JIABS 15-1

THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

Peter N. Gregory

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Roger Jackson Dept. of Religion Carleton College

Northfield, MN 55057 USA

EDITORS

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, Illinois, USA

Alexander W. Macdonald Universite de Paris X Nanterre, France

Ernst Steinkellner University of Vienna

Wien, Austria

Jikido Takasaki University of Tokyo

Tokyo, Japan

Steven Collins Concordia University Montreal, Canada

Robert Thurman Columbia University

New York, New York, USA

Volume 15 1992 Number 1

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies Inc. It is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholarly' contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines, such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The JIABS is published twice yearly, in the summer and winter.

Manuscripts for publication (we must have two copies) and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to the JIABS editorial office at the address given below. Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the JIABS printed on the inside back cover of every issue. Books for review should also be sent to the address below. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related publications.

Editor's Address

Roger Jackson JIABS c/o Dept. of Religion Carleton College Northfield, 55057 USA

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andre Bareau (France) M N. Deshpande (India) R. Gard (USA) B.G. Gokhale (USA) John C. Huntington (USA) P.S. Jaini (USA)

Joseph M. Kitagawa (USA) Jacques May (Switzerland) Hajime Nakamura (Japan)

John Rosenfield (USA) David Snellgrove (UK.)

E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

Both the Editor and Association would like to thank Carleton College for its financial support in the production of the Journal.

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1992 ISSN: 0193-600X

Indexed in Religion Index One: Periodicdls, American Theological Library Association, Chicago, available online through BRS (Bibliographic Retrieval Services), Latham, New York, and DIALOG Information Services, Palo Alto,

California.

Composition by Institute of Buddhist Studies, Berkeley, CA 94704.

Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.

CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

The Violence of Non-Violence: A Study of Some Jain Responses to Non-Jain Religious Practices, by Phyllis Granoff

Is the Dharma-kaya the Real "Phantom Body" of the Buddha?, by Paul Harrison

Lost in China, Found in Tibet: How Wonch'uk Became the Author of the Great Chinese Commentary, by John Powers

n. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

Some Observations on the Present and Future of Buddhist

1

44

95

Studies, by D. Seyfort Ruegg 104

III. AN EXCHANGE

The Theatre of Objectivity: Comments on Jose Cabezon's Interpretations of mKhas grub Ije's and C.W. Huntington, Ir.'s Interpretations of the Tibetan Translation of a Seventh Century Indian Buddhist Text, by C. W Huntington, Jr. 118

On Retreating to Method and Other Postmodern Turns: A Response to C. W. Huntington, Jr., by Jose Ignacio Cabez6n 134

N. BOOK REVIEWS

1. Choix de Documents tibitains conservesdia Bibliotheque Nationale complete par quelques manuscrits de l'I ndia Office et du British Museum, by Yo shiro Imaeda and Tsugohito Takeuchi (Alexander W. Macdonald) 144

2. A Concordance of Buddhist Birth Stories, by Leslie Grey (Barend A. van Nooten) 145

v. NOTES AND NEWS

Report on the 10th lABS Conference (A. W. Macdonald)

CONTRIBUTORS

148

151

:;Jfhe Vio~ence of Non-Violence:. A St~d?, of ~!soroe Iron Responses to Non-Jam RelIgIous ~Fractices . l\'~:!:;

~~pjrPhyl1is Granoff !~;?P '(

::i>' ';:

:~:Jllins and Buddhists, often lumped together by their opponents, ,',were acutely aware of their own distinctiveness, though they may Sriot have always been equally concerned with the challenge that ;.each represented to the other. Medieval Jain philosophers would ;;seem to have taken the Buddhists far more seriously than Buddhists did their Jain opponents. While Haribhadra argued extensively in

?·a work like the Anekiintajayapataka against Buddhist doctrine and 'Akalarika in his many writings sought to discredit Buddhist theories of epistemology, no contemporary Buddhist seems to have

'expended as much energy on any Jain opponent. Medieval Jain '. story literature similarly attests to the high regard in which Jains held Buddhist teachers of logic, with many a Jain student secretly going to learn from a Buddhist master, and often succumbing to the . persuasiveness of the Buddhist teaching.1 I know of no comparable story material for the same time period on the Buddhist side, and by and large it seems safe to say that medieval Buddhist philosophers appear to have been far more intent upon engaging Naiyayikas and Mimfu:p.sakas, in effect marginalizing the J ains, whom they do not seem to have taken seriously as partners in philosophical debate.2

The situation is not radically different when we tum to a consideration of actual religious practices rather than abstract thinking. Although scholars have yet to study in any detail Jain objections to Buddhist religious practices, there is no question that medieval Jains were as concerned with the Buddhist concepts of compassion

1

2 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

and self-sacrifice as they were with Buddhist arguments againslll' existence of a permanent soul or against ¢.e existence of exte t .t objects of knowledge, the two major philosophical issues .~~ •. engaged them. In fact, the Jains might be said to have defin~' themselves as the religion of compassion par excellence in medt~ val ~dia, .and to ~upport their. claim they needed t~ show that ~l. possIble nval claImants practIced a false compaSSIOn. Given th6 Buddhist emphasis on compassion and their opposition to blo~d~.· sacrifice which they shared with the J ains, it was only natural tha.t the Jains should regard them as a major rival and that Jains would expend considerable energy in trying to show that the B uddhistsexL: emplified a wrong ideal of compassion that was in itself inherently violent. Jains also raised objections to what they regarded as the "easy life" of the Buddhist monks, which the Buddhists quickly countered by accepting the criticism and turning it into a positive \ virtue.3 Buddhists were in a more difficult position when it Carrie to Jain objections to Mahayana ideals, particularly the idea of) physical self-sacrifice which dominated both story literature and" the prescriptive texts, but it is a curious aspect of this whole debate .•.. that the Buddhist response seems often to have been simply to ignore the repeated Jain challenges to their cardinal practices; it is only here and there that we get an occasional glimmer of Buddhist awareness of the Jain criticisms.4

Jains sought to show that Buddhist notions of compassion enshrined in stories like the Vyaghri Jataka, in which the Buddha., offers his body to save a living being, in fact involve a degree of violence that makes such compassion tantamount to murder, for the Jains argued that the Buddha's body like all human bodies was filled with worms, and thus in offering his body the Buddha actually committed numerous murders.5 At the same time some J ains clearly found the story so compelling (and no doubt of such widespread popular appeal) that they were not beyond assimilating it into their own tradition despite all the efforts to criticize its underlying lack of morality.6 Beyond the VyaghrJ Jataka, which is the one story often specifically cited, Jains attacked the entire notion of selfsacrifice prevalent in so many Buddhist stories in which the Bodhisattva offers himself as food in times of famine as equally

VIOLENCE OF NON-VIOLENCE 3

""lent; the objection to this act of compassion, which the Jains ~?a.rd as misguided, also hinges on the fact that it involved sin for reg . 11 . l' . h B ddh' d 7 theaters as we as Imp lcatmg t eu a m mur er. ~',}eMost of the Jain objections to the Buddhist und~rstanding of :1I11passion occur in Jain texts on lay ethics, the Sravakacaras, ~ihOUgh the topic can also be treated in a philosophical text as well. While the most widespread objections are to the extreme acts of ~~ing celebrated in stories like the Vyaghri Jataka, Jain objections t6Buddhist concepts of non-violence in fact cover a wide ground lind can be understood to refer back well into the Pali vinaya, as we shall discuss below. ~,.< Jain objections to Buddhist ethics occur in the context of a more ~xtensive discussion of the duty of ahirpsa, non-violence, incumbertt upon all lains, and they do not always refer to the Buddhists hy name, although there is no question in many cases that the Buddhists are meant. The discussions mayor may not also include 'a discussion of the violence of sacrifice and of Hindu practices of offering gifts of meat to guests and in the sraddha ceremony; where they do not include a discussion of the Vedic sacrifice it is because this was so obviously a fonn of violence and the discussion is focussing on types of "non-violence" that it will show fall short of the Jain ideal.

Invariably, the discussion includes views of other groups as well. The group most frequently treated alongside the Buddhists and usually mentioned by name is the sarpsaramocakas. They are identified in one Jain text as "kutirthikas", non-Hindu ascetics but ,of false belief. The sarpsaramocakas are a mysterious group. The majority of references to them occur in Jain Sravakacara texts where their views on ahirpsa are countered. tor example the Sravakacara of Amitagati refutes their views, although it does not name them, while Hemacandra in his Yogasastra both names them and defines them as kutirthikas, "bad ascetics."g The Sastraviirtasamuccaya of Haribhadra argues against their views, verses 38-40, and there is an extensive refutation of the sarpsaramocakas in the Malayagiri commentary to the Nandisutta. 9 The section in Malayagiri is clearly a summary of the arguments in the Sravakaprajiiapti, which may well be the earliest extensive refuta-

4 nABS VOL. 15, NO.1

tion of the sarpsaramocakas in a Jain text. It has} comment ..... attributed to Haribhadra, and it is regarded by the Svetfunbaras<try· the earliest text on lay ethics. A recent discussion of the text dat!l~ the commentary to the eighth century C. E. and the text itself ets. ·0

some time before the end of the fifth century C. £.10

Outside the Jains, the commentary of Medatithi on Manu knows the sarpsaramocakas as a heterodox or non-Vedic groUp' and there are references to them as a non-Vedic group scattered t!rr0ughout orthodox texts. ll Kumarila mentions them in the Slokavarttika, as does Jayantabhana in his Nyayamanjari. 12 There are also a number of Buddhist texts that either refer to the sarpsaramocakas by name or at least describe practices that are elsewhere attributed to them. They seem to have been a group that was closely associated with the Jains and Buddhists, probably at least by the time of the present recension of the PaIi vinaya· and certainly by the time of BuddhaghosaP

Jain discussions of ethics focus on the issue of non-violence , and much of the debate seems to have taken place amongst the non~ Vedic groups; in Jain eyes this was a debate between J ains, Buddhists and oilier "tlrthikas' who had all turned from the violence of the Vedic sacrifice, but who nonetheless saw the meaning of "compassion" fulfilled in a variety of diverse religious practices. In the present paper I should like to explore some of the Jain responses to these non-Jain religious practices as they touch upon the issue of ahirpsif. I begin with a translation of a section from the Sravakaprajnapti dealing with the sarpsaramocakas and other opponents. I have translated the commentary under the heading "commentary" and where I felt that some comments were required to make the text more easily accessible I have given them under "remarks." I have attempted to identify the opponents whose views are being criticized in the sections entitled "remarks"; in many cases the available evidence indicates that it is the Buddhists against whom the Jains argue. Following the translation I offer some further general discussion of the Jain understandings of nonviolence. Regrettably, I must leave for a future study the challenge of locating the exact Buddhist responses to the Jain objections, and indeed of identifying all the viewpoints represented. At this early


:'tage of roy work my main goal shall be limited indeed: to acquaint t~holars with the Jain arguments and call attention to this little 'bown debate so that. others a:ay ~ontribute .to what! hope, will ~pecoroe a comprehensIve exammatIon of medIeval Indian ethlcs.14

WJI.The Sravakaprajfiapti and commentary by Haribhadra

1133.' Others say this: "There are many desperately unhappy creatures who go ,.from birth to birth on account of their sins. Surely one should kill them, to get 'tid of those."

Commentary: The sentence is to be construed as follows: others, that is L'le Samsaramocakas, state thus. And what is it that they state? They state that

, desperately unhappy creatures, beings like worms and ants, roam around in the Jeyc1e of births, that is fall into the cycle of births, on account of sin. "On account of sin" means by reason of their lack of merit. And since that is the case, these creatures should be slain. There is a particle in the sentence that indicates firm certitude: they should always be slain and never allowed to live. And why is that? The verse says, "in order to get rid of those," which means in order to get rid of sins.

134. Thus it is wrong to state that one should abstain from taking life in all ,circumstances. The rule should apply only to creatures who are happy.

Otherwise, to operate under any other interpretation leads to a person's committing a fault.

Commentary: Since what was said above is correct, then one should not abstain from taking life in all circumstances; rather only with respect to those creatures that are happy. That is to say the proscription has as its object only happy creatures, since only killing a happy creature can entail sin. Otherwise, that is, if you do not subscribe to this interpretation of the proscription, you will commit a fault. For, a person desirous of securing for himself the next world has a duty to eradicate the sins of those who are suffering. If he does not do this, then he is at fault, just as is the person who denies others access to renunciation or access to the opportunity to make gifts. This is the statement of someone who objects to our position. Now we begin the rejoinder to his objection.

Remarks: While most representations of the views of the sarpsaramocakas attribute to them the practice of killing "miserable creatures," which can mean both suffering creatures and lower forms of life (ants, worms, and such), the majority of rebuttals of

6 nABS VOL 15, NO.1

their views specifically name lower life forms as the intend: recipients of their compassion. Nonetheless, there are Some rebeq, tals of their views in which higher animals' and even human beinUt ... are included in the list of people ~~ be released from their mise~i> The present text and the Malayagm commentary to the NandislItt'i' in fact include human beings who are dreadfully sinful amongst tha list of living beings who should be killed. This may well have beeh the original doctrine of the sarpsfiramocakas, for it is in this fonn< that their views are said to have influenced some Buddhists. -

The section of the Pilli Buddhist vinaya that deals with murder' Pifriijika 3, opens with an interesting and odd story about som~ monks who have just heard the Buddha lecture on the impurity of the body. When the Buddha retires from the assembly the monks ... . ponder what they have just learned and become exceedingly, .... . disgusted with their bodies and their physical existence. They ask another monk to kill them. A goddess comes from the evil Mara and •. praises the monk who has done the deed, saying that he is to be honored, for he has released those who were not released (atiI}I}e tifresl). Emboldened by this praise, the culprit, whose name is given .... as Migalandika, kills a number of monks. The Buddha learns of his deeds and proclaims the firm rule that a monk must neither take his own life nor take the life of another. I5

In this story we have a clear example of a practice attributed widely in the Jain texts to the s8rpsfiramocakas that is here said to have occurred amongst the Buddhist monks only to be forbidden by the Buddha. The commentary of Buddhaghosa, the Samantapiisiidika, supplies further interesting infonnation. The Buddha withdraws from the monks after instructing them in the impurity of the body and Buddhaghosa explains that he did so knowing that these people were not ripe to understand his teachings and knowing what would happen. He did not want anyone to attribute the practice to the Buddha or to say that the Buddha taught his disciples to murder each other.16 To me, this reads like a careful attempt to disavow a practice that was indeed attributed to the Buddhists. Furthennore, Buddhaghosa notes that in her wrong view the Goddess was saI!Jsiframocakamilakkha viya, "like the mlecchas called Sarpsaramocakas."17 I deduce from this remark


d.froIll the entire story in the vinaya the hypothesis that views ~iributed to th~ sa~s~am~cakas by the Jai~s were to be found trtnongst the vanous sramcu;l1c groups, and partlcularly amongst the 'Buddhists. References in the Buddhist literature to practices that !ire rejected under the rubric of ~e "sa1J1.asaramoc~~s" i~ the Jain Srivakacaras can also be found ill me~eval Mahayana lIterature. Thus, the Sik$asamuccaya, citing the Aryaratnamegha, says that it ispennitted to kill someone who is about to commit one of the five

• 18 great SIllS.

>- -

135. What proof do those who state this view have that when a suffering creature i~ slain sin is eradicated and further bondage is not created as a result of their constant thinking of evil thoughts? Answer: the proof is to be found in statements that deal with existence in the realm of hell.

Commentary: What proof is there that when these suffering creatures are slain, wat is killed, in this manner, the onI y consequence is that their sins are eradicated and that they do not experience further bondage on account of their obsessive dunking of evil thoughts? The author means to say that there is no such proof that this is the case. Here the objector rejoins, there are the statements that are applied with respect to hellish existences; that means the same statements applied to creatures in hell can serve as proof of our assertion. The next verse goes on to say exactly what the objector means here.

136. For, as those creatures are constantly slain by wicked supernatural beings, although they are constantly absorbed in evil thoughts, they do not acquire bondage in the same way as they destroy their sins.

Commentary: "Those creatures" means creatures in hell. To say that they are slain means that they are beaten. And by whom are they beaten? By wicked supernatural beings such as Ambaand the others. Constantly means without stop. They are constantly absorbed in evil thoughts. Despite this they do not acquire bondage in the same way as they get rid of their bad deeds through their suffering. This is the gist of the verse. How do we know this to be the case? In response to that question our objector replies:

137. Because they do not have the karma that will result in their falling again into hell, for they are never reborn there right away. And in the absence of those, they still exhaust their sins through the torments that they inflict on each other.

Commentary: Because they do not have the karma that will result in their falling

8 . nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

into hell: a creature in hen never acquires the karma that would make h'f; into hell again right away. The reason why we can say this is then given: b: a¥ no creature immediately, that is to say, as soon as he gets out of hell, is born ~u~ that is to say takes birth again in hell. For the Jains do not believe that a crea~e1 having lived in hell, is immediately reborn in hell once more. And so the Object~~ means that just as this is agreed to be the case, so should it be allowed that wh! a miserable creature is murdered he does not acquire further bondage on acco~n of his evil obsessions, but rather gets rid of his sins. This is the general intentio t. of the objector. The verse continues: "and in the absence of those." This meann<

in the absence of those supernatural beings who tonnent the creatures in hell i~ . the realms known as mud-hell and the other realms in which these supemauri-al beings are not present, they still exhaust their sins through the torments they. inflict on each other, that is, through the pains they inflict on each other, as it is said in the Tattvarthadhigamasiitra, 3.4, "They suffer terrible pains that they. inflict on each other." From this statement it is clear that their getting rid of their sins has only that as its cause; even in the aprati$t/1anahell, there is no other cause for getting rid of sin. The objector, in order to make this clear, anticipates an objection to his last point and thus says:

138. Even in the aprati$t/1ana hell it is through suffering that a creature gets rid of his sins. For in the absence of that, a god there cannot exhaust those sins.

Commentary: Even in aprathi$t/1ana, that is to say in the seventh hell, only through suffering, that is to say through the pain born from being raised up and cast down, is the eradication of sin accomplished, and not by any other means. This is so because we see that in the absence of that, which means in the absence of suffering, a god, a divine being, there, in that hell cannot exhaust that karma, the flow of which results in the experience of hell (this means that we allow that a god can somehow be born there; the verse also has a particle "and" meaning that the god when he is elsewhere is always free from suffering, which is also the case when he visits hell).

Remarks: The objector to the Jain doctrine that one should abstain from taking life under all conditions has proposed a restriction to this general rule: one should abstain from taking the life of happy creatures, but one should in fact always take the life of miserable creatures, for this will allow them to be released from their sins. The Jain in tum has objected that creatures when they are deprived of life become absorbed in evil thoughts, raudradhyiina. This leads to bondage. It is therefore a moot point whether killing some creature in the end benefits that creature: while the creature may get rid of


1':;< e past sins, he acquires new bad karma through his obsessive saID -1_ dh - . di d . J . iiI thoughts. Rauwa yana Isscusse m many am texts; a ,f~cularlY vivid example is the story of King Brahmadatta told by ~eIDacandra in his Yogasastra, IL27ff. Brahmadatta is so obsessed '>ith his hatred of the Brahmins whom he has ordered blinded that ~~sits fingering a bowl of grapes imagining them to be the eyes of !the Brahmins he has had punished. For the sin of such wicked thoughts Brahmadatta goes to hell. Raudradhyana is particularly associated with the moment of death; like many groups in India the\ :Jains stress the necessity of controlling one's thoughts at death to 'insure a good rebirth. . The objector to the Jain position attempts to argue his way out bfthe conundrum posed by the Jain by using doctrines familiar to the J ains. He refers in some detail to the Jain concept of hell. The Jains believe that there are seven hellish realms. In all of them creatures suffer terribly. The Jains agree that through their sufferings these hellish creatures are rid of the bad deeds that brought them to hell in the first place; it may also be argued that they may also experience terrible obsessive thoughts, or raudradhyana, but the doctrine nonetheless allows that the eradication of sin is the more powerful influence. This is why no creature is reborn from hell back into hell; all creatures leave hell for another rebirth after which of course there is no bar to their being reborn again in hell.

The last verse is not entirely clear to me. I interpret the text and commentary to mean that it is obvious that suffering causes the eradication of sin because we see in the case of gods who visit even the worst of the hells that nothing happens to their own sins; gods do not suffer, and thus we know that it is the absence of their suffering that entails the absence of eradication of sin.19

139. Therefore, killing them, even if it leads to their harboring evil thoughts, is the cause of eradicating their sins and should not be considered a wrong doing.

Commentary: Since what is said above is correct, then, killing them, which means murdering those suffering begins, even though it leads to their harboring bad thoughts, that is, even though it causes them to think bad thoughts and produces in them many different types of mental anguish, still, it is the cause of eradicating their sins, that is to say it is the means of putting an end to the sins


of those suffering peings. For this reason it is not to be regarded as a Wrong d ..>(

This is the position of the SaI!1saramocaka, who is opposed to the Jain do Ol~~: being expounded in this text. The response to that position is as fOl1ows~trijt

' •. ")<

140. For the moment we shall forget aU else. What good comes to that on.·J

the eradicating of sins? The end to karma? What caused that in your view~l~

Commentary: At this point in the discussion let us put aside for the mome'i whatever else needs to. be said. "In the eradicating of sins" means in ~. eradicating of the sins of those suffering creatures. "To that one" means toth~ person who causes the eradication, namely the person who kills the sUfferin~ creature. What good comes to him? The question is legitimate becauseno reasonable man acts without considering the result of his actions. Now you might think thus: The end to karma. That is, you might believe that the good that comes to the murderer is an end to his own karma. If that is your view, then I ask you, my opponent, what had caused that karma in the first place according to your doctrine?

141. If it was caused by ignorance, then only from the removal of that can it be removed. What use is that act of murder? Or do you imagine that the absence of that is its cause?

Commentary: If you should think that it was caused by ignorance, that is to say it was brought about by ignorance, well then, only from the removal of that, that is to say, only from the cessation of ignorance can there be removal of it or cessation of it. "It" in all of this refers to karma; it can only be stopped from the removal of its cause for it is generally admitted that a product ceases to appear in the absence of its cause. If this is what you hold, then in that case, what has the act of murder to do with anything? For it does not affect karma in the sense of being opposed to it in any way. Perhaps you imagine that the absence of that, meaning the absence of the act of murder, is the cause of the karma? In that case we reply:

142. In that case there results the unwarranted conclusion that even released souls would have karma and release would be meaningless. Or do you think that such a one gains merit? Even that cannot be, because there is also obstruction.

Commentary: There would result the unwarranted conclusion that even released souls would have karma, since karma is caused by the absence of the act of murder and released souls surely do not commit murder. In this way release would be totally meaningless, as it would be accompanied by bondage as well. Or perhaps you think in this way: such a one, that is, the person who kills a suffering creature, gets as his reward some kind of merit, and not the destruction


ii' it own karma, Even that cannot be, that is, even that merit cannot be the good £f;l~omes to him, for an obstruction is also caused which prevents your view i~~holding true. This is made clear in the next verse. ,-tt":' - ,

,1~3.Killing those he must o~ nece~sity c~eate an obstacle to their ~aking ~erit. 'ijow could tha.t o~e th~n gam ment, for It cannot have any cause, Just as ill the 'case with eradlcatmg sms. , : :~:

'~ommentary: By killing, that is, murdering, those, which means those suffering 'tteatures, of necessity, that is, without fail, the murderer creates, that is brings ~bout, an obstacle to their making merit. "Their" means the suffering creatures.

'porifthey had lived they might have made merit for themselves by killing other miSerable creatures. And when those suffering creatures are themselves slain,

,then since they cannot go on to kill others we must admit that an obstacle has been put in the path of their making merit for themselves. Since that is so, how can that one, that is, how can the murderer, have gained merit? The question is Ineant to imply that he cannot in any way gain merit because there is no cause for such merit. This is the correct way of construing the syntax of the verse. To amplify the logic here, you cannot argue that there is a cause of merit for the

. murderer, for something that causes an obstacle to merit-making in another being talmot at the same time be a cause of merit to someone else. The verse supplies !II1 example: just as in the case with eradicating their sins. Here "their" refers to

the suffering creatures who are being killed. The gist of the verse is this: You maintain that killing suffering creatures is the cause of eradicating your own sins; at the same time, since those creatures who are killed cannot go on to kill other creatures, there will be no cause for the eradication of their own sins and so how can their sins ever be eradicated?

Remarks: The argument in this verse seems to be as follows. The Jain has asked his opponent to explain what benefit the murderer gets from killing miserable creatures. The first response is given in verse 140: the murderer benefits because by killing miserable creatures he gets rid of his own adverse karma. The answer to this is given in verse 141: a product is only terminated by removing its cause. The absence of murder is not the cause of the murderer's bad karma, but ignorance is. Only by removing his ignorance can the murderer in fact remove his own bad karma. In verse 143 the opponent is allowed to suggest that the murderer is benefitted not because he eradicates his own bad karma, but because he gains some good karma, some merit. This is also rejected. The grounds for rejecting this position are simple: when the murderer kills a


miserable creature he not only stops it from doing wrong; he als stops it from making merit for itself. If you assume that mUrderin? an unfortunate creature brings merit, then When some unfonunal creature is murdered it obviously cannot make any merit for itseli by killing some other miserable being. To murder, then, preventS merit-making. 'What is obstructive of merit-making cannot also give rise to merit. A single act or entity cannot be both the cause of something and the cause of that same thing's destruction; this would be contrary to common sense. The commentator then proceeds to apply this exact same logic to the first alternative advanced, namely that the act of murder brings about the eradication of karma for the murderer. The commentary argues that in this case too the murdered creature is prevented from eradicating his own bad karma by murdering other creatures. Thus, the opponent's position implies that murder is both the cause of eradicating kanna and an act that prevents the eradication of karma, an obvious impossibility. It also implies that the victim can never accomplish the eradication of his own karma because he is prevented from performing acts of murder himself, and those acts of murder are assumed to be the cause of eradicating karma. The commentary therefore concludes that murder cannot lead to the removal of the murderer's bad karma.

144. Perhaps you think that the cause of it is the act of murderrelated to the agent; well, then, why bother to kill another creature? Kin yourself if you want to get rid of your karma!

Commentary: Or perhaps you think in this way: Killing, that is the desire to kill, related to the agent, that is, present in the agent, is the cause of it. "It" here means the eradication of karma. If this is your position, then why bother to kill another? For in this case nothing further would be accomplished by killing another creature. You should kill yourself if you want to get rid of your karma, for you acknowledge that the act of killing operating in the agent is the cause and nothing else.

Remarks: With this verse the opponent attempts to get out of the difficult position in which he has been placed. He is given the chance to argue that even if killing a suffering creature prevents that


;/ eature from doing merit or from getting rid of its own bad karma, i;'~stinleadS to merit or th~ era~c~ting of karma fo: ~e agent of ~he ,t~urder. The causal relatlOns.hlp IS ?ot betwee~ ki~hng a suffen~g ~tqeature in general and ment-making or eradicatlon of karma III )general. This h~d l~d to the probl~m that A's killing creature :s b?th \causes the eradicatlon of kanna (m A) and prevents the eradIcatlOn Of karma (in B). In this situation, one act was both the cause of a

.result and the cause of the absence of that same result. Now the ;()pponent argues with a more restricted causal relationship: the ;desn-e to kill in agent A is the cause of the eradication of karma in agent A only. Conversely, the absence ofthe cause now interpreted as a desire to kill present in agent A, can only lead to the absence ofits product, the eradication of A's bad karma. It is no longer ac-ceptable to say that because A kills B and B cannot have a desire· tokill some other creature C then the act of killing done by A leads to both the presence of the eradication of karma in A and its absence in B. The desire to kill pertains to A alone: it leads only to the presence of the eradication of karma in A.

What the opponent has forgotten is that this negates the whole enterprise: he began by trying to prove that you should kill suffering. creatures to eradicate their sins or bad karma. Now he says that the murder has nothing to do with the victim, only with the agent. In that case, the Jain rejoins, forget the victim, who serves no purpose. Why don't you just kill yourself, putting an end to further sin quite completely?

145. Or do you argue that the murder is the cause for the eradication of karma for both? That cannot be, for it is produced by that. And something that is produced by a cause that is not opposed to the means for that very thing's absence does not cease even in the presence of that something else.

Commentary: Perhaps you think thus: The murder is the cause for the eradication of karma for both, that means for both the murderer and the victim. This is because the act of murder pertains to both the agent and its object and requires both as its cause. The answer to this hypothesis is as follows. This cannot be the case. Why? Because that karma is in fact produced by it; this means to say that the karma is in fact produced by the act of murder which is absolutely opposed to and cannot coexist with that which brings about the eradication of karma that you wish to see happen. So what, you ask? The verse goes on to explain. Consider


the case of an entity that is produced from a cause, where that cause can CClex'

with or is not opposed to the cause of destruction of that very entity. In suc~st caSe that entity does not cease to be, that is to say; the entity in question is n a. destroyed even in the presence of that something else. By the Words "th ot something else" is meant that which is not opposed to and can coexist with t:1

cause of destruction of that entity. He clarifies this very point in the next ver:'

146. The cold of ice goes away in the presence of fire, but heat does not. If you refuse to admit this, then you will be forced to admit some unwarranted conse" quence.

Commentary: Only the cold of ice goes away in the presence of fire, because the fire cannot coexist with or is opposed to that which causes the coldness. Heat does not go away, since fire is not opposed to and can coexist with that which causes the heat. If you refuse to admit this, namely that a product ceases to be on account of something that is incompatible with its cause, then you will be forced to admit some unwarranted consequence. The unwarranted consequence is that there will be no order to the world; just as you allow what you want to see destroyed to be destroyed even from something that does not block the cause of that thing, so you will have to admit that countless other unrelated entities may vanish. The next verse states this forcibly.

147. In that case, all kinds of things can cease to be on account of all sorts of other things. And in this way it would result that nothing at all would exist, because all things depend on other things.

Commentary: In that case, meaning if you accept the unwarranted consequence, then anything at all might cease to be in the presence of anything else. And this is so because you admit that something can cease to be on account of another entity that is not in contradiction to it. The verse then goes on to say what is wrong with such a situation. In this way it would result that nothing at all would exist; that is to say the absence of absolutely every entity in the world would result. Why is that? Because all things depend on other things. In other words, one thing will cease even on account of something that is not inherently opposed to it and this will go on and on until nothing is left.

Remarks: The argument in these verses revolves around one central principle: if you wish to argue that in the presence of a given act or entity (A) some other act or entity (B) is destroyed or ceases to

exist, then you must also admit that a certain special relationship exists between (A) and (B). That relationship is that (A) is


~Yincornpatible with the cause of (B). For two entities or acts to be '{fncornpatible means that they cannot coexist. The standard example {';(~ftWO incompatible entities is hot and cold, and the Jain makes use i;'jjfthis example in verse 146. Everyone admits that in the presence roffrre the coldness produced by ice vanishes. This is because fIre ;js incompatible, that is to say, cannot coexist with the cause of that ;'boldness, which is ice. The fIre melts and destroys the ice and ~;,kcause its cause is removed the coldness ceases to be produced. ,!'fire is not incompatible with heat, for example the heat produced ;bY the sun. That is why even in the presence of fire, heat does not ,vanish.

When this rule is applied to the question at hand, we find that the opponent is arguing that in the presence of murder, (A), bad karma, (B), disappears or ceases to exist. Now the Jain begins by

..... asking, what was the cause of that bad karma to begin with? The opponent must admit that the cause of that bad karma cannot

,possibly coexist with the act of murderfor the opponent to maintain " that in the presence of the act of murder bad karma ceases. In my understanding of the verse you now need to supply another step. It was established in verse 141 above that the cause of bad karma is ignorance, ajiiiina. The present argument now asserts that murder is totally incompatible with the cause of karma, or that murder is totally incompatible with ignorance. This means in effect that the desire to kill can exist only in the absence of ignorance, or in enlightened beings. We now have the absurd conclusion that only enlightened beings are murderers or that released souls would still commit murder, which no one admits.

One possible way out of this absurdity is for the opponent to insist that the act of murder or the desire to murder and the cause of karma, ignorance, are not mutually incompatible. The problem with this is that it violates the rule stated in verse 145 that you cannot maintain that (A) and the cause of (B) are not mutually incompatible and insist that in the presence of (A), (B) disappears or ceases to be produced. If you do admit this then the world suddenly tumbles into chaos. If you admit that in the presence of (A) any other entity, even an entity the cause of which is not

- -,


incompatible with (A) disappears, then in the presence of a p even paper would vanish. Since all entities exist in the presence ~i .... other entities and no single act or entity in the world exists ? isolation from other acts or entities, then it is easy to see why thn>

entire world would simply vanish from sight. e Another possibility is what is given in verse 148. Karma is na~

caused by something that is incompatible with murder, narby; something that is compatible with murder. Since no third possibil_ . ity exists where two entities are the negation of each other, then> karma cannot have any cause at all.

148. Or do you maintain that karma is uncaused? In that case how can you say it exists? And how would it cease to be? For entities like the ether cannot be destroyed by anything at all.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think: thus: That karma is uncaused, that is to say, has no cause. In response the verse says that in that case it would not exist at all, any more than the horns of a rabbit can be said to exist, because it has no cause. Anticipating the objection that the general relationship, "whatever has no cause does not exist, like the horns of a rabbit" does not hold as a universal proposition since the ether, which has no cause, is accepted as existent, the author of the verse says, "And how would it cease to be?" This means, "and how would it be destroyed?" He clarifies this last statement by saying, "For entities like the ether," which means entities like the ether and dhanna in the Jain system, are not destroyed by any means, by axes and the like. They are eternal, because they are uncaused.

149. And for these reasons as well, since it cannot have any result, one should never slay living beings. After all, it is caused by killing living creatures and so how can it be stopped by that very same act?

Commentary: And for these reasons, that is to say, because karma that is uncaused can never be destroyed, since it cannot have any result, that is to say, since it is devoid of any result in the form of eradication of karma, one should never slay living beings. The verse then refutes this possible viewpoint, that karma is both caused by the act of murder and destroyed by that very act of murder. How, that is, by what means, could it be stopped, that is to say, could it be eliminated, through that very same act, meaning through that act of murder? Here "it" means karma. And this is said because it is generally admitted that the same entity cannot both come to be and cease to be from the same cause; in that case it would never come to be at all.


i')i;'~d. Therefore, ~ause it is the cause of eradicating karma that is acquired l;iWough the slaying of livin.g ?eings, one should strictly observe the vow of :;~bstaining from that act This IS known as saf!1vara. t:7f'};--- ~

.;'@6rnmentarY: Therefore, that. is t.o say, since karma ~s caused by murder: then J,;because it is the cause of era~catmg that karma acqUIred ttu:o~gh the slaymg of .;\'llviDg beings, one shoul~ stnc~y obse:ve the V?W of absta~mg. fr~m that act. ;:;~'rhat act" means the taking of life. TIus abstentIon from taking life IS a form of t~aJllvara, and should be done as a fIxed duty. That is the meaning of the word iV"'stt;ctly" in the verse. The Jain then goes on to ask the opponent further

:',Remarks: Smpvara is a technical term in Iainism that refers to ;"practices that prevent the further influx of karma. 20

151. And why do you abstain from committing acts of murder with respect to 'creatures that are happy? Is it ~ause you think that they have no sin? Well, there . still could result the eradication of their merit, for in the presence of it release· cannot occur.

Commentary: And why do you abstain from acts of murder, that is why do you desist from killing, with respect to happy creatures? Is it ~ause you think they have no sin, since merit must be the cause of their happiness? The author of the

. verse anticipates this answer and responds. The act would still have its result in the destruction of their merit. And so why would you abstain from killing with respect to those particular creatures? If you should ask, how is it that the destruction of merit can be counted as a good result of the act of murder, then the answer is that in the presence of it, meaning, in the presence of merit, release cannot occur. Release is the primary goal and it would not exist, since it is caused by an absence of both sin and merit.

152. Or perhaps you think that such a creature on his own eradicates that. Why doesn't the other one eradicate that other thing himself, too? They too in time eradicate their karma; the act of murder only hastens the process.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think thus: Such a creature, meaning a happy creature, eradicates that, meaning his merit, on his own, meaning by himself. He does this by experiencing it on his own. In answer to such an anticipated statement by the opponent the author of the verse replies, "Why doesn't the other one eradicate that other thing himself, too?" Here "the other one" means a suffering creature. "That other thing" means sin. The question is meant to imply

18 nABS VOL 15, NO.1

that indeed a sutTering creature does eradicate his own sin on his own. Next th author of the verse anticipates this reply from his opponent. "In time", meani . e. over a long period of time, he does indeed eradicate his sin; nothing un tow n~; is done in our theory. The process is merely speeded up by the act of mllrdar

That sin which can only be experienced and thereby eradicated over a very lo~r~> period of time is turned into a sin that can be experienced and eradicated in a Sho!' space of time by the act of killing. In answerto this anticipated statement of hi opponent the Jain replies in the next verse. s ..

Remarks: The answer of the opponent given at the end of this verse. refers to the Jain concept of upakrama. Initially the term seems to have been applied to the notion of a life-span; every creature is borri with a determined or fixed life-span. The determination is accomplished by a special type of karma that controls the length a creature will live in a given rebirth. At the same time, it is often observed' that some living beings meet a "premature death," struck down by a murderer, for example in the prime of their lives. This gave rise to the concept of "upakrama", an external cause that shortens the time or life-span over which a living being was to live out his karma. The opponent is arguing that while it is true that karma, both good karma (merit) and bad karma (sin) are naturally exhausted as a creature lives out its life span, murdering miserable creatures does have a function. It acts as an upakrama, a means to shorten the lifetime of suffering over which the creature would otherwise have exhausted his karma.

153. Why is not the same done for that other thing that happy creatures have by providing them with more and more instruments of pleasure? Because there would be no gain in having it exhausted; for after all it brings them ,pleasure.

Commentary: "That other thing" means merit. Why do you not offer an upakrama, a shortening of the time over which karma is exhausted, in the case of happy creatures, by providing them with more and more instruments of pleasure? By this is meant things like Kashmiri saffron paste and unguents of turmeric with which to anoint themselves. Or perhaps your reasoning is thus: There would be nothing gained by shortening the time for them to experience their karma. There would be no gain in having it, meaning having that merit, exhausted. And why is that? For after all, it brings them pleasure. By this the verse means to say, after all, that merit gives rise to nothing but pleasure. The author of the verse anticipates all of this on the part of the opponent and r~lies

VIOLENCE OF NON-VIOLENCE

r. 21 ,.:+, ·w the next verse. WI

19

:'r:,,:-,::'~

;154. Release is ~e ul~ate bliss, with?ut comp~n. And it ~annot take pl~ce 'hen there remams ment. And so why IS there nothmg to be gamed? If you thmk j~tthere exists·the suspicion that that one might go on to commit sins, then 'Where is the guarantee for the other case?

Commentary: Release is the ultimate bliss, without comparison. This is because itisthe total absence of all obstructions; both of us admit that. And it cannot take place when there. rem~s .merit. This is ~ause one .of its cau~es is the .destrUction of ment. ThIS bemg the case, why IS there nothing to be gamed? The ~uthor means to imply that there is certainly much to be gained in speeding up the process through which merit is exhausted. Perhaps you would argue that there exists the suspicion that that one might go on to commit sins, for there is no guarantee that after his merit has been exhausted through the process of upakrama he will definitely experience release and will not have any further sins. In answer to this possibility the author of the verse says, "then where is the guarantee for the other case?" "The other case" means the case in which sin is !eradicated. How can you be sure that the act of murder speeding up the exhaustion of sin will bring about a good result and not an even worse result? ,He goes on to clarify this last point further in the next verse.

155. It might very well be that a miserable creature, having been slain, would go to hell; ifleft alive, he might kill many others and not go there ever. Why is there not room for doubt?

Commentary: It might very well be that a miserable creature, for example, a fishennan, having been slain, would go to hell. This is the correct syntax of the verse. On the other hand by your own admission, that kanna which results in a sojourn in hell can be brought to a quick fruition through the process of upakrama; thus, that same person if left alive, meaning if not killed, might slay many other miserable creatures, and by your own admission those acts would lead to the eradication of his bad karma and to the fact that he would never go to helL Since this is the case, then why is there not room for doubt? In other words, why is there not room for doubt in the case of eradicating sin as well as in the case of destroying merit? Now the author returns to the example of creatures in hell which was given earlier.

156. Generally speaking, creatures in hell are subject to such severe bodily pain that they do not experience extreme mental modifications, just as is the case with living beings when they are overcome by too much pain.

Commentary: Creatures in hell were adduced earlier as an example. Generally they do not experience extreme mental modifications such as cruel thought since

,.

I 20 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

they are subject to such severe bodily pain, or.m other words, they suffe'{< terrible ?odily pain, a~ a result of their karma, whi~h ~s. resulted in their r~kh, reborn III hell. Such IS known to be the case WIth hvmg beings When tll~ consciousness is overshadowed by excessive sensations of pain. This last po~V: is strengthened in the next verse. . mt

. .,-;

157. Here living beings, overwhelmed, confused in mind, exhausted by th'> experience of pain, thinking of nothing else, do not experience various PasSioeir

·th h b' ns WI . respect to ot er 0 Jects.

Commentary: "Here"means in the realm of animals."Overwhelmed" means; reduced to an entirely different state by the many sensations of pain. "ConfUSed in mind" means that their minds are incapable of perfonning their proper sPecific·> functions. "Exhausted by their experience of pain" means completely weakened by their knowing so much pain. "Thinking of nothing else" means thinking only of their experience of that pain. To say that such creatures "do not experience various passions with respect to other objects" means that they do not experience·· such men tal modifications such as passionate desires for women. This is because all of their thoughts and mental processes are exhausted in focusing on their pain ..

158. Because they lack strong passions or hatreds what bondage they do acquire . is slight. Because they are subject to delusion their eradication of karma is also not terribly impressive.

Commentary: Since the above holds true, it follows that because they lack strong passions or hatreds what bondage they do acquire is slight. "They" here refers to those creatures that are overwhelmed by sensations of pain. This is true because the cause of that bondage is a weak cause. And because they are subject to delusion even their eradication of bondage is not terribly impressive. This is because they lack such necessary specific causes as right knowledge. The next verse continues to illustrate how their eradication of bondage is not very impressive.

159. The amount of karma that a creature in hell eradicates over many billions of years can be eradicated by a wise man who is well protected by the three, in no more than the time it takes to inhale a single breath.

Commentary: The verse begins "The amount of karma a creature in hell eradicates over many billions of years"; one should add that in so doing that creature in hell suffers terribly. The wise man, by abandoning all activity, protected by the three guptis, watchful of mind, speech and body, eradicates that same amount of karma in no more than the time it takes to inhale a single breath.


lIt;:',' ~\~isiS beCause the causes o~ ~radic~ting ~a, s~ch pure mental modifications ri"~' tense desire for the rehglOus life, eXIst for hIm to a very strong degree. In (f,as 1n , .. th ~i;g" :, elusion the Jam gIves e next verse: 3i~gn ' , .:-,"),'-:;'-',.-,'

;i~460. It is for this reason that creatures in hell, having done wicked deeds, and );i,reawres who are miserable, here, both do not experience bondage to the same ,cr . di' '(degree as they expenence era canon.

1~'2()mmentary: "It is for this reason" means for the reason just given above. In the r{Sentence, "Creatures in hell, having done wicked deeds, and in the very same ;'i~ay, creatures who are miserabl~, here" the word "here" means in the present 'discussion. They do not expenence bondage to the same degree as they ,experience the eradication of their sins because for the most part they are not subject to obsessive wicked thoughts.

;tRemarks: Earlier in the debate, with verse 135, the Jain had asked ; his opponent how the opponent could be sure that killing a , inis~rable creature resulted in the eradication of that creature's sins '

':arid not in further sin. The further sin, the Jain asserts, would come from the fact that when a living being is being slain, he sinks into

. raudradhyana, obsessive evil thoughts. Raudradhyana is invariably .the cause of a terrible rebirth, more painful than the rebirth in which

',' the living being cultivated those bad thoughts. The opponent had . answered that the situation could be closely paralleled by the state that the Jain himself believes obtains in hell. The Jain believes that creatures in hell suffer terribly and are beaten and slain but that they do not as a result get worse rebirths in even lower hells; in fact a

,creature in hell cannot be reborn in hell immediately. He must fIrst be reborn elsewhere and then can fall back into hell. For creatures in hell the dominant experience of pain leads to eradication of bad karma and not further bad karma.

With the present series of verses the Jain seeks to explain why creatures in hell do not accumulate even more bondage. He argues that this is because they are so overwhelmed by their pain they do not sink into raudradhyana; they do not focus on their obsessive hatreds or lusts since their thoughts are fully absorbed with their experience of pain. The opponent must now prove that such would also be the case with a miserable creature that was being murdered. This is the point made in the next verse.


161. Or is it the case that the act of slaying someo~e and nothing else give to such a state and so it is to be done? This cannot be correct, because its S

would then constitute bondage.

Commentary: Or perhaps you think thus: "The act of slaying someone," that', the act of killing, gives rise to "such a state." By the words "such astate"ism~'; a s~te of confusion: being ov.e~helmed by pain. This state: given the smaJ,1 amount of bondage Involved, IS m fact the cause for the eradication of kar1ll 1

Nothing else can eradicate karma. For this reason "it" is to be done. In lli~~: sentence "it" means the act of slaying. Having anticipated this rejoinder fromthdopponent the Jain now answers, "This cannot be correct, because its OPposite: would then constitute bondage," The opposite of slaying is not slaying. That: would be bondage. Were that not so, then you would not have the eradication of karma from the act of slaying since in that case the two would not be:: incompatible with each other.

Remarks: Now the opponent is permitted to argue that the act ~f slaying some creature produces the same kind of state of mental confusion that creatures in hell suffer and that prevents their sinking>' into obsessive cultivation of evil thoughts. This would mean that when you slay a miserable creature he does indeed eradicate more bad karma than he acquires and thus there is a net gain to the act The Jain returns with an argument that he has already used: if slaying a creature puts an end to karma, then one must assume, by the argument given in verses 145 and 146, that the act of slaying a living being cannot coexist with the cause of karma. By a general rule entities do not coexist with their own absence; therefore the cause of karma or bondage is now the absence of slaying. This also returns to the argument in verse 141.

162. And in this way would result the faults adduced earlier, for example, that released souls would suffer bondage; there would surely be nothing to stop the many contradictions to your own doctrine that would flow unchecked.

Commentary: "And in this way" means with the absence of the act of slaying being the cause of bondage. The faults adduced earlier, for example that released souls would suffer bondage, would hold and there would be nothing to stop the many contradictions to your own doctrine that would flow unchecked. By this


~~:{":phrase the verse means that there would be many contradictions of the ;~Jiljftr1<'nes that you accept once you allow that the eradication of karma can be 'dOC . f urd "S 1" uld· 'd h d' ~;cilllsed by an acto mer. ure y means you co not avOl t e contra lC-

,:;:\>",;': ';';~Ons. i:'~""/",',

~~i63. Thus this false view is beset by hundred~ of faults; it is self-contradictory W;"dagamst what everyone knows to be true. It 1ll1presses only fools. Enough then

?!(~ .. th. is discussion! t'!,,-',"

~(12blnlnentary: "Thus" means in this way. It is beset by hundreds of faults; it is ,~i¢lf_contradictory and against what everyone knows to be true; it impresses only ~;.fools, this doctrine proposed by the Sarpsaramocakas. Enough, let us finish with ~;f,this discussion. i

~~~6W we debate another position.

$'164. Others state that, since unexpected bad consequences might result from ;~bstaining from taking life, both sin. Such people have not understood the true IJmeaning of our doctrine.

YtOlnlnentary: "Others" means other debaters. Because there is the possibility :~that unexpected bad consequences result, they say the following: From the {"abstention of taking life both men, that is to say, both the one who refrains from ; taking life and the person who orders him to refrain from taking life, accumulate ibad karma; they sin. "Such people have not understood the true meaning of our doctrine" means that they have not grasped the real intention of our scriptures.

In the next verse the Jain explains what is meaQt by the phrase, "unexpected bad .... consequences."

165. A lion or other similar creature was not slain by someone who was capable .... of killing any creature at all but had taken a vow to abstain from killing animals.

As a result that lion was left alive to kin the leading monk of the community.

Commentary: The phrase "capable of killing any creature" means that the individual in question was able to kill extremely violent animals like lions; he had taken the minor vow to abstain from killing animals. The phrase "lion or other similar creature" includes such animals as the mythical sarabha. Such an animal was not killed, but by that animal the leading monk of the community was slain. The term "leading monk of the community" refers not just to any monk but to that monk, the great teacher, who knows all the scriptures; only one such outstanding monk can exist in a generation. The verse means to offer this as an hypothetical but possible scenario.


. 166. And from that resulted a total break in the transmission of the Jain teach ./<.: a terrible loss to many living beings. Now explain in what way there wou~~i. no fault for those people. .",

Commentary: "And from that" means from the death of that teacher. A to~·'~, break in the Jain teachings is a terrible loss, that is a severe loss, to many liv"}; beings. This is beca~e those living beings desir?us of achiev~g release wo~t no longer have aVaIlable to them such requrrements as nght faith, right"· knowledge and right conduct. And since this is so, in what way would there ~ •. ' no fault for those people? "Those people" means those who abstain from takiri life and order others to abstain from taking life. Since they have become the caus~ ...•. of destruction themselves, they would indeed have committed a sin.

167. Therefore one should not carry out a vow of abstention. Instead one should consider carefully what is appropriate in a situation and act accordingly.

Commentary: Since what has been said above is true then one should not carry out a vow of abstention from taking life. Instead one should consider carefully what is appropriate in a situation, that is, what is appropriate at that particular time, and act accordingly. By this is meant that one should do what is best for everyone else. In response to this the Jain says:

168. Could it not be that the teacher, having been protected from being slain by. the lion, somehow or other would commit some sin and in the end turn out to do harm to himself and to others?

Commentary: If you want to include in your consideration the possibility of unexpected bad consequences, then this is also possible. Protected from being slain by the lion, that teacher, somehow or other, that is through the ripening of some bad karma, might commit some sin, for example sleeping with a woman or enjoying something else forbidden. In this way he would do harm to himself, by making karma that would result in his inability to come to know the true doctrine, and to the lay community, by causing them to lose faith. Such a scenario is perfectly possible.

169. And in this way would not the cause of the Faith suffer? And would not that lion, having been slain, go to hell? If it had lived might 1t not have obtained the right belief?

Commentary: "And in this way would not the cause of the Faith suffer?" means in fact the cause of the Faith would suffer. And that lion, having been slain, that is to say, having been killed, on account of his cruel temperament, will surely


Si';;> ,gone to hell. If it had lived, might it not have obtained right belief? This ;"1wMl~s that it s~ely coul~ have obtained the right belief if it had come into contact {C'·tIl an exceptIonally nghteous person. }\~:~,:~J"i" , !$·i,tf~6.And is it not possible that that one, not having been killed by it, m.ight be 'id(6itten by a snake? Wh~ s~oul.d not the very fault adduced also result 10 your ':;.;\\iiew? Thus we may dismISS It. ~ :.'=.';",,,"

:1ti)g6~mentary: And is it not possible that that teacher, not having been killed, that l,,'stosay, not having been slain, by that lion, might become careless in the night '1;~d might be bitten by a snake or serpent? All of this is possible. And so why "!:ishou1d not the fault that you adduce also result in your view? Thus we may f(Jismiss it; that is we must consider it in your view as well. And since that is so, -:>,' ~

~'-';': . ',')\'<:-:-i

:~~;emarks: There is some evidence that at least some religious ::ipractitioners actually did subscribe to the logic of the ;,iSrivakaprajiiaptihere and argued that a teacher, having reached the ;;Shighest state of meditation, should indeed be willfully slain by his " , disciples to prevent the possibility of his falling from his high level

of attainment.22 Amrtacandra in his Srfivakficfira, the Puru~a'siddhyupaya, speaks out against a student who would cut off his

>:reacher's head as the teacher perfects his meditative state.23 While the examples from Buddhist literature familiar to me deal with

'isuicide and not with murder, the same logic could indeed apply to 'both cases.

171. ... One would even have to stop totally from giving food to others; for is it not possible that faults like bad indigestion might result?

Commentary: One would even have to stop totally from giving food, since ,unexpected consequences are possible. This, being the case one would be compelled not to give food. The word "even" is meant to indicate that the same logic would apply to not giving food. And so there result in either case bad consequences; in the case of giving food, "bad indigestion," that is to say a fatal condition, and in the case of not giving food a dire situation in which the person who was denied the food harbors such hatred for the one who failed to give that he steals his money or even kills him. Would not these bad consequences result? They surely would. For ...


Remarks: The Buddhist Piiriijikas in fact discuss these situati ..... . d il . 1 1 . h eli 1 ons m eta , partlCU ar y wit respect to me. Cal treatment. Is it i'.

'bI h di al . h .. not POSSl e t at me c treatment Illig t unmtentIOnally result int~C death of the patient? The Buddhists would in fact acknowledgej 5 such a possibility and yet they argue that such deaths do not en~~l; the sin of murder since there was no intention to kill. Anoth~' example relevant to this verse is given in the Pfiriijika on murd{' and involves the case where a monk is given poisoned food on hi~ begging rounds. Unaware that the food he has received is deadly. he distributes some to his fellow monks who then die. Th6 conclusion is that this is also not a "culpable murder" in that th~ agent was an unwitting agent and had no intent to kill the victims.24·

The Jain in general disallows such absolution and refuses to' tolerate certain acts of violence on the grounds that they are> involuntary. Slla:I'lka's commentary to the Siitralqtiiilga gives one of the clearest statements of the Jain position and is discussed.. below.25

The Buddhist emphasis on intentionality is discussed in almost every genre of Buddhist writing. It is the subject of a number of jiitakas, among them the Tittirajiitaka, number 319.26 The Tittirajiitaka is the story of Rahula in a past birth; Rahula is described as being "kukkuccaka," "overscrupulous and overanxious" about his own behavior and the Buddha tells this story to the monks to indicate that this was also the case in Rahula's past birth. Rahula was once a partridge or tittira, with an alluring voice. A bird-catcher kept this tittira captive in a cage and made it sing. Other birds were drawn to the singing and the bird-catcher would grab them and kill them. The singing tittira realized that he was the cause of the destruction of so many of his relatives and refused one day to sing. The bird-catcher beat him and in pain and sorrow the tittiraresumed his song. But the bird was troubled, fearing that he was guilty of the sin of murder. Eventually he found the future Buddha, who in that birth was a Hindu ascetic. The future Buddha explained to him that he was not guilty because he hadnot intended to kill any of the other birds.

Given the number of the jiitaka stories, it is often not easy to assess the importance to the tradition of any individual tale. In the


;';se of this Tittirajataka, however, there is some evidence that it lea ed h ' all T d" al f :f:'as consider to teac a vep] vlt esson. ra ItlOn accounts 0

~;'methird Buddhist council include a reference to the TittirajiItaka . . ~We read in those ~ccounts of how King Asoka was troubled by the ~.fa.ctthat many tirthikas had infiltrated the Buddhist monastic ~~;C{)J11Illunity. The Buddhists were so successful, that the tlrthikas ,:"were losing their base of support among the laity. They were no ·t~161lger receiving alms and could not get any of their necessities, so .r'they became Buddhist monks, but they did not relinquish their ~{f{)nner views or practices. The Buddhist monks refused to conduct lillie rituals of uposatha with them, and the community was in iihn1lloil. King Asoka was distressed with the situation and sent his 'i;~ri1issary, instructing him to put a stop to the dissension. The 'enrlssary, we are told, was a fool and took counsel with other fools. C:'They decided that the king wanted them to kill the recalcitrant : Buddhist monks and they did so without much further ado, until ;'they came to kill Mahinda, the son of King Asoka. They stopped ;~hort of this crime, and returned to the king. When the king heard what they had done he was horrified, and tormented by the thought that although it had never been his intention to put the monks to death, he was in some way gUilty of the crime. He eventually cliscussed his fears with the monk Moggaliputtatissathera. To

'·a.ssure the king of his innocence, the monk told him this Tittira·····-t.ak 27 Ja a.

Later Buddhist texts, and texts written in a very different vein, restate forcefully this central Buddhist contention that it is only the intention behind an act that determines whether the agent of that act is guilty or not. Haribhadra's commentary to the PrajiiiIpiIramita

. has an extensive discussion of this issue.28

172. ... A person would even have to desist from eating food himself; and the same would be true with respect to going and other activities. Nothing would be proper, for one can never totally remove the doubt that bad consequences might unexpectedly result.

.. ·Commentary: A person would even have to desist from eating food himself, for this very same reason, that there would surely always exist the possibility of some unexpected bad consequence arising. The same would be true with respect to

28 JIABS VOL. 15, NO.1

. going, coming, staying and everything else - it would not be proper to".h; anything at all, for one can never totally remove the doubt that bad conseqQ~jf'~ might unexpectedly result. While walking, a person might well step on :~~s:j:; and get hurt; there is always the possibility that the house might fall in on :rn\;, if he stayed home. lIlIJe

~\ ;-'::'/?

173. By the same token, why should one refuse to abstain from aCtivity'~ account of the very reasons already given? Even careful reflection will not h )0,: since committing sin is always possible. ep

Commentary: By the same token, why should one refuse to abstain, on account of the very reasons already given? If one refuses to abstain from taking lifehe might get into trouble by slaying the King's favorite peacock. The reflection ..... mentioned earlier (verse 167) is of no help, since all it does is to stop one from" doing any activity at all; and while people are reflecting it is also possible that they could de facto be harming others, and thus sinning. Thus reflection is use. In conclusion the Jain says:

174. And so what these people who do not understand our doctrine sayis contrary to experience, common sense and scripture; it is the cause of delusion and is without any real meaning.

Commentary: And so this is contrary to experience, custom and scripture. It is contrary to experience because we do experience a beneficial change in our hearts when we abstain from taking life. It is contrary to common sense in the same way as trying to swim across the ocean violates common sense. It is contrary to scripture because it allows that anything at all might be done. "It" means the words of our opponent. This is the correct syntax of the verse. The phrase "who do not understand our doctrine" means those who have not comprehended our scriptures. Being the cause of delusion, how could it be good? What is the nature of these words that are the cause of confusion? They lack any real meaning, which means that they are devoid of their intended sense. Since that is the case,

175. Therefore those two are of pure mind, believing only in the words of the Jina, engaged in abstention from taking life, and firm in their minds they both destroy their sins.

Commentary: "Therefore, those two are of pure mind." This phrase means that they have no wants. "Believing only in the words of the Jina" means that they believe in what is said in the words of the Jina. The two of them are the one who abstains from taking life and the one who commands another to abstain from taking life. They are both engaged in carrying out this vow faithfully to the best


i;i~~P'their ~bi1ities. Th~y ~estroy their sins. Th~s means ~at th~y eradicate their ~1!:~~' a. ''Firm in therr mmds" means that therr resolve IS unhmdered. ,,,,.,katJll . ;~1ri~¥~,i\:::;,:' ~lfseI11arks: M~ch of th~ de~ate in this passage can be interprete~ as ~'ii~)flecting Jau'l/Buddhlst differences. The debate began by saymg ~Siliat some peopl~ argue that total abstenti?n from the .takin~ of life ;l?,e'sa faulty rule m that there are exceptIonal cases m whIch the f~»:;~()SSibility of some living creature' ~ doing harm in the future is so ~if;~great as to warrant that creature' sbemg put to death before the harm l~:\\#sdone. Th~ example is given of a lion who kill~ an exceptional j~c"thonk. The Sik$asamuccaya cites a verse from the Aryaratnamegha ';'I'inWhich permission is given to kill a person who is about to commit :iij.one of the five cardinal sinS.29 Given that the Sik$asamuccaya itself iRttakes great pains to redefine the major sins to mean acts that hinder t\·:tthe bodhisattva or harm the Buddhist community, it seems possible 1';tL·to illterpret the Aryaratnamegha passage in a very general sense, as .~.er1dorsing the killing of any living being who would harm a great .E;'{ieligious teacher or hinder the religious comrnunity.30 Making these r~\/allowances, then, it would be possible to understand the ii';Srifvakaprajiiapti as combating a Buddhist position in this section. ':iThis is certainly consistent with the argument as it develops; the

: verses lead us to the conclusion that given the proposition that a ,{.hannful creature should be killed to prevent it from doing harm one jwould also have to stop doing all acts of good since they too might

have unwarranted bad consequences. Just as the possibility of an 'unexpected bad consequence should prevent us from abstaining

.....•.•.. from the taking of life, so should the possibility of some undesired /. consequence prevent us from doing good. The initial proposition

entails a rejection of the central Buddhist view expressed through.. out the PffrfIjika and in some Mahayana texts that unexpected bad

consequences do not make an act blameworthy.

[Commentary:] And now we debate another position.

221. Some say that in killing a baby, because so much karma must be made to ripen in such a short time, there is greater sin than in killing older people, because the opposite is true.

Commentary: Some debaters argue that in killing a young person, that is to say,


,in murdering a baby, a child, or a youth, because so much kanna must be m de to rip~n in a short ti:ne through the process of up~ama, there is more sin.~e: oPPOsIte holds true ill the case of older people, because only a small amountr karma must be made to ripen quickly. The answer to this is given: 0, 222. This is not correct, for sin is said to result from the state of mind. That ./'.' why violence is classified by such terms as physical or mental in our doctrinl8 . e .. "

Commentary: This is not correct, for sin is said to result from the state of mind.' And it is not the case that the state of mind in killing a child is more violent than the state of mind that obtains when the victim is elderly. Violence is classified by such terms as physical and mental in our doctrine, as it is said, "Violence carried our,in a physical way is one thing and violence of mental state is another."" He explains the first kind of violence as follows:

223. When someone who is carefully controlling his own movements raises his. '. foot to take a step, a lowly creature may be struck and killed from that contact

Commentary: "Raises his foot" means lifts his foot. "To take a step" means to walk. This is the way to construe the verse. "Someone who is carefully controlling his own movements" means someone who is mindful of everything, that he does in the proper way, that is a holy man. What "may be struck", that is to say what might suffer terrible pains? What "may be killed", that is, what may be deprived oflife? "A lowly creature": this means a creature with two sense organs. "From that contact" means having come into contact with that holy man.

224. Nor does that one get even the slightest amount of bondage from that in our doctrine. For he was mindful and it is defined as unmindfulness.

Commentary: Nor does that one, that holy man, from that, that is, from being the cause of the death of that lowly creature, get even the slightest amount of bondage in our doctrine. Why is that? It is because he was mindful, which is to say that he has behaved exactly as the scriptures demand thathe behave. "It" here means violence. Violence is defined as unmindfulness. It is so defined by the Tirthankaras and their first disciples, the gaI}adharas. What has happened here is a form of physical violence and not mental violence. In the next case there is mental violence but no physical violence.

225. In a dark place someone sees a rope that looks like a cobra. He unsheathes his sharp sword and strikes the rope, intending in his mind to do violence.

Commentary: "In a dark place" means a dank, low-lying place. "A rope" here


!'~·'£!anS something made out of straw or some similar material. "That looks like ~;~e bra" means that resembles a cobra. Seeing that, he unsheathes his sharp !;,!a:~d and strikes, that is to say he hits it. "Intending in his mind to do violence" ;;,seans intending to kill that snake. !{F

r!~;6. Let it be .m0:vn that ~v~n though no snake was killed, because that person '(:'intended in hIS mmd to kill It, he surely gets further bondage.

)\J~~[llmentary: "Even though no snake was killed" means that in actuality no i./sllake was killed. Nonetheless, because he intended in his mind to kill it, that ",\VouId-be snake killer "gets further bondage." This means that he acquires the \;birna that leads to many future rebirths. Now he describes a third type of

·~iolence.

~227. Intending in his mind to slay a deer, a person makes ready his bow. He lets '.;py, an arrow and kills it in both ways. He is the worst.

(',Commentary: Intending in his mind to slay a deer, he "makes ready his bow", ,stretching it back to his ear. He lets fly an arrow and kills it in both ways. This ;,!.means both physically and in his mind. "It" is the deer. He is the "worst" means J>the most violent. A fourth type is as follows:

.. ;,228. That which involves neither of these two is simply a verbal construct and "completes the unit of four. Still, describing it is not wrong because it may help (sharpen a student's understanding.

Commentary: "That which involves neither of these two" means that which has neither physical nor mental violence. Such violence actually does not exist; it is just a verbal construct without any real object, and is introduced here artificially fo complete the foursome. Still, being described, it may sharpen a student's understanding and so there is nothing wrong in bringing it up.

229. And so since bondage results from mental intention, it matters little here if one is a baby or an old man. Even with respect to a baby that might not be

,! strong, but it might be strong in some cases with respect to an old person.

Commentary: And so since bondage results from mental intention, it matters little here if one is a baby or an old man. "Here" means in the consideration of a murder. Why is that so? Because even with respect to a baby that might not be strong. "That" means the mental intention to kill. And in some cases it might be strong even with respect to an old man. This is so because the mental inclinations of those who desire to kill will always be different.


.230. But it might then be true that in the absence of the mental intention to kiJ. even when a murder is actually committed, there is no bondage that results II)' could there be no intention to kill when a murder is committed, and in ~: presence of that how could there be no bondage? . ,:

Commentary: Or perhaps you might think the following. In the absence of an mental intention to kill, even when a murder is actually committed, it would mJ· out that no bondage would result in your doctrine where what is important is th mental intention. Anticipating this objection, the Jain responds. How could the~ be no intention to kill when a murder is committed? In fact there has to be sucr an intention, for someone without evil intentions would never engage in suchan .. ; act. "And in the presence of that" means where that intention to kill is present .. and where a murder is committed, how could there be no bondage? There would surely result bondage.

Remarks: This section explains carefully the distinction between the Jain and Buddhist understanding of "intentionality" and the. relationship between intention and culpability. On the surface, both Jain and Buddhist seem to be making the same point: a person is guilty of a violent act because he intentionally committed that act; conversely a person is not guilty when there was no intention t() commit violence. Much of the Buddhist Parajika centers around this issue and is devoted to detennining under what circumstances the taking of life is a major offense. The Buddhists are clear in ; saying that where a person did not intend to commit violence there is no major crime even if an act results in the death of another living being. Thus the monk who unwittingly offers poisoned food to his brethren.is not guilty, nor is the monk who accidentally sits on a baby and suffocates it. The Jains hotly debate the Buddhists on this point and reject categorically Buddhist understandings of the concept "intended violence." The Jams argue that all violence is intended violence; they argue that it is not possible for a person to be so ignorant and yet not guilty. His very ignorance and carelessness constitute an intent to do violence and imply correspondingly his guilt. Only the Jain holy man, who has the right understanding and who is ever mindful of his acts, is truly devoid of the intention to commit violenceY

231. Consider this possibility. There is an intent to kill, but it is not a wrongful


;~) tent fo~ the person was acting under the influence of ignorance or of false t'a6ctrines. In both cases that very thing is still the cause of bad bondage.

;~t6i11ment:arY: Consider this p<?ssibility. There is an int~nt to kil~, ?ut ~t is n~t a .1;~~ongful intent, on account of Ignorance. The person domg the kilhng IS subject ;,Jiioignorance. Or he is acting under the influence of false doctrines, for example ~'where someone performs a sacrifice that involves the taking of life. Anticipating ~7;isuch an objection, the Jain replies, that in both cases that ignorance is what we J~i'rnean by a "wrongful intent" and it is the cause of further bad bondage. "Bad ' .. bOndage" means karma that leads to many future rebirths. ~" .

·:ikemarks: Again it is possible to refer this verse to Buddhist ':lifguments. The Buddhists contend that the Buddha in a past birth :jndeed performed blood. sacrifices but that because he did so under ~grave delusion he is not guilty of murder in the same way in which ;.iperson who commits such acts but is not confused in mind is

i/guilty. The issue in the Buddhist texts is raised quite explicitly in ". the Milindapaiiha with reference to the Lomassakassapa Jiftaka. 32

rIn the Lomassakassapa Jiftaka (433), Lomassa performs a blood ".sacrifice (pasu yajiia) but only after he has been blinded with lust

a maiden sent to him by Indra to disturb his awesome tapas. The verdict is that the Buddha was not guilty of his acts because he was

the grips of passion. The Jain answer is that his very passion is what makes him guilty. In the Jain view, only the person who is devoid of passion and totally mindful, possessed of right know

. ledge, can by definition be free from the intention to do violence. One of the most informative discussions between a Buddhist

opponent and the Jains on the issue of intentionality is the commentary of Sllfu:ika to the Suyagacjanga, which has been mentioned several times above.33 The Buddhists in Sllilnka's commentary argue that external rituals are totally insignificant and that the only thing that is important is mental state. One of their more bizarre examples to illustrate how internal states are the only determinants of good and evil actions is a case in which a person roasts a child that is covered up on a fIre, thinking the child to be a gourd. The Buddhist verdict is that the man who did this awful deed is not guilty of murder since he was ignorant of what he did and had no intention to commit violence. This in fact corresponds closely to an example given in the P~ili Vinaya, PiIrifjika 3, in which


a Buddhist monk accidentally sits ona baby that is covered in blanket and the baby suffocates. The verdi~t is that the monk is nof' gUilty of the major c~e of murder since he had no intention of killing the baby.34 In Silanka's commentary the Jains counter the Buddhists by saying that it is this very ignorance that results in bondage an~_thus it is not possible to argue that ignorance excuses bad deeds. Silank:a adds that if only good intention, even Coupled with extreme ignorance, were required in order for a deed to be judged virtuous, then the Buddhists would have to admit that the sarpsiiramocakas are released from their karma by their unusual", deeds. Another discussion of the importance of intention in judging acts is the Pali UpaJipariPfcchii, which offers arguments that the Buddhists regarded as establishing their doctrine over the Jain emphasis on the actual physical act itself as opposed to the thoughts that motivated it. The main Buddhist argument is that the Jains, too, recognize intentionality in allowing that monks, though they kill living creatures, are not at fault. To Sllanka the Buddhists in this and bther texts are missing the point the Jains wish to make: it is not just intention, but right knowledge and right behavior as well, that constitutes the definition of non-violenceY

232. Since such an intention to do evil vanishes with the removal of ignorance, therefore someone who desires to do away with it should strive to acquire knowledge.

Commentary: Since the mental intention to kill does not exist when its cause, ignorance and the like, disappears and since it invariably exists when ignorance exists (in fact that evil intention is nothing but ignorance in essence), then "someone desires to do away with it", someone who desires the absence of that mental intention to kill should strive to acquire knowledge. This is because things like knowledge are incompatible with the existence of ignorance. Having stated the nature of reality, he goes on to point out how the reason given by the opponent is not universally true.

233. Nor is it true that in the one case there is far more karma that must be brought to fruition in a short time. For even some children are destined to have short-life spans, while some elderly people will be long-lived.

Commentary: That there is more or less karma to be brought to fruition in a short


,~'tirne 111 the case ~f children and the e!derly is by n? means certain. For even some "1)1ildren are destIned to have short life-spans while some though elderly may be {,foog-lived. For this is what we in fact observe in the world. 7':</ ,"a31. Therefore the sinless declare that the murder of any living being entails sin. JtThe degree of sin in most cases is related to mental intention.

iJi2ommentary: Since whatwas said above is true, then the murder of any living \'being, child or elderly, entails sin. This is proclaimed by the sinless, that is by (those who are devoid of passion. The degree of that sin is said in most cases to

,ii,e related to the mental intention. The qualifier "in most cases" is added to allow ;ii!or such differences as "being an ascetic" and such factors.

i,/m. Conclusions

,In the sections from the Sriivakaprajiiapti that I have translated here the Jains refute a number of challenges to their general rule that total

" abstention from the taking of life is the ultimate act of virtue, and '<indeed the only way for a person to achieve spiritualliberation; '''conversely all taking of life entails sin. The basic argument of the

Jains is that any attempt to create exceptions must in the end totally undermine the entire structure of moral behavior; to create any

• exception (A) allows room for exceptions (B) ... , in an infinite series and thus totally destroys any possibility for moral action.

'While this is implicit in the Sriivakaprajiiapti, it is made explicit in other Jain texts.

The Siistraviirtasamuccaya of Haribhadra states firmly that the source of morality must be scripture and that only the Jain scriptures are valid; they enjoin total abstention from taking life and so it must be accepted that the abstention from taking life brings merit and the taking of life entails sin. Haribhadra stresses that this is an absolute rule to which no exception is permitted. In his own commentary on the Sifstraviirtasamuccaya, verse 119, Haribhadra

"glosses his comment "And so one who would use various arguments is in terrible trouble" with the following remarks: "One who would use various arguments" means "one who would seek to make subtle distinctions with respect to sin." Thus, the correlation is simple and complete: violence is sinful and abstention from violence is meritorious.36


. Jain arguments in the SravakaprajiIapti and other texts ar directed against three main groups who so~ght to make exception~ to the general rule that violence is wrong. The group best known to Western scholars is the orthodox Hindus, the Mimfup.sakas, with their sacrifice of animals; Jain arguments against the Vedic sacrifice appear in a variety of guises, in philosophical texts, texts on lay behavior and in stories.37 The second group that fonus a standard opponent for the Jains was the sarpsaramocakas, who argued that it was meritorious to kill sinful or suffering creatures. I have tried to show above that their views in tum had also influenced the Buddhists, the third and perhaps most important group to offer a challenge to the Jain ethical teachings.

The Buddhists challenged the Jain doctrine of total abstention from violence in a number of ways, but behind all their challenges may be seen an alternative explanation of mental intention, a. concept that was critical to the Jains as well as to the Buddhists. Whereas the Jains confined right mental intention to the Jain holy man and maintained that an absence of the desire to do violence could never really exist in someone who was ignorant of the true (Jain) doctrine or was swayed by the passions, the Buddhists. understood "intention to do violence" in its ordinary and obvious meaning and allowed that its absence meant that there could be a variety of cases in which even a murder committed did not necessarily entail bad karma.

The Jain rejection of all of these viewpoints in its turn also revolves around one central assertion that brings us back to Haribhadra: to make any distinction with respect to sin is to undermine the entire moral order. And this is what the SravakaprajiIapti was intended to demonstrate. To the sarpsiiramocaka the J ains says that a duty to kill unhappy creatures could equally apply to happy creatures as well; thus if you allow the commandment to abstain from taking life to refer to only some creatures, namely happy creatures, you end up by denying its validity altogether. To the Buddhist who would kill a living creature who might commit a major sin the Jain says that one can never know the future consequences of any act. Again, this ends up


..inundennining all moral behavior: you would never save a life 'either, for you cannot know what evil deed the person saved might ~iater perpetrate. To those who would argue that only intended ;Molence entails sin, the Jain answers that all violence is intended ;lI1the sense that it is done out of ignorance and passion, and both i,ignorance and passion in any case result in sin and in the prolongation of participation in the cycle of rebirths.

At the same time, the Jains must acknowledge the inevitable ; "iolence of living and breathing, walking and moving, and they do " admit that monks who must do these things must also act in such 'a.way that living beings are deprived of life. It is here and here .. alone, with regard to the behavior of monks and nuns that the Jain , utilizes a concept of intentionality. The Jains do not apply the >.notion of intentionality to restrict the applicability of their general prohibition against taking life which would thereby undermine

..... moral order, but they make it a direct component of the definition of violence. Violence is the intention to hann or the hann done

'when one is in a state of carelessness; by definition, a monk, careful and mindful of his every act, cannot commit violence and the general applicability of the universal prohibition not to do violence is preserved.38

By contrast, in a text like like the Sriivakaprajfiapti, the Buddhists and sarpsiframocakas argue that the notion of a general prohibition is itself faulty since violence does not always result in sin; they do not redefine "violence" as the J ains do, but they reject

. the concept of a universal prohibition against the taking of life. Similarly, Mimfup.sakas argue in Jain texts that the general prohibition must be restricted in sphere by specific injunctions that

. tell us that we are to kill animals in the context of the sacrifice.39

The central issue of the debate for the Jains is not what restriction is permissible, but showing that no .limitations on universal moral laws can ever be tolerated.

In closing, I would stress that this translation and analysis should be seen as a preliminary investigation into the debate over moral injunctions in ancient and medieval India. The many questions that remain are as significant as the few that this paper


may have answered. It :em~in~ to identify thS ~ain opponents in; many of the arguments III thIS smgle text, the Sravakaprajiiapti t

assess their responses and above all to assess the validity of the J~i 0., assertion that they alone of all the participants in the debate argun

. e from a deep conviction that moral law must apply uniformly and without exception.

It is also important to extend the study down through history for the J ains remain a maj or party in a discussion on ethics, although their fellow debaters change in identity. The Hindu Vallabha_

. digvijaya, written in Sanskrit by the grandson ofVallabha (d. 1530 C. E.) tells a story of Vallabha's encounter with a Jain and a barbarian, typically in Indian literature representatives of the two·· extreme positions possible in the issue of violence and nonviolence. Vallabha chooses to instruct the two by reference to ... another barbarian and another Jain from times long past; that barbarian is now a crow and the Jain is now a dove, and the two birds are sitting together on a tree. Vallabha asks the birds about. violence and non-violence, and the crow speaks first. It had been a barbarian in a former birth and true to form had killed wantonly, particularly by enjoying the royal hunt. Himself wounded in one of his ventures, he had died and experienced terrible rebirths, even~ tually being reborn as the crow who is made to speak by Vallabha. The crow also tells us the moral we are to deduce from his experiences: the taking of life when it is not specifically enjoined by the authoritative Law Books (dharmasiistras) is a sin. The dove then speaks up. The dove had been a Brahmin, who had converted to Jainism after becoming disgusted at all the violence he had committed within the context of the many sacrifices he had once performed. As a Jain monk he had once come to a village and spent the night just outside the village limits. A devastating fire had broken out and the villagers had begged the monk to open the village gates from the outside, for they were locked in the village, which had become an inferno in which men and beasts were being consumed by the flames. The monk had refused to comply with their request, for he feared that he might take the life of some living being if he walked in the dark, unable to see the insects and tiny


,1;i'!!creatures in his path. The dove also explains what he ha~ done ~;:r:Mong and how he came to be born as the dove: he had smned, !~~!because abstention from the taking of life is invalid as a general j}J1l1e. Only those acts of abstention from taking. of life that are ··~pecifically enjoined in the Law Books in particular contexts are

;;~, IIleritorious.40

i", And so the debate continues and the question remains consis!tent: Is a general more law moral, or to be moral must it be flexible

~1' and accommodate the needs of the moment? The Jain voice is strong and unmistakable, and its challengers were many. Much inore work is needed to uncover the many details of the debate and disclose its many changing parameters.

JNOTES

1. On Jains studying with Buddhists see my article on Haribhadr1l., 'The Jain "Biographies of Haribhadra: An Inquiry into the Logic of the Legend," Journal of Indian

Philosophy, vol. 16, 1988, pp. 109-125. 2. I make this sweeping statement fully aware of the existence of Buddhist refutations

of Jain doctrine amongst medieval Buddhist philosophers. These refutations are not of the same scope and breadth as Jain refutations of the Buddhists and are in my mind evidence of their very unequal mutual preoccupation. The same statement could not be made with reference to the Pili. suttas, of course, where the Jains are often depicted in argument with the Buddhists, nor with reference to some of the avadiina material, for example the Vitaiokavadana of the Divyavadiina. I am in the process of studying Buddhist references to the Jains and hope t6 return to the question in greater detail at a later date. I have further comments on Jain reactions to the Buddhists in my paper, "Being in the Minority: Medieval Jain Reactions to Other Religious Groups," forthcoming in the festschrift for J. C. Jain that is being edited by N. Bhattacharya.

3. See the Bodhicaryavatifra, 1.7, BuddhistSanskritTexts Series, vol. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960, p. 7, where the term sukhena applied to the practice discovered by. the buddhas is glossed in the commentary of Prajfiakaramati as "na siroluiicanadina mahata kll$tena," "And not by such painful rituals as pulling out the hair from one's head." This is clearly a reference to the well-known Jain practice. The accusation against the Buddhist monks that they lived the good life is not by any means confmed to the Jains. Jayantabhana in his Agamat;iiUpbara makes fun of the Buddhist monks because they lead a life of ease and pleasure. See Agamat;iiUpbara, edited by V. Raghavan and Anantalal Thakur, Mithila Institute Series, Ancient Text no. 7, 1964, chapter 1.

4. Thus the AbhisamayaJaiIkiira seems to counter the Jain objection to the Vyagbrl

40 JIABS VOL. 15, NOo 1

liitaka, discussed below, that if his body was full of worms and Lhe Buddha fed it toth tigress, in effect he murdered those countless worms and the guilt of those murders muse, far outweigh his rescuing the tigress from eating her cubs.. The AbhisamayiilaiJkiira offci t

that after a certain stage of religious practice the Buddha's body no longer has any worrn: c in it. This of course directly contradicts the Vyiigoo Jataka as it appears in a text like th ..•..• SuvaTl}aprabhiisottamasiltra, vyiigoo parivarta, verse 8, where the Buddha describes hi: body as "]qmisatiibharitam" filled with hundreds of worms. It would seem that this Was the version most familiar to the Jains. See the SuvaTl}aprabhiisottama, edited by S. Bagchi

in the Buddhist Sanskrit Text Series, no. 8, Darbhanga: Mithilalnstitute of Post-Graduate Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1967, p. 109; Abhisamayiilruikiira, Tokyo: Sankibo, 1971 reprint of the 1932 Toyo Bunko edition by U. Wogihara, p. 671. I have studied some of the Jain responses to the Vyiigoo liitaka in my paper, 'The Sacrifice of Mar,ticllga: The Context of Narrative Action as a Guide to Interpretation," published in the FestsChrift

for H. Nakamura, edited by V. N. Jha, Delhi: Indian Books Centre, 1990, pp. 225-239: Unfortunately the paper has many misprints. I should also take this opportunity to correct an error that I made there on page 226; the story of Sukosalamuni does not speak of the

monk giving his life to a tigress as the Buddha did in the Vyiigoo liitaka, but of a monk

who was tormented to death by a tigress who had been his mother in a former birth. I still suspect that the stories are related, but surely not in the direct way I stated in that paper.

The story of Sukosala is told in great detail in the Brhatkathiikosa of Hari~el!a, no. 127, pp. 305-314, ed. A. N. Upadhye, Singhi Jain Series, no. 17, Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1943.

5. On this concept of the body as filled with worms see the Bodhicaryiivatiira chapter 5 on verse 85 where the commentary cites the Aryaratnarasi which advises the Buddhist aspirant to contemplate the following thoughts when he eats: 'This body of mine has eighty thousand different species of worms. May they all live happily with the strength

that they get from this food. Now I please them with this food, and when I have achieved enlightenment I shall please them with the dharma." See the Bodhicaryiivatiira, ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Texts Series, vol. 12, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute of Post

Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1960, p. 70.

6. See my paper on Mru:licu<;la cited above.

7. The Buddhists repeatedly stress such acts of compassion; the Bodhicaryavatiira

3.8, p. 38, which is part of the vow the Bodhisattva makes is a plea that he might become

"food and drink to all creatures in time of famine." There are many avadana stories that

reflect this same theme. For some references see Jampa Losang Panglung, Die

Erziihlstoffe des Millasarviistiviidavinaya Analysiert auf Grund des Tibetischen

Obersetzung, Tokyo: Reiyukai, 1981, p. 47. 8. Sravakiiciira of Amitagati, 6.39ff, p. 316 in the edition Sriivakiiciira Sarpgrahavol.

I, ed. HiralalSiddhantalankar,Sholapur: Sri Jivaraj JainaGranthamala, 1976. Hemacandra,

YogaSiisira, 2.19.13ff, in the edition published form the Jaina Siihitya Vikas Mandal,

1981. 9. This is reproduced in full in the Abhidhiinarajendrakosa, vol. VII, pp.154-455. 10. See R. Williams, laina Yoga: A Survey of the Medieval Sravakacaras, London


;\Qriental Series, vol. 14, London: Oxford University Press, 1963, pp. 2-3. My edition of ;~:tl1etextis edited by Muni Rajendra Vijaya from Disa: Samskara Sahitya Sadan (Gujarat), r1~!:';;{

j"''f1971. ' !t;;, 11. Manu, 2:6 ,,:'i,:!!, 12. These references are from Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection:

,'explorations in Indian Though~ Albany: State University of New York, 1991, pp. 98-

'1:>129, which has the best discussion of the saIJlsilramocakas that I have read. My references !}'tD Buddhist texts are also from Halbfass. :f' 13. Wilhelm Halbfass, who has discussed some of these references in detail, 'X'c6ncluded that there was no evidence for the existence of any such group and that they

represent in fact more of a "theoretical possibility" than an historical actuality, based on »:.'., -:~irewriting of foreign, perhaps Zoroastrian practices. (Halbfass, op. cit., p. 111.) Halbfass

: did not mention the Sriivakaprajiiapti, although he was familiar with the Malayagiri :.commentary as given in the Abhidhiinariijendrakosa. Given the detail of the argument in ';'the SriivakaprajiiaptiI am inclined to give the saf!lsilramocakas a bit more credence. My

; (own view is that the Sriivakaprajiiapti with its complicated argumentation and fully

developed pfirvap~a for the saIJlsilramocakas suggests that in fact they did exist as a ,coherently defIned group that had a well-defmed position. This would also be consistent

• with the fact that in Jayanta, for example, what is attacked is not their behavior as such but the notion that their scriptures are valid. I would argue that had they been a

"hypothetical pfirvap~a their views might indeed have been raised and defeated but with far less detail and there would not have been the references to their texts as a body of

'literature. Some of their practices are also mentioned in the Buddhist texts, where they are said to have filtered into the Buddhist monastic community as well, as we shall see below, and Buddhaghosa when commenting on the appearance of saIJlsilramocaka

practices amongst the Buddhists allows us to deduce with some conviction that they were ,'areal group of ascetics. Finally, I would argue that it seems natural that the saf!lsilramocakas figure most prominently in the Jain texts since their main doctrine was an obvious

challenge to the Jain doctrine of ahif!lsa; at the same time since they were non-Vedic they must have travelled in the same circles as the Buddhists and their influence on the Buddhist monastic community seems to me to be a real possibility rather than just a

convenient fiction for the sake of argument To argue as Halbfass does that the saf!1silramocakas are merely a convenient device that the Jains use to bolster their arguments against the legitimacy of the violence of the Vedic sacrifice seems to me to ignore the very context in which the saIJlsilramocakas appear, namely a larger effort on the part of the Jains to define themselves as the non-violent religion par excellence in India in which the debate against the violence of the sacrifice may even be omitted. It also does not make sense of Buddhist references to the saIJlsilramocakas in Buddhaghosa and the Pilriijika, which will be treated later in this paper and which Halbfass did not mention.

14. There is a small but useful monograph on non-violence in Jainism that summarizes some of the material from another important Sravakacara text, the Puru~asiddhyupaya of Amrtacandra. This is Jain Moral Doctrine by Hari Satya Bhattacharya, Bombay: Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, 1976. See in partiCUlar pp. 51-56.


15. Nalanda Pili Series, pp. 84-88. 16. Samantapasiidika, Nalanda Pili edition, vol. II, 1965, p. 396. 17. See page 399, line 7.

18. Sik$asamuccaya, ed. Cecil Bendall, Indo-Iranian Reprints, 'S-Gravenh Mouton and Company, 1957, p. 168. See also Paul Williams, Mahayana BUddhism Nage: , ew York and London: Routledge, 1989, p. 145 for reference to a story from the Upayakausalyasiitra in which the Buddha kills a person who is about to kill others.A different viewpoint comes through in the Mahlsajataka, no. 278, in which the BUddhais a bull and a wicked monkey is tormenting him. The goddess of the forest, the vanade_

vatli, suggests that the Buddha put an end to the troublesome creature, at least to prevent him from torturing other bulls in the future. The Buddha prefers to gain merit by endUrlll the suffering; he says that the monkey will soon be killed by another bull anyway.g

19. For my understanding of Jain hells I have relied on the discussion by Pandit. Sukhlalji in his commentary to the Tattvifrthadhigamasiitra and the Sri laina Siddhanta

Bola Sarpgraha. See Tattvifrthadhigamasfitra, Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute Series, voL44,

1974, pp.130-140 and Sri laina Siddhiinta Bol Sarpgraha by Bhairoda Sethiva, Sri Sethiya Jaina Granthamala, vol. 97, Bikaner: JainaParamarthika Samstha, 1941, vol. 2, pp. 314ff.

20. For defInitions and explanations see the Tattvifrthadhigamasfitra with Pandit Suklalji's commentary, p. 320ff.

21. For upakrama see the Tattviirthadhigamasiitra, p. 127.

22. There are examples in the Buddhist literature of arhats who commit suicide so as not to backslide. See the article by Per Arne Berglie and Carl Sunesson, "Arhatschaft und Selbstrnord - zur buddhistischen Interpretation von cetanabhabba/cetanadhanna

und attasamcetana/atmasamcetana" in Elvind Kars, Kalyiinamitraraganam, Norwegian University Press, 1986, pp. 13-49.

23. See verse 87, page 108 in the Srfivakacara Sarpgraha, vol. 1, edited by Hiralal Siddhantalankara, Sholapur: Jivaraja Jaina Granthamala, 1976.

24. Nalanda Pili edition, p. 99.

25. See the SiitrakrtiiIiga with commentary of Sllanka, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Indological Trust, 1978, pp. 264-265.

26. This is pp. 64-66 in volume III of Fausboll's edition in the Pili Text Society, London: Luzac and Company, 1963. There is a secondjataka by the same name, pp. 536-543 of the same volume, but it is umelated.

27. I am summarizing the account by Buddhaghosa in the Sam an tapas adikii, N alanda PaIi Text Series, voL 1, pp. 33-53. The Samantapasadikaaccount of the third council was also used by the Burmese author of the Sasanavarpsa, edited in the Nalanda PaIi Series,

pp. 7 -9. Although the Sasanasavarpsa gives only the briefest summary of King Asoka and his fear of his own culpability, it retains the reference to the Tittirajataka.

28. See pp. 728-738 in the reprint from Sankibo, Tokyo. 29. See p. 168. 30. See the Sik$asamuccaya, pp. 59ff. 31. See the references to Silanka's commentary on the Suyagac;1aIiga cited earlier and

see below. In this way the J ains do at least absolve their monks of the inevitable violence


".",ncl.''''~ with being alive. There are further cases in which an exception is made for us acts among the laity, for example building temples, but the Jains remain deeply

'bivalent about temple building at least in some of their prescriptive texts as opposed :i;I:0;~their story colleCtions, because temple building involves a great degree of violence to

~!'\{~~lng creatures as the ground is broken and the temple stones are laid. See the i9,,'; 'Sravakaprajiiapti, verse 346, and the Syiidviidamaiijari, edited by Jagadiscandra Jain, in ;i, 't/JeSrimadrajcandra Jainasastramala, Varanasi, 1970, p. 90. ,tty}. ' 32. It is dilemma 45, in the translation p. 16 of vol. II, in the Dover Edition of 1963.

;"~" 33. Edited by Acarya Sagaranandasuriji Maharaja in the Lala Sundarlal Agamagran;",;,'tliamala, vol. 1, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Indological Trust, Delhi, 1978, p. 265.

~'~r~:: ~anr:~!-:::~~~P:a~himanikaya, Nalanda PilIi edition, vol. 2, p. 43. '\\~~'~ 36.-Bombay, 1929,p.17. 'r,:r,, 37. See for example the Yasodharacarita translated by FriedheIm Hardy in the book

,'.'>dtat I have edited, The Clever Adulteress and Other Stories, Oakville, Ontario: Mosaic

'hPress, 1990. ?, '. 38. YaSovijaya in his commentary to Haribhadra's SIistravifrtIisamuccaya, vol. 2, p.

';\;62, explains that this is why the willful abstention from food resulting in death I(sallekhana) which is the preferred way in which a monk or nun or pious layperson may i'die is not "atmahirpsa," or "violence to the self." The person engaging in the fast to death

is totally mindful of his or her acts and thus the death fails to meet the definition of :·;:C·violence, in which "unmindfulness" is a key word. The issue of to what extent suicide

, was considered violence by any of the groups in our debate is an interesting one; there iare a number of excellent studies on suicide in Buddhism in contrast to the paucity of good

, literature on murder. For an overview see the article by Per Arne Berglie and Carl , Sunesson, "Arhatschaft und Selbstrnord - zur Buddhistischen Interpretation von

cetanabhabba/cetanadharma und attasamcetana/atmasamcetana in Elvind Kars, Kalyiinamitriiriiganam, Norwegian University Press, 1986, pp. 13-49. There are a number of indications that suicide or voluntary death was not considered by the Buddhists to be an act of violence in the same way that murder was; several monks are described as eager to terminate their lives when they reached a certain stage of attainment, and in some cases the Buddha praises the death as a pious act. Jain criticisms of stories like the Vyiighrl

liitaka, as we have seen above, do not focus on the issue of iitmahirpsa, which is not even mentioned, but on the unintentional murder of all the worms in the Buddha's body. I should like to return to this issue in the future.

39. See the Syiidviidamaiijari cited above for just one example. 40. sri Vallabhadigvijaya, by Gosvami Sri Yadunathji Maharaj, edited in the Sri

Vallabha Studies Series, no. 16, Baroda and Delhi: Shri VallabhaPubIications, 1985, pp.

39-40.

nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

Is the Dharma-kaya the Real "Phantom Body" of the Buddha 11

by Paul Harrison

L Introduction

The Trildlya doctrine of Buddhism, i.e., the doctrine that the Buddha has three "bodies," is notorious for its complexities. Attributed to the Y ogacara, but regarded as typical of the Mahayana in general, it is customarily cited in books on Buddhism in terms of the triad dharma-kaya, sarpbhoga-kaya (or sarpbhogika-kaya) and nirmiiI;la-kaya (or nairmal)ika-kaya). Taking these in ascending order of abstraction, the nirmiIl)a-kaya, usually translated "apparitional body," "phantom body," "transformation body," etc., is the physical manifestation of Buddhahood, the ordinary perishable human form, as exemplified by the "historical Buddha," Siddhartha Gautama. The sarpbhoga-kaya ("body of bliss," "reward body," "enjoyment body," etc.) is a more exalted and splendid manifestation of the enlightened personality, still in the realm of fonn, but visible only to bodhisattvas, those of advanced spiritual capabilities. By contrast, the dharma-kaya("Dhanna-body," "Body of Truth," "Cosmic Body," "Absolute Body," etc.) is both forrnless and imperishable, representing the identification of the Buddha with the truth which he revealed, or with reality itself. As such the dhanna-kaya is often linked with various terms for reality, such as dharrnata, dharma-dhatu, and so on, and has even been regarded as a kind of Buddhist absolute, or at least at one with it.2 In this light the dharma-kaya is understood as the primal "source" or" ground" from which the other two types of bodies emanate.3 While many scholars are content to describe this in purely abstract tenns, others impute personal characteristics to it;4 and at least one writer has gone so far as to compare it to the Christian idea of Godhead.s

44

DHARMA-KAYA 45

As a summary of the Trikaya doctrine this is, of course, oversUuplified. We are dealing here with a complex theory which tihderwent many accretions and refinements, as Buddhists continJed down through the centuries to speculate on the nature of Buddhahood, on the nature of reality, and on the relationship between them.6 It is hardly surprising, then, that attempts to plot the bourse of such arcane speculations have not always been entirely successful in reaching a clear consensus, although the arguments a.dvanced, even in recent writing on the subject, do tend to follow similar lines. A good example of this is the authoritative treatment by Nagao, "On the Theory of Buddha-body (Buddha-kaya)," first published in English in 1973.7 Generally Nagao distinguishes three phases: an initial one-body theory, a two-body theory, and the three-body theory elaborated by the Yogacaras. According to him (p. 104), the two-body theory (i.e., rupa-kaya and dharma-kaya) "became stabilized in a variety of earlier sutras,8 and in early ,Mahayana sutras, the Prajiiaparamita, the SaddharmapUI)l;Iarika, and so forth. The rupa-kaya is the Buddhaseen in a human body, while the dharma-kaya is the Buddha's personality seen in the dharma or dharma-nature." Elsewhere (pp. 106-7) Nagao states that the two-body theory was the one held "until the time of the Prajfiaparamita Sutra and the time of Nagarjuna," even though the raw materials for the third body, the sarpbhoga-kaya, were also to hand before the time of AsaiJ.ga and Vasubandhu, as a consequence of the bodhisattva-concept and the idea that a bodhisattva's performance of meritorious actions produced a body which was their manifest "reward." Nagao's article contains many valuable observations, but, as we shall see, some of its assertions are rather too imprecise, both chronologically and philosophically, to be of much use in unravelling the early development of the doctrine at issue. Another recent treatment of the subject by Makransky (1989) also describes certain features of the putative earlier two-body theory before the Yogacaras remodelled it (see esp. pp. 51-53), and. distinguishes it sharply from the previous Mainstream9 (in this case, Sarvastivadin) formulations. This analysis, too, is open to question in certain respects, as I shall show. In these and other articles on the subject10 there is a general tendency to postulate a one-body/two-


'?od~/~hree-?OOy progre.ssion, in terms ?~which a single personali~ IS· diVIded mto a phYSICal and a "spmtual" body, and theri'tti~ physical body is f~er split in two, ~elding the fi~al complem~~% of three. Some wnters, however, pomt to the eXIstence of thIg~~ bodies even in the PaIi sources, what one scholar has called th~ "primitive triad," i.e., piiti- or ciituI-mahiibhiitika-kiiya, In;;;la~ maya-kaya, and dhamma-kiiya.ll The fIrst is the corruptible physi~~ cal body formed out of the four elements, while the second is thr mind-made body with which the Buddha visits the celestial real~~l (believed by some to be a forerunner of the sarpbhoga-kiIya); th€~ third is the so-called "Dhamma-body." Now, although both thes~~ ways of approaching the subject-the assumption of a lineai1 process, and the belief that the Pali Canon contains an embryonit'; Trikaya schema-raise certain diffIculties, I do not propose in thi~t paper to discuss the evolution of the Trikaya theory in its entiret9;'7, since that would be a mammoth undertaking. What I wish to do is" address one aspect of it only, viz., the early development oftheide~'~ of dharma-kiiya, in the hope that clarifying this will open the waY,l to a better understanding of Mahayana buddhology as a whole. /;~;

II. Dhanna-kaya in Texts Translated by Lokak$ema

One possible way of investigating the initial development of the dharma-kiiya idea in the Mahayana context is to look for it in thd.: small group of siitras translated into Chinese by Lokak~emi' towards the end of the 2nd century C. E., given that these texts· constitute our earliest datable literary ~vidence for Mahayana Buddhism. 12 What, if anything, do these ancient documents tell us about the "prehistory" of the Y ogacara Trikaya theory, and about Mahayanist notions of dharma-kiiya in particular? Fortunately, we need not start from scratch: preliminary work in this area has . already been done by Lewis Lancaster, who some time ago examined the various Chinese versions of the A$tasiihasrikiIprajiiii-piiramita-siitra (AsPP) with careful attention to the develop- . ment of a number of key doctrinal concepts, among them dharma-' kiiyaY In view of the importance of the AsPP as the seminal Prajiiaparamita text,clearly the most influential of all the scriptures

DHARMA-KAYA 47

.• hich Lokak~ema worked, let us begin by reviewing Lancaster's ·ngs.

.. Lancaster (1968: 92-100) originally isolated five occurrences

. e term dharma-kiiya in the Sanskrit text of the AsPP, and ilInined the relevant portions of the various Chinese translations .1 der to determine the development of this concept in that siitra.14

~found that the term does not appear in what he called the "early if~it" (represented by the first three Chinese versions, the oldest of tfhlch is Lokak~ema's, the Daoxing [banruo] jing, T.224), except ti2! one passage, but is attested by the "middle" and "late" texts, ~\ren though these do not entirely agree with the Sanskrit and i1%etan versions. On this basis he concluded (1974: 36) that ~81iliough the later texts display the two-body theory (rfipa-kiiya and rNharma-kiiya), "it appears that the earliest ideas in Mahayana sutras ~ere neither the two;..body nor the three-body ones, but rather the (adon of one Buddha-body." Although this statement in particular fE~ints us in the right direction, and Lancaster's [mdings are indeed ~mteresting, some of the inferences he drew from them now merit [~i6ser scrutiny. If we look carefully at the passages in question, ~mending at the same time to what previous scholarship has made ,1!i~;~ " ~of them, it will become apparent that what Lancaster saw as the ~progressive introduction into the text of the "uniquely Mahayana" rtloctrine of the dharma-kiiya can be understood in quite different :";j'-',

,,!~nns. ~!; The five occurrences of dharma-kiiya in the Sanskrit text of { ... ;the AsPP are:15

1. Chap. IV (Vaidya 1960: 48). 2. Chap. IV (Vaidya 1960: 50). 3. Chap. XVII (Vaidya 1960: 168). 4. Chap. xxvm (Vaidya 1960: 228). 5. Chap. XXXI (Vaidya 1960: 253).

Not found in T.224. Not found in T.224. Not found in T.224. Found in T.224. Not found in T.224.

<rhe first of these is perhaps the most important; the passage is worth citing in full (the key sentences are underlined);

Sakra aha sacen me bhagavan aYaI!1 jambudvIpal} paripiirr;11lS cUlikabaddhas tatMgata-sarIriiI)§Jp. diyeta iYaI!1 ca prajiia-piiramita likhitvopanamyeta


tata ekatarel}.a bMgena pravaryamiiI)o 'nayor dvayor bhagayo/.l stha tayor imam e vtibarp bhagavan prajna-paraI1!itarp parigrhI}Jyam / tat ". heto/.l yathapi nama tathagata-netrl-citr1kare1J.a / etad dhi tathliga -bhiitiirthikarp swam / tat kasya heto!) uktarp hy etad bhagavatii dh kaya buddha bhagavantah / ma khaJu punar imam bhiksavah sat-lea kayam manyadhvam / dharma-kaya-parinispattito mam bhiksa draksyatha / esa ca tathagata-kayo bhiita-koti-prabhavito drasta yaduta prajna-paramita /

" Although there can be no doubt about the fundamental intent of ili~ text here-" that the Buddhas and their relics are worthy ofvenera~ tion solely by virtue of their realisation of perfect wisdom, whiclii;~ is therefore pre-eminent-many previous treatments of this impopJ;~ tant passage of the AsPP have failed to take account of one cruCiat point. Translations by Conze (1975: 116), Kajiyama (1984: 11) and Makransky (1989: 65) have all rendered dharma-kifya in the phra£e dharma-kifya buddha bhagavantal;1 as a noun, Kajiyama in th~ singular ("Buddhas consist of the Dharma-body"), Conze an: Makransky in the plural ("The Dharma-bodies are the Buddhas, th; Lords");16 However, this raises a problem: if dharma-kifya here i a noun," how can it possibly stand in the plural, as it most certainly does in the Sanskrit? Given the later understanding of this tenn m' the Buddhist tradition, can there be more than one dharma-kaya?} After all, not one of the other similarly elusive words which all supposed to do duty for "reality"-dharmatif, tathata, bhiita-kop,< etc. ,-ever occurs in the plural, indeed could not: since these" "things" are supposed to be formless, beyond quantification,~ beyond all duality, how could there be more than one of them?:';;~~

The same problem pertains to two of the other citations listed·~~ above. In the passage in Chap. XVII, in fact, the relevant wording:~;~ (underlined below) is identical: ;;~

;J";.~~ ""if,:'

tasmiid bodhisattvo mahasattvo 'vinivartanIyal) sad-dharma-parigrahaya4;~~ paramudyogam apadyate atItiinagata-pratyutpannifnlfrp buddhiiniiIp. ~;i;;~ bhagavatiiJp premnii ca gaurave1J.a ca / dharma-kiiya buddha bhagavanta:;jl~l iti dharme prema ca gauravarp copadaya sad-dharma-parigraharp karoti ?I~~

>~i,p;fs " >,,'2

Here the iti following the key phrase suggests that it is taken from ;4~ another source, as is more strongly indicated in Chap. IV by the'gl~

. ~;~;:~f~ :!,'~~

DHARMA-KAYA 49

,i'f;/ords uktarp hy etad bhagava ta, which in Mahayana siitras ~::,j~nunonlY introduce citations from Mainstream cano~ical texts . . ~*~gain, Conze (1975;,207) translates: "the Dharma-bodies are the J' i\J3uddhas, the Lords. ;;, In Chap. XXXI, however, the wording is somewhat different:

evam evakula-putra ye kecit tathagata-IiipeI}a va gho$eI}a va abhinivi$tab te tathagatasyagamanarp ca gamanarp ca kalpayanti / ye ca tathagatasyagamanarp ca gamanarp ca kalpayanti sarve te Mla-jatiya d~prajfiajatiya iti vaktavyab tadyathapi nama sa eva puru$O yo 'nudake udakasamjiilln utpadayati / tat kasya hetob na hi tathagato Iiipa-kayato drastavyah / dharma-kayas tathagatah / na ca kula-putra dharma (a agacchati va gacchati va / evam eva kulaputra nasti tathagatanam agamanarp va gamanarp va /

;;.:Thekey words here are paraphrased by Kajiyama (1984: 14) as "a ~A'Tathagata should not be considered as a riipakaya; Tathagatas ;:<consist of dharmakayas," and translated by Conze (1975: 291) as ; (;"For a Tathagata cannot be seen from his form-body. The Dharma:~;bodies are the Tathagatas ... "17

,; '., This way of construing the texts has certain theoretical . implications. For example, it is on the basis of his understanding of these passages that Kajiyama (1984: 12-13) speaks of a change

: in the idea of the "Buddha-body," and the emergence of a "theory ·····of the two-bodied Buddha" at a comparatively early stage in the

development of the Sanskrit text of the AsPP. Thus, he concludes (p. 13), "the physical Buddha body came to be called riipakaya,

'while the Buddha body equated with prajfiaparamita was called dharmakaya, " and he infers that the two-body theory using these terms must have been formed by the middle of the 4th century, since the passage from Chap. XXXI is attested in Kumarajiva's transla-tion of the AsPP (although the passages from Chaps. N and XVII are not).

This is, however, problematical, for imposing a two-body schema on these passages leads us into the philosophical incoherence mentioned above: if there is such a thing as the dharma-kaya, how can it be plural? Fortunately, the solution to this problem lies ready to hand, having been pointed out by Edgerton as long ago as


i953 (BHSD, S.V.):18 the compound dharma-kiiya in these Paniclif;l'~~ citation_s is not a tatpuru$a (or karmadhiiraya) substantive but~1 bahuvrihi adj:c?:e.19 This usage, as Edgerton note~, is the only o*~, attested for Pa1.I; III fact, the term occurs but once m the entire Pali'~ Canon. The sole citation in question is in the Aggciiifia-sutta of th~r:;:l DIgha-Nikiiya (D iii 84), where dhamma-kiiya, brahma-ka:i~'(~' dhamma-bhiita and brahma-bhiita are listed as designations for th~'~ Buddha. These are all adjectives, although not all translatorshavef,! recognised or preserved them as such.20 The message of the text iSfi'~ that followers of the Buddha may claim to be his sons, not because')~ they have been engendered by his physical body, but through beirig"~ the offspring of the dhamma,21 because the Buddha is "dhamma-'] bodied" or has the dhamma as his body (dhamma-kiiya),22 tM( Buddha is the dhamma itself (dhamma-bhiita).23 This equation of;~ the Buddha with the dhamma is also found in a number of wellf[J known passages in the Pili Canon, for example at S iii 120, where;ii Gautama says to Vakkali, long stricken by illness and desperate t00;~ see the Buddha, "What is the point of your seeing this corruptible::l body (Piiti-kiiya)?Whoever sees the dhamma, Vakkali, sees me;i~ whoever sees me sees the dhamma."24 Along similar lines are;] Gautama's celebrated instructions to his followers to take the< dhamma itself as their guide following the demise of his body.2S The use of the adjective dhamma-kiiya in the Aggafifia-sutta can be· seen as· reflecting these ideas. The Buddha is equated with the dhamma; therefore, he is said to be dhamma-kiiya, to "have the dhamrila as his body." To put it in more elegant English, the Buddha is truly "embodied" in the dhamma, rather than in his physical person, which, as Vakkali is reminded, has no real significance at . alL The adjective dhamma-bhiita is virtually synonymous, i.e., to describe the Buddha as dhamma-bhiita is to say that the Buddha is . the dhamma itself.26

Turning back to the AsPP, we see then that the three passages thus far in question are making the same point: not that the Buddhas are the dharma-kiiyas, but that they are those who are embodied in the dharma. While this assertion may still require explication, it seems not to lead us straight into the philosophical quicksands of

DHARMA-KAYA 51

;',the developed Trikaya theory. In fact, there is nothing particularly ,dMahayanist about it at all, as it occurs in the. Pali scriptures, even ;ii£only once. Indeed, as we have noted, In two of the AsPP ~~cJccurrences in question there are indications that the crucial phrase ;,:rnay well have been a quotation from a Mainstream text, although );iwe have yet to identify the source. It is certainly the case that the ~!Mainstream-in this case Theravadin-interpretation of the tenn l~uits the context perfectly, far better, in fact, than the Trikaya,:.influenced reading. This is especially clear in the passages in .' Chaps. XVII and XXXI, where the interpretation suggested re;';solves the awkward non sequiturs of Conze's translation. Thus in ,~Chap. IV Sakra, faced with a choice between the world packed to

the ceiling with relics of the Buddha and a written copy of the :'f teaching or dharma of the Perfection of Wisdom, expresses his

preference for the latter "out of reverence for the guide of the ','..rathagatas, since it is their genuine bodily relic. Why? Because the 'Lord has said 'The Buddhas and Lords have the dharma as their body,'" i.e., the dharma is their true body, and thus it is their true relic as well?7 Similarly, the passage in Chap. XVII may be rendered freely as follows:

"Therefore the bodhisattva and mahasattva who is incapable of regression makes a supreme effort to take up the true dhanna out of love and respect for past, future and present Buddhas and Lords. Feeling love and respect for the dhanna, with the thought 'The Buddhas and Lords have the dhanna as their body,' he/she takes up the true dhanna."

That is to say, the Buddhas are embodied in the dharma, and so to , love and respect the dharma is to love and respect the Buddhas. And lastly, the relevant passage in Chap. XXXI may be translated like this:

"In the same way, son of good family, those who fixate on the Tathagata' s physical appearance or his voice imagine that the TathfIgata comes and goes, but it has to be said that all those who imagine that the TathfIgata comes and goes are inherently foolish and stupid, just like the man who perceives water where none exists. Why is that? Because a Tathagata is


not to be seen through his physical body; Tathagatas have the dharm Nfl

their body. The nature of dhanna, son of go¢ family, neither comes: ~~) goes. In the same way, son of good family, there is neither coming 1l.2f, going for the Tathagatas." )?~;

) .~

What is important here is the dharma which constitutes the ~l:: identity of the Buddhas, not any particular "body," howev~i abstract. Just as coming and going cannot be predicated of th~' dharma itself, or of the nature of dharma(s) (dharmatff), it cann6i be predicated of the Buddhas insofar as they are identified with the' dharma.28 ) ") 'Ii

We are still left, however, with three instances in the AsP~; where dharma-kaya appears as a noun. The first is the sentenc~ dharmakaya-parini$pattito mffrp bhik$avo drak$yatha in the Chap: IV passage cited at length above. This is rendered by Kajiyama ai "Monks, you should see me as the accomplishment of the Dhanna~. body," by Conze as "Monks, you should see Me from the: accomplishment of the Dharma-body." However, since we are: dealing here with a continuation of a (probably Mainstreamf scriptural quotation, we ought first to consider interpretations of dharma-kaya which are consistent with Mainstream doctrine, to see whether they fit the context better.

Although dharma-kiiya as a noun is not attested in the PaIi Canon, it does occur in other Mainstream sources. To begin with, . there is a handful of passages in the Chinese translations of the Agamas where the appearance of the term fa-shen, "body oL dharma(s),"29 indicates that the underlying Indic may have had dharma-kaya as a substantive. These passages were exhaustively. studied by Anesaki (1982),30 whose findings may be found summarised in Demieville's article in the Hobogirin, s.v. busshin (1930: 176-177). There is one clear reference in the Sarpyuktagama,' now generally assigned to the MUlasarvastivadins,31 and three in' the Ekottaragama, thought by many to be part of the Mahasarpghika' canon.32 In the Sarpyuktiigama passage King Asoka justifies his lavish veneration of the stiipa of Ananda with reference to the . latter's key role in the preservation and transmission of the dharma. Asked by his ministers why these offerings surpass all others, he

DHARMA-KAYA 53

says "The b~dy of the Tathagata is the body of dharma(s), pure in nature. He [Ananda] was able to retain it/them all; for this reason the offerings [to him] surpass [all others]."33 In the opening verses oithe Elwttariigama (T.125, I, 549c14), which have n~ Pali tounterpart, we read: "The appearance of the Master of the Sakyas ihthis world was very brief. Although the physical body has passed away, the body of dharma(s) endures." And later, in the same passage (550a 1-2): "The body of dharma(s) of the Tathiigata is indestructible; it abides in the world forever, and does not cease. When gods and human beings get to hear it, they perfect the fruit of the Way." This idea is subsequently thematised in Section LXIV, where the Buddha and Ananda discuss the survival of the dharma after the death of the Tathiigata (787b17-29):

Then Ananda said to the Lord: "The Buddhas and Lords of the distant past had an extremely long lifespan, precept-breakers were rare and there was no impurity. Now, however, people have a very short lifespan, not exceeding ten decades. After the Buddhas of the past attained extinction, how long did the dharma they left behind remain in the world?" The Buddha said to Ananda: "After the Buddhas of the past attained extinction, the dharma did not remain for long." Ananda said to the Buddha: "After the Tathagata attains extinction, how long will the true dharma remain in the world?" The Buddha said to Ananda: "After I attain extinction, the dharma will remain for a long time. After the extinction of the Buddha Kasyapa, the dharma which he left behind lasted seven days. Right now, Ananda, you [may think] the TatiJagata has few disciples. Don't hold this view: there are countless thousand kops of disciples in the east, and countless thousand kops of disciples in the south. Therefore, Ananda, you ShOlIld think: 'The lifespan of our Buddha Sakyamuni is extremely long. Why? Although the physical body undergoes extinction, the body of dharma(s) persists. This is its meaning, which we should ponder, take up and put into practice. ",

Finally, in Section XXXI (719b7-8), Anuruddharemarks that "The body of the Tathiigata is the body of the true dharma (rulai shenzhe zhenfa zhi shen)."

As becomes especially clear when one considers the contexts in which they are embedded, all these Agarna citations make a specific identification of the term translated as fa-shen, "body of


dharma(s)," with the dharma or dharmas demonstrated by th Buddha, or with the true dharma, i.e., with his teachings or ht Teaching considered as a whole. It is this which is described as pure, indestructible, eternal, remaining after the nirvaI}a of th~ physical body, and, according to one telling passage, something that one can hear. But there is a problem: can we be sure that the underlying Indic word was indeed dharma-kaya? For there is at least one other candidate for the position, and that is dhanna-sarlra. The occurrence of this compound in the AsPP has already been noted above. To what extent its meaning differs from dharma-kifya remains to be determined, but some light is thrown on this in the lengthy discussion by the unknown author of the Karrnavibharigopadesa (see Levi 1932: 157ff., 172fO·34 In this text we find an explicit equation of dharma-sarira with the teaching of the Buddha, the hearing orrealisation of which far outweighs the vision of the Buddha's physical body, the "body produced by mother and father."35 The theme of the text, then, is similar to that of the Aggafifia-sutta, viz., that the dharma in the sense of the teaching is the true body (and in this case "relic"?6 of the Buddha; and in line with the text's own definition the noun dharma-smfra is best interpreted as a karmadhm-aya, i.e., as "the body/relic which consists in the dharma(s)." Since all this is obviously congruent with the Agama passages we have just looked at, one has to ask whether the word translated in them as fa-shen was not dharmasmira rather than dharma-kaya.

In the absence of Indic fragments or parallels, we cannot answer this question with certainty. Only for the Sarpyuktagama passage can we refer to the Divyiivadana, where we see that neither compound is attested;37 the other Agama passages remain in doubt. However, it is quite clear that dharma-kaya is at least possible, for it definitely occurs in the sense required in other Mainstream sources. One of these is the Milinda-pafiha, a non-canonical PaIi text preserved by the Theravadins. The relevant passage, as translated by Horner (1965: 99-100), runs as follows: "the Lord has attained final nibbana in the element of nibbana that has no substrate remaining (for future birth); it is not possible to point to the Lord who has gone home and say that he is either here or there;

DHARMA-KAYA 55

but, sire, it is possible to point to the Lord by means of the body fDhamma, for Dhamma, sire, was taught by the Lord."38 This

/l~choes a previous statement in the same section, to the effect that i'fIe who sees the dhamma sees the Lord, for the dhamma was

;iaught by the Lord."39 These variations on what are by now familiar :theroes indicate that the substantives dharma-kfiya and dharma:'jarira certainly overlap in meaning, even if they may not be entirely 'synonymous. A second Mainstream citation of interest here is a passage in the Miilasarvastivadin Vinaya(seeDutt 1950: 185-186),

: where SroI;la KofikaII).a expresses his strong desire to see the physical body of the Buddha, since the "seeing" (darsana) of

. Buddhas is as rare as the U4umbara flower. His words are: "On the authority of my preceptor [my emphasis] I have seen the Lord by means of the body of dharma(s), but not by means of the physical body (dr$to mayopfidhyfiyfinubhfivena sa bhagavfin dharma-kfiyena 110 tu rupa-kfiyena)." In both these sources I would maintain that dharma-kfiya clearly refers not to some "spiritual body,"40 but, in line with the Agama passages cited above, to the Buddha's

. teachings, acquired, in SroI)a KoW<:in).a's case, on the authority of his preceptor Mahakatyayana.41 However, one question remains,

. which I have left open up till now: if we accept that the first element of the nominal compound dharma-kaya denotes the Buddha's teachings, should we continue to translate it in the singular, as is customary, or in the plural?

Although it may not seem so at first sight, the answer to this question is suggested by a number of scholastic Sarvastivadin sources, which use the term dharma-kfiya to refer to the special, undefiled dharmas or qualities which make a Buddha a Buddha.42

There appear to have been differences of opinion as to the identity of these dharmas. According to Vasubandhu' s Abhidharma-kosabhii$ya some scholars identified them with the 18 qualities exclusive to a Buddha (iiveIJika-dharmas),43 viz., the ten powers (bala), four assurances (vaisiiradya), three applications of mindfulness (smrtyupasthiina) and great compassion (mahfikaruIJif).44 Other Sarvastivadin sources, however, equated them with the more modest list of the five anfisrava-skandhas, or "incorruptible constituents," viz., sila, samfidhi, prajfUi, vimukti and vimukti-jiifina-


'?arsana (see, .e.g., Lamotte 1958: 689-690), _~ identification whi~Kl IS also found In the work of the gre~~Therava~n commentator BriaJ dhaghosa.45 Whatever the composItIOn of the lIst, however, dha.niii1~~~ kify~ ~ this co~te~t c1earl~ means the collection o~ the ~undefiled)1J qualIties or pnncipies WhICh the Buddha has realised In his owR)~ person and rev~aled to others. That is to say, the use of the Sansklit~~ word kifya turns on the same ambiguity possessed by the Eng1iSh~f word "body" or the Latin COlpUS; it means "body" in the sense'ot~ a complete collection of constituent parts, ensemble, entiretyi'~;~ totality. And this is in itself an indication that the first term in th~~ compound-at least when it is a substantive-is indeed to be7g construed as plural.46 Further, there is a second ambiguity built intb,(l the term: the dharmas in question are both taught by the Buddha;';~~ in which case we might call them "teachings" or "truths," and theyJ:i are realised in his person, in which case we might call therri~ "qualities" (in the latter sense they are more obviously plural). Thi~~$ ambiguity is probably intentional and fundamental. We find idi; acknowledged, for example, in a commentary on the VajracchedikH, ascribed to Asailga, who distinguishes two types of dharma-kaya~~f the "dharma-kifya as words" and the "dharma-kaya as realis{'l tion."47 If we accept then that this interpretation, "body of dhaif 1 mas," with its multiple ambiguities, well established for Main-7 stream scholastic sources, can also be applied to Mainstream ;!, scriptural texts in which the substantive dharma-kifya appears, wek must concede that renditions such as "Body of the Dharma," "Body~ of Truth" or "Body of the Teaching" are mistaken, or at the very' least too limiting, since a collection cannot consist of one thing.48

To return now to the Mahayana sources, it can be seen that the rather multivalent Mainstream interpretation of the substantive form of our term-"body/collection of qualities/truths/teachings"is consistent with the AsPP citations under consideration. The remainder of the passage from Chap. N, therefore, may be translated as follows: '''Again, bhik$us, you ought not to think that this existing body is [my real] body. Bhik$us, you should see me in terms 'of the full realisation of the body of dharmas (i.e., the totality of undefiled qualities or truths). '49 And one ought to see that this [real] body of the Tathifgaf3. is constituted ~by50 perfect truth, i.e.,

DHARMA-KAYA 57

by the Perfection of Wisdom." This interpretation fits the context, ind raises fewer philosophical difficulties. . A similar reading can be applied to the other occurrence of dhanna-kaya as a noun in Chap. IV (no. 2 in the list above; no equivalent in any Chinese translation), where it is said that just as the king' s representative is inviolable and worthy of worship by the great mass of people because of the authority (anubhav!) of ct:e king, so too the preacher of the dharma (dharma-bhaIJ.aka) IS

inviolable and worthy of worship because of the authority of the ~y of dharmas (dharma-kayanubhavat).51 It seems to me far more likely that the preachers in question owe their reception to the inherent power of the teachings they purvey than to some abstract but nonetheless awe-inspiring theistic principle; that is to say, the Icing's servants represent the king, and derive their authority from him, the dharma-preachers represent the dharma, and derive their authority from it. . Finally, the same reading is also preferable for the fourth passage listed above, which happens to be the only one represented in the early Chinese versions. The Sanskrit text reads:

sumanasilqta ca sudh[tiI ca suparyaviiptiI ca supravartitiI ca tvaya Ananda i yarp prajnii-piiramitii kartavyii / suparivyakteniik$ara-pada-vyanjanena suniruktiI codgrahitavya/ tat kasya hetol) atitiinagata-pratyutpanniinlim hi Ananda tathiigatiinlim arhatiIm samvak-sambuddhiiniim dharma-kiiyateti tlim dharmatiIm pramanlkrtya /

Most previous commentators have recognised that this has nothing to do with the Trikaya,52 even though Conze's rendition (1975: 267) blurs the issue: "For as the dharma-body of the past, future and present Tathagatas is this dharma-text authoritative." Lokak~ema' s Chinese translation (468cI6-18) reads:

"You should carefully study [the PrajfUlparamim] and accept it in its entirety, bear it all in mind, keep it, and copy out its words correctly without error or loss [since] it is equivalent to and not different from the body of the scriptures of the Buddhas [fo-jing-shen] of the past, future and present."


The use of the Chinese word jing (canonical text, sCripture) dharma i.s standard with Lokak:~ema, and so the presence of word dharma-kiiya in the earliest accessible version of the hardly to be doubted. Here the text is obviously playing on aforementioned ambiguity of the term dharma, meaning teaching and principle or law of existence, as the Buddha Ananda to ponder, remember, master, etc., the PrajiiaparamiUi minute care, because "one ought to accept that nature of [which the Prajiiaparamita teaches] as authoritative, as being body of dharmas of all past, future and present Tathiigatas."53

My contention is, then, that even in the later Sanskrit text the AsPP, where dharma-kiiya clearly occurs as a noun, it·· perfectly comprehensible in terms of the multivalent •. uuuo.u

interpretation of the word, as the body or collection of _~ _____ .. _. principles, t::ruths, or teachings. Elsewhere it appears as an adj tive, a usage which is also found in Mainstream sources. What common to both grammatical forms -in the different sources we have reviewed is that the emphasis is on the member, dharma, not on kiiya. The same is true for all in the AsPP. Therefore there is no real support for .L.J"''',",U..->L''~

contention that dharma-kiiya is one of the specifically doctrines inserted into the text of the AsPP in the course of its velopment, even though it is true that many of the citations are attested in the three early Chinese translations.54

Is there, then, any support in the rest of the Lokak~ema for a distinctively Mahayanist interpretation of dharma-kiiya? It in the Lokiinuvartanii-siitIa (LAn)55 that we would most expect encounter material relating to this question, for the LAn is essence a meditation on buddhology proper. In this work, which closely affiliated with the Mahasarpghika-Lokottaravadins, we indeed find a sustained attempt to harmonise conflicting notions Buddhahood, in particular to reconcile the obvious frailties and limitations of the historical human being with a more glorious conception of the physical and spiritual attributes of an enlightened personality. Most of the text, then, turns on the discrepancies between what are in the classical Trikaya theory called the HL"_H~.-'_ kiiya and the sarpbhoga-kiiya, even though the second of these

DHARMA-KAYA 59

termS is not used in the extant Tibetan version. 56 The Tibetan for ~dharma-kaya does occur twice, however, in verses 37 and 79, in 'bOth of which it appears in the predicative position, i.e., it is almost ';~ertainly rendering the bahuvrIhi adjective.57 The relevant verses ;}ead as follows:

Verse 37: / yid kyi sku dang ldan pas ncr8 /

/ de bzhin gshegs pa chos sku yang / / mag can sku ni ston mdzad pa / / 'di ni 'jig nen 'thun 'jug yin / "Even though, being endowed with a mental body, The Tathagatas have the dharma for a body, They manifest a corruptible body; This is conformity with the world."

Verse 79: / de bzhin gshegs pa chos sku ste / / gcig ci ' dra bar de bzhin kun / / 'on kyang tha dad stan mdzad pa / / 'di ni 'jig nen 'thun 'jug yin / "Since the Tathagatas have the dharma for a body, As one is, so are they all; Nevertheless, they make a show of multiplicity; This is conformity with the world."

There can be no doubt that the text which Lokak~ema had in front of him also contained these two verses, in much the same form. His ·version of them (T. 807) runs:

The Buddha's body is like an illusion. [He] calls the scripture/dhanna(s) Uingfa)59 [his] body. To others he displays an impure body. It is in conformity with worldly custom that he engages in such a manifestation. (752a18-19) All Buddhas share the one body; [they] regard the scripture/dharma(s) Uingfa) as [their] body. The Buddhas manifest teaching the scripture/ dharma(s) to others. It is in confonnity with worldly custom that they engage in such a manifestation. (753a19-20)60

Not only does Lokak~ema's translation demonstrate the existence of the term dharma-kaya in his text of the LAn, but the Chinese wording, almost identical in both verses (yi jingfa ming


. wei shen, yi jir:gfa wei shen), shows clearly that he construed it a bahuvrihi. Using the classical Chinese yi X wei Y constructi ("to take X as Y," "to regard X as Y," etc.), he split the compouil' just as we might.61 Neither the Chinese nor the Tibetan version~flj the LAn, then, attests dharma-kaya in its nominal form. Both'"' versions suggest, in addition, that the Sanskrit text of the relevatit~ pada in both verses read dharma-kaya tathagati:fl;l, which is the sam.~;1 phrase found in Chap. XXXI of the AsPP. l~~'l!

Although a full discussion of the buddhology of the LAni~fl beyond the scope of this paper, we ought to note that in v. 37 th~t Tib. term yid kyi sku is attested, which the Chinese glosses ~si~ body "like an illusion," but which must represent manomaya-kay~;'~; normally translated as "mental body" <;>r "mind-made body." Set\~ beside dharma-kaya, this is contrasted with mag can sku, which i§j,~ surely Skt./PaIi piiti-kaya.62 We have here what Lancaster calls the~ "primitive triad" (see above), the three bodies supposedly foundirii'~ the p~m Canon. However, since dharma-kaya is an adjective, Onl1~i two actual bodies in the proper sense of the word are attested in this"~ verse, as indeed they are in the PaIi Canon. Both these bodies, the~fi; mind-made and the corruptible, belong to the world of materia1:~ forms .. :~~

Turning next to the Pratyutpanna-buddha-'sarpmukhavasthita7'~ samadhi-siitra (PraS), we find a single obscure citation, at Sectioriv~i IX, where the Tib. has chos kyi sku dang 'dra bar rtogs pas nam] mkha'lta bu mams su 'gyur ba. In my English translation of this\~~ text I tentatively rendered this as "become those who resemblei:t space in their understanding [of it as?] similar to the Body of:~ Dharma," the problem being partly the presence in all three Chinese'i· versions of what seems to be an equivalent for animitta. Thus C~:. suggested that the original sense of the passage may have been";; "become those who understand the Body of Dharma to be sign1es~'jl like space."63 T.418's (Lokak~ema's) equivalent for dharma-kiIyin:i here isjing-zang-shen, literally "body of the treasury of scriptures,",l while T.416 has simply "all dharmas," suggesting once again thatij~ dharma-kaya means the totality of dharmas. 64 The citation is~:;j obscur~, but the presence of dharma-kaya as a substantive in the'.

:'<j

-,:;:::~f ,";tlj

DHARMA-KAYA 61

'ar··· .. liest known version is beyond doubt, in a context which seems .,e 'lito have nothing to do with buddhology as such.

?:P In the Kasyapa-parivana (KP), another important text in the ~'£~kak~ema corpus, the word dharma-kaya does not appear, but ('iupa-kaya occurs once, in Section 125, in a context which is ;;relevant to the discussion. The Sanskrit text runs: dharma to pi ;;tathagataIP na samanupasyati kal) punar vada rupakayel)a, i.e., "~;[the bodhisattva] does not view the Tathagata even in terms of the

;>aharrna(s), how much less in terms of his physical body."65 ;·\.Lokak~ema's version-"he is not even attached to the Buddha'.lc1lJarma(s), how much less constantly [?] attached to form?"~>conveys the intent of the Sanskrit reasonably well. The Jin dynasty ~,translation accords with it too, but the Qin and Song versions both l:~troduce the term fa-shen (= dharma-kaya). This could represent '{translator's license, or a different Sanskrit recension of the text : which sought to clarify its sense along the lines suggested by the ipassages in Chaps. IV and XXXI of the AsPP. That is to say, one

: does not "view" the Buddha even in terms of the body of qualities .or principles which he has realised (dharrna-kaya-parini$pattitas),

.' to say nothing of viewing him in terms of his physical person (rupakayatas).

As we move on to other less well-known works of early middle Mahayana sutra-literature, a significant new pattern begins JO emerge. In the Druma-kinnararaja-parip!ccha-siitra (DKP) , 66 to begin with, although there are no occurrences of the term chos kyi sku in the Tibetan text, Lokak~ema's Chinese version (T.624) contains several occurrences of fa-shen, the standard Chinese equivalent for dharma-kaya. In Section 2D (349c27-28), for example, we find: "What does it mean to say that bodhisattvas

. know the realm of all human beings without being separated from the body of dharmas?" which in the Tib. text is ji ltar na byang chub sems dpa' khams sna tshogs 1a yang mam par b1ta 1a chos kyi

··dbyings las kyang nil g.yo ba mams lags. Here Lokak~ema appears to have used fa-shen to render dharma-dhatu (Tib. chos kyi dbyings), which is also indicated by the appearance of fa-jie, the standard Chinese equivalent for dharma-dhatu, in Kumarajiva's


rendition of the same passage (T.625, 368c17-18).67 The sarn'i~! wording is repeated in the Tib. text at 2M, and the renditions·eJ~ T.624 (350c15) and T.625 (369c8) agree with those for the f:n,: citation. There can be little doubt, therefore, that Lokak:~ema h:t ,,: rendered dharma-dhiitu, contrasted with sattva-dhiitu, as fa-shens; presumably because he believed both terms to refer to the totality} of dharmas. The same thing happens at 20 where Tib. has chos kyT': dbyings, T.625 (369a18-19) has fa-jie and T.624 (350a21) has fa_\<ii shen.68 ,',l

A more pertinent citation is found at 7K, where the Tibetan: reads chos kyi dbyings bsam gyis mi khyab pa 1a zhugs pas/ sangs rgyas thams cad sangs rgyas gcig tu shes pa, "knowing that aU' Buddhas are one Buddha, by virtue of [their] entry into the:' inconceivable dharma-dhiitu"; i.e., all Buddhas are the same byi virtue of their common "entry" into, or understanding of, the' inconceivable dharma-dhiitu (Skt. acintya-dharma-dhiitvavatifra). T.624 (358b5-6) has "all Buddhas are nothing but one Buddha. For what reason? Because [their] penetration of the body of dharmas (fa-shen) is incalculable,"69 while T.625 (377b18-19) agrees exactly with the Tibetan, i.e., construing acintya as qualifying dharma-dhiitu rather than avatiira. At 8Cv54 T.624 (360b26) again, has fa-shen where Tib. has chos kyi dbyings and T.625 (379c14) has fa-jie. A further occurrence at 90 is especially interesting: in enumerating the six anusmrtis, the Tib. text has sangs rgyas kyi sku thob par bya ba 'j phyir / sangs rgyas rjes su dran pa, i.e., "commemoration of the Buddha in order to acquire the body of a Buddha." Here too T.625 (381a13-14) agrees with the Tibetan, but T.624 (361 b29) has "constantly think of the Buddha and obtain the body of dharmas (fa-shen)." This is unexpected; we could postulate corruption, but it is also possible that the translator has settled on fa-shen as conveying the true sense of buddha-kiiya. It is not easy to see how Lokak~ema has arrived at his translation of lOHv25, but the appearance of fa-shen in T.624 (363all), zhu-fa in T.625 (383aI6), and chos mams kun in Tib. suggests that sarva-dharma stood in the original lndic text. At llD, in a list of 64 "dharmasounds," we again find fa-shen in T.624 (363c18) where Tib. and T.625 (384a18) indicate dharma-dhiitu. The three versions differ

DHARMA-KAYA 63

i~; , bstantially from this point on, and it is interesting to note that the ;;tJI~uowingitems in T.?24 are the ten power~, the f?ur assurances and '~ihe eighteen, exclusIve dharmas (not lIsted m the two other ~iyersions), suggesting an association between these qualities and i";iJhanna-dhatu as equated with dharma-kaya. At 14D ehos kyi 'tdbyings in Tib. again fm~s a co~nte.rp~ i~ fa-shen in T.624 j{:(366a22), but the sentence In quesTIon IS mIssmg from T.62S (see ;'j87b22-26). Finally, a less clear-cut case occurs in Section lSE, :i}where T.624 (366cS) has: "they are able to practice and guard the : Hharma; through this they obtain the body of dharmas (fa-shen)." :'!The Tib. text at this point (Section lSE) has dam pa 'i ehos yongs >"s~ srung ba dang I sangs rgyas beom ldan 'das mams kyi dam pa 'i :/chos 'dzin par 'gyur ba, i.e., "they [the bodhisattvas] protect the true X/dharma, and they obtain the true dharma of the Buddhas and ?lords," while KumarajIva' s version (T.62S) reads "they protect the ·ltrue dharma and uphold the treasury of the Buddha-dharma(s) (foafa-zang)." Although not attested by the Tibetan, therefore, dharma~:Jaya is suggested by both Chinese versions of lSE, in a context : which implies it carries the meaning "collection of dharmas." The 'most significant finding in relation to the DKP, however, is that in

some half-a-dozen cases Lokaksema has translated dharma-dhatu ,by fa-shen.

Despite the doctrinal richness of the Ajatasatru-kau1qtyavinodana-siitra (AjKV), as well as the presence in it of apparent

" Yogadira tendencies, I have not been able to locate a single occurrence of dharma-kaya in the Tibetan text. However, once again Lokak~ema's translation (T,626) contains a number of uses of the term fa-shen, and the passages in question need careful investigation. At 390bl, to begin with, we read that bodhisattvas "do not deviate from twelvefold causation; they consider the body of dharmas (fa-shen) to be neither increasing nor decreasing." This

, corresponds to Tib. tien cing 'bre1 bar 'byung ba dang mi 'gal ba 'i phyir des chos thams cad (Derge: nyid for thams cad) 1a brtag par bya '0 II thog ma nas ma skyes pa 'j phyir ehos gang yang ma bri ba dang ma 'phd bar bya '0 (Peking Mdo Tsu 22Sa6-7). None of the other complete Chinese versions (T.627, T.628) supports dharmakaya, so it appears fa-shen has been used by Lokak~ema to denote


':;'

. all dharmas. At 390b28-29 the text states: "They see the BUddll~~ but do not think of seeking them through form. Why is thi

Because of the body of dharmas (or: because they have the db as body?)." However, Tib. ~Peking 226b2-~) has,?~ly sangsrgy, thams cad mthong mod kYI I gZligs 1a dmigs pa 1 du shes kyafj mi skyed, "although they see all the Buddhas, they do not give ns to any conception based on form," which is supported by the oth Chinese translations, indicating that T.626 has p~obably incorp rated a gloss. At 392b we also come across a number of OCcurrence of fa-shen (392b2, 4-5, 15), but the corresponding Tibetan texthiis only chos or chos nyid (see Peking 232al-8), while the Chine;~ version ofDhannarak~a (T.627, 41ObI8-c3) has fa-jieor fa, that or Fatian (T.628, 432bI7-29) simply fa. At 398b6-7, in the course6i Mafiju§ri's exposition of the bodhisattva-pitaka, Lokak:~ema' s text states: "The dharmas of bodhisattvas are unsurpassed, because they; penetrate the body of dharmas, because of great compassion." Bul when we compare this with the Tibetan, we find: byang chub sems' dpa'i bslab pa ni tshad med pa 'i rjes su song ba I snyillg rje chen" pos zin pa'o II (Peking 253a2-3), "The bodhisattva's training starts! with the immeasurable states and is completed by great compas- . sion. Similarly, T.627 (418aI5) and T.629 (439c21) mention only compassion." Taken with the clumsy repetition of "because" T.624, the testimony of the later versions indicates again that a gloss has been incorporated in the text. Later occurrences, however, follow the pattern laid down in the DKP. At 398c 1 fa-shen corresponds to chos kyi dbyings in the Tibetan text (see Peking 254a2), fa-jie in T.627 (418c1) and T.628 (440aI4); at 401b9-12 fa-shen occurs several times, corresponding to chos kyi dbyings or possibly chos thams cad (sarva-dharma) in the Tibetan (see Peking 263a7-263bl) and to fa-jie in -both T.627 (422bl-7) and T.628 (443a3-4); and finally, at 402cl-3, fa-shen again occurs several times, corresponding to choskyi dbyingsin the Tibetan (see Peking 267b7-268a2) and fa-jie in the later Chinese versions (see T.627, 423c15-18, and T.628, 44b25(?)).

It would be inappropriate here to give the full text of all the passages cited, but it is clear enough that Lokak:~ema has used fashen throughout the AjKV to designate the totality of dharmas,

DHARMA-KAYA 65

c enerally in places where his lndic original had dharma-dhatu. The /~o exceptions to this rule are almost certainly glosses which have been erroneously incorporated in the text. , There are three other texts belonging to the Lokak~ema

2corpus: T.458, the Wenshushili wenpusa-shujing(wwp); T.280, £the Dousha jing (DS], an early version of a small section of the i.Avatarpsaka-siitra); and T.313, the Achu-fo guo jing, a translation ;'oftheAk$obhya-tathagatasya-vyiiha (AkTV).7°Lokak~ema's trans/lations of the first two of these texts contain no references to "dharma-kaya, and the same is true, as far as I am aware, of the later : Chinese or Tibetan versions, where they exist.71 A perusal of the various versions of the AkTV, however, reveals one problematical Qccurrenceofthe tenn, in Chap. 1, Sections 69-70 (according to the

/divisions in the translation by Dantinne).72 Here the Tibetan text states that when the Buddha Ak~obhya used to pursue the course of training of a bodhisattva he never once experienced any bodily

. or mental fatigue while expounding or listening to the dharma, the reason being that, ever since the time he conceived his initial aspiration to awakening, he had realised the dharma-kaya. Further, when he was pursuing the course of training of a bodhisattva and listening to the dharma he thought "In the same way that I now love the dharma, so too may beings in my Buddha-field also be lovers of the dharma, and not those who do not love it! "73 At first blush

. this seems coherent, coherent enough for Dantinne to have trans

. lated it without comment-but is it? I think not; a closer inspection of the Chinese translations shows us why. Bodhiruci's Chinese translation (T.31O, No.6), produced in the period 706-713, reads (104c8-13):

"Sfuiputra, when in the past he was practising the course of practice of a bodhisattva, the Tathagata Arhat Samyaksambuddha Ak~obhya did not experience physical or mental tiredness when expounding the dharmas or listening to them. Why? Because when he first conceived the aspiration to cultivate the course of practice of a bodhisattva, he obtained the awesome power (weili, usually = anubhava) of the body of dharmas ({ashen). Sfuiputra, when in the past he was practising the course of practice of a bodhisattva, the Tathagata Arhat Sam yaksambuddha Ak~obhya made the following vow: 'Mayall the bodhisattvas and mahfisattvas in my


buddha-k$etra obtain the perfection of the body of dharmas, just lile .•. me! "'74 e.

In Lokak:~ema's version, however, the passage in question runs as follows (755a4'-8): ...

The Buddha said to Sariputra: "Long ago, when the Tathagata Arhat Samyaksambuddha Ak~obhya was practising the way of the bOdhisattva and listening to or expounding the dharrn,a, his body experienced no· fatigue, and his mind felt no fatigue either. Sariputra, long ago, when the Tathagata Ak~obhya was pUrsuing the way of the bodhisattva and listening to or expounding the dharma, [he said:] 'This is how [I] love the dharma. May the bodhisattvasand mahasattvas in my buddha-k$etra love the dharma like this!'"

At flrst sight we might be disposed to accept Bodhiruci's text: Ak~obhya possesses a "dharma-body" which is immune to fatigue, and he wishes that on other bodhisattvas. But how can bodhisattvas (especiaJly those at the beginning of their career) be said to "reaJise" the dharma-kaya before they become Buddhas? And why is there only one occurrence of the term in the Tibetan, as opposed to two in Bodhiruci's version? Lokak~ema's text, with no occurrences at all, offers the solution: in the transmission of the Indic, dharma-kama has been corrupted to dharma-kaya, quite possibly under the influence of Yogacara Trikaya speculations.75 The Tibetan translation, which stands closer to Lokak~ema's version than to Bodhiruci's,76 represents a haJf-corrupted text, since it still preserves one dharma-kama (chos 'dod pa). Originally the AkTV was making the unproblematical point that from the very fIrst Ak~obhya was indefatigable in teaching and hearing the dharma because he loved it so much, and so he vowed that the bodhisattvas of his Buddha-fIeld would be similarly endowed with this un wearying love for the dharma. The "because he loved it so much" appears to have been missing from the earliest version of the text, if we go by T.313. The Tibetan wording (chos kyi sku rab tu bsgoms par gyur pa'i phyir TO) suggests that a gloss containing the words dharma-kama-prabhiivita77 may have been subsequently incorporated into the text before being corrupted to dharma-kaya-

DHARMA-KAYA 67

rrabhavita.78 In an even later form of the text this corruption {ppears to have inf~cted the last sentenc~ of. the pas.s~ge as well, leading to the peculIar message of BodhrruCl'S rendltlon.79

..•... Let us now review our findings. We have seen that in the ~I1lall group of texts translated into Chinese by Lokak~ema in the latter haIf'of the 2nd century C. E. there is no evidence for any developed Mahayana notions of dha.rma-kaya, even though this :term was clearly familiar to him and does occur, albeit rarely, in several of his translations in the two grammatical forms and senses attested in Mainstream sources. That is to say, it is either (1) a bahuvrIhi adjective, meaning "having the dharma as body" or "embodied in the dharma" (twice in the LAn), or (2) a tatpuru$a

'substantive, with the sense "body of dharmas," dharmasin this case being understood as qualities, principles of existence, truths, or teachings (once in the AsPP, once in the PraS, possibly once in the . DKP). Furthermore, even when the term does appear more .frequently in later Chinese, Tibetan and Sanskrit versions of the scriptures in question, it still exhibits the same forms and meanings, as was demonstrated in particular for the Sanskrit text of the AsPP. An additional and unexpected discovery was that the Chinese term fa-shen, the standard equivalent for the substantive dharma-kaya,

,sometimes occurs in Lokak:~ema's translations at points where the '. Indic original is almost certain to have had dharma-dhatu. 80 This

suggests that he regarded the two terms (viz., dharma-dhatu and dharma-kiiya as a substantive) as interchangeable; for him both

· ... meant the totality of dharmas. 81 vVhile this is of course in keeping with the Mainstream interpretation, and therefore supports our thesis, two things remain puzzling. The first is that Lokak:~ema also used renditions of dharma-dhiitu which do approximate the standard Chinese equivalent. 82 Why then was he not consistent? The second enigma is his insistence on employing the Chinese word shen, given that this never means "collection." Unable to replicate the ambiguity of the Sanskrit in Chinese, Lokak:~ema was clearly faced with a difficult choice. That he opted for shen suggests that he regarded the primary meaning of the word kiiya as more important, as somehow worth preserving, and could indicate that even by his time there were Buddhists who were already starting

. i

,I


. to regard thedharma-kifya as a "body" of some kind, even if metaphorically. While these questions relating to """"",,'''-<Ul..;:'SCIJnll

stylistic preferences will only be clarified by the examination of his translations, they do not, I believe, our general thesis, which is that the use of the term Wl.aI£tJa-J.-;; •.

in this important body of early middle Mahayana siltras is ous with Mainstream interpretations.

IlL Dhanna-kaya in Other Mahayana Sources

There we might be content to let the matter rest, but attempting to fonnulate some general conclusions it might useful to look for corroborating evidence in Mahayana outside the Lokak~ema corpus, especially those often cited discussions of the Trikaya theory.83 Clearly there are limits t6' we can undertake here, but one obvious candidate for is the Vajracchedikif-prajiiif-piframitif-siltra (Vaj) and the known verses which run, according to Conze's:(1974: 57) -~.~v .. of the Sanskrit text (I have regularised the spelling):

ye maip. riipeIJa cadrifk$UI ye mfiIp. gho$eIJa canvayul;! I mithya-praMI;.a-prasrm na mfiIp. drak$yanti te janiil}. II

dhannato buddha dra$favya dhanna-kaya hi nayakiil). I dhannatff ca na vijneya na sa sakya vijaniturp. II

Once again, Conze's translations-for there are several in tence-are far from adequate. In one version (Conze 1973b: we find the second verse rendered:

From the Dharma should one see the BUddhas, From the Dharmabodies comes their guidance. Yet Dharma's true nature cannot be discerned, And no-one can be conscious of it as an object.

Here, too, we encounter errors in linguistic interpretation pounding philosophical incoherence. What on earth can it mean to say that the Buddhas are guided by the "Dharmabodies"?

DHARMA-KAYA 69

:bas, of course, mistaken the subject for the predicate and vice versa, j;rlthe belief that dharma-kaya is a substantive. What the text says is that the Guides or Leaders are dharma-kaya, i.e., this word is once ~,~gain functioning as an .adjective. Even for the (6th centur~?) Gilgit version, recently re-edited by Schopen (see Gomez & SIlk 1989:

.1'89-139), where the words hi nayakfil) in the relevant line are ~:;replaced by tathagatal; (i.e., singular), the same interpretation is in ;rtlY opinion the correct one. 84 However, Schopen, following ,;Conze's example, translates dharma-kaya as a noun ("The Tathagata '~lsthe body of Doctrine"), thus continuing a long tradition. The 0:~econd verse makes much better sense if we translate it properly: ""The Buddha is to be seen in terms of the dharma; the Tathagata i:has the dharma for a body. The nature of dharma(s), however, is >indiscernible [to the senses]; it is not possible to discern it."85 . . What this means is that in the Vaj there is no use of the term X/dharma-kaya in the nominal sense, although the term rupa-kaya ,::does occur, in a passage which may at first have directly preceded !tthe above, but become separated from it in the course of time (see 'Conze 1973b: sections 20a, 26a). This is possibly a further

': indication of the age of the Vaj, in that no Trikaya-related notion lof the dharma-kaya is found in it. 86 Both verses are apparently ...... drawn from a Mainstream text, although Mainstream parallels have

been found only for the first one.8? The second verse, of greater interest to us here, has so far proved elusive. One notes, however, the similarity of the wording in the Gilgit version (viz., dharmakifyas tathagatal;) with that of the passage from Chap. XXXI of the AsPPand the two verses from the LAn cited above, and the fact that the point being made by the Vajhere is precisely that which KP 125 is attempting to trump, as it were. That this second verse is missing from some recensions of the Vaj, such as the Central Asian MS88

and the earliest Chinese translation by Kumarajlva (T.235, dated 402 C. E.), indicates that it has been inserted later in the history of the text, possibly under the influence of a different Perfection of Wisdom or other Mahayana sutra.89 In one sense, however, the date of its insertion is beside the point: even with it, the Vaj never goes beyond the Mainstream position.


Another text occasionally cited in connection with Trika theory is the Samadhi-rifja-siitra (SR), , in particular the 22 rd chapter dealing explicitly with the bodies of the Buddha, which w:~ edited and translated by Regamey (1938b). As Regamey remark in his comments on the doctrinal standpoint of the text (pp. 23-2sl its buddhology is akin to that of the Perfection of Wisdom siitra~ in knowing only two bodies, the rupa-kfiya and the dharma-kaya.: Its notion of the rupa-kaya encompasses many features which are commonly assigned to the sarpbhoga-kaya (in this regard if resembles the LAn), but here we are more concerned with its description of the dharma-kaya. We find many statements with a familiar ring. For example, in Section 7 (Regamey 1938b: 81), we are told that the Tathiigata is not to be discerned on the basis of his physical body, because the Buddhas and Lords are distinguished or constituted by the dharma-kaya, not by the physical body (narupakiiyatas tathiigatal) prajiIiitavyal}. tat kasya hetol)? dharma-kiiyaprabhiivitiis ca buddhii bhagavanto na riipa-kiiya-prabhiivitifl)). This dharma-kiiya is then described in fairly abstract terms in the '. prose (Sections 9-12) and verses (Sections 13-37) which follow. Although Regamey translates it consistently as "Absolute Body," there is no reason why we should not render it as "body of dharmas," except for Section 34, where the words dharma-kayo mahiiviro ought to be rendered "The great hero has the dharma for a body" (i.e., dharma-kaya is a bahuvrihl).

What then of the Sad-dhanna-pw:ujaiika-siitra (SP), which is said by Nagao (1991: 104) to be one of the Mahayana satras in which the two-body theory "became stabilized"?90 In fact, there is only one occurrence of the term dhanna-kaya in the entire Sanskrit text, in v. 82 near the end of Chap. 5 (Vaidya's edition, p. 96), which clearly has the sense of "body of dharmas," "totality of dharmas," "all dharmas."91 The context places this beyond any doubt. Therefore, while it is certainly true that the SP teaches a developed Mahayana buddhology, it does not explicitly invoke the concept of dharma-kaya to support it.92

Let us turn finally to the Lailkiivatiira-satra (LA), where we . might reasonably expect to find traces ofY ogacara doctrines, given the well-known affinity of this text with that school. As Suzuki

DHARMA-KAYA 71

'oints out (1930: 316ff.), there are adumbrations of the Trikaya ~octrine, but ~tho~g~ "the idea .of Dharmakaya is not want~ng in 'the LifIikavatara ... It IS used not III the sense of the Dhannakaya of the Triple Body dogma." And yet Suzuki's own interpretation of ihere1evant passages is heavily influenced by Trikaya notions, or ~erhaps by C~stian theology, and therefore the text needs to be ~ie~interpreted ill a number of places. ',: For example, at LA 30.7-8,93 the words tathagato dharmakaya-vasavarti bhavi$yati dharma-nairatmya-darsanat mean "he WI become a Tathagata who has mastery over the body/collection! :totality of dharmas through seeing the absence of self in dharrnas.'>94 Here dharma-kaya probably has the same sense it carries (iI1the SPpassage cited above. Suzuki's translation ("endowed with ,the perfect freedom of the Dhannakaya") is ambiguous, but could ,easily give one the impression that dharma-kaya possesses the ; quality of "perfect freedom," rather than being merely the object of !vasavartin. The same problem arises at LA 55.11-12, which reads: ,punar api 1okottarifnasrava-dhatu-paryapannifn sarpbharan paripilrya .; acintya-dharma-kaya-vasavartittirp pratilapsyante. One could trans-late this roughly as "Further, having acquired all the requisites

. pertaining to the supramundane and incorruptible realm, they will

.>obtain mastery over the body of inconceivable dharmas." Unac-countably, Suzuki (1932: 116) speaks of "the attainment of the

. Dharmakaya which is of sovereign power and beyond concep·.tion,'>95 but here acintya, which usually means "inconceivable in . number or extent," is just as likely to qualify dharma as it is kaya,

and dharma-kaya must again be the object of vas8vartita, as in the preceding citation.96 Other passages where dharma-kaya is best understood as the totality of dharmas are LA 10.11-12 (Chap. II, v. 4);97 LA 20.12, where Mahamati invites the Buddha to expound the dharma-kaya-surely the collection of dharmas understood as teachings-praised (anugita) by the Tathagatas;98 LA 23.16, where . as a result of the teachings of the Tathagatas the bodhisattvas are said to obtain the dharma-kaya;99 and LA 94.19, where the dharmakaya of the TathiIgatas is said to be as indestructible as the sands of the Ganges. 100 While these passages could at a pinch be interpreted in terms of some kind of "cosmic body," "body of


dharmafl' is a perfectly adequate rendition in all cases, and a bett . ~ one In most. .

There are, however, a number of passages where buddhology seems to be the issue. At LA 58.11-14, for example, the bodily identity (kaya-samata; of all Tathagatas is explained in terms of the sameness of both the dharma-kaya and the rfipa-lak$aJ}.iinuVYaiijana_ kaya, except when Tathagatas assume different fOnTIS to convert beings.101 This passage is a definite echo of LAn v. 79 (see above) even though dharma-kaya is a substantive here; we noted the sarn~ idea in the DKP, the Upaya-kau§a1ya-siitra and the Kosa. 1f12 As Suzuki points out (1930: 318), this passage certainly implies all three bodies, but dharma-kaya here may still be interpreted along the lines already established. A more puzzling passage OCcurs at LA· 78.6-8:

kiIp tu mahiimate manomaya-dharma-kayasya tathagatasyaitad adhivacanmp yatra sarva-tirthakara-Sravaka-pratyekabuddha-sapta-bhiimi_ prati$thitanfIIp ca bodhisattvaniim avi$ayal}. I so 'nutpadas tathagatasya [jJ etan mahiimate paryaya-vacanam.

Although the faulty punctuation is easily remedied, the compound manomaya-dharma-kayasya is potentially troublesome, given that there is such a thing as the manomaya-kaya. However, if we take it as a bahuvrihi adjective qualifying tathagatasya, the passage yields the following sense:

"However, Mahamati, there is a designation for the Tathagata, insofar as he is embodied in the dharma which is mind-made [or better: in the dharmas which are mind-made], which is beyond the reach of any sectarians, sravakas, pratyekabuddhas or bodhisattvas on the [first] seven stages. It is 'non-production.' This, Mahamati, is a synonym for the Tathagata." 103

That is to say, the term manomaya-dharrna-kaya is probably to be explained as an allusion to the celebrated opening verses of the Dhammapada, which say that all dharmas are, among other things, manomaya or "mind-made."l04 Thus the designation anutpada,· "non-production," applies to the Tathagata insofar as he is embod-

DHARMA-KAYA 73

in or identified with the dharma or dharmas, which are amaya and therefore essentially "unproduced." Non-movet also follows from this, as we saw in the AsPP. Of course, the dha's physical body is a different matter, since it is corruptible; produced and destroyed, which is exactly the message of LAn

;37 (see above).1OS Finally, we encounter the bahuvnhiadjective \ain at LA 104.2-3, in the section prohibiting meat-eating, where find the words dharma-kif yif hi mahamate tathifgatif dharmifhifra-itaya, i.e., "for the Tathifgatas have the dharma as their body, ; y are dependent on the dharma for their food. "106 The phrase arma-kifyifs tathifgatifl) is by now an old friend; the adjective arinifhifra-sthio107 is reminiscent of another of the Agama pas

'ges studied by Anesaki, EkottarifgamaXV (T.125, 623b7): rulai.; en-zhe yi fa wei shi, "the Tathifgata's body has the dharma as its

"lOS

We must conclude, then, that although the LA may well ontain many allusions and references to the Y ogacara Trikaya 'eory, its use of the term dharma-kifya itself does not differ in any 'ignificant way from the other siitras we have studied, a fact of

~;which Suzuki himself was aware. Despite this, he was frequently !!seduced by a somewhat theistic interpretation of the Trikaya ~~doctrine into misconstruing the relevant passages, so that his ~readers were left thinking that the LA did in fact teach such a thing ffi~s.the "Dharmakaya which is of sovereign power and beyond If'c()nception."109 ' ;~:,:.!."

t)v. General Conclusions

lIn the context of this paper I cannot survey the full range of dharmat~'kifya references in the scriptural and scholastic literature of the ~;Jvlahayana, but I hope that I have covered enough major works to d~demonstrate that a case can be made for a different reading of the ;j"concept. At least as far as the early and middle Mahayana are ;;:'concerned, there is little in the texts I have studied to suggest a t;;ideparture from Mainstream interpretations. I see this paper, thereif; fore, as yet another attempt at what I might call the ·abolition of t~ imaginary discontinuities in Buddhist history. In this case what is :~

~~t::

74 JIABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

:;11

. done away with is the prevailing notion that the dharma-kifyac:~~ some kind of Buddhist "Godhead" or "CQsmic Body" invented~~ the followers of the Mahayana in the philosophical exuberance~ their headlong. rush towards theism. Pioneers in the field ~: Suzuki and Conze can be excused for falling under the spell of thll idea, but, as we have seen, even recent writers on the subject of th~ Trikaya have continued to ignore such basics as Edgenon'i observations concerning the use of dharma-kaya as an adjectiveI£ early and middle Mahayana siitras, and have therefore obscured more than one important moment in the development of the" concept. Too ready to assimilate all occurrences of the term to~: particular understanding of the nominal dharma-kaya of th&' developed Trikaya theory, they have misconstrued many key", passages, thereby collapsing what may have been centuries of gradual doctrinal development, into a single incoherent theoretical' position. Further, this incoherency has become enshrined in the: standard English translations of key Mahayana siitras, to the extent' that it now goes unchallenged by some of the leading lights of Buddhist studies. Nor is it merely that the adjective, even wheIi~ recognized as such, has been misinterpreted as the noun; the noun: has also been misinterpreted. Where dharma-kaya does appear as' a substantive, to continue to translate it as "Dharma-body" or; "Body of Dharma" may not seem a serious error, but when that tenD appears in conjunction with the other "bodies" of the Buddha, the . '

temptation is to impute some kind of unitary ontological status to it, and to engage in theological flights of fancy which are unsupported by the texts. Thus metaphor gives way to metaphysics. That. kaya means both "body" in the ordinary sense and "body" in the sense of collection obviously provided Buddhists of both Mainstream and Mahayana persuasions with an ambiguity which they found exceedingly useful and suggestive, but one presumes they were always in a position to construe the term dharma-kaya in a way which did not involve hypostatisation of a non-existent entity, however abstract, even when it occurred alongside other kaya tenns which did relate to the material world. Reification of the nonexistent is a cardinal sin as far as Buddhists are concerned. We Buddhist scholars should avoid it too. Since the English expression "the body

DHARMA-KAYA 75

'r·;'. dh. armag' does not carry the same potential ontological freight 0·, ~;~"the Body of Dharma" or "theDhanna-body," we could do [fbrse th~ u.se it from n~w on, assuming, of course, that we are '~aIing With the substantIve.

I~~t All this raises the question: is the" Dharma-body" understood :as'an actual body of the Buddha purely a figment of the modem B'uddhological imagination, or does it go back to the Yogacaras or rbine other followers of the Mahayana at a later point in its history? the' study of the texts translated by Lokak~ema demonstrates that Ihactual "Buddha-body" called the dharma-kaya is not attested in rth~ earlier versions, but we have also seen that even in their later f61:mS many siitras did not move very far (if at all) beyond a position K*hich was also acceptable to at least some of the Mainstream f~(;hools, and were a long way from postulating the "cosmic body" i~t"absolute principle" which we have come almost automatically Ib identify with the dharma-kaya. For we must remember in this k6nnection that the Tibetan and Sanskrit versions of the texts ~~~ferred to in this study date for the mostpart from a relatively late fp~riod; if they show no trace of this idea, it can hardly have been ji'¢ommon coin. Would it then be appropriate to suggest that the !~tandard notion of dharma-kaya as a unitary cosmic principle was, ~ln Indian Buddhism at least, exclusively a matter of Y ogacara ~~9holastics, and not one of the staple Mahayana doctrines as is i:commonly supposed? At this point I arrive at the limits of my own ~competence, but in the light of my findings with respect to the LA, fja. text rich in Cittamatra elements, I am tempted to ask if even the ~Yogacara discussions of the subject, as well as those writings RiDfluenced by them, may also need to be reconsidered. I hope ~therefore that others might be prompted by this paper to re-evaluate :ldharma-kaya passages in the later siitra and sastra literature, in t;order to see if less "reifying" interpretations make better sense of !1them, or are at least possible. 110

g;, Although my conclusions may well have wider application, jJthey relate in the first instance to the Mainstream and early and i:Driddle Mahayana understanding of dharma-kaya. Let us be clear rabout the central issue here, since that may well have become

~'ji;).i:.·obscured by the sheer mass of textual detail which this paper has

I~


thrown up. As far as the Buddhists who wrote the texts we/~~ concerned, what was important was the identification of lli~ Buddha with the dharma or dharmas, of the Teacher with the trut~i which he taught or the principles which he realised, considered~ either. in the abstract, or c.oncretely e~bodied in scripture. A simple! equatIon p~rhaps, but ':Ith ~ar-re~chIng consequen~es, especiany~ for BuddhIs~ cult-practIce, In WhICh the. cult of r~hcs eventUalhi} coalesced WIth the cult of the book. In lIght of thIS we ourselveS"' should always opt for an interpretation which emphasises th€;i dharma of dharma-kiIya, rather than the kiIya, that is, the dha.rma'~ or dharmas by which Buddhahood is truly constituted and in whiCiiij it finds its expression, and not some ill-defined transcendental! "body. "1l1;,,~

I trust that this paper has in passing illustrated some of th.e~ benefits to be derived from a close study of the early Chinesd'l translations.112 Undoubtedly it illustrates the complexity of such an~ undertaking, since even the attempt to run a single technical tenri~ to ground has led us a merry chase, through and around scores otl textual and philosophical difficulties, deep into the four-dimen~~f sional labyrinth of Mahayana sutTa-literature. We have seen,.f~ hope, that careful linguistic analysis is our equivalent of Ariadne'sJ thread, enabling us to keep our bearings as we move slowly-if noti\ always surely!-towards the clarification of the issues central tc5~ our concern. It is not enough to count the occurrences of this or tha(;i,: term in this or that translation: each and every occurrence has to be:; weighed in the balance, considered in its context. Of course, it isJ stating the obvious to say that the study of Buddhist ideas should'~ always proceed like this, carefully and on the basis of sound; philology, but let us not be too quick to pass judgement on those ., •. who in preceding us have lost their way. At this point the labyrinth;, harboured something particularly deceptive, in a way which is not] unusual. It is common knowledge that Buddhist texts, scriptures' and treatises alike, often use puns, double meanings, plays on words and fanciful etymologies to get their message across, and that this poses exceptional difficulties for translators and commen~ tators. The beast in this instance not only had the power to appear

DHARMA-KAYA 77

ill tWO grammatical fOIms, but those fOTITIS were also cloaked in lnultiple ambiguities. Even when cornered, it continued to resist its interpreters. In the ensuing struggle the ambiguities and the twin forIllS perished. 'tV orse still, from their ma.'1g1ed remains arose a ghosdy entity which continues to haunt us, insubstantial but yet substantivised (and provided with imposing capitals to boot), the COSnllC or absolute Dharma-Body of the Buddha-a "body" which is more of a phantom than any of the apparitions ever conjured up by the Tathiigatas out of compassion for suffering sentient beings. 113

··NOTES

1. A preliminary version of this paper was presented at Berkeley and at the 10th ... Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies in Paris in July, 1991. I wish :Iothank all those friends and colleagues who either heard or read this first draft and made helpful comments on it, in particular Rolf Giebel, Richard Gombrich, Kevin Lee, Jan Nattier, David Seyfort Ruegg, Lambert Schmithausen, Gregory Schopen and Jonathan

. Silk. 2. See, e.g., Murti 1955: 284-287. 3. See, e.g., Reynolds and Hallisey 1987: 330-331.

4. See, e.g., Murti 1955: 285: 'The Dharmakaya is still a Person, and innumerable merits and powers etc. are ascribed to him."

5. See Suzuki 1930: 308-338. Suzuki's discussion of the whole subject has a distinctly "theological" flavour (see especially pp. 308, 310), to which we shall return

later. 6. For example, sometimes the dharma-kaya is also referred to as the sviibhiivika

kiiya or "essential body," sometimes this latter is said to constitute a fourth body. The dispute over this issue is the focus of the article by John Makransky (1989).

7. This article was reprinted with inconsequential changes in Nagao 1991: 103-122. All citations are from this later version.

8. Presumably Nagao means Mainstream Buddhist scriptures here. "Mainstream Buddhism" is the tenn I employ to refer to non-Mahayana Buddhism, in preference to

the other terms in current use, none of which is totally satisfactory. "Theravada" is patently inaccurate and anachronistic, "Hlnayana" is pejorative and potentially offensive, "Sravakayana" is more subtly pejorative, and also makes it hard to place the Pratyekabuddhayana (whatever that was), while "Nikaya" or "Sectarian Buddhism," although neutral, are historically misleading, given the fact that the Mahayana was a pan-Buddhist movement running across Nikaya or Vinaya school/ordination lineage boundaries. This

means that monks and nuns converted to the Mahayana continued to belong also to the Nikayain which they had been ordained, to uphold its Vinaya, and so on. However, they


~!~I 'remained in the minority, at least in India. The term "Mainstream" reflects this Situati~

9. See above, n. 8. , .. :,d~ 10. Other valuable recent contributions are by Kajiyama (1984/1989)~':~~

Williams (1989: 167-184). The lengthy discussion by Dutt (1977: 141-117) canno~~ recommended. For art excellent survey of earlier scholarly work on this question alUi'~:'f""

. 0 the Buddhist sourcesthernselves, see de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 762-813.;;it~~

11. See Lancaster 1968: 92; see also de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 764.#~ 12. For a short survey of these texts see Harrison 1987 and forthcoming.{~~~ 13. Although a detailed treatment can be found only in Lancaster's unpublish~

doctoral dissertation (1968), indications of some of his findings appear in Lancaster 1971'1 & 1975··t;;f~

14. A sixth passage containing the term dharma-sarlra (in Chap. ill; see Vaidif~ 1960: 29 and Conze 1975: 105-106) was also studied in Lancaster's dissertation, butw~; not considered in his published work. Although it seems to have nothing to dO willi: Trikaya theory, it is in certain respects relevant to our subject, as we shall see. r~£

. 15. References to the Sanskrit are to Vaidya's text, on account of its gene;J~ availability. i~)~~~~

16. A similar rendering of dharma-kiiya as a noun is also found in Kajiyama:;~~ Japanese translation of the AsPP (Kajiyama 1974: L 128). "i~~

17. Makransky's rendering (p. 66) agrees substantially with Conze's, as does tli~l ofDutt (1977: 175).:;~~

18. The same point was made by S. Bagchi in the "Glossary and Critical Notd~;l appended to V aidya' s edition of the AsPP (p. 57 6)..~;;c

19. Bahuvrihls are exocentric possessive compounds. Although their fuill'l member is a substantive, they function primarily as adjectives, qualifying othel;

substantives. A bahuvrihl of the form "XY" may be often be translated as "having ay:1 which is X." Analogues in English are expressions like "two-car family" and "Wide-body';

~" ~

20. The four terms mean "having the dhamma for a body," "having brahman f~;~~ a body," "become dhamma," "become brahman." Cf. T. W. & C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1921:'; N, 81; de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 765; Lamotte 1958: 689; and Takasaki 1987: 64. The translation by de La Vallee Poussin (accepted by Lamotte) seems to me the most accurare:'; "les .Bouddhas ont pour corps Ie Dharma, Ie Brahman, sont Ie Dharma, sont Ie Brahman". (see also Lamotte 1988: 622). Similarly, the listing fot dhamma-kiiya in this passage iii the Pali Tipitaka Concordance, S.V., is: "having dh. as body." However, the translatioii:. by Demieville (1930: 176) misleadingly renders dhamma-kiiya and brahma-kiiya as su~:; stantives, as does the recent translation by Walshe (1987: 409). Reynolds (1977: 379)' follows the same tendency, and even Mus, in his lengthy ruminations on this passage; (1978: 624-625,712-717), constantly substantivises the term. These writers, one assumes, \\ have been unduly influenced by Trikaya formulations. The worst offender is Mus, wh();'?, largely on the basis of this passage, discerns in the PaIi canon ''une doctrine esoteriquO du dhanunakaya: Ie Corps du Buddha est fait de la substance transcendante du dharm~;;:

DHARMA-KAYA 79

. les Saints ant part a cette substance" (1978: 761) . .. ~~ .. ' 21. TIrroughout this study I refrain from capitalising the Sanskrit word dharma

i~iiIi: dhamma): since doing so restric~ its possibl~ range of me~ngs. ~ ~anskrit, which .611s no capitals ill any case, the word IS often ambIguous, and this amblgUlty ought to be

Preserved in English. ':,.:' 22. I take dhamma-kaya to be that kind of bahuvnm composed of two nouns and ~rmed "appositional possessive" by Whitney (1962: 506), where the form "XY" may be

!ttanslated "having a Y which is X" or "having X for Y."I can think of no exact analogue 'kEnglish, but an ersatz example like "snake-hair(ed) woman" as a description of Medusa 'illustrates how such compounds work; i.e., they can be literal as well as metaphorical in

:meaning. :;;. 23. There is no equivalent of dhamma-kaya in the Chinese translations of the :. ~~rresponding text in the DJrghagama; see Demieville 1930: 176. The pair dhamma

bhiita, brahma-bhiita also occurs at M iii 195. .. 24. See also ltivuttaka 91 and Milinda-paiiha71 (translated in T.W. Rhys Davids

:'1890: 110; Horner 1965: 96-97; see also below) for similar statements. :~\-', 25. See, e.g., the Mahaparinibbana Sutta (D ii 154). Cf. S i 71, where Gautama :'observes that although the body succumbs to aging, the dhamma of the good does not '(satarp ca dhammo na jararp upeo). ;.'. 26. See, e.g., the equation of the two terms by Dharnmapala, cited in Mus 1978:

;';707. i.

". 27. I shall return to the remainder of this passage below. Let us note in passing, <however, the crucial ambiguities embedded in this passage. Just as the word sarlra refers ~;.both to the living body and to the physical remains or relics of that body in which its life;;force is believed to inhere, so too does "dharma" here refer to the law or truth in itself .(and to the physical objects in which it is concretised, i.e., the written copies of the (scriptures. Much depends on this equation of the text with the truth (and thus the power) '~hich it conveys.

28. Note that the correct interpretation of these three passages in the AsPP is also given by Dantinne (1983: 175), who, however, still cites them as evidence for a

. conception of the dharma-kaya.

29. I adopt the translation "body of dharma(s)" to avoid prejudicing the issue, for reasons which will become clear shortly.

30. The original work appeared in 1901; I have used the 1982 reprint of the revised version which appeared in the Collected Works in 1956.

31. The complete translation of the Sarpyuktagama (T.99) was done by GUl).abhadra 435-443 C. E.

32. The translation (T.125) was made by Gautama Sanghadeva during the Eastern . Jin Period (317-420). For recent studies on the school affiliation of the Agama literature see Bechert 1985.

33. See T.99, XXIII, 168b16. Cf. Anesaki 1982: 155, especially his citation of the


, parallel passage m Divyavadiina XXVII (pp. 396-397), the first two lines of which .~ yat tacchari'nup vadatiiIp. varasya dhannatmano dhanna;maYaJ1l visuddham (also qU~: in de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 766). A further reference in T.99, XXIV, 171cI4-16,a;; the mingjuwei-shen, the "body of words, phrases and syllables," is relevant to our sub . '(if:, too: "The teachings <if the Tathagata are immeasurable-and limitless; the body of wo~~~ phrases and syllables is also immeasurable and endless." This reflects the Sanskrit te~~ nama-, vyaiijana-, and pada-kaya (cf. BHSD, s.v. kaya); the peculiar use of the chara~fui' wei (literally, "flavour") to translate vyaiijana presumably relates to its other meaning 'cif "sauce" or "con~ent." For the sense of kaya her~, s.ee be~ow. __ ;;~

34. I am mdebted to Gregory Schopen for brmgmg this reference to my attentiori~ The school affiliation of the text is undetermined. ~,/~!'j~

35. I refer here to such statements as 'The dhanna taught by the Lord is the b~d~~ of the Lord" (p. 157: ya e~a dhanno Bhagavata de1it;¢ etadBhagavat;¢ sarirarp.) and '''I'hii'~ dh ann a is the body of the Lord" (p. 160: dhanna eva [or dhannaS cal Bhagavatli{J sarlrarIJj:f together with the frequent use of the noun compound dhanna-sarira (at one point...::p:" 157-described as Bhagavat;¢ sarlram piiramiirthikam, cf. the AsPP passage cired~ above). Bahuvnhis also crop up in the expressions dhanna-sarlras tathagata (p. 158) ana' dhannakayalJ, tathagatiilJ. (pp. 158-159), which have the same meaning we saw abov~~~ 'The Tathagata(s) is/are dhanna-bodied." It is to be noted that dhanna-kiiya as~~ substantive does not make an appearance. Further, athough there are many quotations6ri

Mainstream scriptures, almost all of the above-cited material appears in the commen~'! appended to them by the author. By my reckoning there is one citation from the Bodbi~1i mula-sutra which contains the phrase dhannaS ca Bhagavat;¢ sarli-am. A parallel textlr; found in the Vinaya of the MUlasarvastivadins; see Levi 1932: 160, n. 2 and T .1451, 224~~ 225c. .-.,~~

36. On the ambiguity of the word Sarlra (living body, dead body, physicalrernaini~t relic) see above, n. 27. ·Z~

37. See above, n. 33. 'f 38. See Trenckner's edition (1986: 73): dhamma-kayenapanakhomahiiriijasakIJ:

bhagava nidasseturp, dhammo hi mahiiriija bhagavata desito. On this passage, see alSo;' Mus 1978: 708-709; and Horner's own comments (1965: xl-xli).~i'

39. Trenckner 1986: 71: yo dhammmp passati so bhagavan tarp passati, dhammo

hi .. . bhagavata desito. -

40. Contra Edgerton (BHSD, s.v. dhanna-kaya); in his discussion of the parallel., to this Vinaya passage in the Divyavadiina. Note that this parallel has the words;; upadhyayiinubhavena, whereas according to Dutt the Gilgit MS omits the worf; anubhavena.

41. For further evidence for a Theravadin understanding of the dhamma-kaya 3l!. "body of the teachings," see Reynolds 1977: 376-377.:~

42. See de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 766-768, Makransky 1989: 51-52, arul~_ Williams 1989: 170-171 for a ~iscussion of this Sarvastivadin usage. .}!

43. Note that this Sarvastivadin list does not tally with Mahayana enurneratio~'0 of the 18 exclusive Buddha-dhannas. See Traite, III, pp. 1625-1703, and, for one;;

',;j,

DHARMA-KAYA 81

Mahayana example, Harriso~ 1990: 169-171. _ . . :/.. 44. Cf. the understandmg of the dbarma-kaya as consIStIng of the ten powers, four

tsuraI1ces, four special types of knowledge (pratisaI!lvid), the 18 exclusive qualities (here

:> separate category), and other qualities, as attested by the Dazhidu-lun attributed to

~agarjuna (f. 1509, 274a); see Traite, IV, pp. 1913-1914, and de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 783-784. This notion is also echoed in Candraklrti's Tri-sara:pa-saptati, PP: 10-11 (see

s~rensen 1986: 20-21; I am indebted to Peter Skilling for this reference). 45. See Reynolds 1977: 380. 46. On the various meanings of the wordkifya, see Makransky 1989: 63, n. 2, and

'BHSD, s.v. 47. See T.151O, 584b. Cf. also Ratna-gotra-vibhifga, v. I.145, which distinguishes

'!wo aspects of dharma-kifya, one being the utterly pure dharma-dhiftu and the other being

;:its "outflow" (ni~yanda), the teaching; or, in other words, dharma as realisation (adhigama-dharma) and dharma as teaching (de.sanif-dharma); see Takasaki 1966a: 182,

284-285; Ruegg 1969: 275. . 48. The alternative is to construe dharma-kifya as a karmadhifraya with the first

5~nn being a noun used appositionally or in an adjectival sense, but this is totally unsuited

.~ the Sarvastivadin scholastic context. In effect I am proposing a single interpretation

'; which will fit all contexts, viz., as a tatpuru~a, the case relationship being genitive plural,

as in the compounds deva-senif or milrkha-satifni (cf. Whitney 1962: 489-490). Of course, tll~ compound dharma-sarlrn cannot be understood like this; it is a karmadhifraya, with

.. an appositional relationship between the two terms (i.e. "the body/relic which consists in

: the dharrna(s)"), and is thus different in meaning. This is presumably why, when the

. author of the KarmavibhaiJ.gopade.sa wants to talk about this type of "body" or "relic," ;he uses only dharma-sarlrn, and avoids the substantive dbarma-kifya, even though he is

quite prepared to use both terms interchangeably as bahuvnhis.

.. 49. I assume that the scriptural quotation ends at this point, as is indicated by the

. Tibetan version. I have consulted only the Derge edition, Sherphyin Brgyad stong section,

Volume Ka; see folio 53bl-2.

50. On the various ways of interpreting prabhifvita, see Conze 1974: 98-99; Conze

1973a: 284; BHSD, s.v. dharma-kifya; and especially the lucid discussion by Schmithausen

(1969: 109-111). The word's nuances include "produced," "maillfested," "recognised,"

"characterised," and "distinguished"; Schmithausen proposes the rendering "cotlStituted

: by" (konsti tuiert dUTCh) in order to cover most of these senses. See also Ruegg 1969: 347-

; 351 and Takasaki 1966a: 290, 314, & 355 for further examples of the use of prabhifvita.

51. Cf. Conze's translation (p. 118), which is in error in various respects, as has

; been pointed out by de Jong (1979: 375). This is possibly an echo of the Saf!Jyuktifgama

>paSsage concerning Ananda quoted above.

52. See, e.g., Lancaster 1968: 93-94, 1975: 36, and Kajiyama 1984: 14.

53. Cf. Kajiyama 1974: II, 286. The Tibetan text (Derge Ka 249b3) suggests that

pramif1)iiqtya is to be taken as a gerundive.

54. It is worth noting that not one of the dharma-kifya Citations in question is

represented in the text of the Ratna-gl11J.a-saf!Jcaya-gifthif, the so-called verse summary of


, the AsPP; see Yuyama 1976.

55. For an introduction to this text, see HarrisoI). 1982. A full study of the in its two extant versions is in preparation.

56. The verb sprul pa (= Skt. nir-ma-) is, however, found twice, once in v. 54 ,.

Ius sprul pa mdzad pa. m), and once in v. 89 (sku Ius dag ni sprul mdzad pa). In the case ninniii;la-kaya could underlie the Tibetan. .

57. I take David Seyfort Ruegg's point (personal communication, July, 1991 one cannot be absolutely sure that the Tibetans have construed bahuvnhis here. classical Tibetan lacks the grammatical resources to make a clear distinction bahuvrihi and a tatpurug unless it separates the two terms of the compound, appears to be reluctant to do. If the two terms are kept together there is no way the difference, since even locutions like chos (kyi) sku can or chos (kyi) sku pa might render an expression containing dharma-kaya as a noun, such as U"''''lIla-JIG/V

sllI!lpanna (unattested in Sanskrit as far as I am aware). Hence, while bahuvrihis indicated by the use of particles like can (cf. Ruegg 1969: 510), they may also be

simply by the predicate position, and perhaps by the refusal to translate the plural.

can be seen in the Tibetan text for the dharma-kayapassages of the AsPPul~"u,;~",,~ al)O those in which the Sanskrit clearly has a bahuvrihi (the Tibetan is taken from the

edition, Sher phyin Brgyad stong section, Volume Ka). In Chap. IV, Skt. Ufllll1l1a-lC,fv

buddha bhagavantal;! = Tib. sangs rgyas bcom Idan ' das mams ni chos kyi sku yin in Chap. XVII, Skt. dharma-kiiyii buddha bhagavanta = Tib. sangs rgyas bcom mams chos kyi sku '0 (187a6), and in Chap. XXXI, Skt. dharma-kiiyiis tathagatalJ. = '

de bzhin gshegs pa ni chos kyi sku'o (277b2).

58. Variant reading in the Tshal pa Kanjurs: rab Idan pas for Idan pas na. 59. Lok~ema uses a number of words to translate Skt. dharma; see

1990: 241. In order to reflect what I take to be his attempt to convey the the term, I adopt the strict rule of rendering his jing as "scripture," fa as "dharma." .

60. To say that the Buddhas are the same insofar as they are embodied in dharma, which is always the same, is somewhat different from saying that they are

same because they all possess the same dharma-kiiya, or body of pure qualities, etc.,

there is defmitely a connection between the two. The dharma as a whole is the same,

ensemble of dharmas which constitute it is the same. The second idea appears in

Abhidharma-kosa-bha$ya, Chap. VII, v. 34 (Pradhan 1975: 415):

sllI!lbhiira-dharma-kayiibhyiiIp. jagatas ciirtba-caryayii I samatii sarva-buddhiiniiIp. nayur-jati-pramiii;latal;! II

See also the translation of this verse and the following discussion in de La Vallee

1971: V, 79ff., and the English translation by Pruden (1990: IV, 1145ff.). Cf. also

1978: 627-628. 61. Here I cannot resist underlining the fact that, even though the early

translations are often dismissed as too crude and imprecise to be of much use to

this case Lok~ema has handled a crucial phrase with far greater precision and than' many of his twentieth-century counterparts have contrived to do, with all ,

resources at their disposal.

DHARMA-KAYA 83

62. Cf. TSD, where the equivalent mag gi lus is given for puli-kiiya. 63. See Harrison 1990: 22, n. 42 for the Chinese versions. In the light of the present

"'·cle this passage in the PraS oUght to be retranslated, with "Body of Dharma" replaced aru. " r"body of dharmas. ,} 64. Cf. de La Vallee Poussin 1929: 708: "Plusieurs textes ... disent que ce corps

;~stconunun a tous les Tathagatas, penetre taus les Dhannas, est semblable 11 l' espace, sans

;inarques (animitta), sans causes (as<lrpsJerta); qu'il n'estpas Rupa au Citta." Cf. also Mus

1978: 686. ;:, 65. See KP, Section 125. Cf. Tib.: de de bzhin gshegs pa 1a chos nyid du yang mi

tta na I gzugs kyi skur ita ci smos. e 66. A critical edition of the Tibetan translation of this text is in progress. The

:~!Japter and section divisions cited refer to this edition, to be published by the International

'Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo, in 1992. (. 67. T.625 also indicates that the original had sattva-dhiitu rather than the niina-~dhiitu suggested by the Tibetan. /)' 's:} 68. The tenn fa-shen occurs again in Lok~1{$ema's version df 2M (350c16), at a

iPo'int where Tib. has only chos. Although his version of the latter half of the passage is

i.rather obscure, neither Tib. nor T.625 suggests dhanna-kiiya here. 69. Note that the Song, Yuan and Ming editions read jingfa (i.e., scripture

:~dh3rmas) for fa-shen. This may well represent the original wording of Lokak~ema' s text.

.; 70. T.313 is here accepted as a translation by Lok~ema: or members of his

~chool, which may subsequently have been partia:Ily revised, with the result that it now

.:possesses various stylistic features which are not characteristic ofLokak~ema. Given that

"the same thing has happened to a number of Lok~erna's works (most notably the

tBanzhou sanmei jing), I now see no reason to reject the traditional attribution entirely.

'Cf. Harrison 1990: 275, n. 43.

71. However, the WWP, a suira for which only the version ascribed to Lokak~ema

extant, does contain some interesting episodes where several bra:hmans who were

i previously unaware of the superiority of the Buddhist path report the decisive experience

•• of seeing the Buddha with a body endowed with the 32 marks and the minor characteris tics

; (see, e.g., 438a26 et seq.). This suggests that the vision of what we now think of as the

iS3Ip.bhoga-kiiya was not restricted to advanced bodhisattvas, at least as far as some ',JBuddhists were concerned.

72. See Dantinne 1983: 120.

73. The Tib. text (Derge ed., Dkon brtsegs Kha 18b7-19a2) reads:

shil Fa dwa ii'j bu yang beom 1dan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra bcom pa yang dag par •. [dzogs pa 'j sangs rgyas mi 'khrugs pa de sngon byang chub sems dpa'i spyad pa spyod ~!pa na chos stan pa 'am chos nyan pa 'i tshe 11an dga' [read 'ga 1 yang de'i 1us ngal ba h'am sems ngal bar gyur pa med de I de ci'j phyir zhe na I sha Fa dwa Ii'i bu 'di 1tar de \ bzhin gshegs pa des dang po sems bskyed pa nas bzung ste Ibyang chub sems dpa 'i spyad ('

i, pa spyod pa na chos kyi sku rab tu bsgoms par gyur pa 'i phyir TO II sha ra dwa Ii'i bu yang <>bcom 1dan 'das de bzhin gshegs pa dgra beam pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i sangs rgyas ii.rm 'khrugs pa desngon byangchub sems dpa'i spyad pa spyod cing chos nyanpa na 'di


. snyam du sems te ji ltar bdag da ltar chos 'dod pa de bzhin du bdag bla na med pa '.

dag par rdzogs pa 'j byang chub mngon par rdzogs par fangs rgyas pa 'i sangs rgya~~~; zhing de na sems can mams kyang chos nll 'dod par nll 'gyur zhing chos 'dod par Yl.

gYUr . cig snyam mo 1/ .

74. This passage is part of a long section of the text (one of many) omitted in the translation of T.3lO, No.6 by Garma C. C. Chang et aI. (Chang 1983: 320).

75. For proof that this corruption is possible, see BHSD, s.v. Dharmakama, and" Regamey 1938b: 58, n. 11.' . ' .•

76. Cf. Dantinne 1983: 3-4, 38-39. Dantinne postulates two separate recensions of the text, one represented by T.313 and the Tib., the other by T.310.

77. Prabhiivitameaning "distinguished by," etc. See above, n. 50. Presumably this word was construed somewhat differently by Bodhiruci.

78. This corruption may well have been influenced by the phrase dharma-kiiya_

prabhiivita which occurs, e.g., in Chap. 22 of the SR (this passage is discussed below).

It also occurs in the Tathiigata-guhya-sulra, as quoted in the Sik~ii (Vaidya 1961: 89), where the bodhisattva is said to be dharma-kiiya.prabhiivita, Le., "distinguished by [their possession of] the body of dharmas." It seems highly unlikely that this is the same body .

which suffering beings see, hear and touch to such good effect, although Bendall and

Rouse's translation of the passage wouldhaveitso (1971: 157-158). Cf. also Conze 1974: 99. On prabhiivita, see above, n. 50.

79. Note that this interpretation of the passage clashes with Dantinne's Sanskrit

"reconstructions" and, indeed, his division of the text into two separate sections.

However, I am in agreement with Dantinne's translation of dharma-kiiya as "l'ensemble des qualites." See also his lengthy note on the term (pp. 175-180), which provides a

number of useful references to passages concerning dharma-kiiya, which he also translates

as "corps de qualites."

80. Examples found so far only in the DKP and the AjKV. A close re-reading of

Lokakl?ema's other works may turn up further instances.

81. This is, of course, a perfectly acceptable equation; see, e.g., Takasaki 1966b,

Ruegg 1969: 275, King 1991: 13, and above, n. 47. A similar instance of interchangeability in translation is found in the Upiiya-kau.salya-sutra, in a passage which echoes a number of themes we have already raised. If we go by the Tibetan text translated from

Indic (see Derge, Dkon brtsegs Cha 32a2-6), this passage says that bodhisattvas skilled

in the use of creative stratagems (upiiya-ku.saJa) who worship one Buddha know that by doing so they worship them all, through reflecting that "the Buddhas and Lords have

arisen from one and the same dharma-dhiitu, and have one and the same morality,

samiidhi, wisdom, liberation, knowledge and vision of liberation, cognition and under~

standing (Tib. sangs rgyas beom Idan 'das mams ni chos kyi dbyings gcig las nges par

byung ba dang / tshul khrims gcig pa dang / ling nge 'dzin gcig pa dang / shes rab gcig

pa dang / mam par grol ba gcig pa dang / mam par grol ba 'i ye shes mthong ba gcig pa

dang lye shes gcig pa dang / rig pa gcig pa yin no)." The earliest Chinese translation, that of Dharmarakl?a (T.345 , 156b2Of.), states that the Buddhas are equal in their dharma-kiiya

(fa-shen); the second, of Zhu Nanti (T.310, No. 38, 595aI8f.) states that "all Tathiigatas

DHARMA-KAYA 85

:hare one and the same dharma-dhiltu and dharma-kiiya (yiqie rulai tong yi fajie yi

lashen)"; while the latest version by DanapaIa (T.346, 166b20) says only that they share ,erie and the same dharma-dhiitu (fa-xing). In the words which follow, the two older ~efsions also list only the five aniisrava-skandhas, which, as we have already noted,

~ornprise a classic Mainstream definition of dharma-kiiya. 82. See, e.g., his version of the LAn (T.807), where jingfa-benjie (753b2, 15) and

.1~g_benjie(753bI8) correspond to coos kyi dbyingsin the Tib. version (w. 87, 93 & 94). { 83. Here we transgress against one of the basic methodological principles of the "Lok~ema Project," viz., to consider only those scriptures known to have been used in ;~certain place at a certain time, but it is to be hoped that the results achieved will make

up for any departure from methodological purity. .... 84. The Gilgit text reads:

ye miiIp riipeI}a adriik~ur ye miiIp gho~eI}a anvayul;! I mithyii-prahiiI}a-prasrtii na miirp dralqyanti te janiilJ II dra§!avyo dhannato buddho dharma-kiiyas tathiigatal;! I dharmatii ciipy avijiieyii na sii sakyarp vijiiniturp II 85. Dantinne also provides a correct interpretation (1983: 176), as does Nagao

(1973b: 62); see also Takasaki (1987: 66). I take avijiieya here to mean "not able to be ~ade the object of sensory consciousness (vijiiiina)."

86. Cf. Schopen 1975: 153. 87. A partial parallel in Thera-giithii 469; see Conze 1974: 57. 88. This is the Sanskrit MS of the Vaj, dated to around the end of 5th century,

edited by Pargiter in Hoernle 1916: 176-195 (see especially p. 192). 89. The second verse is to be found in all the later Chinese translations of the Vaj,

beginning with Bodhiruci's version of 509 (T.236, 756b & 761b). An equivalent also appears in the Khotanese version edited by Sten Konow in Hoernle 1916: 214-288; the

:verses appear on pp. 270-271; note also the English translation on p. 286: "The Exalted .Ones should be viewed as being the Law; their body consists of the Law; he is rightly

. understood as being the Law, and he is not to be understood by means of expedients." It is to be observed that the relevant passage in Chap. XXXI of the AsPP makes its first appearance in Chinese in Kumarajiva's translation, i.e., early 5th century.

90. See also Reynolds & Hallisey 1987: 331: "According to such texts as the

SaddharmapuI}darlka, the dharma-kiiya is the true meaning of Buddhahood." While not exactly wrong, this statement is quite misleading in its context.

91. Cf. BHSD, s.v. kiiya.

92. Cf. Mus 1978: 678-703. Although he identifies its magnificent central figure as a kind of sarpbhoga-kiiya, Mus contends at length that the entire buddholo gy of the SP

rests ultimately on a notion of dharma-kiiya-the relevant chapter of his book is even entitled "Le Dharmakaya du Lotus de 1a Bonne Loi" -without ever drawing attention to the virtual non-occurrence of the term in the text! The relationship of the buddhology

. of the SP to dharma-kiiya is also considered at length in Lai 1981. 93. References are to Vaidya's edition, 1963.

94. Cf. Suzuki 1930: 317 and 1932: 62: "become a Tathagata endowed with the


perfect freedom of the Dhannakaya, because of his insight into the egolessness of thin'; 95 InfullS ki ' I' ds "N ,. 1 . gs.' . uzu s trans anon rea: ow oemg taken mto a super-world hi i",

is the realm of no-evil-outflows, they will gather up all the material for the aUainm:nt ~h, the Dharmakaya w~ch is of severeign [sic] pow~ ~d.beyond conception." It is sm:~ wonder that the LA IS thought to be so confused, If this IS all non-Sanskritists have to go' on.

96. Note the matching verse at the end of the chapter (55.29) which says te bUddha1 dharmiikhyarp kayarp prfipsyanti mamakam, "they will attain the body of mine Which is known as the Buddha-dharmas." ,

97. Cf. Suzuki 1932: 22, and BHSD, s.v. kaya. A possible alternative interpreta~

tion would be to take dharma-kaya as a noun based on a bahuvnm: "How can one praise him who has the nature of an illusion or a dream, who has the dharma for a body?" 'i

98. Cf. Suzuki 1932: 40.

99. The Sanskrit reads: sarva-sravaka-pratyekabuddha-tlrthakara-dh yana-sarniidhi_

samapatti-sukham atikramya tathagatacintya-vi~aya-praciira-gati-praciirarp paiica-<1harma~

svabhiiva-gati-vinivrttarp tathagatarp [?] dharma-kayarp prajiia -jiiana-sunibaddha-<1harmam

maya-vi~ayiibhinivrttarp sarva-buddha-k~etra-tu~ita-bhavaniikani~.thiilayopagarp tathagat~~ kiiyarp pratilabheran. This is without doubt an extremely difficult passage; cf. Suzuki 1932: 46. . '

100. Cf. Suzuki 1930: 318-319 & 1932: 200. Note the following comments about'

the dharma being bodiless (94.25-27). This is rather reminiscent of the Agama passages

cited above. "

101. Skt.: tatTa katama kaya-samata? yaduta aharp ca te ca tathagata arhanta{i'\:

samyak-sarp buddha dharma-kayena ca riipa-lak~aIJ.iinuvyaiijana-kayena ca sarna nirvisi~!a

anyatTa vaineya-vasam upadaya / tatTa tatTa sattva-gati-vis~eIJ.a tathagata rupa-vaicit7 .

ryam adarsayanti. Cf. Suzuki 1932: 123.

102. See above. ru. 60 & 81.

103. Cf. Suzuki 1930: 318 & 1932: 165: ..... there is another name for the

Tathagata when his Dharmakaya assumes a will-body. This is what goes beyond the

compreheruion of the philosophers, Sravakas, Pratyekabuddhas, and those Bodhisattvas ,

still abiding in the seventh stage. The unborn, Mahamati, is synonymous with the,

Tathagata."

104. See Carter & PaIihawadana 1987: 89-94. My thanks to Richard Gombrich

(personal communication, 30n /91) for suggesting this interpretation.

105. Cf. also de La ValleePoussin 1929: 704, quoting Madhyamakavatara, p. 361.

106. Cf. Suzuki 1932: 219: "The Tathagata is the Dharmakaya, Mahamati: he

abides in the Dharma as food."

107. Cf. pari ahiira-.thitika (PTSD, S.v. ahara, fhitika).

108. Cf. Anesaki 1982: 155 (with several similar ci tations in the M ahiiparinirvar;.ac

sutTa); also quoted in Demieville 1930: 177: "Le Corps du Tg. a pour nourriture la Loi."

Note the use of the yi ... wei ... corutruction to render the bahuvrlhi.

109. In fact the buddhology of the LA is so chaotic and complex that a full study"

of it would be a truly Herculean task. For the purposes of this paper it is enough to show

DHARMA-KAYA 87

;,,' 'IS use of dharma-kiiya, both as an adjective and a noun, can be satisfactorily watl ad" altin :; 'ierpreted along tr lUon es. ~: '. 110. SallieKing's recent book on the "Buddha Nature" is a good example of the '.'ii .. reifying" approach, applied inter alia to dharma-kiiya (see King 1991: 65-68, !'nOn-

·Wff.). . .. .F' 111. It should be noted that even if my attempt to apply a smgle granunaucal ;~\ji~etation to the substantive dharma-kiiya is rejected, and it is read in so~e contexts )l1 1ik d·... ,T • "th bod hi h' th d'" "" >akarmadhiiraya e Harma-sanra, VlZ., as e y w c IS e Harma, a non-

;:ifYing" approach emphasizing dharma can still be defended. :.... 112. On this see, e.g., Lancaster 1977. B 113. As David SeyfortRuegg has pointed out (personal communication, July,

;::l~~H), the evolution of the tathiigata-garbha concept also poses problems which are in

:scirne respects sinlliar to those outlined above. In both cases semantic and granunatical

~duficulties comp()und the philosophical complexity of the issues involved. On this and 6nthe use of tathiigata-garbha and related terms as bahuvri'his see Ruegg 1969: 499-516. 'ItInay well be, as Ruegg suggests (p. 512), that the occurrence of the term as a bahuvnhi is'historically prior to its appearance as a tatpuru~a. This r~ises the possibility that in the

• ease of tathiigata-garbha, too, we are faced with many different textual strata, deposited Jover time by the gradual process of hypo statis at ion (of something that began life as pure g!iletaphor), but now hopelessly jumbled in heterogeneous sources whose dates we can

i'bnIy guess at. Once again, the matter is further complicated by the ambiguity of the word

2gaibha, which means both "womb" and "embryo." Hence, for example, the statement in

';the Tathiigata-garbha-siitra to the effect sarva-sattviis tathiigata-garbhiilJ (cited Ruegg

;1969: 510; see also Takasaki 1966a: 196) may be understood as "all sentient beings are ,Tathiigata-wombs" (i.e., contain the Tathiigata, a common use of garbha in fine ;compositl), or as "all sentient beings have the Tathiigata as embryo." While these two

,senses are much the same, and may be read purely as a figure of speech-inside every

'. unenlightened sentient being is a Buddha trying to get out-secondary and possibly later ,interpretations of tathiigata-garbha as a substantive meaning "the embryo of the

,Tathiigata" entail quite different and much more complex philosophical consequences.

: But that of course is another story ....

,ABBREVIATIONS

':A AjKV

,'iAkTV

';AsPP

'BHSD

D

Ailguttara-Nikiiya (Pali Text Society Edition).

Ajiitasatru-kau1q:tya-vinodanii-siitra. Ak~bhya-tathiigatasya-vyiiha.

Vaidya, P. L., ed., A§tasiihasrikii-prajiiiipiiramitii-siitra, Darbhanga:

Mithila Institute, 1960.

Edgerton. F., Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary, New Haven:

Yale University Press, 1953 [Reprinted Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1970, 1972].

Digha-Nikiiya (Pali Text Society Edition).

88

DKP DXJ DZDL

HEGR

JIABS KP

LA

LAn M P

PraS PTC

PTSD

Skt. SP

SR

T.

Tib.

Traite

TSD

Vaj

WWP

nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

Druma-kinnararaJa-parip!cchii-siitra. Daoxing jing or Daoxing banruo Jing (T.224). Dazhidu-lun (T.1509).

Hooogirin: Dictionnaire encyc10pedique du Bouddhisme d' , "1 bin . . . T ky apres es sources c OlSes et)aponalses, 0 0, 1929. . "

Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. von Stael-Holstein, A., ed., The Kiiyapaparivarta, Shanghai: . Commercial Press, 1926.

Vaidya, P. L., ed., LaIikiivatiirn-siitra, Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1963.

Lokifnuvartanii-siitra.

Majjhima-Nikaya (paIi Text Society Edition).

Peking Edition of the Tibetan Kanjur (Suzuki Daisetz T., ed., Th~ Peking Edition of the Tibetan Tripitaka,Tokyo-Kyoto: Suzuki ".

Research Foundation, 1955-61).

Pratyutpanna-buddha-sarpmukhavasthita-samiidhi-siitra.

Hare, E. M., et aI., eds., Pall Tipitaka Concordance, London: PaIi Text Society, 1955.

Rhys Davids, T. W. & W. Stede, eds., The Pali Text Society's.

Pali-English Dictionary, London: Pali Text Society, 1921-25.

Sarpyutta-Nikiiya (PaIi Text Society Edition).

Vaidya, P. L., ed., Sik~ii-samuccaya, Darbhanga: Mithila

Institute, 1961.

Sanskrit.

Vaidya, P. L., ed., Saddharma-pWJ.cJaiJka-siitra, Darbhanga:

Mithila Institute, 1960.

Vaidya, P. L., ed., Samiidhiriija-siltra, Darbhanga: Mithila

Insti tute, 1961.

Taka.lrusu Junjir6 & Watanabe Kaikyoku, eds., Taisho shinshii

daiwkyo, 100 vols., Tokyo: Taish6 Issaiky6 Kank6kai, 1924-

34.

Tibetan.

Lamotte, E., Le Trait6 de la grande vertu de sagesse de

Niigiirjuna (Mahiiprajiiaparamitasistra), 5 vols., Louvain:

Institut Orientaliste, 1944-S0 [Vols. 1 & 2 reprinted 1966 &

1967]. Chandra, Lokesh, Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary, New Delhi:

International Academy of Indian Culture, 1961 [Reprint edition,

Tokyo: Rinsen, 1971].

Va jracchedikii-prajii apfirami tff-siltra.

Wenshushili wen pusa-shujing (T.2S0).

DHARMA-KAYA

. Masaharu (1982). Kaitei Genshinbutsu to Hosshinbutsu, Tokyo: Kokusho

kankokai [1st ed. 1956]. Heinz (1985). Zur SchulzugehOrigkeit von Werken der Hlnayana-Literatur,

Erster Teil, Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. , Cecil & W. H. D. Rouse (1971). Sikshii-samuccaya: A Compendium of

Buddhist Doctrine, reprint ed., Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass .

. , John Ross & Mahinda Palihawadana (1987). The Dhammapada, New York:

Oxford University Press.

89

Garma C. C., ed., (1983). A Treasury of Mahiiyana Siitras: Selections from

the Mahiiratnakiita Siitra, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University

Press. Edward (1973a). Materials for a Dictionary of the Prajiiiipiiramitii

Literature, Tokyo: Suzuki Research Foundation.

(1973b). The Short Prajiiiipiiramitii Texts, London: Luzac.

(1974). Vajracchedikii Prajiiiipiiramitii, 2nd ed., Rome: ISMEO.

(1975). The Perfection of Wisdom in Eight Thousand Lines and Its Verse

Summary (2nd printing with corrections), Bolinas: Four Seasons Foundation.

J., (1983). La Splendeur de l1nebranlable (Ak~obhyavyiiha), Tome I,

Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste.

P., (1930). "Busshin" in Hl5bi5girin, Vol. ill, pp. 174-185.

Nalinaksha (1950). Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. ill, Part IV, Calcutta.

(1977). Mahiiyiina Buddhism, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.

F., (see Abbreviations under BHSD). L. & J. A. Silk, eds .. , (1989). Studies in the Literature of the Great Vehicle:

Three Mahiiyana Buddhist Texts, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan. Paul (1978b). The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpanna-Buddha

Sarpmukhiivasthita-Samiidhi-Siitra (Studia Philologica Buddhica, Monograph

Series 1), Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library.

(1982). "Sanskrit Fragments of a Lokottaravadin Tradition," in Hercus, L. A. et al., eds., Indological and Buddhist Studies: Volume in Honour of Professor

l. W. de long on his Sixtieth Birthday, Canberra: Faculty of Asian Studies,

pp. 211-234. (1987). "Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self-inlage and Identity

Among the Followers of the Early Mahayana," JIABS, Vol. 10, No.1, pp. 67-89.

(1990). The Samiidhi of Direct Encounter with the Buddhas of the Present: An

Annotated English Translation of the Tibetan VeISion of the Pratyutpanna

Buddha-Sarpmukhiivasthita-Samiidhi-Siitra (Studia Philologica Buddhica,

Monograph Series '0, Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies.

(forthcoming). 'The Earliest Chinese Translations of Mahayana Buddhist


Sutras: Some Notes on the Works of Lok~ema." in Buddhist Studies Review, London.

Hoetnle, A. F. R., (1916). Manuscript Remains of Buddhist Literature FOl1Ild in Eastern Turkestan, Oxford: Oxford University Press [Reprinted Delhi: Sri Satguru, 198.8].

Homer, I. B., (1963). MiJinda's Questions, 2 vals., London: Luzac & Co. de long, l. W., (1979). Buddhist Studies, Gregory Schopen, ed., Berkeley: Asian

Humanities Press. Kajiyama YUichi (1974). Hassenju hannya gyO, 2 vols. (Daijo butten, Vols. IT &

Tokyo: Chuokoronsha. . (1984). "Srupa. the Mother of Buddhas and Dhanna-body," in A. K. ed., New Paths in Buddhist Research, Durham, North Carolina: Acorn pp. 9-16; reprinted without changes in Kajiyama 1989. (1989). Studies in Buddhist Philosophy (Selected Papers), Mimaki Katsumi al., eds., Kyoto: Rinsen Book Co.

Lai, Whalen W., (1981). 'The Predocetic 'Finite Buddhakaya' in the Lotus Sutra: In Search of the illusive Dhannakaya Therein," Journal of the American Academy of Religion, XLIX, No.3, pp. 447-469.

Lamotte, E., (1958). Histoire du bouddhisme indien, Louvain: Institut Orientaliste. (1988). History of Indian Buddhism, Sara Webb-Boin, trans., Louvain: Orientaliste. See also Abbreviations under Traite.

Lancaster, Lewis (1968). An Analysis of the A$!asiihasrikiiprajiiiipiiramitiisiifra from the Chinese Translations (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin), Ann Arbor: University Microfilms. (1974). "An Early Mahayana Sermon about the Body of the Buddha and Making of Images," Artibus Asiae, Vol. XXXVI, No.4, pp. 287-29l. (1975). 'The Oldest Mahayana Sutra: Its Significance for the Study of Buddhist Development," Eastern Buddhist, New Series, VIII, No.1, pp. 30-41. (1977). 'The Editing of Buddhist Texts," in Leslie S. Kawamura & Keith Scott, eds., Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday, Emeryville: Dhanna Publish ing, pp. 145-151.

de La Vallee Poussin, L., (1928-48). Vijiiaptimiitratiisiddhi: La Siddhi de Hiuan

tsang, 3 vols. (1928, 1929, 1948), Paris: Guethner. (1971). L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu: traduction et annotations, 6 vols., Brussels: Institut BeIge des Hautes Etudes Chinoises [see also Pruden: 1988~ 90].

Levi, Sylvain (1932). Mahiikarmavibhanga (La grande classification des actes) et

Karmavibhangopadesa.(Discussion sur le Mahiikarmavibhanga), Paris: Librairie Ernest Leroux.

DHARMA-KAYA 91

Makransky, John J., (1989). "Controversy over Dharmakiiya in India and Tibet: A Reappraisal of its Basis, Abhisamayiilarpkiira Chapter 8," JIABS, Vol. 12, No.

2, pp. 45-78. Murti, T. R. V., (1955). The Centrai Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the ,; Miidhyamika System, London: George Allen & Unwin.

:Mus, Paul (1978). Barabudur: Esquisse d'une histoire du bouddhisme fondee sur 1a . . critique archeoJogique des textes, reprint edition, New York: Arno Press [1st r/ edition in two vols., Hanoi: Imprimerie d'extreme-orient, 1935].

:Nagao Gadjin (1973a). "On the Theory of Buddha-Body," Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. VI, No.1, pp. 25-53. (1973b). "Kongo Hannya gyo," in Nagao Gadjin & Kajiyama Yuichi, eds., DaijO butten, Vol. 1, Tokyo: ChUokoronsha. (1991). Madhyamika and Yogiiciira: A Study of Mahayana Philosophies, Leslie S. Kawamura, trans., New York: SUNY Press.

Pradhan, P., (1975). Abhidharmakosabhif~yam of Vasubandhu, rev. 2nd ed., Patna: J. '" P. Jayaswal Research Institute.

Pruden, Leo M., trans., (1988-90). Abhidharmakosabha~yam by Louis de La Vallee Poussin, 4 vols., Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press.

'Regamey, K., (1938a). The BhadramiiyiikiiravyiikaraI)a, Warsaw: Trowarzystwo Naukowe Warszawskie. (1938b). Three Chapters from the Samifdlllrifjasiitra, Warsaw: Towarzystwo N aukowe Warszawskie.

"Reynolds, Frank E., (1977). 'The Several Bodies of Buddha: Reflections on a Neglected Aspect of Theravada Tradition," History of Religions, 16, pp. 374-389.

"Reynolds, Frank E. and Charles Hallisey (1987). "Buddha," in M. Eliade, ed., The

Encyclopedia of Religion, 16 vols, New York: Macmillan. Rhys Davids T. W., (1890). The Questions of King Milinda, Part I (Sacred Books of

the East, XXXV), London: Oxford University Press. Rhys Davids, T. W. & C. A. F., (1921). Dialogues of the Buddha, London: Pali Text

Society. Ruegg, David Seyfort (1969). La Theone du Tathiigatagarbha et du Cotra: Etudes sur

1a Sotenologie et 1a Gnoseologie du Bouddhisme, Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient.

ScJunithausen, Lambert (1969). Der NirviiI)a-Abschnitt in der Viniscaya-saIpgrahaIJl

der Yogiiciirabhiimil}., Vienna: Osterreichische Akadernie der Wissenschaften. Schopen, Gregory (1975). "The Phrase 'sa prtbivlpradeias caityabhilto bhavet in the

Vajracchedikii: Notes on the Cult of the Book in Mahayana," Indo-Iranian Journal, 17, pp. 147-181.

Sorensen, Per K., (1986). Candrakirti TnsiiI"a{lasaptati: The Septuagint on the Three

Refuges, Wien: Arbeitskreis fUr tibetische und buddhistische Studien, Universitlit Wien.


Suzuki, D. T., (1930). Studies in the Lankavatara Sutra, London: Routledge & Paul. (1932). The Lankavatara Sutra, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Takasaki Jikid6 (1966a). A Study on the Ratnagotravibhiiga (Uttaratantra), ISMEO. (1966b). "Dhannatii, Dhannadhatu, Dhannakaya and Btiddhadhatu: ... ...,.,·.~h_ .. C·

of the Ultimate Value in Mahayana Buddhism," Indogaku bukkyogaku kenkyii, XIV, 2, pp. 78(919)-94(903). (1987). An Introduction to Buddhism, RolfW. Giebel, trans., Tokyo: Gakkai.

Trenclmer. V., ed., (1986). The Milindapaiiho in The Milindapaiiho with Milinda. fikii, London: Pali Text Society [1st ed. Williams & Norgate, 1880].

Tucci, G., (1971). Minor Buddhist Texts, Part ill, Rome: ISMEO. Walshe, Maurice (1987). Thus Have I Heard: The Long Discourses of the

London: Wisdom Publications. Whitney, William Dwight (1962). Sanskrit Grammar, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass

[reprint of 5th edition, Leipzig, 1924].

Williams, Paul (1989). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, London: Routledge.

Yuyama, Akira (1976). Prajiiii-paramitii-ratna-guIJ.a-saIpcaya-giithii (Sanskrit

sion A), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

DHARMA-KAYA

(:~LOSSARY OF CHINESE CHARACTERS

~Achu-fO guo jing £isanzho u sanmei jing ft;aoxing banruo jing :,Vazhidu- lun ;<vousha jing :;fa ;fajie <:fa-shen ;.:Fatian :,'fa-xing Yro-fa-zang i7o-jing-shen [ijing !Jing-benjie ·/Uingfa )ingfa~benjie

: . .ling -zang -shen ;'}mingjuwei -shen i.rulai-shen-zhe yi fa wei shi

IWJml~lII~ ;JR:ffl--,*~ )![rr!£t:E=~

*~Jt~ *~o/~ ~ ~W ~Jf ~7( ~111

{L~~ {L~Jf *-£ *£*W *£~ *-£$*-W *£~Jf 4;lo],*Jf

.', ~*Jf~~~~~ ;'rulai shen-zhe zhenfa zhi shen

tm*Jf~~~LJf shen Jf

93


wel '* weili g£jJ Wenshushili wen pusa-shu jing

X~ BiPfU ro'~Uji:i:~ yi jingfa ming wei shen j..j~~~~Jf. yi jingfa wei shen j..j~~~Jf yiqie rulai tong yi fajie yi fashen

yi... wei ... zhu-fa

--Wj(a*~-~W-~~ j..j ... ~... .

~~

Lost in China, Found in Tibet: How Wonch'~ Became the Author of the iVreat Ch)nese Commentary

~tby John Powers ,5; ~:> '

LJntroduction: Wonch 'uk's Life and Times ,:,/'

wonch'uk (Chinese: Yuan-tse; Tibetan: Wen tshegs, 613-696),1 author of the largest extant commentary on the Sarpdhinirmocana\siitra,Z was a monk from Hsin-lo in Korea who moved to Ch'angaiI, then the capital of T' ang China. According to his memorial inscription at Hsi-ming Monastery,3 he was born a prince of the Silla kingdom but renounced his royal heritage to become a monk. He travelled to Ch'ang-an, where he became one of the two main disciples of Hsuan-tsang (600-664),4 the other being K'uei-chi \(632-682) of Tz'u-en Monastery.5 Wonch'uk later became the abbot of Hsi-ming Monastery. . He is described as being naturally astute, instantly apprehending the profound meaning of whatever texts he was taught, and he .is said to have mastered the V aibha~ika Abhidharma treatises, the Abhidhannakosa, the Mahiivibhii~ii, as well as the main treatises of the Y ogacara school. 6

He came into conflict with K'uei-chi, whose school was later recognized as the orthodox tradition of the Yogacara (Fa-hsiang) school in China. According to the Continued Biographies of

. Eminent Buddhist Monks (Hsii kao-seng chiia.n), by Tao-hsuan, there was an ongoing rivalry between Wonch'uk and K'uei-chi, and on one occasion Wonch'uk is said to have bribed an attendant in order to overhear Hsuan -tsang's private instructions to K' uei -chi concerning the Ch 'eng wei-shih lun. He later publicly expounded the explanations that he had overheard, which angered and disgusted K'uei-chi. 7 Whatever the historical accuracy of the story, it

95


indicates that the rivalry between Wonch'uk and K'uei-chi \V/'~~ probably as much personal as phi1osophi~al and doctrinaJ.8 .:,'~~

.Th~ rivalry co~tinued a~ter the deaths of Wonch'uk ,ari~~ K'uel-chl among theIr respectIve students, and the end resuldri1 China was that Wonch 'uk's school came to be considered unorth()~~ dox and was superseded by that of K'uei-chi.9 As a reslilt! Wonch'uk's Sarpdhinirmocana commentary is not widely studi~~ in East Asia, although it became an important text for the study df, the Mind-Only (sems tsam, citta-miitra) system in the Dge lugs p~. School of Tibetan Buddhism, due to the fact that it is mentioned iri:; several places in Tsong kha pa' s Essence of the Good Explanationi (Legs bshad snying po), in which he refers to it as "The Gre~F Chinese Commentary" (rgya nag gi 'grel chen). 10 ,"%i

Tsong kha pa, of course, had no way of knowing that'; Wonch 'uk was actually Korean, since in the Tibetan translation hi~: name is given as Wen tshegs, a Tibetan transliteration of th~: Chinese Ytian-tse. In the Essence of the Good Explanations, Tsong; kha pa treats Wonch'uk's commentary as a, text containing tlie~ Chinese approach to exegesis of the Sarpdhinirmocana-sfitra, and; in a number of places he presents Wonch 'uk's view as an importani~ rival view representing Chinese Y ogacara scholarship. The pui-~ pose of the present article is to trace the history of the tranSmission'. of this text into Tibet and to examine how a text that was largely.: forgotten in East Asia came to be seen in Tibet as the paradigrilatic': Chinese commentary on the Sarpdhinirmocana-sfitra.

II. The Chinese and Tibetan Versions of the Commentari

The Chinese title ofWonch'uk' s work is Commentary on the Sfitra' Elucidating the Profound Secret (Chieh shen mi ching shu). The' only extant complete version of the text is found in the Tibetan Bstan 'gyur, where it is translated as Arya-gambhira~.;, sarpdhinirmocana-sfitra-fikii (Tibetan: 'Phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'grel pa'i mdo'i rgya cher 'grel pa),u An incomplete, Chinese version is found in the Dai-nihon Zokuzi5kyi5,u which is" missing the beginning of the eighth section (chiian) and all of the;: tenth chiian. Originally consisting of ten chiian, and divided into

GREATCHThffiSECOMMENTARY 97

eventy-five smaller sections (called bam po in the Tibetan tersions), in the Chin ling k'o ching ch'u edition13 there are only eight mostly comple~e .chuan ~nd an incomplete version of. the eighth chuan. The mIssmg portIOns have been reconstructed mto Chinese, based on the Tibetan versions, by Inaba Sh6ju.14

. The apparent reason for the propagation of Wonch'uk's 60nunentary in Tibet is his indirect connection with the translator (10 tsa ba) Chos grub (Chinese: Fa-ch'eng), who was a major .translator of Chinese Buddhist texts into Tibetan. He lived in the .atea of Tun-huang, in the Hsiu-to Monastery in Kan-chou Province during the early part of the ninth century,15 and the colophon to the Tibetan translation ofWonch'uk's work indicates that Chos grub was commissioned to undertake the task of translating it from Chinese into Tibetan by the King of Tibet,16 who at that time would have been Ral pa can (r. 815-841),17 This was during the eighty-six year period that Tibet controlled the area of Tun-huang.

Chos grub's translation is listed in the Tibetan Lhan dkar catalogue, which was compiled before 824,18 and so he must have completed it sometime between 815 and 824. As Inaba points out,19 Chos grub was named the Chief Translator (shu chen gyi 10 tsa ba)

·of Buddhist Texts by Ral pa can, and the translation must have . taken place during his reign, since his successor GIang dar rna (r. 841-846) vigorously persecuted Buddhism.20

Chos grub was one of the major Buddhist figures of his time, . and in addition to the office of Chief Translator he also held the title of Master of the Long Lineage (ring lugs pa). This lineage is associated with the transmission of the written works of Buddhism and is contrasted with the Near Lineage (nye brgyud or nye lugs), the transmission of Buddha's teachings that is not bound by space and time, that is transmitted through revelation and inspiration. The Long Lineage, by contrast, consists of a series of teachers and students who pass on the written and oral traditions in a continuous line of descent. A person such as Chos grub, who had been recognized as a master of the Long Lineage, would have been viewed as a successor to the line of textual transmission going back to the Buddha and, as such, would have great personal and religious authority due to his perceived connection with the orthodox lineage


.oftransrnission. During Chos grub's lifetime, the title of Ring pa (which was apparently a short fonn of Chos bcom ldan ' . ring lugskyi mdun sa)21 indicated that its 'holder was the authority on Buddhist doctrine. The holder was the ~r1T1n,~' head of the regional order of monks and had as an emblem of the "Large Golden Letter", and this marked him as one of the important figures in the social and political hierarchy of the re of Central Asia controlled by Tibet.22

But how did Wonch'uk's text arrive in Tun-huang in the place, and why did Chos grub decide to include it in the canon as one of the few Chinese texts to be recognized as important enough to be translated? The answers to these .go back to the year 735, when a pilgrim named T' an-k'uang . 700) from Ho-hsi, in the area of Tun-huang, travelled to Ch' an to pursue studies in Buddhist philosophy.23 While in Ch' he became acquainted with the texts of the Y ogacara school, for much of his stay he lived in Hsi-ming Monastery, the LU'-Il"~,~LC;l where Wonch'uk had been abbot, and this was presumably he became acquainted with Wonch'uk's commentary.24

to Paul Demieville, he remained in Ch'ang-an until 774, after he returned to the area of Tun-huang.25 ,

After his return to Central Asia, T'an-k'uang came to be recognized as one of the major Buddhist teachers of his day, and his propagation of the teachings of Wonch'uk was the probable reason that Fa-ch'eng decided to translate Wonch'uk's commen-: tary. During his stay at the Hsi-ming Monastery, T'an-k'uang apparently became interested in the writings of Wonch' uk. He brought them back to Central Asia, and T'an-k'uang's prestige as. a prominent Buddhist teacher probably led Fa~ch'eng to study and translate Wonch'uk's work.

After T'an-k'uang's death, his students continued to Wonch'uk's commentary, and since Fa-ch'eng belonged to the lineage established by T'an-k'uang, it is not surprising that when asked to translate important Chinese texts for inclusion into the Tibetan canon, he chose Wonch'uk's text. As a result, this commentary, which was partially lost and mostly neglected in East Asia, came to be studied in Tibet. Due to its size, the breadth of

GREAT CHINESE COMNlENTARY 99

t'holarship its author demonstrates, as well as the depth of ;;~derstanding ?~ Buddhist ~hilo~ophy ~n gene:al and the thought .;6fthe SaIPdhlflJImOCana-sutra III partIcular, It commanded the :(littention of Tibetan Buddhist scholars. ;':i Wonch 'uk's work is by far the largest known commentary on i;;dle sarpdhinirmocana-siitra, and in the Sde dge edition of the Bstan Figyur it takes up. all of tW? vOl.umes ~d most of a th~d.26 It begins ; with a lengthy mtroductlOn, III whIch the author dIscusses such ~,t6pics as the meaning of the title of the siitra, the sutra 's system of 'hermeneutics (particularly the topics of the three wheels of doctrine ~tlmd the three natures of phenomena), and the structure of confsciousness, with a particular focus on the basis-consciousness (kun 'izhi roam par shes pa, aJaya-vijiiana). After this the commentary /,begins with a line-by-line (and often word-by-word) commentary .. on the text. Wonch'uk's main text of the sutra was probably Hstian>tsang's translation, as is indicated by the many places where he ; comments on a term or phrase that is present in Hstian-tsang's text

>' hut is not found in the Tibetan versions and the many places where ~e refers specifically to Hstian-tsang' s translations of this and other texts.

His commentary is an unusual work for a traditional scholar in that his citations of opinions and quotations generally refer not

'only to an author but also often cite the work from which it comes, and in many places he indicates the Chinese translation that he was using.27 This commentary is a massive compendium of Buddhist scholarship, and it contains a wide range of opinions that reflects Wonch'uk's own encylopedic knowledge of Buddhist literature.28

In tracing the chain of events leading to the inclusion of Wonch'uk's work in the Tibetan canon, one finds a series of

, fortunate historical accidents that caused it to travel to Central Asia, . ", to be propagated there because of the status of the monk: who

introduced it to that region, and later translated into Tibetan during the relatively brief time that Tibet controlled the area of Tun-huang. If not for this collection of circumstances, large parts of this valuable and encylopedic work of Buddhist scholarship might have been lost.


NOTES

1. Regarding Wonch'uk's dates, see Nakamura Hajime, Shin Bukkyo lit· (Tokyo: Seishi.."1 ShobO, 1961), p. 60. See also the "Enjiki" entry in the HobO~ catalogue, ed., Paul Demieville et aI., Paris and Tokyo, 1978.

2. Entitled ifrya-gambhira-sarpdhinirmocana-sulra-Pkii( 'phags pa dgongs pa zab mo nges par 'greJpa'i mdo'irgya cher 'greJpa); (a) Peking #5517, vol. 106, pp. 1-345' (b) Tohoku #4016. '

3. Written by Sung-fu, entitled Ta-chou Hsi-ming ssu ku ta-te Yiian-tS"e fa-shih fo she-li t'a-ming ping hsu.

4. For information about his life, see: Stanley Weinstein, Buddhism Under the T'ang (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 24-31; Kenneth Ch'en

Buddhism in China (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), pp. 235-38; and J~ Yiln-hua, A Chronicle of Buddhism in China, 581-960 A.D. (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati 1966), pp. 20-21 and 33-4. '

5. With respect to K'uei-chi, see: Stanley Weinstein, "A Biographical Study of

Tz'u-en," in Monumenta Nipponica #15.1-2, 1959, pp. 119-49; Alan Sponberg, The Vijiiaptimiilratii Buddhism of the Chinese Monk K'uei-chi (Ph.D. Dissertation, Univer

sity of British Columbia; University Microfilms, 1979); Kenneth Ch'en, op. cit., pp. 320-21; and IidaSMtaro, "TheThreeStlipas of Ch 'ang-an, " in Papers of the FirstInternationru

Conference on Korean Studies (Seoul: The Academy of Korean Studies, 1980), pp. 486-

7. 6. W onch 'uk has been the subject of several articles by Iida ShOtaro, for example:

"A Mukung-hwa in Ch'ang-an - A Study of the Life and Works of Wonch'uk (613-696)," in Proceedings, International Symposium Commemorating the 30th Anniversary of Korean Liberation, Seoul, 1975, pp. 225-51; ''The Three Stlipas of Ch'ang An," ill Papers oftheFirstInternational Conference on Korean Studies, Seoul, 1980, pp. 484-497; and "Who Can Best Re-tum the Dharma-cilia?" in Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyii

#27.1, 1986, pp. 170-7l. 7. This story is recounted in Hsu Kao-seng chiian, ch. 4, Taisho 50, p. 457c

(reported in W. Pachow, A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahiiyana Buddhism,

in Chinese Culture, vol. XX.l, 1979, p. 22). See also Inaba Shoju, "On Chos-grub's Translation of the Chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu," in Buddhist Thought and Asian Civilization,

ed., Leslie S. Kawamura and Keith Scott (Emeryville: Dharma Publishing, 1977), pp.

105-113. 8. The same story, from the Biographies of Eminent Monks of Sung, is translated

by Iida SMtar6 in "The Three Stlipas of Ch'ang-an," p. 485. Iida thinks (pp. 486-8) that this story may have been untrue and that it may have been propagated by K'uei-chi or

his followers in order to diminish the stature of Wonch'uk, but he provides no evidence

for this contention. 9. See Iida, 'Three Stlipas," pp. 484-6 and Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation,"

p.105.

GREATCHThffiSECOMMENTARY 101

10. See, for instance, Legs bshad snying po (Sarnath: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings

',,'. ting Press, 1973), p. 5. Wonch'uk's text is one of Tsong kha pa's main sources, and ~equently refers to it. Sometimes he accepts W onch'uk' s explanations, and at other

':,:;' es he refutes Wonch'uk and advances his own ideas. See Robert A. F. Thurman's

t~latiOn of the Legs bshad snying po (Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence ,ffTrueE1oquence; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 204-8 for a passage

~which Wonch'uk is cited and discussed at length. I>" Thurman's note 50, pp. 205-6, is worth mentioning for the serious errors that it

!containS. Firstly, he contends that Wonch'uk's commentary is lost in Chinese, which is ~unlIUe(in fact, only some portions are completely lost, and most of the text can still be ;f~undin the Dai-nihon ZokuzOkyo; see note 12). He then indicates that he thinks that ;'Wonch'uk quotes from a commentary on the Sarpdhininnocana by Paramartha, which is ~rnisiaken. Wonch'uk often cites the translation of the Sarpdhinirmocana by Paramartha

; (just as he also often mentions Hsuan-tsang's translation). This is an example of his

'meticulous scholarship, which is unusual among traditional scholars. He often indicates which translation he is following and mentions differences between the Chinese versions

,'()f the sutra. Thurman then makes an almost incomprehensible statement that the reason

:.for the many citations and discussions of Wonch'uk's ideas by Tsong kha pa is that

''Tsong Khapa perhaps wishes to clear the name of Chinese Buddhist scholarship from

the popular stigma, by showing how the Chinese scholar's interpretations were in many

ways preferable to the Indian master's." Thurman mentions the Tibetan version of a doctrinal debate that was purportedly held at Lhasa or Bsam yas between the Chinese Ho

" shang Ma ha ya na and the Indian master Kamala.slla, which Tibetan sources agree was decisively won by Kamala.slla. Thurman's contention that Tsong kha pa was, trying to

'defend the honor of Chinese Buddhist scholarship is extremely improbable. As the present article shows, the more likely reason is that Tsang kha pa discusses Wonch'uk's work

because it is the most extensive commentary on the sutTa in the Tibetan Buddhist canon, and since Tsong kha pa, like Wonch'uk, was a meticulous scholar, when writing his

treatise on the thought of the sutra he read this extensive commentary carefully,

considered its ideas, and in his own work indicated which ofW onch 'uk's ideas he agreed

with and which he found unconvincing.

11. The main edition consulted in the present study is from the Karmapa Press edition of the Sde dge recension of the Tibetan canon (Delhi: Delhi Karmapae Choedhey,

Gyalwae Sungrab Partun Khang, 1985, mdo 'grel, vol. ti [118]).

12. Dai-nihon Zokuzokyo, Hsii tsang ching, Hong Kong Reprint, 1922, vol. 106,

134d-35a.

13. Hong Kong, 1922; see above note. 14. Inaba ShBju, Enjiki Gejinmikkyosho Sanitsububan no kanbunyaku (Kyoto:

H6z6kan, 1949; Restoration ofYiian-tse 's Chieh-shSn-mi-ching-shu Through Its Tibetan

Counterpart (Kyoto: Heirakuji, 1972); reviewed by Nagao Gadjin, in Suzuki Gakujutsu

Zaidan Kenkyii Nempi5 #9, 1972, p. 95. Inaba discusses his methodology in his article "On Chos-grub's Translation of the Chieh-shen-mi-ching-shu," op. cit., pp. 105-113.


, 15. See Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation," p. 105. For a discussion of !:hi author, see W. Pachow, A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahayana BUddhisrns pp.15-20. ," 1

16. This is found on p. 349.8 of Sde dge vol. 118.

17. See David, Snellgrove, Indo-Tibetan Buddhism, pp. 408-9 and 424-5' d' , ,~

Inaba Shoju, "On Chos-grub's Translation," p. 106. 18. See Yamaguchi Zuiho's study of this catalogue in Nantasan B,,'A. _

"""'yo Kenkyiijo Kiyo #9, 1985, pp. 1-61

19. See Inaba, "On Chos-grub's Translation," pp. 106-7, and see also Hadano HakuyIT, "A Note on the Arya-laIikiivatiira-vrtti," Acta Asiatica #29, 1975, pp. 89-9l.

20. See Paul Demieville, "Recents Travaux sur Touen-Houang,"T'oung-pao, vol. ' LVI, 1970, pp. 38-40, 44-5, and 47-63; Inaba, p. 106; and David Snellgrove, A Cultural History of Tibet (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), pp. 23 and 73.

21. See Hadano, "A Note on the AryalaIikavatiira-vrtti," pp. 75-94 and 89-90. 22. See Hadano, p. 89, Demieville, "Recents Travaux," pp. 49-50, and Giuseppe

Tucci, Minor Buddhist Texts II (Rome: IsMEO, 1958), p. 56, note 2. The first Ring lugs pa was Ye shes dbang po (pronounced Ye-shay wang-bo) of

the Ba (rba) family, a pioneer of Buddhism in Tibet, and the second was Dpal dbyangs (pronounced Bay-yang), also of the Ba family, who was appointed by King Khri srong Ide brtsan (pronounced Tri-song-day-dzen). See also Ueyama Daishun, "Donko to Tonka Bukkyogaku (T' an-kuang and Buddhist Studies at Tun-huang)," in TohO Ga1whO #35, 1964, pp. 141-214, where he contends that Chos-grub was of Chinese origin, and not Tibetan as is generally accepted. This is reviewed by Yamaguchi Zuiho in Toyo GakuhO,

1965, pp. 47-44 (reported by Nagao Gadjin, "Reflections on Tibetan Studies in Japan," in Acta Asiatica #29,1975, p. 121). Ueyama's arguments are summarized by Demieville in "Recents Travaux," pp. 48-50 and 29-43, and Yamaguchi's article is summarized on' pp.43-44.

23. See Ueyama Daishun ("Donko to Tonko bukky6gaku"), pp. 141-214. 24. See W. Pachow, A Study of the Twenty-two Dialogues on Mahayana

Buddhism, pp. 15-20. 25. See Demieville, "Recents Travaux sur Touen-Houang," pp. 29-30. Both

Pachow and Demieville report (Pachow p. 21; Demieville p. 29) that T'an-k'uang stayed in the Hsi-ming Monastery. Demieville thinks that he was probably born in 700, and so he probably arrived in Ch'ang-an after Wonch'uk died.

26. Sde dge vols. 118-120; the Peking version begins in vol. 106. 27. Inaba ("On Chos-grub's Translation," p. 109) reports that in the Chinese text

Wonch'uk even cites the volume number according to the Chinese canon of many of his sources, but these are omitted in the Tibetan translation since they would be unnecessary

to Tibetan readers. 28. For example, in the opening section of his work (pp. 2-28), he quotes a total

of thirty-one texts.

GREAT CHINESE COMMENTARY 103

hLOS SARY OF CHINESE CHARACIERS

Ch'ang-an Chieh shen mi ching shu

'Chin ling k'o ching ch'u 'pai-nihon Zokuzokyo 1 Fa-ch 'eng \Fa-hsiang ; Hsi-ming lIsin-lo Hsiu-to Hsu kao seng chilan

.. Hstian-tsang Kan-chou K'uei-chi T'an-k'uang Tao-hstian Tun-huang

.. Tz'u-en . Ytian-tse

nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

,ll. PRESIDENTIAL ADDRES

Some Observations on the Present and Future of Buddhist Studies*

by D. Seyfort Ruegg

At this Conference we are fortunate to be celebrating the fifteenth anniversarY of the founding of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. By the standards of many learned societies this is not a great age, but it is no doubt long enough for our Association to be able to look back and take stock with a sense of some achievement. It may also be an appropriate moment to attempt to loaf ~ri;

The lABS has as its goal the furthering of Buddhist studies throughout th~' world, and it is then fitting if we think of it as being a World Association of Buddhist Studies. By Buddhist studies the lABS understands the seriou~ investigation, by all suitable means, of Buddhism both historically (diachroni-' cally) and descriptively (synchronically). Accordingly, drawing as it does on diverse disciplines such as those of philology, history, archaeology, architecture" epigraphy, numismatics, philosophy, cultural and social anthropology, and the: histories of religion and art, our enterprise is at the same time a disciplinary and ,. a multi-disciplinary one. Buddhism is indeed not only philosophy and/ot, religion, at least in the narrow senses of these terms, but also a way of living and" being, a cultural and value system permitting Buddhists in vast ~eas of the world to construct so much of their mundane as well as spiritual lives.

The kind of serious intellectual investigation promoted by the lABS is certainly in part academic, one pursued in institutions devoted to teaching and!, or research. But only in part. For in view of the prevailing patchy, and often unsatisfactory, implantation of Buddhist studies in universities and research organizations in so many parts of the world, were Buddhist studies to be confined exclusively to these institutions they could run the risk of having a very limited future. Exceptionally fortunate indeed are the places where this is not the case,} and rare are the institutions where Buddhist studies have been regarded as a' discipline meriting an academic chair and structure.

104

FUTURE OF BUDDHIST STUDIES 105

Equally importantly, we see today a significant and serious - if still .... ;-hapS somewhat diffuse - interest in Buddhism among the public, both the pe ung and the . less young, to which the universities find themselves poorly Y~ced to respond. Many will perhaps agree that in order for Buddhist studies to ~burish - even to survive - it will be the task of those concerned with them JO seek to attract and hold the educated attention, interest and support of persons 'Who are not fuB-time professional academics. An effort must be made somehow to achieve a closing of the ancient and entrenched divide between "town" and

}'gown." Scholars of Buddhist studies need to fcister contacts with specialists from other disciplines with whom collaboration may prove fruitful both within and outside the universities: historians and archaeologists, anthropologists, .medical and health specialists, psychologists, those concerned with ethics and .tlle relation between man and his environment, and many more.

Ethics for example has become a focus of attention in many disciplines from philosophy to medicine (and including now business studies). In Buddhism non-injury (a[ vlJhirpsff) is of course an ancient and honoured concept, but its

:implications may not have always been drawn out in their fullness. The question ; of man in relation to nature and his environment is also an old one in Buddhism, ':even if looked at simply from the point of view of the division between the sentient (sattvaloka) and non-sentient world (bhajanaloka). According to a very 'important current of Buddhist thought, moreover, all sentient beings (sar"vasattva) without exception, including of course animals, are considered to have . the Buddha-nature (tathagatagarbha, etc.); certain schools in addition attribute this Buddha-nature also to plants, and it is then thought of as pervading in some way the whole of nature. So it will be of interest to observe how the Buddhist

. traditions have demarcated the areas of man and his environment differently both from each other and from many contemporary discussions on the subject which are of course influenced by quite other religio-philosophical and cultural traditions. 1

Mention has just been made of the problems posed by the patchy implantation of Buddhist studies in universities and research institutions. It is of course true that in South Asia there exists a good deal of activity in various branches of Buddhist studies associated with established university posts, but

. 'less perhaps than in former years and less also than might be hoped for in view of the fact that Buddhism originated and took on so many of its developments in this part of the world. As for Europe, the number of university chairs in Buddhist studies can probably still all be counted on the fingers of one hand; and other full-time teaching and research posts dedicated to these studies are not numerous. In Japan, certainly, the situation is very different, so much so that it can be said that it is there that Buddhist studies have their greatest geographical density and are achieving their greatest academic intensity. In America until about a decade ago Buddhist studies suffered from a paucity of established


. academic posts, but significant progress has been made since then. And hii~ note.v:'0rthy that this, development has benefite~ the study of the BUdclhi~s traditIons of Southeast, East and even Central Asia as well as of South Asm;'i~ further remarkable de~elop~e~t in the United States in parti~ular has beenill1 appearance of accredited InstItutes and colleges of BuddhIst studies w!{'li1

. address themselves to the needs of a public that does not consist solely of Youn ~~.~~ full-time students, and which attempt also to bridge the gap between profesSio~~ scholars of Buddhism and those who are not academics.j;~~

A comparison of the present situation of Buddhist studies in Ameri'J~~ Europ~ and Ja?an is. instructive and it suggests s~me observations. First, in Euro~l BuddhIst studies, WIth only a few notable exceptIons, have tended to be concerned' with Indian Buddhism whereas in North America they deal at least as often wiili~ East Asian and occasionally Southeast or Central Asian Buddhism. Secondly,'t{ continental Europe most posts in Buddhist studies are either in departments of Indian or Asiatic/Oriental studies whereas in North America - and now in th~;, United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand - they are increasingly ofieti~ located elsewhere, especially in departments of religion and philosophy or mudht more rarely in departments of history. Thirdly (and perhaps partly as!"a~ consequence of the second point), in America there may be two - in ver}i1, favourable cases even more - scholars of different traditions of Buddhism~ working in the same academic unit, wh~reas in Europe it is still exceptional ~ have full posts in several traditions of Buddhism at a single institution. In Japi\if! the academic organization of Buddhist studies seems to combine features of iller! systems characteristic of continental Europe and America, and a tendency to joi~~ both appears to be making some headway elsewhere too. The idea of locatirig~ Buddhist studies in a department of religion is of course not totally without parallel and indeed precedent in Europe, for at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes fIf)' Paris Buddhist studies were already represented from the inception in 1886 of its': Section des Sciences Religieuses by Sylvain Levi. Generalizations are of cOui~e~! always risky, and it is often possible to point to opposite tendencies in any given'! area. At all events, the two models for the organization of Buddhist studies just! mentioned - the one that places them in a department of Indian or Asiaticli Oriental studies and the one that locates them in departments of religion and/or'~ philosophy or, occasionally, of history - can lend disciplinary varietYt~;0 Buddhist studies., ;;,

Placing Buddhist studies in departments of religion, philosophy or histoif:~ could, it is true, result in their being distanced if not totally divorced from tile} historical and philological disciplines - Indology, Sinology, etc., - devoted~~:~~ the cultural areas in which Buddhism originated and developed. In other woids;l~ the academic study of Buddhism might find itself being organized withoutdu~'~: regard being accorded to its historical matrix and cultural context. This potenti~4~ danger has perhaps been reinforced, in America in particular, by the surprisiiJg~ and indeed paradoxical circumstance that, not infrequently, Buddhist studies have.r!

,iI


represented little or not at all where Indian studies were otherwise strong conversely, Indian studies have not always been cultivated where stUdies were represented. This is once more but a generalization, and

are exceptions which - since things are always changing - may become the rule. At all events, it should be clear that Buddhist studies - however they can benefit from close contact with the disciplines of religious studies

philoSl:>ptlY or of history to which they in tum have very much to contribute be solidly based in philology (in the comprehensive sense of this word)

studies . . If in Europe the link between Buddhist studies on the one side and

on the other has usually been very close, one consequence has been that the fact that chairs of Buddhism have been so rare - very many

tinl~U1:snea scholars of Buddhism in Europe have actually occupied professorof Sanskrit and Indian studies rather than of Buddhist studies. This, as

noted, can have the very important advantage of keeping the study of fmnly anchored in its historical matrix and cultural context. But such

;,~"''';T"''T of Asian studies inevitably carries the danger that the successor of of Buddhism will not be a specialist in our studies at all but in some

different branch of Indology, Sinology, etc. In an age of increasing specialization, moreover, it is growing ever more

to maintain the idea, prevalent since the foundation of Asian studies, of in for example Sanskrit and Indian studies that may be filled equally by

a classical Sanskritist or a specialist in Indian Buddhism. (The ~"".''''''''O of institutes and seminar libraries alone can make such shifting from

of Indology, Sinology, etc., to another .highly problematic from a practical point of view.) I cannot see that sufficient recognition has been

to this problem, and to the risk it involves, in any but a very small handful EUI'o~;:an universities. In Japan on the other hand the system adopted, in the

universities in particular, of distinct established chairs in Buddhist beside chairs of Sanskrit and Indian philosophy has quite successfully

(1(1n~sseX1 this real problem for our discipline. How this problem of chairs and continuity will be resolved in the North American universities still remains seen. Without established and continuing structures ~d without strong and

academic traditions it is at any rate hard to see how any discipline can first place become established and then, once established, develop and

•••. v ..... ,,· u. Vigorous and sustained efforts need to be made towards consolidating study of the different traditions of Buddhism at universities and research

~U.L''''U~1U''. Outside South and Southeast Asia dedicated posts in PaIi and the ner~IVa(1a tradition of Buddhism are almost unknown. Only a very small handful posts exist for Central Asian Buddhism, in particular for the Tibetan and

traditions. And outside Japan surprisingly few exist for such areas as the Buddhist traditions of China and Japan. The development

108 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

. of Buddhist studies has indeed often proved difficult, and one Clli,not altogeth escape the impression that inertia, perhaps even opposition, has been greater th: might legitimately have been hoped and expected. This is not the place to go int this phenomenon. But it does appear pertinent at least to allude to it if only i~ order to pose the question whether this situation reflects, to some degree that is difficult to ascertain, a cultural or ideological prejudice, perhaps even a more Or less unconscious attitude of anti-clerical secularism or anti-monasticism. As for the study of Buddhist philosophy, it has no doubt been affected by the fact that, in recent years, the development of the human and social sciences (welcome though this was) has been accompanied by a retreat in philosophy - a subject that one would have thought to be essential to these very sciences.

A very strong plea must also be entered here for pursuing research in Buddhist studies in close collaboration with competent scholars from BUddhist countries who are well trained in their intellectual and spiritual traditions. The. need for this kind of collaboration might appear altogether obvious were it not for the fact that, to the detriment of scholarship as well as of mutual understanding in these studies, it has too often been overlooked.

We have probably all come to see that the universalist scholar in Indology, Sinology, etc., is something of the past, noble though the ideal of comprehensive know ledge still remains and however successful this ideal of scholarship may have been before specialization developed to the degree we now know. The problems of the universalist scholar and the generalist are ones that may concern . us within the field of Buddhist studies also. For here too specialization is inevitable, and it is growing at a rapid and daunting pace. Communication, both intellectual and organizational, among the various disciplines and trends represented within the broad purview of Buddhist studies is sometimes proving . difficult. Even the question of the usefulness of holding general congresses such as the present one is being raised. A historian dealing with Buddhism might perhaps ask what he can find in a congress where much time is spent in discussing philosophy and religion, and some philosophers and religionists might ask how they can benefit from a conference where anthropology or archaeology are legitimate subjects of discussion. Nonetheless, while we acknowledge both the inevitability and the very real benefits of specialization - and therefore the usefulness of holding smaller colloquia devoted to the emerging specialisms in· Buddhist studies - it seems to me that there remains a need for a com prehensive congress where the overarching concerns - theoretical and practical, disciplinary and interdisciplinary - of Buddhist studies can be addressed. This Conference may wish also to consider the question of promoting in the future specialized colloquia alongside our periodical General Conferences. If the latter were for example to be held every three or four years, smaller thematic and regional colloquia could be organized in the intervals.


I have mentioned that Buddhist studies have, traditionally, most often been placed i.n philolo~ically and h~storic~lly oriented departments or faculties "fAsiatic/Onental studIes, and thatm thenmeteenth century and through several ~eCades of the twentieth century this arrangement served them well, allowing them to make very remarkable progress. But since the 19608 in particular have we not heard much about a supposed lack of "relevance" of the philological and historical disciplines, not to speak of philosophy? And especially since the 1970s, with the publication of Edward Said's book Orientalism (1978), has not an attack been mounted on Orientalism for its supposed racial, cultural and 'Political biases? This critic of Orientalism once took a great Sanskritist and scholar of Buddhism, Sylvain Levi, as a target in his very sweeping campaign. And commenting on Levi's having connected Orientalism and politics in an interview,2 Said has written:

"For all his expressed humanism, his admirable concern for fellow creatures,

Levi conceives the present juncture in unpleasantly constricted terms .... The

Oriental is imagined to feel his world threatened by a superior civilization; yet his

motives are impelled ... by rancor or jealous malice. The panacea offered for this

potentially ugly turn of affairs is that the Orient should be marketed for a Western

consumer, be put before him as one among numerous wares .... By a single stroke

you will defuse the Orient ... and you will appease Western fears of an Oriental

tidal wave. At bottom ... Levi's principal point - and his most telling confession

- is that unless something is done about the Orient, 'the Asiatic drama will

approach the crisis point. '''3

. To anyone familiar with Levi's oeuvre, this representation of it will appear so tangential by its focus on the manipulative and exploitative as to render his ideas and position hardly recognizable for us.

Yet the practitioners of what in academic circles is often still being called Orientalism must now, I think, be conscious - at least somewhat more so than they were in the past - of their pre-judgements (not to say prejudices) and be more critically aware of both their pre-suppositions and their methodologies . . Orientalism and with it our own discipline, when not in a phase of antiquarianism and a rather unreflective positivism, seem quite often to have found themselves being buffeted between exoticism and attempts at "relevance" motivated either by sheer fashion or by considerations of trade and commerce with Asia. The .dangers of fashion and radical chic are now being encountered in the problems ansing in connection with curricular pluralism and "cultural studies" - things that could, however, be made very worthwhile provided of course that they are pursued on a solid foundation. Regrettably, far from contributing to greater scholarly and critical awareness, the fashion for so-called relevance as well as the stance of anti-Orientalism, generating heat rather than light, appear not to have made matters better.


It might be that Orientalism as represented in our institutions will so (though for quite ?ther reasons) be as m~ch overtaken .by d.evelopments, ;~ hence as much a thmg of the past, as the unIversal Indologlst, Smologist, etc. And. the change in name of our great sister (or rather, in view of its age, mother) institution from Congress of Orientalists first to Congress of Human SCience in Asia and North Africa and then to Congress of Asian and North Afric~ Studies had perhaps after all a certain justification that was not only politico, ideological but genuinely intellectual. For the lABS too such debates are probably not altogether without pertinency.

Let us now tum briefly to a couple of developments in Buddhist stUdies over the past fifteen years or so. Most welcome has been the resurgence in Pali Buddhist studies after a period of eclipse relative to their former state. This is especially gratifying since, after all, the Pali canon (together with its exegetical traditions elaborated in the Theravada school) represents one of the main pillars in the great hall of Buddhist studies as well as of Buddhism as a living tradition .. Another specialism, Tibetan Buddhist studies, has also made a good deal of progress in this period despite the considerable obstacles in the way of the i

establishment of Tibetology as an academic discipline. The development of this specialism too is gratifying because of the great significance of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions when considering the religious, philosophical and cultural role of Buddhism as a way of thought and practice that has remained very much

.. alive until the present day. Occasionally these two traditions within Buddhism have, however, been

seen as antithetical in their religious and philosophical positions, and sometimes (e.g., in contemporary Nepal, and elsewhere too) they are even regarded as rivals in competition with each other. It is of course true that the Buddhist traditions of Tibet and Mongolia are deeply imbued by the Mahayana whilst the PaIi canon and the Theravada school are normally to be classified as Sravakayanist.4 But what has sometimes been lost sight of is the fact that Tibetan-Mongolian Buddhism is by no means exciusiveiyMahayanist or Vajrayanist. In fact, like any Buddhist order of monks or Srupgha, the monastic order in Tibet and Mongolia is founded on the Vinaya, in this case the one belonging to the Miilasarvastivadins which is one of the great Sravakayanist Schools and (in so far as they are Vinaya-Schools) Orders (nikaya). Furthermore, in Tibetan philosophical thought Vasubandhu's Abhidhannakosa, representing as it does the doctrines of the Vaibha~ika and Sautrantika schools of the Sravakayana, is one of the fundamental points of reference and, accordingly, one of the prescribed textbooks in Tibetan seminaries. In the Tibetan and Mongolian canons, the bKa' 'gyur, there are moreover to be found a number of texts parallel to Pali Suttantas, and some that were apparently translated from Pali;5 and the Buddhist tradition in Tibet has accorded due attention to these siitras belonging to what is in Buddhist historiography and doxography frequently described as


fh&Buddha's first ~~g of the Wheel ofth~ Dharma. It is ther~fore fitti~g that Ini~pali Text Soc:ety IS at prese~t supportmg a research project to edit ~d ~slate severl;ll sutras from the TIbetan bKa' 'gyur and to compare them WIth f~allels extant in Pili as well as in Sanskrit. .¥;C'. In Buddhist studies uncertainty and perplexity have been c31used by the ~flStion as to how best and most precisely to use the terms SI:avakayana, irtnayana and Theravada, which are sometimes being employed as if they were ~filctically coterminous equivalents to which Mahayana (or Bodhisattvayana) is tarttithetically (or even hostilely) opposed. f:S Strictly speaking - and very notably in the usage of the Tibetan {~iographers and descriptions of the Path - the Sravakayana (Tib. nan thos kyi 'lh~g pa, the "Vehicle of the Auditor") is indeed contrasted with the Mahayana OCJib. theg pa chen po, the "Great Vehic~e"), but these two Vehicles are ;ffonetheless very frequently regarded as bemg complementary rather than as ~bsolutely exclusive of (or hostilely opposed to) each other. For Tibetan ~bddhist tradition in fact acknowledges both to be authentically founded in the i}Vord of the Buddha (buddhavacana) and to correspond to the Buddha's Isutcessive turnings of the Wheel of the Dharma. This view of the matter may ~~adopted in the perspective of that version of the triyana-theory in which the ~ihtee Vehicles of the Sravaka, Pratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva, classified in an t~cending hierarchical order, are acknowledged as separate and ultimately ~ilistinct yanas bringing different types of individuals - divided according to ~their spiritual categories or "genes" (gotra) - to their respective and different lfmal destinations, namely the three distinct kinds of Awakening (bodfu) ~it:Cognized in this theory. Or on the contrary, and a fortiori, this view of the iYehicles may be taken in the perspective of the theory of the One Vehicle ~(ekayana) according to which the three yanas are accepted not as ultimately p,separate Vehicles leading to ultimately distinct kinds of liberation, but as all ~Jinally converging in the single and unique Vehicle (the ekayana= buddhayana) :i:~hereby all sentient beings will reach Buddhahood. In this second perspective, i,ihen, the theory of three Vehicles and of separate spiritual gotras has only :provisional validity. For in this case the distinct yanas of the Sravaka, ;)>ratyekabuddha and Bodhisattva serve to convey persons of the corresponding ;igotrasto genuine yet provisional spiritual destinations without, however, leading 1;00 radically distinct spiritual goals; and they finally converge together in the ,¥ekayana or buddhayana in conformity with the theory of the tathagatagarbha or 'e13uddha-nature according to which all sentient beings ultimately achieve ~briddhahood. ' c,' Now the fact that the Sravakayana, the first of the turnings of the Wheel ";of the Dharma, has been considered by Mahayanist hermeneuticians to be not i;of definitive and certain meaning (nItiirtha = nges don) but rather of philosoph it;~ally and soteriologically provisional meaning, and thus to require further I interpretation in another sense (neyartha = drang don), was not simply a crude


. attempt by Mahayanists to denigrate non-Mahaya,rtist texts and doctrines. In f Mahayanist hermeneutics considers a large body of its own Mahayana sCript~ct, - either those belonging to the second or to the third turning of the Wheel e~ the Dharma - to be neyartha too. 0

On the other hand, the Hinayana (Tib. theg dman, also theg chung th "Small Vehicle" or "Lesser Vehicle") - a term that embraces both'the

Sravakayana and the Pratyekabuddhayana - is antithetically opposed to the Bodhisat~vayana (Tib. by~g sems kyi theg pa) in~much as it is a Vehicle tha~ does not mclude the BodhIsattva's Path but constItutes a Path leading rather t Arhatship conceived of as different from Buddhahood. Where Hinayana ha~ been employed as a historical designation either for pre-Mahayana BUddhism Or for Buddhism that is not specifically Mahayanist, but without any specific reference being actually intended to the Path (marga) of the Small Vehicle of the Arhat in contradistinction to the Path of the Bodhisattva, the tenn Sravakayana can usefully be substituted both in the interests of the terminological and conceptual clarity required in scholarly work and in order to avoid the use of a possibly disparaging expression. Alongside features that are strictly speaking characteristically Hinayanist - that is, that are specific to the path of an Arhat in contradistinction to that of a Bodhisattva - the Sravakayana also comprises elements that are so to say neutral - i.e., largely mainstream and non-specific to any single Buddhist yana- and (in some of its forms) even elements that point in the direction of what is known as the Mahayana.

As for the term Theravada, literally "Doctrine of the Elders," linguistically it is of course simply the PaIi word that corresponds to Skt. Sthaviravada, the name given to that great trunk of Buddhism opposed to the MahasaJTIghika at the time of a disagreement in early Indian Buddhism. Sthaviravada is thus a comprehensive term that covers several of the traditional Schools/Orders or Nikayas (e.g., the Sarvastivada, Dharmaguptaka, etc.,) and may accordingly cover a wider area than the Pali term Theravada. But since Sthaviravada does not embrace all the Nikayas, this term cannot properly be used as an equivalent of what has been termed "Nikaya Buddhism." Furthermore, it has to be borne in mind that in the course of its long history the Theravada too has not been altogether unfamiliar with the Bodhisattva-ideal;6 this School indeed passed through a number of the developments that its sister-schools in India knew. Moreover, to take for scholarly purposes the name Theravada as a designation for "early" or "original" Buddhism (i.e., the teaching of the historical Buddha)1 in contrast to later developments - that is, in effect to identify Theravada and Buddhavacana8 - is, historically speaking, a very wide (and eventually tendentious) use of the word.9 Nor can Theravada designate the whole of socalled "Nikaya Buddhism" any more than can its Sanskrit counterpart Sthaviravada. In sum, the term Theravada is in fact required by the historian of Buddhism as a technical mime to designate one of the many schools deriving from early Buddhism, namely the venerable tradition of the Theras that traces its descent

FUTURE OF BUDDHIST STIJDIES 113

rtlrOUgh Asoka's son, the Elder Mahinda who established it in the middle of the ibif4 century BeE in ~ri ~a whence it spread ver;: ex~nsively in So~theast ~a. Today Th~ravada IS usual~~ understood by ~Istonans of_B.u~dhl~m a~ ,€signating specafically the tradItIon co~nec.ted With the Mahavlhara I~ Sn ~.IO On the contrary, when reference IS bemg made to the above-mentIoned ~lddivision of Nikaya Buddhism which is opposed to the Mahasarnghika, and ~St specifically to the Buddhist tradition of Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, the ~torian has available the Sanskrit term Sthaviravada which, as just mentioned, I'llsed more comprehensively than Pali Theravada and is therefore appropriate {S designate the broader group of School~/Orders in question. I;, .. Consequently; to regard the names Sravakayana, Hinayana, Sthaviravada ~dTheravada as coterminous equivalents (except only to the extent that the ~e Hinayana might be understood as a more or less disparaging one) qespite ftliifact that they enter into distinct combinations and into quite different pairs ~fferms and concepts, and then to make them en bloc the radical antithesis of lMahayana, can only render the terminology unserviceable for tracing the ~6mplex historical developments in Buddhism and for describing its no less !5inplex spiritual paths. ~i:~;~:,-~ . Ii;, . If only the Pilii and the Tibetan traditions of Buddhism have been dwelt tan here, this is certainly not because I consider them to be somehow more ~{Oiportant than others, but rather in order to attempt to show by means of ~amples how two Buddhist traditions that may perhaps appear to us as in some tnse "imtipodal"ll in relation to each other are, nevertheless, not heterogeneous I·, find totally irreconcilable in the broad and rich frame of Buddhist theory and . f~ractice. My observations relate at the same time to several of the gaps in oUr ~iliscipline to which attention was usefully called by G. M. Nagao in his r~esidential address to the first Conference of our Association in 1978,12 Much !;yery valuable work has of course also been carried out over the past decade and ~['half in the Buddhist traditions transmitted in Sanskrit (of which in fact the ~:Buddhism of Tibet is in large part a prolongation), and in those of East and ~~:()Utheast Asia. Let me also recall here the emphasis Nagao laid on the need to (bring to bear in Buddhist studies what he termed the analytical and synthetic fa.pproaches - i.e., the method whereby pieces of information accumulated from ~Various sources are established as reliable data and the method by which these i~tablished data are then made to yield a humanistically meaningful historical ~;and descriptive account of Buddhist thought, practice and culture-and reiterate &~e plea for a solid philological (by which I do not of course mean only linguistic) ~f()undation for studies in the history, religion, philosophy and iconology of ~~uddhism.

it ~}. At the start of this address I said that in Buddhist studies we can look back tpver the fifteen years that have passed since the founding of the lABS with a

I.

114 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

~ense. of achievement. Some of this achieve~ent has been mirrored in alJd contnbuted to by our Journal. The JJABS has III fact a very essential functi'\; to fulfIl both as an organ of the Association, recording its conferences and OL~~ activities, and as an outlet for articles, book-reviews and reports on sympoSiaari~j the like which reflect the many facets of Buddhist studies world-wide. Som' articles may also seek to respond to th~ needs of our r~dership whi~h is Varied;, and presumably not composed exclusIvely of professIOnal academIcs in BUd! dhist studies. And precisely because few can aspire to being experts in each arid every aspect of Buddhist studies, we probably require more reports arid bibliographical surveys that keep specialists in one branch abreast of develop, ments in others. The philologist and the historian of religion and philosophy will for example requir~ information about importantrece~t devel?pments in history} archaeology, art hIStOry, etc., as they bear on BuddhIst studies. Above all, our organization will wish to promote this scholarly exchange on a world-wide basis.

The present and future of Buddhist studies are of course to be seen not onl;, as the product of what happens in universities and learned societies but ill correlation, at least in part, with the world situation, and also, it has to be added with the trials and troubles through which so many Buddhist peoples and the~ Sarpghas have passed. In that great arc of Buddhist civilization stretching frolll Tibet and Sri Lanka in the west to Korea and Japan in the east, few indeed hav6( been the Buddhist peoples that have been spared prolonged and terrible calamities during this century. The events to which I am referring have inevitably had a deep impact on Buddhism - both on the Sarpgha and also on the Dharma-" as-teaching (desanadhanna) in its temporal situation - in the areas concerned and thus, if only indirectly, on Buddhist studies. For it can hardly be supposed that there exists no correlation between the welfare and well-being -the hitasukha - of the Buddhist peoples and the flourishing of Dharma and Sarpgha on' the one side and the condition of Buddhist studies on the other side. Let us hOpe' that the well-being that some peoples having a Buddhist heritage now enjoy may prove to be also a harbinger of amelioration elsewhere.

NOTES

* Presidential address delivered on the 19th july 1991 on the occasion of the Tenth Conference of the lABS held at UNESCO, Paris. The author wishes to thank the Spalding

Trust for a travel grant.

.1. The role of environmentalism in Buddhism has become highly topical. For the

Fourteenth Dalai Lama's espousal of this cause for Tibet and the Himalayan region and for his proposal of a Zone of AhiITlSa. see his Freedom in Exile (London, 1990), pp. 274-5: "The Tibetan plateau would be transformed into the world's largest natural park or biosphere. Strict laws would be enforced to protect wildlife and plant life; the exploitation


c fnaturalresources would be carefully regulated so as not to damage relevant ecosystems; P d a policy of sustainable development would be adopted in populated areas." >~ Concerning nature and environmentalism in Buddhism, see recently L. S~Iunithausen, "Buddhismus und Natur," in: R. Panikkar and W. Strolz, Die Verantwor

(uIJg des Menschen ffir eine bewohnbare Welt in Christen tum. Hinduismus und

Buddhismus (Freiburg-Basel-Wien, 1985), pp. 100-33; K. Inada, "Environmental

Ptoblematics in the Buddhist Context," Philosophy East and West37 (1987), pp. 135-49; imd the discussions connected with the 1990 Tsurumi/Osaka International Garden and Greenery Exhibition reported in Revista de Estudios budistas 1 (1991). For the question

of ecology, etc., in Buddhism, reference can be made to the bibliography and brief discussion in 1. Harris, "How Environmentalist is Buddhism?," Religion 21 (1991), pp.

\01-14. 2. Une heure avec M. Sylvain Levi, Indianiste, Professeur au College de France,

par Frederic Lefevre, in Nouvelles Litteraires, 14 March 1925, reprinted in Memorial

Sylvain Levi (Paris, 1937), pp. 118-25. 3. E. Said, Orientalism (Penguin ed., London, 1985), pp. 249-50.

4. The terms Sravakayana and Sravakayanist are here being used advisedly instead

ofHInayana and HInayarust. See below. 5. Nos. 747-759 in the Beijing edition, translatedby AnandaSrl and Nyi rna rgyal

mtshan dpal bzang po of Thar pa gling (Thar pa Lo tsa ba, a teacher of Bu ston Rin chen

grub, 1290-1364). 6. Even though in Sri Lanka the Bodhisattva-concept seems to have been

associated especially closely with kingship, concerning the bodhisatta mahasatta as a

spiritual type - as distinct from bodhisatta used as an appellative to designate Gotama Sakyamuni prior to his attainment ofbuddhahood and including his earlier existences

see Buddhaghosa, Visuddhimgga iii. 128 (ed. Kosambi, p. 94) and ix.124 (p. 270). And on the paramitasila, the highest form of sila exercised for the purpose of the liberation of all beings (sabbasattavimokkha), see Visuddhimagga i.33 (p. 12). - On sammasam

bodhi as distinct from savakabodhi and pacceka(sam)bodhi, see (in addition to the

Khuddakapajha, p. 7, on savakaparamL paccekabodhi and buddhabhuml) the Lokuttarasampattiniddesa (Chap. viii) of the UpasakajaniilaiJkara, p. 340 ff. (which mentions

sirvakabuddhas and paccekasambuddhas). Cf. W. Rahula, "L' ideal du Bodhisattva dans Ie Theravada et Ie Mahayana," Journal Asiatique 1971, p. 68 f.

7. Under the entry theravada, the Pali Text Society's Dictionary (London, 1925)

has given both "the doctrine of the Theras" and "the original Buddhist doctrine."

8. See R. C. Childers, A Dictionary of the Pali Language (London, 1875), s.v.

virdo: "Theravado is a term applied to the orthodox doctrines or word of Buddha as settled

at the first Sailgiti." Childers quotes the DJpavilf!lsa (iv. 6, 13).

9. It is to be noted that as used alongside fiiii,Javada in the pari canon (Majjhirna

nikayai, pp.I64-165, inconnexion with Alara Kalama and UddakaRamaputta) theravada

, has in fact a quite different meaning from the one it acquired in the DJpavarpsa and comparable later texts. In other words, in the Pali canon theravadahas neither the meaning

of (buddha)sasana it has acquired in the historical literature of Sri Lanka, nor the meaning


of original Buddhism given it by some modern writers.

Needless to say, what is being stated here is defInitely not meant to deny the f~;' that the buddhavacana as recorded in the Piili canon of the Theravadins has become:,t( integral part of the tradition of this school, which is of course based on it. But by the SllIIl'c token the buddhavacana as recorded in the canons of the Sarvastivadins, Dhannagu ; takas, etc., has become an integral part of these Nikaya-traditions, which are sirnil:u-i:;

based on these canons. Thus, much of the contents as such of the Theravadin canon ar~ no more (and of course no less) Theravada in the historical sense of this term than th';;: e. contents of, e.g., the Sarvastivadin canon are Sarvastivada in the historical sense. But if it were the case that the philosophical and religious contents of the canon of the Theraviidll'

school are Theravada, by the same token the contents of the canons of the Sarviistiv8da' school, etc., will be Sarvastivada, etc.; and as a result the same (or very similar) BUddhaJ word would be termed sometimes Theravada and sometimes Sarvastivada, etc., for n6' otherreason than that it happens to be found in the canon of this or that Nikaya even wheri': it is coinmon to other canonical traditions. ' ,

Nevertheless, the expressions 'Theravadin canon," "Sarvastivadin canon," ete:;';

may serve perfectly legitimately to designate a particular canon as redacted anr transmitted by the Theravada, Sarvastivada, etc., schools. These canons may then b~:~ specifIcally Therav~din, Sarvastivadin, etc., in respect to their linguistic expressio~{'

structure, etc., but not in their religious and philosophical contents which may in fact bJl: largely mainstream and thus not Nikaya-specifIc. :.{'\

10. Historically, Sinhalese Buddhism embraced other traditions too, e.g., that of: the Abhayagiri Vihiira. And it has to be recognized that in a later mainland BUddhist!

source such as VinItadeva's *Samayabhedoparacanacakra-Nikiiyabhedopadarsan~_: sarpgraha, the school of the gnas brtan pa (= sthavira) is identifIed only by its subdivision'S';

of Ietavamya, Abhayagirivasin and Mahavihiiravasin without any continental represen::~ tative being mentioned. Hence, in effect, it is represented as being the Tamrap3I1)iya, or Sri Lanka, school. This appears to indicate that the only, or at least the mam:1

representatives of the Sthaviras (as a school) known to the later Indian and to the TibetariJ

historiographical and doxographical traditions were indeed to be found in Sri Lanka: at ~~ 0

On the Mahayana in Sri Lanka, see especially S. Paranavitana, "Mahayanism ·ht~ Ceylon," Ceylon Journal of Science (Section G: Archaeology, Ethnology, etc.), ii (1928-1 33), pp. 35-71; H. Saddhatissa (ed.), UpiisakajanilaiJkiira (London, 1965), Introduction,;':

pp. 104-11; Nandasena Mudiyanse, Mahayana Monuments in Ceylon (Colombo, 1967);1 H. Bechert, "Mahayana literature in Sri Lanka: the early phase," in: L. Lancaster (ed.y,' .

Prajiiiipiiramitii and Related Systems (Studies in Honor of E. Conze, Berkeley, 1977), PP:'! 361-8; and G. Schopen, 'The text on the 'Dhiiran:il Stones from Abhayagiriya,'" JIABS, 5/1 (1982), pp. 100-08 Cf. also J. C. Holt, Buddha in the Crown: Avalokitesvara in thb'\

, ~~,::~ ).',.,

~/::; ; ',.r'/ :;;"::i


f!J~ddhist Traditions of Sri Lanka (New York, 1991). ~~:o? On the question of "Mahayana Therav ada" in Hsuan-tsang' s writings, see recently t!:Birakawa, A History of Indian Buddhism (Hawaii, 1990), p. 257. E. Lamotte, Histoire 'fi~;bouddhisme in.dien (Louvain, 1958), pp. 596-601, refers, perhaps more appropriately, ~t;·Mahayanasthaviras. They are located by Hsuan-tsang not only in Sri Lanka but also iththe mainland at Bodh Gaya and Bharukaccha, and in Kalinga and Sur~!ra; it is not [fib-tam what language(s) they used. Hsuan-tsang also refers to monks who studied both ~rth~ Great and the Little Vehicles; cf. E. Lamotte, "Sur la formation du Mahayana," ~lj4siatica (Festschrift F. Weller, Leipzig, 1954), p. 395, and Histoire, p. 60l. ti\. 11. In using the expression "antipodal," I am not thinking only of the difference ~~lhe geographical distribution of the Vehicles in South and North Asia but also of a t~ertain polarity be~een them, poles being of course not only opposed but also in

Ift6mplementary tenSIOn. j~;0;~

• .;i.': 12 . See JIABS 1{2 (1979), pp. 79-85.

nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

ill. AN EXCHANGE

The Theatre of Objectivity: Comments on Jose Cabezon's Interpretations of mKhas grub rje's and C. W. Huntington, Jr. 's Interpretations of the Tibetan Translation of a Seventh Century Indian dhist Text

by C W. Huntington.lr.

I

During the past year several journals have published reviews of my book, Th~"~ Emptiness of Emptiness.l The authors of these reviews raise a number of engaging questions regarding my work on early Madhyamika. No meaningful; discussion on these issues can take place, however, until we have gone much deeperinto the problem of methodology. Although I shall focus my remarks here on an essay by Jose Cabez6n I would, in fact, like to draw attention to another piece as well, a long article by Paul Williams that is full of interesting and controversial opinions. It will be seen that both of these reviews are marked by a common leitmotif that bears directly on some important matters of general concern having to do with the translation and interpretation of Indian Buddhist texts.

At the very outset I would like to thank my reviewers for their generous assessment of my work. I doubt that anyone could be more severe with the book . than I am myself. The truth is that I can barely open the cover without contemplating some stylistic or thematic problem. That they have recorded so. many favorable reactions to what I have written is certainly gratifying. I was. particularly encouraged by Mr. Cabez6n's judgement of the translation. Of course he is absolutely correct about the difficulty of translating ancient technical treatises like the Madhyamakavatara and in retrospect there are several changes I would be tempted to make if! had the chance. For example, I like his suggestion ..• of "provisional meaning" for neyartha. In any case, before I leap into a detailed· account of my specific concerns I want to express my sincere appreciation for the general tenor of these reviews which, in my estimation, manage to be both

118

EMPTINESS OF EMPTIJ\iESS 119

';telligent and nonadversarial. What I have to say here can not help but appear £t~rical; I only hope that, with care, I might succeed in maintaining the high 't~tandard set by. Mr. C~bez6n, Mr. Willi~s and the others who have taken the Mfouble to publish therr valuab~e o~servatIons on ~y res~h. I,,' To be perfectly honest, m spIte of all I have Just srud I must confess iliat :1 read a great deal of Mr. Cabezon's review with a sort of horrified fascination. ,J can not imagine ever encountering more dramatic evidence of just what little ,dontrOl an author has over how his work is understood. By the time I reached

Jibe final paragraph I was dumbfounded. How could a man who is virtually my ideal reader possibly have come up with an interpretation of my book that

:Idirectly conflicts with my own understanding of what I had written on so many vital issues? It really is startIing, the extent to which ilie meaning of one's words

,'{eludes even one's own grasp. Near ilie beginning of his review Mr. Cabez6n >~tes " ... it is ironic that the main ilirust of Huntington's introduction should 'be so at odds wiili the dGe lugs pa reading of ilie Madhyamaka" (p. 131). And ';,yet as I made my way through his presentation of what he refers to as "the dGe . jugs pa reading" I discovered that ilie difference between my own understanding "ofMadhyarnika and that of mKhas grub rje did not appear to be nearly so striking

as I had been led to expect. To be precise, I found myself in disagreement not 'only with Mr. Cabezon's interpretation of aspects of my own book but also with "his understanding of several passages drawn from mKhas grub rje's sTong thun " chen rno - all of which raises, I believe, several interesting hermeneutical ; problems. It is iliese problems iliat I would like to address in what follows, for, ,:, as Gadamer and others have argued, there is an intimate relationship between the 'tools a scholar brings to his research and ilie conclusions he reaches. To devalue

this relationship is to compromise one's capacity for just tlle sort of self-critical . ,reflection tllat is tlle lifeblood of any intellectual work. , If our effort to make sense out of Buddhist literature is to be convincing

then this effort must be suffused with an equally intense and overt interest in exhuming not only tlle presuppositions of Indian and Tibetan authors, but our own presuppositions and preconceptions as well. As a corollary to this general principle I would suggest that if we are radically to challenge tlle accepted interpretations of Indian Madhyamika texts - iliat is, if we are interested in

,developing a persuasive philosophical interpretation of Nagarjuna and the other "'early Indian Madhyamikas, one that we might have the courage, finally, to call

our own - ilien we must radically challenge the accepted models of scholarship. The first, laborious step in this process is to uneartlltlle assumptions that empower tllese models and bring tllem up into tlle light where we can get a close look at exactly what it is tllat we are dealing with.

II

To begin with I want to discuss very briefly a few prominent instances where


Mr. Cabez6n and I seem to be in less than perfect accord over the.meaning" implications of what I wrote in my book. The list of examples I have chose~~i discuss is representative, but by no means comp'rehensive, for it is no(~~~ purpose here to contest his claim to have presented "one interpretation"i CandraIdrti that varies radically from the one presented in the introduction:~: [The Emptiness of Emptiness]"(p. 153). Rather I wish only to suggest that t1{' claim becomes extremely problematic given that the two of us - Mr. Cabez~~' and myself - do in fact hold distinctly different interpretations, if nor({l CandraIdrti, then most certainly of Huntington. Let me be more expliciti;ir#

"Intuitively one might say," Mr. Cabez6n writes on page 159, "thattlii' Madhyamikas argue for their beliefs against ... different opponents, butfc)f Huntington this is not possible, since what they are doing is not philosophy." M::; Cabez6n's conviction that I do not take CandraIdrti's text to be properii philosophical permeates his review. So far as I can see, this conviction it apparently rooted in my references to the philosopher Richard Rorty and hiJ; remarks on the "nonphilosophicallanguage" of William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein. While I realize that my readers may not be versed in Rorty' s work;; I had hoped that the significance of this expression could be determined within" the wider context of my discussion in the introduction. "Nonphilosophical"in" Rorty's admittedly idiosyncratic usage means "nonspeculative;" that is, "prag~; matic" or even "deconstructive" in a somewhat less than technical sense of the' term. My point was that modern Pragmatism and ancient Madhyamika boili' represent attempts to subvert the sort of metaphysical speculation that hill' throughout history generally co-opted the grand title of Philosophy in India and the West. Again, in Rorty's jargon the people who engage in this highly critiC:3J. enterprise are called "edifying philo~ophers." Edifying philosophers do not construct systematic philosophical explanations of their own; rather they emploY: every means at their disposal to develop persuasive critiques directed at the. conceptual systems Presented by others. Granting the possibility that Mr." Cabez6n may not be conversant with Rorty's terminology, it is nevertheless: difficult to understand how this single expression could have been responsible" for such a sweeping conclusion when my entire project was - from my own perspective, at least - an entirely self-conscious attempt to develop a reading of Madhyamika that is nothing if not philosophical. See, for example, p. 129: "It is misleading'to characterize Nagarjuna and Candraldrti as the proponents oca mystical, alogical, or irrational system unconcerned with the proper business of philosophy .... Such an interpretation does a tremendous disservice to Nagarjuna's " thought .... The single most controversial and revolutionary feature ofNagarjuna's legacy lies in his restructuring of the philosophical enterprise .... " The problenf' may be that in Mr. Cabez6n's view philosophy devoid of either epistemology" or syllogistic reasoning is not philosophy at all. "Instead," as he makes clear, "iq is something more akin to therapy of the Wittgensteinian kind" (p. 159). We, ought to note in passing that in his review Mr. Williams not only disagrees witll .

EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS 121

Cabezon on this particular issue, but he has gone so far as to criticize me ':~ver-emphasizing the philosophical dimension of early Madhyamika: u~tington's rethinking of Madhyamaka -in the light-of contemporary philo'I:ticalconce~s is viable and perhaps laudable, but it should not be represented the only option for those who would take the relevance of these texts to modern ~stern concerns seriously" (p. 195). _ . . Closely related to his assertion that I do not treat the Madhyamika as per, methodologically grounded philosophy is Mr. Cabezon's claim that my erpretation of Candrakirti dispenses with the need for "rational and systematic tification of the philosophical truth of ... emptiness" (pp. 155 ff). In many texts I discuss the undeniable significance of rational discourse in early

'"dhyamika. As a representative example we might look to p. 139, where I iew the overall thrust of my attempt to make sense of the Madhyamika as

-ilosophy: "Carefully taking into account 'the limits of reason' as well as its , essary and legitimate claims, the meaning that this or any other philosophy

for us can perhaps be measured by no higher standard than as a function of 'practical consequences for the individual, for society, and for all forms of life. e most important question would then be: Through incorporating a vocabulary

-' tseeks neither to deny nor otherwise to contradict or denigrate all the evidence t can and must be accepted by the canons of reason ... [and so forth]." One my major goals in this enterprise was to examine how these texts may have nsiderably redefined the accepted, methodologically grounded models of both ilosophy and reason, but it would be a serious mistake to equate even bstantial redefinition with outright rejection. Nagarjuna appears to me to be terested only in mitigating what was taken by him to be a compulsive and iritually crippling preoccupation with a style of rationalism that had become

ntrenched in the Buddhist world during the centuries immediately before and , ter the advent of the Christian era. His work was produced in a context shaped y the Prajnap8ramitii-siitras and it must have been welcomed by at least some

Orhis contemporaries - those who referred to themselves, somewhat hyperbolitally, one suspects, as the "MahasaIighikas" - but we also know that the early

-dhyamika writings were denounced from the first as irrational and nihilistic y a large segment of the intellectual community, both Buddhist and non

_ uddhist. And still several hundred years seem to have passed before any effort . as made to accommodate these critics. It was not until the middle of the sixth

, ntury that one of Candrakirti's immediate predecessors, Bhavaviveka, com-~J'Posed a number of highly influential treatises built solely around the promise of lilurnishing the Madhyamakakiirikas with an unshakable logical foundation. ~;'( On p. 155 Mr. Cabezon cites mKhas grub rje as saying "the belief in no~JJleliefs is itself a belief," as though this difficulty had not been addressed (£ifuywhere in my account of Candrakirti. The "no view" that I find in early ~~}1adhyamika is certainly not so naive as to be oblivious to.the difficulties posed t~by this kind of self-referential conundrum, and in fact I specifically addressed

i


the issu~ in several pl~ces. See, f~r in.stance, p. 135, where I r~fer to Rony; alternatIve understanding of what It mIght mean not to hold a VIew: "Whe less pretentious revolutionaries can afford to have views on lots of things w r their predecessors had views on, edifying philosophers have to decry the v?" notion of having a view, while avoiding having a view about having views.1i:. is awkward, but not impossible .... " The problem of self-reference is linked l

concerns about relativism and the even more basic matter of how I have defin' a "view." In brief, my argument in the book is not that early Madhyamikahol no views whatsoever, butratherthat it lays no claim to any "value-free, objec'cl view of truth or reality." This is a critical point that both Mr. Cabezon and~ Williams seem to have missed,2 though I hammered on it almost ad naus'!; from the preface on through the introduction and notes. With all due respect mKhas grub rje, I would think it obvious - so obvious it hardly requires menti' - that no one can compose an expository text without expressing some vie or another (be it "right" or "wrong," confused or perfectly lucid). The early Indian Madhyamika authors were certainly no different in this regard from an' author who has ever set pen to paper. On the other hand, they seem to diffe considerably from most other philosophers to the extent that their views do n" demand any ahistorical, a pnorijustification.The views expressed in those tex are anchored only in 'jig rten pa 'i tha snyad: " ... according to the Madhyamih; concepts of logic, and theoretical as well as practical concepts dealing with empirical phenomena like causation, are all grounded in a particular way of life ... " (Huntington, p. 10). It is this "way of life" (whatever it may be) thati~ groundless, and not our concepts, our logic, etc. To put this another way: While early Madhyamika texts expound many and varied opinions on issues of crucial relevance to the project of developing an effective sQteriological strategy, such' opinions are obviously not what is being referred to in, for example, MadhyamakasiIstra 13.8, where Nagajuna cautions us not to misconstrue emptiness by making it into a dr$p. His use of the Sanskrit word must be, in ~t iit' context, synonymous with what Candrakirti occasionally identifies as mithyai,,~2 or ku-dr$p: an incorrect or perverse view. Which is to say (in my reading), a viewit~ of truth or reality that would undermine the Buddhist soteriological projecti~~ through purporting to be value-free or objective.3 ..;~'i1!~

Toward the close of his discussion Mr. Cabezon suggests that I appear at1tt times to subscribe to the fourth member of the catu$kop. Actually on this issue\;~ I referred to none other than mKhas grub rje himself regarding the connection~J;: between the fourth member of the catu$kop and concepts of a "transcendent,";1 ground," an "ineffable reality," or, for that matter, the assertion that earIY;~i Madhyamika is.not philosophy, but some kind of mystical practice (Huntington~ .•..• ~~ S. 3,. n. 12). Given the context of Mr. Cabez6n' s remarks, I suspect he may hav¢$; formed his opinion solely on the basis of what I wrote about "most contemporary Ji,' scholars [believing] that the term emptiness refers neither to existence nor non-;,~ existence" (p. 18). After citing this line from my book, he flatly asserts that';~

'~:'~~

>j


•• L temporary dGe lugs pa scholars do not hold to such a position. Maybe not, ,CQ~ they must still explain, e.g., Madhyamakasastra 15.6: "Those who see in it :t y reference to] intrinsic and extrinsic being, or existence and nonexistence, ;:not see the actual teaching of the Buddha."4 In support of his assertion Mr. Cabez6n translates a passage from the sTong thun chen rno where mKhas grub } 'ec1arifies the critical distinction between outright non-existence and the lack ~f"inherent existence." I was truly puzzled here, for mKhas grub rje' s discussion 'seems to me to be relevant not to the fourth member of the catu$koti but rather tto the second, usually interpreted as a statement of unqualified negation: "Things ;do not exist" This is one instance of a place where the tables are turned and I ifUld myself in apparent disagreement with Mr. Cabezon's interpretation of his "oWn translation of mKhas grub rje. ii· Finally, a less abstruse, but equally disturbing example of how even a .'~ost obvious effort to control the meaning of my words can fail. Mr. Cabezon is startled by my observation that early MMhyamika set itself "in opposition to

"a philosophical tradition which was preoccupied with the search for more and more precise technical terminology and had neglected the practical application of philosophical theory ... " (Huntington, p. xii). "What a terribly poor picture this paints ... " he exclaims, "of the great Abhidharma and Y ogacara masters! Was the Abhidharma truly the dry scholasticism that Huntington implies it was?,"

i(Cabez6n, p. 160). On p. 17, in defming my use of the term "Hinayana," I wrote: : "It is clear ... that the Madhyamika critique was specifically directed against an abstract, academic philosophy that had become divorced from the tradition of

practical application. Still, we have no reason to suppose that this sort of scholasticism was characteristic of every non-Madhyamika school even in :Nagarjuna's time, and therefore the terms [Hinayana and Mahayana] have been retained here as convenient labels for two different genres of literature." And

. from Section Two, note 1 (p. 201): "In this discussion I have used the term .,Hinayana as it is used by Nagarjuna, Candrakirti and other Mahayanists; in fact,

.: the Madhyarnika critique was almost certainly directed against only one of at . .least eighteen early Indian Hinayana sects, the Sarvastivada .... "

III

The examples discussed above provide strong support for the unsettling observation that a text - any text - will not necessarily be interpreted in accord

with the author's own understanding of what he has written. In this case the text .. happens to be my own, and, as a consequence, this particular demonstration of

the lack of authorial control is unusually vivid. The feeling is very much as though my book, the book I wrote, has been forced to serve some purpose other . than the one I myself envisioned for it. What I require, of course - and what

.. r can not seem to fmd - is some stable criterion for determining who is qualified to adjudicate in the matter of our disparate interpretations of my words. Is there


really no final arbiter to whom I, Mr. Cabezon and my other reviewers m' h" ld all 1 . , 19 t

appeal? Is there no one w~, co~ pace 0U: trust tn, no ::eferee willing and able to say, once and for all, This - and nothmg else - IS the meaning of wh ' Huntington has written"? For my own part, I could not honestly claim ~. command that kind of certainty. For any number of reasons I may not ha '.' managed to say what I thought I was saying in my book. Perhaps I failed:e

appreciate the full implications of my own ideas. Or it may be that I was unabt to articulate those ideas clearly enough. I might have been confused about wh~ it was that I intended to communicate. Then again, I can't completely rule out even the unlikely possibility that my ideas may have changed over the past few years in ways I myself can not quite see. If so, then I could easily be incapable of remembering exactly what I was thinking when the book was taking shape. It is not enough for me simply to insist that my work has been misunderstood when in fact my reviewers are in many ways every bit as qualified as I am ~ assess the significance of The Emptiness of Emptiness. Mr. Cabez6n' s creden~ tials are clearly in order. He is a highly trained, competent critic, an authority in his own right. This being the case, there is, moreover, good reason to believe that" his understanding of my book will be shared by others of equal competence. For' better or worse, then, we're apparently left on our own to hash things out between ourselves. I can publish a response to his review. We might eventually find the' opportunity to get together and talk, and, with luck, we might even work out some common understanding of my book. One way or the other the exchange of ideas and opinions will go on between us as long as we care to stick with it, and, in the end, what more could we want? For the moment it would be enough if only I could persuade Mr. Cabez6n, Mr. Williams and their readers that what has happened to my book is exactly what could happen to any text. Which brings me to the considerably more complicated and problematic issue of Mr. Cabez6n's reading of mKhas grub rje.

If nothing else, the disparity between my understanding of the sTong thun chen mo andMr. Cabez6n's certainly seems to throw into question the whole idea of a single, authorized ("traditional") dGe lugs pa reading of the Madhyamika like the one referred to by both him and Mr. Williams. At the very least it must suggest that, even assuming such a reading exists, we do not have any dependable , access to it since one or the other (or both) of us has obviously been led astray. This is exactly the sort of meta-confusion I was trying to avoid by not relying, in my own work, on later Tibetan exegesis. I subtitled the book "An introduction· to early Indian Miidhyamika" and on every significant point of interpretation where classical documentation was required I strove to support my case primarily with references to "early" Indian sources (that is, to no author later than Candrakirti himself). I sought, to put it another way, to present my understanding of Candrakirti, and not my understanding of a later Tibetan understanding of Candrakirti. I will take this issue up in somewhat greater detail in just a moment, .


i, t before I do I want to step back-stage, so to speak, and take a look at the : torical structure of Mr. Cabezon' s review. This is where we can expect to find ~: costumes, props, colored lights and other paraphernalia that operate behind iI1e scenes to create the dramatic effect of objectivity. •.. As I mentioned above, we are told early on that the reviewer's goals are ~Odest, for he aspires merely to demonstrate "that there is at least one .'hterpretation of Candrakirti that varies radically from the one presented in the illtrOductiOR to [The Emptiness of Emptiness] ., .. Which comes closer to the mark will be left up to the reader" (Cabezon, p. 153). One "mark" at the center ,bfthe target. The bull's eye. This is the spot where, in my understanding of the . trOpe, L'1e reader will locate the actual meaning of Candrakllti's work. In other words, two interpretations are to be offered for inspection and the reader is

(invited to judge for himself which comes closer to this meaning, but the very :existence of a single, centralized meaning around which all interpretations are ~grouped like so many misfired arrows seems itself to be taken for granted in Mr. cCabezon's choice of metaphor. It is not clear who establishes the position of the ,bull's eye; this does not appear to be so important as the simple fact of its 'presence. All that we know for sure at this juncture is that a contest of some kind is about to get underway, that the winning interpretation will be the one that tomes - in the opinion of the reader - "closer to the mark," and that the

,reviewer will not himself participate either as judge Qr contestant. Fair enough. Or is it?

Ostensibly this is an amiable way to proceed, but the truth is that the stage · is already set for a by no means insignificant rhetorical illusion. If this illusion is successful then everything the reviewer goes on to say will be cloaked in an aura of undeniable, and, as I hope to show, undeserved prestige. In short: :N1r.

· Cabezon has set out in such a way as to gain the upper hand immediately by absenting himself as author from the discussion that follows. Once this feat is

. accomplished the reader will be convinced that he is being presented with (1) the

... traditional dGe lugs pa reading of Madhyamika and (2) the reading of a modern ,Western scholar "clearly ... influenced by Wittgenstein" and a host of other very un-traditional, non-Buddhist authors. Or, perhaps even more dramaticall y, if we · accept the terms as established by the reviewer then the debate (such as it is) will .take place between "the great dGe lugs pa exegete" mKhas grub rje - no less

. a personage than the close disciple of Tsang kha pa himself - and this guy . Huntington, whoever he is. Where, I want to know, is Mr. Cabezon in all of this? How did he manage to slip into the wings so gracefully, and without so much

·as a word of farewell? And finally, what, exactly, is he doing back there? Confronted with the formidable spectre of mKhas grub rje and "the dGe lugs pa reading of the Madhyamaka," I find myself feeling a bit like Dorothy must have felt in that scene from the Wizard of Oz - the one where she's cowering before

,a gigantic projected image of the Wizard when Toto, playing somewhere off in

126 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

a corner, pulls back a little drapery and reveals the elderly gentleman wli"i actually in charge of the whole frightening show. Immediately the old fell ~ leans forward, speaks into a microphone and the terrifying voice of the W· ',' booms out: "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!"

Let me try to be somewhat more precise. Given the rhetorical struc of this review6 the reader is evidently supposed to accept (without ever actu' being presented with any such claim) that Mr. Cabezon has direct and unfair access to an authorized - the authorized - dGe lugs pa reading of Madhyamika, that he is thoroughly qualified to present such a reading, and in effect, Mr. Cabezon is completely transparent, nothing but an impresario mouthpiece for Tsongkha pa's eminent disciple, who is in his turn (for all' know) capable of performing a similar service for Candrakirti. Moreover, allp,:,'; this is in rather stark contrast to the circumstances surrounding this other fello*l~ -"Huntington" - who is at best presenting his own more or less accurilit~~ interpretation of Candrakirti. And the reader is being asked to decide whichSf~\ these two accounts of Madhyamika "comes closer to the mark.";:~~l

At the risk of seeming blunt: Is this stacking the deck, or what! Are'ililt claims in my book not documented every bit as closely as those in Mr. Cabez6ri ;;~ review? Is my scholarship really all that much less reliable than his? Or is itii~ matter of my not being privy to some kind of esoteric knowledge passed alongl through "living contemporary interpretations of Candraklrti"? Why, in othet] words, is Mr. Cabezon to be granted the right to speak directly through iUr~ influential proxy, to speak with such enviable certainty, almost as if he were~ himself mKhas grub rje, while I, despite all my best efforts, am nothing huH CandraIdrti's more or less fallible interpreter? Assuming that our scholarly#: credentials are relatively comparable, so far as this discussion is concerned, then;l: why not set up the debate on the meaning of Candraklrti's work between! Candrakirti himself (whom I claim to represent) and mKhas grub rje (whom Mi:;t.l Cabezon seems to favor)? Or else, much more to my liking, why not simply lay}! our cards on the table and acknowledge that in fact both of us are doing exactly;~ the same thing - each presenting his own interpretation of someone else's) writing. Someone long since dead and gone. j,.

Like it ornot we're both in the same boat I don't think Mr. Cabezon would;j seriously want to suggest that he possesses some infallible key to the meaning'; of mKhas grub rje' s words, but that is precisely what is implied in his rhetoric.! Of course the truth is that mKhas grub rje is no more present in his review thani Candrakirti is in my book. The truth is that the reader is being asked to evaluate , the claims made by two modern Western scholars, each of whom has chosen to: rely, to some extent, on a different corpus of texts. On the one hand we have J 086, ., Cabezon's interpretation of mKhas grub rje's interpretation of Candrakirti; on.' the other - assuming the reader is interested in going directly to my own writing' - C. W. Huntington's interpretation of Candrakirti. Actually the situation in the; review itself is even more convoluted, since what we have there is Jose'


in<.tteZl'U'S interpretation of C. W. Huntington's interpretation of Candrakirti. all these accounts of the Madhyamika are highly interpretive, though I'll admit that it seems to me my book has the advantage of being least. from the acknowledged object of our investigation. Be that as it may,

Mr. Cabez6n' s interpretation of mKhas grub Ije nor mine of Candrakirti strict sense of the word, "traditional." More to the point, neither of us

lel!ltm(la~tay claim to be capable of directly re-presenting, either through or exegesis, an authorized reading of the Mlidhyamika.

IV

very troubling to me that Mr. Cabez6n has structured his discourse in this not because I believe, even for a moment, that it was done with the slightest

of gaining some unfair advantage. Rather my concern is just the reverse: sort of scholarship is at present endemic to serious studies of Buddhist

tilOiSOpnICru literature. It is my constant harping on the interpretive dimension work that appears idiosyncratic and perhaps even a little suspect. By

drawing attention to my own role as interpreter I have chosen to place on center stage, and it is not surprising that Mr. Cabez6n is more than to leave me out there with mKhas grub Ije, sweating under the bright

while he retires to the wings. He is only doing what too many others in m'.L, .... ~I ... would do under similar circumstances. Unlike most Buddhologists who i,Uiodllce interpretive studies of classical Buddhist texts, in The Emptiness of 'fJ$J'11plWe.SS I went out of my way to acknowledge that my interpretation of

is just that -,- my interpretation. I also insisted that even my l¥iU.u1i).a .... ',.. of the Madhyamakavatara is incapable of conjuring up the original

author and absolving me from responsibility for my role as interpreter. II.H,VU.,Unever hope to succeed in understanding the Mlidhyamika exclusively "on

own terms," as Mr. Williams suggests I might have attempted to do (p. 194), more than we can hope to understand this distant, incomparably foreign

;l'CJIllatelrialon ourown terms. And still as text-critical scholars we have no plausible ~lt.l1llter:native but to proceed as if it were possible to accomplish both these

To return again and again to the problem of interpretation is to tf3lclaJlov.'lecl!!e that we do not know, after all, exactly what the classical authors

saying to each other. Why should this strike us as odd or controversial? is threatening, I believe, is that in focusing on the interpretive dimension

our work we attest that our understanding never will achieve the ideal of ~~;al~sollute certainty, that in practice the idea of this kind of certainty operates as

of archetypal vikalpa, a conceptual palimpsest on which layer after layer impossible dreams have been inscribed.

;., We can never read any text - even in the original language - except ..•. through the lens of our conscious and unconscious presuppositions. More, were


it not for these very presuppositions and prejudices no text or teacher could h· ... any meaning at all for us, since the very possibility of meaning is rooted i ~v~

. al'l H . th di b' diu f H . n Just this conceptu SOl. ere IS e stur mg conun m 0 eldegger's fam . "hermeneutical circle," what Gadamer calls "the fInitude which dominatesOUs

h . b al h" al . ,,., B not only our umanlty, ut so our lstonc conscIOusness. ut one need share my estim~tion of ~~ implications. of recent herm.eneutical theory in or~~! to agree that sohd text-cnucal scholarship can not be built on any veiled asserti of a priori privilege. It ought to be nothing more than a matter of acade~n professionalism that all attempts to fmd meaning in ancient Buddhist texts mu~ stand or fall on the strength of their own scholarly merit, and not because of an~ direct or implied claim to represent the actual meaning of a classical author. I have no doubt that Mr. Cabez6n would agree with me about this. If, however he still believes that there are "evaluative criteria that can be employed to decid~ questions of authorial intent" (p. 153), then it is imperative that he openly demonstrate how I have failed to employ those criteria and thereby relegated my work on Candraldrti to the status of "interpretation," while his on mKhas grub rje deserves to be treated as "the dGe lugs pa reading of the Madhyamaka."I don't know how to put this any more forcefully: Methodological problems are no longer peripheral to our common search for philosophical meaning in Buddhist literature.

Both Mr. Cabez6n and Mr. Williams comment on the irony of my having developed my unorthodox interpretation of the Madhyamika under the guidance of a venerable Tibetan dge bshesofthe dGe lugs pa school. Mr. Williams informs his readers that "It is fashionable nowadays to work on Buddhist texts, even those from India, with a Tibetan lama. This gives the translation a certain imprimatur ... " (p. 203). Surely this comment is more than a bit ingenuous. First of all, collaborative translations involving one native speaker of each language are much more than simply fashionable. As Mr. Williams knows, every canonical Tibetan translation of an original Sanskrit text - including the Tibetan translation of Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatlira - bears just this kind of imprimatur. And for good reason. It makes obvious sense that the Tibetans chose to consult with Indian scholars, just as it now makes sense for European and American scholars to work as closely as possible with their Tibetan counterparts. But, as Mr. Williams himself goes on to tell us, ''Tibetan lamas can sometimes make mistakes, and even when they are right it is the Western scholar who uses their advice and help ... " (ibid.). Which brings me to my second point: There is not so much as the possibility of irony in the situation as I see it. I learned two thingsJrom Gesh€ Wangchen: First, he taught me a great deal about how to read the texts; and second, he fostered in me, by his own example, the courage to think for myself. If "the" dGe lugs pareading ofMadhyamika exists, he certainly never let me in on it. Our discussions were always marked by an ongoing struggle to make sense out of whatever we happened to be reading, whether it was Candrakirti, Vasubandhu, or Tsong kha pa. Geshe Wangchen mayor may not


.j(bo1d any wayward views of his ~wn." For all I know, in ~is own un~s?ming 1;''1 he may actually be somethmg of a renegade. He IS most defmltely a (fJilosopher, andno apologist. I learned from him, in a very practical way, an ;~gva1uable lesson that was only reinforced by my reading of Gadamer and others: t::We have no choice but to grapple with ~e unsettling fact that th~re can be.no :\'lgitimate grounds whatsoever for the chum that anyone textual mterpretatlOn ':1: necessarily more authoritative or traditional than any other. It is altogether ~u;appropriate to intimate, as Mr. Williams seems to be doing, that Geshe ,Wangchen ought to take a stand for or against my interpretation of early Indian ;:i1adhyamika, when I made it perfectly clear in the preface to the book that I :3ssumed full responsibility for assessing the significance of Candrakfrti' s work :inthe context of modern Buddhist scholarship (p. xii). , At the close of his review Mr. Cabezon refers to "living contemporary interpretations of Candraklrti" and "traditional Tibetan readings of the

;Madhyamaka" (p. 160), as though such interpretations and readings were '~:<lirectly available to us, simply out there, waiting to be appropriated should we . decide to do so. As though the question were every bit as simple as he makes \~it appear: mKhas grub rje, or Huntington? "Which seems closer to the mark will ,:be left up to the reader." Frankly I can't imagine what it would be like to believe !that the task is nearly so straightforward as this. What I learned from Geshe {Wangchen and my own further study is so far rem~ved from this way of thinking I.'. that I can not be absolutely sure that I know what it would be like to desire the '. kind of innocent simplicity that prevails in most current research on Buddhist 'philosophical literature. In my view, if our research is truly concerned with the ',search for meaning in these texts then it needs voluntarily to inhabit a world that is much more complicated and uncomfortable, much darker and more perilous, and a great deal more interesting.

v I promised, a few pages back, to pursue my initial remarks on the problem of interposing Tibetan authors between ourselves and the ancient Indian MMhyamileas like Candraklrti and Nagarjuna. As I mentioned, in my research on early Indian Madhyamika I consciously elected to focus on texts composed in India during or before the seventh century. My reason for this was not only to avoid the kind of meta-confusion I discussed briefly in section III. There is another consideration as well, one that has to do directly with the principles of Tibetan hermenuetics.

Tibet and India are what Mircea Eliade called "traditional civilizations." In Cosmos and History we are told that the person immersed in these cultures "acknowledges no act which has not been previously posited and lived by someone else .... What he does has been done before. His life is the ceaseless repetition of gestures initiated by others."g "The man of the traditional civiliza-


tions accorded the historical event no value in itself; in other words, he did ............. . regard it as a specific category of his own mode of existence."9 Of course Eli ~t was simply malcing a fonnal, theoretical statemenrout of something that ~d been known and ~dgin~ly accepted since at least ~e early ni.neteenth cent~,> when European Orientalists were already deeply mvolved m the frustrati ...... . struggle to compose a history of South Asia. Regardless of whether or not o~: is inclined to accept the broader implications of Eliade's thesis as they are developed in his book (I, for one, am not), most contemporary Asian specialists? would nevertheless acknowledge that the so-called "traditional civilizations" of India and Tibet have no concept of history that accords with our own. It should·; come as no surprise that this difference in historical consciousness is reflected in the methods and goals of Tibetan hennenueutics.

! think it would be fair to say a central feature of most Tibetan exegesis· is its concern with hannonizing - or, if you prefer, systematizing - any apparent discord among the Indian sources. Witness the entire genre ofliterature so popular in Tibet, known as grub mtha '. Another way of putting this might b~ to point out that Tibetan textual interpretation proceeds according to an unstated presupposition that there is such a thing as "the Indian tradition" and that this Indian tradition is in some meaningful sense both monolithic and unbroken. This presupposition was transported into Tibet along with the canonical literature and it would never have occurred to anyone to question it. The notion of an unbroken, monolithic Indian tradition was, for all practical purposes, an unexamined postulate, an invisible, guiding force that suffused the work of editors and translators at bSam yas and the other early monastic centers and provided the results of their work with indisputable, ready-made significance. lO .

Text-critical scholarship in Europe and America does not take for granted the existence of an Indian tradition. Rather, it is one of the explicit tasks of modern textual scholarship to organize this literature within the context of archeological and other historical data, so as to define a chronological sequence. within which we may eventually be able to speak convincingly of a history of Buddhist thought in India. From our point of view "the Indian tradition" does not yet quite exist, for it has still to be fully conceived. All we have, so far, are fragments of a story that need to be laboriously pieced together and correlated with a variety of evidence culled from the study of ancient Indian epigraphy, indigenous Chinese codicils and other sources only indirectly related to the Indian texts themselves. The history of Buddhist thought in India is a tale gradually being written through the application of scholarly tools and techniques common to all historiography. Whether or not we will be able to construct for ourselves a monolithic, unbroken Indian Buddhist tradition is still very much open to question. Personally I remain skeptical. My own research on the Akutobhayaand other early Indian Madhyamika texts suggests otherwise. Based on this research I am convinced that it is not only possible, but most rewarding, to view Candrakirti's writing as a sort of rococo expression of Nagarjuna's

EMPTINESS OF EMPTINESS l31

~~~~lassica1 Madhyamika. Candrakirti wou~d then be the fin~, an~ i~ cer.tain sigS:f,"iiificant respects, decadent, tr~sfonnatJ.on of the Master ~ ongInal nnpulse. :::C;13iiefly, I propose that the late S1X~ and.early se~e~~ ce?tunes saw the crys.tal~;lization of a fundamentally new onentatlOn to NagarJu~a s work. ~ter that tnne ~:~Madhyamika ~uthor.s bec~e much ~ess conce:med With pragma~cs and much f1f;nore preoccuPIed WIth lOgical and epIstemologICal problems.ll ThIS would have ~i;,:bCen no small event, either, no mere ripple on an unbroken continuum. What I 'l:~<Wnat present engaged in surveying could turn out to be nothing less than a deep J~riftin the intellectual history of Indian Buddhism, in Kuhn's jargon, a "paradigm ~:: shift," an upheaval at once so dramatic and so subtle that· - given their ;,; presuPpositions about the existence of an Indian tradition - Bhavaviveka and ;1: the others who followed Candrakirti (including the Tibetans) would not even (i< have been aware that they were engaged in a substantially different project. But ;r;,here is not the place to develop these ideas, nor is it important whether or not (;Jone agrees with me. What I want to point out in the present context is only this: ~;/(were it not for our own peculiarly modern concept of historiography and the it: tools and instruments associated with it, I could neither define nor recognize this ~j<iparticular sort of "incommensurable" discontinuity in any history of Buddhist '·"UIought. This is, I believe, compelling justification for my insistence that "2{ Ai.,~dhyamika literature of the period from Nagarjuna to Candrakirti - what I

J;'"."ieier to as "early Indian Madhyamika" - needs to be studied primarily in the ;,. context of its own era, and only secondarily through the lens of later exegesis .

.Tibetan sources will have to be handled with an especially high degree of critical ;~attention if we are interested in pursuing an understanding of Nagarjuna and his . ,',;jmmediate disciples that does justice to the modern Western historical conscious;;''",ness. :i'L

, I want to be clear that nothing I have just said need be read as an r>' ' , , unqualified endorsement of the premises and goals of historiography. My

9,}; purpose is simply to acknowledge the considerable power that this model of , \c,

{. <scholarship commands in the contemporary intellectual world, a power that one shrugs off, I believe, only at one's own risk. Here is the basis for my insistence

cL that questions of methodology need to be treated side by side with any effort at ~'(fmding meaning in Indian Buddhist texts. If it is to be cogent and convincing t: ,within the territory governed by historiography then any concept of meaning

,,' , .. , must necessarily incorporate a strong historical component - something which :" ,Tibetan exegesis lacks almost by definition. This is the reason why we can not

i simply fling ourselves directly into the mainstream of Tibetan exegetical \'" writings and let the current carry us along. For those who work in the shadow

. of Hegel, Nietzsche and Heidegger, the problem of philosophical meaning can , not be separated from the problem of history. R. G. Collingwood speaks for all

of us - whether we like it or not - when he asserts that history has become ~': the primary vehicle "for human self-knowledge."12 Dilthey was probably even

~/


closer to rep~esenting the state of the West:rn intellectual.in this, the last decadei> of the twentIeth century, when he wrote, Man mows hlffiself only in histo ..... .

h . . "13 0 1 tha tho ry,. never throug mtrospecuon. ne may e ect to argue t IS assertion'~

culturally chauvinistic, or, perhaps, that the situation ought not to be so even .~ ...•..• the West, but it wOlI1d be difficult to deny the significance of Dilthey's wor~n for anyone working within the academic community today. S

The failure to recognize and address the role of effective history in modem Western concepts of meaning is one of the principal shortcomings of whatI called, in The Emptiness of Emptiness, "proselytic scholarship." And yet, as} also indicated in several places, the way things stand now scholars with a primaryi research interest in Buddhist philosophical literature are all but forced to believe . that they must decide between philology and historiography, on the one hand· and the search for philosophical meaning, on the other. Here, I submit, is an iron; that invites considerable scrutiny. There is a profound reason for the continUed split between text-critical and proselytic scholarship in the field of Buddhist studies - one that bears directly on any possible philosophical significance we .. may eventually find in the MMhyamika texts. The willingness to marginalize questions of methodology is coupled with an almost principled lack of appreciation for the depth of our responsibility as interpreters of the Indian and Tibetan sources. Both of these can be explained as manifestations of a covert and decidedly utopian desire to step beyond history into an ahistorical, a priori realIn of objectively verifiable truth.

I do not wish to argue here whether or not the early Indian Madhyamika texts offer any support for the hope of such an escape. I do insist, however, that this is not the only way Nagarjuna and Candra.1cirti can be understood. A genuinely alternative reading is possible. A reading that would see this desire to step out of history as yet another form of grasping. A reading that would work to defuse the desire for transhistorical objectivity without propelling us headlong into an equally untenable relativism.

NOlES

1. See Jose Cabez6n, the JournaJ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. Vol. 13, No. 2, pp.152-161 (hereafterreferred to as Cabez6n); and Paul Williams,

the Journal ofIndian Philosophy, Vol. 19, pp. 191-218 (hereafterreferred to as Williams).

Although I will not refer to it in this essay, the reader might also want to consult Paul

Griffiths· review in the Journal of the American Oriental Society, 111.2, pp. 413-414. References to The Emptiness of Emptiness (Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, 1989)

will be made under the rubric of "Huntington." 2. See, for instance, Williams, p. 200: "There are paradoxes involved in

maintaining that Madhyamaka has no approach or viewpoint in any sense." (Italics are

in the originil text.) 3. I am indebted to Williams for pointing out, on pp. 202-203 of his review, four

. EMPTINESS OF EMPTI~'ESS 133

;,) tances where I failed to translate the Tibetan ngan or log ("perverse" or "wrong") in

,~: expression "perverse/wrong view." Whether this results in nearly so fatal a distortion

{;'fcandraklrti's text as he implies is another matter. In several other contexts I did not

~'~verlook such explicit references to "incorrect" views or misconceptions: See my 1:-iI"anslations on p. 226, n. 5; p. 231, n. 36; and p. 162, n. 63. More significant, however,

:Zisthe fact that there are yet other passages where Candraklrti uncategorically dispenses

!'iWith all views and positions, whether "bad" or "good." See 6.119; 6.173; and the ;'commentary to 6.88 (translated onP 248, n. 118). Outside of MA and the accompanying

?bh~ya, evidence of CandralGrti 's apparent willingness to issue a blanket rejection of all

{views is even more abundant. See, for example, his commentary to MS 13.8 (pp. 108.14-";15 in Vaidya's edition): "Emptiness is the abandoning or the not setting in motion of all

"strong attachment and grasping, of all that is fabricated by views" Uha sarve$iim eva

;/drstilatiiniiIp sarvagrahifbhinive$anarp yannilJsaraIJam apravrttilJ sa siInyata I). The only

:t~g fuat can be said for certain is that Candraklrti' s writings as a whole are not consistent

-. ()nthis issue. I look forward to exploring the problem in considerably more detail in a

}separate article. . 4. I cited this kiirika on p. 130 of my book. The Sanskrit is in the accompanying

'. ;n~te along with my understanding of its significance.

5. My observations here apply, mutatis mutandis, to what Williams has to say

~/about "dGe lugs pa orthodoxy," "the dGe lugs pa tradition," etc.

'.. .•.... 6. H. Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans!. by Garret Barden & John Cumming

;. (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 244.

7. M. Eliade, Cosmos and History, The Myth of the Eternal Retum, (New York:

•..... '. Harper & Rowe, 1959 [rep.]), p. 5.

8. Ibid., p. 141.

9. Tibetan fascination with the siddhiinta (= grub mtha' ) schema is, according to

';'Cabezon, the presupposition underlying mKhas grub rje's "second objection" to the view

that the Prasailgikas have no position of their own. He continues: "mKhas grub rje states

that for someone who maintains that the Priisailgikas hold no philosophical position all

')lotions of distinct philosophical schools or traditions vanish .... " Obviously the real threat

. ;' is not simply to one or another isolated "school" or "tradition," nor even to the siddhanta

schema itself, but rather, to the deeply held pan-Tibetan faith in the existence 'of an

unbroken, monolithic Indian tradition like the one I have described here. To challenge

,'this faith "was (and still is) considered devastating by traditional [Tibetan] scholars." In

.; fact such a challenge was (and still is) literally unthinkable. As Cabezon makes perfectly

. clear: "It leaves one a relativist." Or, in religious rather than philosophical terms: It leaves

one an apostate. (All citations in this note are lifted from Cabez6n, p. 156.)

10. Ruegg has reached a similar conclusion: See The Literature of the Madhyamaka

School of Indian Buddhism (Wiesbaden: Harrasowitz, 1981), p. 239.

11. R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 10.

12. Wilheim Dilthey, Gesamelte Schriften (StUttgart: Trubner, Gottingen: Van

Hoek & Ruprecht, 1914-1972), Vol. VII, p. 279.

JIABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

On Retreating to Method and Other Postmodern Turns: A Response to C. W. Huntington

by Jose Ignacio Cabez6n

C.W. Huntington'S response to my review is, like his book, an interesting and provocative piece of scholarship. It raises a number of issues, both practical and· theoretical, that are worthy of serious response. It is to further the discussion of the important issues raised in Huntington's essay that I decided to avail myself of the opportunity of responding to him.

Why would someone who repudiates "value-free or objective" truth, who discards the notion of authorial intent, who rejects the possibility of arbitering between different interpretations of a text (even one's own!), write an essay whose aim is, in large part, to demonstrate that he has been misunderstood? Huntington of course realizes this dilemma and takes great pains to be consistent with his own views on this issue. His approach is ingenious: true to his view that every reading is interpretation, and that competing interpretations can never be arbitrated, he couches his comments in a rhetoric of method. For him what is ultimately at stake cannot be whether his reading of Candrakirti is right, whether mKhas grub rje's was wrong or whether my reading of both (Huntington and mKhas grub rje) is valid. There is, after all, no objective validity to interpretation, but only variant interpretations. Instead, the fundamental issue becomes one of method. This, at least, is Huntington's own rhetorical strategy, but ultimately of course the very fact that he is responding to my review speaks of a need to defend his own views - his own reading of his book, of Candrakirti, of mKhas grub rje and of me. At the level of theory Huntington's only possible (lege consistent) reply to the challenges I raise in my review of his book is silence, for my review and his own book represent ever irreconcilable interpretations of texts and . doctrines. Luckily, his innate philosophical spirit gets the better of him. There is, it seems, something to defend after all!

In what follows I hope to show: 1. that, despite his rhetoric, Huntington does have a view as regards whose readings are the better ones, II, that.his ostensible means for demonstrating this are, when he is not retreating to a rhetoric of method, good ones, III. that his defense, which involves demonstrating how I have failed to understand his work, ultimately fails, and IV. that his theoretical views hamper what is an otherwise noble goal, the attempt to show that he is right.

134


I

:Afi readings are of course interpretations, as are translatiOns. Only in the case 'fa calculus-like translation from one language to another, a translation in which C~one-to-one isomorphism is artificially created between the source and target languages, can anything like a literal translation ever be effectuated; and even then the choice of equivalents can easily become an object of dispute. Now in 'natural languages the hope of a literal translation (and by analogy of a single torrect reading) of a text becomes even more problematic. On this point Huntington and I are in agreement. For Huntington, however, the value-laden nature of interpretation implies that no two interpretations can ever be arbitered, that is, that no interpretation can ever be considered better than any other. On this point we differ.

But there are instances in Huntington's response to my review that suggest that Huntington himself is, at best, ambivalent on this question. For example, while eschewing any privileged status concerning the interpretation of what he wrote in his own book, he nonetheless sets out (in section II) to vindicate his own interpretation, in the process attempting to argue for the implausibility of my

'own. Citations from other portions of his work are meant to show a consistency to his views that differs radically from my own reading. Leaving aside for the moment the question of whether he is ultimately successful, the fact remains that in practice Huntington is engaging in a task that is incompatible with what he is preaching at the level of theory. If the value-laden character of interpretation implies that no interpretation is more plausible than any other, then why argue for one reading of his book (his own) over another (mine)?

Toward the end of section II Huntington's implicit belief in normative standards again rears its head as he attempts to demonstrate that the dGe lugs pas' interpretation of Nagarjuna is lacking ("... they must still explain Madhyamakavatffra 15.6") and bringing into question my own reading of dGe lugs pa exegesis (" ... I find myself in disagreement with Cabez6n' s interpretation of ... mKhas grub rje"). Toward the end of section III Huntington's innate sense of objectivity is even more prominent, as he is forced "to admit that it seems to me that my book (lege interpretation) has the advantage of being least removed from (lege most proximate/true to) the acknowledged object of our investigation" (my insertions). Finally, toward the end of his essay his denial of objective interpretability and of authorial intent seems to fall by the wayside as he considers Candraklrti's to be "the final ... transformation of the Master's (Nagfu'juna's) original impulse" (my insertion and emphasis). In so far as Madhyamikas after Candrakirti "became much less concerned with pragmatics and much more preoccupied with logical and epistemological problems," it seems, they veered from Nagarjuna's true purport. Hence, it seems that at least


one author, Nagarjuna, had an objective viewpoint; and at least one interpr C drakT • . d .. h eter. an mI," manage to get It ng t. ". ' .

My point here is not to criticize Huntington for attempting to defend h:/. interpretation (of himself, of Candraldrti, or of Candrakrrti's readingl~ Nagarjuna). As I have already stated, I believe this to be a noble goal. ~f ". Huntington is to be taken to task here it is simply for his refusq] to acknowledg !" •

that goal and the implicit standards he uses in its defense. e

II

What are the standards Huntington uses? How is the reader to glean that both Williams and Cabez6n have misunderstood Huntington's purport? The technique is of course a common sense one. In his attempt to demonstrate that I have misunderstood him he cites other passages from his work that support his, rather than my own, interpretation of that work. This is, of course, exactly how one should proceed in such a case. One musters up one's exegetical acumen and marshals different passages in defense of the fact that (a) one's work is expressing consistent views on particular issues, (b) that those views have been misrepresented and therefore (c) that the work has been not simply interpreted " differently but has actually been mis-interpreted. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary, it is clear that Huntington is here engaged in a normati ve and objective enterprise, that of showing that his interpretation of himself and of Candralcirti. are both valid and better than my own. This comes through not only in his· language but in the very methods he utilizes to this end.

III

Is mine such a misreading of Huntington, however? Huntington claims, for example, that I have misread him when I ascribe to him the view that what the . Madhyamikas are doing is not philosophy. He corrects me by implying that I have made too much of his reliance on the Rortyan notion of "nonphilosophical." This should not, it seems, be taken literally to imply a repudiation of philosophy. Instead, it should be taken as a repudiation of philosophy as it has heretofore been done, that is, as a critique of "metaphysical speculation" and "systematic philosophical explanations." Madhyamikas, he says, do not engage in this type of philosophy, but they do engage in what he (following Rorty) calls "edifying philosophy," a kind of philosophy that is "pragmatic," and aimed at the transformation of individuals through the destruction of "the conceptual systems presented by others."

My point, however, was precisely to suggest that in mKhas grub rje' s view Madhyamikas do engage in "systematic philosophical explanations," that they do have a notion of objective truth, and that they are therefore philosophers in


i;i'\l1e classical mode, who, far ~om "making ~ti-philosophical points. in nonphi.~:iii()sophical l~nguage" (Err:PtJne~s of ~mpm:ess, .p. ~O), are co:nmItt~d to th.e f~'defense of highly speculatIve philosophlcal Vlews III hIghly techmcal philosophl;~caI language. Aie the Madhy~ik~ then ?ot "edifyi~g ~hiloso~hers'? To the !·:i~i.x:tent that the end goal of theIr philosophIcal enterpnse IS sotenologlcal, they (i;~e certainly this, but then so are all Buddhist (and, with the exception of the .lYcarvakas perhaps, all Indian) philosophers. The point is not that I hold, as 1~I1untington suggests, that "philosophy devoid of either epistemology or syllorj;i;gistic reasoning is not philosophy," but that mKhas grub rje holds that :1'"1 Madhyamaka philosophy has epistemological implications, does use syllogistic .;~;reasoning and does subscribe to objective, rationally defensible truths. Hunting-2 ton has missed the point when he ascribes to me the view that philosophy is : "something more akin to therapy of the Wittgensteinian kind." On the contrary,

f,'when I make this statement in my review (p. 159) I am ascribing this view to <'Huntington himself. There my point is that for mKhas grub rje the Madhyamaka .is more than mere therapy, for it miikes objective claims and therefore has

;fphilosophical content, "philosophical" in the "old" (anti-Rortyan) sense of the '. word. For mKhas grub rje the Madhyamaka is a better and truer system of ;. thought not because it represents a "restructuring of philosophy," as Huntington 'calls it, but rather because it engages in "old-time philosophy" in a better and

i rnore sophisticated way. Specifically, the Prasailgika Madhyamaka represents the highest philosophical view because it sets forth the only unequivocally true and complete theory of the nature of reality.

I do indeed claim in my review that Huntington's interpretation of Candrakirti dispenses with the need for "rational and systematic justification of the philosophical truth of ... emptiness," and I glean this from Huntington's claim (cited in my review, p. 154) that:

... according to the Madhyamika, concepts of logic as well as practical concepts dealing with empirical phenomena like causation, are all grounded in a particular way of life which is itself groundless; Everyday experience is empty of a fixed substratum for the justification of any type of knowledge or belief, and precisely this lack of justification - this being empty even of "emptiness" - is itself the truth of the highest meaning.

But Huntington insists that again I have misread him, quoting a passage in the Emptiness of Emptiness (p. 139) where he states that the Madhyamaka "seeks neither to deny nor otherwise to denigrate all of the evidence that can and must be accepted by the canons of reason." But that he states elsewhere that the Madhyamikas do not reject the evidence implied by the "canons of reason" does not of course vitiate against the fact that the lengthy passage cited above suggests that neither logic nor experience can justify beliefs, religious or otherwise. Moreover, to say that the Madhyamikas do not repudiate the things that reasoning


proves is not equival.ent to sa~ing th~t the Madh~amikas ru:e a~tively committed to the use.of reasonm~, that IS, l?glC and expenence, to ]~st1fy their religious .. claims. It IS e~ac~y thIS la.tt~r pomt that .see~s to be ~epudiated by HuntingtOn] in the above cItatIOn, and It IS exactly thIS pomt that IS very forcefully asserted i

by mKhas grub rje and his spiritual heirs. . Now when I bring up mKhas grub rje's suggestion that ':the belief in n().. ..

beliefs is itself a belief' I do not mean to imply that Huntington is unaware of .. this problem, but simply that he fails to resolve it. Nor does appeal to Rorty, as Huntington suggests, help in this case, for Rorty defends the cogency of.. Wittgenstein's and Heidegger's "non-views" by resorting to a non-referential· view oflanguage (see Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 135), which is not possible for a Madhyamika, the latter being a point for which both Williams and I have argued elsewhere. It is at this point that Huntington engages mKhas grub rje for the first time, implying as he does that mKhas grub rje would have to be at best naive and at worst sophistic in urging the fault of contradiction on those who hold to a literal "no-view" viewpoint. It is not that the Madhyamikas holds no views says Huntington, but that they hold no "value-free, objective view of truth 0; reality." It is not that they hold no views, but that they hold no views "that demand any ahistorical, a priori justification," for their views are "anchored only in ... a particular way of life," where "particular way of life" seems to be Huntington's gloss of 'jig rten pa'i tha snyad (which I prefer to translate "worldly convention"). Now Huntington's choice of the word "particular" (which has no foundation in either the Sanskrit or the Tibetan) is telling. It seems that, as with interpretation, there is no such thing as objective conventional truth. Instead there are only mutually incommensurable realities, each grounded in particular ways of life (cultures, languages, morals, tastes, one assumes).

This line of argument requires careful scrutiny. Leaving aside the question of whether or not Huntington's qualification of his "no-view" standpoint is an afterthought, it should be pointed out, in defense of mKhas grub rje, that there seem to have existed Tibetan Madhyamikas who do uphold the "no-view" doctrine of the Madhyamaka literally. These were not straw men against which mKhas grub rje was arguing. Be that as it may, is Huntington's (re?)formulation of the "no-views" doctrine any better off than the naive, that is, literal, one? In his view it is precisely because the Madhyamaka view is grounded in 'jig rten pa 'j tha snyad (what he calls "a particular way of life" and what I call "worldly conventions") that there is no appeal to an ahistorical and a priori grounding, and it is because of this that the Madhyamaka has no value free, objective view. Now, as I stated in my review, for mKhas grub rje the Madhyamaka view (in fact, all true philosophy) is grounded in the conventional valid cognitions of the world ('jig rten pa'i tha snyad pa 'i tshad ma). But this has nothing to do with a particular way of life, can at times be a priori, and most definitely leads to objective truths.· Now Huntington (Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 136) implies that the Madhyamaka's


;. jection of all views cannot be understood in the "anachronistic context of a {~gical or epistemological problematic" (Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 136). Is it >~erefore that surp?sing that ~ should have offered the dGe lugs pa ~iew as ' ... ounterpoint - a View that claIms that all truth (Nladhyamaka or otherwIse) can t.bnIY be understood in the context of logic and epistemology? .;.. Huntington suggests that on p. 158 of my review I am ascribing to him thefourW position of the catu$koti. This is not the case. What I do state is that

;.Buntington at times seems to subscribe to the fourth of the four views I had listed 'previous to that, namely the claim that the Madhyamikas negate the existence :()f all phenomena, and that he does this" by taking the catu$koti at face value, > i.e., literally." Now my goal here was simply to point out yet another instance in which Huntington's reading of Candrakirti differs from the dGe lugs pa one.

i/Itis here that Huntington confronts the dGe lugs pas for the second time, by suggesting that in maintaining this nonliteral view of the catu$koti they go

. counter to Madhyamakasiistra 15.6. This, it seems to me, is the kind of response worth making. It takes a variant reading of the Madhyamaka (the dGe lugs pa reading) seriously and attempts to answer it on its own terms, not by retreating

ito questions of method. Unfortunately, this former kind of response, one that • takes seriously the challenge of dGe lugs pa exegesis, occurs only in two ;jnstances in Huntington's response to my review. Instead, the bulk of his essay

is aimed at uncovering faulty methodological presuppositions (what Huntington ;;calls "meta-confusions") which allegedly undergird both Williams' review and

my own, as if turning to the secondary discourse of theory somehow constituted ian answer to the kinds of problems that both Williams and mKhas grub rje, 'through me, bring up.

To conclude this section, I stand by my assertion that to make of the Madhyarnaka the sole "edifying philosophical" school of Buddhist thought, and

; to pit this school against "an abstract, academic philosophy that had become divorced from the tradition of practical application" (Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 17), a philosophy whose sole aim was to "search for more and more precise

. technical terminology," is to unfairly characterize the Madhyamikas' opponents. As mentioned previously, Buddhist philosophical schools cannot be distinguished from each other as regards their pragmatic aims, for they all have soteriological motivations. Instead, they differ as regards their basic philosophical tenets, that is, what they hold as objective truths. The conundrum for Huntington, of course, is that in his interpretation Madhyamikas have no such tenets.

The preceding has been my attempt to defend (a) my reading of the Emptiness of Emptiness and (b) my suggestion that mKhas grub rje's views represent a significant challenge to that work. Whose reading of Huntington and of dGe lugs pa exegesis comes closer to the now infamous "mark" will of course be up to the reader to determine. That there is such a mark to be haggled over


- if only figuratively, in the sense that some interpretations are more adequa~ than others - is evidenced most clearly, perhaps, by the very existence of tile exchange you have before you. '

IV

I have argued that Huntington's response to my review represents a retreat t method, a turning to meta-questions of theory and away from theprim~ questions concerning the meaning of Candraldrti.' s text. Such a strategy may not adequately respond to the types of challenges raised by the dGe lugs pi interpretation of the Madhyamaka, but it does bring up interesting questions irl . its own right, and it is to these that I now turn.

Underlying much of Huntington's argument is the premise that the existence of disparate interpretations is evidence for hermeneutical relativism: the view that, since there is no arbitering between competing interpretations there are no criteria on which to judge whose interpretation of a text is better: His argument runs something like this: (a) Huntington has one reading of Huntington and of the mKhas grub rje, and Cabezon has another; (b) hence, there is no best reading, only alternative ones. Now clearly (b) does not follow from (a). The very existence of disparate readings in no way implies that those readings are equally valid; and I have shown above how, in practice if not in theory, this is something to which even Huntington subscribes. What is more, one does not defend one's reading of a text by saying, "Look, there are other readings, and therefore mine is as valid as any other." One defends one's interpretation through the methods I described in section II above. No one would argue that there are, and have been, different readings of Candrakirti, or of the dGe lugs pas, for that matter. But when one's reading of Candrakirti is challenged by another (in this case, I suggest, by mKhas grub Ije's) it does not suffice to say simply, "Mine is a different reading of Candrakirti," or to say "Mine is a different reading of the challenger (mKhas grub rje)." It is necessary to show how one's reading of Candrakirti or of mKhas grub rje is born out by the texts themselves. It is necessary to defend one's reading by demonstrating how one's own interpretation fits the textual facts better than that of the challenger. This cannot be accomplished from on high, from the realm of method; it requires getting one's exegetical hands dirty in the world of texts, and this Huntington has failed to do, at least as regards the challenges that I think mKhas grub rje poses to him.

As an aside, it is interesting that much ofE. D. Hirsch's critique ofDerrida has focussed on this very issue: what I am calling hermeneutical relativism, and what others have called subjectivism. In his American Religious Empiricism, William Dean paraphrases Hirsch's criticism as follows. He says that if Derrida is right, and "the objective meaning of a text is gone, the text is meaningless -or, to say the same thing, the meaning of the text is simply invented in the


11i~subjectivity ~f Yle reader."l. It s~ould be obvious that H~ntington sides with ~\:'~"r:verrida on thIS lssue, and I WIth Hirsch, and that the debate IS by no means a new ;:~'~7:;';:';:e _ ' ~ ;·i0~~.· Let me make something clear at this point. I am not objecting here to 'l;k!~~~untington's attempt to make Candraldrti relevant to the modern Western ;;Z(';philosophical mind: an e~terpris~ tha.t we migh.t call Bu~d~~st apologetics. To JL'i,'develop a "persuasIve philosophical mterpretatlOn of Naga!juna and the other !iy\(:elu-1y Indian MMhyamikas, one th.at we might have the courage, finally, to call ,;;;; > bur own" is indeed a worthy goal, one that takes seriously these thinkers' claims ';;/.to universalistic and transhistorical validity. It is about time that we as :?>~:;Buddhologists dispelled the myth that good scholarship in Buddhist Studies "'!iequires a neutral and dispassionate, attitude toward our subject matter, a view ;j!;{that has long been dispensed with in other sectors of the academy. I also have ;~2;·.J1oobjections to the use of Western or other philosophical traditions to elucidate "the meaning and implications of Buddhist doctrine. This is, it seems to me, the

•. 'igreat virtue of the comparative approach to knowledge. However, when one has i/ imposed upon oneself the limits of working within the confines of a tradition,

say Candralcirti' s, it is incumbent upon one to demonstrate that one is being true .! tothat tradition. This requires not only that one contextualize one's reading in fn. its historical milieu by examining Candraklrti' s sources, which Huntington does, ~.~ but also that one give heed to the later voices of the tradition and to the challenges ',~whichthey raise. The philosopher's and apologist's task is different from that . 'Of the philologist, for whom the task can viably terminate at the text itself.

Now Huntington claims that he has consciously chosen to avoid "meta• confusions" (a skeptic might say "challenges") by ignoring "later Tibetan

.. exegesis." But why restrict oneself in this way? If Wittgenstein and Rorty can be of use in the task of developing a version of the Madhyamaka that is of relevance to the modern Western mind, might not later Indian and Tibetan scholarship? Huntington suggests a reason for avoiding Tibetan scholarship as a source later in his essay. The Tibetan tradition, by virtue of having "no concept of history that accords with our own,"2 employs different (and implicitly inferior)

... ····standards of interpretation. Reading the Indian sources through the filter of the siddhanta schema,3 a doxographical system "imported into Tibet along with the

.. canonical literature," Tibetan exegesis presents the Indian tradition as "monolithic," and is incapable of the subtleties of "our own peculiarly modern concept of historiography."

Now the extent to which the siddhanta schema was imported into Tibet not at all clear. Certainly, categories such as "Cittamatra" and "Madhyamaka"

known in India, but Mimaki and others have shown that the finer distinctions of siddhanta classification, the Prasangika/Svatantrika distinction, for example, were Tibetan innovations. Huntington himself is quite willing to utilize such innovations where it suits him (e.g., Emptiness of Emptiness, p. 34), which makes his rejection of Tibetan exegetical categories disingenuous. None-

142 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

theless, I am not unsympathetic to the problems of using Tibetan exegeti aI materials to interpret Indian texts. Still, it seems to me unfair to characteJ Tibetan siddhan.ta as presenting the Indian tradition ~onoIithiCally. That ~~ •..•... Tibetans were mgemous enough to create categones of use even to the. historiographically superior modern (e.g., the Prasailgika/SvaJantrika dis tine:. tion) should be evidence enough of the nuanced (non-monolithic) nature of their doxography. What is more, Huntington's very claim of eschewing reliance On the later Tibetan tradition is problematic for another reason. By relying on the expertise of a learned Tibetan scholar, Huntington's reading of the Madhyamakavatara is de facto a reading that has been influenced by Tibetan exegesis. This is so, it seems to me, whether or not his guide in this endeavor ever represented his views as dGe lugs pa views. My experience has been that when Tibetan scholars teach a text like the Madhyamakavatara they do not go out of their way to "let one in on" the fact that they are passing on their tradition. They take this for granted, as should the student.

Let me conclude this essay with a response to what is most disturbing to Huntington, the charge that by pitting mKhas grub rje's interpretation against his . own I, as critic, have somehow slipped into the background. Now I, asa student of Candrakirti in my own right, could have taken another tack in my review. I could have, for example, offered my own alternative interpretation of Candrakrrti, an interpretation born from my own apologetic reflection on the meaning of the Madhyamakavatara. I chose not to do this, however, because, quite frankly, even· after fifteen years of studying the text, I do not yet find myself in the position of being able to enunciate a consistent formulation of Candrakirti' s Madhyamaka that is sufficiently true to the tradition to call Buddhist and sufficiently relevant to the modern mind to be worth enunciating. In this regard I admire Huntington's approach. Whether or not it is valid, it is at the very least intelligent and courageous.

Why then impose mKhas grub rje as Huntington's interlocutor? The reasons seem obvious. First of all, Huntington invites a dGe lugs pa response not· so much because he acknowledges dGe lugs pa connections as because he does not eschew them. Given the fact that he studied under an eminent dGe lugs pa scholar, it would seem incumbent upon him to mention, if only in passing, that his reading of Candrakirti is radically different from his teacher's. This he does not do. Secondly, mKhas grub rje is an interesting interlocutor for Huntington. The issues that emerge by pitting the two against each other, as I stated in my review, are some of the most fascinating in the history of Madhyamaka exegesis. Am I making the claim then that mKhas grub rje's is the correct interpretation of Candrakirti's Madhyamaka? Not at all. Nevertheless, mKhas grub rje raises objections to Huntington's reading that are deserving of response. Unfortunately, by enveloping his response in a rhetoric of theory, Huntington evades ever truly engaging mKhas grub rje, a loss to us all.


Finally, does mKhas grub rje's represent the traditional dGe lugs pa reading of Candraklrti? On the points that I chose to emphasize in my review I Jilieve that he does. Now I could be proven wrong. For example, Huntington '()uld find passages in Tsong kha pa or in later dGe lugs pa exegesis that disagree ~ith mKhas grub rje's readiIlg. This, it seems to me, is the way to proceed if aspersions are to be cast upon my claim that mKhas grub rje is representative of dGe lugs pa exegesis on these issues. Likewise, if Huntington would challenge cny reading of mKhas grub rje, he must immerse himself in mKhas grub rje's Writings, and show textually how I have failed in my interpretation of him.

Despite a rhetoric that casts me as a wizard behind the scenes, I never claim, nor do I believe myself, to have "direct and unfailing access to an authorized - the authorized - dGe lugs pa reading of the Madhyamika" or to

"esoteric knowledge" of the tradition. That mine is one interpretation of mKhas grub rje seems so trivial as to almost be banal. For the record, let me repea~ that mine is but one, possibly fallible, interpretation of mKhas grub rje. Do I believe itto be vested with authority gained through some sort of esoteric transmission

. or "a priori privilege"? I find it inconceivable that anyone could ever have read such a thing into my words. Is my interpretation a "traditional" one? To the extent that it is consistent with the oral and written texts of the dGe lugs pa tradition,

·at least those I have read, I would say fairly so. Do I believe it to be a valid one? Yes. Might I be wrong? Yes, but to demonstrate that will require working as I did, not in the ether of theory, but in the nitty gritty of texts. Methodological

. concerns may no longer be, as Huntington says, "peripheral to our common search for philosophical meaning in Buddhist literature," but they will also never be substitutes for it.

NOTES

1. William Dean, American Religious Empiricism (Albany: SUNY Press, 1986), p.46.

2. I have argued, in a recent essay, that the Indian and Tibetan rejection of history, far from being an artifact of its being a "traditional civilization," represents a self

conscious and philosophically rigorous attempt to posit rationality as the overriding .... hermeneutical principle. See my "V asubandhu' s Vyiikhyayukti on the Authenticity of the

Mahayana Siitras," in I. Timm, ed., Texts in Context: Traditional Henneneutics in South

Asia (Albany: SUNY Press, 1991). 3. On this, see my "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhanta

in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism," in 1. Keenan and P. I. Griffiths, eds., Buddha Nature (Reno: Buddhist Books International, 1990).

nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

IV~ REVIEWS

Choix de Documents tibetains conserves a la Bibliotheque Nation_ ale complete par quelques manuscrits de 1 'India Office et du British Museum, by Yo shiro Imaeda and Tsugohito Takeuchi, tome III: Corpus syllabique; Paris: Bibliotheque Nationale; 1990; XIV + 1009 pages. Price: 550 ff.

In the first two volumes of the Choix des Documents tiMtains conserves a la Bibliotheque ... presented by Ariane Macdonald and Yoshiro Imaeda in 1978 and 1979, 168 manuscripts were reproduced in facsimile on 640 plates. In the preface to the first volume, Professeur R. A. Stein expressed his hope to see published "the voluminous index of rare words," compiled by Marcelle Lalou before her death in 1967, along with notes and remarks by other researchers. However, such an ambitious project could not be carried out rapidly. Since 1979, two important studies have appeared: A Corpus of Early Tibetan Inscriptions, London, Royal Asiatic Society, 1985, by Hugh Richardson, and A Study of the Old Tibetan Inscriptions, Taipei, Institute of History and Philosophy, Academia Sinica,. Special Publications no. 91,1987, by LiFang Kuei and W. S. Coblin. And, since 1977, the Seminar on Tibet of the Taya B unka has pursued, at a regular rhythm, under the direction of ZuihO Yamaguchi, its re-examination of the Tibetan manuscripts today in the British Library, many of which were previously inventoried by L. de la Vallee Poussin in his Catalogue ... dating from 1962.

What is offered here is not an exhaustive list of rare words with their meanings and suggested meanings but a research tool which will undoubtedly prove extremely helpful to those engaged in the arduous task of translating these early Tibetan literary remains. The volume corresponds to the complete transcription of eleven of the manuscripts already published in the Choix .... These are: PeIliot-Tibetain 16, 1038, 1067, 1286, 1287, 1288, 1290, India Office 750,751 and Ch. XVII, 2, and British Museum Or. 8212 (187). All are concerned with history. From September 1981 to January 1982, thanks to an invitation of the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Y. Imaeda was able to work with H. Kitamura, who was then the Director of the Institute for the Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa, Tokyo University of Foreign Languages. A program for the treatment of Tibetan by computer was elaborated, . which made possible the input and printing of a Tibetan text in Tibetan characters-and not just in transliteration-and to sort out the syllables in the order of the Tibetan alphabet. The total number of syllables examined in this.

144

REVIEWS 145

fbdice of documents is approximately 30,000. Each is accompanied by the few CyIlableS which precede it and follow it and by a precise reference to the ,~ocument in which it figures. So a syllable in its context occupies one complete line of the Corpus: the presentation enables the reader to know the context of a ,Syllable's use with.out ~aving to refer ~ch ~e to the photographic reproduction: "The texts indexed m thIS manner are edlted,m full, as Y. Imaeda and T. TakeuchI read them, on p. 1-59, before the Corpus. Gaps and unreadable passages are signalled as are uncertain readings and alternative or corrected readings.

The General Administrator of the Bibliotheque Nationale who is himself 'a distinguished European historian has contributed a short preface in French (p. VII-VIII).

I . This massive, ingenious and beautifully produced volume will be of great dtiIity to the growing number of scholars throughout the world who study these rare historical sources. The volume is a fine example of Franco-Japanese scientific cooperation.

On p. XIII, penultimate line, for dgung rab read: gdung rab.

Alexander W. Macdonald

AConcordance of Buddhist Birth Stones, by Leslie Grey. Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1990. 268 pp .

. This book presents a concordance of printed books and articles that are concerned with the stories of Buddha's former births, both Hitakas and

'Avadanas. It is organized on the model of a union list, where the main body of the work consists of an index of the titles of Jatakas (pp. 1-172) and Avadanas (pp. 173-251) in the order of the Roman alphabet. In addition there are shorter

; indexes. One lists the names of the Jatakas and A vadanas discussed in the book (pp. v-xxviii) and another, called "Codes" (pp. xxx-xliii), lists abbreviations of almost 200 bibliographical sources that have been utilized in the preparation of

'the concordance. The index of "Codes" is not confined to editions and . translations of Jatakas, but also includes all manner of publications in which Jatakas are discussed and/or described in both English and a number of other modem European languages. Every major work in which sculptures and paintings of Jatakas are represented also find a place here. Titles like Benfey's Pantchatantra, Jaini's Pafjjj:isa-j:itaka, as well as catalogs from various museums throughout the world are listed here in abbreviated form.

The main list of Jatakas has the title of each Birth Story along with the number assigned to it in the Pali I:itakatthavaIJl:lan:i, the Sanskrit I:itakam:il:i, and a number of other works of the Buddhist Sanskrit tradition. The title is followed by a brief summary of the story, the moral of the story and then an exhaustive

146 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

list of references to publications where the particular story is discussed Or represented.

To give an example, under the title Baka-Jataka (no. 38), we find a brief reference to FausbQll's edition, Cowell's translation and its discussion by Malalasekhara. Under "Story" we find the summary: "Crane devours crabs one by one, till a suspicious crab cuts its throat." The "Moral" is given as: "Don't be gullible!" Then follow seventeen references to publications which include:

1) Translations and reworkings of the story in Western languages: Buddhist Birth Stories by Rhys-Davids; J§taka Tales by Francis and Thomas' Ages Ago by S. W. Jones; Buddhistische Marchen by Else Ltiders and A Risto; of Indian Literature by M. Winternitz.

2) Stories with a similar theme found in the later Indian and Western literature: The Moral Philosophy of Doni by Sir Thomas North; the Ritopadesa by NarayaI)a; the Kathasaritsfigara by Somadeva; The Fables of Jean Lafontaine; the Paiicatantra in Benfey's edition.

3) Artistic representations of the stories in older monuments: Le Siam Ancien by Lucien Foumereau; Old Burma ~ Early Pagan by Gordon H. Luce, with the names of two Burmese temples where the Jataka is represented; Mural Paintings of the Buddhist Temples in Burma, by TOfU Ono.

In the "Bibliography" (pp. 252-68) the full titles of the works are given. The titles show the broad scope of the concordance. They also cast into relief, incidentally, the vast geographical area over which the Jatakas have spread in the course of the past 2000 years. Central Asia, Eastern China, Korea, Japan, Thailand, Burma and farther south, Java and Bali, all have become legatees of that remarkable collection ofPali stories that had its origin in an unknown region of India, or Sri Lanka. The seventeen references to the literature given for the Baka Jataka are more than are found for most of the Jatakas in this book, although for the popular Sivi Jataka (pp. 137-140) the author has found more than lOOt

This book meets a genuine need not only for scholars who make a serious study of the Indian story literature, but also for art historians, Buddhologists and students of comparative literature and folklore. Previously, it was difficult to know where to find traditional representations of Avadanas and Jatakas in art. Such seminal works as Benfey's Pantchatantra and Penzer's Ocean of Story, though indispensable for literary research, do not encompass the same range of works as this Concordance offers. With this work the reader of a Jataka tale can determine first of all whether people have deemed it worthy of a representation, second, where this representation may be found, and third, whether it has appeared in print. Dr. Grey has searched through many volumes of published art works, including Cunningham's Stupa of Bharhut, Krom' s Barabuc;IUI and Tucci's rare Tibetan Painted Scrolls.

The author invites the reader to bring to his attention comments and corrections which may be incorporated in a possible second edition. It is clear that such corrections of detail may be necessary. A critique of the entry for the

REVIEWS 147

Baka story, for instance, would have to point out that the summary of the story -is erroneous. The lata.1ca story clearly does not make crabs the victims of the Mron, but fish who live in the pond. This is a rather trivial point, but in a concise summary accuracy is essential. Nor is the moral of the story "Don't be gullible!" Instead, the Hitaka is narrated to illustrate the saying (gathff) that deceitful creatures end up as victims of deceit themselves. This second point is not trivial. One of the most interesting features of a diachronic study of folktales is the significance that the narrator and the audience attribute to the story. True, the fish murdered by the heron are gullible, and to that extent Dr. Grey's "Moral" applies, but it was not the essential point for the Hitaka narrator. Many other "Morals" listed seem to be less than accurate (e.g., SUJTlsumara [1. 208], not so much "Sacca," as well as: "A fool is tricked;" Kakati J. 327: "Women cannot be protected against lovers," rather than "Lust of women uncontrollable," etc.). It isthis reviewer's suggestion to either expand the description of the "Moral," or leave it out altogether.

The book is a model of the type of reference work that is desirable, yet infrequently produced by Indologists. In a way it is comparable to Colonel Yule's Hobson-Jobson, a work that likewise covers an area of study that is not exactly the property of any specific academic discipline, but is eminently useful to a number of them. Dr. Grey acknowledges in the "Introduction" (p. iii): "The material is vast. This is a beginning." I agree, but must add that it is a very good beginning. We hope that the work will be continued. Perhaps in future editions an electronic version of the text could be included to facilitate the searches for titles.

Barend A. van Nooten

148 nABS VOL. 15, NO. 1

V% NOTES AND NEWS

Report on the 10th IABS Conference

The 10th International Conference of 1. A. B. S. was hosted by UNESCO and the Permanent Delegation of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to UNESCO, 7 place de Fontenoy, 75007 Paris and 1, rue Miollis, 75015 Paris France. It took place between July 18 and 21, 1991 and was sponsored by th~ United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation; the Sri Lanka Permanent Delegation to UNESCO; the Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, and the Laboratoire d'ethnologie et de sociologie comparative of that University.

Because of the Gulf War and fear of terrorism, many members hesitated to make the journey to Paris. However, seventy-seven abstracts of papers were received (the number actually delivered was slightly less) and one hundred and thirteen participants paid the $50 fee to attend. The inaugural session on July 19 which was open to the public was attended by over three hundred persons. Speakers were H. E. Dr. Ananda W. P. Guruge, Sri Lanka Ambassador in France and Permanent Delegate to UNESCO who, as Local Secretary of the conference, welcomed participants; Professor Alexander W. Macdonald, the new General

. Secretary who drew attention to the difficulties which have to be overcome if a conference is to be organised in Paris in the summer months when universities are, literally, shut; and Mr. C. L. Sharma, Deputy Director-general of UNESCO, who inaugurated the conference on behalf of Mr. Federico Mayor who was unavoidably absent from Paris. The keynote address on "The Present and Future of Buddhist Studies" was then delivered by the President of I. A. B. S., David Seyfort Ruegg. This address appears in this issue of the Journal; and a more detailed account of the papers read and discussed in panels will be published in a volume of Proceedings which the untiring Dr. Guruge proposes to bring out in Sri Lanka.

Alexander W. Macdonald

CONTRIBUTORS

Prof. Jose Ignacio Cabezon Iliff School of Theology 2201 South University Ave. Denver, CO 80201

Prof. Phyllis Granoff Dept. of Religious Studies

.·McMaster University Hamilton, ONT L8S 4KI Canada

Prof. Paul Harrison Dept. of Philosophy

and Religious Studies University of Canterbury Christchurch New Zealand

Dr. C. W. Huntington 2417 North Circle Ann Arbor, MI 48103

151

Prof. Alexander W. Macdonald Laboratoire d' Ethnologie et de

Sociologie Comparative Universite de Paris X 92001 Nanterre France

Prof. Barend A. van Nooten Dept. of South and

Southeast Asian Studies University of California, Berkeley Berkeley, CA 94720

Prof. John Powers Dept. of Religion Wittenberg University Springfield, OH 45501

Prof. D. Seyfort Ruegg 15 Cadogan Square London SW 1 X OHT England

Date post:	29-Nov-2014
Category:	Documents
Upload:	jiabsonline
View:	98 times
Download:	1 times