JIABS 8-1

THE JOURNAL

OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

A.K. Narain

University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA

L. M. Joshi Punjabi University

Patiala, India

Alexander W. Macdonald

Universite de Paris X Nanterre, France

Bardwell Smith

Carleton College

Northfield, Minnesota, USA

EDITORS

Ernst Steinkellner

University of Vienna Wien, Austria

Jikido Takasaki

University of Tokyo

Tokyo,japan

Robert Thurman

Amherst College

Amherst, Massachusetts, USA

ASSISTANT EDITOR

Volume 8

Roger Jackson University of Michigan

Ann Arbor, Michigan, USA

1985 Number 1

the watermark

THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

This Journal is the organ of the International AssocIation of Buddhist Studies, Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The jIABS is published twice yearly in the summer and winter.

Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief, jIABS, Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A. Please refer to the guidelines for contributors to the jIABS printed on the inside back cover of every issue.

The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related publications.

Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders.

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Andre Bareau (France) Joseph M. Kitagawa (USA)

M.N. Deshpande (India) Jacques May (Switzedand)

R. Card (USA) H ajirne N akarnura U apan)

B.C. Cokhale (USA) John Rosenfield (USA)

P.S. Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.)

J. W. de J ong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands)

Editor's Note: L.M. Joshi's name was inadvertently omitted from the list of .editors in vol. 7, no. 2. Prof. Joshi, sadly, is no longer with us, but several of the articles in the last and the present issue were reviewed and helped toward publication by him. .

Also inadvertantly omitted from vol. 7, nos. 1 and 2 was the relevant copyright information, which does, of course, apply.

The Editor wishes to thank Ms. Rena Haggarty for her invaluable help in the preparation of this issue.

Copyright © The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1985 ISSN: 0193-600X

Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison.

Composition by Publications Division, Grote Deutsch & Co., Madison, WI 53704. Printing by Thomson-Shore, Inc., Dexter, MI 48130.

CONTENTS

I. ARTICLES

1. Nagarjuna's Arguments Against Motion, by Kamaleswar Bhattacharya

2. Dhiira11l and Pratibhiina: Memory and Eloquence of the Bodhisattvas, byJens Braarvig

3. The Concept of a "Creator God" in Tantric Buddhism, byEvaK. Dargyay

4. Direct Perception (Pratya~a) in dGe-Iugs-pa Interpre-tations ofSautrantika, by Anne C. Klein

5. A Text-Historical Note on Hevajratantra II:v: 1-2, by Leonard WI van der Kuijp

6. Simultaneous Relation (Sahabhil-hetu): AS tud y in Bud-dhist Theory of Causation, by Kenneth K. Tanaka

II. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

Reviews: 1. The Books ofKiu-Te or the Tibetan Buddhist Tantras: A Pre

liminary Analysis, by David Reigle Dzog Chen and Zen, by N amkhai N orbu

7

17

31

49

83

91

(Roger Jackson) 113 2. Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of

Niigiirjuna, by Chr. Lindtner (Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti) 115

3. Selfless Persons: Imagery and Thought in TheraviidaBud-dhism, by Steven Collins (Vijitha Rajapakse) 117

4. SelfandNon-SelfinEarlyBuddhism, by Joaquin PerezRemon (Vijitha Rajapkse) 122

5. The World of Buddhism, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich ' (Roger Jackson) 126

Notices: 1. Tibetan B lockprints in the Department of Rare Books

and Special Collections, compiled by Leonard Zwilling (Rena Haggarty) 134

OBITUARY 135 LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS 138

Nagarjuna's Arguments against Motion*

by Kamrileswar Bhattacharya

I want to take up again a topic I have discussed before: Nagarjuna's arguments against motion. I It is a topic that continues to attract the attention of scholars, who have been giving most imaginative interpretations, and is important not only for our understanding of Nagarjuna's own philosophy, but of Indian philosophy in general and the comparison between Indian and Western philosophy in particular.

That Indian philosophy follows the grammatical method and makes a massive use of grammatical concepts was for the first time emphasized-so far as I am aware-by Louis Renou, who, in 1942, in his great article in the Journal Asiatique, "Les Connexions entre Ie Rituel et la Grammaire en Sanskrit," wrote: "La pensee indienne a pour substructure des raisonnements d'ordre grammatical.,,2 Later, Renou repeated the idea in different forms on more than one occasion. Its best expression was in L'/nde classique II (1953): "Adherer ala pensee indienne, c'est d'abord penser en grammairien."3 Renou was thus echoing, as it were, what Anandavardhana had said in the 9th century, in his Vr:tti on the Dhvanyiiloka: prathame vidviin:tso vaiyiikarar],iilJ" vyiikarar],amillatviit sarvavidyiiniim. 4 In Indian philosophy, Nagarjuna's arguments against motion give the best illustration of this characterization.

In my previous papers, I discussed the various interpretations given by modern scholars of these arguments: those of T.R.V. Murti and Jacques May of course, but also those of Mark Siderits and]. Dervin O'Brien, for instance. The latter, in 1976,5 proposed of Nagarjuna's arguments against motion what they called a "mathematical" interpretation beside what they called

7

8 JIABS VOL. 8 NO.1

a "conceptual" interpretation, and, naturally, in their "mathematical" interpretation they endeavoured to draw a parallel with Zeno's arguments against motion. I believe, however, that they have demonstrated nothing, because of philological limitations: they refer often to Candrakirti's commentary, and believe that they find support from it, but it is only at the cost of grave misconstructions.

I know that Nagarjuna's arguments in the second chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakiirikiis were sometimes interpreted by their ancient exponents in a temporal sense. In this connection, there is an interesting interpretation given by Andre Bareau: "Nagarjuna critique ensuite la notion de temps, non pas de duree mais de temps fonctionnel, actif, la 'marche du temps' (gati). Celle-ci n'existe plus dans Ie passe et n'existe pas encore dans Ie futur. On ne la retrouve pas non plus dans la present car ce dernier, sans passe ni futur en fonction desquels il puisse se mouvoir, n'est qU'un point immobile.,,6 I am not aware, however, whether this interpretation is supported by any ancient authority.

So far as I am concerned, one must rely upon Candrakirti's Prasannapadii, . the only commentary on the Mulamadhyamakakiirikiis extant in Sanskrit; and, in the present instance, I gladly rely on it, since the interpretation it gives of the arguments of the difficult second chapter-that "infamous chapter" as it is sometimes called-appeals to me as perfectly satisfactory-an interpretation which, alas, has itself been misunderstood by its modern exponents.

The first kiirikii runs as follows:

gatan; na gamy ate tavad agatan; naiva gamyate / gatagatavinirmuktan; gamyamanan; na gamyate / /

It can best be translated:

First, [the road] that has already been travelled (gata) is not being travelled at present; nor the one that has not yet been travelled (agata). And [the road] that is being travelled at present,-road independent of that which has been travelled and that which has not yet been travelled,-is not being travelled at present.

That neither the road that has already been travelled nor the

NAGARJUNA 9

one that has not yet been travelled is being travelled at present needs no explanation: in the former motion has ceased, in the latter it has not yet occurred. But how can Nagarjuna say that the road that is being travelled at present is not being travelled at present? Perhaps because of Nagarjuna's qualification of gamyamiinam as gatiigatavinirmuktam, the early commentators interpreted na gamyate at the ~ end of the fourth piida, as "it is not perceived," "is not known.'" Candrakirti follows this interpretation. 8 He explains that the feet are merely conglomerations of atoms (paramiir}usarIJghiita). Now, when a person treads a certain space, one distinguishes by taking as reference, on the one hand, the atom situated at the tip of one of the toes, and, on the other, the atom that is situated at the extremity of the heel, only a portion of space that has already been traversed (gata) and one that has not yet been traversed (agata); one does not perceive a portion that would be in process of being traversed (gamyamana). The same situation occurs if one takes as references the spatial divisions of the atoms the foot is composed of.g

Understood in this way, this karika has nothing to do with Zeno's arrow paradox-contrary to what has sometimes been thought. Candraklrti bases his interpretation on two Buddhist theories, namely that there is no whole independent of the parts, and that atoms have spatial extension.

In the second kiirika, N agarjuna states the objection raised by the opponent:

ce/i(a yatra gatis tatra gamyamane ca sa yatal?- / na gate nagate ce~(a gamyamane gatis tatal?- / /

Here Candraklrti states that gati, in the fourth pada, has two meanings: "knowledge," and "motion," in accordance with the two meanings of the root gam, "to know," and "to move": eko 'tra gamir jniinarthal]" aparas ca desantarasarIJpraptyarthal],. All this is, perhaps, unnecessary complication. We can simply translate the second karika:

Where there is effort, there is motion. Now, there is effort in [the road] that is being travelled, not in that which has already been travelled, nor in that which has not yet been travelled. There is, therefore, motion in [the road] that is being travelled at present.

10 JIABS VOL. 8 NO.1

Be that as it may, Nagarjuna presents against this objection arguments which can best be explained if they are related to grammatical concepts, as Candraklrti clearly perceived. I shall, therefore, summarize these arguments in the light of Candraklrti's Prasannapada: Motion (gati, gamana) , we have seen, cannot be conceived in relation to a road that has already been travelled (gata), nor in relation to a road that has not yet been travelled (agata). It can be conceived only in relation to a road that is being travelled at present (gamyamana). But-Nagarjuna argues-it is equally impossible to attribute motion to a road that is being travelled at present. Why? It is in virtue of a connection with the action of travelling (gamikriya, says Candraklrti) that one designates a road as "being travelled" (gamyamana). There is no second action of travelling that can be coherently attributed to it. Or, one should suppose that in attributing 10

the action of travelling to a road that is "being travelled," in the sentence gamyamanarlJ gamyate, "[The road] that is being travelled is being travelled," one is using the verb gamyate, "is being travelled," without there being any motion-which is absurd. In other words, one can only say gamyamanam, "being travelled"; one cannot use the complete sentence, gamyamanarlJ gamyate, "[The road] that is being travelled is being travelled." Now, if it is supposed for the sake of argument that the connection with the action of travelling is in the finite verb gamyate, "is being travelled," then there is no connection with the action of travelling in the participle gamyamana, "being travelled"; and we encounter the same absurdity as before: one would be designating a road as "being travelled" (gamyamana) without there being any motion! Finally, it may be supposed that there is connection with the action of travelling in both gamyamana, "being travelled," and gamyate, "is being travelled." But, in this case, it follows that there are two motions: one by virtue of which the road is designated as "being travelled," and another that is attributed to that road, its locus, when it is said: gamyamanarlJ gamyate "[The road] that is being travelled is being travelled." gamyamanasya gamane prasaktarlJ gamanadvayam I yena tad gamyamanarlJ ca yac catra gamanarlJ puna;' II (karika 5). "Locus" (adhikararJa) says Candraklrti: although gramatically the road that is being travelled (gamyamana) is, in the sentence gamyamanarlJ gamyate, the "object" (karman) , semantically it is the locus (adhikararJa) of the action

NAGARJUNA 11

of travelling, insofar as it holds the agent in whom inheres the action of travelling denoted by the verbal root gam (the "locus," adhikarar]a, holds the acti~n only indirectly by holding either the agent or the object in which the action inheres). Similarly, in the Mahabha:jya, Patanjali says that in a sentence such as adhvanar(l vrajati " ... travels the road," the road is the locus of the action of travelling (adhikarar]am atradhva vrajatikriyayah).11 What harm is there if there are two motions? The harm is that, if there are two motions, then there should also be two agents of motion; for, without an agent of motion, there cannot be motion: dvau gantarau prasajyete prasakte gamanadvaye Igantarar(l hi tirask'(tya gamanar(l nopapadyate II (karika 6). "An action," writes Candrakirti, "necessarily requires a means to bring it about (sadhana = karaka): the object (karman) or the agent (kart'(). Now the action of travelling also resides in an agent; therefore, it requires an agent of travelling (gant'()." 12 Candrak"irti refers here to the grammatical theory according to which the action denoted by a verbal root resides either in the agent (kart-r;) or in the object (karman) , and the verbal root gam, "to go, move, travel," is one of those which denote actions that reside in the agent (kart,(sthakriya). It is therefore indispensable that there should be two agents of motion if there are two motions. But we have only one agent in the case under consideration. The' opponent, ignorant of grammar, says that one agent can perform more than one action, as, for instance, when the same Devadatta, standing, speaks and looks. But CandrakIrti teaches him that karaka, in Grammar, is not a substance (dravya), but a power (sakti) which is diversified because of the diversity of the actions. In this way we can account for the fact that Devadatta performs simultaneously the actions of standing, speaking, and looking. Each of these' actions has a different agent: it is not the substance Devadatta which remains the same in all these actions, but a power, different for each of these actions, which resides in him. When, however, Devadatta alone moves, there are not in him two powers which can account for the double action of moving implied in the sentence gamyamanar(l gamyate, "[The road] that is being travelled is being travelled." There would be no difficulty if the two actions referred to two different times: there would then be two powers in Devadatta functioning as the agents of the actions of travelling at two different times. But, in the instance we are considering,


both the actions refer to the same time, the present. Hence the paradox. 13

Candrakirti, coming after Bhartrhari, naturally uses his terminology. It is well known that Bhartrhari had defined siidhana (= kiiraka) as the capacity (siimarthya) or the power (sakti) that a thing has to bring an action to accomplishment. But the author of the Mahiibh~ya, Patanjali, had already shown-unless the idea goes back to PaI).ini himself-that siidhana cannot be a substance (dravya), and it is perhaps to Patanjali that Nagajuna owes his inspiration. 14 All the other arguments of this second chapter of the Mulamadhyamakakiirikiis will be found to be equally based on grammatical concepts, if we follow Candraklrti. In fact, the majority of them will be found to be merely variants of those which have just been summarized. They will therefore be easily understood, once one has understood these.

The importance of the arguments of the second chapter will be seen from the fact that they serve as a model for other arguments contained in other chapters, for instance, in the third, the seventh, and the tenth. The eighth chapter is a continuation of the second, since the last two kiirikiis of the second chapter will be elucidated only in the eighth. 15

I am satisfied with Candraklrti's interpretation insofar as it helps me discover in Nagarjuna's arguments an inner coherence, and I am better satisfied with it than with any other interpretation given by ancient or modern authorities of which I am aware. Nevertheless, I do believe that the Madhyamika, who uses the grammarian's concepts to serve his dialectical needs, is open to criticism from the grammarian's own side. The latter would say that the Madhyamika is unduly mixing up facts of language with ontological considerations which are foreign to them: these facts are to be explained, not, as the Madhyamika assumes or feigns to assume, by reference to the "external being" (biihyasattii) or "primary being" (mukhyasattii) of the things, but only by reference to· their "superimposed being" (aupaciirikZ sattii or upaciirasattii) which is conceived and externally projected by the mind of the speaker and hearer. It is this being, which exists in the mind alone (buddhisattii) , that is the ground of all verbal behaviour. "The meaning of a word never deviates from being" (na sattiirIJ padiirtho vyabhicarati) , said Patanjali, and, according

NAaAR]UNA 13

to B-hartrhari and the later tradition, it is this '.'superimposed being" that he had in mind. 16

I believe equally, however, that the Madhyamika would never have been able to formulate his arguments against motion if he had· not found in grammar the concepts which furnished him with the technical basis for them.

Here is a significant point for those who are interested in the comparison ofIndian and Western philosophy, nay, for the historian in general, who is not merely interested in what may be termed the surface of a civilization, chronology of facts, institutions, and so on, but wants to get at its deep roots. For the difference that separates here two philosophies is also one which separates two civilizations. This difference, which is of a scientific character and therefore, it seems to me, more important than the occasional similarities concerning axioms and dogmas that have been found between Indian and Western philosophy, was emphasized for the first time-so far as I am aware-by ProfessorDaniel H.H. Ingalls, in his celebrated article "A Comparison of Indian and Western Philosophy."l7 I do not know yet what this difference is due to, but it is there, and I can give it no better expression than the one which Profesor Ingalls gave it. "The Greek example," he said, "is based on a problem of mathematics, the Indian one on a problem of grammar. Here is a noticeable difference between Greek and Indian philosophy, a difference of a scientific, not a dogmatic character. In philosophizing the Greeks made as much use as possible of mathematics. The Indians, curiously, failed to do this, curiously because they were good mathematicians. Instead, they made as much use as possible of grammatical theory and argument.,,18 Professor Ingalls did not take into account Nagarjuna's arguments against motion. However, it is these which seem to illustrate best, in the light of Candraklrti's interpretation, what Nagarjuna owes to grammar, and, at the same time, the difference that separates him from Zeno, also arguing against motion.

Mathematics has given, in general, the technical basis for philosophic thought in the West. l9 In India, this role was played by grammar (vyiikaraTJa). And Professor Frits Staal's brilliant statement applies not only to the ancient Indian philosophers but also to their modern students: "Just as Plato reserved admis~


sion to his Academy for geometricians, Indian scholars and philosophers are expected to have first undergone a training in scientific linguistics.,,2o

NOTES

*Paper read at the VI Conference of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, held jointly with the XXXI International Congress of Human Sciences in Asia and North Africa (31 August-7 September, 1983: Tokyo and Kyoto).

1. Cf. "Nagarjuna's Arguments against Motion: Their Grammatical Basis," in A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honour of Professor Gaurinath Sastri (Calcutta, 1980), pp. 85-95; "The Grammatical Basis of Nagarjuna's Arguments: Some Further Considerations," in Indologica Taurinensia, VIII-IX! 1980--81 (Sternbach Commemoration Volume), pp. 35-43; "Reconsideration des arguments de Nagarjuna contre Ie mouvement," in Proceedings of the First International Symposium on the Sanskrit Language, held in Mexico City in February 1982; Mexico, 1984, pp. 189-99.

2. Journal Asiatique, CCXXXIII (1941-42), p. 164 (= A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians, edited by J.F. Staal, Cambridge, Mass., and London: MIT Press, 1972, p. 468).

3. L. Renou and J. Filliozat, L'Inde classique II (Paris-Hanoi, 1953), p. 86, § 1519.

4. Dhvanyaloka (Panabhirama Sastrl's edition: Benares, 1940), pp. 132-3.

5. "Zeno and NagaIjuna on Motion," in Philosophy East & West (Honolulu), XXVI, pp. 281-99.

6. A. Bareau in A. Bareau, W. Schubring & C. von Fiirer-Haimendorf, Les Religions de l'Inde, III: Bouddhisme,jai"nisme, Religions archai'ques (Paris, 1966), p. 18I.

7. Cf. Musashi Tachikawa, "A Study of Buddhapalita's Mulamadhyamakavr:tti," in The Journal of the Faculty of Literature, Nagoya University, LXIII, Philosophy 21 (1974), p. 5 and pp. 9-10, n. 5.

8. See also Prasannapada on Mulamadhyamakakiirikiis, II, 12 & 17; III, 3; VII, 14; X, 13.

9. atha syiit: gantur gacchato yaS caraTjakranto desah sa gamyamanah syad iti. naivam. caraTjayor api paramaTjusawghatatviit. angulyagravasthitasya paramar}-or yah purvo desah sa tasya gate 'ntargatah, pars,Tjyavasthitasya caramaparamaTjor ya uttaro desah sa tasyagate 'ntargatah. na ca paramiiTjuvyatirekeTja caraTjam asti. tasman niisti gatagatavyatirekeTja gamyamanam. yatha caivaw caraTje vicarah, evaw paramaTjunam api purvaparadigbhagasawbandhena vicarah kiirya iti . .. Prasannapada (L. de La Vallee Poussin's edition, Bibliotheca Buddhica, IV, St.Petersbourg, 1903-13) p. 93.

lO. On the precise nature of this attribution, see below.

NAGARJUNA 15

11. See "Nagarjuna's Arguments against Motion ... ," loco cit., pp. 94-5,

n.39. 12. yasmad avasyarIJ kriya svasadhanam ape~ate karma kartararIJ va, gamikriya

caivarIJ kartary avasthitato gantaram ape~ate . . .. "Nagarjuna's Arguments against Motion ... ," loco cit., p. 87.

13. For' more details see "Nagarjuna's Arguments against Motion ... ," loco cit., pp. 87ff., with the notes.

14. See ibid., pp. 89-90, with the notes. 15. See "The Grammatical Basis ofNagarjuna's Arguments ... ," loco cit. 16. Ibid., pp. 42-3. 17. Journal of Oriental Research (Madras), XXII (1954), pp. I-II. 18. Ibid., p. 4. 19. Cf. Bertrand Russell, Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, edited

by Robert Charles Marsh, London-New York, 1956 (fifth impression: 1971), pp.367-8.

20. "Euclid and Pal).ini," in Philosophy East and West, XV (1965), p. 114.

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Dharar(i and Pratibhana: Memory and Eloquence of the Bodhisattvas*

by Jens Braarvig

. Mahayana Buddhism seems to have arisen in a milieu quite sophisticated intellectually. The early adherents of the new faith had to confront the expounders of the complex system of abhidharma, at the same time as they confronted the religious monopoly of the monks.

Therefore, along with the devotional trends among lay people, techniques of discussion and intellectual discipline developed within the fold. The scene where the powerful lay bodhisattva defeats the obdurate monk in public discussion is well known to the readers of Mahayana sutras. This kind of discussion was regarded by the Mahayanists as an important means of religious edification, and according to their central doctrine of sunyata, the emptiness of all views, the aim was not to force another view upon the opponent, but rather to show tbe absurdity and paradox in all views. These discussions were, with their subject-matter, formalized into a system, if one may call it so, by Nagarjuna towards the end of the earliest phase of Mahayana.

Rhetoric naturally grew into a significant discipline. To my knowledge no technical work on rhetoric from the period in question is preserved,l but allusions to the two principle parts of rhetoric, memory and eloquence, dhararj,z and pratibhana, abound in Mahayana works. In the list of bodhisattva-qualities in the sutras they are seldom excluded, and they appear in bodhisattva names, such as Dharariigarbha and Pratibhanakuta, and in names of samadhis like Dhararj,zmati and Anantapratibhana.

The following quotations may serve to elucidate the concepts. The A~ayamatinirdeSa says:

17


What then is the imperishability of dhiiraTff? DhiiraTfl is to keep, retain in memory and not forget, to truly retain by remembrance the eighty-four thousand multitudes of religion, that by means of the remembrance originating from earlier potentialities for the good, this is dhiiraTfl. Again, dhiiraTf'i is that by which one retains the words of all the buddhas, that by which one retains the sayings of all the bodhisattvas, pratyekabuddhas, sravakas and all living beings, that by which one retains all good sayings without remainder. 2

Thus dhiirarp'i is described as both remembrance itself (ya) and the faculty or means of retaining in memory the words and teachings of the buddhas (yaya).

The A~ayamatinirdesa then goes on to describe pratibhiina. In most cases the concepts appear together, except when pratibhiina is mentioned among the four types of knowledge related to the exposition of religion, dharma-, artha-, nirukti- and pratibhiina-pratisar(tvid. The classical definition of pratibhiina in this connection is yuktamuktabhilapita, "coherent and free speech;,,3 mukta, "free," is glossed as asar(tsakta,4 sa11J,sakta meaning "faltering (speech)" (MMW).

These four types of knowledge are treated in the abhidharma of the older schools, but in the Mahayana this bodhisattva-quality came more in the focus. When the two concepts appear together, dhiirarp'i usually precedes pratibhiina as a prerequisite, as one is not a good speaker when not able to memorize. According to th e Lalitavistara: 5

Attaining dhiiraTf'i is an entrance into the light of Dharma, as it functions so as to retain all that the buddhas spoke; attaining pratibhiina is an entrance into the light of Dharma, as it functions so as to please all living beings with good sayings.

The A~(adasasahasrikaprajnaparamita says:6

For the bodhisattvas, great beings who retain these dhiiraTf'is, all kinds of pratibhiina-knowledge appear.

And the Dasabhilmika: 7

Leaving home, he retains what he has heard and turns into

DHARAlYi ANDPRATIBHfWA 19

-a preacher of religion, and to a greater degree attaining dhiiran-i of the heard and practiced he turns into a preacher of religion .... Begets dhiiran-i, he gets pratibhiina and sits down in religious discussions .... He is established in the ability of dhiiran-i because of not forgetting the dharmas, he is established in pratibhiina because of being clever in discerning all the buddhadharmas.

From the preceding it is clear that dhararpi is brought about by remembrance (smJ:ti), by not forgetting (asa'f(tPramo~a).8 It is retaining (dhararpa, adhararpa(-ta)) in memory, both as the process itself and the means to bring it about. The Sanskrit dhararpi may mean "(tubular) vessel (of the body)" (MMW), so it may have been conceived as the vessel in which one should contain what has been learned. The root is of course dhJ:-, "to hold, keep, possess, bear." Several of its derivatives have meanings associated with memory.9 In Tibetan it is translated by gzuns, derived from 'dzin pa, "to hold, grasp."

All this should point to the translation "memory." But, as is well known, Mahayana literature contains volume after volume of seemingly meaningless strings of syllables, . associated with dhararpi, to be recited for magical purposes. This has led buddhologists more often than not to translate dhararpi as "magical formula" or the like. This, though, does not fit well with the obvious connotation of memory. .

The Bodhisattvabhumi 10 divides dhararpi into four types, dharmadhararpi, arthadhararpi, mantradhararpi and dhararpi to attain the tolerance, ~anti, of a bodhisattva. By the first type the bodhisattva acquires the power of remembrance (smJ:ti) and insight (prajiia) into the Dharma, and thus is able to retain in memory for endless time any book merely by hearing it once. Arthadhararpi is the same, only here one retains the meaning of the book, not just the words, as in the first.

It seems that dhararpi in this context may safely be translated as "the power of retaining in memory," or simply "memory," though memory of extraordinary power. Dhararpi was conceived as a seal, mudra, impressed upon the mind,u

The third, mantradhararpi, at first seems to justify the translation "magical formula." Here, the bodhisattva acquires the power of concentration, samadhivasita, and he employs the mantras magically to alleviate the sufferings of living beings. A trans-

. lation "retain, recollect, have a magical formula in mind," is,


however, also possible; the mantrapadani, words of the formula, alleviate suffering through dhara'fJl. In other works, too, the formula itself usually is called mantra or mantrapada, 12 or dhara'fJzmukha(prave.sa), "entrance into dhara'fJz." 13 The passage in question, then, should be translated as follows:

What, then, is the retaining of a formula in mind? Here the bodhisattva accordingly attains power of concentration, and by it the words of the formula bring about the alleviation of suffering.14

The formula "i(i miti ki(i bhi ~anti svaha," quoted in the Bodhisattvabhumi, is also called mantrapada, and is mentioned as an example in the treatment of the fourth, the bodhisattva~antilabhaya dhara'fJz. This dhara'fJz consists in pondering15 a mantra until one understands its meaning, namely that it is without meaning,16 and accordingly understands all dharmas as being beyond expression. 17 The bodhisattva' s ~iinti is the tolerance of this state of things, that dharmas are unborn, empty and so on.

In the Bodhisattvabhumi the syllables of the mantra are said to be without meaning, but the Karu'fJapu'fJ4arzka 18 calls the mantra maharthika, "having great meaning."

The Prajiiaparamitasutras attempt to give each of the syllables a meaning. The mantra arapacana, for instance, is broken down thus: a is the "entrance," mukha, into the original unbornness, adyanutpannatva, of all moments of existence; ra into their absence of impurity, rajo'pagatatva; pa into the teaching of paramartha, and so on. Other mantra syllables are treated in a similar way. According to the Satasahasrikii,19

The syllables are the same as explanations of doctrine; this is the entrance into syllables, the penetration into syllables.

Understanding this, the bodhisattva is furnished with remembrance and eloquence. 2o

The dhara'fJzmukha then turns into a kind of summary of doctrine. The Chinese, when they did not transliterate tuo luo ni,a translated it as zong chi,b zongC meaning "to summarize, all, general," chid "to support." Many summaries of doctrine are found in Buddhist literature to compensate for the long lists of

DHAR.AJyi AND PRATIBHANA 21

abhidharma concepts and endless repetitions, and mantras are said to contain the whole Dharma:

Penetrating into the entrance" of the sarvajiiatiikaradhiira'Y/-'i has great:tpeaning. Why? Because here the bodhisatvaPi~aka is taught with all its parts. And by it the bodhisattva attains unattached pratibhiina. 21

The mantra given mentions several key-concepts from the bodhisattva's way beside the otherWise meaningless syllables. This may indicate that the dhiiraTJ,zmantrapadiini originated as aids to memorizing the teachings. It is well known that the Indians in all periods of history have attached great importance to learning by heart, and, as an aid to this, "meaningless" syllables have been employed to denote concepts. The most famous example of this is, of course, Par;tini's 'grammar, but in the disciplines of Veda-recitation and music similar contrivances have been used.

In his paper, "Zur Entstehung einer Dharar;tl,,,22 Franz Bernhard shows that the words of a much quoted mantra, zne mzne dapphe dad,apphe, may be of Dravidian origin, denoting, as explained by the commmentaries, the Four Noble Truths, and thus summarizing a basic doctrine of Buddhism. According to tradition the Buddha used the mantra to teach the world-protector Viriipak~a, who did not understand Sanskrit. As ~ernhard o!:>serves, however, to understand all the mantras this way is going too far.

Though the words dhiiraTJ,z or dhiiraTJ,zmantra do not appear in the Pali canon, summaries of doctrine to help the bhikkhu remember were not unusual in earlier phases of Buddhism; the miitikiis (Skt. miitr:kii), long lists of abhidharma words, seem to have been the means of retaining the abhidhammapitaka before writing it down and giving it its present form. 23 The bhikkhu is presented as miitikiidhara,24 "retaining the miitikiis," and as such he is dhammakathika, "preacher of religion," and dzghabhiiTJ,aka, majjhimabhiiTJ,aka, etc. The patisarIJbhidiis are mentioned in the same connection.25 The miitikiidhara is also called dhammarakkha, 26 "protector of religion," similar to the usage of dhiiraTJ,zpada as bringing about ra~ii, protection of the Dharma.

It thus is plausible that there is a link between' the concept


of matika(-dhara) and dharaTf,i. This is also shown by the passage concluding the section on the four kinds of dharaTf,i in the Bodhisattvabhumi; by finding joy in the summaries of doctrin~, the matr:kiis, one attains dharaTf,i. The passage runs as follows:

Furnishedwith four qualities-not leaving out any of themthe bodhisattva attains these dhiirarpis. What four? [When he is] not attached to passion; and being without envy has no envy for others' success; giving to all who ask without giving so as to hurt; finding joy in religion. Happy about religion he takes hold of the bodhisatvapitaka and finds joy in the summaries (miitr:kii) of.the p#aka. 27 .

Most Buddhist mantras, however, especially in later times, were hardly employed as summaries of doctrine, but, rather, as aids to concentration and as magical means for protection, as, e.g., in the third and fourth dharaTf,i of the Bodhisattvabhtlmi, whose words have no meaning. But dharaTf,i is also in the period in question closely connected with concentration, samadhi, as is also smr:ti, remembrance, recollection, and dhyana, meditation. DharaTf,i and samadhi naturally belong together; to retain something in memory, concentration is needed, and remembrance may produce concentration. Pratibhana also is associated with samadhi. 28

The sutras themselves were early regarded as magically potent, and so, too, were the dharaTf,imantras, containing the whole Dharma. But in early times, dharaTf,i does not seem to be primarily connected with magic. Sarasvatl, the Hindu goddess of speech, says in the SuvarTf,aprabhiisottamasutra:

Reverend Lord, I, the great goddess Sarasvati, will confer eloquence upon the monk who is a preacher of religion for the sake of embellishing his speech, I will give him memory and develop his ability for explicit statements, I will make for him a great light of knowledge; and whatever sentences or sounds he loses or forgets, I will grant him again, I will give him memory so he does not lose remembrance.29

In this passage it is also clear that pratibhana means eloquerice: it is for the sake of embellishing the bodhisattva's speech;, vakyavibhu~aTf,arthaya. 30 Etymologically, pratibhana is

DHARAIyi AND PRATIBH.4NA 23

connected with prati-bhii-, "to shine upon, come in sight, flash upon the thoughts, occur to" (MMW); to be in accordance with etymology one is tempted to translate pratibhiina as "candor,"

.. meaning '~outspokenness, freedom from reserve in speech," beside its connotation of light and whiteness (Lat. candeo, "shine, be white"). Among European translations one may quote "intelligence, inspiration, clairvoyance, intuition," but also ."readiness in speech, power of expounding" and "elo~uence."31 The Chinese translations, bian cai, e and bian shuo, 2f establish its meaning unequivocally as "eloquence." The Tibetan does not give much explanation, as the material which illustrates the meaning of spobs pa other than as an equivalent of pratibhiina is scanty. Jischke gives "courage, confidence." Translations of pratibhiina as "inspiration, intuition," etc. are taken from its use in kiivya literature,33 but this does not seem to suit the context in question.

A strongly analytical aspect of pratibhiina is indicated by its connection with pravicaya and vibhiiga or prabheda, discernment and classification.34 The usual description of the bodhisattva's eloquence, however, is that it is uninterrupted and unhindered, aniicchedya and apratihata, or unattached, asariga. 35 Like the six piiramitiis, eloquence should be in accordance with trimar]rJalapariSuddhi, "purity in the three factors involved in action,'; whereby the bodhisattva should have concepts of neither himself, others, or the subject-matter of his speech, neither iitmasallJjiiii, parasarlJjiiii, nor dharmasarlJjiiii;36 he should not construe an image of himself as a clever debater. 37

Though pratibhiina was likened to the horns of the Buddha's speech,38 employed by the triumphant bodhisattvas, one was aware that eloquence may be misused. After Ak~ayamati's brilliant exposition of the concepts of coming and going, Saradvati-

. putra says:

I did not ask you for the sake of your eloquence, but to hear of such places as I have never heard of before.39

The Larikiivatiira and the KiiSyapaparivarta depreciate the lokiiyatiko vicitramantrapratibhiinalJ,,40 and the AdhyiiSayasallJcodanasutra41 says that eloquence should be in accordance with truth, and not function so as to increase the vices.


In the Western tradition, from classical times onwards, the discipline of rhetoric has played an important role. According to Latin works, rhetoric has five parts: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronuntiatio. To stress the importance of memoria, the author of Ad Herennium says:

Now let us turn to the treasurehouse of inventions, the custodian of all parts of rhetoric, memory. 42

Roman rhetoric was the heir of Greek rhetorica. Elaborate systems to aid memory have been in use throughout history; in scholastic Christianity the art of memory was even regarded as a part of the cardinal virtue of Prudence. It yet remains to be proved with any degree of certainty that there was a connection between the rise of Mahayana and the ideas of Hellenism. Where it concerns memory and eloquence in rhetoric, there is a similarity between the two traditions. It should not, however, be necessary to presuppose a historical connection, as a ready memory naturally belongs to the good preacher of religion.

It seems, then, that the frequently-encountered dharaTJ,zpratilabdha should not, at least in the early Mahayana context, be translated as "having attained the magical formulas" or the like. It is also improbable that the bodhisattva at an advanced stage should obtain a set of meaningless syllables, when his attainments usually count qualities and powers. It yet remains a fact that the word dhiiraTJ,z often appears in titles of texts containing such formulas, closely associated with them. The connotation of retaining in memory, keeping in mind, was probably often forgotten in later phases of Buddhism. I hope to have established the meaning of pratibhiina, in the context concerned, as eloquence, and that the two words in question, so often appearing together, denote the two principal parts of rhetoric, memory and eloquence.

NOTES

*This paper was read at the lABS conference in Tokyo/Kyoto, September, 1983.

1. The last chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Siiwkathyaviniscaya,

DHARANiANDPRATIBHANA 25

is an analysis of discussion, not a work on rhetoric proper. It mentions neither pratibhana nordMrar}'i. Cf. also Alex Wayman, "The Rules of Debate According to Asauga," JAOS vo!' 78, 1958.

2. Tatra katama dMrar}ya~ayata? ya purvakusalamfdasmr:tya caturaS'itidhar-. maskandMn dMrar}ata-adMrar}ata-asar(!.promos.ata smr:tya samyagadMrar}ata, iyam

ucyate dMrar}t. punar dMrar}'iti yaya saroabuddhabMs.itadMrar}ata saroabodhisatvapratyekabuddhafravakasatvabMs.itadMrar}ata-ases.atalJ, saroasubhas.itadMrar}ata, iyam ucyate dMrar}'i. Ak~. fo!' ~ 73b4-6. My rec~nstruction. An' edition and translation of the whole sutra IS under preparation. Cfr. also Tathagatamahakarur}anirdefa (=DMrar}lSvararajasutra): rigs kyi bu, byang chub sems dpa' roams kyi gzungs kyi rgyan (dMrar}yalar(!.kara) ni gcig ste, gcig gang zhe na? 'di Ita ste: dran pa brjed pa med pa (asar(!.pramos.asmr:ti) ste ... kun tu 'dzin pa (adMrar}a) dang,

. 'dzin pa (dMrar}a) ste ... don la mkhas pa (arthakausalya) dang, tshig 'bru la mkhas pa (vyaiijanakausalya) dang, nges pa'i tshig la mkhas pa (niruktikausalya) ste fo1. 191al seq., Narthang ed. mdo da - Taisho XIII, p. 6c29 seq., read bit shZ niim x'in for nian x'in. Narthang reads brjod for brjed); and ibid. fo1. 195a6: de ni nam yang dran pa brjed pa med - Taisho 8a19.

3. KosabMs.ya p. 41S, 17 -IS: yuktamuktabhilapitayar(!. samadhivasisar(!.prakhyane cavaivartyar(!. jiianar(!. pratibMna(prati)sar(!.vid, "the knowledge of eloquence is the irreversible knowledge of coherent and free speech, of clarification, belonging to one powerful in concentration." Same in Kosavyakhya p. 652,22-26; with variants Arthaviniscaya p. 52,1 0; similar expression in Abhidharmadzpa p. 393,11. Cf. Aug. II p. 135: muttapa{ibMna and yuttapatibMna; Divy. I p. 329,3, 493,S:yuktamuktapratibMna; Av.1I p. SI,l:yuktamuktapratibMnin. Aloka p. 28,10 and p. 252,15 yuktamuktabhidMnam. For other occurrences of pratisar(!.vid v. MaMyanasar(!.graha p. 53. Ak~. treats them in fols. 150a6-153b7. Smdhr. p. 309,13-310,12 associates them all with dMrar}'i, as Nagasena attains pa(isar(!.bhidas as buddhavacanar(!. dMrento in Mil. p. IS,16.

4. Kosavyakhya p. 652-,22; Arthaviniscaya p. 278,1-3. 5. P. 35,18-19: dMrar}'ipratilambho dharmalokamukhar(!. saroabud

dhabMs.itadMrar}atayai sar(!.vartate, pratibMnapratilambho dharmalokamukhar(!. sarvasattvasubhas.itasar(!.tos.ar}ayai sar(!.vartate.

6. P. S4, 9-10: iman dMrar}zn dMrayatar(!. bodhisattvanar(!. mahasattvanar(!. saroapratibMnapratisar(!.vida amukh'ibhavanti.

7. Dbh. p. 46,11-12, 79,22-23, 71,4-5: pravrajitas ca srutadMr'i dharmabMr}ako bhavati, sa bhuyasa matraya srutacaradMrar}Tpratilabdho dharmabMr}ko bhavati ... sa evar(!. dMrar}'ipraptas ca bhavati pratibMnapraptas ca dharmasar(!.kathyar(!. sar(!.nis.ar}r}alJ, ... dMrar}'ibalasupratis.thitas ca bhavaty asar(!.pramos.adharmatvat, pratibMnabalasupratis.thitas ca bhavati saroabuddhadharmapravicayavibMgakusalatvat. Cf. also ibid. p. 79,9-16; Smdhr. p. 264,11-14, 328,3-4; A~.t'ika fo!' 59b3: chud zabar mi 'gyur ba'i gzungs, bshad pa'i don-mi brjed pa'i spobs pa ( - aviprar}asadMrar}z, uktarthasal1:tpramos.apratibMnam). The occurrences are legion.

S. Or "not losing," but Tibetan has mi brjed pa, "not forgetting," and Chinese wang shZ,g "forget-lose."

9. The oft-encountered dMrayis.yati in the formula srutva codgrahis.yati dMrayis.yati vacayis.yati, etc., "keep in mind, retain in memory," is a verb for


dhiira'r}i. Srutodgraha'r}adhiira'r}i (Dbh. p. 79,21, cfr. Mvy. 782) is a nominalization of the formula's first words. samiidhi dhiirayitvii (Smdhr. p. 264,10) means "holding on to concentration, staying concentrated." Cf. also Smdhr. p. 323,3-4: dhiirayet sutram ... pratibhiina7IJ.labhate. For Pali v. PTSD s. v. dhara, dhara'r}a, dhiiraka' to dhiireti for derivations of dhr:- associated with memory. Dhiira'r}i is not found in Pali, only dhiira'f}ii meaning "memory."

10. Bbh. p. 272,12ff. 11. E.g. Mvy. 4297, Satasiihasrikiip. 1452, Lallk. p. 160,16;Vkn. p. 378. 12. E.g. Suv. p. 105,5, Rkp. p.63,15 et passim, Lank. p. 260,2ff, Sdhmp.

p. 369,3 et passim. 13. E.g. Paiicavi'r[!5atisiihasrikii p. 212,8, Krp. p. 21,15 et passim, Ratnagot

ravibhiiga p. 58,3, Dbh. p. 79,10ff. Dbh. p. 79,10 has dhiira'r}ipada. 14. Bbh. p. 272, 23-25: tatra mantradhiira'r}i katamii? iha bodhisattvalJ tad

rupii11J. samiidhivasitii11J. pratilabhate yayii yiini mantrapadiini-ztisa'r[!5amaniiya sattviiniim adhiti$thanti.

15. cintayati tulayati upaparik$ate, ibid. p. 273,12. 16. ayam eva cai$iim artho yad uta nirarthatii, ibid. p. 273,16. 17. It is remarkable that this use of mantras in meditation, so much

employed in tantrism, appears at such an early point of time (if it is accepted that Asanga wrote the passage).

18. Krp. p. 30,5, Rkp. p. 37,14. 19. P. 1450,17-18: ak$arasamatii bhii!iyasamatii ak$aramukham ak$ara

pravesam. Cf. Lalitavistara p. 127,4-128,8, where the alphabet is analysed in the same way, and as such called a miitr:kii. On miitr:kii/dhiira'r}i v. infra. The arapacana-alphabet is treated by S. Konow in AO, XII, 1934, p. 13-24: "The Arapacana alphabet and the Sakas." Other references in R.E. Emmerick, The Book of Zambasta, London, 1968, p. 454.

20. smr:timii11J.scabhavi!iyati . .. pratibhiinavii11J.sca, ibid. p. 1452,22-1453,1. 21. Krp. p. 30,9-12: tad eva11J. mahiirthikalJ kulaputra bodhisattviinii11J.

mahiisattviiniim aya11J. sarvajiiatiikiiradhiira'r}zmukhapraveSalJ. tat kasmiid dhetor? yasmiid atra siikalyena bodhisattvapitakam upadi!itam. anena ca sarvajiiatiikiiradhiira'r}imukhapraveSena bodhisattvo mahiisattvalJ asangapratibhiinatii11J. pratilabhate. Cf. also ibid. p. 28,5: iha ca sakalabuddhadharmii'r}ii11J. pangrahalJ; Abhidharmasamuccayabhii!iya p. 129,12-14: yathiikiima11J.·· dhiira'r}imukhasa11J.dhiira'f}asamr:ddhiiv iti ... sarvadharmaparyiiyiibhilapanasiimarthyapratilambhiiyetyarthalJ; and Ak$. tzkii fol. 23b3: don dang tshig mi Tied pa'i gzungs thob par mdo sde'i don thams cad mi brjed par 'dzin pa'i phyir mdo sde'i rgyal po zhes bya ba bzhin no. Commentary onAk~. fol. 89bl: dhiira'r}isutriintariijatathiigatamudriimudrita.

22. ZDMG vol. 117, 1967 p. 148,-168. 23. For miitikii-lists v. examples in Vbh. p. 306f, 345f. V. also Mil. tr. II

p. 193 n. 6. Cfr. also Divy p. 333,7f. Beside the miitr:kiis also the uddiinas must be mentioned as summaries of doctrine. For references v. BHSD s.V.

24. In the formula bhikkhu bahassutii iigatiigamii dhammadharii vinayadharii miitikiidharii in Mil. p. 343,29-344,1. Similar expression in Yin. I p. 119,22, 337,10, II p. 8,28 and Aug. I p. 117,29, II p. 147,28, IV p. 179,lff.

25. Mil. 339,6-344,5. 26. Mil. 344,4.

DHAR~jANDPRATIBHANA 27

27. eta punah sarva dhiirarj'i boilhisattvah caturbhir gurjair yukto labhate nanyatamavikalah. katamaif caturbhih? kame!iv anadhyavasito bhavati. parasamucchraye!iv zr!iyallJ notpiidayati, an'inyur bhavati. sarvayacitapradas ca bhavaty ananutapyaday'i. dharmaramas ca bhavati.dharmarato bodhisattvaPi~akam arabhya pitakamat,(kayam aramate. Bbh. 274,16-22.

28. samadhildhiirarjz, e.g. Abhidharmasamuccaya p. 97,24, Rkp. p. 32,11, Bodhicaryavatarapanjikii p. 428,4, Suv. 30,5, Ratnagotravibhiiga p. 58,3, Dbh. p. 73,12, Bbh. p. 272,24; dhiirarjzlsm'(tilpratibhiina, e.g. Vkn. p. 345, Smdhr. p. 264,11-14; pratibhiinalsamiidhi, v. n. 3. Cfr. also Mil. p. 79,31-80,9: kathallJ dhiirarjato sati uppajjati ....

29. aham api bhadanta bhagavan sarasvatz mahiidev'i tasya dharmabhiirjakasya bhik/ior vakyavibhU/iarjarthiiya pratibhiirjallJ upasallJhari!iyami, dhiirarjzllJ canupradiisyami, suniruktavacanabhiivallJ sallJbhiivay4yami, mahantallJ ca dharmabhiirjakasya bhik/ior jnanavabhiisallJ kar4yami. yani kanicit padavyanjanani itah suvaTr}abhiisottamat sutrendrarajat paribhra:jtani bhav4yanti vismaritani ca, tanyaharl). sarvarji tasya dharmabharjakasya bhik/ioh suniruktapadavyanjanany upasallJhari!iyami, dhiirarjillJ canupradiisyami sm'(tyasallJpramo!iarjaya. Suv. p. 102,16-lO3,6.

30. Cf. also Suv. p. 130,9-lO, and Dbh. p. 79,12: svarangakaufalyena ..... pratibhanavibhaktimukhena dharmarl). desayati.

3l. V. list of translations in H. Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine, repro Dehli, 1978, p. 265-6.

32. Others: bian, h le shuo, i qiao bian) zu neng shuo fa, k neng bian shuo fa, I neng bian shuo zhe, m neng shuo fa zhe. n

33.Cf. Kavyiidarsa l,lO4 (also here, however pratibhana is granted by the' goddess Speech), and KavyalallJkiirav,(tti 1,3,17. In the passage in Ang. II p. 230,9-10, commented upon in Sumangalavilasinz p. 95,24-30, enumerating four kinds of kavis, patibhana should be interpreted along these lines.

34. V. Dbh. p. 71,5, quoted in n. 7, and ibid. p. 79,12, quoted iI1 n. 30, and Bbh. 258,14.

35. anacchedya, e.g. Ak~. fol 173b7, Vkn. p. 99, 220, 384, Surangamasamadhi p. 121, 234; cfr. also Smdhr. 398,11: no ciisyu pratibhanu chidyate; apratihata, e.g. Surangamasamadhi p. 145, Ak~. fo1173b3; asanga, e.g. Krp. p. 30, ll, Sdhmp. 327,6, 330,4; Smdhr. p. 3lO,11 has asakta.

36. Surangamasamadhi p. 188-9. 37. Cfr. Ak~. fo!' 174a4: 'di bshad do zhes mi rtog cing . .. 38. Saundarananda XVIII, 11: pratibhanaf,(nga. 39. Ak~. fo!' 88a2: khyod kyi spobs pa 'di lta bu'i phyir ma yin gyi, ci nas de

lta bu sngon ma thos pa'i gnas roams mnyan pa'i phyir 'dri'o. 40. Lank. p. 173,3-4, Kpv. 13. 4l. Quoted in Sik~. p. 15,13ff. 42. Quoted p. 20 in F.A. Yates, The Art of Memory, repro Penguin, 1978.

She gives a splendid historical treatment of views on memory.

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Rome, 1962. Av. - Avadiinasataka, ed.J.S. Speyer (Bibliotheca Buddhica 3), St.-Petersburg,

1902-9, 2 vols. Bbh. - Bodhisattvabhumi, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo, 1930. Bodhicaryiivatiirapaiijikii, ed. L. de La Vallee Poussin (Bibliotheca Indica 150),

Calcutta, 1901-14. Dbh. - Dasabhumika, ed. J. Rahder, Leuven, 1926. Divy. - Divyiivadiina, ed. E.B. Cowell and R.A. Neil, Cambridge, 1886. Kiivyiidarsa, ed. O. Bohtlingk, Leipzig, 1890. Kiivyiila'f(lkiiravrtti, ed. C. Cappeller, Jena, 1875. Kosabh~ya - Abhidharmakosabh~ya, ed. P. Pradhan (TSWS 8), revised ed.

Patna, 1975. Kosavyiikhyii - Sphu(iirthii Abhidharmakosavyiikhyii, ed. U. Wogihara, Tokyo,

1932-36, 2 vols. Kpv. - KiiSyapapanvarta, ed. A.v. Stael-Holstein, Peking, 1933. Krp. - Kar1l'fl,iipu'fl,rjarfka, ed. I. Yamada, London, 1968, 2 vols. Lalitavistara, ed. S. Lefmann, Halle, 1902-8, 2 vols. Lank. - Lankiiviitiirasutra, ed. B. Nanjio, Kyoto, 1923. Mahiiyiinasa'f(lgraha, ed. et tr. E. Lamotte (Publ. de L'Institute Orientaliste de

Louvain 8), Louvain, 1973,2 vols. Mil. - Milindapaiiho, ed. V. Trenckner, London 1928; tr. I.B.Horner,

Milinda's Questions, London, 1964,2 vols. MMW - M. Monier-Williams: Sanskrit-English Dictionary, repro Oxford, 1970. Mvy. - Mahiivyutpatti, ed. Sakaki, Kyoto, 1916-25, 2 vols. Paiicavi'f(lfatisiihasrikii(-prajiiiipiiramitii), ed. N. Dutt, London, 1934. PTS - Pali Text Society. PTSD - T.W. Rhys Davids and W. Stede: Pali English Dictionary, repr. PTS,

1972. Ratnagotravibhaga, ed. E.H. Johnston, Patna, 1950. Rkp. - Ratnaketuparivarta, ed. Y. Kurumiya, Kyoto, 1978. Satasiihasrikii(-prajiiiipiiramitii), ed. P. Gho~a, Calcutta, 1902. Saundarananda, ed. E.H. Johnston, repr. Delhi, 1975: Sdhmp. - Saddharmapu'fl,rjar'ika, ed. H. Kern and B. Nanjio (Bibliotheca Bud

dhica 10), St. Petersburg, 1908-12. Sik~. - Si~iimuccaya, ed. C. Bendall (Bibliotheca Buddhica 1), St. Petersburg,

1902. Smdhr. - Samiidhiriijasutra, ed. N. Dutt (Gilgit Manuscripts 2), Srinagar, 1941-

54,3 parts.

DHARANiANDPRATIBHANA 29

Sumangalaviliisin'i, PTS, 1968-71, 3 vols. Suran;gamasamiidhi(-sutra), tr. E. Lamotte (Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques

13), Bruxelles, 1975. Suv. - SuvarTJaprabhiisottamasutra, ed. J Nobel, Leipzig, 1937. TSWS - Tibetan Sanskrit Works Series. Vbh. - Vibhanga, PTS, 1904. Yin. - Vinayapitaka, PTS, 1879-83.

Chinese Terms a. p'L- ti f.,

b. J'~~' if-

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The Concept of a "Creator God" in Tantric Buddhism

by Eva K. Dargyay

1. Introduction

This contribution is provocative in that it attempts to modify some well established conceptions of the nature of Buddhist religion. To initiate a debate concerning the modes of our understanding the consummate reality (siinyatii) so that it will incorporate, and eventually integrate, the tantric experience of pristine bliss (mahasukha) would be truly rewarding. In order to raise doubts about the adequacy of our understanding of reality in the Buddhist sense I use a concept commonly negated in Buddhism, i.e., that of a "Creator God."

Like many other terms in philosophy and religion the term "Creator God" is ambivalent and multi-faceted, although most people might affirm that they know what the term means. The myths of many tribal populations who live in an exclusively oral tradition tell us that a suprahuman being shaped the world and its sentient beings out of some molding matter (clay, dirt, etc.) at the inception of the universe. In this mythic context, God resembles a craftsman and God's creation is similar to the act of manufacturing. In India some of the Munda tribes have preserved such myths. 1 Such mythic understandings of God as a craftsman bear on philosophical elaborations of God as creator of the universe, despite all the differences between the act of "molding" the world by using a given material and the creatio ex nihilo.

Such a modified concept of a mythic Creator God is well documented in later Hinduism, when the popular gods, such as Vi~I)u, Siva, and Dev! became predominant. But it seems to be difficult to trace such a concept at the time of the historical

31


Buddha. Regardless of this situation, the Buddhist texts argue against the inconsistency of such a mythic creator whose actual being was only superficially coordinated with the current philosophical streams. This attitude resulted in the assumption that the Buddhists deny God in general, without ever bothering to define the exceedingly ambiguous term "god." In the following paragraphs I shall survey this tendency.

Buddhist thinkers continued throughout history to point to the incompatibility of the vision of a mythic divine craftsman who manufactures the world and the philosophical claim that God is the totally other who, beyond the limitations of space and time, is the absolute source and origin for the universe, but not its causal beginning.

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya has pointed out that the Upani~adic paramatman is not rejected in the Pali texts, as. they negate solely the popular idea of an unchanging, independent individual atman imparted to the person.2 Furthermore he comes to the conclusion that some texts in the Pali canon identify dhammakaya with brahmakaya. 3

The main part of this article will present a Buddhist text preserved in the Tibetan canon that uses theistic language when referring to the ultimate, which is seen as the Mind as the focal point of the entire universe. This text seems to be much indebted to Y ogacara thought. Some typical and informative quotations from this text might help us to redefine the current understanding of the Buddhist vision of the ultimate and whether or not we may label it "God."

II. Buddhism, a Non-theistic Religion

When Buddhism came to be known in the West, many scholars and philosophers were surpnsed to encounter for the first time a non-theistic religion, a phenomenon which seemed to entail a self~contradiction. A. Schopenhauer said:

Through the agreement of all genuine testimonies and original documents, it is put beyond all doubt that Buddhism, the religion that is the foremost on earth by virtue of the overwhelming number of its adherents, is absolutely and expressly atheistic.4

T ANTRIC "CREATOR GOD" 33

The earliest phase of Buddhist scripture is given in the Pali Canon. Here the concept of God is presented and discussed exclusively from a late U pani~adic and Vedic background. God is understood as Brahma, the ruler and creator of the world, yet incapable of promoting wisdom, gaining insight, or coping with the Buddhist wise men. One passage, taken from a sutta in the Dzgha Nikiiya, will demonstrate the over-all character of that argumentation.

"And it was not long, Kevaddha, before the Great Brahma appeared. The monk drew close and asked: 'Where, friend, do the four great elements-earth, water, fire, and air-cease, leaving no trace behind?' The Great Brahma replied: '1, monk, am Brahma, the Great Brahma, the Supreme, the Mighty, the Allseeing, the Ruler, the Lord of all, the Controller, the Creator, the Chief of all, appointing to each his place, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that is and will be.' Again the monk asked Brahma: '1 did not query, friend, whether you are indeed Brahma, the Great Brahma, the Mighty ... , but rather as to where the four elements earth, water, fire, and air, cease, leaving no trace behind.' Again Brahma answered: '1 am Brahma, the Great Brahma ... .' And a third time the monk addressed Brahma: '1 did not query, friend, whether you are indeed Brahma, ... but rather as to where the four elements ... cease, leaving no trace behind.' Then the Great Brahma took that monk by the arm and led him aside, and said: These gods of the brahma-world here, monk, hold that there is nothing I cannot see, nothing 1 do not know, and nothing that is not manifest to me. Therefore 1 did not answer you in their presence. 1 do not know, monk, where the four elements of earth, water, fire, and air cease without leaving a trace. You have acted wrong, you have done ill by ignoring the Exalted One and going elsewhere to find an answer to your question. Go now to the Exalted One, ask him your question, and accept his answer.' ,,5

In the Piili Canon it is only Brahma as visualized by the late Upani~adic and Vedic Brahmins who is rejected. We would rarely find any passage rejecting the idea of a philosophical God, of a Creator as such.

The next prominent step in the development of Buddhist thought was the rise of Mahayana, which led to a loss in creativity in Hlnayaya thought. The Abhidharmakosa marks this phase of


transformation very well; its author, Vasubandhu, was first a follower of the Hlnayana tradition and later a follower and promoter of the Mahayana tradition. In the second chapter of his Abhidharmakosa, Vasubandhu discusses ,the indriya, i.e., the potentialities, a term which identifies in particular the sensuous fields and in general everything that exhibits the capacity to cause something. For this reason, the last passage within chapter II deals with causes and results. Within this context, Vasubandhu enters into a lengthy dialogue with the Hindu theists. Their claim that iSvara, the primordial God and Creator, is the only cause of the universe is rejected by Vasubandhu. His reasons are that if God were the first cause everything that results from this cause had to come into existence at once and not gradually. That means the universe had to be created in one step and not in the process of a long-lasting evolution, as was commonly accepted in ancient India. Given this viewpoint, Vasubandhu asks the Hindu theists what caused God to prevent everything from coming into existence at the same moment. They answer that He did not wish so, which leads Vasubandhu to speculate that this Creator is subject to something outside of Himself that makes His will changing, an assumption that contradicts the concept of a primordial God and Creator. 6

Santideva, an 8th century Buddhist master, talks of God in the 9th chapter of his Bodhicaryavatara as follows:

'God is the cause of the world.' Tell me, who is God? The elements? Then why all the trouble about a mere word? (119) Besides the elements are manifold, impermanent, without intelligence or activity; without anything divine or venerable; impure. Also such elements as earth, etc., are not God.(120) Neither is space God; space lacks activity, nor is atman-that we have already excluded. Would you say that God is too great to conceive? An unthinkable creator is likewise unthinkable, so that nothing further can be said. (121 f

Here Santideva criticizes the shortcomings and failures of the adversaries' definition of the concept of a Creator God. He, like Vasubandhu, is not interested in establishing a philosophy that might allow for a concept of a Creator God to be included into the Buddhist thought. However, the Buddhist philosophers did point out that the Hindu thinkers' concept of God was inconsis-

TANTRIC "CREATOR GOD" 35

. tent and irrational and had therefore to be rejected.8 Thus far, I have summarized a viewpoint commonly accepted by the followers of Buddha's teaching as well as by modern critical

. scholars.

II!. The Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo as a Theistic Buddhist Scripture

The Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo (hereafter KBG) has not so far been studied by any modern scholar. For this reason I want here to give a few data regarding the various editions of the text and outline the major events which characterize the transmitting of the text through the ages.

The KBG is a Buddhist canonical text and included in all Kanjur editions9 as well as in two collections of Tantras (Rnying ma rgyud 'bum, hereafter NGB, and Vairocana rgyud 'bum, hereafter VGB)lO that were not unanimously accepted by all Buddhist traditions in Tibet.

In the Kanjur editions and in the NGB the complete title of the KBG is Chos thams cad rdzogs pa chen po byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po which might be translated as The All-Creating King, i.e., Bodhicitta, as the Great Perfection of All Phenomena. In the VGB the title is somewhat different: Byang chub kyi sems kun byed rgyal po Ita ba nam mkha' ltar mtha' dbus med pa'i rgyud nam mkha'i snying po mchog gi don gsang ba mchog gi mdo lung brgyad cu rtsa bzhi pa: Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King, or: A Tantra Free from Segregations Like the Sky, a Scripture in 84 Chapters of Utmost Secrecy, the Essence of the Sky. The texts preserved in the 5 Kanjur editions as well as that in the NGB are almost totally identical, but the text in the VGB lacks the first of the three parts of the KBG.

The history of this text is still obscured by mysteries. According to Samten Karmay, Pho-brang Zhi-ba-'od, a member of the royal house of Guge (West Tibet) issued in 1032 a statement wherein he alleged that a text with the title Kun byed was forged by a man named Drang-nga Shag-tshul. ll It is unclear whether this statement refers to the KBG as it is extant today.

In the voluminous history of Tibetan Buddhism, the Blue Annals, the KBG is mentioned only twice. In both cases the reference to the KBG is peripheral. First, it is said that the


Rnying rna master Zhig-po Bdud-rtsi (1149-1199) was an expert in the 24 Tantras of the Mind Section (sems sde) and that among them there were 10 texts of the kun byed cycle. 12 Second, the annals report that 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba Gzhon-nu-dpal (1392-1481), the author of the Blue Annals, was introduced to the KBG. 13

In the modern Kanjur editions the KBG is part of the Rnying rgyud (Old Tantras) section, which contains those Tantras which were translated into Tibetan during the First Period of Dissemination of Buddhism (snga dar, 7th-9th centuries). But the Gsar rgyud (New Tantras) which were translated during the Second Period of Dissemination (phyi dar, 10th century and after) gained more authority and therefore constitute the main part of the canonical Tantras. The authenticity of the Old Tantras was doubted by several Buddhist masters who lived in Guge and Ladakh during the 11 th and 12th centuries, 14 and many modern scholars of the West followed their line. 15

Bu-ston (1290-1364), who compiled one of the first editions of the Tibetan Tripitaka, did not include the Old Tantras in the Canon, although he explicitly stated that two of his teachers saw the Sanskrit originals of the Old Tantras in Bsam-yas and that therefore he had no reason to doubt the authenticity of these Tantras. 16 We do not know what caused Bu-ston to exclude the Old Tantras from the Canon, although he was-according to his own words-aware that at least some of the Old Tantras were translated from Sanskrit texts.

Si-tu Dge-ba'i-blo-gros (alias Kun-dga'-rdo-rje), Bu-ston's contemporary, is said to have put together another version of the Tibetan Tripitaka, i.e., the Tshal pa bka' 'gyur, wherein he included the Old Tantras. 17 Nevertheless the Old Tantras are an integral part of all present editions of the Tibetan Tripitaka. This is an important fact, in particular, when we regard the exceptional ideas formulated in one of the Old Tantras-the KBG.

In the colophons of the various editions of the KBG the Indian master Srlsirhhaprabha is said to have translated the text in cooperation with the Tibetan monk Vairocana. The latter is a well-known historical figure of the 8th century. At this time Padmasambhava integrated the pre-Buddhist local beliefs into the Buddhist system of thought and laid the foundation for the successful development of the typically Tibetan form of Buddhism. In this task he was supported by king Khri-srong-Ide-


btsan (ruled from 755 until 797), who built the first Buddhist. monastery in Tibet, where seven young Tibetans were ordained as the first Buddhist monks, Vairocana one of them. IS But the "Indian master Srisirilhaprabha" cannot be traced as the translator of any other canonical text, nor is he mentioned in Dpa' -bogtsug-Jag's chapter on the Indian par:ujitas. 19

The KBG is divided into three parts, or "books." The first book, which comprises 57 chapters, explains the Dharma as "similar to heaven." The nature of the ultimate, addressed as All-Creating King, is explained therein. The second book, of 12 chapters, instructs on how to visualize the All-Creating King. The third book, of 15 chapters, deals mainly with Buddhist doctrine and practice. The entire KBG is arranged in 84 chapters, some only one page in length. For the present purpose the first book is the most informative one. In the first 45 chapt~rs a kind of ontology of the All-Creating King is taught, while the remaining 12 chapters develop the conclusion that "there is nothing to be practised and nothing to be attained" -a common claim within the spiritual and mystical traditions of Buddhism.

IV. The Ontology of the Kun byed rgyal po'i mdo

The All-Creating King and His Entourage As a common practice, all Buddhist scriptures begin by

describing the situation where and when the Buddha taught the doctrine and to whom. In the Pali Canon we get precise information with regard to the ancient Indian geography and society, while in the Mahayana siitras the environment and location is mainly mythical, although monks, nuns, and Bodhisattvas are listening to the Buddha's preaching.20 The Tantras, however, introduce the reader into a world of complex symbolism. The Hevajra Tantra, for instance, starts:

Thus I have heard-at one time the Lord dwelt in bliss with the Vajrayogini: who is the Body, Speech, and Mind of all the Buddhas. There the Lord pronounced these words: .... 21

Another famous Tantra, the Guhyasamaja Tantra, starts with almost identical words:


Thus I have heard: At one time the Exalted One dwelt in the . womb of the female Diamond who is the Body, Speech, Mind, and Heart of all the Buddhas.22

In most Tantras the Buddha enters a discourse either with his female consort or· with Vajrasattva, who submits his questions to the Buddha. The KBG Tantra however starts in a different way:

At a place of No-Beneath Cog min), in the space ofreality as such, in the sphere of facticity, at the centre of mind itself, in the mansion of undefiled wisdom, at a time when He gave that sermon there was His entourage revealing His nature, His identity, His compassion and wisdom: An entourage [that revealed] His nature and that therefore was called "the entourage dharmakaya"; an entourage [that revealed] His identity and that therefore was called "the entourage sambhogakaya"; an entourage [that revealed] His identity and was called therefore "the entourage sambhogakaya [correlating to the element of] water"; an entourage [that revealed] His identity

. and was called therefore "the entourage sambhogakaya [correlating to the element of] fire"; an entourage [that revealed] His identity and was called therefore "the entourage sambhogakaya [correlating to the element of] wind"; an entourage [that revealed] His identity and was called therefore "the entourage sambhogakaya [correlating to the element of] space."

Furthermore, there are the entourages of his nirmal)akaya revealing His compassion and wisdom: The entourage called "the creatures of the World of Desires"; the entourage called "the creatures of the World of Forms"; the entourage called "the creatures of the World of Formlessness."

Furthermore, there are His entourages visualizing His nature, i.e., the four aspects of Yoga: The entourage called atiyoga, the entourage called pari yoga [sic!], the entourage called mahayoga, the entourage called "the Yoga of creatures." They are one, as His nature, His identity, and the character of His compassion are inseparable.

Furthermore, there are the entourages that understand His nature: The entourage residing in Him, i.e., the previous and now past Buddhas; the entourage realizing His intention, i.e., the now existent Buddhas; the entourage emerging from Him, i.e., the Buddhas to come in the future. They are one, as His nature is inseparable.


Then in order to bless the entire entourage with His nature, Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King absorbed the entire entourage into His mind itself. The spontaneous wisdom (rang byung gi ye shes) he let become shining clear. Then in order to endow [the entire entourage] with reality as such he condensed them all to a single great bindu, wherein they remained.23

In this passage the All-Creating King's entourage consists in the three kayas, i.e., the three levels of Buddha's being. The dharmakaya, or the being in utmost reality, is just listed while the entourages constituting his sambhogakaya, a way of being that allows the Buddha to communicate in bliss and joy with other adequately experienced creatures, are correlated to four elements (water, fire, wind, and space). His nirmar;akaya, or his existence in time and space, through which the Buddha manifests in the human world, consists in entourages which equal the three realms of the universe: the world of formlessness, the world of forms, the world of desires. In other words, the nature of the All-Creating King is manifested in the noetic as well as the physical structure of the world. Four other entourages represent the Four Yogas, which means that the All-Creating King is the Path (marga, or lam) to Enlightenment, to Buddhahood. Finally, there are the entourages which are the Buddhas of all times, past, present, and future. According to the categorial system of Mahayana Buddhism nothing exists outside of the listed categories; thus, the All-Creating King's entourage is the universe, and this universe reflects and reveals His mystic nature.

All the various entourages disappear into the so-called bindu that is a luminous focal point symbolizing the very essence of His personality. Once again from the bindu, Vajrasattva originates, and he will put forward the questions and problems to be answered and discussed by the All-Creating King. If we sum up the iritroduction to the KBG, we may conclude that Vajrasattva is the entirety of the entourages which again reflect the All-Creating King's nature. Thus, the discussion between the All-Creating King and Vajrasattva is actually a self-dialogue. Consequently, the text assures that the entourage and the AlICreating king are one, as there is no difference with regard to their nature or identity.

In general, the Buddha's entourage consists of beings who


are different from his own person as long as we stay in the realm of conventional truth. The KBG, however, places the action in the introduction in the realm of absolute or utmost reality, where everything coincides with Voidness (Silnyata) , which is the essence of the Buddha. In the discussion of utmost reality only two aspects are of concern. For this reason, the two most important allegorical figures in the text are Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King, and Vajrasattva, who asks the questions. Bodhicitta symbolizes the ontological ground of everything visible and invisible, while Vajrasattva comprises all aspects which want to emerge from the ontological ground and reveal their individuality, though it might be an ephemeral one.

Following the line of this introduction, the first great theme of the KBG is raised in the question of how the ontological ground, i.e., the All-Creating King, correlates to the aspects emanating from this ground. The subject is discussed mainly in the second chapter, though the 16th chapter also deals to some extent with the same problem. In answering the question concerning the correlation between the ontological ground and its emanating aspects the discussion slides from time to time into an explanation of evolution.

The World Emanating from the All-Creating King

With regard to the emanation of the world, the KBG states:

Then, with regard to His nature, His identity, His compassion, Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King established all phenomena in the following way:

Out of the sole great wisdom originating from Him spontaneously, the five great spontaneous wisdoms emanate. They are: the great spontaneous wisdom of hatred, the great spontaneous wisdom of passion, the great spontaneous wisdom of ignorance, ... of jealousy, ... of arrogance.

Out of these five great spontaneous wisdoms, the five great visible causes (rgyan kyi rgyu chen po) emanate. They constitute the three realms of the impermanent world.

If one summarizes the external appearance of the five visible causes, then it is as follows: There is the appearance called "earth," an appearance of visible causes; there is the appearance


called "water," an appearance of visible causes; there is the appearance called "fire," an appearance of visible causes; there is the appearance called "wind," an appearance of visible causes; there is the appearance called "space," an appearance of visible causes,

Condensed in a single appearance they will unfold into the various categories ofthe five wisdoms (ye shes lnga) , i.e., the spontaneous wisdom of the category "hatred," . .. "passion," ... "ignorance," ... 'Jealousy," and ... "arrogance." When the various categories of the five spontaneous wisdoms appear, the reality as such is established in correlation with the appearance of the visible causes.

After having established reality as such, i.e., His nature, Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King, dwells in that way.24

This passage states that from the All-Creating King the four elements and the five spontaneous wisdoms, which are cognitive categories used in Tantric Buddhism in order to understand reality, emanate. In interpreting the passage from the KBG, the All-Creating King may be. conceived as the ontological ground, while the five spontaneous wisdoms as well as the physical world (i.e., the four elements) are the phenomena emanating from it. In the primary nature of the ontological ground, i.e., the AllCreating King, rests the entirety of the phenomenal world. His nature is of spontaneous wisdom unfolding into the five aspects which are classified as defilements (sgrib pa) by the common Buddhist tradition: hatred, passion, ignorance, jealousy, and arrogance. However, these "defilements" provide the seed-bed for all forces of vitality. All facets of man's entangling encounter with life (sarrtsara) emanate from this ground. The external or physical world is established by the All-Creating King as well. The text emphasizes the various ways through which the great wisdom becomes manifest in the elements which constitute the three realms of the universe: the realm of passion (kamaloka) , the realm of form (rupaloka) , and the realm of formlessness (arupaloka) .

In the perspective of the KBG, the creation is an outflow of the primordial ground; it appears to be distinct from its origin, though it is not essentiCilly different.

In the 6th chapter of the KBG, the emanation of the universe is explained in an alternative way:


Although My nature may not be revealed to you, yet My identity may be revealed to you. The three realms (i.e., kamaloka, rupaloka, arupaloka) the five greatnesses (chen po lnga) , the six characters (rgyud drug) are the five [aspects of] bodhicitta, which reveal My nature. From there the five wisdoms emanate as their spontaneous essence. And the five wisdoms illuminate the five sensory objects. Thus the five desires and the five passions come into existence. The result, ripened by means of the five desires, manifests in the various realms of existence.

In such kind I teach you the appearances: The three aspects of My being (sku gsum) I teach you [to see them in] the six aspects of the soteriological path. Although i instruct you herein, you will be unable to see it [in such way], and yet each individual [phenomenon] is in some respect My nature, My identity, My person, My word, My mind. In the totality [of the universe] My identity is to be visualized in its individual aspects.

Further I shall teach you My nature. My identity in its utmost purity is bodhicitta. As I am the essence of a sphere free from any artificiality (spros med dbyings) and as I am the great origin of all the Buddhas, the three delightful realms [of the universe] and the six realms of existence emanate from Me.

Although virtuous and wrong deeds are different, they demonstrate My sincere, unfailing compassion. To those who adhere to a system of causality (rgyu dang 'bras bu theg pa) I do not reveal the teaching that I am the All-Creating One. Even if I would reveal this teaching to them definitively, they would still claim that virtuous and wrong deeds have their causes and results. Consequently, they would subject Me, the wholly pure, to their praise and blame and for a long time they would be unable to find Me, the wholly pure.

I am the teacher, the All-Creating One, Bodhicitta, and it is Bodhicitta that is the All-Creating King. 25

This passage explains well the fact that the ontological ground is immanent and transcendent at once. Although the primary One is reflected in the phenomenal world, it transcends the world of perception. Its general purity is never affected by ethical categories. In order to substantiate this claim, the text has to discard the doctrine of causality commonly thought to be one of the cornerstones of Buddhist philosophy.

Certainly in early Buddhism the concept of causality was conducive to the no-self theory and the soteriological path as


the traditional Buddhist conceived it. But when Nagarjunare~ised the entire problem of causality it became clear that the concept of a lineal causality is inconsistent in itself. He replaced

. the concept of a lineal causality with that of a situational causality. The KBG takes us one step further in abolishing the theory of causality in total. This move undermines the old objection that a pure and good primary principle cannot be the origin of all the misery and evil in the world. With the dissolving of the concept of causality, the power of this objection was eliminated. The last sentence of the translated passage is certainly one of the pearls of Buddhist scripture; a solemn proclamation of the All-Creating King's grandeur, its language of exaltation speaks for itself.

When Vajrasattva asks for the reason or necessity of emanation, the All-Creating King explains His relationship to the phenomena emanating from Him:

o Mahasattva, the necessity is that beside Me, the Creator (byed mkhan) and All-Creating King, no other creator exists. Nobody beside Me created (byed pa) reality as it is (chos nyid). Nobody beside Me enthroned the Buddhas of the three [times]. Nobody beside Me established the various groups of entourage. Nobody beside Me established the nature of reality as it is. 26

The claim of a Creator God can hardly be more explicit than in this passage.

Bodhicitta-The All-Creating King's Nature

The KBG, however, is ambiguous in its description of the nature of the All-Creating King in so far as there are passages in which the term "creator" is used metaphorically:

I shall now reveal My nature to you, Vajrasattva! My nature is manifested in three ways: My nature is bodhicitta (byang chub sems). My sheer nature shows itself as "pure" (byang) , as it is the three perfections, the pure reality. My nature shows itself as "perfect" (chub) as by means of the three necessities it covers all like space. My nature shows itself as "mind" (sems) as it is the infinite and absolute (ma [us) All-Creating King. Who else if not the Mind of

44 J1ABS VOL. 8 NO.1

Pure Perfection (Tib.byang chub sems, Skr.bodhicitta) would create the entirety?27

In this passage the term bodhicitta, which means, in its Tibetan translation, "mind of pure perfection" is not understood in terms of soteriological altruism but rather as the authentic nature of mind as such. 28 This specific meaning of the term bodhicitta is found throughout the Tantric literature of Buddhism. In this way, the KBG does not exhibit any pecularity. When the Buddhist mystic experiences the nature of mind as such, he perceives a state of limpid luminosity which transcends every conceptualization and which is therefore said to equal Voidness, and yet is full of utmost bliss. Therefore the nature of mind as such, or the pure mind, is said to be inseparable and indistinguishable (gnyis su med) from reality as such (chas nyid).

On the other hand, it is only when the mind departs from its sheer nature and manifests itself in various activities that the world of sensuous perception can arise. For this reason, one might well say that from the individual's viewpoint the mind is the creator of the world. This is a common concept of the Cittamatra School of Buddhist philosophy. In this regard, the KBG fits into the general framework of Mahayana and Tantric thought without any major difficulties.

Surprisingly, the KBG employs metaphorical anthropomorphism in identifying the ultimate. However, I am doubtful whether the word "metaphor" is appropriate, as the intention of the text is not clear. The question arises whether the ultimate, when revealing itself to the mystic in the blissful unia mystica, can be experienced only in a personal way. Or, is it more a matter of adopting the philosophical jargon flourishing at the time of the writing of the text? Or, did the Buddhists make use of the theistic terminology of Hinduism in order to attract some devotees of the great personal gods of ancient India, e.g., Shiva and Vishnu?

Nevertheless, the KBG is a sublime monument of Buddhist spirituality, using language of timeless beauty:

Then Bodhicitta, the All-Creating King, proclaimed: "I am the Creator of all phenomena in the past, Mahasattva, pay attention to your ear, reflect on what you will hear now: I am the All-Creat-


-ing King. I am the Mind of Pure Perfection (byang chub sems). If I were not pre-existent, phenomena would not have a point from where their existence could start. If I were not pre-existent, there would be no King who creates all phenomena. If I were not pre-e~istent, no Buddha would ever be. If I were not pre-existent, no Doctrine would ever be. If I were not pre-existent, no entourage would ever be.29

Conclusion

Although only a few paragraphs of the KBG could be examined in this article, the study of this text stipulates revising our present understanding of "God" in the context of Buddhism. The term "God" is too vague to be dealt with in an academic study; therefore a precise definition has to precede any attempt to do so. If the term "God" is understood as the mythic craftsman "manufacturing" the world, then-we may conclude-the KBG does not corroborate such a notion. If we define "God" as the totally other, predating and preceding everything which is imparted to this world, then the term "God" may found to be suitable for that task. When the KBG uses the term kun byed, which I translated as "all creating" then we have to understand it within the context of Yogacara philosophy: Mind operates like a mirror by which, the objects are reflected, although the existence or non-existence of the objects themselves will never be disclosed to ,us. Thus, we may say, Mind functions like a "creator." So, what's new about the KBG, we may ask? The KBG is traditional enough to adopt a well-defined philosophical concept, that of Mind in the Y ogacara tradition, but it is innovative inasmuch it casts the philosophical concept into the symbolic image of a "creator," thus using a theistic pattern to communicate the mystic experience to those who have not been exposed to it.

NOTES

1. ". . . Bhagavan first made the world and created all living creatures from dirt rubbed from his body . . ." (Verrier, Elwin Tribal Myths of Orissa.


Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1954, 4); this is only one example to illustrate this kind of "Creator God," but there are many more myths of this type included in Elwin's book.

2. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, L'Atman-Brahma,n dans le Bouddhisme ancien, Publications de L'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient XC. Paris: Ecole Francaise d'Extreme-Orient, 1973, 137.

3. Bhattacharya, L'Atman-Brahman, 89: dhammakayo iti pi Brahmakiiyo iti Pi, dhammabhuto iti pi brahmabhuto iti pi.

4. A. Schopenhauer, Parerga and Paralipomena, Short Philosophical Essays, tr. from the German (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), vol. I, 127.

5. H. von Glasenapp, Buddhism--a Non-Theistic Religion, tr. from the German (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 146.

6. L. de La Vallee Poussin (tr.), L'Abhidharmakosa de Vasubandhu, Melanges Chinois et Bouddhiques, Vol. XVI (Brussels: Institut Beige Des Hautes Etudes Chinoises, 1971), vol. I, 311-13.

7. Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya (ed.), Bodhicaryavatara, Bibliotheca Indica no. 280 (Calcutta: The Asiatic Society, 1960) v. 119-22, p. 216-17.

8. For further information on this subject see George Chemparathy, "Two Early Buddhist Refutations of the Existence of Isvara as the Creator of the Universe," Beitrage zur Geistesgeschichte Indiens-Festschriftfiir Erich Frauwallner (Leiden: E.]. Brill, 1968), 85-100.

9. Cone Kanjur (Washington: Library of Congress), vol. Dza, fo!' Ib.l-92a.l; Narthang Kanjur, vol. Dza, fol. Ib.I-120b.l; Lhasa Kanjur, vol. Dza, fol. Ib.I-123a.6; Peking Kanjur, vo!' 9, Rgyud xx (Dza), no. 451: p. 93, fo!' 1.1-p. 126, fo!' 5.2; Derge Kanjur, vol. 97, Rnying rgyud no. 1, fo!' 1-171; further see Hakuju Ui, Munetada Suzuki, Yensho Kanakura, Tokan Tada (eds.), A Complete Catalogue of the Tibetan Buddhist Canons (Bkaly,-ly,gyur and Bstan-!;,gyur) (Sendai, Japan: Tohoku Imperial University, 1934), 138a, no. 828.

10. Rnying ma'i Rgyud 'Bum. A Collection of Treasured Tantras Translated during the Period of First Propagation of Buddhism in Tibet, ed. by Dingo Khyentse Rimpoche (Thimpu, Bhutan: n.p., 1973), vo!' I, fo!' 1-220; Vairocana Rgyud 'Bum. A Collection of Ancient Tantras and Esoteric Instructions Compiled and Translated by the 8th Century Tibetan Master (Leh, India: Tashi Y. Tashigangpa, 1971), vol. I, fo!' 383.1--435.6.

11. S. Karmay, "The Doctrinal Position of rDzogs chen. "journal Asiatique (1975), 152, and by the same author "An Open Letter by Pho-brang Zhi-ba-'od to the Buddhists in Tibet." The Tibet journal (1980) vo!' 5, no. 3, p. 16.

12. G. Roerich (tr.), Blue Annals (1949, rpt. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1976), 133, 137.

13. Blue Annals, 172. 14. Bu-ston Rin-chen-grub. Bde bar gshegs pa'i bstan pa'i gsal byedl chos kyi

'byung gnas gsung rab rin po che'i mdzod, in Lokesh Chandra (ed.), The Collected Works of Bu-ston, Sata-Pitaka Series vo. 64 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1965-71), pt. 24, vol. Ya (1971), 990.2; hereafter Chos 'byung chen mo.

15. G. Tucci, Tibetan Painted Scrolls (Rome: La Libreria Dello Stato, 1949), vo!' I, 88.


16. Chos 'byung chen mo, 990.3-4. 17. 'Jigs-med-gling-pa, Snga 'gyur rgyud 'bum Tin po che'i rtogs pa brjod pa

'ja.mglingmtha'igrukhyabpa'irgyan, ed. in NGB, vol. 34,175.5. New information on the Tshal-pa Kanjur is presented by Yo shiro Imaeda in his Catalogue du Kanjur Tibetain de l'Edition de Jang Sa-tham (Bibliographia Philologica Buddhica, Series Maior IIa). Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1982. Unfortunately I learnt about this publication alter the present article had been submitted for publication.

18. David Snellgrove (ed. and tL), Hevajra-Tantra (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), vol. II, p. vii; G. Tucci (ed.), Minor Buddhist Texts (Rome: IsMEO, 1958), vol. II, 16.

19. Lokesh Chandra (ed.), Mkhas pahi dgah ston of Dpah-bo-gtsug-lag, SataPitaka vol. 9 (New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture, 1959), pt. I, 155ff.

20. D.T. Suzuki (tL), Lankiivatara Sidra (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966), 3.

21. Snellgrove, Hevajra Tantra vol. I, 47. 22. Evam maya srutam ! ekasmin samaye bhagaviin sarvatathiigata-kiiyavak

citta-hrdayavajray00idbhage0u vyahara ! Benoytosh Bhattacharya (ed.), Guhyasamaja Tantra or Tathagataguhyaka, Gaekwad's Oriental Series No. 53 (Baroda, India: Oriental Institute, 1967), 1.

23. KBG foI.2.3-5.2, in NGB vol. I. 24. KBG foL 7.1-7.7, in NGB vol. I. 25. KBG fol. 17.3-18.2, in NGB vol. I. 26. KBG fol. 8.3-8.4, in NGB vol. I. 27. KBG fol. 8.4-8.7, in NGB vol. I. This Tibetan "definition" of the

term byang chub sems dpa' does not correspond with the Skr. bodhisattva. 28. H.V. Guenther examines the meaning of bodhicitta and Bodhisattva

within the context of several Buddhist traditions of Tibet in his article "Bodhisattva-the Ethical Phase in Evolution," inL.S. Kawamura (ed.), The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhism, SR supplements: 10 (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier Press, 1981), 111-124.

29. KBG fol. 8.7-9.3, in NGB vol. I.

CIHIITNJE§lE §TUDITlE§ TIN IPIHITIlO§OIPIHIY A Quarterly Journal of Translations

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Reevaluating "One Divides into Two" and "Two Combine into One" On the Difference between "One Divides into Two" and "Two Com-

bine into One" "One Divides into Two" Reveals Struggle; "Two Combine into One"

Reveals Unity "One Divides into Two" Cannot Fully Describe the Theory of the

Unity of Opposites On the Problem of the Debate over "One Divides into Two" and "Two

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Direct Perception indGe-Iugs-pa Interpretations of Sautrantika

by Anne C. Klein

1. Texts

In a religious-philosophical system which considers erroneous perception-ignorance-to be the chief source of suffering, and whose goal is to eradicate such error, epistemological analysis is a vital issue. Starting roughly with the Indian philosopher Dignaga in about the 5th century A.D., Buddhist philosophers began to discuss perceptual errors in terms of direct and conceptual perception (pratya~a, mngon sum; kalpanii, rtog pa) and their objects. According to these thinkers, there are only two types of valid cognition, direct perception <pratya~apramiina, mngon sum tshad ma) and inference (anumiina pramiirja, rjes dpag tshad ma).

The works of Dignaga and Dharmakirti were among the major Indian texts that Tibetan commentators relied upon to formulate a presentation of the Sautrantika system. This was a task requiring considerable interpretation. Indian texts written by Sautrantikas never came to Tibet; rather, Sautrantika assertions were introduced into Tibet through mention of them in texts that focused mainly on other systems. Foremost among this group are Dharmakirti's Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition (Tshad ma'i bstan beos sde bdun) , especially the Commentary on (Digniiga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition" (Pramiirjavarttikakiirikii) and Dignaga's Compendium on Valid Cognition (Pramiirjasamuecaya). I It is widely recognized that the works of Dignaga and Dharmakirti can be interpreted in many different ways. No less an authority than Daniel H.H. Ingalls has bluntly stated: "the Pramiirjasamueeaya exhibits in exaggerated form the elliptical style that characterizes Sanskrit texts of philosophy."2 Vary-

49


ing modes of interpretation grew up in Tibet amid a rich tradition of written and oral commentarial material evolved over many centuries. In the dGe-lugs-pa order, founded by Tsongkha-pa in the 14th century, this material became an important part of the monastic college curriculum and remains so to this day. Portions from that exegetical tradition form the basis for the present investigation of direct perception.

In an effort to tap the resources of a still vibrant tradition whose ability to survive the rigors of the present century is yet uncertain, emphasis has been placed on 18th and 19th century Tibetan commentarial works in current usage among Tibetan dGe-Iugs-pa scholars and the oral discourse that traditionally accompanies them. In particular, the following discussion draws on Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-pa, b. 1759), Ngawang-bel-den (Nga-dbang-dpal-Idan, b. 1797) who is also known as Bel-den-cho-jay, Pur-bu-jok (Phur-bu-lcog, 1825-1901), Jang-gya (lCang-skya, 1717-86), and Jam-yang-shay-ba C'Jamdbyangs-bzhad-pa, 1648-1721)-see the Bibliography for full entries. Works by these authors, together with the Tibetan translations of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, have for the last 100 years been the major sources for Sautrantika epistemological studies in the dGe-Iugs-pa monastic universities. This literature, like the Buddhist commentarial tradition generally, is often exceedingly terse and presumes a great deal of background. The books were meant to be read (1) in co~unction with an oral explanation, at which time they serve as lecture notes to the instructor, who expands on and questions points in the text .and (2) as a complement to other rigorous textual study and debate. Noone text is a truly self-contained unit; no one of the works by the above commentators yields a comprehensive view of the dGelugs-pa discussion of direct perception.

II. Scholarly Informants

In my own study and translation of these works3 I have been in systematic consultation with thinkers who are widely regarded in the Tibetan scholarly community and, increasingly, the Western one, as leading figures among the last generation of scholars to complete virtually all of their Geshe training in

DIRECT PERCEPTION 51

. Tibet. Contact with these holders of the oral philosophical tradition has been essential to the present research. My work to date indicates that the level of analytical detail in the oral scholarly tradition regarding the furictioning of direct perception significantly exceeds that found in the texts alone.

Geshe Gedun Lodro, the first Tibetan scholar with whom I discussed in some detail dGe-lugs-pa analyses of direct perception, was trained in Gomang College of Drebung Monastic University. He received the Geshe degree in 1961 when he was ranked first among all other recipients that year. For several years prior to his untimely death in 1979 at the age of 55 he taught at the University of Hamburg, Germany. I worked with him on the Sautrantika section of Jam-yang-shay-pa's Great Tenets (Grub mtha'i chen ma) when he was a Visiting Lecturer in Religious Studies at the University of Virginia in 1978.

Kensur Yes hay Thupden, abbot emeritus of Loseling College of Drebung Monastic University in India, was the highest ranking Geshe in his year, and is widely renowned for his ability to draw out the meaning and context of questions arising from textual readings. I discussed works by Den-dar-hla-ram-ba and Bel-den-cho-jay with him as a Fulbright Dissertation Researcher in India in 1980, and during his stay as Visiting Lecturer at Virginia in 1982. One of his foremost students, Geshe Bel-Dendrak-ba, Head Librarian and Resident Scholar at the Tibet House cultural center in New Delhi, provided invaluable insight in the course of our discussions of J ang-gya's Sautrantika chapter by drawing my attention to problems inherent in the Sautrantika presentation of direct perception. While in India I also benefited from discussing a variety of points from J ang-gya with Ven. Tshultrim Phuntzog of Gomang, who now holds Geshe Gedun Lodro's former post at the University of Hamburg.

My procedure with these scholars was to elicit and tape-record their commentary on the text at hand, and to use this commentary as a starting point for detailed discussions of key issues that often led us to other commentators or to their Indian sources. After each session, conducted solely in Tibetan, I would listen to the tape, translating and summarizing the discussion. This would usually generate further discussion on our next meeting; it thus became possible to have a sustained dialogue over several weeks or months devoted to identifying and dealing


with major points or problems. The material from these sessions became the raw data which was then shaped into the present discussion. Where there is general agreement among literal and oral philosophical material I have presented this as the generic dGe-Iugs-pa position. Where there have been differences on key points, the merits of each argument are considered.

In brief, the discussion is formulated so as to accommodate three purposes: (1) to make available a detailed, accurate description of direct perception as it is understood in the dGe-Iugspa interpretation of Sautrantika, (2) to critically analyze this interpretation in the context of other Buddhist systems' discussions of direct perception and (3) to identify and probe the significance of apparent inconsistencies or other limitations in the dGe-Iugs-pa presentation. It will of course be very important to clarify how the dGe-Iugs-pa view contrasts with or emulates Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian traditions which deal with perception, but that is beyond the scope of the present article. The focus here is on the discussion of direct perception-its objects and its mode of functioning-in the context of the dGelugs-pa interpretation of Sautrantika.

It is axiomatic to the dGe-Iugs-pa view of Sautrantika that only impermanent or specifically characterized phenomena (svala~a7]a, rang mtshan) actually appear as objects of direct perception. Because directly perceiving consciousnesses are seen here as ultimate minds, the impermanent things they perceivetables, chairs, and the like-are considered ultimate truths (paramartha-satya, don dam bden pa) in the system of the Sautrantika Followers of Reasoning (nyayanusarin, rigs pa'i rje su 'brangs pa) as defined by dGe-Iugs-pa scholarship. An understanding of the epistemological and ontological implications of this unusual tenet requires a detailed investigation into how directly perceiving consciousnesses take on the aspects of their objects. It is a topic on which there is a wider variety of opinion than most.

III. A Consciousness that Fully Perceives Objects

According to the dGe-Iugs-pa presentation of Sautrantika, specifically characterized phenomena are things which exist the way they appear. Their existence does not depend on imputation


by thought or terminology, for they are established by way of their own nature, and that actual nature appears to direct perception. These features greatly distinguish objects of direct per-

. ception from objects of thought. For, the image of a pot that appears to thought is like a pot but not a pot. What appears to direct perception is an actual pot, not something that is merely like one. Therefore, the eye consciousness observing a pot is an ultimate mind because the features appearing to it are what they appear to be-both in the sense that the mode of being of the pot appears just as it is and because an actual, functioning pot itself is taken as the object; it is not represented by something else.

The eye consciousness that sees a pot is a complete engager (*vidhi-pram:tti-buddhi, sgrub 'jug gi blo). This means that everything which co-exists with that pot, such as its mouth, base, color, subtle impermanence and so forth, appears directly to that eye consciousness. All the impermanent characteristics that come into existence and go out of existence simultaneously with the pot's own momentary production and disintegration are said to be one substantial entity of production and abiding (grub bde rdzas gcig) with the pot. Permanent phenomena related with the pot are not one substantial entity of production and abiding with the pot. For example, the uncaused space inside a pot is a permanent phenomenon because it does not change or disintegrate from one moment to the next. Thus, "permanent" here means static, not eternal, for that space comes into existence when the pot is produced and goes out of existence when the pot is destroyed. Even though its existence is simultaneous with that of the pot, this space is not one substantial entity of production and abiding with the pot because permanent and impermanent phenomena cannot be a single substance (*ekadravya, rdzas gcig). Because only impermanent specific characteristics, which are one substantial entity with the pot, are explicitly realized by the eye consciousness, the permanent uncaused space is not so realized. To be explicitly realized means that the object casts its own specific characteristics toward the consciousness. Uncaused space has no such specific characteristics and, as a permanent phenomenon, cannot perform the function of casting its own aspect. Therefore, it is not realized explicitly by the eye consciousness. However, it cannot be said that the eye consciousness


does not realize uncaused space at all; rather, it realizes ~pace implicitly (shugs rtogs)-that is, not by means of aspects cast toward it but through observing a gap in the material ofthe pot.

Even with respect to the impermanent characteristics of pot which do actually appear, the eye consciousness is not necessarily able to induce ascertainment of all that appears to it. It is a complete engager in the sense that the entire collection of specific characteristics that are one substantial entity with the pot do appear to it-cast their aspect toward it-but not in the sense that it induces ascertainment of all of them.

A consciousness which is a complete engager is defined as one which engages all parts of its object,4 but this does not entail the absurdity that all particles of a table, for example, appear to a single eye consciousness in the sense that those inside it, or on the side opposite to the one facing the perceiver and so forth, would appear. It simply means that all parts of the object which would normally be considered within eye range are appearing. Sautrantikas, Cittamatrins and Svatantrikas all agree that the specific characteristics of an object must appear to direct perception. This is because if direct perception were not valid with respect to the specific characteristics of the five types of objects (forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects) they would not be valid with respect to specifically characterized phenomena. The eye consciousness is "valid" with respect to specific characteristics not in the sense that it ascertains them, but only in the sense that they appear. What the eye consciousness is able to ascertain is that the object exists by way of its own power-or, more technically, by way of its own characterized~ ness, and not through being imputed by thought or terminology.

To realize the specifically characterized nature of a phenomenon means to ascertain its mode of abiding; that is, to realize everything that is one substantial entity of place, time, and nature with it-for example, production, productness, subtle impermanence, ultimate truth, form and shape, abiding and cessation.5 Thus, even though the eye consciousness does realize a specifically characterized phenomenon and even though the aspect cast by the object is concordant with the nature of the object, the eye consciousness or any other ultimate consciousness does not ascertain the actual specifically characterized nature of its object. The eye consciousness of an ordinary person cannot


ascertain all the specific characteristics that are part of this specifically characterized nature. It cannot ascertain the object's inability to abide for a second mo~ent .by its own pow~r that is the

" subtle impermanence of that object, It cannot ascertam the subtle rooroent-by-moment disintegration of a product-the disintegration that is the definition of being a"product-and thus can-

o not ascertain the specific nature of the table as being a product. 6

. In Sautrfmtika, all these characteristics, momentary disintegration, 'productness and so f~rt~, are .part o.f the object's mode of abidmg (gnas tshul). ThIs IS qUIte dIfferent from the Madhyamika assertion that there is just one final mode of abiding (gnas lugs mthar thug)-an object's emptiness of inherent ·7" eXIstence.

To realize something as a specifically characterized phenomenon means to know that it exists from its own side, that is to say, without being merely imputed by thought or terminology. Even though a table, for example, is imputed to its parts in the sense that when one sees them one thinks "This is a table," a table is not imputed by thought. In this system, to be imputed by thought simply means to be an object of thought. It is not a statement about the thing's mode of existence. Thus, although the table is imputed by thought, it is not merely imputed by thought. It exists from its own side, independent of thought or terminology.8

An eye consciousness can engage the entire collection of characteristics associated with its object because all the aspects of that object appear toward the sense consciousness. Thus, an alternative definition of a consciousness that is a complete engager is "an awareness that operates through the power of the [functioning] thing."g What appears to a direct perceiver or a mind of complete engagement such as an eye consciousness are the aspects cast by the object or functioning thing itself; therefore, such a perceiver observes only presently existing phenomena. Today's pot can be an object of today's eye consciousness; the eye cannot see tomorrow's pot, which is yet to be created, nor yesterday's pot, which no longer exists. Only thought can reflect on past and future objects. It is also thought, not direct perception, that superimposes onto presently existing phenomena a continuity extending from the past to the future.

For example, when a person observes a river flowing by,


what actually appears to the eye consciousness is just the minute, presently appearing particles of water as well as the impermanence and other aspects which are one substantial entity with them. The particles of water-the present stream of them-are specifically characterized phenomena, appearing objects of the eye consciousnessthat perceives them. The minute particles of water which have already passed and those yet to come do not appear at all to direct perception, only to thought. Nevertheless, when a person whose shoe was carried off by the water of a river early in the day returns to that spot later on, he feels, "There is the river which carried away my shoe." The stream of water that took the shoe has actually passed away long before, but such appears to his mind because earlier and later parts of the water's stream appear the same for thought. 10 The person's sense of presently seeing the very river that carried off his shoe is a case of thought superimposing a mixture of former and later times onto a present object of direct perception. Nearly all ordinary experience of the world involves an unanalyzed mixture of conceptual thought and direct perception. This occurs to the point where what is merely imputed by thought often seems to be established by way of its own nature, just as an imputed stream stretching from morning to evening seems actually to appear to the eye consciousness that explicitly perceives only presently existing particles of water.

How can tiny particles of water appear to the sense consciousness of an ordinary being? The individual particles are not individually ascertained and cannot serve as causal conditions for generating an eye consciousness, but they do appear to the eye consciousness. For, as a complete engager the eye consciousness perceives all that is one substantial entity in place, time, and nature with its object. The collection of these particles at any given time, therefore, is the specifically characterized phenomenon which is an appearing object of direct perception. Moreover, the fact that the individual particles are not ascertained and so cannot serve as the objective causal condition does not contradict the fact that the cohesive unit which is a collection of numerous particles does appear. For, even though one cannot see individual trees from a distance, one does not hesitate to say that the forest can be seen. Similarly, in order for a fist to appear it is necessary for the collection of five fingers to appear.


Any whole-whether a pot, river, forest or fist-cannot appear to direct percepti0fol except by its. compone~ts appearing; therefore, it must be saId that the mmute partIcles of matter that compose a pot, river, and so forth appear to the direct perceiver cognizing that object. Thus, according to the dGe-Iugspa presentation of .Sautrantika, a whOl~ s:-r~h as a p~t is not merely imputed to Its parts. Just as the mdlvldual partIcles are specifically characterized phenomena which exist by way of their own nature without being imputed by thought or terminology, the wholes which are composites of those particles also exist by way of their own nature.

The dGe-Iugs-pa assertion that in Sautrantika wholes and parts are equally established by their own nature is unusual; other Tibetan writers, such as the Sa-skya-pa Tak-tsang (sTag tshang) and most modern scholars of Sautrantika, consider only the particles to be established by their own nature and all wholes to be merely imputed by thought. According to the dGe-Iugs-pa view, if the collection of particles were not a specifically characterized phenomenon, it could not appear to direct perception and then it would be impossible to ascertain on the basis of direct sense perception that, for example, there is a table here or a bureau over there. This does not mean that the collection is considered something factually other (don gzhan) than or beyond the collection of particles, or that it has a separate entity (ngo bo gzhan) from them. It is composed of them but not superimposed by thought onto them. Thus, the presently existing stream of the river)n the example does appear to direct perception and is a specifically characterized phenomenon. The further superimposition that occurs in this example is a case of seeing the presently existing continuum as one entity with the continuum of river that existed hours earlier. Thus, the collection of presently existing particles that occupies a certain area is an ultimate truth, a specifically characterized phenomenon that exists by way of its own nature. The temporal continuity of the stream, however-which is superimposed onto both presently existing particles and particles that have either ceased to exist or not yet come into existence in the sense of conceiving these to be one entity-is merely imputed by thought, and in fact does not exist at all.

Each of the five sense consciousnesses can take only one of


the five types of objects as its appearing object. That is, It IS

capable of observing or taking on the aspects cast by only one type of object. The eye consciousness sees only color and shape, configurations of particles; the ear consciousness hear sounds, the nose consciousness smells odors, the tongue consciousness experiences tastes, and the body consciousness feels tangible objects. Each of these consciousnesses explicitly realizes its own specific object-a smell, taste, and so forth. This is because an explicit realization (dngos rtogs ) can occur only when the aspect of an object is cast toward an appropriate consciousness. At that time, the eye consciousness, for example, realizes the table itself, which is a collection of particles of form. This eye consciousness realizes the specifically characterized table, but it does not realize the table's own specifically characterized nature (svala~ar}a, rang mtshan). This would involve the realization of everything that is one entity of establishment and abiding with the table, including its subtle impermanence, productness, and so forth. In other words, it would entail realizing all that characterizes the mode of abiding of the table's own nature (rang mtshan gyi gnas lugs). To realize the specifically characterized nature of a phenomenon is to ascertain all its specific characteristics. Although these do appear to the eye consciousness-whereby it can be called a mind of complete engagement-they are not ascertained. 11 The fact that the eye consciousness cannot induce ascertainment of the specifically characterized nature of its objects does not mean that it is mistaken with respect to that nature. Because that nature does appear to it, the eye consciousness is considered unmistaken with respect to the actual nature of tables and so forth and is, therefore, considered an ultimate mind. In Sautrantika, there is no contradiction in not realizing something and being unmistaken with respect to it. 12 Since phenomena cast their aspect to the consciousness in accordance with their own mode of abiding, the direct perceiver or ultimate consciousness does not perceive anything which is not the mode of abiding of the object. 13 In brief, whatever a sense consciousness ascertains, it ascertains correctly; however, it does not ascertain all aspects of its objects.

Explicit realization of an object means that the perceiving consciousness must take on the aspect of that object, much like a mirror reflects things by taking on an image or aspect of those


things. Because the eye consciousness, for example, can be generated only into the aspect of color or shape, only colors and shapes can be realized directly by i1. Therefore, although in

. general a cedar table is an object of the eye consciousness apprehending suc~ a table, only th~ color and shape of that table are directly realIzed by that conSCIousness. Other factors related with the table, its odor and tangibility for example, are not explicitly realized ?y the ey~ consciou~ness. Doe~ this not undermine the Sautrantika assertIOn that dIrect perceIvers such as the eye consciousness are complete engagers which operate with respect to everything that is of one substantial entity of production and abiding-that is, simultaneous in existence with-that object? It is suitable to say that the eye consciousness sees the table because the table itself is color and shape; it is also the basis of qualities such as odor and tangibility which are actually perceived by other senses.

Similarly, it might be asked whether or not the eye consciousness sees fire or water. Although both of these have color and shape, water itself is defined as "that which is damp and moistening" and fire as "that which is hot and burning.,,13 In other words, these are, technically, objects not of sight but of the body consciousness which can experience the dampness of water or the heat of fire; still, a dGe-Iugs-pa will say that water and fire appear to the eye consciousness. Does this contradict the Buddhist assertion that the eye consciousness explicitly perceives only color and shape? No, because water and fire do not appear to the eye consciousness independently, as do color and shape; they appear to the eye consciousness through something

. else appearing first. Therefore, their appearance depends on the appearance of their color and shape to the eye consciousness. An actual object of apprehension of the eye consciousness (mig shes kyi gzung bya) on the other hand is something that can appear to that consciousness without depending on anything else; only color and shape fulfill this criterion, and thus only they are actual objects of apprehension for the eye consciousness. However, everything that the eye consciousness sees is not necessarily, technically speaking, its object of apprehension. For example, the impermanence of a table, its productness and so forth are not objects of apprehension of the eye consciousness, but they do appear to it by means of other phenomena-the color


and shape which are objects of apprehension-appearing. 15 Objects ofthe eye consciousness, therefore, fall into two categories: (1) objects of apprehension, namely, color and shape, and (2) other phenomena, such as fire, which are known in dependence on color and shape.

Another measure of the fact that color and shape are objects of apprehension for the eye consciousness is that the eye consciousness, like a mirror, actually takes on the aspect of the colors and shapes it perceives. The eye consciousness does not, however, take on the aspects of water or fire. This is considered a sign that the eye consciousness is not actually seeing fire or water-it does not know or experience the wetness or heat which are the distinguishing characteristics of these. However, in terms of ordinary conventional speech, it is suitable to say that the eye sees water or fire due to the fact that it sees the color and shape of these. 16 Moreover, as a direct perceiver the eye consciousness is a mind of complete engagement that necessarily perceives all factors of its objects which are one entity of establishment and abiding in relation to place, nature, and time. It does not necessarily perceive factors that are simply one entity with its objects, however. Thus, with respect to seeing a table, there is no contradiction in the eye consciousness explicitly perceiving the table but not its tangibility. This is because although tangibility is in general one substantial entity with the table/ 7 its tangibility is not infallibly concomitant with the table in terms of place, time, and nature. For, whatever is one entity with a table is not necessarily one entity with a table's tangibility. For example, a table's shape is not a tangible object. 18

IV. Appearing Objects of Direct Perception

The table that appears to the eye consciousness is an impermanent thing. However, the appearing object (*Pratibhiisa-vi~aya, snang yul) of that eye consciousness is not just visible formnamely, color and shape. For, in the Buddhist presentation all functioning things are included within three categories: forms, consciousnesses, and that which is neither-non-associated compositional factors (viprayukta-sar(lskara, ldan min 'du byed) such as

"impermanence, which are neither form nor consciousness. 19 A


fully appearing object or an ac~ual obje~t ~f apprehension of an eye consciousness cannot be mcluded m Just the cate~ory of form. This is because many phenomena that are not the Impermanent table-and thus not form-but are non-associated compositional factors, such as productness, impermanence, and so forth, appear to the eye consciousness simultaneously with the table. These are also appearing objects of the eye consciousness, although, as in the examples of fire and water above, they are not technically objects of apprehension of the eye consciousness. The table is the basis of these appearances; thus, it is necessary to distinguish the appearing object of direct perception-the table or, specifically, the color and shape of the table-from the many phenomena related with it which are not the table but do also appear. 20 Everything that is one entity of establishment and abiding with table in relation to place, time, and nature is an ~ppearing object of the collectively engaging eye consciousness that apprehends table, but all impermanent and non-associated compositional factors which are associated with table and which therefore also appear to that eye consciousness are not themselves the table.

Permanent phenomena associated with a table cannot appear to direct perception because Sautrantika asserts that permanent phenomena, being incapable of casting an aspect, cannot be appearing objects of direct perception. Thus, the emptiness associated with a table cannot appear to direct perception, even though the table itself appears and even though the table and its emptiness are a single entity. A table's emptiness is its lack of being used or enjoyed by substantially existent persons. This can be conceptually realized but not directly perceived according to Sautrantika. Thus, emptiness-realization of which is the chief antidote to the most subtle forms of ignorance-can be realized only implicitly, not directly by a direct perceiver. The type of valid cognition that explicitly realizes emptiness is conceptual; namely, inference (anumfina, rjes dpag).

The eye consciousness observing a table is non-conceptual; this means it does not have an articulate realization that "this is a table." Further, although it realizes the specifically characterized table, it cannot ascertain all the specific characteristics of a table such as its subtle impermanence.21 Thus, the eye consciousness does not fully realize the specifically characterized


nature of the table it perceives, for such a realization would entail ascertainment of the table's subtle impermanence, productness, momentary disintegration, and so forth. It would have to realize the mode of abiding of the table's own nature (rang mtshan gyi gnas lugs). Because the eye consciousness is a complete engager, this would mean that it would necessarily ascertain everything that is the nature or own-character of the table. The eye consciousness, however, is not ordinarily capable of ascertaining the subtle characteristics of its objects.22

Thus, even though a table is a specifically characterized phenomenon and a product, the direct perception observing a table does not ordinarily realize it as such, despite the fact that both specifically characterized phenomenon and product, which are one entity with the table, are appearing to it. This further emphasizes the limitations of ordinary direct perceivers or ultimate consciousnesses in Sautrantika and indicates the necessity for cultivating a conceptual understanding of, for example, subtle impermanence, productness, and emptiness.

v. How a Direct Perceiver Knows Objects

The Buddhist systems have two ways of explaining the workings of direct perception, non-aspected and aspected. The only proponents of non-aspected direct perception are the Vaibha~ikas; the upper three systems-Sautrantika, Cittamatra, and Madhyamika-all assert some type of aspected direct perception. These three systems maintain that the aspect of an object is cast toward or impinges on the consciousness. According to Vaibha~ika, this is not the case. In this latter view, direct perception means that both the eye sense power and the eye consciousness meet the object and thereby know it. Unlike any of the upper systems, the Vaibha~ikas maintain that both the eye sense and the eye consciousness perceive, for example, a table. 23 They argue that if, as the other systems assert, only the eye consciousness knew the object, there would be no explanq.tion for why we do not see through walls and so forth. The eye sense is simultaneous with the object it cognizes and a different substantial entity from it. 24

Thus, according to Vaibhasika, a direct valid cognizer is not


necessarily a consciousness because the sense power itself-the subtle matter inside the eye organ-also cognizes its object directly. In Sautrantika. (as w~ll as Sautranti~a-Svatantrika and Prasangika-MadhyamIka) thIS sense power IS one of the three causal conditions for generation of an eye consciousness and exists just prior to the eye consciousness which is its own effect. All three upper systems agree that only the eye-consciousnessnot the eye sense power-is a direct perceiver of the object.

Because in Vaibha~ika the eye consciousness and eye sense extend out to the object, there is no discussion of perception by way of an aspect, that is, of the object b~ing .reflected in ~he consciousness. The only aspect connected wIth dIrect perceptIOn is the objective aspect (don rnam )-the object itself. Furthermore, because the consciousness contacts an object with which it is simultaneous, the object is not a causal condition that effects or impinges on the consciousness.

By contrast, the upper three systems concur in asserting that an aspect of the object either appears25 or is cast toward the consciousness; all but the Cittamatrins and Yogacara-Svatantrikas further maintain that the object is a causal condition or observed-object-condition for the generation of a consciousness that perceives it in the next moment. This, in the view of these systems, is th~ objective aspect. Thus, the proponents of both non-aspected and aspected perception agree on the existence of an objective aspect; there is a difference of opinion, however, even among proponents of aspected perception, as to whether this objective aspect is a cause of the perceiving consciousness or not. In Sautrantika, subject and object in direct perception are not simultaneous, as in Vaibha~ika, but serial. Even though a directly perceiving consciousness and its object are consecutive, the consciousness does clearly perceive the object, because it is one entity with the aspect of the object. The aspect with which it is one entity is a consciousness aspect (shes rnam) not an objective aspect. Thus, one reason for positing aspected direct perception is to explain how a consciousness directly perceives an object that existed in the previous moment.

For example, an eye consciousness cognizing a table knows that table by taking on or being generated into the aspect (akiira, rnam pa) of table, much as a mirror takes on the aspect of an object it reflects. This means it is possible to assert that the eye


consciousness takes on the aspect of a table without actually extending out and contacting the external table. In this way one can perceive a table as "over there" but subject and object need not actually meet, as they must in the Vaibha~ika system. 26

The fact that a consciousness takes on the aspect of its object does not mean that the object in any sense actually enters into the eye cons~iousness. For, a consciousness cannot have any specific color or shape. Just as a glass placed over a blue cloth takes on the color blue without itself becoming blue and without blue actually entering into the glass, the eye consciousness perceiving a table becomes like a table without actually becoming a table and without a table actually entering into it. 27

A direct perceiver such as an eye consciousness does not ascertain all that appears to it, and therefore is not generated in the aspect of all objects before 'it. Being generated in the aspect of blue, for example, is the unique characteristic or uncommon positer (thun mongma yin pa'i 'jog byed) of a consciousness perceiving blue. Thus, even though yellow and so forth might also appear, this eye consciousness would not be generated in the aspect of yellow and so forth because it does not take note of yellow at that time. 28

A consciousness that does not ascertain an object is not generated in the aspect of that object. Thus if, for example, one is deeply absorbed in listening to music, forms and so forth can appear to the eye consciousness without that consciousness necessarily ascertaining those forms or being generated in their aspect. Similarly, when an impermanent phenomenon such as a table appears to the eye consciousness, that consciousness is generated in the aspect of table but not in the aspect of the subtle impermanence of the table-although this subtle impermanence does appear to it-because one is not ascertaining subtle impermanence. The consciousness would only be generated in that aspect if one had previously cognized subtle impermanence directly and could therefore ascertain it.

Thus, the aspect into which the consciousness is generated, even though similar to the external object, is itself of the nature of consciousness. 29 One indication that perception is aspected is the fact that if something is placed very close to the eye you cannot see it properly. This is because the aspect cannot appear


unless there is some distance between the object and perceiving . 30

·.:C:::onscIOusness. . An aspect similar to the object (yul gyi 'dra rnam) is cast toward the eye consciousness which then takes on or is generated 'in the aspect of that object. Both the objective (don rnam) and subjective aspects (shes rnam) are known'as apprehension aspects (bzung rnam). When the eye consciousness perceives a table, for

'example, that very consciousness-like a glass placed over blue cloth-takes on the aspect similar to the table. This subjective apprehension aspect31 is also .known as a consciousness aspect (jiiiina-iikiira, shes rnam). In thIS context, some scholars say that the consciousness-aspect is an aspect similar to the object (yul gyi 'dra rnam).32 However, this assertion is not common to all dGe-Iugs-pas. For, some monastic texts assert that only objective aspects can be aspects similar to the object and that no other aspect of the object (yul gyi rnam pa) is involved in direct perception.33

In any case, the subjective and objective apprehension aspects (bzung rnam) are similar, like the reflection of a face in the mirror and the actual face. When it is said that the eye consciousness is generated in the aspect of the object (dngos po'i rnam ldan du skyes pa) the aspect referred to is the subjective apprehension aspect or consciousness aspect. To say that an eye consciousness perceiving a table, for example, is generated in the aspect of that table also means that the consciousness has become or taken on the entity of a consciousness that has table as its aspect, that is to say, which ascertains a table.

This perception of an aspected direct perception is shared by the higher systems and is a marked departure from the Vaibha~ika view of an aspectless direct perception. One significant reason why the Vaibha~ikas do not posit aspected direct perception is that they cannot distinguish between subjective and objective apprehension aspects.34 Hence, for them, whatever is an aspect or appearance of a table necessarily is a material table.35

, Therefore, they cannot posit a consciousness aspect or subjective apprehension aspect, for this would entail the absurdity either of the consciousness being material or of the object itself being immaterial. 36 They must argue that no aspect exists anywhere between the observing consciousness and the object itself. For,


if there were something between the consciousness and its object, that something would have to be an appearance (snang ba) which, in their view, is none other than the object itself. Thus, they maintain that since the appearance is not the object, there can be no proof for an object-that is, a subjective aspect-which does not appear.37

That which is generated in the image of the object is the consciousness aspect, also known as the subjective apprehension aspect. 38 That which is apprehended is the object-also known as the apprehension aspect existing in the object (yul la yod pa'i gzung rnam). 39 This apprehension aspect and the consciousness or subjective apprehension aspect are one entity, just as a mirror and the image it reflects are one entity.40 In this assertion, the Sautrantikas seem to be approaching the Cittamatra (MindOnly) position that a perceiving consciousness is the same entity as its object. However, according to Sautrantika, it is still an external object that is being realized; the aspect in the consciousness arises through the power of that external object, whereas for Cittamatrins, subject and object both arise from the same internal latency (viisana, bag chags)Y Furthermore, even though the reflected aspect of an external object is one entity with the consciousness in which it is reflected and is an aspect of the external object, Sautrantika does not assert that whatever is an aspect of the object is necessarily the object itselfY Thereby, they maintain that subject and object are different substantial entities. Unlike the Cittamatrins, the Sautrantikas do not try to prove that the object aspect is one substantial entity with the consciousness that perceives it. 43 For, whatever is the aspect of a table, according to Sautrantika, is not necessarily a table. The eye consciousness realizing a table, for example/4 takes on the aspect of the table, and this aspect, although similar to a table, is itself the entity of consciousness, whereas the table is not. This consciousness aspect or subjective apprehension aspect has the feature of mixing or combining both the objective and subjective aspects. These aspects are "mixed" in the sense that the apprehension aspect is common to both subject and object. The wayan object becomes known is through this common aspect; however, it is not the case that the object itself becomes mixed with the consciousness.45


In short, aspected perception means that direct perception knows an object by way of an aspect similar to that object being generated in the. consciou~n~ss itself. . . Cittamatra, lIke Sautrantlka, also asserts that the conscIOUSness is generated into or takes on the aspect of the object; however, Sautrantika, unlike Cittamatra, asserts that the material object is external, arises from causes and conditions unrelated with the consciousness, and will continue to exist as a collection of particles even when it is no longer perceived by that particular consciousness. In brief, the Sautrantikas (as well as SautrantikaSvatantrika-Madhyamika and Prasangika-Madhyamika) maintain that a consciousness and its object are different substantial entities arising from different substantial causes, whereas for Cittamatra and Yogacara-Svatantrika subject and object are one substantial entity, arising simultaneously from a single cause-a predisposition previously established in the mind.

The Sautrantikas and other proponents of aspected direct perception are specifically refuting the Vaibha~ika tenet of aspectless perception. If an object were capable of illuminating or knowing itself, no perceiving consciousness would be required, but since material objects have no such capacity, they must be known by means of a perceiving consciousness. On this much all four systems agree. The Sautrantikas and the others further make the case that aspectless perception is unsuitable for, if such existed, the object could only be known when the consciousness actually extended out to the object. If direct perception operated in this way, argues Sautrantika, the eye consciousness, for example, should be able to see through walls and so forth, because consciousness is not obstructed by material objects. The Sautrantikas reject the Vaibha~ika explanation that the eye sense power, extending to the object along with the eye consciousness, is obstructed by walls, and therefore one cannot see through them. For, the Sautrantikas do hot consider the sense power to be a perceiver of objects. According to them, the fact that we do not see through walls is an indication that direct perception operates by way of an aspect, as it is a sign that aspectless perception does not exist. Thus, the position of Sautrantika and the higher systems is that if there were no aspected direct perception, either objects would not be seen at


all-because the consciousness would have no way of relating to them-or we should be able to see through walls because the consciousness knows objects by actually going out to them.46

An important Indian source for this position is a passage in Santarak~ita's Ornament to the Middle Way (Madhyamakala1lJkara, dbU ma rgyan) , quoted by Jam-yang-shay-bain his Great Exposition of Tenets (Grub mtha' chen mo):

Regarding the position that consciousness is aspected, Actually the two [a glass and the blue cloth on which it is placed]

are different; [Yet] because there is an image similar to the [object] Feeling [i.e., experience of that object] is suitable Through the mere imputation [of seeing it in the glass]. If an aspect exists, comprehension of the object is suitable.47

In this way, Santarak~ita indicates that direct perception is possible only because the perceiving consciousness can take on the aspect of its object.

VI. Location and Identification of the Aspect

Although the above explanation is clear and well reasoned, on closer examination it becomes very difficult to state precisely where the aspect arises and of what it consists. In one view, the consciousness aspect similar to the object-or the aspect into which the consciousness is generated-exists in the pupil of the eye itself. Thus, when the pupil deteriorates one cannot see very well because the proper basis for the aspect no longer exists.48 Some scholars assert that the objective apprehension aspect exists somewhere between the object and the perceiving consciousness. An indication in support of this view is that clear perception does not occur if the eye is too close to its object, suggesting that there is not sufficient room to allow for proper generation of the aspect. 49 In this view, the eye consciousness actually perceives not the object itself but the objective aspectwhich is like the object but which is not the object-and seeing this similar aspect functions as seeing the object. 50 This position, although not widely asserted among present-day dGe-lugs-pa scholars, is supported by a statement in Gyel-tsap's Commentary


. on (Dharmakirti's) "Ascertainment Of Valid Cognition". (PramiiTJaviniSa:ya) where it is asserted that the aspect does eXIst between the

c , .. d b· 51 consciousness and Its perceIve 0 ~ect.

The aspect into which the consciousness is generated is . simultaneous with the directly perceiving consciousness and is itself necessarily consciousness. This is because it cannot be either the perceived object, which is material, or the subtle matter inside the eye organ, for object and eye organ are, respectively, the observed-object-condition and uncommon dominant condition of the eye consciousness, due to which they exist prior to that consciousness. Both have ceased when the eye consciousness, which is their effect, begins to function. Thus, it is not suitable that either object or sense power be the subjective apprehension aspect.

It would also not be suitable to consider the apprehension .aspect to be a non-associated compositional factor, namely, an aspect common to the three components of perception-eye consciousness, eye sense, and object. For, the actual subjective apprehension aspect, the one that mixes or is similar to subject and object aspects, can only be a consciousness. 52 Also, it is not the object because the consciousness aspect, though similar to the object, is a different substantial entity from it.

From the above, it is clear that the subjective apprehension aspect is not the actual object. However, it may be that this aspect seems to be the external object. Still, if the subjective apprehension aspect seems to be the object but is not, then direct perception would absurdly have the same type of mistake as conceptual thought, for to thought, the image mistakenly seems to be the actual object it represents, but is not.53 Thought mayor may f).ot actually misconceive the image to be the object; in most cases it does not. However, one could argue that such a mistake never applies to direct perception because the similar aspect ('dra rnam) of the table is never construed to be the table; the aspect merely appears as similar to table. Since it is in fact similar to the table, there is no mistake involved. 54

Some proponents of the view that the subjective apprehension aspect exists in the pupil of the eye hold that this does not necessarily contradict the view that an apprehension aspect also exists between eye consciousness and object. This interceding apprehension aspect (bzung rnam) is considered an objective as-


pect (don rnam). FOT, one could assert the pupil to be the locus of the subject apprehension aspect and consider that the aspect between subject and object is the objective aspect. However, this is difficult to uphold because the objective apprehension aspect itself is material, due to which there would be the absurdity of a material table existing between the eye consciousness and the actual table. It makes more sense to consider the interceding object as a subjective apprehension aspect. Still, in this case, it is implicitly contradictory to the view of a subjective apprehension aspect existing in the eye, because there is no explicit presentation of two subjective apprehension aspects-although this is not explicitly refuted either. In any case, there is a further problem with this assertion. If the subjective apprehension aspect itself is a consciousness, why would cognition of a table require the presence of an eye consciousness? A consciousness does not need to appear to another consciousness in order to know its own object. 55 If one asserts that the subjective apprehension aspect needs to appear, does it follow that this aspect is in fact a table and not a consciousness? Some say that the perceived aspect is in the table, others that it is not. 56 One way to settle it, as mentioned above, is to consider that from the viewpoint of the consciousness' perception of table, it is a consciousnessor subjective apprehension aspect-and from the viewpoint of its being the apprehended aspect itself it is an object or objective apprehension aspect.

This is an interesting topic for further exploration, as valuable for the problems it raises as for the presentation that could be uncovered. For, the difficulties of making a presentation that can settle all the problems it raises without self-contradictionfor example, maintaining the existence of external objects within asserting aspected direct perception-tends to draw thought on to both the Cittamatrin and Madhyamika systems and prepares one to understand their respective positions of no external objects and no inherently existent or findable objects or subjects.

VII. Different Positions Asserting Aspected Perception

In general, there are three different presentations of how aspected direct perception knows an object, that of the Pro po-


nentsof an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects (gzung 'dzin grang mnyam pa), the Non-Pluralists (sna tshags gnyis med pa), and the Half-Eggists (sga nga phyed tshal ba). These three presentations are common to the Sautrantika and Cittamatra systems (although, as will be explained below, there is disagreement among dGe-Iugs-pa scholars as to whether or not any Sautrantikas assert the Half-Eggist position).

The Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects assert that wha~ever number of ~spects ~xist as one substantial entity of estabhshment and abIdmg with, for example, a table, that many aspects are cast to the perceiving consciousness. Some proponents of this position assert that there are as many simultaneous consciousnesses as there are appearing aspects; others, that a single consciousness is generated into. as many

d · 57 aspects as are cast towar It. The Non-Pluralists say that the many aspects of a given

object appear to a single consciousness simultaneously and that this consciousness itself takes on all the various aspects. Some scholars assert that these aspects appear not simultaneously but serially, in such quick succession that they seem simultaneous. Holders of this position, known as Sequential Non-Pluralists (rim gyis pa'isna tshags gnyis med pa), are said by Jam-yang-shay-pa and Jang-gya to exist among Sautrantikas.58

The Half-Eggists assert that only a single aspect-for example, a general aspect similar to a table or to a mottle-colored cloth-appears to a single consciousness, and that this consciousness is generated only into that aspect. One potential objection to this position is that, since direct perception is necessarily a mind of complete engagement that observes all aspects of its object, it is unsuitable to say that only the general aspect, for example, of the mottle-colored cloth is cast, because of the unwanted consequence that the particular colors would not then appear. However, the Half-Eggists maintain that although only the general aspect of the mottle is cast, the consciousness is still able to see the separate colors contained in the mottle. This is because it does not follow that only that which casts its aspect is capable of being seen. It could be said that even though the entire collection of aspects appears and can be seen, the appearance of the individual colors is weak whereas that of the collection of the colors-the mottle itself-is strong. Thus, the eye


consciousness which is generated in the aspect of a mere mottle is a fully qualified complete engager because everything that is one entity of establishment and abiding with that mottle does

. 59 appear to It. As to whether or not any Sautrantikas assert the Half-Eggist

position, Jang-gya writes that Tsong-ka-pa and his chief disciples, Gyel-tsap and Kay-drup, did not clearly state an opinion on this topic. However, both Jam-yang-shay-pa and Jang-gya consider that it would be difficult to posit the Half-Egg position for Sautrantika, an opinion based on their interpretation of an important Indian source for this position, Santarak:;ita's Commentary to the "Ornament to the Middle Way" (Madhyamaka-alar(lkiiravr:tti, dbU ma'i rgyan gyi 'grel pa). Although mainly setting forth the Svatantrika tenet system, this is an important source for the Sautrantika and Cittamatra discussions of the various ways of asserting aspected perception. This text states:

Consciousnesses arise serially With respect to the white and so forth [of a mottle]. Because they arise very quickly Fools think they are simultaneous. 50

Jam-yang-shay-pa's commentator, Bel-den-cho-jay, considers this to be a statement of the Half-Eggist position. J am-yang-shaypa himself and J ang-gya do not. (This is a not so rare instance of Jam-yang-shay-pa's commentator disagreeing with him.) Hence, the former two maintain that there are Sautrantika HalfEggists, the latter that there are not. Their disagreement is due to the fact that they have different ways of asserting what the Half-Eggist position is. Jang-gya and J am-yang-shay-pa consider that the Half-Eggists assert that when the aspect of a mere mottle, for example, is cast, there is no casting of as many aspects as are one substantial entity of establishment and abiding with that mottle. Thus, in this view, when the eye consciousness perceives a mottle-colored cloth, the aspect of the mere mottle is cast toward the eye consciousness; there is no casting of however many aspects there are of the mottle's red, yellow, and so forth. Therefore, because the above quote, in mentioning a serial generation of consciousness with respect to a single object,


indicates that many different aspects are cast to the consciousness, Jam-yang-shay-pa and Jang-gya do not consider it to indicate the Half-Eggist position. Rather, they assert this quote to .be an expression of the Sequential Non-Pluralist position; namely, that all aspects of the object appear serially but iIi such quick succession that they see~ simultaneous. In other words, both sides agree on the meamng of the quote, but not on the system it repr~sents.

Because Santarak1;iita's Commentary to the "Ornament to the Middle Way" is one of the major Indian sources for Sautrantika,61 those who, like Bel-den-cho-jay, consider this verse to represent the Half-Eggist position maintain that there are Sautrantika Half-Eggists; those who consider it to express the position of the Sequential Non-Pluralists do·not. They posit the Half-Eggist position in relation to Cittamatra only, not Sautrantika. In their view, the three Sautrantika positions regarding aspected direct perception are (1) Non-Pluralists, (2) Sequential Non-Pluralists and (3) Proponents of an Equal Number of Subjects and Objects.

It seems that any of these positions can be supported, depending on one's choice of quotes and interpretations. One value of the discussion in the context of Sautrantika and of the general course of study appears to be to draw students into critical evaluation and analysis of the relevant texts. This is done within a recognition that conclusions are made despite the dif

i ficulties of interpretation they entai1.62 The other main value revolves around drawing one even more into examining the relationship between object and subject.

VIII. The Perceiving Consciousness as Both Subject and Object

Any perceiving consciousness is accompanied by a factor of self-knowing (svasar[tvedana, rang rig) which experiences or knows that consciousness. For example, while the eye consciousness is observing a circus act, the self-knower experiencing that eye consciousness takes the eye consciousness observing the circus as its object. Thus, although in relation to the circus the eye consciousness is a perceiving subject, in relation to the selfknower it is a perceived object. Proof that the self-knower exists


is said to be the fact that when one reflects on the circus seen previously, one re~embers not only the circus itself but the mind that observed It.

The Sautrantikas, Cittamatrins, and Yogacara-Svatantrikas all assert the existence of a self-knowing consciousness, maintaining that it is the only explanation for such memories. The Vaibha~ikas do not assert self-knowers-they cannot, because they are unable to assert a subjective apprehension aspect that could be its object.63 For, the self-knower observes not merely the perceiving consciousness but the consciousness aspect which is similar to the actual object. The Sautrantika-SvatantrikaMadhyamikas and the Prasangika-Madhyamikas also reject the self-knower on the basis that it would involve a confusion of agent and object.

The explicit object (dngos yul) of the self-knower is the perceiving consciousness that is generated in the aspect of its object. Through observing this. subjective apprehension aspect, the selfknower indirectly knows the perceived object. In relation to the self-knower, all other consciousnesses are objective apprehension aspects (gzung rnam);64 a self-knower is the only type of consciousness that is never an appearing object of any other nonconceptual consciousness in the same continuum. The consciousness which a self-knower apprehends never apprehends that self-knower.

Jam-yang-shay-pa describes the relationship between a directly perceived object, the directly perceiving consciousness, and its factor of self-knowing through the example of a stained glass:

All Buddhist proponents of [consciousness] as having aspects [the Sautrantikas on up] assert the following: If one coats the far side of a glass with paint, then when one looks at [it] both the glass and the paint are similar in being perceived objects. [However] the glass is realized by way of its own thingness and the color by way of an image [in the glass], although there is no way of distinguishing the two, image and glass. Therefore, the master Bodhibhadra said:

When a person looks at a glass on which the color of tortoise paint has been applied, the eye apprehends both glass and paint; the glass is apprehended directly and the paint is apprehended [by


way of an image]. Therefore, just as the person apprehends two objects, [direct perception involves two objects of apprehension].65

.The two objects of apprehension indicated here are the external object,per~eived by t~e eye consciousness, and the ey~ c~nsciousness Itself, perceIved by the self~knower. The ObjectIve aspect of similar type ('~r~ rnam kyi bzung ~nam) disc~ssed ~bove, which in some scholars VIew could be posIted as a thIrd obJectanoqjective apprehension aspect existing between the eye con-

• sciousness and an external object such as a table-is not rep. resented in this example.

The self-knower experiences the eye consciousness directly, just as, in the exam~le, the glass is seen di~ectly. The self-know:r experiences the object of the eye conSCIousness by way of ItS image-that is, through perceiving the subjective apprehension aspect into which the eye consciousness is generated-just as

'the blue is known indirectly by looking at it through glass. The self-knower, therefore, is aware of external objects indirectly, through the medium of the subjective apprehension aspect or the consciousness aspect. The eye consciousness knows the object directly although, as noted above, some scholars assert that what the eye consciousness actually perceives is the objective apprehension aspect and not the object itself.

Another way to express this is that in relation to the eye consciousness apprehending blue there are two aspects, apprehended and apprehending. The apprehending aspect (grahaka-akara, 'dzin rnam) is the factor of experience, the selfknower. The apprehended aspect (grahya-akiira, bzung rnam) consists of two factors of illumination: the factor of the object which is illuminated-in this case, the color blue-and the factor of the consciousness that illuminates it.

In any case, because the self-knower is a factor of experience that is one entity with the perceiving consciousness, the difficulty remains of explaining more fully how the two factors of a single directly perceiving consciousness relate to one another. For example, it is said that the self-knower observes the subjective apprehension aspect; yet, why should one consciousness or factor of consciousness need to appear to another one? Is the self-knower itself then generated in the image of the apprehension aspect? The Prasangika system rejects the assertion of a


self-knower because it considers that if a self-knower had to be posited in order to explain the self-awareness of an eye consciousness, then that self-knower would also have to possess a self-knower, and so on infinitely.

The Sautrantika system, like the higher systems, asserts aspected direct perception in order to avoid the faults it finds with the Vaibha~ika assertion of aspectless direct perception. The main problem with the Vaibha~ika presentation is that it must posit sense powers such as the eye sense as knowers of external objects; otherwise, they could not explain why consciousnesses do not see through walls and so forth. This means that in Vaibha~ika the sense-power is not considered a causal condition for perception, as it is in Sautrantika, Sautrantika-SvatantrikaMadhyamika and Prasangika-Madhyamika. Therefore, in Vaibha~ika (as in Cittamatra) subject and object are simultaneous. In Sautrantika, however, the main significance of categorizing impermanent phenomena as ultimate truths is the ability of such objects to act as causal conditions for the generation of an ultimate or directly perceiving consciousness. The entire Sautrantika tenet system is built along the axis of distinguishing the apearing objects of direct perception (ultimate truths) from the appearing objects of thought (conventional truths) in terms of how these two types of valid cognizers know their respective objects. Thus, the presentation of aspected direct perception, a correlate of the assertion that an external object is prior to and a causal condition of the consciousness that directly perceives it, is central to the dGe-Iugs-pa Sautrantika system.

With certain modifications, the explanation of aspected direct perception remains valid for the higher systems as well. Nevertheless, a presentation of aspected direct perception involves a number of difficulties, such as identifying exactly what the apprehension aspect is and detailing whether or not the directly perceiving consciousness knows its objects by means of a subjective apprehension aspect. The difficulties themselves are very instructive, as the explanation that even direct perceivers are actually observing a subjective apprehension aspect leads one quite naturally to an interest in and critical appreciation of the Cittamatra system. In Cittamatra, subject and object are said to be both one entity and simultaneous, thereby avoiding certain difficulties of the Sautrantika position (such as how to integrate


the subjective and objective apprehension aspects) but encountering other problems, such as how to account for shared experiences or clairvoyant knowledge of another's mind when there

'are no external objects which are a different substantial entity from one's own mind.66 The difficulties in Sautrantika of pinpointing exactly where the apprehension aspects exist are also provocative. These aspects are impermanent phenomena and

. hence ultimate truths in this system; therefore, they are, by definition, not merely imputed by either terms or thoughts but, at least in theory, specifically located and findable. The problems associated with determining exactly what that specific location is-whether external, internal, or both-leads one to an interest in and critical appreciation of the Madhyamika system, which presents all permanent arid i.mpermane~t phenomena as ana~yt-. ically unfindable, yet functIonal. In thIS way, the Sautrantlka presentation of direct perception is intended to fulfill its long range purpose in dGe-Iugs-pa ofleading the scholar-practitioner on to the higher systems.

Bibliography Bel-den-cho-jay (see Nga-wang-bel-den). Chim-jam-bel-yang (mChims-Jam-dpal-dbyangs), Commentary on the Treasury

of Knowledge (mChims mdzod). Go-mang library block print (Mundgod, India).

Den-dar-hla-ram-ba (bsTan-dar-lha-ram-ba), b. 1759, Presentation of Generally and Specifically Characterized Phenomena (Rang mtshan spyi mtshan gyi roam gzhag). Collected gsung 'bum of Bstan-dar Lha-ram of A-lag-sha, VoL 1. New Delhi: Lama Guru Deva, 1971.

Devendrabuddhi (Lha-dbang-blo), Commentary on (Dharmak'irti's) "Commentary on (Digniiga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition'" (Pramii'Y}avarttikapaftjikii).

Dharmaklrti (Chos-kyi-grags-pa), 7th century Ascertainment of Valid Cognition (Pramii'Y}aviniSchaya, Tshad ma roam par nges pa). P5710, Vol. 130. Commentary on (Digniiga's) "Compendium on Valid Cognition" (Pramii'Y}avarttikakiirikii, Tshad ma roam 'grel gyi tshig le'ur byas pa). P5709, Vol. 130. ' .

Jam-bel-sam-pel, Ge-shay CJam-dpal-bsam-phel, dGe-gshes), d. 1975, Presen. tation of Awareness and Knowledge, Composite of All the Important Points, Opener of the Eye of New Intelligence (Blo rig gi roam bzhag nyer mkho kun 'dus blo gsar mig 'byed) Modern blockprint, n.p., n.d.

Jam-yang-chok-hla-o-ser CJam-dbyangs-phyogs-hla~od-zer), about 15th century, Collected Topics of Ra-do (Rva stod bsdus grva). Dharamsala, India: Damchoe Sangpo, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Printed at Jayyed Press, Ballimaran, Delhi), 1980.

78 JIARS VOL. 8 NO.1

Jam-yang-shay-ba ('jam_dbyangs-bzhad-pa), 1648-1721, Final Analysis of (Dharmakzrti's) "Commentary on (Dignaga's) 'Compendium on Valid Cognition'" (Tshad ma rnam 'gret gyi mtha' dpyod). Collected Works of 'Jam-dbyans-bzad-pa Nag-dban-brston-'grus. New Delhi: Ngawang Gelek Demo, 1972. Great Exposition of the Middle Way! Final Analysis of (Candrakfrti's) "Supplement to the MiddleWay"

Jang-gya (lCang-skya), 1717-86, Presentation of Tenets!Clear Exposition of the Presentations of Tenets, Beautiful Ornament for the Meru of the Subduer's Teaching (Grub pa'i mtha'i rnam par bzhag pa gsal bar bshad pa thub bstan lhun po'i mdzesrgyan). Sarnath, Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings Press, 1970.

Nagatomi, Masatoshi, "Manasa-Pratyak~a," in Sanskrit and Indian Studies, ed. by Nagatomi, Matilal, Masson and Dimock. Boston: Reidel, 1979.

N-apper, Elizabeth, trans., ed. & Introduction, Mind in Tibetan Buddhism London: Rider, 1980.

N ga-wang-bel-den (N gag-dbang-dpal-ldan), b. 1797, Annotations for (Jam-yangshay-ba's) "Great Exposition of Tenets," Freeing the Knots of the Difficult Points, Precious]ewel of Clear Thought (Grub mtha' chen mo'i mchan 'grel dka' gnad mdud grol blo gsal bees nor) Sarnath, Varanasi: Pleasure of Elegant Sayings, 1964.

Potter, Karl H., Presuppositions of India's Philosophies Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963.

Pur-bu-jok (Phur-bu-lcog Byams-pa rgya-mtsho), 1825-1901, Explanation of . the Presentation of Objects and Object Possessors as well as Awareness and Knowledge in Magical Key to the Path of Reasoning, Presentation of the Collected Topics Revealing the Meaning of the Treatises on Valid Cognition (Yul yul can dang blo rig gi rnam par bshad pa in Tshad ma'i gzhung don 'byed pa'i bsdus grva'i rnam bzhag rigs lam 'Phrul gyi sde mig) Buxa: n.d., 1965.

Sopa, Geshe Lhundup and Jeffrey Hopkins, Practice and Theory of Tibetan Buddhism. London: Rider and Co., 1976.

Stcherbatsky, F.Th., Buddhist Logic. New York: Dover, 1962 (First published 1930). I

Streng, Frederick J., Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967.

NOTES

1. Kensur Yeshe Tupden, oral commentary. 2. Quoted by Masatoshi Nagatomi in Sanskrit and Indian Studies, Reidel,

1979, p. 255. 3. See Knowledge and Liberation and The Sautriintika Tenet System in Tibet,

both forthcoming from Snow Lion Press, Ithaca, New York, 1985. 4. Pur-bu-jok, "Great Path of Reasoning," 36a.5 (definition of complete

engager). 5. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary.

DIRECT PERCEPTION

6. Kensur Yeshay Tupden, oral commentary. 7. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. S. Ven. Sangyay Samdrup, discussion.

79

9. Napper, Mind, p. 141; Ge-shay Jam-bel-sam-pel, Presentation of . Awareness and Knowledge, modern blockprint, n.p., n.d., 11a.1-2.

10. Den~dar-hla-ram-ba, 161.4ff. 11. Kensur Yeshay Tupden, oral commentary. 12. Ibid. 13. Ibid. 14. Pur-bu-jok, "The Lesser Path of Reasoning" 7.3. 15. Kensur Yeshay Tupden, oral commentary. 16. Source for this and the preceding paragraph is Lati Rinbochay, oral

commentary. 17. Ven. Sangyay Samdrup, discussion. IS. This is a widely accepted assertion but, according to Ven. Sangyay

Samdrup, some scholars argue that a table's tangibility is not one entity with it. 19. Pur-bu-jok, "The Lesser Path of Reasoning" 13.2. 20. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 21. Kensur Yeshay Tupden, oral commentary. 22. Ibid. 23. Bel-den-cho-jay, Explanation of the Conventional and the Ultimate in the

Four Systems of Tenets (Grub mtha'i bzhi'i lugs kyi kun rdzob dang don dam pa'i don mam par bshad pa) (New Delhi: Guru Deva, 1972), 31a.2.

24. See Practice and Theory p. 79 for further discussion. 25. In the epistemology and physics of classical Greece there is a similar

notion phrased in terms of the nature oflight. For example, see Plato's Republic, The Collected Dialogues, p. 742ff.

tary.

26. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. 27. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. 2S. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. 29. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro and Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commen-

30. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. 31. The Tibetan uses the term bzung mam-apprehension aspect-for

both subject and object. For the sake of clarity this term has been translated as subjective apprehension aspect or objective apprehension aspect according to context.

32. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. 33. Ibid. 34. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 35. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. 36. Kensur Yeshay Tupden and Ge-shay Belden Drakba. 37. Kensur Yeshay Tupden and Ge-shay Belden Drakba. This is an

argument put forth by the Vaibha~ikas in the Commentary on the Treasury of Knowledge by Chim-jam-bel-yang (mChims mdzod), text from Go-mang Library, Mundgod, from blocks available to them, p. 69: de dag gis yul 'dzin pa niyul gyi mam pa ma shar bzhin du 'dzin pa yin gyi mam pa dang bcas pa ni ma yin te


snang ba 'di don rna yin na mi snang ba'i don yod pa la sgrub byed med pa'i phyir dang rags snang shes pa yin na rags pa rdul phran bsags pa ma yin par thai ba'i phyir ra.

38. Ge-shay Tsultrim Puntsok, ofal commentary. 39. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro,' oral commentary. 40. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 41. Ibid. 42. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. 43. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 44, Kensur Yeshay Tupden, oral commentary. 45. Ibid. 46. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. 47. Quoted in Great Tenets, 11a.6 48. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 49. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro used the word bzungrnam (apprehension aspect).

I am inferring this to signify "objective apprehension aspect." 50. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. 51. Gyel-tsap, Commentary on (Dharmakfrti's) "Ascertainment a/Valid Cogni-

tion" (rNam nges t,ik chen), Tashi Lhunpo blockprint, n.d., p. 110.2-7. 52. Ven. Sangyay Samdrup, discussion. 53. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 54. Ge-shay Tsultrim Puntsok, oral commentary. 55. Ge-shay Belden Drakba, oral commentary. 56. Ibid. 57. Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary. In either case, the position

of the proponents of an equal number of subjects and objects is refuted in Santarak~ita's Commentary to the Ornament to the Middle Way (MadhyamakiilarJkiiravrtti) .

58. Tsong-kha-pa and his chief disciples assert that the "own system" (rang lugs) of Dharmaklrti's Commentary on (Digniiga's) "Treatise on Valid Cognition" is that ofthe sequential non-pluralists. However, the system (lugs) ofthis text is that of the proponents of an equal number of subjects and objects. Source: Ge-shay Gedun Lodro, oral commentary.

59. According to Kon-chokjik-may-wang-bo, Half-Eggists are so called because they are half like Sautrantika-that is, their assertion that an eye consciousness and its object are different entities accords with Sautrantika, and half like Cittamatra, because of their assertion that an eye consciousness and its object are both of the nature of the mind. See Practice and Theory pp. 109-110. According to the present-day rNying-ma scholar andsngags pa, Ven. Khetsun Sangbo Rinbochay, the name reflects the Half-Eggist assertion that subject and object are like two halves of an egg.

60. Santarak~ita, Madhyamakalar(lkaravr:tti, P5285, Vol. 101,4-5-4. 6l. Jang-gya, p. 98.l. 62. It would be an interesting project to set up a controlled laboratory

experiment by which these theories could be investigated and perhaps definitivelyestablished or rejected.

63. Kensur Yes hay Tupden, oral commentary. 64. Ven. Sangyay Samdrup, discussion.


65. Jam~yang-shay-ba, Great Tenets, lla.2. 66. For more on the Cittamatra tenet system, see Practice and Theory,

. pp. 107-121; also, Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (London: Wisdom . publications, 1984), pp. 364-397.

A Text-Historical Note on Hevajratantra II:v: 1-2

by Leonard W.J. van der KuiJP

It has been some twenty-four years since D. Snellgrove published his editions and translation of the Hevajratantra. I Since its appearance, little has been written on this tantra and its associated literature. What follows is but a footnote to his translation and editions of the Hevajratantra II:v: 1-2, which in its Sanskrit, Tibetan, and English versions reads:

atha vajrf mahariija Hevajrah sarvadalJ prabhuh II (1) sarviikiirasvabhiiviitmii ma'fJqalarIJ sarIJprakiiSayet II sukhiivatyiirIJ samiisfnah sarviikiirasvarupatah II cittavajrasya bijena ni!ipanno ma'fJqale§varah II (2)

de nas rgyal po rdo rje 'dzin II gtso bo kye rdor kun sbyin pas II rnam kun rang bzhin bdag nyid kyi II dkyil 'khor dag ni yang dag gsungs II (1)

rnam pa thams cad rang bzhin gyis II bde ba can na yang dag bzhugs II thugs kyi rdo rje sa bon gyis II rang gi dkyil 'khor bskyed pa ste II (2)

And now the Adamantine One, the mighty King and Lord Hevajra, the giver of all things and the substance of all forms, discourses on the ma'fJqala.

He reposes there in bliss as the essence of all forms, for he is LQrd of the Ma'fJqala and has emanated from thee seed of the Vajra of Mind.

83


In his edition of the Tibetan of these two verses, Snellgrove has noted that both "are omitted in the Narthang edition." Since he has also used the Beijing print of the revised translation of the Hevajratantra by 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba-Gzhon-nu:.dpal (1392-1481), the inclusion of these verses in this print of the Bka'-'gyur suggests that these constituted one of his revisions of the earlier translation by Gayadhara and 'Brog-mi Lo-tsa-ba Sakya-ye-shes (993-1050).2 The palmleaf manuscript of Ka1)ha's Yogaratnamiilii, a commentary on the Hevajratantra and edited by Snellgrove, also omits these two verses. 3

The first indication of the existence of these two verses in certain manuscript traditions of the Sanskrit version of the Hevajratantra was given by the great Sa-skya-pa scholar and practitioner Ngor-chen Kun-dga' bzang-po (1382-1456). The author of a number of major works relating to this tantra,4 N gor-chen had apparently found three Sanskrit manuscripts (rgya-dpe)-presumably in Sa-skya monastery-which contained these verses. A transcription of the Sanskrit text, its translation by N gor-chen, and a few additional notes are found in the Sde-dge print of his collected works under the title of A Translation of the Second Chapter of the Fundamental Tantra. 5 The Sanskrit text given by N gor-chen differs only slightly from the above edition by Snellgrove:

Verse 1: hevajra for· hevajrah, -atma for -atma, -prakasaye for -prakasayet.

Verse 2: sukhavatyarIJ for sukhavatyarIJ.

The text has a space, occupied by a dotted line, between hevajra and prabhuh which could suggest a purposive editorial correction of a miscut which had included the visarga. To be sure, these variants are unproblematic.

More interesting, however, is the Tibetan translation of these verses given by N gor-chen:

de nas rgyal chen rdo rje 'dzin II kun stsol khyab bdag kye rdo rje II rnam pa kun gyi rang bzhin bdag II dkyil 'khor yang dag rab gsal ba II (1)

HEVAJRATANTRA

mi mnyam pa yi bde ba can II rnam pa kun gyi rang bzhin las II thugs kyi rda rje'i sa ban gyis II phun sum tshags pa'i dkyil 'khar dbang II (2)

85

The translations of the first verse by Ngor-chen and 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba show only minor differences. 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba evidently preferred to undersco~e the subje~t of discourse by introducin?" the instrumental partIcle (kun-sbyzn)-pas, whereas the Sansknt (all in the nominative case-ending) and N gor-chen's translation (no case-ending, hence nominative) have nothing to this effect. Furthermore, N gor-chen's rendition of san:tprakasaye(t) by yangdag rab-gsal-ba is perhaps semantically preferable to 'Gos Lo-tsaba's yang-dag gsungs. Ma1'fq,alan:t is translated by the latter as dykil'khor-dag (ni), which is yet another instance of the peculiar function of the particle dag, so lucidly analysed by M. Hahn. 6

Snellgrove's translation of this verse stands to be corrected on a few points:

And now, the Adamantine One, the mighty King, Hevajra, the giver of all, the Lord, may (he) he clarify the maflq,ala (having) the nature of the essence of all forms.

Ngor-chen's translation of the second verse is somewhat more problematic, and so is the one by 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba. The first piida, sukkavatya(a)n:t samasznah is rendered by N gor-chen as mi-mnyampa-yi bde-ba-can!, and 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba transposed the first and second pada-s. The latter translated -svarupatah with an instrumental -gyis, rather than the correct ablative -las. Ma1'fq,alesvarah is wrongly rendered by 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba as rang-gi dkyil-'khor, "his own ma1'fq,ala," whereas N gor-chen correctly has dykil-'khor dbang, "the lord of the ma1'fq,ala." Again, Snellgrove's translation of this verse needs to be somewhat amended:

Reposing in Sukhiivati, (he is) the lord of the maflcjala, perfected (or: generated) by the seed of the adamantine mind from the essence of all forms.

These two verses are conceptually harmless for the intent of

86 JIABSVOL.8NO.l

Hevajratantra Il:v, but the evidence suggests that they are later inserts. All of Snellgrove's manuscripts of the Sanskrit version of the Hevrijratantra apparently contained them, even the fifteenth century one from "the private library of Kaisher Shamsher in Kathmandu." It would appear, though, that in view of their absence in the early Sanskrit commentarialliterature, they were probably added to the fifth chapter during the thirteenth or fourteenth century. The fact that all of Snellgrove's manuscript sources of the Hevajratantra contain these would seem to indicate that his texts all go back to this particular version. None of the early Sa-skya-pa commentaries on this tantra, including the one by Bla-ma dam-pa Bsod-nams rgyalmtshan (1312-1375) comment on these verses, although they do on occasion refer to different Sanskrit manuscripts rgya-dpe.

N gor-chen's discovery was either not known to his immediate contemporaries, or was simply ignored by them due to the prevailing strained relations. Thus, these verses were not commented upon by Mkhas-grub Dge-Iegs dpal-bzang-po (1375-1438f or Bo-dong Pal).-chen Phyogs-las rnam-rgyal (1376-1445).8 At the same time, however, it appears that perhaps Ngor-chen himself realised their questionable authenticity, for he explicitly stated that the translations of the Hevajratantra by 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba Khug-pa Lhas-btsas (lIth cent.), G.yi-jo Lo-tsaba, and Shong Lo-tsa-ba also did not include them. While the available evidence strongly suggests that N gor-chen was. the first to have drawn attention to these two verses, it remains difficult to explain why 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba Gzhon-nu-dpal failed to credit him with this discovery and why he obviously chose to translate them anew. Possibly, the answer should be sought in the fact that he might not have been very satisfied with N gor-chen's rendition although, as was shown, his own translation is also far from unproblematic. On the other hand, the possibility should also not be ruled out that his was an independent discovery. Certainty regarding this matter may perhaps be gained when his biography is recovered from its place of concealment.

The Hevajratantra II:v: 1-2 was also noticed by the anonymous study of the different readings found in the various Bka''gyur-s, which was completed in 1918.9 In this important work, it is pointed out that, while absent in the Snar-thang print, it is found in the prints of the Urga (Khu-ri) and Co-ne Bka'-'gyur-s.

HEVAJRAT ANTRA 87

The latter also hold for those of the Beijing, Sde-dge, and Lhasa Bka'-'gyur-s as well. lO

Appendix:

Note: References to Ngor-chen's and Go-rams-pa Bsod-nams seng-ge's (1429-1489) writings are found in Vol. 9 and Vol. 15 (1969) of the series of Sa-skya-pa texts mentioned in note 5.

Ngor-chen 1. Rgyud-kyi rgyal-po dpal kyai-rdo-rje'i byung-tshul dang

brgyud-pa'i bla-ma dam-pa-rnams-kyi rnam-par thar-pa ngo-mtshar rgya-mtsho, pp. 278 ff. Written in the first half of 1405. The bulk of this text deals with the origins of vajrayana and the. different recensions of the text of the Hevajratantra. The biographies (rnam-thar)of the "lineage lamas" more often than not merely consists of the mention of their names.

2. Rgyud-gsum gnod-Joms / de'i 'grel-pa, pp. 155 ff. The commentary was written towards the middle of the second half of 1406. It is a polemical text against Ratnakarasanti and his Tibetan followers, who maintained that the Hevajratantra was mentalistic (sems-tsam-pa) in philosophical persuasion. These Tibetan followers included Red-mda'-ba Gzhon-nu blo-gros (1348/49-1412) and Bo-dong Pal)-chen.

3. Dpal kyai-rdo-rje'i sgrub-thabs-kyi rgya-cher bshad-pa bskyedrim gnad-kyi zla-zer, pp. 173 ff. Written around the middle of 1419. This work consists of a detailed exposition of the Hevajra "means of evocation" (sadhana), and is frequently polemical. Go-rams-pa wrote a lengthy treatise on the same problematic entitled the Dpal kyai-rdo-rje'i sgrub pa'i-thabs-kyi rgya-cher bshad-pa bskyed-rim gnad-kyi zla-zer-la rtsod-pa spong-ba gnad-kyi gsal-byed, pp. 282 ff. The latter is a series of replies to Mkhas-grub-rje's and Bo-dong Pal)-chen's (Nyi-zer Mkhan-po) objections to Ngor-chen's text. Among the latest Sa-skya-pa texts dealing with the issues connected with the generation of the deity in visualisation (bskyed-rim) is 'Jammgon A-myes-zhabs Ngag-dbang kun-dga' bsod-nams' (1597-1659/62) Dpal kyai rdo-rje'i phyi-nang-gi bskyed-rim-gyi rnam-par


bshad-pa dge-legs nor-bu'i phreng-ba gsang-sngags mdzes-rgyan, Bir, 1979, pp. 23l.

4. Dpal kyai-rdo-rje'i lus-kyi dkyil-'khor-la rtsod-pa spong-ba smra-ba ngan-'.Joms pp. 135 ff. /-lta-ba ngan-sel, pp. 144 ff. Written during the first half of 1426, these are two prints of the same text, with some interesting variant readings. It is a polemical work dealing with the marviala of Hevajra, conceived as a reply to and criticism of Mkhas-grub-rje's aside on the same in his Rgyud thams-cad-kyi rgyal-po dpal-gsang-ba 'dus-pa'i bskyed-rim dngos-grub rgya-mtsho, Collected Works oj Mkhas-grub-rje, Lha-sa Zhol print, Vol. Ja, Dharamsala, 1981, pp. 254 ff. The latter wrote a reply to Ngor-chen's work which, in the later literature, is usually referred to as the Ngor-lan but whose actual title is the Phyin-ci-log-gi gtam-gyi sbyor-ba-la zhugs-pa'i smra-ba ngan-pa rnam-par 'thag-pa'i bstan-bcos gnam-lcags 'khor-lo, Collected Works oj Mkhas-grub-rje, Lha-sa Zhol print, Vol. Kha, Dharamsala, 1981, pp. 1 ff.

NOTES

1. See D.L. Snellgrove, The Hevajratantra, Parts I and II, London Oriental Series. Volume 6, London: Oxford University Press, 1959.

2. As a rule of thumb, the interdependency of the Snar-thang and Beijing prints of the Buddhist canons can generally be assumed in such cases where subsequent revisions were not included in the former. D.S. Ruegg has, however, cogently argued for the necessity of consulting all the prints of the different Tibetan canons in his "The Study of Tibetan Philosophy and its Indian Sources. Notes on its History and Methods," Proceedings of the Csoma de Karas Memorial Symposium (held at MatrafUred, Hungary, 24-30 September, 1976), ed. L. Ligeti, Bibliotheca Orientalis Hungarica XXIII, Budapest, 1978, pp. 377-39l. His study should be extended to the Bka'-'gyur.

3. These verses are also not met with in the palm-leaf manuscripts of the Hevajratantra(ikil (Vairocana, incompI., 59 fols) , and the Hevajrapaiijika (Sarorucha, incompl., 25 fols.), and the Hevjrapaiijika (Kamalanath, compI., 23 fols.), which were filmed by the Nepal-German Manuscript Preservation Project (respectively, reel nos. C14/6, E260/2, and C26/4). I should like to thank my colleague at the NGMPP, Mr. Jayaraj Acarya, for checking these out for me.

4. For a brief listing of these see the Appendix. 5. See his Rtsa-rgyud brtag-gnyis-kyi-'gyur, in The Complete Works of the

Great Masters of the Sa-skya Sect of the [sic] Tibetan Buddhism, Vol. 9. The Complete

HEVAJRATANTRA 89

.. Works 'of Ngor-chen Kun-dga' bzang-po; compo Bsod-nams rgya-mtso, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko, 1968, no. 57, p. 282/3/3-6. In the colophon, Ngor-chen is styl<::d "vibutpata'i ~o-tsa-ba". ~ th~nk th.a~ the ~~butpat~ is a corruption of vibuddha, which renders thIS expreSSIOn Ihtelhgible: the WIse translator."

6. See his "On the Function and Origin of the Particle Dag," in Tibetan Studies, eds. P:Kvaerne and M. Brauen, Zurich, 1978, pp. 137-147. My friend Christoph Cuppers has drawn my attention to the fact that such a use of dag is also often met with in the Tibetan translation of the Samiidhirajasutra; see for instance his soon-to-be published critical edition of the Samadhirajasutra

'IX:4a, 5a, 8a, etc. 7. See his Dpal brtag-pa gynis-pa'i mam-par bshad-pa rdo-rje mkha'-'gro-ma

rnams-kyigsang-ba'i-mdzod, Collected Works of Mkhas-grub-rje, Lha-sa Zhol print, Vol.Ja, Dharamsala, 1981, pp. 912 ff. The colophon of this work says nothing about its date of composition .. . 8. See his Brtag-pa phyi-ma'i-rgyud bshad in Encyclopedia Tibetica. The Collected Works of Bo-dong Pa1p-chen Phyogs-las mam-rgyal, Vol. 106, New Delhi: The Tibet House, 1973, pp. 315 ff.

9. See the Rgyal-ba'i bka'-'gyur rin-po-che'i 'bri-klog dang 'chad nan-byed mkhan-mams-la nye-bar mkho-ba'i yi-ge gzhan-phan rnam-dag-gi gsal-byed me-long, New Delhi: The Tibet House, 1982.,. pp. 332-333.

10. The blocks of the Snar-thang Bka'-'gyur at Shel-dkar Mi-'gyur rdo-rje Rdzong, however, do contain 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba's revised translation of the Hevajratantra; see the Bka'-'gyur rin-po-che'i mtshan-tho published as Catalogue of the Narthang Kanjur, New Delhi: International Academy ofIndian Culture, 1983, . p. 235. These blocks presumably were those of the revised Snar-thang Bka''gyur of the 1730's. Ngor-chen's catalogue of the Bka'-'gyur at Glo-bo Smonthang (Mustang, Nepal) which he completed in December of 1447, does not contain 'Gos Lo-tsa-ba's revised version either. They are, however, found in the Li-thang Kanjur, Rgyud-'bum vol. ka, fols. 258b-259a, which I filmed and catalogued under a generous grant from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft.

Simultaneous Relation (Sahabhu-hetu): A Study in Buddhist Theory of Causation 1

by Kenneth K. Tanaka

The two major Hinayana schools, the Sarvastivadins and Theravadins, each posited a concept of mutually simultaneous "causation," sahabhu-hetu (chu-yu yin) and aiiiiamaiifta-paccaya, respectively.2 The Sarvastivadins in particular were severely criticized by their doctrinal antagonists, the Dar~tantikas and the Sautrantikas, for undermining the basic assumption of the theory of causation: the temporal sequence between cause and effect.3 Modern researchers as well seem to find it difficult to accommodate sahabhu-hetu's anomalous nature as causation into the traditional framework of causation. D. Kalupahana, for example, comments, "This relation seems to refute the idea that a cause should always be temporally prior to its effect.,,4 Th. Stcherbatsky similarly states, "It is curious that the citta is related to caitta by the sahabhu relation which is defined as mutual causality, one being the cause of the other as much as the latter is the cause of the former.,,5

This paper will focus on the theory of the sahabhu-hetu of the Sarvastivadins and attempt to clear up the ambiguities that surround the interpretations given for this hetu. This will allow us to determine whether the antagonists of the Sarvastivadins were justified in their criticism and modern scholars in their skepticism.

Previous treatments of the hetu in Western languages have been handicapped by the over-reliance on the Abhidharmakosa (henceforth Kosa) interpretation, which suffers both from brevity and a pronounced Sautrantika bias when compared to the major orthodox Sarvastivadin texts. 6 Japanese studies on causation have fared a little better, in that they allude to the major

91


Sarvastivadin texts, most of which are available only in their Chinese translations.7 However, even these cannot be said to constitute an in-depth examination of the sahabhil-hetu. In order to correct the shortcomings of the earlier studies, this paper will draw largely from the orthodox Sarvastivadin texts, notably the Mahavibhil.~ii (Ta pi-p'o-sha [un) and the Nyiiyiinusiira (Shun cheng-li lun).8

The sahabhil-hetu belongs to a category of Six relations (liuyin, ~aq-hetavah) which also includes kiirarJa (basic), sabhiiga (homogeneous),sarvatraga (dominant), vipiika (retributive) and samprayukta (associated). Of these six, samprayukta and sahabhil are closely related; the major difference being that the former applies to a smaller number of dharmas, i.e., mental dharmas only.9 Hence, it should be tacitly understood that much of our discussion will be directly relevant to samprayukta-hetu as well.

It is highly unlikely that the Six relations were taught by the Buddha as the Sarvastivadins take pains to show, for no occurrences are found in the Pali Nikiiyas, Chinese Agamas or the Vinaya texts. The Six relations, however, could not have first appeared after Nagarjuna (c. 150-250 C.E.), as Th. Stcherbatsky has suggested. 10 The Six relations appear in both of the Chinese translations of the jiiiinaprasthiina-siistra, a major Sarvastivadin work attributed to Katyayanlputra, who is believed to have lived no later than the latter half of the first century B.C.E. ll

1. The Objections to Sahabhu-hetu

Let us begin with Vasubandhu's definition from the Kosa:

Sahabhil(-hetus) are those (dharmas) that become effect together (sahabilr ye mithah phaliih). 12

Vasubandhu elaborates:

Together (means) mutuality (parasparam); dharmas which are mutual effects are mutually sahabhil-hetu. 13

The interlocutor vehemently objects to what he sees as an abrogation of the temporal sequence pertaining between cause and effect:

SIMULTANEOUS RELATION 93

... but because this line of reasoning does not apply to seed, (sprout, stem,) etc., which have been recognized (by the world) as constituting cause and effect, it should be taught {by you, the Sarvastivadins) as to how the dharmas which are produced simultaneously can be both cause and effect. (If you answer that these simultaneously-produced dharmas are mutually cause and effect) in the same manner as the lamp and lamp-light or sprout (arikura) and shadow, then let the following be properly discussed: whether, 1) the lamp is the cause of the lamp-light, or 2) there is a previously-produced cluster (of dharmas) that is the cause of the production of lamp-light and lamp or of sprout and shadow? 14

Vasubandhu responds to the objection by citing the basic premise of the Logicians (haitukii/p):

When there is existence of one, there is invariably existence of the other, and when there is non-existence of one, there is invariably non-existence of the other; then the former is the cause and the latter is the effect. And among the co-existent dharmas, when one exists then all exist, and when one does not exist then all do not exist; therefore, they do constitute cause and effect. 15

This succeeds in placating the objector regarding the simultaneity (sahotpannam) but not regarding the aspect of mutuality (parasparam) in sahabhu-hetu. 16 This response is significant in that it shows that the Buddhists, at least the two schools represented here, at the time recognized at least two separate dimensions for this hetu. It further shows that simultaneity in the production of the dharmas was not the real issue; rather the point of controversy was mutuality, i.e., the simultaneously-produced dharmas which are mutually cause and effect.

Regarding the second point of the question, Vasubandhu acknowledges that the previously-produced cluster (purvotpanna-siimagri) of dharmas, functioning as sabhiiga-hetu or one of the other three relations (of the Six relations besides sahabhu and samprayukta-hetus), was responsible for the production of the simultaneously-produced dharmas. 17 Vasubandhu is clear on this point, but the same cannot be said for the first point of the question, which asked whether or not the lamp was the cause of lamp-light. Vasubandhu, by citing the views of the


Logicians, purports to answer the question, but in our view, the response is not clear in its full meaning.

The interlocutor-in probable dissatisfaction with Vasubandhu's ambiguous answer-suggests that the Telationship of the simultaneously-produced dharmas, like lamp and lamp-light, may be compared to a tripod (trirjarprja), where the three sticks are able to stand on the strength of their mutual support (trirjarprjanyonyabalavasthanavat); the three sticks act as cause and effect for each other.18 Since Vasubandhu does not object, it seems safe to assume that he accepted this as an appropriate metaphor for this hetu. While this metaphor does to some extent succeed in elucidating the nature of mutuality, the absence of further elaboration by both Vasubandhu and Yasomitra in his commentary, the Abhidharmakosa-vyakhya, leaves us with an incomplete picture of this dimension of the hetu.

II. Sanghabhadra's Defense and Explanation of "Mutuality"

Fortunately, Sanghabhadra (Chung-hsien, c. 400 C.E.) in his Nyayanusara fills in this incomplete picture with an extensive amount of scriptural and logical argument from the orthodox Sarvastivadin point of view. In the text we find the Sautrantikas rejecting mutual causation on the following grounds:

1) At the point when the dharmas are about to be produced, they have not already been produced, and both, therefore, should not yet exist. How can you speak of dharmas that produce (= cause) and those that are produced (= effect)? 2) Since it is explained, "Because there is cause there is effect," if dharmas can be produced in the future period, there would be the fault of perpetual production of the dharmas. 3) There exists no definite criterion for determining which among the simultaneouslyproduced dharmas are the effect and which the cause. They are like the two horns of an ox (i.e., indistinguishable). 4) Furthermore, with regard to the things of the world that are produced as the seed and sprout (as found) in the recognized characteristics of (the law of) cause and effect, we have not yet seen cause and effect (functioning at) the same time as this. Thus, you must now explain how there can be a meaning for cause and effect among the cluster of mutually-produced dharmas. 19


These arguments are unkriown in the Kasa, except for the last which argues on the basis of "common sense" understanding: The first argument is based on the assumption that if a

. group of dharmas function mutually as cause, then they would also have to do so in the future moment, immediately prior to the production of their corresponding effect in the present moment. But since the Sautrantikas do not recognize the real existence of dharmas in the future and past moments, they point out it is ludicrous to speak of some dharmas as "causes" and others as "effects." In the second argument, the Sautrantikas claim that if a cause-and-effect relation were recognized for the future, an unacceptable situation would result in which the dharmas would exist in the future and the past as well as in the present, making dharmas eternal. The third argument is related to the first; here the emphasis is on the lack of criteria for determining which of the simultaneously-produced dharmas constitute the cause and which the effect.

Sarighabhadra then proceeds to refute the Sautrantika objection on the basis of canonical sutra passages and the metaphor of the lamp and lamp-light.

Sarighabhadra cites two of the most-often quoted sutra passages on causation: "Relying on this, that exists" (i t'zu yu pi yu; imasya sata idam bhavati) and "Because this is produced, that is produced" (t'zu sheng ku pi sheng; imasyatpadad idam utpadyate).20 It is especially interesting that he views these two as representing two distinct kinds of hetu:

What the former and the latter (passages) require are different. Thus, what we advocate is that the first sutra (passage) is intended to reveal the meaning of the simultaneously-produced hetu (chu-sheng yin; sahotpanna-hetu) and the latter sutra (passage) then reveals the meaning of the previously-produced hetu (ch'iensheng yin; purvotpanna-hetu).21

Sanghabhadra further explains it is wrong to inquire regarding the first passage, "On account of whose production was that produced?" or state, "Because the cause is produced, the effect is produced." These are, instead, appropriate for the second passage, the one explicating the previously-produced hetu. What constitutes an appropriate question for the first passage is, "Relying on whose existence does that exist?,,22


For Sanghabhadra, the simultaneously-produced hetu is not responsible for the production (sheng) of dharmas; he attributes such function to the previously-produced hetu. It is in this latter kind of hetu-where the relation between cause and effect is indicated by "because" or "on account of" (ku)-that he saw causation and, thus, the production of new dharmas. On the contrary, the former type emphasizes the mutual reliance (i) which allows the "member" dharmas to co-exist but which cannot by itself lead to the production of new dharmas.

With regard to the metaphor of the lamp and lamp-light, the Kosa completely fails to elaborate on it, but Sanghabhadra vigorously defends it as example par excellance of sahabhu-hetu. The Sautrantika initiates the polemics with a biting attack on the Sarvastivadin interpretation of the metaphor:

I also accept that lamp-light is produced on account of the lamp, but do not accept that its cause is the lamp which is produced simultaneously with it. What is the reason? It is because if the lamp and lamp-light are produced simultaneously, the lamp-light could not have been produced having required (-as it should-) the lamp. The simultaneously-produced dharmas which require each other (for their production) do not accord with the principle, just as an entity does not require itself in order for its production. Merely on account of the previously-produced lamp, which functions as condition, lamp-light is able to be produced in the immediately subsequent thought moment. Thus, you should not cite this as metaphor (for sahabhu-hetu).

(SaiJ.ghabhadra:) What you say is not correct, since when the lamp is first produced it is impossible to have the lamp exist without the light. In other words, we have yet to see a lamp which existed without a light. Thus, (your opinion) is incorrect. 23

Here, we see more clearly the fundamentally different assumptions from which the two positions view the relationship between the lamp and the lamp-light. The Sautrantikas adhere to the view that the two represent a sequential causal relation where lamp is the cause and light the effect. The lamp exists one moment prior to the light and directly causes the production of the light. The metaphor is seen as illustrating the previouslyproduced hetu.

On the other hand, Sanghabhadra sees the metaphor as


illustrating the simultaneously-produced hetu, concerned more with the spatial-as opposed to temporal-relation among the co-existent dharmas, with emphasis on their inseparability. In fact, the lamp and the lamp-light are not viewed as two entities existing independently of each other at any time, but as an inextricable unit in which both support each other; thus, the above statement, "We have yet to see a lamp when.it existed without a light." In other words, Sanghabhadra argues on the premise that a lamp is alu:ays lit; an un~t l~mp is inconceivab~e within his framework. Like the Sautrantika, he supports hiS position with evidence fr?m w~at he deems "comm~n human experience": "However, (m reality) there has never eXlsted even a small number of unlit lamps; the world has established this well.,,24 If the sahabhu-hetu as a simultaneously~produced hetu is not responsible for the production of the lamp and light, how then does Sanghabhadra explain their coming into existence? His position is that the previously-produced hetus are responsible. They are the previously-produced lamp and light which in this case function as sabhilga-hetu and kararj,a-hetu. This is in basic accord with the view as deliniated in the Kosa (p. 93 above).

III. The Root of the Controversy

The Sautrantika criticism of the simultaneously-produced hetu stemmed, in our estimation, from their failure to distinguish the fundamental difference between these two kinds of hetus. They incorrectly sought to find "sequential causation" in the simultaneously-produced hetu, when the Sarvastivadins had always reserved that function for the previously-produced hetus.

In light of the above analysis of Sanghabhadra's views, the earlier-quoted statement of the Logicians (p. 93) in the Kosa makes more sense. It was cited in response to the Sautrantika objection to the sahabhu-hetu. As in the case of Sanghabhadra, this statement by the Logicians also presu pposes a set of dharmas that are produced together inseparably (sahabhuvam dharmanam). Once this premise is understood, this passage becomes more intelligible. It was precisely due to the failure to do so that the Sautrantika respondent continued to take exception to the Sarvastivadin position, as he persisted in denying .the meaning of


mutuality (parasparam). The Sarvastivadin response was simply to refer him to the statement of the Logicians under discussion, apparently but of exasperation with the objector's inability to comprehend his position. While the Kosa appends no further explanation of the statement of the Logicians, Yasomitra comments:

Because there is citta when there are caittas, and because there is no citta when there are no caittas, the caittas are the causes of citta . ... If one exists then all (the rest) exist, and if all (the rest) do not exist then the one does not exist; therefore, they are mutually cause and effect. 25

What is clearly shown here is that "to be mutually cause and effect" (anyonyam hetu-phala-bhavaM does not refer to causation. It, instead, points to the relationship in which the one is inextricably related to the rest and vice versa. Like citta and caitta, they are always produced together. It is a matter of relation, and does not refer to one causing the other to be produced. 26

Sanghabhadra's understanding of mutuality also is corroborated by the Mahiivibhii~ii, which concludes the section on sahabhu-hetu with the following question and answer:

What are the meanings of sahabhu? Non-separation (pu hsiang-li) , sharing a common effect (tung

i-kuo) and mutual accompanying (hsiang sui-shun) are the meanings of sahabhu. 27

None of these three meanings exibits any high degree of causation. Instead, all three meanings-particularly the first and the third (the second will be discussed in detail below)-support the relations characterized by the Nyiiyiinusiira metaphor of the lamp and lamp-light: inseparability and simultaneity. We maintain that these correspond to the above Mahiivibh~ii meanings of "non-separation" and "mutual accompanying," respectively.

It appears that modern researchers on the subject have repeated the same error as the Sautrantikas in holding this hetu responsible for the production of new dharmas. 28 They have, in our opinion, taken the expression, "dharmas which are mutual effects are sahabhu-hetus to each other," to mean that


ne member of the sahabhu-hetu dharmas produces the other, o nd vice versa; each is, thereby, the effect of the other as well ~s the cause of the other. Such an understanding goes contrary to the above findings, which showed that mutuality in sahabhflhettl for the'Sarvastivadins meant the inseparable nature of the relationship pertaining between simultaneously-produced dharmas. It is noteworthy that KamalaSIla (c. 740-795) also questioned the validity of this hettl as a theory of causation, though for reasons different from ours.29

IV. "Common Effect" as the Principal Meaning of Sahabhu-Hetu

We have noticed so far through our examination that the sahabhu-hettl subsumes the meanings of simultaneity and mutuality. If this hettl were confined just to these two dimensions, it would virtually correspond to the Theravadin's aiiiiamaiiiia-paccaya in terms of nature and scope.30 However, Sanghabhadra introduces the importance of another sense of the term-that of sharing a "commOn effect" (i-ktlo; eka-phala)-which he views as the principal dimension of sahabhu-hetu. 31 This is not to suggest that this particular sense was totally absent in the Kosa, but that it was overshadowed there by the meaning of mutuality. It should be noted that while some earlier scholars have alluded to the difference in the emphasis between the Kosa and Sanghabhadra's works, no one to our knowledge has so far treated this subject in detai1. 32

The arguments presented in the previous section show that while Sanghabhadra did define sahabhu-hettl as mutuality, he also included "common effect" among the indispensible dimensions of this he ttl :

Also, we do not accept that all dharmas that are produced simultaneously have the meaning of mutually functioning as cause and effect. Which are the ones that we accept (as having that meaning?) (Only dharmas which) share a common effect or those that are mutual effects have this meaning. 33

However, when we ask which of the two meanings Sanghabhadra valued more, we find that "common effect" took precedence:


One ought not teach that (dharmas) are sahabhu-hetu merely on the basis of their being mutual effects. A dharma and its secondary characteristics are mutual effects but are not (sahabhuhetus) . ... From this meaning, one ought to determine that "those conditioned dharmas with a common effect are sahabhu-hetu." Since the authoritative text explains (accordingly), this is bereft of error. 34

Sanghabhadra's preference for common effect as the primary meaning is further attested in his other major work, Hsientsung lun (Pradzpaka). Whereas the karikas (verses) cited in the Nyayanusara are identical to those of the Kosa, Sanghabhadra in the Pradzpaka alters the first karika on sahabhii-hetu to read, "Sahabhu.s are (dharmas with) the common effect dharma," rather than "Sahabhu.s are (dharmas) which are mutual effects," as found in the Kosa and the Nyayanusara. 35 This alteration,. we believe, better reflects Sanghabhadra's true position, for in this work he was more at liberty to expound his own views, unlike in the Nyayanusara, where his main objective was to refute the Kosa by adhering closely to its format. 36

In turning to the earlier Sarvastivadin texts to determine which of the two meanings was emphasized, we find the Jnanaprasthana-":"-the earliest text to expound the Six relations- to be of little help, since it merely lists the categories of dharmas that qualify as sahabhu-hetu. The Mahavibha~a, on the other hand, contains extensive discussions on this hetu, which show that the "common effect" dominated the meaning of sahabhu-hetu:

1) To carry out a common effort37 (pan i-shih) is the meaning of sahabhU-hetu. .

2) Our position is that citta and the accompanying body and speech actions are sahabhu-hetus. Why is this so? It is because they have a common effect; it is because they carry out a common effort.

3) Are the obstructable derivative-forms (upadaya-rupa) and other obstructable derivative-forms mutually sahabhu-hetus? No, .... The reason for this is that the meaning of sahabhu-hetu is the (carrying out of) a common effect, but they (the derivativeforms) do not carry out a common effect; (hence, they are not sahabhu-hetu) .

4) Why is it said that "mutuality" is notsahabhu-hetu? Because


it is not common effect, it is not sahabhu-hetu, since sahabhu-hetu dharmas definitely have a common effect.38

The emphasis on "common effect" in these statements ; shows . that Sanghabhadra. was in accordance with the ;Mahiivibh~ii and that this emphasis was, therefore, the orthodox ~Sarvastivadin position. It is worth noting that none of the three ,7'Illajor Sarvastivadin texts mentions the metaphor of the tripod, suggesting further that "mutuality"-the concept which the

':nietaphor was intended to illustrate in the Kosa-did not constitute the principal meaning for the Sarvastivadins.39 The tripod ID~taphor, on the other hand, is reported in association with

• the aiiiiamaiiiia-paccaya of the Theravadins.40 As to the actual mechanism by which sahabhu-hetu dharmas

'~hare a common effect, we were unable to find any clear expla.nation that specifically addressed itself to this issue in $anghabhadra's writings or in the Mahiivibhii~ii. However, in ~ttempting to reconstruct the mechanism based on scattered

;'ififormation, we have found that the sahabhu-hetu dharmas 'inerely assist and are not by themselves responsible for the production of a common effect.

According to Sanghabhadra, a common effect is included in the category of the pur~akiira-phala (shih-yung kuo; man-function effect), one of the Five effects (wu-kuo; paiicaphaliini) ofthe ~arvastivadin theory of causation. There are three kinds of pur~akiira-phalas in connection with sahabhu-hetu: "simultaneously-produced" (sahotpanna) , "subsequent" (samanantara) and "separated" (vipraknta)Y Of these three,however, Sanghabhadra does not recognize the simultaneously-produced .as a common effect of sahabhu-hetu/2 the latter two-which he

c admits as a common effect of sahabhu-hetu-:-turn out to be none . ". other than the effects of sabhiiga and sarvatraga hetus (n4yanda····phala), and of vipiika-hetu (vipiika-phala) , respectively.43 Hence,

a common effect which the sahabhu-hetu dharmas share is produced not in the same moment as the sahabhu-hetu dharmas, but in one of the subsequent moments.

However, this leads to a dilemma, in thatsahabhu-hetu dharmas by definition can only have their effect produced in the same moment as themselves.44 How can they, then, share a common effect-which is produced in one of the subsequent


moments-as advocated in the two major Sarvastivadin texts? Based on our reading, these two texts do not offer a clear explanation of this problem. Fortunately, P'u-kuang (7th century) throws some light on this point in his commentary to the Kosa, Chu-she lun chi:

The intent of the sahabhu-hetu in taking (ch'uj" grhfJati) the simultaneously(-produced) purus.akara-phala is to assist the simultaneously(-produced) dharmas to each awaken (ch'i) its function (yung). (To each awaken its function means) to awaken the function of karafJahetu, or to awaken the function of sabhaga-hetu and sarvatraga-hetu, or to awaken the function of vipaka-hetu, thus each (hetu) taking its own effect.45

In other words, the sahabhu-hetus serve as catalyst for the other hetus to generate their own function, that is to say, the production of their respective effects. Included in these effects are the "subsequent" and "separated" purufiakara-phalas, which, for Sanghabhadra, constituted a common effect of the sahabhu-hetu dharmas.

There is no conclusive evidence to prove that P'u-kuang's view correctly reflects the Sarvastivadin position, though it is reported that this commentary was compiled from notes taken orally from Hsuan-tsang during the translation of the Kosa. 46

But for our primary interest, the evidence seen above does not show the sahabhu-hetu playing a direct causative role in the production of a common effect.

Stated differently, sahabhu-hetu is the force that co-ordinates the dharmas for a common effect. Its main concern lies with the "horizontal" relationship among the dharmas, not with the direct production of a common effect. We believe. it was this hetu that T.V.R. Murti, the noted Madhyamika scholar, sought in vain, lending to his criticism of the Sarvastivadin view of causation:

As causation, on the Vaibha~ika (= Sarvastivadin) view, is not self-becoming but the co-operation of several factors (pratyayas) in generating an effect, the question arises: what makes factors A, B, C, D, etc., which by themselves are disconnected entities and no[t] causes and conditions, into causes. What co-ordinates them for a united effort, for a common end.47


We believe this is ex.actly the role performed by the sahabhu. hetu. It appears that Murti was unaware of this particular func. tion in the sahabhu-hetu, probably due to his over-reliance on the Kosa, which, we noted above, deemphasized this particular

cmeaning in favor of the meaning of mutuality.48

v. Sahabhii-hetu as a Principle of Unifying Relations

We have seen from the above discussions that sahabhu-hetu is comprised of three meanings: simultaneity, inseparability and

. common effect. These are not three separate kinds of sahabhuhetu but, instead, three distinct dimensions of the same hetu-two of which, as noted above (p. 99), correspond to some of the Theravadin paccayas. 49 Because of this multi-dimensional character, the usual English rendering of sahabhu-hetu as "simultaneous" or "co-existent" does not do justice to the full meaning of this hetu. Not all simultaneous dharmas are sahabhu-hetus. Moreover, they must invariably be produced together, i.e., be inseparable. But even these two are insufficient, for finally they must share a common effect.

More significantly for the aims of this paper, all three aspects happen to be aspects of a hetu which has proven to be primarily a principle of spatial unity or aggregation rather than of causation, as was generally understood before. Our findings are

. further supported by the similar meanings that sahabhu-hetu shares with two concepts that denote unity and aggregation: accompanying and convergence.

The concept of "accompanying" (sui-chuan; anu(pari) vr:t) is embodied in the dharmas that accompany others (anuparivartikiilJ,). In the Mahilvibhi4il, the mental concomitants (caitta), phys- . ical (kilya) and speech (vilc) avijiiapti and the four great elements (mahiibhutilni) are described as dharmas that accompany citta. 50

When questioned as to why these dharmas are considered "accompanying," three reasons are given: they accompany one another (sui-shun), mutually benefit each other (hsiang she-i) and carry out a common effort <pan i-shih).51 Compared to those of sahabhu-hetu, only the second meaning differs, but even these two-the "mutual inseparability" of sahabhu-hetu and the "mutual benefit" of accompaniment-are in our view related.


To support this, we saw in the Sarvastivadin understanding of the analogyof the lamp and light that the two were mutually inseparable as well as mutually supportive.

Regarding the concept of "convergence" (ho-ho; samagrz, saT(lnipata), the Mahavibha!ja recognizes two kinds: dharmas that 1) a) are produced together and b) do not separate, and 2) carry out a common object without conflict. While no example for the former kind is given, the second is represented by a quote from GOiJaka:

Because the faculty, object and consciousness similarly carry out a common object, it is called "convergence," and not because they are produced together and are mutually inseparable. 52

It is tempting to suggest, in light of the correspondences noted in the statements by GOiJaka and Sanghabhadra, that there was a borrowing of meanings among the three concepts; without more information, however, we cannot know. What is significant for our main interest are the virtually identical meanings that sahabhu-hetu shares with the two concepts which denote unity and aggregation; this lends further support to our finding regarding the nature of sahabhu-hetu. 53

VI. The Two Categories of Relations

The above findings suggest deep implications for our understanding of the Buddhist theories of relations. As Sanghabhadra incisively perceived, there are two general categories of hetu: the previously-produced and the simultaneously-produced. The former represents causation where a having been produced prior to b causes the production of b. In the latter category, a and b are produced simultaneously without one being responsible, at least directly, for the production of the other. The two should not be confused with one other.

The confusion surrounding the sahabhu-hetu can be partly blamed on the fact that it was classified among the Six relations as a "hetu" along with the other previously-produced hetus. Prior to its appearance as one of the Six relations in the Jiianaprasthana, we find in the SangUiparyaya-(fastra) a reference made to a cat-


egory of dharmas called "simultaneously-produced dharmas" (chu-sheng fa). But at this stage, this notion had yet to be associated with that of a hetu. 54 It was under the Six hetu-relations

. that the Sarvastivadin systemizers consolidated the various relations of heterogeneous nature.

Some modern scholars have alluded to the existence of the twO distinct kinds of categories. S. Yamakami, in explaining the scope of the Six relations states, "This law has to show the causal relation of the 'dharmas,' not only in (temporal) succession, but also in their (spatial) concomitance; so its scope is vast.,,55 Ledi Sadaw, based on Pali material and drawing especially from Abhidhammattha-sa1igaha, concludes that Buddhism has expounded relations (paccaya) by two methods: 1) the law of production via a cause (paticcasamuppiida) and 2) a system of correlations (patthiina-naya). While his categorization does not agree exactly with that of Sanghabhadra, the former group definitely corresponds to the latter's previously-produced hetu. 56

D. Kalupahana, in one of the most detailed studies on the subject of Buddhist causality, discusses the usage of the term "idampratyayatii)" meaning "conditionality" or "relativity." He cites Candrakirti, whom he suggests distinguished idampratyayatii in the sense of "relativity" from pratztyasamutpiida, which denotes "active casuation." What is highly interesting is that Candrakirti supports this distinction with exactly the same set of sutra passages as found in Sanghabhadra: idampratyayatii correlates with "When this exists, that exists" and pratttyasamutpiida with "When this is produced, that is produced." The former corresponds to Sanghabhadra's "simultaneously-produced hetu" and the latter to the "previously-produced hetu. ,,57

Nagao Gadjin, in.reference to Yogacarin materials, offers his views on the difference between what he calls the "sequential" (ijiteki) and "simultaneous" (doji) causations. The latter includes, for example, the relation between the first seven consciousness (vijiiiina) and the iilayav~'iiiina, which are said to be mutually cause and effect and which are produced simultaneously. Nagao explains that in the case of simultaneity-despite its being one of the categories of time-temporal considerations are relegated to the background while the abstract dimension is emphasized. Such methods were employed by the major Vijiianavadin figures, including Asanga, Vasubandhu and Dharmapala. Nagao


later adds, based on Sthiramati's view, that simultaneity in causation indicates the "mutually dependent relations" of the law

d . 58 of co-dependent pro uctlOn.

Admittedly, the scope and viewpoints ofthe above opinions may vary somewhat. Nevertheless, they not only reinforce the findings of this paper, but also call attention to the need for further research in clarifying the nature of the two fundamentally distinct types of relations.

VII. Conclusion

1. Sahabhu-hetu constitutes a unifying relationship between simultaneously-produced dharmas.

2. Therefore, both the Sarvastivadins' opponents and the modern scholars who viewed this hetu as causation failed to understand correctly its nature.

3. Not being a theory of causation, sahabhu-hetu does not undermine, as was feared by the above two groups, the traditional assumption of causation being a cause which is produced simultaneously with its effect.

4. Sahabhu-hetu, at least from the period of the compilation of the Mahavibhii4ii (c. 150 C.E.) on, was defined by three distinct meanings: simultaneity, inseparability (with mutual support as its corollary) and common effect. This simultaneity was broad in scope, and was not contested by the critics of sahabhu-hetu, who also recognized its validity.

5. Inseparability (or mutuality)-expressed as "mutual cause and effect"-was severely attacked by the other schools, the Sautrantikas in particular. However, their criticism was misdirected and unwarranted, since we found "mutuality" to mean in actuality the "inseparability" of the dharmas that comprise sahabhu-hetu, and not causation.

6. Common effect, much neglected in the Kosa, constituted the principal meaning of sahabhu-hetu for the Sarvastivadins. Though this meaning involved some semblance of causation, it still was not directly responsible for bringing another dharma into existence.

7. Sahabhu-hetu, along with samprayukta-hetu,59 constitutes one of the two fundamentally distinct types of relations found in Buddhist literature.


NOTES

1. I wish to acknowledge P.S. Jaini, Kenyo Mitomo and, in particular, Robert Bus~ell for their suggestions. .

2. For a concise discussion of sahabhil-hetu, see Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakosabhii4yam, ed. by P. Pradhan, (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975), pp. 83-85. The annaman:iia-paccaya, which is one of the twenty-four paccayas, is discussed in the Pa~~hiina; see Nyanatiloka Maha.thera, Guide Through the Abhidhamma-pitaka, (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1971),

p. 120. S -·k b·· ·11 b d· d· d ·1 b 1 F . 3. The autrantl a 0 ~ectlOns WI e Iscusse In etal e ow. or passages indicating that the Dar~tantikas also objected to what they viewed as simultaneous causation, see Mahiivibhii4a, TaishO Daizokyo (henceforth T) 27, p.79c7-8.

4. D. Kalupahana, Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (Honolulu: The Univ. of Hawaii Press, 1975), p. 167.

5. Th. Stcherbastsky, The Central Conception of Buddhism, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 19.74), p. 36 note 3.

6. Sogen Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, (Calcutta: Univ. of Calcutta, 1912), pp. 309-315; William M. McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1923), pp. 192-205; Stcherbatsky, Central Conception, pp. 31-37; E. Conze, Buddhist Thought in India, (Ann Arbor: The Univ. of Michigan Press, 1967), pp.153-156; Y. Karunadasa, Buddhist Analysis of Matter, (Colombo: The Dept. of Cultural Affairs, 1967), pp. 126-132.

7. Takagi, S., Kusha kyogi, (Kyoto: Nozogawa Shoten, 1918), pp. 122-J49; Funabashi, M., Kusharon kogi, (Kyoto: Dobosha, 1932), pp. 157-204; Fukuhara, R., Ubu-abidatsuma-ronsho-no hatten, 198-217; Sakurabe, T., "Abidatsuma bukkyo no ingaron," Inga, Bukkyo shiso-shi 3, (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1980), pp. 127-146.

8. T 27, No. 1545 and T 29, No. 1562, respectively. 9. Vasubandhu, Kosa, pp. 83: 20-24 and 88: 15. Sahabhil-hetu encompas

ses the four dharma categories of mind (citta), mental concomitants (caitta), form (rilPa) and the non-accompanying (viprayukta-hetu) , whilesamprayukta-hetu applies only to the relationship between the first two. More specifically, sahabhil-hetu applies to the following relationships: citta and caittas; citta and two restraints (sa'T(tvara); caittas and characteristics (la~aTjas); citta and characteristics; among the great elements (mahiibhiltani).

10. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist NirvaTja, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), p. 174 note 4. Stcherbatsky bases his suggestion on the grounds that NagaIjuna does not mention the Six relations at all. The Four conditions (catulJ,-pratyayah; ssu-yiian), the other of the two major theories of relations advocted by the Sarvastivadins, was, however, severely attacked by Nagarjuna and Candrakirti, in Madhyamaka-sastra and Prasannapada, respectively. But there is no specific reference to sahabhil-hetu or samprayukta-hetu that I was able to find in these two texts. See Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist NirvaTja, pp. 72-192. According to Sakurabe, the Four conditions


appeared earlier in the literature than the Six relations and were recognized by the other Buddhist schools. See Sakurabe, "Abidaruma ingaron," pp. 127-128.

11. T 26, No. 1543, p. 773a and T 26, No. 1544, pp. 920c-921a. The dating of the author is based on Fukuhara, Ubu ronsh;, p. 174.

12. Vasubandhu, Kosa, p. 83: 18. 13. Ibid., p. 83: 19. 14. Ibid., p. 84: 20-24. 15. Ibid., pp. 84: 25-85: l. The Kosa makes no other reference to the

Logicians; Yasomitra's commentary also does not elaborate. A possible candidate would be the Hetuvadins mentioned in the Kathavatthu; in it, they are treated as one of the early Buddhist groups in the same sense as the Mahasaitghikas and the Sabbatthivadins. (p. xxvi). Very little is known about these Hetuvadins, as they appear to have been a minor school, if not, in fact, simply specialists in the area of causation and reasoning within each of the various schools. (p. xlv) See S.Z. Aung and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, Points of Controversy, (London: Luzac & Company, Ltd., 1960), pp. xxvi and xlv.

16. Vasubandhu, Kosa, p. 85: 1. 17. Ibid., p. 85: 5-7. 18. Ibid., p. 85: 3. 19. T 29, p. 418c22-28. 20. Ibid., p. 419al-2. 21. Ibid., p. 419b7-8. 22. Ibid., p. 419bl-7. 23. Ibid., p. 420al1-17. 24. Ibid., p. 420a20-21. 25. Yasomitra, Sphutarthabhidharmakosa-vyakhya, ed. U. Wogihara,

(Tokyo: Sankib6 Buddhist Book Store, 1971), p. 197: 31-34. 26. See note 15 above and its quoted passage in the text for parallels. 27. T 27, p. 85b23-25. 28. Stcherbatsky, The Central Conception, p. 31, "The Sarvastivadin school

reckons in all six different causal relations, ... "; McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 194, "In certain cases co-existing dharmas ... have a causal influence on one another." Conze, Buddhist Thought, p. 154, "Therefore they mutually condition one another." See also notes 4 and 5 above.

29. KamalaSila, Tattvasarigraha-paiijika, Gaekward's Oriental Series 30, (Baroda: Central Library Baroda, 1926), p. 175. KamalasHa argues that, in essence, sahabhu-hetu cannot be a type of causation in which simultaneouslyproduced dharmas produce each other. Being momentary, a dharma cannot produce the other when it has not itself yet been produced. On the other hand, if a dharma produces the other after it has been produced, then there would be no need for it to produce it again, for there would be a redundancy of production. Hence, KamalasHa also seems to have incorrectly treated this hetu as a type of causation.

30. Like sahabhu-hetu, aiiiiamaiiiia-paccaya includes the two dimensions of simultaneity and mutuality, and applies to the four great elements (mahiibhutani) .


31. The term "eka" in "eka-phala;'---one of the ten modalities of this hetu in the Kosa (p. 84: 2-6)-is to be understood as "common," according to later commentators:Yasomitra, Sphutiirtha, p. 192: 10, "siidhiira'I'Ja"; Hsuan-tsang in his translation of the Kosa, interprets as "kung" (T 29, p. 30c5); Sanghabhadra

. explains similar~y in the N~ii~iinusiira (T 29, p. 418b18-19). . 32. TakagI, Kusha-kyo{;1" pp. 124-127; McGovern, A Manual of Buddhzst

Philosophy, p. 194; Funabashi, Kusharon kiigi, pp. 164-169; Fukuhara, Ubu ronsho, pp. 204-205.

33. T 29, p. 419c26-28. 34. Ibid., p. 417 c23-26. The Sarvastivadins, at least from the Mahiivibhii~ii

on, have maintained that dharmas that are produced simultaneously do not necessarily constitute sahabhu-hetu, since they fail to share a common effect. The relation between secondary characteristic dharmas and a dharma falls within such a category. For list of relations in this category, see Vasubandhu, Kosa, p. 84: 15-19.

35. T 29, p. 814cl9. 36. Cf. McGovern, A Manual of Buddhist Philosophy, p. 194. 37. The terms "effort" (shih; kiiryatva) and "effect" (kuo; phala) are, in

our estimation, used synonymously by the Sarvastivadins, particularly in the Mahiivibh~a. We shall, therefore, treat them accordingly, referring to both as "effect."

38. T 27, p. 81b20-21; p. 81c7-9; p. 82b3-7; p. 663cl7-18. 39. P'u-kuang (7th century), in his commentary on the Kosa, points out

how Vasubandhu emphasized mutuality, while the Mahiivibhii~a and Nyayanusara favored common-effect. T 41, pp. 113c7-114a9.

40. On the association of this metaphor with aiiiiamaiiiiam-phala, see Nyanatiloka, Guide Through, p. 120.

41. Sanghabhadra also includes visarIJyoga-phala (li-hsi kuo) along with pu~a-kiira-phala as a common effect, but we have expediently left it out, since it does not directly relate to the present discussion on sahabhu-hetu. Also, although four kinds of puru~akiira-phalas are recognized, we have omitted the fourth, "non-production" <pu-sheng) , which corresponds to visarIJyoga-phala, for the same reason as above. See T 29, pp. 418bll-14; 437a13-18.

In our view of the Sarvastivadin position, especially Sanghabhadra's, there are narrow and broad interpretations as to what constitutes a purusakiiraphala. In its narrow sense, only the "simultaneously-produced" as effect of sahabhu and samprayukta hetus is included. On the other hand, in its broad meaning, the other two are included. Of the two interpretations, Sanghabhadra chooses the latter. See T 29, pp. 436a14-29; 437a13-18, and also Vasubandhu, Kosa, p. 95: 5.

42. Sanghabhadra's reasoning for this exclusion is that there cannot be any effect that is produced in the same moment as its causes; he also says that a dharma cannot function as the cause of its own production. It appears that, for Sanghabhadra, the sahabhu-hetu dharmas and the simultaneously-produced puru~akara-phalas form a "harmonious cluster" (ho-ho chil) wherein the dharmas function as "mutual effects" ( = inseparability). See T 29, pp. 418al4-17; 436a9-12. In our view, the simultaneously-produced pur~akiira-phalas and


sahabhii-hetus constitute interchangeable terms that refer to a same cluster of simultaneously-produced dharmas. Each of the dharmas in the cluster can either be the phala or hetu, depending on the context. For example, of the four great elements, earth, water and fire can functi~n as sahabhii-hetus and space as pUTUlakara-phala; but the roles can be interchanged so that another set of three elements can be the hetus and the remaining element the phala. See T 29, p. SI4c22-26:

43. T 29, pp. 41SbI3-1S; 436aS-29. 44. Vasubandhu, Kosa, p. 96: 16-17. 45. T 41, p. 114aI2-15. 46. Sung kao-seng chaun, T 50, p. 727al0-11. 47. T.V.R. Murti The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, (London: George

Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960), p. 175. 4S. Murti would more than likely respond to the existence of sahabhii-hetu

by saying that it requires a hetu of its own, hence leading to an infinite regress. That may be true from the Madhyamika standpoint, but it still does not detract from the fact that he appears to be unaware of this co-ordinating function in the sahabhii-hetu.

49. While the correspondence is not precise since they often overlap in meaning, it is possible to make the following correspondences: simultaneity to sahajiita (co-nascence); inseparability to aiiiiamaiiiia (mutuality). Common effect, however, does not seem to have a counterpart among the paccayas; if one has to pick one,sahajiita-kamma, i.e., cetanii (volition) best approximates it.

50. T 27, pp. Slb24-S2a9. 51. Ibid., p. S2bI6-1S. 52. Ibid., p. 9S4a6-S. 53. Sanghabhadra, elsewhere, also states, "Since (dharmas of) a harmoni

ous cluster become mutual effects, ... " See T 29, p. 41Sb16. 54. SarigftiParyiiya(-siistra), T 26, p. 3S4b20-c2. In a somewhat later

Abhidharma text, the Vijiiiinakiiya(-siistra), which is still earlier than theJiiiinaprasthiina, sahabhii and samprayukta dharmas are identified with causal-condition (yin-yuan; hetu-pratyaya) one of the Four conditions: hence, we witness the germination of its association with "causation" prior to its full-fledged form in the Six relations.

55. Yamakami, Systems of Buddhistic Thought, pp. 309-310. I acknowledge the fact that his observation provided the intial impetus to re-examine the nature of sahabhii-hetu. One part of my conclusion is essentially the same as his observation, and I have attempted to provide a detailed analysis to support that point.

56. Ledi Sadaw, "On the Philosophy of Relations," The Journal of the Piili Text Society (1915-6): 22.

57. Kalupahana, Causality, pp. 54-56; 96-97. 5S. Nagao Gadjin, Chiigan to Yuishiki, (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1978),

pp. 354-357. 59. See note 9 above.

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Studies in Ch'an and Rna-yen edited by Robert M. Gimello and Peter N Gregory Studies in East AstOn Buddhism, No.1, published in association with the Kuroda Institute

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II. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES

The Books of Kiu-Te or the Tibetan Buddhist Tantras: A Preliminary AnalysiS, by David Reigle. San Diego: Wizards Bookshelf, 1983. 68 p.

Dzog Chen and Zen, by Namkhai Norbu. Edited with a Preface and Notes by Kennard Lipman. Oakland, CA: Zhang Zhung Eidtions, 1984, 40 p.

The two books under review are really but "pamphlets" issued by small publishing houses, but they are worthy of notice, for each presents information of interest to students of the Tibetan Buddhist tradition.

David Reigle's The Books of Kiu-Te is based on a peculiar (to Buddhologists, at any rate) concern: to demonstrate that H.P. Blavatsky's references to the "Books of Kiu-Te" in her theosophical magnum opus, The Secret Doctrine, were not merely figments of her imagination, but, in fact, were a phonetic rendering of the Tibetan rgyud sde, the "tantra class" of Buddhist literature that is contrasted with the mdo sde, or sutra class. Primarily, it seems, for the edification of Theosophists, Reigle then proceeds to outline these most advanced of esoteric teachings, discussing the basic division between sutra and tantra, and the major divisions and subdivisions of tantra. He clearly has read the secondary material available on tantra carefully, and refers occasionally, too, to primary sources. He includes a number of useful charts, among them a breakdown of the numbers of volumes devoted to sutra and tantra in each of the six major available Kanjurs; a list of the divisions of the tantra section of the Ta~ur, with Co-ne volume numbers and Tohoku catalogue numbers; Bu-ston's classification of Anuttarayoga tantras in the Kanjur, cross-referenced for the Tohoku catalogue, the Peking edition, and Tanjur commentary locations; and the curriculum of the tantric college ofTashi Lhunpo, one of the highest "Gelugpa mystery schools."

Reigle also includes lengthy notes on the available editions of the Kanjur, the correlation of the number of Tripitaka volumes said to be available by Madame Blavatsky with the actual number available, available editions and translations of the "Five Books of Maitreya," the Theosophical term Dzyan (which seems to be a corruption either of dhyana or jiiana) , and the Jo nang pas (with

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114 JIARS VOL. 8 NO.1

whom Reigle is concerned because of their-especially Dol po pa's--connection with the Kalacakra tradition).

Most useful, perhaps, is an annotated bibliography of works on Buddhist tantra, especially those related to the Gelugpa tradition (that with which Madame Blavatsky apparently had contact). Reigle's listing is fairly complete, including most available reference materials, Sanskrit editions and English translations, general works, microfilm sources and sound recordings. Omissions worth noting are H.V. Guenther's Treasures on the Tibetan Middle Way (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976), which includes translations of a number of short texts that deal in part or wholly with tantra; Geshe Kesang Gyatso's Clear Light of Bliss (London: Wisdom Publications, 1982), which describes the Gelugpa mahiimudra tradition in considerable detail; and such pamphlets from the Library of Tibetan Works and Archives (Dharamsala, India) as The Great Seal of Voidness and The Steps of Visualization for the Three Essential Moments. Of course, literature on the tantras is being brought out constantly nowadays, so Reigle's list will slowly grow outdated, but it provides an excellent foundation for anyone wishing to begin a study of tantric texts, especially in translation.

The only point raised by Reigle on which I wish to take issue (1 cannot comment on the Theosophical aspects of the work) is his contention that all sexual references in the tantras are intended as purely symbolic. Granted, one may attain enlightenment (after death) if one relies only on a visualized consort (jiianamudra), but even the "puritanical" Gelugpa tradition makes it quite clear that practices involving an acutal consort are approp~ riate on some occasions and for some practitioners.

Namkhai Norbu's Dzog Chen and Zen is a small, useful introduction to the hermeneutical structures employed by the rdzogs chen (mahii ati) meditative tradition of the Nyingmapas. Prof. Norbu's essay (a transcribed lecture translated from Italian), combined with Kennard Lipman's fine preface and careful notes, discuss the well-known Nyingmapa division of the path into nine yanas, then discusses some less well-known aspects of these divisions, e.g., into ways of renunCIatIOn (the sravaka, pratyekabuddha and bodhisattva yanas) , purification (Kriya, Carya and Yoga tantras) and transformation (Mahayoga, Anuyoga and Atiyoga tantras). rDzog chen pas, however, claim that their tradition ( = Atiyoga) actually is beyond even the yanas of transformation, and, rather, represents a final, "spontaneously perfect" (lhun grub) way that encompasses the ways of renuncia-

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rion, purification, and transformation, and itself entails an effortless practice of one's own primordial perfection that bypasses the gradual and conventional practices of the other yanas. Basing his remarks in part on the bSam gtan mig gron (a rdzogs chen text from Tun Huang), Prof. Norbu points out that, from the rDzogs chen pa perspective, although Zen (or Ch'an) is, like rdzogs chen, "a way to find yourself in the absolute condition," it nevertheless arises in a bodhisattvayana context, and lacks the tantric background or specific concept of "the manifestation of the energy of the primordial state of the individual himself," which is at the heart of rdzogs chen. Thus, although there are common elements shared by rdzogs chen and Zen, we must speak of the former "as the way of self-liberation and the other as the path of renunciation. From the beginning ... these two methods are very different" (p. 26).

Other topics touched upon by Prof. Norbu include the relation of rdzogs chen to Bon, the introduction of the tradition to Tibet by Vairocana, and the importance of gter-mas. Appended to the book is a brief biography of Prof. N orbu, a reincarnate lama who now teaches at the University of Naples, in Italy; included, too, is a guide to pronunciation of the Tibetan transliteration system devised by Prof. Norbu based on the pinyin system of transliterating Chinese.

Overall, Prof. Norbu's approach is a somewhat traditional one, but Dr. Lipman's preface and notes flesh out the historical issues raised by the main essay, and make this little book a good introduction to certain aspects of the rdzogs chen tradition, and a welcome addition to the growing literature that discusses the relationship among the various Chinese and Indian traditions that contended or cooperated during the early years of Buddhism in Tibet.

Roger Jackson

Nagarjuniana. Studies in the Writings and Philosophy of Nagarjuna by Chr. Lindtner. Akademisk Forlag: Copenhagen, 1982, pp. 327 (Indiske Studier IV).

Professor Lindtner's Nagarjuniana is a most valuable book. Professor Lindtner has given scholars interested in Nagarjuna a most useful instrument of research.


In his Introduction, Lindtner deals with the difficult problem of authenticating the works attributed to Nagarjuna. He establishes some criteria for solving this problem and, according to these criteria, he divides the works attributed to Nagarjuna into three groups: a) genuine, b) spurious and c) dubious. In his Introduction Professor Lindtner has also a preliminary summary of the religious and philosophical doctrines of Nagarjuna, in order to guide the reader of the texts that he edits in the following pages.

In the second part of the book, under the title Authentic Works, Professor Lindtner gives critical reviews of the following works: I. Mulamadhyamakakiirika prajiia nama; IV. Vaidalyaprakara1'}a,~ VIII. Ratnavall; IX. Prat'ityasamutpadahr:dayakarika; X. Sutrasamuccaya; XII. Suhr:llekha. Lindtner offers also a critical edition and a translation of the following works: II. Sunyatasaptati; III. Vigrahavyavartan'i; V. Vyavahiirasiddhi; VI. Yukt~a~(ika;

VII. Catuhstava (is the editio princeps of the Lokat'itastava and the Acintyastava, according to four manuscripts); XI. Bodhicittavivara1'}a. Finally, Professor Lindtner presents a translation of XIII. Bodhisaf(lbhara(ka) from its Chinese text. All these reviews, editions and translations are accompanied by numerous notes which indicate parallel texts, or clarify obscure passages, and which reveal the great knowledge of Sanskrit and Tibetan Buddhist literature that the author has.

The last part, The Unity of Nagarjuna's Thought, first studies the background of Nagarjuna's thought, then makes a concise exposition of Nagarjuna's system, and finally refers briefly to Nagarjuna's influence.

The book ends with a bibliography, a resume in Danish, and a reproduction of the Nepalese manuscripts used by the author for his edition of the Catuhstava.

Professor Lindtner is to be congratulated for the excellent work he has done, and it is to be hoped that other books like this one will follow.

Professor P. Williams has published a large Review Article on Professor Lindtner's book in journal of Indian Philosophy Vol. 12, No.1, 1984, pp. 73-104, and Bhikku Pasadika has reviewed it in The Tibet journal, VIII, 2 (1983), pp. 58-61.

In JIABS, Vol. VI, 2, 1983, pp. 94-123, we published the Tibetan text of the Yukti~a~(ikiikarika ofNagarjuna with an English translation. In the introduction we gave the references of four

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quotations of Yukti~a~(ikii's stanzas (19, 33, 34 and 39), that are found in other authors' works. We think it is useful that we indicate now the other quotations that Professor Lindtner points out. They are: stanza 1 in Sekoddefa(ikii, p. 48 (ed. M.E. Carelli, Baroda, 1941); stanza 5 in Aryadeva, CittaviSuddhiprakara1Jii, 24 (ed. Patel); stanza 6 in Ratnaklrtinibandhiivalf, p. 139 (ed. A. Thakur, Patna, 1975); stanza 30 in Subhii~itasa7(lgraha, p. 385 (ed. C. Bendall, Le Museon, N.S. IV, 1903, p. 385), and Nyiiyaviniscayavivara1Ja II, pp. 17-18 (e~l. M.K. Jain) both with variants; stanzas 46-48 in Haribhadra'sAloka, p. 161 (ed. Wogihara, Tokyo 1932-35 = pp. 343-344 ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga, 1960); and stanza 55 Cittavisuddhiprakara1Ja, already quoted.

We also avail ourselves of this opportunity to correct so~e small misprints that appear in our article, in the Sanskrit texts of pages 96 and 97 and in the Tibetan text edited by us: stanza 33a read prokta7(l instead of proktarf:t; stanza 2d read s~1Ju~va instead of s(1Jusva; stanza 1 b read sin instead of is; stanza 6c read yons instead of yons; stanza 7 dread sgyu instead of sgu; stanza 14d read dan instead of das; stanza 19c read dnos por l4 instead of dnos por; stanza 36a read gyo instead of g-yo; stanza 49c read stsogs instead of sogs (as in Sde-dge edition; cf. stanza 44, and Lokesh Chandra, Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary II, p. 1916, who refers to Mahiivyutpatti 9228); stanza 56b read bzlog instead of bilog; stanza 59b read gyo instead of g-yo (twice).

Fernando Tola and Carmen Dragonetti

Seifless Persons: Imagery and Thought in Theravada Buddhism, by Steven Collins. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982. Pp. ix + 323.

Buddhist teachings on the nature of the self (the celebrated anattii doctrine) clearly stood against the established views on the subject that were upheld in India's various other religious and philosophical systems. A radical anti-metaphysical outlook as well as a striking analytical procedure are evident in these teachings; hence, there is much room to link the latter with the standpoints of Western empiricists, both old and new. Yet this, significantly, is not the perception that guides the discussions in the Seifless Persons. On the contrary, the exposition of Theravada thinking


on selfhood and personality that is offered here actually proceeds on the assumption that this thinking is entirely "alien" to Western ideas and beliefs.

What Collins undertakes in this book is certainly a "new account of a familiar doctrine"; for he departs notably from traditional patterns of exegesis. It must be also observed that there is much that is controversial in his discussions; whether his conclusions are always persuasive is likely to be very much disputed, especially by Theravada believers. In any event, readers would do well to recognize that despite professions of a philosophical intent, this account is not developed on the basis of a simple consideration of the interpretative criteria associated with logic and philosophy. The author believes in the existence of subtle links between religious doctrines and society, ideas and their background. Hence, the approaches adopted in recent sociological and anthropological explanations of religion in general and Buddhism in particular are consciously drawn into the discussions in this book. Indeed, some of Collins' more notable claims and interpretations (as, for example, the assertion that the Buddhist denial of the self is a "linguistic taboo" geared to provide "intransigent symbolic opposition" to Brahminism, or again the arguments that support his elucidation of Theravada imagery), all stem in the main from the adoption of sociologically inspired. approaches. And, strikingly enough, what underlies these approaches is the view that Buddhism's informing ideas invariably touch upon or are addressed to "socially derived concerns." Now it is not impossible to entertain reservations regarding methodological perspectives of this kind; some Theravada scholars might perhaps feel that Collins' approaches frequently lead to an improper exteriorization of the products of a tradition of religious thinking whose basis is after all pre-eminently interior or esoteric. Nevertheless, Selfless Persons fully merits careful attention, for its discussions bear witness to the application of interesting new viewpoints; besides, these discussions are on the whole supported by a rather impressive review of Pali textual sources that deal with the anattii doctrine.

The main contents of this book (which follow an introductory clarification of its aims) are presented in four parts organized under a total of eight chapters. The first part prepares in large measure the background to the study, and deals with the cultural and social setting of Buddhist thought. Its focus falls initially on pre-Buddhist (Brahmanical) ideas that influenced Buddhism (sarpsara, karma and the like) and then shifts to a consideration

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of the overall framework within which "self" and "person" came to be viewed by Buddhism itself. The discussions in the next three parts of the book revolve around Theravada thinking as well as its expressions as they relate to these latter subjects. Thus, Part n considers the doctrine of non-self; Part III delves into the question of personality and re-birth; and Part IV examines the notion of continuity. These discussions indeed serve to bring to light some characteristic features of Therevada thought and imagery; but what is very distinctive of the treatment of the above topics is of course the conscious effort to forge links between the mental and the social worlds of the Buddhists. Collins, to be sure, takes the view that Theravada texts which deal with selfhood and personality, as well as the interpretations given to them, are subtly connected with the ambient background.

This line of thinking forms the basis for many of Collins' arguments and interpretations. Thus, he regards a distinction which figures in some later expositions of the anattii doctrine, namely that between "conventional" (sammuti) and "ultimate" <paramattha) truth to be the "main means by which Buddhist intellectualism has oriented itself in society and culture" (p. 147). Further, he discerns a specificity in Buddhist imagery, the origins of which are traced to the peasant society of South Asia. The images themselves are regarded as key structures, providing access to the ingrained features of the Buddhist mentality. According to Collins, the various strata of Buddhist society, from scholarly monks to peasant believers, are actually united into a single cultural world by this imagery.

Many patterns of imagery found in the Pali texts are identified and examined in the course of Collins' study, and some of the details highlighted are worth brief notice. Thus, imagery associated with houses and dwelling places are held to play a major role in the entire soteriological scheme of Buddhism, woven around the need to overcome the desires that sustain existence in sarpsara. Village imagery, he finds, sometimes replicates house imagery, with an extended simile referring to the border town liable to attack. Some other emphases of Buddhism, according to him, are conveyed with the help of vegetation imagery drawn from the preoccupations of South Asian peasant agriculturalists. Examples cited in this connection include "root" and "seed" (used in explanations of causality), as well as "ripening" and "fruit" (used to bring out the idea of effect or result). Collins observes perceptively that some of the finer points of Theravada thinking on the self are actually clarified through


imagery. The burning lamp-flame, for example, is held fo:-th as a classic means of bringing out the import of anatta, especially in relation to the prospect of a life beyond, while streams, running waters and moving chariots are identified as images which highlight continuity (or in some instances, desire). Lastly, water in the deep or placid state is noted as an image that is commonly invoked to portray the condition of the mind stilled and calmednot only of the disciple, but also of the Buddha himself.

Though Collins concedes in passing that some kinds of Buddhist imagery (streams in particular) figure in non-Buddhist systems, he does not really favor "cross-cultural" comparison. What he seeks instead is to "understand Theravada thought and imagery in its own terms" (p. 258). The adoption of this attitude actually leads him to attempt a firm disengagement of Buddhist accounts of change and continuity from Western ones (like those of Heraclitus and Bergson), with which they are often compared. These positions, it must be noted, are open to criticism. But, then, many of his findings and conclusions regarding the nature and the basis of the anatta doctrine itself are even often more so. What many commentators (especially those philosophically inclined) usually see in this doctrine is an insightful interpretation of our total being. Such commentators are apt to be attracted by its logical features above every thing else. T.H. Huxley'S remarks in his Evolution and Ethics (1894) exemplify this rather strikingly. Huxley hailed Buddhism's rejection of the notion of an abiding soul-substance as "a metaphysical tour de force of great interest to the student of philosophy," and he viewed this stance as "a remarkable indication of the subtlty ofIndian speculation." Yet, what Collins recognizes here is finally the product of a localised cultural imagination. Not only does he incline towards the position that the anatta doctrine is "counter intuitive" (and hence an unlikely vehicle for the religious aspirations of ordinary people), but he also maintains that it is "Buddhist scholasticism" which has ensured its survival by upholding it as an unquestionable dogma. And, as indicated above, this in turn prompts him to assign the character of a "linguistic taboo" to the Theravada view of the self. The role it has performed, he contends, is symbolicthat of preserving the identity and integrity of Buddhism as a system separate from Brahmanical Hinduism.

It is somewhat difficult to conceive of anyone without a penchant for a particular kind of sociological explanation accepting many of the conclusions in Selfless Persons. Admirers of Theravada Buddhism c-an hardly be faulted if they get the impres-

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sion that the notably philosophical character of the anatta doctrine (and its meaningfulness and considerable viability within an empiricist framework of thought) is unfairly de-emphasized here in order to pave the way for a confidently reductionist, sociologically inspired accounting. Aspects of this accounting as it relates to both Theravada thought and imagery are especially vulnerable to criticism. This can be substantiated by delving into a few details.

It might be argued, for example, that the principle underlying the "two truths" need not, after all, be given an exclusively sociologically-slanted interpretation. Collins himself identifies it at one point as a "metapsychological schematization" (p. 156), and a philosophically informed inquirer is likely to discern two levels of empirical analysis here. It should be observed that there is a parallel of a sort to it in the famous distinction between statements in the "formal" and "material" modes which the contemporary philosopher Rudolph Carnap has elaborated in his Logical Syntax of Language. As regards imagery, one may indeed concede that it does playa certain role in Theravada thinking. Yet there is again some room to wonder whether the images Collins highlights can be really called the unifying structures of Buddhist culture and, still less, that they hold the keys to some highly important but hitherto unrecognized facts about the collective Theravada psyche. As against Collins, one may indeed say that what serves to unite Buddhists into a single cultural world are the thoughts behind the images, rather than the images themselves. In any case, it is possible to dispute Collins' tacit assumption that Theravada imagery is wholly stereotyped. The immensely influential Dhammapada, for example, uses a rich and varied stock of images; and, significantly, they cannot be always related to a narrow range of agricultural activities. Fletchers and their shafts, the herdsman and his kine, bees, flowers and swans figure in many of its famous couplets. It should be recalled that the mind's unsteady nature is compared here to the wrigglings of a fish taken out of water, an evocative, but still not typically agricultural image that could have issued from the "moulds" Collins' account seems to set up.· All in all, the limitations of Collins' findings on the question of imagery tend to become even more evident when one examines the role images play in another influential religious tradition, the Christianity of the Gospels. Pastoral and agricultural activities, as well as the fishing which sustained West Asian peoples among whom Christianity originated, have indeed left unmistakable imprints on the language and the idiom of the Christian message set forth in the Gospels.


Yet would it not be somewhat naive to say baldly that Christians are united into a single cultural world by this imagery, forgetting the underlying ideas? Moreover, Collins' contentions regarding the "specificity" of Theravada imagery might be considerably undermined by a wider review of Gospel imagery. It is well to remember that Christianity also refers to houses and homes, and in particular to fields, plants, seeds and fruits in order to clarify its doctrinal points.

To sum up, Selfless Persons is an interesting book incorporating several strands of argument, many of which are unusually thought provoking and sometimes controversial as well. Its findings on Theravada positions on selfhood and personality might be sociologically illuminating, but doubts can be entertained as regards their philosophical, and in particular religious, acceptability. Collins' attempt to link the thoughts and images relating to these positions to their contextual social factors is a noteworthy effort. Still, it is possible to detect some shortcomings in the way he addresses himself to this very complex task. But even those who object to some of the book's conclusions will no doubt recognize that the investigation pursued here has many innovative features. The focus on Theravada imagery is especially worthy of recall in this connection. This, to be sure, is something that could be extended and viewed on the basis of other, less "reductionist" perspectives. It must be reiterated that Selfless Persons, finally, is not likely to prove very attractive to admirers of Theravada thought. But even this category of readers might be instructed in some ways by paying heed to the critical vistas it opens.

Vijitha Rajapakse

Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism, by Joaquin Perez-Remon. The Hague, Paris and New York: Mouton Publishers, 1980. xii + 421 pp.

Buddhism dispenses with the traditional notion of an abiding self, a position which appears to be somewhat paradoxical for a religious system. Still, certain Buddhist schools (like the Theravada) did place great emphasis on this position, sometimes treating it as the focal point of Buddhist thinking as a whole.

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Many modern exponents of early Buddhism have sought to follow their example, dwelling in turn on the negative implications of the Buddhist teachings on the self-the anatta doctrine-with a rigour which is almost scholastic. P~ili literature reveals, however, that even in ancient times new entrants to the Buddhist fold were not infrequently puzzled by these teachings. In any event, the latter do pose certain problems and difficulties. The discussions in this book tend to take into account two of them in particular, and they are, to be sure, noteworthy. For one thing, it might be asked whether the anatta doctrine can be strictly maintained within Buddhism's spiritually oriented framework where, among other things, the quest for salvation (and by implication a life beyond death) is seen as a reality. Then, on the other hand, the present-day inquirer has to contend with the fact that Pali literary sources which proclaim anatta (non-self) are themselves not entirely free from occasional references to atta (self). Perez-Remon endeavours in this study to go some way towards providing a reasoned solution to the former problem, and also account for the latter difficulty. Though his conclusions, as will be shown shortly, are not beyond challenge, Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism is a well researched study, and hence merits serious notice. It addresses itself to a set of issues that have a great significance not only to Buddhist thought, but also to Pali textual exegesIs.

Perez-Reman's book is analytical in nature, and its immediate aim is to provide an interpretative study of the anatta doctrine as it appears in the earlier parts of the Pali canon, namely the Nikaya literature. He describes the religious views elaborated in these contexts as a soteriology, that is to say a system of moral training which considers salvation to be its prime goal. Buddhist writings on the self, he argues, are not as clear and unambiguous as is often supposed. He does not, in particular, believe that one could regard them in a purely negative light, after the manner of certain Theravada exponents. The use and the import of "self' (atta) and "non-self' (anatta) are of course central to this study. In order to facilitate his inquiry into these key terms, he introduces some important distinctions which appear for the most part to be philosophical in nature. First, there is the distinction between the self in its existential and metaphysical signification; and second, between two senses of the term non-self, one qualified and the other absolute. Previous interpretations of the anatta doctrine have not revolved around distinctions of this kind. PerezRemon, however, is of the view that it is necessary to focus on


them in order to gain a true insight into early Buddhist thinking on the nature and existence of the self.

Since it provides the framework for the book's core discussions, the first of the above distinctions is especially noteworthy. Indeed, the discussions in question are arranged in two parts, under two heads, "The Existential Self' (Part I) and "The Metaphysical Self' (Part II). Perez-Rem6n considers this division to be reflective of a pivotal fact gathered from textual analysis, namely, the existence of different usages (and hence different meanings) for the term "self' in early Buddhist writings. He insists, to be sure, that "whatever relations there may be between these two kinds of self, the existence of the texts that speak of them is a fact that no one can deny" (p. 7).

Part I of this book (which focuses on what Perez-Rem6n calls the "existential self') serves in the main to draw attention to the Nikaya sources where the self is represented in action, especially in the moral and soteriological spheres. Not "one-sided insistence on cessation" but rather, the "positive dwelling on inner development" are the motifs that are held to dominate the exposition in these contexts (p. 119). It is also emphasized that the self as referred to here often stands for nothing less than man's "existential core" as distinguished from the "peripheral samsaric adjuncts" (p. 150). The drift of these findings tends to be complemented or reinforced in the course of the examination of texts that the author considers to highlight Buddhist positions on the selfs very nature in Part II (presented under the caption, "The Metaphysical Self'). He argues here that a higher, undefinable reality is always posited even amidst the reductive analyses that one encounters in classic accounts of the anattii doctrine. What tends to be denied, he maintains, is the existence of a self identifiable with the human psycho-physical complex, (the khandhas). Accordingly, anattii as taught in early Buddhism is held to be relative, not absolute. He also expresses the opinion that the texts that allude to the liberated sage "implicitly accept that there is someone who is beyond description or beyond our present categories of thought" (p. 285). Further, we are reminded that the middle point between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism (which Buddhism always avoided) can hardly be anattii as interpreted in an absolute sense. This middle point, in the view ofthe author, has to be the absolute metaphysical transcendence of the self. But in keeping with its soteriological orientation, Nikaya literature, he adds, never sought to deliniate its final character or basis, for in these writings, "the true self is the

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subject of emancipation, never the object of speculation or philosophical discussion" (p. 299).

It should be remembered that these conclusions (and for that matter much of the argumentation behind the book as a whole). tend to counter what is designated as the "persistent negativism" of extreme interpretations which "anattavadins" are said to uphold on the question of the self. Perez-Reman's efforts in Self and Non-Self in Early Buddhism are interesting, and some might even contend that they have a definite relevance in that they throw some new light on a vexed question in Buddhist thought. Indeed, he might not be entirely wrong when he observes that the absolutist positions taken on the selfs non-existence in certain Theravada circles can assume the form of an obsessive view (ditthi) which is at odds with the true spirit of Buddhism. On the other hand, there is also room to ask whether the author himself does not veer towards indulging in discursive thinking and speculation on an ultimate issue in a way that is not quite consonant with the outlook of the Nikaya literature. Anyone pursuing this line of criticism might even say that he eschews one extreme position (namely absolute anatta ) only finally to embrace another, (though at a different level), for somewhat paradoxically, relative anatta eventually comes to be equated with the absolute metaphysical transcendence of the self (p. 286). And, what is more, this poses a problem to the historian of religion: if a reality over and above the khandhas is admitted, then early Buddhism would to all intents and purposes lose its distinctiveness vis it vis the iitman doctrine of U panishadic Hinduism.

On the other hand, those who adopt classic Theravada approaches might not only insist that there are no explicit contexts in Nikaya literature where a reality of the above kind is admitted, but also maintain that many of Perez-Reman's affirmations on this score are more often than not questionable inferences. In this connection, it is possible to argue that the statements concerning the indescribability of the liberated sage's destiny, for example, hardly afford sufficient ground for reaching conclusions about the seWs transcendence (cf. p. 280 ff.). In any event, it would be well to point out that since Buddhism frowns upon intellectualizing, even designations with positive connotations (like "transcendent") can in the last analysis acquire a speculative significance, and hence prove to be soteriologically stultifying in . the eyes of the believer. The preferred position of the Nikayas on ultimate matters is no more than silence; this is a mode esoteric

126 JIABS VOL. 8 NO. I

systems typically employ in order to point to what might be taken as a dimension of inner meaning that stands beyond conceptual thought altogether. Besides, it would be somewhat unwise to read too much into the use of the term "self' ·(aWl) in moral contexts and make this latter fact one of the grounds for arguing that early Buddhism accepts the existence of a self in a higher sense. It should be remember~d that systems that reject thenotion of a self at the epistemological and metaphysical levels are often forced to retain it in moral discussion. The writings of the British philosopher David Hume sometimes bear witness to this circumstance in a notable way. What it highlights, however, is a logical feature about language structure and discourse: in talking about the facts of individual existence one is necessarily led to use terms such as "self' and "person" because in the last analysis grammar demands it. In view of these considerations in particular, it appears that the quality of Perez-Rem6n's exposition would have been notably enhanced ifsome of the categories and ideas found in Western philosophical inquiries relating to the self had been brought to bear upon his discussions. The subjects he deals with are complex, and the interpretation of their finer points indeed requires considerable conceptual sophistication. Still, the book as it is has some undeniable merits. The connected view it presents of the thinking in the Nikaya tradition on "self' and "non-self' is both interesting and illuminating from the standpoint of textual analysis; it can be also said to provide a good basis for a more consciously philosophical study of these key terms.

Vijitha R<ijapakse

The World of Buddhism, edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich. New York: Facts on File Publications, 1984. 308 p., 297 illustrations (82 color), 215 photographs, drawings and maps. Glossary, Select Bibliography, Index. $49.95.

This may be the most beautiful book on Buddhism ever produced, but it is devoutly to be wished that it will serve more than just to accumulate onion-dip and wine-glass stains on suburban coffee tables, for its text, to which have contributed the likes of Etienne Lamotte, Lal Mani Joshi and Erik Zurcher, is as fine a social history of Buddhism as we have.

REVIEWS 127

The book's focus is on· the sangha, which Heinz Bechert identifies in his Foreword as "the most truly Buddhist institution .. , .It is primarily the Sangha that has transmitted the Buddha's words and maintained the tradition of meditation and thus eI1sured that future generations too can be shown the way to release from the world" (7b). Prof. Bechert notes the traditional view that "Buddhism has not taken root in a country till there are native monks there" (ibid.), and Richard Gombrich, in his Introduction, states the corollary: "Buddhists believed that where the Order dies out, Buddhism itself is dead. This is for two reasons. Firstly, Buddhists have traditionally believed that for a layman to attain salvation is virtually impossible; it just is not practically feasible. Secondly, it is the Order that preserves the scriptures; without the scriptures, the true Doctrine will soon be forgotten, and so for want of a guide no one will be able to attain salvation" (9b).

One might argue about the feasibility of salvation for lay-persons, and note, as various of the book's contributors do, that there are countries (e.g., Nepal, Japan, Tibet) where the sangha is not always conceived exclusively along monastic lines, but the decision to focus on the sangha seems to me, overall, to be a wise one, for it is in the sangha broadly conceived that one will find "Buddhism." Indeed, were one to perform a Buddhist analysis of the phenomenon of "Buddhism," one might argue that there is no "Buddhism" existing outside the men and women who have attempted to practice Buddhadharma over the centuries, that Buddhism is simply an aggregate of its various sanghas (and, of course, the texts they have left us).

Following the Foreword and Introduction by, respectively, Professors Bechert and Gombrich, the book is divided into six major sections, "The Path to Enlightenment," "The Indian Tradition," "Theravada Buddhism," "Buddhism in East Asia," "Tibetan Buddhism," and "Buddhism in the Modern World." Each section (save the last) is preceded by approximately twenty pages of photos illustrating Buddhist art and practice, half in color, all extraordinarily beautiful and informatively captioned. The ten chapters that actually comprise the book are written by both venerable and younger scholars (mostly European), and follow a geographic approach. An overview of "The Buddha, His Teachings and His Sangha" is contributed by Prof. Lamotte. The chapter on ancient Indian Buddhism includes segments by Prof. Gombrich (on the evolution of the sangha), Prof. Lamotte (on Mahayana) and Lal ManiJoshi (on the monastic contribution to art and architecture). Buddhism in Afghanistan and Central

128 jIABSVOL.8NO.l

Asia is covered by Oskar von Hinuber; Nepalese Buddhism by Seigfried Lienhard; Sri Lankan Buddhism by Michael Carrithers; Burmese Buddhism by Prof. Bechert; Thai, Laotion and Cambodian Buddhism by Jane Bunnang; Chinese, Vietnamese and Korean Buddhism by Prof. Zurcher; Japanese Buddhism by Robert Heinemann; Tibetan Buddhism by Per Kvaerne; and the "Buddhist Revival inEast and West" by Prof. Bechert.

One cannot, in a short review, do justice to a book as varied and richly informative as this, but I will give brief accounts of each of the contributions, pointing out their strengths and noting those points (usually minor) on which I differ.

Prof. Gombrich's Introduction admirably summarizes the overall importance of the sangha for Buddhism, noting that "The position of the monastic Order. . .is even more dominant than that of the church in Christianity" (9b), and he goes on to point out that, the book's title notwithstanding, there is no "world of Buddhism" in the sense in which there is a "world of Christianity" or a "world of Islam." This is due, he believes, to the fact that Buddhism has a strong soteriological thrust, and therefore (a) tolerates other religious systems, often mingling uncomplainingly with them and (b) does not so much attempt to define a "world" as to transcend one. Nevertheless, I doubt that Prof. Gombrich would argue that such Western traditions as Christianity and Islam have been utterly intolerant of local traditions they have encountered, nor entirely adverse to occasional "compromises" with them; nor, clearly, does he believe that Buddhism's theoretical transworldliness means any the less that Buddhism has, indeed, left its mark on various parts of the world-the book as a whole, in fact, is a record of that mark. Prof. Gombrich goes on to describe the background to Buddhism, the centrality of the three jewels, and the sangha's historical role. The latter discussion includes a useful delineation of the difference between priest and monk, and introduces the argument, reiterated later, that the "divisons" in Buddhism are the result not so much of doctrinal disagreements-as in Christianity-but of conflicts over proper monastic conduct. Needless to say, such disputes can be and often have been interfused with broader doctrinal concerns, but Prof. Gombrich's point is that the sangha is constituted such that expulsion only really can result from improper behavior, not improper views (though sanghiibheda seems an elastic enough concept that it might be applied to opposing views on occasion).

Prof. Lamotte's summary of basic Buddhist doctrines may be the best such brief account ever written. With his usual effort-

REVIEWS 129

less erudition, Prof. Lamotte covers the life of the Buddha as best we have been able to reconstruct it; his teaching, structured along the lines of the four noble truths; and the formation of the sangha, its initial development after the Buddha's demise, and its. basic structures and practices. Particularly welcome in Prof. Lamotte's chapter are his parenthetical references to texts he is citing, a practice that might have been made uniform throughout the book and thus, in the absence of endnotes, aided readers disposed to checking references. I have only minor quibbles: I wonder whether the objective six iiyatanas ought to be designated as "external," given that mental objects are included among them (47b); I find slightly confusing the account, following that of the five lay-precepts, of the one-day vows, which are listed as five, but, of course, named as eight (the a~tanga fila) (54a); finally, on the same page, the Buddha is distinguished from the arhats by an "omniscience which extends as far as the particular characteristics of all phenomena," but what exactly this entails (a moot point among scholars of early Buddhism) is not made clear.

The largest section of the chapter on ancient Indian Buddhism, that on the formation of the sangha, comes again from Prof. Gombrich, who notes the basic distinction (recapitulated throughout the sangha's history) between forest and monastery, emphasizes the fact that authority in the sangha in principle flows diachronically from the Buddha rather than synchronically through a complex hierarchy, and reiterates his argument that the divisions within Buddhism are based on monastic rather than doctrinal disagreements, as a result of which Mahayana cannot properly be considered a sect (82a). Again, a couple of small points of contention; I have never seen Maya vijiiiina translated as "appetitive consciousness" (86b), iilaya usually, I believe, referring to a house or abode. Also, Prof. Gombrich implies (87b) that the Tibetans consider the Vajrayana a third yiina beyond the Hinayana and Mahayana, whereas it is my impression that most Tibetans, in fact, regard the Vajrayana as falling under the general rubric of Mahayana, which then can be subdivided into sutrayiina and tantrayiina, the dividing line between the two being the practice of deity yoga enjoined by the tantras. The chapter on ancient Indian Indian Buddhism also includes a brief contribution on Mahayana by Prof. Lamotte, excellent apart from its questionable contention (partially countered by a later discussion of the two truths) that "Faced with the emptiness ... ofbeings and things, the attitude of the wise man consists of no longer doing anything, no longer saying anything, no longer thinking


anything" (92b). Also, the late Prof. Joshi contributes an account of the historical evolution of Buddhist artistic forms, particularly stu pas and viharas.

Prof. von Hiniiber's discussion of Buddhi.sm's expansion into Afghanistan and Central Asia is notable for the extreme care he takes only to represent opinions that are soundly supported by material or textual evidence. His chapter includes discussions of historical developments, the languages involved in Central Asian traditions, art and imagery, and monastic life. Since Central Asian Buddhism is an area still little understood, and often excluded from surveys, Prof. von Hiniiber's chapter is a most welcome inclusion.

Also oft-neglected in surveys of Buddhism is Nepal, which probably has the longest continuous tradition of Buddhist practice in the world, and whose non-monastic orientation provides a fascinating contrast to the sangha's usual structure and role. Siegfried Lienhard's chapter on Nepal traces the development of the Nepalese sangha from its monastic origins to its present state and examines Buddhism's uneasy relationship (sometimes symbiotic, sometimes antagonistic) with the officially-sanctioned Hinduism around it. Prof. Lienhard points out the degree to which Nepalese Buddhism has been "Hinduized," a fact that many observers have noted, but I would question his contention that the Vajrayana Buddhism absorbed by the Nepalese has "its doctrines and practices taken from Saiva tantrism" (11 Oa), for not only are there considerable doctrinal and practical differences between Buddhist and Hindu tantrism, but the causal relationship between the two traditions is notoriously difficult to settle with any certainty.

Michael Carrithers' chapter on Sri Lankan Buddhism highlights the degree to which Buddhism has shaped the culture and identity of the Sinhalese, and the degree to which, in turn, "cultural hegemony" effectively has been exercised by the sangha. He delineates the de facto partition of the sangha into "village" and "forest" components, the former oriented toward study and preaching, the latter toward meditation. He also discusses in some detail the sangha's involvement in politics, noting with some irony early Buddhist justifications of royal blood-shedding (l41b) and thefact that-as so often has been the case-adherence to the Vinaya's strict injunctions on "right livelihood" has been less than thoroughgoing. Prof. Carrither's chapter is superb as a social history, but I wish that he (and the authors of the two succeeding chapters on Theravada) had paid a bit more attention to medita-

REVIEWS 131

don practices and scholastic pursuits-these, after all, are part of what the sangha has done, too.

Prof. Bechert's chapter on Buddhism in Burma places a strong emphasis on modern political developments, covering both the complex relationship between Buddhism and the Burmese state, and the structure and divisions within the sangha itself. There is a brief mention of post-war attempts to reconcile Buddhism with Marxism, and a discussion of the importance to Burmese Buddhism of the abhidhamma tradition, Prof. Bechert concluding that "This wide interest in questions of systematic philosophy may well explain why ideology is, to Burmese Buddhists, of such paramount importance in politics and sociology" (1 54b).

Jane Bunnang's chapter on Cambodian, Laotian and (primarily) Thai Buddhism examines the varieties of interaction between the lay and monastic communities, and concludes that "the monk is not in fact the solitary recluse ... but .. .in a variety of ways he ministers to the needs of lay society," although, paradoxically, he can "only maintain his semi-divine status by remaining as aloof as possible from the fruits of the world he has left behind" (l70b). There are other paradoxes pointed out by Dr. Bunnang, too: while monks believe their greatest merit /, to derive from study, they are most respected by the lay community for their comportment. Futher, although meditation is the traditional route to salvation in normative -Buddhism, it has so fallen into desuetude among certain segments of the sangha that it is derided as the proper activity only of nuns and devout pilgrims (l65a)!

Prof. Zurcher's chapter on Buddhism in China contains, as one might expect, a masterly summation of the complex problems faced by Buddhism in its attempt to "conquer" a civilization as ancient and well-developed as the Chinese, and includes a fascinating, detailed account of an early (third century) defense of Buddhism against a litany of Chinese complaints. There is little discussion of the particular doctrines or histories of the Chinese schools, but the history of the sangha as an institution is admirably conveyed. Prof. Zurcher also gives brief accounts of the development of Buddhism in Vietnam and Korea; one wishes that he might have included more information on the structure of the sangha in these countries, as well as a delineation of the idiosyncracies that separate them from the parent Chinese tradition.

Prof. Heinemann, in his chapter on Japanese Buddhism, emphasizes the traditional Japanese distinction between jiriki


(self-reliant) and tariki (other-dependent) traditions, but emphasizes that all Japanese traditions have a "this-worldliness" about them that contrasts with the "quietism" implied in the Indian tradition (I would want to argue that the contrast is actually one of degree, not kind). Prof. Heinemann's chapt.er is rather different from most of the others, for his focus is primarily doctrinal. He outlines the development of the various Japanese schools, giving particularly fine accounts of Tendai and Shingon. Some further discussion of the structure of the sangha, both past and present, might have been desirable, especially given the unique solutions to the lay-monastic problem developed by the Japanese, but the chapter stands as an excellent account of the doctrines of Japanese Buddhism.

The chapter on Tibetan Buddhism is contributed by Prof. Kvaerne, who quite rightly identifies the pandit Santirak~ita and the siddha Padmasambhava not only as the traditional co-founders of the Tibetan sangha, but as the archetypes of the two basic forms of Buddhist practice in Tibet, "one based on the vinaya, the sutras and scholastic philosophy, the other on the ritualistic and mystical tantras" (257a). Prof. Kvaerne also offers an interesting defense of the use of the term "lamaism," noting that if one eliminates the pejorative sense in which the term connotes a "degraded" form of Buddhism, "it retains value for its allusion to a fact of fundamental importance: the lama in Tibet is not necessarily a fully-ordained monk and consequently the monk does not monopolize the Dharma as he does in other Buddhist countries" (255a). Prof. Kvaerne further criticizes the oft-expressed view that Bon is a form of shamanism, arguing that the sources we have give no evidence that Bon-pos entered the sorts of trances usually associated with shamanism (269a). Overall, his chapter is an excellent historical account of Tibetan Buddhism, which might only have been improved by more detailed discussions of the monastic structure and of tantric practice, which is different enough from the sorts of basic Buddhist practices described in the first two chapters to warrant greater exposure.

The final chapter, also written by Prof. Bechert, examines the counter-colonialist resurgence of Buddhism in Asia, some Buddhist responses to modernism, and the ongoing spread of Buddhism to the West, especially to Germany, England and America. He includes an account of the Mahar Buddhism of Ambedkar in India, and a fascinating description of the littleknown modern Buddhist movement in Indonesia, which has faced some particularly vexing doctrinal problems in its attempt

REVIEWS 133

to come to terms with the theism of the predominantly Islamic culture around it.

The picture of the sali.gha that emerges from The World of Buddhism is as varied as Buddhism itself, but there are some central,themes that occur again and again, and these are mostly paradoxes. There is, first of all, the basic paradox of the necessary institutionalization in the world of a teaching that points beyond the world. Then, there is the establishment of a set of institutional rules that seem to preclude the accumulation of worldly wealth and power; yet, precisely because of the valuation placed by both princes and peasants on the spiritual power of the monastery, there inevitably accrues to the sangha precisely that wealth and power that it was supposed to avoid. Finally, then, there is the paradox that the akiilika Dharma has, in fact, taken a bewildering variety of forms at different times and, like any other religion, been used for both good and ill by those who espoused it; like any institution, it consists of human beings, some scoundrels, some saints, most somewhere in the middle, attempting to make their ways through a world whose history, alas, has been the most cogent of arguments for the truth of the first noble truth.

In its presentation of Buddhism as a world-historical phenomenon, The World of Buddhism makes a needed contribution to the rounding out of our picture of Buddhism, bringing together as it does information that heretofore has been found only scattered through largely specialized monographs and articles. One only wishes that it might somehow be made available in paperback, as it is expensive, and as such probably never will reach the wider audience for whom it was written and which it so richly deserves.

Roger Jackson


NOTICES

Tibetan Blockprints in the Department of Rare Books and Special Collections, compiled by Leonard Zwilling. Madison, 'Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries Publications Committee, 1984. 95 p.

In 1962, the Director of Libraries at the University of Wisconsin purchased a large number of Tibetan manuscripts, Mongolian blockprints, Tibetan blockprints, and volumes in Western languages from the estate of Professor Ferdinand Diederich Lessing (1882-1961). Except for the books in Western languages which were made part of the general collection, the Tibetan and Mongolian materials have remained in the Department of Rare Books, uncatalogued and unorganized, until now. Dr. Zwilling has so far completed the task of organizing and cataloguing the Tibetan blockprints, approximately seventy percent of which are devotional works, prayers and rituals. The rest are divided between canonical literature, biography and history, didactic works, lexicography, bibliography, and indexes. Since most of these works were printed during the early part of the twentieth century in Peking, they represent most of the important authors in the dGe-lugs-pa tradition, the Tibetan Buddhist tradition patronized by the Ch'ing emperors. Dr. Zwilling points out that this collection is an important resource for the study of Tibetan Buddhist cult and literature, as well as for that of Tibetan printing and publishing.

In this valuable catalogue, Dr. Zwilling has included physical descriptions (number of folios, size of folios, dimensions of the printed field and number oflines of text on one side of an average folio, distinctive decorations, ornamentations, etc.); concise statements of the works' subjects in English or Sanskrit; the works' authors; and any other pertinent information. The items are catalogued according to Tibetan alphabetical order, with each item given a control number by which it may be readily accessed. There is also an author index, a general classification of titles, a classification of deities addressed in rituals, prayers and devotional works, a Sanskrit title index, and a Mongolian title index.

Anyone interested in purchasing this catalogue may contact the Acquisitions Department, 324 Memorial Library, University of Wisconsin, 728 State Street, Madison, WI, 53706 USA. The cost is $1.00 to U.W. System purchasers, and $4.00 to others.

Rena Haggarty

OBITUARY

Lal ManiJoshi (1935-1984)

professor Lal ManiJoshi passed away in June, 1984, at the prime of his life, leaving the field of Indian Buddhist Studies poorer by his sudden demise. We had great expectations from this youthful and energetic distinguished scholar of great potentialities in the field of Buddhist Studies.

He died suddenly of a ruptured ulcer a few weeks before his forty-ninth birthday. He had just spent three years in America: the first as Henry R. Luce distinguished Visiting Professor of Comparative Religious Ethics at Amherst College, and the next two as the Margaret Gest Professor of World Religions at Haverford College. During these years, his circle of devoted students and colleagues had widened considerably, and his writings had been published in journals and encyclopedias world-wide more numerously than ever. His important book, published just before his death, Discerning the Buddha: A Study oj Buddhism and of the Brahmanical Hindu Attitude to it (M unshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1983), leaves us in no doubt that the late scholar made a penetrating analysis of the traditional Brahmanical approach towards Buddhism in an historical perspective. Few scholars have shown mastery over materials on the subject as Joshi did.

During his third and final year of leave from his Guru Gobind Singh Department of Religious Studies at Punjabi University in Patiala, he received information about his appointment to a Professorship in Buddhological Research, at the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, affiliated with Varanasi Sanskrit University. Having spent fifteen years at the Punjabi University, he was not happy to leave his home in Patiala. But he felt that Buddhist studies in India required his move. He returned to Patiala to pack, amid the difficulties of the summer of 1984 in the Punjab. His library, possibly one of the best Buddhological collections in India, was shipped to Sarnath. Tragically, Professor Joshi never reached there himself, dying in the hospital in Delhi.

Professor Joshi was born on July 27, 1935, in a traditional Brahmin family in the Almora district of the Kumaon hills of Uttar Pradesh, near the ancient pilgrim route to Mt. Kailash. He was proud of the fact that his birth was in July of 1935, only a few weeks after H.H. the XIVth Dalai Lama was born, which he used to say was an "omen" of their shared concern for the

135


spread of appreciation of Buddhism in the world. As a young man he had strong spiritual inclinations, and a favorite story he liked to tell was how his parents were worried at one point that he might become a Sadhu, so intensely did he spend time meditating in the small but famous Yoga Ashramas in the Almora area. Fortunately, he met the lovely Janaki, his bride, who, as Uma did for Lord Siva, effectively re-kindled his interest in the world.

In the late fifties he received his M.A. in Pali from Banaras Hindu University and, as well as his Ph.D., another M.A. in Ancient History and Culture from Gorakhpur University. His doctorate dissertation was on "Buddhistic Culture of India during the 7th and 8th Centuries." He started his career as Assistant Professor in the Department of Ancient Indian History and Culture at Gorakhpur University from 1961 to 1967. He went on tojoin the Guru Gobind Singh Department of Religious Studies at Punjabi University, Patiala, becoming a key figure in that thriving center of the study of world religions. He was made Dean of Faculty of Religious Studies, in 1980-81. His international reputation rose steadily as he ably edited the Journal of Religious Studies, and his milestone work in Indian religious history, Studies in the Buddhistic Culture of India (Delhi, 1967), was more and more widely acclaimed. Another major project of his, with Bhikkhu Pasadika, was the translation of the Arya-vimalakZrti-nirdesa-sutra into Hindi (Sarnath, 1981). Other publications include Dhammapada, Pali Text in Gurmukhi Script (Patiala, 1969); Brahmanism, Buddhism and Hinduism (Kandy, 1970); An Introduction to Indian Religions (Patiala, 1970); Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita with the commentary of Asaitga and its translation in Hindi (Sarnath, 1978); Facets of Jain Religiousness in Comparative Light (Ahmedabad, 1981); and a chapter on "The Monastic Contribution to Buddhist Art and Architecture" in The World of Buddhism edited by Heinz Bechert and Richard Gombrich (London, 1983). He attended many international conferences, in Sri Lanka, Burma, Thailand, Malaysia, Taiwan, Korea, Japan, Russia, Europe, and the United States, as well as all over India. He was a member of the editorial board of our JIABS, as well as a member of the Board of Directors of the lABS. He was a valued member of the Board of Advisers of the American Institute of Buddhist Studies at Amherst College in Amherst, Massachusetts, USA. His contributions to various seminars and conferences on Buddhist Studies and allied disciplines are still fresh.

He was liked for his gentle, humorous, sincere personality, and his gracious warmth of heart and he was well respected for his courage, honesty and his critical acumen, coupled with a personal commitment to the practice and study of the Buddha Dharma, in all its varied forms. The late scholar is missed by all very much. He leaves behind him his wife and three children. In his

OBITUARY 137

death Buddhist scholarship has lost an eminent and beloved person. We can but remember the Buddha's abiding message: sabbe sankiirii annicii.

NOTE:

N.H. Samtani Robert Alexander Farrer Thurman

Professor Joshi leaves all of us, his friends and colleagues, to reflect on the lesson of anitya and dulpkha. His remarkable library is presently in storage at the Central Institute for Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, awaiting decision on the part of his family as to its disposition. I personally have had in mind an appeal to those Buddhologists world-wide who knew and admired Lal Mani and would wish to see his life's work fruitfully continuing, in spite of this tragic surprise. I would like to see if we could not establish a fund with an appropriate non-profit international organization which would be expressly designated to purchase his library from his family and establish it on its own at Sarnath, at that holy center of Buddha's teaching activity, perhaps nearby the Central Institute, perhaps nearer the center of the town, near the Dharma Chakra Stupa. Such a library, perhaps accompanied by a small "Lal Mani Joshi Research Institute" staff of scholars and translators, could become a wonderful resource for Buddhist scholars from all over the world, many of whom visit Sarnath yearly, and would doubtless be delighted to hold scholarly conferences there from time to time. Our little American Institute of Buddhist Studies here at Amherst would certainly contribute from its very modest means to the establishment of such a library and center, as would I personally and many of our colleagues.

I put forward this idea as I consider that he would consider any movement in the direction he walked throughout his days by far the most fitting tribute. Let us please join together in his memory and work toward maintaining the momentum he generated in helping his countrymen and the world re-discover the precious Buddhist heritage of India.

Robert Alexander Farrar Thurman

CONTRIBUTORS

Kamaleswar Bhattacharya Centre National de la

Recherche Scientifique Clos Baron 23 78112 Fourqueux FRANCE

Jens Braarvig Religionshistorisk Institutt Universitetet i Oslo Boks 10lD Blindern Oslo NORWAY

Eva K. Dargyay Religious Studies The University of Calgary 2920 24th Ave. N.W. Calgary T2N IN4 CANADA

Carmen Dragonetti Centro de Investigaciones

Filosoficas Miiiones 2073 1428 Buenos Aires ARGENTINA

Rena Haggarty Dept. of South Asian Studies University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706

Roger Jackson Dept. of Far Eastern Languages

and Literatures 3070 Frieze Building University of Michigan Ann Arbor MI 48109

A~ne C. Klein Dept. of Religious Studies Building 70 Stanford University Stanford CA 94305

138

Leonard W.j. van der Kuijp Freie Universitat Berlin Institut fUr Indische Philologie

und Kunstgeschichte Ki.inigin-Luise-Strasse 34a D-IOOO Berlin 33 WEST GERMANY

Vijitha Rajapakse 35950 Timberlane Dr. Solon OH 44139

N.H. Samtani Buddha Kutir Banaras Hindu University Varanasi 221 005 INDIA

Kenneth K. Tanaka Institute of Buddhist Studies 2717 Haste St. Berkeley, CA 94704

Robert Alexander Farrar Thurman Department of Religion Amherst College Amherst MA 01002

Fernando Tala Seminario de Indologia CIF Miiiones 2073 1428 Buenos Aires ARGENTINA

BOARD OF DIRECTORS THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC.

CHAIRPERSON: A.L. Basham (Australia)

VICE CHAIRPERSONS: Heinz Bechert (West Germany) Lokesh Chandra (India) Ismael Quiles (Argentina)

TREASURER: Beatrice Miller (USA)

GENERAL SECRETARY (EDITOR-IN-CHIEF): A.K. N arain (India)

REGIONAL SECRETARIES:

EDITORS:

ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS:

HONORARY FELLOWS:

LATE HONORARY

Richard Gombrich (Europe) Luis Gomez (Americas) Akira Yuyama (Asia)

L.M.Joshi (India) Alexander W. Macdonald

(France) Bardwell Smith (USA)

Richard A. Gard (USA) Jeffrey Hopkins (USA) Per Kvaerne (Norway) Charles Prebish (USA) Alex Wayman (USA)

P.V. Bapat(India) Kenneth K.S. Ch'en (USA) Louis Ligeti (Hungary) Shoson Miyamoto 0 apan) Gadjin Nagao Oapan) Nicholas Poppe (USA) Giuseppe Tucci (Italy) O.H. de A. Wijesekera

(Sri Lanka)

Ernst Steinkellner (Austria) Jikido Takasaki Oapan) Robert Thurman (USA)

Akira Hirakawa 0 apan) Leslie Kawamura (Canada) Lewis Lancaster (USA) D. Seyfort Ruegg (USA) Erik Zurcher (Netherlands)

Sir Harold W. Bailey (U.K.) V.V. Gokhale (India) Etienne Lamotte (Belgium) T.R.v. Murti (India) Hajime Nakamura Oapan) Walpola Rahula (Sri Lanka) Ernst Waldschmidt

(West Germany)

FELLOWS: Edward Conze (l976--1979)PaulDemieville (1976--1979) l.B. Horner (1976--1981) P.L. Vaidya (1976-1978) Susumu Yamaguchi (1976--1976)

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