of uncertainty seek out leaders and governments that promise to uphold the

traditional status quo or even to provide a new status quo that will better suit those people’s

interests. Oftentimes, these political leaders seek to unify people by appealing to the racial,

ethnic, national, or religious identity they share, in opposition to groups of others (Bleich, 2011).

The appeal of a charismatic leader with a promising vision during a time of uncertainty explains

the rise of many political leaders, as well as non-state actors, in the Middle East, Africa, Asia,

and even Europe and the USA.

The Milošević regime shared many commonalities with other regimes that have arisen in

the post-Cold War era. A prime example would be the Assad regime in Syria or the Gaddafi

regime in Libya. Another example would be the government of Iran, even though leadership,

instead of remaining in the hands of one leader, has recently been passed from Mahmoud

Ahmedinejad to Hassan Rouhani (Heydemann and Leenders, 2013). Many such authoritarian

regimes have exacerbated violence and armed conflicts in and around their countries. Syria is

again a prime example, as the state has all but collapsed in a civil war between ethnic and

religious groups under Bashar al-Assad. The governments of Iran and Saudi Arabia have also

been linked with violence in the Middle East as they sponsored terrorist organizations in

neighboring countries (Byman, 2008; Choksy and Choksy, 2015).

Governments are not the only political perpetrators of violence. Non-state actors that

have gained political and military power in South Asia and the Middle East, such as Al-Qaeda,

the Taliban, and the Islamic State, are also widely known for causing destruction to human life.

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These many governments and other political and military actors have much in common. In many

cases, their rise to power reflects the three-pillar model on which the Milošević regime was built:

uncertainty, traditionalism, and nationalism. Authoritarian governments and other political actors

have introduced variations on this model, such as by appealing to religious identity instead of

ethnic or national identity (Chayes, 2015). However, the use of identity narratives often produces

similar results.

The mass killings of people based on national, ethnic, or religious identity, including acts

of genocide, are a deeply concerning aspect of authoritarian politics in the 21st century. In

Rwanda, Iraq, Syria, and other countries, the systematic killing of civilians rivals the genocide at

Srebrenica in Bosnia. Western actors cite these acts of humanitarian destruction to justify

intervention campaigns against authoritarian governments and political non-state actors around

the world (Barša, 2005). The Yugoslav case again provides a useful framework for

understanding how and why Western actors continue to intervene in conflicts around the world.

6.2.3. Authoritarianism and Violence Prompt Western Intervention

The story of Western intervention into Yugoslavia during its breakdown does not exist in

isolation. Rather, it is part of a century-long tapestry of intervention campaigns radiating out

from Western actors. On several occasions since the end of the Second World War, Western

actors, particularly the USA and NATO, have intervened in conflicts in all parts of the world.

During the Cold War, the USA and NATO sent troops to Korea and Vietnam to fight the spread

of communism. After the end of the Cold War, Western actors shifted their attention to brutal

and even genocidal conflicts in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Rwanda, and the Persian Gulf. In the 21st

century, the USA in particular has become politically, militarily, and economically involved in

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Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Iran, and other countries where authoritarian regimes have exacerbated

violence in periods of conflict (Rashid, 2012; Harvey, 2005).

A quick appraisal of these cases reveals common trends. Western actors expressed two

main reasons for intervening in Yugoslavia: To build capitalist, democratic systems and to

protect human rights. The spread of capitalism and democracy harkens back to the USA’s

foreign policy efforts during the Cold War, when Western actors promoted capitalism in the

Third World as superior to communism. Western actors’ mission of protecting human rights also

has a lengthy history, dating back to the UN Declaration of Human Rights in the 1940s.

In the years since the breakdown of Yugoslavia, Western actors have used these

overarching political, economic, and humanitarian goals to justify intervention into conflict

zones around the world. The political and economic goals of Western involvement worldwide

have also extended beyond intervention into conflicts. The global economy has witnessed deep

integration since the opening of the Berlin Wall, as capitalism—or hypercapitalism as some

scholars call it—has become a dominating ideology in the globalized world (Scholte, 2005;

Rodrik, 2011). Western actors have been heavily involved in spreading capitalist systems and

ideologies through the World Trade Organization (WTO) and free trade deals such as the Trans-

Pacific Partnership (TPP) (Irwin, 2002; Rodrik, 2011). Economic integration under capitalist

ideologies recalls the indirect economic forms of Western intervention in Yugoslavia. As the

systems of communism and socialism showed signs of weakness, Western influences poured

through the former Iron Curtain. Western actors like the EU, the IMF, and the World Bank

worked to restructure planned economies and replace them with free markets (Åslund, 2013;

White, Stewart, and Batt, 2013).

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As for the goal of protecting human rights, Western actors have continued to justify

intervention on humanitarian grounds. The public rationale for intervening in countries in the

Middle East and South Asia during the “War on Terror” has been to save lives and enforce

respect for human rights. At the same time, Western actors, particularly the USA, have argued

that the “War on Terror” must involve democratization to replace authoritarian regimes with

properly functioning states (Rashid, 2012). The call for spreading democracy in the Middle East

and South Asia parodies Western involvement in the Eastern Bloc during the post-Cold War era.

In the 1990s, Western actors argued that democracy, alongside free markets, would make the

countries of the former Eastern Bloc better off. Although Western attention has refocused onto

the Middle East with a greater focus on terrorism, the old humanitarian narratives are still useful

for justifying intervention.

Liberal theory explains the moral justification of Western involvement in the Eastern

Bloc in the post-Cold War era. Yet at the same time Western actors made use of realist policy

tools to spread their systems and ideals, particularly in intervening in the wars in Yugoslavia.

Constructivist theory reconciles this contradiction by arguing that Western actors have used their

own institutions and political, economic, and normative reform efforts to perpetuate the global

spread of capitalism and democracy. Throughout the 1990s, these policy tools escalated from

indirect forms of intervention like economic reforms and stationing peace-keeping forces to

significantly more direct forms of intervention like economic sanctions and bombs. The most

direct and indirect intervention strategies suggested that Western actors’ liberal, teleological

narrative about a democratic, capitalist utopia was not enough to build these systems in

Yugoslavia. They had to rely on realist tools of power politics to combat anti-Western forces like

those supporting the Milošević regime.

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Western actors continue to use the intervention strategies they used in Yugoslavia

elsewhere, particularly the most direct and destructive strategies like economic sanctions and

bombs. Perhaps because those strategies did help in many ways to end the violence of the

Milošević regime, many policy makers believe economic sanctions and bombs are the most

effective in ending conflicts and toppling regimes. The USA have conducted airstrikes in

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya to attack the authoritarian governments in those countries, followed

by actual armed soldiers on the ground. Western actors have also levied economic sanctions—

including embargos and travel bans—against Russia, Iran, and Cuba for the violence the

governments in those countries have supported. The severe forms of intervention that Western

actors unleashed upon Yugoslavia may have seemed unprecedented at the time. However, in the

two decades since, the thought of Western actors, particularly the USA, intervening in other

countries with sanctions and bombs has become almost commonplace.

The persistence of NATO, a Cold War era organization in opposition to the Soviet Union,

in the post-Cold War era also raises some eyebrows. The NATO bombings on Belgrade have

apparently provided an opportunity for Western actors, in particular the USA and NATO, to

develop a new mission for themselves (McGwire, 2000; Nambiar, 1999). US and NATO

involvement around the world, in the name of maintaining peace and promoting human rights,

but also in the interest of promoting capitalism and democracy, runs parallel with the EU’s

narrative of the “Hour of Europe.” In the post-Cold War era, the USA and NATO have sought to

prove themselves as guarantors of international security in a world threatened by violent

conflicts and terrorism that transcend national borders (McGwire, 2000).

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In the 21st century, this mission of maintaining international security has spiraled into an

array of intervention campaigns around the world. Some of these campaigns seem to be

continuing on without end, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria.

6.2.4. Western Intervention can Produce Unintended Consequences

The unintended consequences of Western intervention in Yugoslavia demonstrated how

domestic and international forces can interact to strengthen support for the regime that

intervening actors are trying to dismantle. In particular, direct intervention strategies in

Yugoslavia like economic sanctions and bombs produced two unintended consequences. First,

they fueled the Milošević regime’s narrative that the West was attacking the people of the

Republic of Serbia. And second, the destructive ripple effects of those intervention strategies

prevented oppositional forces from organizing against the regime. In contrast, indirect

intervention strategies, like providing funding for opposition organizations like Otpor! and B92,

helped build up an organized opposition to Milošević that managed to vote him out of office.

The retrospective analysis of the consequences of these intervention strategies demands that

Western actors consider all of the effects their intervention strategies produce. This necessitates

using prior instances of unintended consequences to predict how intervention strategies may

produce unanticipated effects. Both intended and unintended consequences determine how

effective intervention strategies will be in achieving their specific goals like protecting human

rights, promoting capitalism and democracy, and facilitating regime change.

The lessons of Western intervention and its unintended consequences in Yugoslavia must

carry on into the future. This conclusion is a realist assessment of the impacts Western

intervention has had and may continue to have around the world. Western actors continue to use

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many of the same direct intervention strategies that they used in Yugoslavia, such as economic

sanctions on Iran and air strikes on Libya. In some of these countries, it is likely that deeply

rooted domestic forces similar to those in Yugoslavia have produced the authoritarian

governments and violent non-state actors that Western actors are seeking to combat. If the

domestic forces resemble those in Yugoslavia, and if the international forces are similar to when

Western actors intervened in Yugoslavia, then it is highly likely that unintended consequences

similar to those seen in Yugoslavia will arise in other parts of the world.

While direct intervention strategies like bombings and economic sanctions may help

accomplish short-term intervention goals, they may serve to make ruling regimes more

impervious to intervention. Meanwhile, subtle support for domestic oppositional forces may help

accomplish more long-term intervention goals like regime change. Therefore, a nuanced

understanding of how Western intervention produced unintended consequences in Yugoslavia is

tremendously important when designing intervention campaigns in other parts of the world, if

and when they do continue to happen.

6.3. Yugoslavia as a Case Study: Reflecting on Unintended Consequences

The destructive events of Yugoslavia’s post-socialist transition contrast with the

significantly less bloody events of post-communist transitions in other Central and Eastern

European countries. This bloodshed prompted Western actors to intervene by more direct and

destructive means than they did in post-communist countries. Western involvement in the former

Soviet Union and buffer states revolved around economic restructuring, democratization, battling

corruption, and strengthening rule of law (Aslund, 2013). While these processes also took place

in Yugoslavia, they coincided with the violent breakdown of the multiethnic federation. Starting

132

in 1992, Western actors already promoting capitalism and democracy in Yugoslavia declared

they had a moral obligation to intervene in the conflicts to protect human rights and minimize

bloodshed.

As the destruction of Milošević’s regime in the 1990s continued, Western actors resorted

to more direct intervention strategies, including economic sanctions and military bombings.

While these strategies did help to end conflicts and curb bloodshed, they also destroyed

Yugoslavia’s economy and disrupted daily life in many parts of Yugoslavia, especially the

capital city of Belgrade. As a result, Milošević had more reason to blame the West for the

suffering of Serbs, which further strengthened nationalist support for his regime. Disruption of

daily life, including a fear of more bombing attacks, also prevented opposition forces from

organizing against Milošević. Western actors achieved the opposite result when they provided

funding for local organizations and media like Otpor! and B92 to build up domestic opposition

to the Milošević regime. The strengthening of civil society mechanisms to oppose Milošević

finally resulted in regime change, an effect that sanctions and bombs may not have been able to

accomplish on their own.

The transformations of the post-Cold War era in the Eastern Bloc, especially the armed

conflicts in Yugoslavia during its breakdown in the 1990s, overlap with Western actors

developing, self-declared mission to intervene in conflicts around the world. Western actors,

especially the USA, have continued using economic sanctions and military bombs as foreign

policy tools to mitigate conflicts, incite regime change, and spread systems and values of

capitalism and democracy around the world. It does not seem likely that these intervention

campaigns against interethnic conflicts and authoritarian governments that sponsor violence will

cease anytime soon.

133

If Western actors continue intervening in armed conflicts around the world, their

intervention plans must reflect on potential unintended consequences. Some intervention

strategies, particularly direct ones like economic sanctions and military bombings, can produce

unforeseen effects that undermine their own intentions. Efforts to destabilize a regime like

Milošević’s can, in some ways, serve to make the regime stronger. The case of intervention in

Yugoslavia during the 1990s demonstrates these counterintuitive results. If Western foreign

policy planners do not consider the very real effects of unintended consequences, then Western

intervention will remain perpetually blind to the lessons of the fall of Yugoslavia and the rise of

the Milošević regime.

134

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Appendices

Appendix 1. Ethnic Map of Yugoslavia (1982)

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992

148

Appendix 2. Rise of Yugoslav Identification (1961-1981)

Source: Sekulić, Massey, and Hodson, 1994

149

Appendix 3. Changing Ethnic Composition of Yugoslav Republics/Provinces (1989, 2003)

Source: Dyrstad, 2010

150

Appendix 4. Unemployment Rates in the Yugoslav Republics and Provinces in the 1980s

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Appendix 5. Economic Inequality among Yugoslav Republics in 1986

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Appendix 6. Gross Domestic Product in the Republic of Serbia (1990-2014)

Source: Kushni’s Macroeconomic Research, http://www.kushnirs.org/macroeconomics_/en/

serbia__gdp.html#main