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Working Paper No. 762385

JOHN MIKHAIL

Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of

Intentional Battery and the Principle of Double Effect

Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition:

Business, Economics and Regulatory Policy

Research Paper No. 762385
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John Mikhail, 2002All rights reserved

Aspects of the Theory of Moral Cognition:

Investigating Intuitive Knowledge of the Prohibition of Intentional Batteryand the Principle of Double Effect

John Mikhail1

Abstract: Where do our moral intuitions come from? Are they innate? Does the brain contain amodule specialized for moral judgment? Questions like these have been asked in one form oranother for centuries. In this paper, we take them up again, with the aim of clarifying them anddeveloping a specific proposal for how they can be empirically investigated. The paper presentsdata from six trolley problem studies of over five hundred individuals, including one group of

Chinese adults and one group of American children, which suggest that adults and children ages8-12 rely on intuitive or unconscious knowledge of specific moral principles to determine the

permissibility of actions that require harming one person in order to prevent harm to others.Significantly, the knowledge in question appears to be merely tacit: when asked to explain or

justify their judgments, experimental subjects were consistently incapable of articulating theoperative principles on which their judgments appear to have been based. We explain thesefindings with reference to an analogy to human linguistic competence. Just as normal personsare typically unaware of the principles guiding their linguistic intuitions, so too are they oftenunaware of the principles guiding their moral intuitions. These studies pave the way for futureresearch by raising the possibility that specific poverty of the stimulus arguments can beformulated in the moral domain. Differences between our approach to moral cognition and those

of Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1981), and Greene et al. (2001) are also discussed.

1. Introduction

Where do our moral intuitions come from? Are they innate? Does the brain contain a

module specialized for moral judgment? Does the human genetic program contain instructions

for the acquisition of a sense of justice or moral sense? Questions like these have been asked in

one form or another for centuries. In this paper we take them up again, with the aim of clarifying

them and developing a specific proposal for how they can be empirically investigated.


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In Section 1, we summarize our approach to the theory of moral cognition and explain

some basic elements of our theoretical framework. We also introduce examples of the

perceptual stimuli used in our research and discuss some of the properties of the moral intuitions

they elicit. In Sections 2-7, we present the results of six trolley problem studies designed to

investigate the moral competence of adults and of children ages 8-12 in particular, their intuitive

or unconscious knowledge of the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double

effect. In Section 8, we provide a general discussion of our findings and contrast our approach to

moral cognition with those of Piaget (1932/1965), Kohlberg (1981), and Greene, Sommerville,

Nystrom, Darley & Cohen (2001). Section 9 is an Appendix containing both the stimulus

materials used in our experiments and our subjects responses to them.

1.1 Theoretical Framework

Like many theorists, we begin from the assumption that the theory of moral cognition

may be usefully modeled on aspects of the theory of linguistic competence (see, e.g., Chomsky,

1978 Cosmides & Tooby, 1994 Dwyer, 1999 Goldman, 1993 Harman, 2000 Mahlmann,

1999 Mikhail, 2000 Mikhail, Sorrentino & Spelke, 1998 Rawls, 1971 Stich, 1993). Our

research is thus organized, in the first instance, around three questions, close analogues of the

fundamental questions in Chomskys (1986) framework for the investigation of human language.

(1) (a) What constitutes moral knowledge?(b) How is moral knowledge acquired?(c) How is moral knowledge put to use?

A brief overview of some of the concepts and terminology we use to clarify these

questions may be helpful. In our framework, the answer to (1a) is given by a particularmoral

grammaror theory ofmoral competence: a theory of the mind/brain of a person who possesses a

system of moral knowledge, or what might be referred to informally as a moral faculty, moral


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sense or conscience. The answer to (1b) is given by Universal Moral Grammar(UMG): a

theory of the initial state of the moral facultywhich, in keeping with conventional assumptions

of modularity (see, e.g., Fodor, 1983 Gazzaniga, 1992 Gazzaniga, Ivry & Magnum, 1998

Pinker, 1997), we provisionally assume to be a distinct subsystem of the mind/brainalong with

an account of how the properties UMG postulates interact with experience to yield a mature

system of moral knowledge. The answer to (1c) is given by a theory ofmoral performance: a

theory of how moral knowledge enters into the actual representation and evaluation of human

acts and institutional arrangements, as well as other forms of actual conduct (see, e.g., Dwyer,

1999 Mikhail, 2000 compare Rawls, 1971 Nozick, 1968).

Following Chomsky (1965), we use the terms observational adequacy, descriptive

adequacy and explanatory adequacy to refer to increasing levels of empirical success a theory

of moral cognition might achieve. A moral theory is observationally adequate with respect to a

given set of moral judgments to the extent that it provides a correct description of those judgments

in some manner or other, for example, by listing them or by explicitly stating a set of principles

from which they can be derived. A moral theory is descriptively adequate with respect to the

mature individuals moral competence to the extent that it correctly describes that system, in other

words, to the extent it provides a correct answer to (1a). Finally, a moral theory meets the

condition ofexplanatory adequacy to the extent it correctly describes the initial state of the moral

faculty and correctly explains how the properties of the initial state it postulates interact with

experience to yield a mature system of moral competence in other words, to the extent that it

provides a correct answer to (1b) (Mikhail, 2000).2

Unlike Kohlberg (1981), we distinguish sharply between an individuals operative moral

principles (those principles actually operative in her exercise of moral judgment) and herexpress


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principles (those statements she makes in the attempt to describe, explain, or justify her

judgments). We make no assumption that the normal individual is aware of the operative

principles which constitute her moral knowledge, or that she can become aware of them through

introspection, or that her statements about them are necessarily accurate. On the contrary, we

hypothesize that just as normal persons are typically unaware of the principles guiding their

linguistic or visual intuitions, so too are they often unaware of the principles guiding their moral

intuitions. In any event, the important point is that, as with language or vision, the theory of moral

cognition must attempt to specify what the properties of moral competence actually are, not what a

person may report about them (Haidt, 2001 Mikhail, 2000 Mikhail, Sorrentino & Spelke, 1998).

Finally, we follow Chomsky (1995), Lewontin (1990), Marr (1982), and other

commentators in assuming that the problems of descriptive and explanatory adequacy possess a

certain logical and methodological priority over more complicated inquiries into the neurological

and evolutionary foundations of moral cognition and behavior. Hence we carefully distinguish

(1a)-(1c) from two further questions a complete theory of moral cognition must answer:

(1) (d) How is moral knowledge physically realized in the brain?(e) How did moral knowledge evolve in the species?

Although many researchers have addressed questions like these, their efforts seem at this

juncture to be somewhat premature. Just as our ability to ask well-focused questions about the

evolution and physical bases of language depends on solving the problems of descriptive and

explanatory adequacy in the linguistic domain (Chomsky, 1995 Hauser, Chomsky & Fitch,

2002), so too is our understanding of (1d) and (1e) advanced by achieving reasonably correct

solutions to questions like (1a) and (1b) in the moral domain. Put simply, we cannot profitably

ask how moral knowledge evolved in the species or where it resides in the brain until what

constitutes moral knowledge and how it is acquired are better understood.


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1.2 Perceptual Stimuli and Perceptual Model

Research in the Piagetian tradition has attempted to answer questions like (1a) and (1b)

by investigating the developing childs mental representations of the subjective and

objective elements of moral judgment, the former consisting of the goals and intentions of an

action, the latter consisting of an actions effects and material consequences. In Piagets

(1932/1965) original studies, children were found to base their moral judgments on mental

representations of effects, not intentions, until around age nine. More recently, many

investigators have suggested that these findings were an artifact of the methods and assessment

procedures Piaget employed. Some researchers (e.g., Baird, 2001 Berndt & Berndt, 1975

Costanzo, Coie, Grumet & Farnhill, 1973 Lilliard & Flavell, 1990 Nelson, 1980) have

discovered that children as young as three use information about motives and intentions when

making moral judgments, if that information is made explicit and salient. Moreover, a

considerable body of research on infant cognition (e.g., Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra & Biro, 1995

Johnson, 2000 Meltzoff, 1995 Woodward, Sommerville & Guajardo, 2001) suggests that even

young infants are predisposed to interpret the actions of animate agents in terms of their goals

and intentions.

Our research seeks to build on these prior studies by investigating how experimental

subjects reconstruct and utilize information about intentions and effects when evaluating

morally complex acts that is, acts and omissions which are comprised of multiple intentions

and which generate both good and bad effects. To illustrate, consider the following examples of

the so-called trolley problem and related thought experiments invented by Foot (1967) and

Thomson (1985).


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The Trolley ProblemCharlie is driving a train when the brakes fail. Ahead five people are working onthe track with their backs turned. Fortunately, Charlie can switch to a side track, if he actsat once. Unfortunately, there is also someone on that track with his back turned. IfCharlie switches his train to the side track, he will kill one person. If Charlie does not

switch his train, he will kill five people.

Is it morally permissible for Charlie to switch his train to the side track?

The Transplant ProblemDr. Brown has five patients in the hospital who are dying. Each patient needs a neworgan in order to survive. One patient needs a new heart. Two patients need a newkidney. And two more patients need a new lung. Dr. Brown can save all five patients ifhe takes a single healthy person and removes her heart, kidneys, and lungs to give tothese five patients. Just such a healthy person is in Room 306. She is in the hospital forroutine tests. Having seen her test results, Dr. Brown knows that she is perfectly healthy

and of the right tissue compatibility. If Dr. Brown cuts up the person in Room 306 andgives her organs to the other five patients, he will save the other five patients, but kill theperson in Room 306 in the process. If Dr. Brown does not cut up the person in Room306, the other five patients will die.

Is it morally permissible for Dr. Brown to cut up the person in Room 306?

The Bystander ProblemEdward is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Edward sees what has happened: the train driver saw fiveworkmen men ahead on the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed andthe driver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the five men the banks are so steepthat they will not be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Edward is standingnext to a switch, which he can throw, that will turn the train onto a side-track.Unfortunately, there is one person standing on the side-track, with his back turned.Edward can throw the switch, killing the one or he can refrain from doing this, letting thefive die.

Is it morally permissible for Edward to throw the switch?

The Footbridge ProblemNancy is taking her daily walk near the train tracks when she notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Five men are walking across the tracks. The train is movingso fast that they will not be able to get off the track in time. Nancy is standing next to aman, whom she can throw in front of the train, thereby preventing it from killing the men.

Nancy can throw the man, killing him but saving the five men or she can refrain fromdoing this, letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Nancy to throw the man?


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As we discuss below, when experimental subjects were presented with these scenarios,

they judged Charlies turning the train in The Trolley Problem to be permissible, Dr. Browns

cutting up the patient in the Transplant Problem to be impermissible, Edwards throwing the

switch in the Bystander Problem to be permissible, and Nancys throwing the man in the

Footbridge Problem to be impermissible (Table 1). These responses confront us with a

potentially surprising contrast between the Trolley and Bystander Problems, on the one hand,

and the Transplant and Footbridge Problems, on the other. In the former problems, saving five

people at the cost of killing one person is thought to be permissible. In the latter problems, by

contrast, saving five at the cost of killing one is held to be impermissible.

Table 1: Moral Intuitions of Trolley, Transplant, Bystander, and Footbridge ProblemsProblem Action Good Effect Bad Effect Deontic

StatusTrolley Charlies turning the train Preventing 5 deaths 1 Death Permissible

Transplant Dr. Browns cutting up the patient Preventing 5 deaths 1 Death Impermissible

Bystander Edwards throwing the switch Preventing 5 deaths 1 Death Permissible

Footbridge Nancys throwing the man Preventing 5 deaths 1 Death Impermissible

These facts lead us to speculate about the cognitive mechanisms the mind employs in

responding to these four scenarios. In the first instance, they lead us to ask the following

question: what are the operative principles of moral competence that are responsible for these

divergent responses? The problem is more difficult than it may seem at first. On the one hand,

comparatively simple deontological and consequentialist moral principles (e.g., If an act causes

death, then it is wrong, If the consequences of an act are better than the consequences of any of

available alternative, then it is required, etc.) are incapable of explaining the pattern of

intuitions elicited by these problems. For example, a simple deontological principle forbidding


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all killing would generate the intuition that Charlies switching tracks in the Trolley Problem and

Edwards switching tracks in the Bystander Problem are impermissible. But these actions are

judged to be permissible. Likewise, a simple utilitarian principle requiring agents to perform

actions with the best foreseeable consequences would presumably generate the intuition that Dr.

Browns cutting up the patient in the Transplant Problem and Nancys throwing the man in the

Footbridge Problem are obligatory, or at least permissible yet these actions are judged to be

impermissible.

On the other hand, conditional principles whose antecedents simply restate those action-

descriptions found in the stimulus (e.g., If an act is of the type throwing the switch, then it is

permissible If an act is of the type throwing the man then it is impermissible,) are also

descriptively inadequate. This is because they lead us to make inaccurate predictions of how

these action-descriptions will be evaluated when they are embedded in materially different

circumstances. For example, as we discuss below, when the costs and benefits in the Bystander

Problem are manipulated, so that an action described as throwing the switch will save $5

million of equipment at the cost of killing one person, individuals judge the action so described

to be impermissible. Likewise, when the circumstances of the Footbridge Problem are modified

so that the action described as throwing the man is presumed to involve consensual touching,

subjects judge the action to be permissible. In general, it is easy to show that the action-

descriptions used in these problems are morally neutral (Baird, 2001 Nelson, 1980), in the

sense that the permissibility judgments they elicit are circumstance-dependent.

Since the circumstances of an action can vary along an indefinite number of dimensions

(e.g., DArcy, 1963 Donagan, 1977 Lyons, 1965 Stone, 1964), the conclusion to which we

quickly are led by considerations like these is that any attempt to explain the moral intuitions


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elicited by these examples by means of a simple stimulus-response model is doomed at the start.

Although each of these moral intuitions is occasionedby an identifiable stimulus, how the mind

goes about interpreting these hypothetical fact patterns, and separating the actions they depict

into those that are permissible and those that are not, is not something revealed in any obvious

way by the surface properties of the stimulus itself. Instead, an intervening step between

stimulus and response must be postulated: a pattern of organization of some sort that is imposed

on the stimulus by the mind itself. Hence a simple perceptual model such as the one in Figure 1

is inadequate for explaining these moral intuitions. Instead, as is the case with language

perception (Chomsky, 1964), an adequate perceptual model must, at a minimum, look more like

the one in Figure 2.

Fig. 1: Simple Perceptual Model for Moral Judgment

INPUT ?

PERMISSIBLE

IMPERMISSIBLE


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?

PERMISSIBLE

IMPERMISSIBLE

STRUCTURAL

DESCRIPTION

Perceptual

Response:

Moral

Judgment

Unconscious

Mental

Representation

INPUT ?

Conversion

RulesStimulus:

Fact Pattern

Deontic Rule s

Fig. 2: Expanded Perceptual Model for Moral Judgment

The expanded perceptual model in Figure 2 implies that, like grammaticality judgments,

permissibility judgments do not necessarily depend on the surface properties of an act ion-

description, but on more fundamental properties of how that action is mentally represented. Put

differently, it suggests that the problem of descriptive adequacy in the theory of moral cognition

may be divided into at least two parts: (a) the problem of determining the nature of the

computational principles (i.e., deontic rules) operative in the exercise of moral judgment, and


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(b) the problem of determining the representational structures (i.e., structural descriptions)

over which those computational operations are defined.

What are the properties of these intervening mental representations? In our view, it

seems reasonable to suppose that morally cognizable fact patterns are mentally represented in

terms of abstract categories like act, consequence, and circumstance agency, motive, and

intention proximate and remote causes and other familiar concepts that are the stock in trade of

philosophers, lawyers, and jurists (Mikhail, 2000 see also Donagan, 1977 Sidgwick, 1907). But

which specific concepts does the system of moral cognition in fact use? In what manner, i.e.,

according to what principles or rules, does it use them? Answers to questions like these, if

available, would begin to solve the problem of descriptive adequacy.

1.3 Our Hypothesis

Our hypothesis is that the moral intuitions generated by the Trolley, Transplant, Bystander,

and Footbridge problems and structurally similar thought experiments (henceforth, trolley

problems) can be best explained by postulating intuitive knowledge of specific moral principles,

including the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double effect. The former is

a familiar principle of both common morality and the common law proscribing acts of

unpermitted, unprivileged bodily contact, that is, of touching without consent (Prosser, 1941

Shapo, 2003). The latter is a complex principle of justification, narrower in scope than the

traditional necessity or choice of evils defense, which in its standard formulation holds that an

otherwise prohibited action may be permissible if the act itself is not wrong, the good but not the

bad effects are intended, the good effects outweigh the bad effects, and no morally preferable

alternative is available (Mikhail, 2000 see also Fischer & Ravizza, 1992). Both of these


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principles require clarification, but taken together and suitably elaborated they can be invoked to

explain the relevant pattern of intuitions in a relatively simple and straightforward manner. The

key structural difference between the two sets of examples is that, in Transplant and Footbridge

problems, the agent commits a series of distinct trespasses prior to and as a means of achieving

his good end, whereas in the Trolley and Bystander problems, these violations are subsequent

and foreseen side effects. Figures 3 and 4 illustrate this difference in the case of the Footbridge

and Bystander problems.

Ds throwing the man at t(0)

Ds committing battery at t(0)

Ds preventing the trainfrom killing the men at t

(+n+o)

Ds killing the man

at t(+n+p)

Ds causing the trainto hit the man at t

(+n)

Ds committing battery at t(+n)

Fig. 3: Mental Representation of Footbridge Problem

Side

Effects

End

Means

Ds committing

homicide at t(+n+p)


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Our computational hypothesis holds that when people encounter the Footbridge and

Bystander problems, they spontaneously compute unconscious representations like those in

Figures 3 and 4.3 Note that in addition to explaining the relevant intuitions, this hypothesis has

further testable implications. For example, we can investigate the structural properties of the

underlying representations by asking subjects to evaluate certain probative descriptions of the

relevant actions. Descriptions using the word by to connect individual nodes of the tree in the

downward direction (e.g., D turned the train by throwing the switch, D killed the man by

turning the train) will be deemed acceptable by contrast, causal reversals using by to connect

nodes in the upward direction (D threw the switch by turning the train, D turned the train by

killing the man) will be deemed unacceptable. Likewise, descriptions using the phrase in order

to to connect nodes in the upward direction along the vertical chain of means and ends (D

Ds throwing the switch at t(0)

Ds turning the train at t(+n)

Ds preventing the train

from killing the men at t(+n)

Ds causing the train

to hit the man at t(+n+o)

Ds committing battery

at t(+n+o)

End

Fig. 4: Mental Representation of Bystander Problem

Side Effects

Ds killing the man

at t(+n+o+p)

Ds committing

homicide at t(+n+o+p)

Means


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threw the switch in order to turn the train) will be deemed acceptable. By contrast, descriptions

of this type linking means with side effects (D threw the switch in order to kill the man) will

be deemed unacceptable. In short, there is an implicit geometry to these representations, which

an adequate theory can and must account for.

Our hypothesis is interesting and controversial for several reasons. First, while many

theorists have suggested that the principle of double effect may be part of a descriptively

adequate theory of trolley intuitions (e.g., Harman, 1977, 2000), and of human morality

generally (e.g., Nagel, 1986 Quinn, 1993), no prior experimental studies have directly tested this

assumption. The experiments by Petrinovich and his colleagues (Petrinovich & ONeill, 1996

Petrinovich, ONeill & Jorgensen, 1993), which utilize trolley problems, do not adequately

clarify this issue, because of their focus on behavioral predictions (e.g., asking participants to

answer the question What would you do?) rather than on deontic judgments per se (e.g., asking

participants to answer the question Is X morally permissible?). Likewise, Greene et al. (2001),

who also use trolley problems as probes, also appear to leave this issue unresolved (see 8.2.3).

Second, our hypothesis is significant because, if it is true, it implies that the mental

operations involved in the exercise of moral judgment are more complex than is commonly

thought. For the principle of double effect, for example, to be operative in its standard

formulation, adults and children must possess a list of intrinsically wrong acts, a set of rules for

generating morally cognizable act-representations, and a calculus of some sort for computing

and comparing the probabilities ofan actions good and bad effects. They must also have the

cognitive resources to distinguish the act itself from its effects and further consequences, to

distinguish the acts foreseen effects from its intended effects, and, more generally, to

differentiate the acts causal and intentional properties from those of its alternatives. Further,


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they must compute act-representations in terms of properties like ends, means, and side effects,

even though the stimulus contains no direct evidence of these properties. In short, our

hypothesis implies that ordinary peoplenot just trained lawyers or philosopherspossess a

complex sense of justice that incorporates subtle elements of a fully articulated legal code,

including abstract theories of causation and intention.

Finally, our hypothesis raises interesting and novel questions for the theory of moral

development. Specifically, it leads us to ask whether children are explicitly taught the principle

of double effect, and if not, whether the principle or some variant of it is in some sense innate.

As Harman (2000) explains, this question naturally arises as soon as one settles on an

explanation of the structure of our moral intuitions that makes reference to this principle. An

ordinary person was never taught the principle of double effect, Harman observes, and it is

unclear how such a principle might have been acquired by the examples available to the ordinary

person. This suggests that [it] is built into . . . morality ahead of time (Harman, 2000, p. 225).

Similar reasoning may be thought to apply to the prohibition of intentional battery, at least as

that prohibition is defined and utilized here.4 On reflection, it seems doubtful that children are

affirmatively taught to generate the specific representations presupposed by this principle to any

significant extent. We thus seem faced with the possibility that certain moral principles emerge

and become operative in the exercise of moral judgment that are neither explicitly taught, nor

derivable in any obvious way from the data of sensory experience. In short, we appear

confronted with an example of what Chomsky calls the phenomenon of the poverty of the

stimulus in the moral domain (Dwyer, 1999 Mikhail, 2000 compare Chomsky, 1986).


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CHILDS

LINGUISTIC

DATA

LINGUISTIC

GRAMMAR

CHILDS

MORAL

DATA

MORAL

GRAMMAR

EnglishJapanese

Zapotec

Malagasy

Arabic

How much diversity?

UG

UMG

?

?

Figure 5: Acquisition Models for Language and Morality

The argument from the poverty of the moral stimulus (Mikhail, 2000) can be depicted

graphically by means of an acquisition model similar to the one Chomsky (1964) initially proposed

in the case of language (Figure 5). In the linguistic version of this model, Universal Grammar

(UG) may be regarded as a theory of innate mechanisms, an underlying biological matrix that

provides a framework within which the growth of language proceeds, and proposed principles of

UG may be regarded as an abstract partial specification of the genetic program that enables the

child to interpret certain events as linguistic experience and to construct a system of rules and

principles on the basis of that experience (Chomsky, 1980, p. 187). Likewise, in the case of


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moral development, Universal Moral Grammar (UMG) may be regarded as a theory of innate

mechanisms that provides the basic framework in which the development of moral competence

unfolds, and specific principles of UMG may be regarded as a partial characterization the innate

function that maps the developing childs relevant moral experience (her moral data) into the

mature state of her acquired moral competence (i.e., her moral grammar).

The linguistic grammars children acquire are hopelessly underdetermined by the data

available to them as language learners linguists therefore postulate a significant amount of innate

knowledge to fill this gap (e.g., Baker, 2001 Pinker, 1994). Further, because every normal human

child can and will learn any of the worlds natural languages simply by being placed in an

appropriate environment, UG must be rich and specific enough to get the child over the learning

hump, but not so specific as to preclude her ability to acquire every human language (Chomsky,

1986). Turning to UMG, it is unclear whether a similar situation and a similar tension between

descriptive and explanatory adequacy obtains. Nevertheless, the acquisition model we have

sketched, though abstract, can be made more concrete by considering the specific example of

trolley intuitions. If a computational moral grammar does in fact enter into the best explanation of

these intuitions, then two further questions arise within the framework of this model: First, what

are the properties of the moral grammars that people do in fact acquire, and how diverse are they?

Second, what informational gaps, if any, can be detected between the inputs and outputs of the

model? That is, what if any principles of moral grammar are acquired for which the environment

contains little or no evidence? According to the argument from the poverty of the moral stimulus,

if specific principles emerge and become operative in the course of normal moral development,

but the acquisition of these principles cannot be explained on the basis of the childs moral data,

then the best explanation of how children acquire these principles may be that they are innate, in


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Chomskys dispositional sense (Chomsky, 1986 see also Baker, 2001 Dwyer, 1999 Mikhail

2002 Pinker, 1994 Spelke, 1998).

2. Experiment 1

Having introduced some elements of our theoretical framework, we turn directly to a

discussion and analysis of our experimental findings. At the outset of our investigations, we

were interested in a variety of questions that might be asked about thought experiments like the

trolley problems and the moral intuitions they elicit, including the following: First, are these

intuitions widely shared? Are they shared across familiar demographic categories like gender,

race, nationality, age, culture, religion, or level of formal education? Second, what are the

operative principles? How precisely can we characterize the relevant mental operations and to

what extent are they open to conscious introspection? Third, how are the operative principles

learned or acquired? What might examples like these eventually tell us about moral

development and the acquisition of the moral sense?

Our first study attempted to address only a subset of these questions, including (1)

whether and to what extent these intuitions are widely shared (2) what are the operative

principles and (3) whether the operative principles are open to conscious introspection.

2.1 Method

2.1.1 Participants

Participants were 40 adult volunteers from the M.I.T. community between the ages of 18-

35. The group consisted of 19 women and 21 men.


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2.1.2 Stimuli and Procedure

Eight scenarios were used, all of which were adapted from Foot (1967), Thomson (1986),

and Harman (1977) (see 9 for the complete text of these scenarios see also Mikhail, 2000). In

all eight scenarios, an agent must choose whether to perform an action that will result in one

person being killed and five other persons, who would otherwise die, being saved.

The scenarios were divided according to our hypothesis into two groups. Four scenarios,

which were modeled on the Transplant and Footbridge Problems, described a choice between (a)

committing an intentional battery in order to prevent five other people from dying, knowing that

the battery will also constitute a foreseeable but non-intentional homicide, and (b) refraining

from doing so, thereby letting the five die. Four other scenarios, which were modeled on the

Trolley and Bystander Problems, described a choice between (a) doing something in order to

prevent five people from dying, knowing that the action will constitute a foreseeable but non-

intentional battery and a foreseeable but non-intentional homicide, and (b) refraining from doing

so, thereby letting the five die.

The morally salient difference between the two sets of cases, in other words, concerned

the type of battery embedded in the agents action plan. In the first group of scenarios, the

battery was intentional, embedded within the agents action plan as a means (henceforth

Intentional Battery). In the second group, the battery was foreseeable (but not intentional),

embedded within the agents action plan as a side effect (henceforth Foreseeable Battery).

Each participant received a written questionnaire containing one scenario. The

participant was first instructed to read the scenario and to judge whether or not the proposed

action it described was morally permissible. The participant was then asked on a separate page

of the questionnaire to provide reasons explaining or justifying his or her response. Twenty


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participants were given an Intentional Battery scenario. The other twenty participants were

given a Foreseeable Battery scenario. The assignment of participants to scenario type was

random.

2.2 Results

2.2.1 Judgments

The main results of Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 6. 2 of 20 participants in the

Intentional Battery condition judged the action constituting intentional battery to be permissible.

By contrast, 19 of 20 participants in the Foreseeable Battery condition scenario judged the action

constituting foreseeable battery to be permissible. This difference is significant: x2 (1, N=40) =

28.96, p < .001, suggesting that the scenarios evoke different action representations whose

properties are morally salient.5

Male and female responses in Experiment 1 are presented in Figure 7. Of the 10 men

given an Intentional Battery scenario, 2 judged the action constituting intentional battery to be

permissible and 8 judged it to be impermissible. Of the 10 women given an Intentional Battery

scenario, all 10 judged the action constituting intentional battery to be impermissible.

Meanwhile, all 11 of the men and 8 of the 9 women who were given a Foreseeable Battery

scenario judged the action constituting foreseeable battery to be permissible. These differences

are also significant, x2 (1, N=19) = 15.44, p < .001 (women) and x2 (1, N=21) = 14.6, p < .001

(men), suggesting that there are no significant gender differences in the way the two types of

scenario are mentally represented and morally evaluated.


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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

18

20

Intentional

Battery

Foreseeable

Battery

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects

Figure 6: Moral Judgments of Two Act Types in Experiment 1

(Intentional Battery vs. Foreseeable Battery)

X2 (1, N=40) = 29.0,

p < .001

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Men Women Men Women

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Intentional

Battery

Subjects

Figure 7: Judgments of Act Types in Experiment 1 by Gender


Foreseeable

Battery

X2 (1, N=19) = 15.44,

p < .001 (women).

X2 (1, N=21) = 14.6,

p < .001 (men).


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2.2.2 Justifications

Subjects expressed principlesthe responses they provided to justify or explain their

judgmentswere also coded and analyzed. Three categories of increasing adequacy were used

to classify these responses: (1) no justification, (2) logically inadequate justification, and (3)

logically adequate justification. Responses that were left completely blank were categorized

under the heading of no justification. Responses that were not blank but which failed to state a

reason, rule, or principleor to identify any feature whatsoever of the given scenariothat

could in principle generate the corresponding judgment were classified as logically inadequate

justifications. Finally, responses that did state a reason, rule, or principle, or did otherwise

identify at least one feature of the given scenarioeven one that was obviously immaterial,

irrelevant, arbitrary, or ad hocthat could in principle generate the corresponding judgment

were classified as logically adequate justifications.

Utilizing this taxonomy, two researchers independently coded a subset of justifications

and achieved an inter-observer reliability of 89% (n=36). One researcher then coded the

complete set of justifications collected in Experiment 1. 32.5% (13/40) of participants gave no

justification, 17% (7/40) provided logically inadequate justifications, while only 50% (20/40)

provided logically adequate justifications. Furthermore, many of the logically adequate

justifications consisted of simple deontological or consequentialist principles that were evidently

incapable of generating the conflicting pattern of intuitions in Experiment 1. These justifications

thus failed the test of observational adequacy in the sense defined in 1.1. These findings

together with the data on expressed justifications gathered in our remaining studies are discussed

again in 8.


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2.3 Discussion

Experiment 1 was designed to achieve several different objectives. First, it was meant to

investigate a set of untested empirical claims implicit in the philosophical and legal literature

about how the trolley problems are mentally represented and morally evaluated. In their

accounts of trolley problems, philosophers and legal theorists often take for granted the deontic

status readers will assign to a given action sequence (e.g., Fischer & Ravizza, 1992 Katz, 1987

Thomson, 1985). Prior to our studies, however, no controlled experiments had directly tested

these assumptions or attempted to extend them to broader populations. Instead, prior

experimental research using trolley problems as probes (Petrinovich & ONeill, 1996

Petrinovich et al., 1993) had left these issues largely unresolved. As we predicted, conventional

assumptions about the deontic intuitions elicited by these problems were confirmed, and the

intuitions themselves were widely shared.

Second, Experiment 1 was designed to investigate whether the participants in our

experiments could, when asked, provide coherent and well-articulated justifications for their

judgments about individual trolley problems. Based on informal observation, as well as theory-

dependent considerations arising from the linguistic analogyin particular, the inaccessible

status of principles of grammarwe predicted that many or most of our subjects be incapable of

doing so. This prediction also held: even under an extremely liberal coding scheme, according to

which a justification was deemed logically adequate if it picked out at least one distinguishing

feature of the given scenario, even one that was obviously immaterial, irrelevant, arbitrary, or ad

hoc, that could in principle serve as part of the premises of an argument that arrives at the

matching judgments (Rawls, 1971, p. 46), only 50% of the participants in our study provided

logically adequate justifications for their judgments. Additionally, as indicated, many of these


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justifications were inadequate to account for the pattern of intuitions generated in Experiment 1

and thus failed the test of observational adequacy in the sense defined in 1.1. This suggested

that a within-subject design would elicit considerable fewer logically adequate justifications than

a between-subject design, because in the former condition subjects would be required to

reconcile and explain two contrary intuitions by means of an overarching rationale or principle.

On this basis, we decided to utilize a within-subject design in Experiment 2 (see 3).

A further objective of Experiment 1 was to investigate our hypothesis that the moral

intuitions generated by the trolley problems could be explained by postulating intuitive

knowledge of the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double effect. As

interpreted here, the combined effect of mechanically applying these principles to these scenarios

would be to permit throwing the switch and turning the train in the Trolley and Bystander

conditions but to prohibit cutting up the patient and throwing the man in the Transplant and

Footbridge conditions. This is how participants did, in fact, respond in these conditions, thus

confirming to a limited extent our hypothesis about operative principles.

Finally, Experiment 1 was also meant to begin the process of investigating the potential

universality of a certain class of moral intuitions, such as those elicited by the trolley problems,

by determining whether one sample of adult men and women would share intuitive responses to

these problems. Again, based upon informal observation, as well as various theory-dependent

considerations (Mikhail, 2000), we predicted that there would be no statistically significant

gender differences. This prediction also helda finding that is at least potentially in conflict

with the claims of Gilligan (1982) and others that men and women typically differ in how they

evaluate moral problems.


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In sum, the findings of Experiment 1 constitute evidence that one component of moral

knowledge, deontic knowledge, consists of a system of rules or principles (a moral grammar)

capable of generating and relating mental representations of various elements of an action plan

(Mikhail et al., 1998). Our findings also constitute evidence that the moral grammar contains

principles capable of distinguishing intentional battery (battery embedded within an agents

action plan as a means) and foreseeable battery (battery embedded within an agents action plan

as a side effect), as well as a further principle, such as the principle of double effect or some

comparably complex ordering principle (Donagan, 1977), prohibiting intentional battery but

permitting foreseeable battery in the context of cases of necessity such as the trolley problems.

Because subjects displayed only a limited ability to provide adequate justifications of their

intuitions, Experiment 1 also implies that, as is the case with linguistic intuitions, the principles

generating moral intuitions are at least partly inaccessible to conscious introspection. Finally,

our findings also suggest that at least some moral intuitions are widely shared, irrespective of

gender.

3. Experiment 2

In Experiment 1, we discovered an apparent difference between the way intentional

battery and foreseeable battery are mentally represented and morally evaluated, at least in the

context of cases of necessity such as the trolley problems. We also discovered that the moral

competence of both men and women appears to consist, at least in part, of intuitive or

unconscious knowledge of the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double

effect. Experiment 2 was designed to bring additional evidence to bear on these hypotheses, in

three different ways.


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The first way was to investigate the concept of battery that was used in our analysis of

Experiment 1. In Experiment 1, we drew on established legal doctrine in assuming that battery

could in effect be defined as unpermitted or unprivileged contact with a person, that is, as

contact without consent (Prosser, 1941 Shapo, 2003). Moreover, we followed the traditional

law of tort in assuming that the notion of unprivileged contact extends to any part of the body,

or to anything which is attached to it and includes any touching of one person by another or by

any substance put in motion by him (Hilliard, 1859). In Experiment 2, we investigated this

concept of battery by modifying one of the Intentional Battery scenarios used in Experiment 1,

so that an action described as throwing the man, which previously constituted battery, no

longer did so, because under the modified circumstances the action would likely be represented

as consensual. We did this by constructing a scenario in which a runaway trolley threatens to kill

a man walking across the tracks and the only way to save the man is to save him is to throw him

out of the path of the train, thereby seriously injuring him.

The second way we extended the results of Experiment 1 was to investigate our subjects

knowledge of the consequentialist provision of the principle of double effect. As stated in 1,

the principle of double effect is a complex principle of justification requiring, among other

things, that the intended and foreseen good effects of an action outweigh its foreseen bad effects.

Our implicit assumption in Experiment 1 was that each of the scenarios used in that experiment

was mentally represented by our subjects as satisfying that condition. In particular, we took for

granted in Experiment 1 that individuals represented preventing the deaths of five people as an

intended and foreseen good effect that outweighed the foreseen bad effect of the death of one

person.


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In Experiment 2, we tested our subjects presumed knowledge of this consequentialist

provision of the principle of double effect directly by modifying one of the Foreseeable Battery

scenarios used in Experiment 1, so that an action described as throwing the switch, which

previously generated intended and foreseen good effects outweighed by its foreseen bad effects,

no longer did so, but rather generated the opposite result of its intended and foreseen good

effects being outweighed by its foreseen bad effects. We did this by taking one version of the

standard Bystander Problem and substituting a valuable thing - five million dollars of railroad

equipment lying idle across the tracks - for what was previously described as five men walking

across the tracks. We reasoned that our subjects would take for granted that the moral worth of

a person is greater than that of a valuable thing.

Finally, our third modification was to convert the experimental design of Experiment 1

from a between-subject design to a within-subject design. Although fully half of the participants

in Experiment 1 provided logically adequate justifications of their judgments, on inspection it

was clear that many of these justifications were unable to explain the alternating pattern of

intuitions generated in Experiment 1. For example, many of these nominally adequate responses

took the form of either simple deontological justifications (e.g., killing is wrong) or simple

utilitarian justifications (five versus one) that were manifestly incapable of explaining the

essential contrast between the Foreseeable Battery scenarios (i.e., the Trolley and Bystander

Problems), on the one hand, and the Intentional Battery scenarios (i.e., the Transplant and

Footbridge Problems), on the other. Hence in Experiment 2 we decided to examine this issue

and to begin to explore related issues such as framing effects by asking participants to provide

judgments and justifications of a pair of trolley problems presented to them simultaneously.


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3.1 Method

3.1.1 Participants

Participants were 65 adult volunteers between the ages of 22-35, 55 of whom were

graduate students at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and 10

of whom were employees of the Cable News Network in Washington, DC. There were 33

women and 30 men. Two subjects did not provide information about their gender.


Five scenarios were used, one of which was the Trolley Problem presented in 1.2. The

other four scenarios, which were our main concern in Experiment 2, are reprinted below. Each

was derived from a template that was designed to allow for systematic control and variation in

this and future investigations (Mikhail, 2000). Differences between the last three scenarios and

the first are underlined and italicized here to make them more noticeable. Participants were

given questionnaires without these markings.

The Bystander Problem (Hank: Foreseeable Battery)Hank is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Hank sees what has happened: the driver of the train sawfive men walking across the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed andthe driver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the five men. It is moving so fast thatthey will not be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Hank is standing next to aswitch, which he can throw, that will turn the train onto a side track, thereby preventing itfrom killing the men. Unfortunately, there is a man standing on the side track with his

back turned. Hank can throw the switch, killing him or he can refrain from doing this,letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Hank to throw the switch?

The Footbridge Problem (Ian: Intentional Battery)Ian is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Ian sees what has happened: the driver of the train saw fivemen walking across the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed and thedriver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the five men. It is moving so fast that


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they will not be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Ian is standing next to aheavy object, which he can throw onto the track in the path of the train, thereby

preventing it from killing the men. Unfortunately, the heavy objectis a man, standingnext to Ian with his back turned. Ian can throw the man, killing him or he can refrainfrom doing this, letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Ian to throw the man?

The Modified Bystander Problem (Karl: Bad Effects Outweigh Good Effects)Karl is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Karl sees what has happened: the driver of the train saw

five million dollars of new railroad equipment lying idle across the tracks and slammedon the brakes, but the brakes failed and the driver fainted. The train is now rushingtoward the equipment. It is moving so fast that itwill be destroyed. Fortunately, Karl isstanding next to a switch, which he can throw, that will turn the train onto a side track,thereby preventing it from destroying the equipment. Unfortunately, there is a man

standing on the side track with his back turned. Karl can throw the switch, killing him orhe can refrain from doing this, letting the equipment be destroyed.

Is it morally permissible for Karl to throw the switch?

The Modified Footbridge Problem (Luke: Consensual Contact)Luke is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Luke sees what has happened: the driver of the train saw aman walking across the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed and thedriver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the man. It is moving so fast that he willnot be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Luke is standing next to the man,whom he can throw off the track out of the path of the train, thereby preventing it fromkilling the man. Unfortunately, the man is frail andstanding with his back turned. Lukecan throw the man, injuring him or he can refrain from doing this, letting the man die.

Is it morally permissible for Luke to throw the man?

In the first scenario, the agent (Hank) must choose whether to throw a switch in order to

prevent a runaway train from killing five people, knowing that doing so will cause the train to

run down and kill an innocent bystander (henceforth Foreseeable Battery). In the second

scenario, the agent (Ian) must choose whether to throw a man in front of a runaway train in

order to prevent the train from killing five people (henceforth Intentional Battery). In the third

scenario, the agent (Karl) must decide whether to throw a switch in order to prevent a runaway


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train from destroying five million dollars of equipment, knowing that doing so will kill an

innocent bystander (henceforth Bad Effects Outweigh Good Effects). Finally, in the fourth

scenario, the agent (Luke) must decide whether to throw a man walking across the tracks out

of the path of the train, knowing that doing so will injure him (henceforth Consensual

Contact).

Unlike Experiment 1, which used a between-subject design, Experiment 2 employed a

within-subject design. Each of the 65 participants received a written questionnaire containing

two scenarios, including one or more of the four scenarios reprinted above. 6 Participants were

first asked whether the proposed actions were morally permissible and then to explain or

justify their responses. 25 participants were given the Intentional Battery scenario, 25

participants were given the Foreseeable Battery scenario, 25 participants were given the Bad

Effects Outweigh Good Effects scenario, and 25 participants were given the Consensual Contact

scenario. The assignment of participants to scenario type was random.

3.2 Results

3.2.1 Intentional Battery vs. Foreseeable Battery

We present the main results of Experiment 2 in stages, beginning with the comparison

between intentional and foreseeable battery (Figure 8). 2 of 25 subjects in the Intentional Battery

condition judged the action constituting intentional battery (throwing the man) to be

permissible. Meanwhile, 19 of 25 subjects in the Foreseeable Battery condition judged the

action constituting foreseeable battery (throwing the switch) to be permissible. This difference

is significant: x2 (1, N=50) = 24.4, p < .001.


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0

5

10

15

20

25

Intentional

Battery

Foreseeable

Battery

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects



X2 (1, N=50) = 24.4,

p < .001

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Men Women Men Women

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Intentional

Battery

Subjects

Figure 9: Judgments of Two Act Types in Experiment 2 by Gender


Foreseeable

Battery

Act Type

X2 (1, N=21) = 11.4,

p < .001 (women).

X2 (1, N=27) = 13.38,

p < .001 (men).


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Male and female participants who were given these two scenarios showed a similar

pattern of responses (Figure 9). 2 of 14 men and 0 of 11 women in the Intentional Battery

condition judged throwing the man the action constituting intentional battery (throwing the

man) to be permissible. Meanwhile, 11 of 13 men and 6 of 10 women in the Foreseeable

Battery condition judged the action constituting foreseeable battery (throwing the switch) to be

permissible. These differences are also significant, x2

(1, N=21) = 11.4, p < .001 (women) and

x2 (1, N=27) = 13.38, p < .001 (men).

3.2.2 Good Effects Outweigh Bad Effects vs. Bad Effects Outweigh Good Effects

Next, we describe the results of Experiment 2 in terms of the weighing of good and bad

effects (Figure 10). As indicated, 19 of 25 subjects who were given the Hank scenario (now re-

categorized as Good Effects Outweigh Bad Effects) judged Hanks throwing the switch to be

permissible. By contrast, none of the 25 subjects who were given the Karl scenario (Bad

Effects Outweigh Good Effects) judged Karls throwing the switch to be permissible. This

difference is significant: x2 (1, N=50) = 30.65, p < .001.

Mens and womens responses followed the same pattern (Figure 11). 11 of 13 men and

6 of 10 women judged throwing the switch to be permissible in the Good Effects Outweigh Bad

Effects condition. By contrast, 0 of 14 men and 0 of 11 women held throwing the switch to be

impermissible in the Bad Effects Outweigh Good Effects condition. These results are also

significant, x2 (1, N=21) = 11.4, p < .001 (women) and x2 (1, N=27) = 19.99, p < .001 (men).


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0

5

10

15

20

25

Bad Effect >

Good Effect

Good Effect >

Bad Effect

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects


(Good Effects vs. Bad Effects)

X2 (1, N=50) = 30.65,

p < .001

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Men Women Men Women

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Bad Effect >

Good Effect

Subjects



Good Effect >

Bad Effect

Act Type

X2 (1, N=21) = 11.4,

p < .001 (women).

X2 (1, N=27) = 19.99,

p < .001 (men).


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3.2.3 Intentional Battery vs. Consensual Contact

Third, we examine the comparison between intentional battery and consensual contact

(Figure 12). As indicated, 2 of 25 subjects in the Intentional Battery condition (Ian) judged the

action constituting intentional battery (throwing the man) to be permissible. By contrast, 24 of

25 subjects in the Consensual Contact condition (Luke) judged the action constituting

consensual contact (throwing the man) to be permissible. This difference is significant: x2

(1,

N=50) = 38.78, p < .001.

Again, male and female responses conformed to the same pattern (Figure 13). 2 of 14

men and none of the 11 women in the Intentional Battery condition judged throwing the man to

be permissible. By contrast, all 7 of the men and all 16 of the women in the Consensual Contact

condition judged throwing the man to be permissible, x2

(1, N=27) = 27.0, p < .001 (women) and

x2 (1, N=21) = 14.0, p < .001 (men).7

3.2.4 Justifications

Finally, we turn to our subjects expressed justifications, that is, the responses they

provided to justify or explain their judgments. Because we utilized a within-subject design in

Experiment 2, we expected that these justifications would be significantly less adequate than the

corresponding justifications in Experiment 1, which relied on a between-subject design. In

addition, we predicted that subjects presented with both an Intentional Battery scenario and a

Foreseeable Battery scenario, in particular, would not be able to justify their conflicting

intuitions.


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0

5

10

15

20

25

Intentional

Battery

Consensual

Contact

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects


(Intentional Battery vs. Consensual Contact)

X2 (1, N=50) = 38.78,

p < .001

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Men Women Men Women

Permiss.

Impermiss.

IntentionalBattery

Subjects


(Intentional Battery vs. Consensual Contact)

ConsensualContact

Act Type

X2 (1, N=27) = 27.0,p < .001 (women ).

X2 (1, N=21) = 14.0,

p < .001 (men).


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Both of these predictions were confirmed. First, 35.4% (23/65) of participants gave no

justification and 38.5% (25/65) provided logically inadequate justifications, while only 20.0%

(13/65) provided logically adequate justifications. This contrasts sharply with the Experiment 1,

in which 50% of subjects provided logically adequate justifications.

Second, only 10% (1/10) of those subjects who were given both the Intentional Battery and

Foreseeable Battery scenarios and who attempted to provide some sort of explanation for their

judgments provided logically adequate justifications. The other 90% (9/10) provided logically

inadequate justifications. Further, as Table 2 reveals, this groups expressed principles were

widely divergent. Many participants merely restated the problem they were asked to resolve or

otherwise provided answers which were non-responsive. Moreover, several participants

appeared puzzled by the nature and strength of their intuitions and by how those intuitions

shifted as a result of apparently minor and inconsequential differences in the relevant action

descriptions.

3.3 Discussion

The results of Experiment 2 corroborate and extend those of Experiment 1. First, they

lend further support to the hypothesis that both men and women possess intuitive or unconscious

knowledge of the prohibition of intentional battery and the principle of double effect. By

imputing knowledge of these principles to our subjects, we can explain and predict their moral

intuitions. Specifically, we can explain why their intuitions flip so predictably when the standard

Bystander Problem is modified so that the costs of throwing the switch outweigh its benefits and

the standard Footbridge Problem is modified so that throwing the man no longer constitutes

intentional battery.


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Table 2: Justifications for Bystander and Footbridge Pair of Problems in Experiment 2

Problem Type of

Battery

Judgment Justification

Bystander Foreseeable Permissible

Footbridge Intentional Impermissible

Very odd. I don't know why I chose differently in the secondscenario. The end result is the same. I just chose my gut

response--and now am intrigued with how to reconcile them.



It's amazing that I would not throw a person but throw a switch tokill a person. I really wish there was more I could do for the 1guy on the other track.



In either case, the moral decision rule depends on how close tothe active killing of the man is.



Not acceptable to decide to risk someone else's life to save others.



I know--five lives are five lives--it's all about the guts. That'swhat it comes down to. Blaise Pascal got it all wrong.



The man, Hank can here actively influence a sequence of eventswhich will limit damage (# of deaths). In the second event, hecannot throw another man onto the tracks because he will activelyand deliberately kill an innocent bystander. Really an impossiblechoice.



Moral actors may be forced to make a decision between two

passive choices where both will end rights. But to make actionover passive choices requires another kind of analysis and degreeof benefit.



In the first scenario it would be permissible to act as a utilitarianoptimizer. In the second rights come into question.


Footbridge Intentional Permissible

I believe that the ultimate question is that of lives lost. Somewould argue that Hank and Ian would be morally justified in notstopping the train. While this may be true, it does not necessitatethat it be morally unjustified to stop the train.

Bystander Foreseeable Impermissible


For the first scenario, I wanted to draw a distinction between "is itpermissible for him to throw the switch" and "does he have a dutyto throw the switch," though I don't know if that would havechanged my answer.


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Second, the results of Experiment 2 suggest that individuals have limited conscious

access to these principles (or to whichever principles are actually responsible for generating their

intuitions). Even under a liberal coding scheme, only 20% of subjects provided logically

adequate justifications for their judgments. Further, only 10% did so when asked to explain the

most challenging pair of moral intuitions, namely, the perceived contrast between the Bystander

and Footbridge problems.

Third, Experiment 2 provides some initial evidence of framing effects. Most notably,

only 76% (19/25) of respondents in the Foreseeable Battery condition judged Hanks throwing

the switch to be permissible, a much lower percentage than the 95% (19/20) of participants who

gave this response in Experiment 1. These effects were slightly less pronounced in males than in

females, but they were discernible in both groups: 85% (11/13) of men gave this response, as

compared with 100% (11/11) in Experiment 1, whereas 60% (6/10) of women gave this

response, as compared with 89% (8/9) in Experiment 1. These sample sizes are obviously quite

small, and it therefore would be premature to draw any firm conclusions about these effects at

this point. It seems likely, however, that a more systematic investigation of framing effects in

larger populations would yield significant results, perhaps including significant gender

differences. Nevertheless, the main pattern of intuitions Experiment 2 fell in line with those of

Experiment 1, in that both men and women in the aggregate recognized the relevant distinctions

among the Bystander, Footbridge, Good Effects Outweigh Bad Effects, and Consensual Contact

Problems. Hence Experiment 2 provides additional evidence that at least some moral intuitions

and the principles that generate them are widely shared, irrespective of demographic variables

like gender.


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4. Experiment 3

Participants in Experiments 1-2 included persons from countries other than the United

States, including Belgium, Canada, Columbia, Denmark, France, Germany, Israel, Japan, Korea,

Lebanon, Mexico, and Puerto Rico. Nonetheless, only one or a few individuals from each of

these countries were represented, and the majority of participants were United States citizens or

members of other Western nations. Accordingly, Experiment 3 was designed to investigate the

moral intuitions of a non-Western population.

4.1 Method

4.1.1 Participants

Participants were 39 adult volunteers ages 18-65 from the broader Cambridge,

Massachusetts community, all of whom had emigrated from China within the previous five years

and most of whom had done so within the previous two years. The group included 19 women

and 19 men 1 participant did not volunteer information about his or her gender. 8


Same as Experiment 2, except that participants in this study were not asked to justify

their judgments. 14 participants were given the Intentional Battery scenario, 16 participants

were given the Intentional Battery scenario, 15 participants were given the Bad Effects Outweigh

Good Effects scenario, and 16 participants were given the Consensual Contact scenario. The

assignment of participants to scenario type was random.


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4.2 Results

4.2.1 Intentional Battery vs. Foreseeable Battery

Once again, we present the results of Experiment 3 in stages, beginning with the

comparison between intentional and foreseeable battery (Figure 14). 2 of 14 subjects in the

Intentional Battery condition judged the action constituting intentional battery (throwing the

man) to be permissible. Meanwhile, 11 of 14 subjects in the Foreseeable Battery condition

judged the action constituting foreseeable battery (throwing the switch) to be permissible.

This difference is significant: x2 (1, N=28) = 11.72, p < .001.

4.2.2 Good Effects Outweigh Bad Effects vs. Bad Effects Outweigh Good Effects

Due to the limited number of subjects in Experiment 3, we refrain from analyzing our

responses by gender. Instead, we turn directly to the comparison between good and bad effects

(Figure 15). 11 of 14 subjects in the Good Effects Outweigh Bad Effects condition judged

throwing the switch to be permissible. Meanwhile, only 1 of 15 subjects in the Bad Effects

Outweigh Good Effects condition judged throwing the switch to be permissible. This difference

is significant: x2 (1, N=29) = 16.81, p < .001.

4.2.3 Intentional Battery vs. Consensual Contact

Third, we examine the contrast between intentional battery and consensual contact

(Figure 16). 2 of 16 subjects in the Intentional Battery condition judged throwing the man to be

permissible. Meanwhile, 14 of 16 subjects in the Consensual Contact condition judged throwing

the man to be permissible. This difference is significant: x2 (1, N=32) = 18.0, p < .001.


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0

2

4

6

8

10

12

Intentional

Battery

Foreseeable

Battery

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects



X2 (1, N=28) = 11.72,

p < .001

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Bad Effect >

Good Effect

Good Effect >

Bad Effect

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects



X2 (1, N=29) = 16.81,

p < .001


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4.3 Discussion

The results of Experiment 3 suggest that the central findings of Experiments 1-2 are not

limited to persons educated or raised in the United States or other Western nations. Instead, they

suggest at least some operative principles of moral competence, including the prohibition of

intentional battery and the principle of double effect, are transnational and may be universal.

While claims of universality are often controversial and should be made with care, this

hypothesis is consistent with the role these principles already play in international law (i.e., the

law of nations). For example, the principle of double effects implied norm of non-combatant

immunitythat is, its prohibition against directly targeting civilians, together with its qualified

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Intentional

Battery

Consensual

Contact

Permiss.

Impermiss.

Act Type

Subjects

Figure 16: Moral Judgments of Two Act Types in Experiment 3(Intentional Battery vs. Consensual Contact)

X2 (1, N=32) = 18.0,

p < .001


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acceptance of harming civilians as a necessary side effect of an otherwise justifiable military

operationhas long been part of customary international law and is codified in Article 48 of the

First Protocol (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions (e.g., Henkin, Pugh, Schacter & Smit,

1993, p. 364-65). Likewise, the principle of double effects implied norm of proportionality is

also part of customary international law and is codified in Articles 22-23 of the Hague

Convention of 1907 (e.g., Henkin et al., 1993, p. 368). Further, many important legal doctrines,

in both American law and the domestic law of other nations, turn on an analysis of purpose and

the distinction between intended and foreseen effects (Mikhail, 2002). Hence it is perhaps not

surprising to discover that thought experiments like trolley problems, which implicate these

concepts, elicit widely shared moral intuitions from individuals of different cultural

backgrounds.

Nevertheless, while Experiment 3 provides some initial support for the existence of moral

universals, this support is obviously quite limited. More empirical investigation on a much wider

scale is necessary before specific claims about universality could be defensible. In the context of

our hypothesis, what would perhaps be most compelling in this regard would be to collect

additional evidence on trolley intuitions from individuals from around the world, in particular

those from markedly different cultural, social, religious, and socioeconomic backgrounds. To do

this, one would presumably need to translate these thought experiments into different languages.

One might also need to modify them in culturally specific ways, insofar as certain inessential

elements of the scenarios (e.g., trolleys) may be unfamiliar. We do not attempt these extensions

in this paper but merely identify them as objectives of future research which flow naturally from

the studies presented here.9


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5. Experiment 4

Experiments 1-3 suggest that the moral competence of adults includes the prohibition of

intentional battery and the principle of double effect. By attributing intuitive knowledge of these

principles to our subjects, we can explain and predict their moral intuitions.

As Table 3 indicates, the computations presupposed by this explanation can be

reconstructed in the simple form of series of yes-no questions or decision tree. Presented with a

presumptively wrong action, such as those harmful actions at issue in the Trolley, Transplant,

Bystander, and Footbridge problems, the decision-maker first asks whether the proposed actions

good effects outweigh its bad effects. If the answer is no, then the decision-maker concludes the

action is impermissible. If the answer is yes, then the decision-maker next asks whether the

action involves committing a battery as a means to achieve a given end. If the answer is no, then

the decision-maker concludes that the action is permissible. If the answer is yes, then the

decision-maker concludes that the action is impermissible.

Table 3: Explanation of Trolley, Transplant, Bystander, and Footbridge Intuitions as a

Function of the Principle of Double EffectProblem (Agent) Homicide? Battery? Good Effects

Outweigh

Bad Effects?

Battery as a

Means?

Deontic

Status

Trolley (Charlie) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Transplant (Dr.Brown) Yes Yes Yes Yes Impermissible

Bystander (Denise) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Footbridge (Nancy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Impermissible

Bystander (Hank) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Footbridge (Ian) Yes Yes Yes Yes Impermissible

Modified Bystander (Karl) Yes Yes No No Impermissible

Modified Footbridge (Luke) No No Yes No Permissible


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Table 3 illustrates that our central findings up to this point can be explained in the

foregoing terms. However, our findings are also consistent with an alternative explanation,

according to which trolley intuitions do not depend primarily on the mental state properties of an

agents action plan, but on its temporalproperties, in particular whether its bad effects (or its

prima facie wrongs such as battery) are mentally represented as occurring before orafterits

good effects. In particular, our central findings could be equally explained by the so-called

Pauline Principle, which holds that it is impermissible to do evil that good may come

(Anscombe, 1970 Donagan, 1977). Suitably formalized, a temporal interpretation of this

principle would in effect compute as impermissible any action plan which represents either a

bad effect or a battery occurring before a good effect. As Table 4 reveals, all but one of the

impermissible act representations examined thus far possess this property, the lone exception,

Karls throwing the switch in the Modified Bystander Problem, being explainable on other

grounds.10 Hence the Pauline Principle (or some suitable formalization of it) also constitutes

(part of) an observationally adequate explanation of the results of Experiments 1-3.

Table 4: Explanation of Trolley, Transplant, Bystander, and Footbridge Intuitions as a

Function of the Pauline PrincipleProblem (Agent) Homicide? Battery? Good Effects

Outweigh

Bad Effects?

Battery or Bad

Effects Prior to

Good Effects?

Deontic

Status

Trolley (Charlie) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Transplant (Dr.Brown) Yes Yes Yes Yes Impermissible

Bystander (Denise) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Footbridge (Nancy) Yes Yes Yes Yes Impermissible

Bystander (Hank) Yes Yes Yes No Permissible

Footbridge (Ian) Yes Yes Yes Yes ImpermissibleModified Bystander (Karl) Yes Yes No No Impermissible

Modified Footbridge (Luke) No No Yes No Permissible


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Experiment 4 was designed to investigate this logically possible alternative, as well as to

provide an additional check on the abstract concept of battery utilized in Experiments 1-3. To

accomplish these objectives, we constructed the following two new scenarios (Mikhail, 2000):

The Looped Track ProblemIntentional Battery (Ned)Ned is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Ned sees what has happened: the driver of the train sawfive men walking across the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed andthe driver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the five men. It is moving so fast thatthey will not be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Ned is standing next to aswitch, which he can throw, that will temporarily turn the train onto a side track. There isa heavy object on the side track. If the train hits the object, the object will slow the traindown, thereby giving the men time to escape. Unfortunately, the heavy object is a man,standing on the side track with his back turned. Ned can throw the switch, preventing the

train from killing the men, but killing the man. Or he can refrain from doing this, lettingthe five die.

Is it morally permissible for Ned to throw the switch?

The Looped Track ProblemForeseeable Battery (Oscar)Oscar is taking his daily walk near the train tracks when he notices that the train that isapproaching is out of control. Oscar sees what has happened: the driver of the train sawfive men walking across the tracks and slammed on the brakes, but the brakes failed andthe driver fainted. The train is now rushing toward the five men. It is moving so fast thatthey will not be able to get off the track in time. Fortunately, Oscar is standing next to aswitch, which he can throw, that will temporarily turn the train onto a side track. There isa heavy object on the side track. If the train hits the object, the object will slow the traindown, thereby giving the men time to escape. Unfortunately, there is a man standing onthe side trackin front of the heavy object, with his back turned. Oscar can throw theswitch, preventing the train from killing the men, but killing the man. Or he can refrainfrom doing this, letting the five die.

Is it morally permissible for Oscar to throw the switch?11

In the first scenario (Ned), battery is embedded within the agents action plan as a means. In

the second scenario (Oscar), battery is embedded within the agents action plan as a side

effect. Unlike the scenarios used in Experiments 1-3, however, the Ned-Oscar pair is not

distinguishable in terms of their morally neutral basic actions (e.g., throwing the switch vs.

throwing the man) or the temporal properties of their good effects, bad effects, and batteries.


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Instead, five fundamental properties are held constant between these two scenarios: (1) good

effects, (2) bad effects, (3) ultimate purpose or goal, (4) morally neutral basic action (throwing

the switch in each case), and (5) the temporal order of good effects, bad effects, and batteries.

Further, both are impersonal scenarios in the sense defined by Greene and colleagues (Greene

et al., 2001). The Ned-Oscar pair is therefore the pure

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John Mikhail - SSRN-Id762385

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