The 18th-century Calvinist philosopher and theologian Jonathan Ed-wards1isamonist.He’snotjustamonistinthesenseinwhichHobbesorBerkeleyisamonist—someonewhobelievesthatthere’sonlyonekindofsubstance—butamonistinthesenseinwhichthegreather-eticSpinozaisamonist.2Thereis,necessarily,onlyonesubstance.3
No action at a distance.Causeandeffectcannotbelocatedindifferentplacesoratdifferenttimes.
1. AllreferencestoEdwards’sworkaretoThe Works of Jonathan Edwards,citedbyvolumeandpage,aswellasworktitle.Free Will, Original Sin, andReligious Affections werepublishedduringEdwards’slifetime;The Nature of True Virtue andThe End for which God Created the World wereintendedforpublicationbutonlypublishedposthumously.TheothertextsIrefertowerenotintendedforpublication.
2. EdwardsdoesnotseemtohaveknownmuchaboutSpinoza.Hereferstohimatonepointastheauthoroftheview“thatGodmayhaveabody;orrather,thattheuniverse,orthematteroftheuniverse,isGod”(Misc. 1233,23.166).(Cf.Misc. 1297,23.242:“TOLANDwasoftheopinionthatthereisnootherGodbuttheuniverse,thereinagreeingwithSpinoza.”)Edwardsdisapprovesofthisview,buthisreactiontoSpinozaisnowherenearasextremeashisreactiontotheothergreatearlymodernbugbear,Hobbes:“AstoMr.Hobbes’maintainingthesamedoctrine[asme]…Iconfess,ithappensIneverreadMr.Hobbes.Lethisopinionbewhatitwill,weneednotrejectalltruthwhichisdemonstratedbyclearevidence,merelybecauseitwasonceheldbysomebadman.Thisgreattruth,thatJesusistheSonofGod,wasnotspoiledbe-causeitwasonceandagainproclaimedwithaloudvoicebythedevil.”(Free-dom of the Will 4.6,1.374).
Edwardsseemstohaveadoptedthissysteminhisearlytwentiesandmaintainedituntilhisdeath.Hepresentedthesystemandsomeargumentsforitinpieceswrittenatdifferenttimesandfordifferentpurposes, some of which were left unfinished and almost none ofwhichwereintendedforpublication.Theargumentativestructureisnotalwaysexactlythesame:whatlooklikepremisesinsometextsareconclusionsinothers;whatisallegedtobeself-evidentinoneplaceisarguedforinanother;andsoon.Nevertheless,thesystemasawholeisremarkablystable,andtwomainlinesofargumentrunthroughit.Onelineofargumentusesno action at a distance asitsmainpremise,andinferscontinual creation andno enduring things fromit.Thislineofargumentsupportsno created substance andno created powers withoutquite implyingthem,forno action at a distance andno enduring things leave open the possibility ofmomentary substances that are imma-nentcausesof theirownstates. I’vediscussedthis lineofargumentelsewhere.7Allweneedtoknowhereisthatitdoesnotmakeclearthepreciseontologicalstatusofwhateveritisthat’scontinuallycreated.
Here I’ll consider the second lineof argument. It startswith thenotionthatpropertiesmustbeupheldbysomethingandaskswhat’sdoingtheupholding,ultimatelyconcludingthatonlyGod—andnotmatter—canupholdthepropertiesofbodies.Thisyieldstheconclu-sionthattherearenomaterialsubstancesandnopowersthereof.Ed-wardslatergeneralizestheconclusiontothecaseofimmaterialsub-stance aswell, thus endingupwithno created powers andno created substance. Thissecondlineofargumentsupportscontinual creationandno enduring things withoutimplyingthem,for,again,itdoesnottelluswhatthecreatedworldis—onlywhatitisnot.
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In 1721, the teenage JonathanEdwards speculated about auniversewithoutminds,andventuredthesuggestionthatsuchaworldwouldexist “only in the divine consciousness” (“Of Being”; 6.204). A few
7. LoLordo2014.
No created powers.OnlyGodhaspowerandthusonlyGodisatruecause.4
No created substances.Godistheonlygenuinesubstance.
No enduring things.5Nothingenduresthroughtime.
No matter.Thereisnomatter.6
Someof theseprinciplesareunusual.As faras I know,noneofEd-wards’spredecessorsorcontemporariesarguedforno enduring things. And althoughmany of Edwards’s contemporariesworried about ac-tionatadistance,Edwards’sprincipleno action at a distance ismuchstronger than theirs: as far as I know,nobody except Edwardswor-riedaboutactionatatemporaldistanceorthoughtthatevenaspatiallycontiguouseffectwas too faraway from itsallegedcause.However,theother fourprincipleswere relatively common.Continual creation wasverywidelyaccepted,althoughphilosophersdisagreedaboutthesense inwhich conservationandcreationareequivalent.No created powers wasacceptedbyMalebrancheandothers,no created substances was(mutatis mutandis) Spinoza’sview,andno matter Berkeley’s.
4. GiventhisprincipleplustheclaimthatGodisnotinspaceortime(Misc. 1208,23.138),no action at a distance is redundant.However,no action at a distance deservesaplaceon the listbecause it is sometimesusedasapremise forargumentsforno created powers.
5. Thisprinciplemayberedundantgivenno created substances:Ithinkthattra-ditionalsubstanceontologiesassumethatonlysubstancesendure.However,theassumptionissufficientlyhiddenthatit’sworthbringingoutno enduring things asaseparateprinciple.
Infact,IthinkEdwardsacceptsthestrongerprincipleno persisting things, althoughIdonottrytomakethecaseforthishere.(SeeLoLordo2014formyargument.)Thisprinciplewouldnot followfromno created substances.
6. Theprinciplesno created powers, no created substance, andno enduring things to-gethermightseemtomakeno matter redundant.(Ifmatterisnotasubstanceanddoesnotendurethroughtimeandcannotact,whatofthetraditionalcon-ceptionofmatterisleft?)Butit’sworththinkingofitasaseparateprinciplebecauseEdwardsadoptedno matter beforetheotherthreenegativeprinciples.
Edwards, like Berkeley, emphasizes that the esse of bodies is theirpercipi:
[I]nwhatrespecthasanythinghadabeing,whenthereisnothingconsciousofitsbeing?…Thusforinstance,sup-posingaroominwhichnoneis,noneseesthethingsintheroom,nocreatedintelligence:thethingsintheroomhave no being any otherway than only asGod is con-scious [of them]; for there is no color there, neither isthereanysound,noranyshape.(Misc. pp;13.188)
8. Berkeleyinsiststhatalthoughimmaterialismmakesit,strictlyspeaking,falsethat“fireheats,orwatercools”,nevertheless“insuchthingsweoughtto think with the learned, and speak with the vulgar”(Principles 1.51).
9. WallaceAnderson’sintroductiontoEdwards’sScientific and Philosophical Writ-ings(Works 6.76–79); Marsden2003,73.
10. Edwardsdid,however,becomeawareofBerkeley’sworklater:intextsfrom1726–1728,hereferstothePrinciples andtheNew Theory (26.102–103),andlatertoAlciphron (26.192).
11. HequotesCudworth’sTrue Intellectual System of the World atgreatlength(seee. g.Misc. 1352,23.640–673).AccordingtohisCatalogue of Books(volume26oftheWorks),heread,oratleastintendedtoread,Bayle’sDictionary (entries
years later,he reiterated that “[t]heworld, i. e. thematerialuniverse,existsnowherebutinthemind”(“TheMind”34;6.353)andthat
[T]herecanbenothing like those thingswecallby thenameofbodiesoutofthemind,unlessitbeinsomeoth-ermindorminds…thesubstanceofallbodiesistheinfi-nitelyexactandpreciseandperfectlystableideainGod’smind, togetherwith his stablewill that the same shallgraduallybecommunicatedtous,andtootherminds,ac-cording to certainfixed and exact establishedmethodsandlaws.(“TheMind”13;6.344)
[T]hereisnosuchthingasmaterialsubstancetrulyandproperly distinct fromall those that are called sensiblequalities….Whatwecallbodyisnothingbutaparticu-larmodeofperception(“NotesonKnowledgeandExis-tence”;6.398).
The table Iwrite on I say exists, that is, I see and feelit; and if I were out of my study I should say it exist-ed—meaningtherebythat if Iwas inmystudyImightperceive it, or that someother spirit actually does per-ceiveit.(Principles1.3)
motion, etc., that wholly makes up what we call body.(The Mind 27,6.351;cf.Misc. 1340,23.363)
However,Edwardsthinks,it’suncontroversialthatthisideaofbodyisseriouslyflawed.Theproblemconcernscolor(and,implicitly,theoth-ersecondaryqualities).13Theideaofcolorshouldnotbeacomponentofour ideaofbody,becausebodiesdon’t reallyhavecolors: “everyknowingphilosopher”agreesthat“colorsare…strictlynowhereelsebutinthemind”(The Mind 27,6.350).
Thismove is a bitworrying. Lots of earlymodern philosophersthoughtthatcolorexistsoutsidethemind(Locke,forinstance,whoseviewEdwardscertainlyknew.)ButallEdwardsreallyneedstoruleoutisthepossibilitythatcolorisafundamentalpropertyofbodies,some-thingbodieshaveoverandabovetheirextensionandimpenetrability.Andthoseearlymodernswhothoughtthatcolorisinbodiestypicallyalsothoughtthatcolorandtheothersecondaryqualitiesarereducibletotheprimaryqualitiesofbodies.
Theremovalofcolorfromourordinaryconceptionofbodyleavesuswithaconceptionofbodyasthatwhichhasextensionandimpen-etrability.Edwards,quitereasonably, thinksofthisastheconsensusview,andit’stheviewcommonlyascribedtoClarke,Locke,More,andNewton, amongothers. Edwards argues against it on thebasisof aclaim that (as far as I know) is unique to him—that extension is amodeofresistance:
13. Edwardsdoesnotuse the terminologyofprimaryandsecondaryqualitiesmuch,andwhenhedoesspeakofprimaryqualities,heseemstomeansome-thing like essential qualities (e. g. Things to be Considered an[d] Written Fully About 31,6.290).
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Edwards’sargumentformonismhasthreestages.Inthefirststage,hearguesthatbodiesarenothingoverandaboveresistance.Thisbyit-selfiscompatiblewithsomeformsofmaterialism.Inthesecondstage,Edwardsaddsthatresistancemustbeupheldbysomething,andthattheonlythingthatcouldupholdresistanceisGod.ThusEdwardscon-cludes that there isnomatter,aconclusionwhich reinforceshisbe-lief(arrivedat forotherreasons12)thatGodexists.Thesamelineofthoughtalsoyieldsrestrictedversionsoftheotherfundamentalmeta-physicalprinciples.Inthethirdstage,hemovesfromimmaterialismtomonism,arguingthatthepowersandpropertiesofminds—aswellasbodies—canbeupheldonlybyGod.And,atthispoint,Edwardsconcludesthattherearenocreatedsubstancesatall,onlyGod.
[W]hatideaisthatwhichwecallbythenameofbody?Ifindcolorhasthechiefshareinit.’Tisnothingbutcolor,andfigurewhichistheterminationofthiscolor,togetherwith some powers such as the power of resisting, and
12. EdwardsarguesfortheexistenceofGodfromimmaterialism;fromthefactthatbelief inGodis“natural”(Misc. 268,13.373);fromtheapparentdesignof theuniverse (Misc. 312, 13.394); and from theprincipleof sufficient rea-son(Freedom of the Will 4.13,1.424;The Mind 54,6.370;Misc. 880,20.122),aprinciplewhichhethinksthatwecannothelpbelieving(The Mind 54,6.370)andwhichisself-evidentlytrueanduniversallyrecognized(Misc. 91,13.254).However,hethinksthatthemostbasicandmostcertaingroundofbeliefisdirectexperienceofthedivine.Suchanexperience,inwhichLockeannewsimpleideasareconveyedthatcouldnotcomefromanyothersource,makesitevidentthatGodexists(Religious Affections 3,2.205).
In the second stage, Edwards claims that resistance cannot exist byitselfbutdependsforitsexistenceonsomeotherthing,which,itturnsout,canonlybeGod.Hegives tworeasons to think that resistancecannotexistbyitself,bothofthemrelativelystraightforward.First,re-sistanceisapower,andpowersdon’tact—thingswith powersact.15 Second, resistance is a property, and properties cannot exist all ontheirown;theymustbepropertiesof something.Edwardsdoesn’tfeelmuchofaneedtodefendthisclaim,since,hethinks,everyoneacceptsitalready:16
The reasonwhy it is so exceedingly natural tomen tosuppose that there is some latent substance, or some-thingthatisaltogetherhid,thatupholdsthepropertiesofbodies,isbecauseallseeatfirstsightthatthepropertiesofbodiesare suchasneedsomecause that shallevery
15. Inanothercontext,Edwardsinsistson“thegreatimproprietyofsuchphrases,andwaysofspeaking,as‘thewill’sdeterminingitself’;becauseactionsaretobeascribedtoagents,andnotproperlytothepowersofagents;whichim-properwayofspeakingleadstomanymistakes,andmuchconfusion,asMr.Lockeobserves”(Freedom of the Will 2.1,1.171–172).
thereisnothingoutofthemindbutresistance.(The Mind 27,6.351)
Two caveats are in order here. First, when Edwards talks about re-sistance,he’snot talkingaboutwhatNewtonorLeibnizwastalkingabout.Rather,he’stalkingaboutthepowertoresistpenetration.ForEdwards,impenetrability,resistance,andsolidityarethesamething.
Second,whenEdwardssaysthatextensionisamodeofresistance,hedoesn’tmeanthatspace isamodeofresistance.Theextensioninquestionisbodily extension,notspatial extension.Fortheretobere-sistance,onEdwards’sview,issimplyforacertainregionofspacetoresistincursion(The Mind 61,6.379).Onewayfortheretoberesistanceis foracertainpartofspace—say,aroughlysphericalpartofspaceaboutnineinchesindiameter—toresistpenetration.Andwhenacer-tainpartofspacebehavesinthisway,wesaythatthereisanextended,impenetrablethingpresent,abody.
That Edwards is here relying on the existence of some kind ofspacethatexistspriortothebodiesinitisclearinpassageslikethefollowing:
Since…bodyandsolidityarethesame,and…resistanceor solidityareby the immediateexerciseofdivinepow-er,itfollowsthatthecertainunknownsubstance,whichphilosophersusedtothinksubsistedbyitself,andstoodunderneathandkeptupsolidityandallotherproperties… isnothingatalldistinct fromsolidity itself;or, if theymustneedsapplythatwordtosomethingelsethatdoesreallyandproperlysubsistbyitselfandsupportallproper-ties,theymustapplyittothedivineBeingorpoweritself.…Sothatthesubstanceofbodiesatlastbecomeseithernothing,ornothingbuttheDeityactinginthatparticularmannerinthosepartsofspacewherehethinksfit.(6.215)
We’vealsoseenthatEdwardshimselfthoughtthatresistanceisup-heldbyspaceatonepoint.ThisthoughtreliedonidentifyingspacewithGod and hence conceiving of space as absolute. Edwards’s ar-gument for the identificationofspacewithGodclosely followsonegivenbyHenryMore.17Itsstartingpointisthepremisethatthereis“anecessary,eternal,infinite,andomnipresentbeing”(“OfBeing”,6.202).ThesefourattributesapplytobothspaceandGod.Soifspaceexists,theneitherit’ssomethinglikeasecondGod,oritjustis God.Andthefirstpossibilityisobviouslyunacceptable.SospacemustbeGod.
Theideawehaveofspace,andwhatwecallbythatname,is only colored space, and is entirely taken out of themindifcolorbetakenaway;andsoallthatwecallexten-sion,motionandfigureisgoneifcolorisgone.Astoanyideaofspace,extension,distanceormotionthatamanbornblindmightform,itwouldbenothinglikewhatwecallbythosenames.Allthathecouldhavewouldbeonlycertainsensationsor feelings, that inthemselveswouldbenomore likewhatwe intendby space,motion, etc.,thanthepainwehavebythescratchofapin….Andastotheideaofmotionthatsuchanonecouldhave,itcouldbeonlyadiversificationofthosesuccessionsinacertainway,bysuccessionastotime.(The Mind 13,6.343–344)
Edwardsassumesthatitfollowsfromourinabilitytoconceiveofemp-ty space thatempty space is impossible.Space thusdepends for its
NoticethewayEdwardscharacterizestherelationbetweenpropertiesandsubstances.Substanceisthatwhich“upholds”bodies.Substanceisalsothatwhich“shall…haveinfluencetotheircontinuance,aswellasacauseoftheirfirstexistence”.It’snatural,Edwardsseemstobesay-ing,forustothinkthatpropertiesinhereinsomethinghiddenbecausetheir continued existence requires a cause.At first this looks like anon sequitur. InmanycasesEdwards’s contemporaries andpredeces-sors thought thatcausationand inherencedidnoteven involve thesamerelata.(ThinkofDescartes’sphysics,forinstance:ifweaskwhatcausesthemotionofbodyA,we’llpoint toanotherbody; ifweaskwhat thatmotion inheres in,we’llpoint tobodyA itself.)However,thecauseEdwardshasinmindhereisnotacauseofbecomingbutacauseofbeing.WhatcausesthemotionofbodyA,inthis sense,isGod,continuallyconservingtheworldinexistence.
The lastpossibilityEdwardsconsidersand rulesout is that resis-tanceisupheldbyabaresubstratum:
… the certain unknown substance, which philosophersused to think subsistedby itself, and stoodunderneathandkeptupsolidityandallotherproperties,whichtheyusedtosayitwasimpossibleforamantohaveanideaof(“OfAtoms”,6.215–216)….
Whoarethesephilosophers?EdwardscouldhavefoundthenotionofabaresubstratuminLocke,whomocksit.ButamorelikelysourceisHenryMore.Morenicely articulates the featureless-substratumcon-ceptionofsubstanceinThe Immortality of the Soul:
The Subject, or naked Essence or Substance of a thing, is utterly unconceivable to any of our Faculties.… For the evidenc-ingofthisTruth,thereneedsnothingmorethenasilentappealtoamansowneMind,ifhedonotfinditso;andthatifhetakeawayallAptitudes, Operations, Properties andModifications fromaSubject, that his conception thereofvanishes intonothing,but into the Idea ofamereUndi-versificated Substance; so that oneSubstance is not thendistinguishablefromanother,butonelyfromAccidents orModes, towhichproperly belongs no subsistence. (BookI,Ch.II,AxiomeVII)
If you take away the “Aptitudes, Operations, Properties [in the narrow,technical sense] andModifications”, then you’re leftwith the ideaofsomethingwithoutproperties in thebroadsense.You’re left, that is,with the ideaof abare substratum inwhich theproperties are sup-posedtoinhere.
Edwardsalsocametoworry that thesuppositionofaworldcon-tainingonlyabsolutespaceandresistanceisincoherent:
[T]here is nothing out of themindbut resistance.Andnotthat,neither,whennothingisactuallyresisted;thenthere isnothingbut theactualexertionofGod’spower,so thepower canbenothing elsebut the constant lawormethodofthatactualexertion.Andhowisthereanyresistanceexceptitbeinsomemind,inidea?Whatisitthat is resisted? It isnotcolor.Andwhatelse is it? It isridiculoustosaythatresistanceisresisted.Thatdoesnottellusatallwhatistoberesisted.…
Letussupposetwoglobesonlyexisting,andnomind.Thereisnothingthere,exconfesso,butresistance.Thatis,thereissuchalawthatthespacewithinthelimitsofaglobularfigureshall resist.Therefore there isnothingtherebutapower,oranestablishment.Andif therebeanyresistancereallyoutofthemind,onepowerandes-tablishmentmustresistanotherestablishmentandlawofresistance,whichisexceedinglyridiculous.…Butnowitiseasytoconceiveofresistanceasamodeofanidea.Itiseasytoconceiveofsuchapowerorconstantmannerofstoppingorresistingacolor.Theideamayberesisted—itmaymove,andstop,andrebound;buthowamerepower…canmove and stop is inconceivable….Theworld isthereforeanidealone.(The Mind 27,6.351)
Edwardswritesthat“itisuniversallyallowedthatgravitydependsimmediatelyonthedivineinfluence”(Things to be Considered an[d] Writ-ten Fully About 23(a),6.234–235). Thisisanexaggeration.Buttheviewwas indeedcommon.ConsideroneofEdwards’sPuritan forefathers,CottonMather—thefirstAmericanmemberoftheRoyalSociety:18
Very various have been the Sentiments of the Curious,whatCause there should be assign’d for this great andcatholick Affection of Matter, theVis Centripeta …. ’Tisenough to me what that incomparable Mathematician,Dr.Halley, has declar’d upon it: That, after all,Gravity …mustbereligiouslyresolv’d into the immediate Will ofourmostwiseCREATOR,who,byappointing thisLaw, throughoutthematerialWorld,keepsallBodiesintheirproperPlacesandStations.(The Christian Philosopher, Es-say 21,90)
Iftherebeanythingthatmakesusapttoseekmoreforareasonofgravitythansolidity, ’tisbecausesolidity isaqualitysoprimarythattheverybeingofthethingde-pendson it. Ifweremovethe ideaof it, thereremainsnothingatallthatwecanconceive.Butwecanconceiveofsomethingexistingwithoutthinkingofgravitatingatadistance.Theyarebothofthemessentialandprimaryqualities, but there is this difference: theone is essen-tialinordertotheveryexistence,theotherinordertotheharmoniousexistence,ofbody.Thoughgravityitself
[T]heideaswehavebyanyofoursenses:color,orvisibleextensionandfigure…and…thesensiblequalitieswehavebyothersenses,as…solidity…and…extensionandfigure…thatthereshouldbeanysubstanceentirelydistinct fromanyorallof these isutterly inconceivable.Forifweexcludeallcolor,solidity,orconceivableexten-sion, dimensions and figure, what is there left thatweconceiveof? Is therenot a removal inourmindsof allexistence,andaperfectemptinessofeverything? (Misc. 1340,23.363)
Itwasbeforeagreedonallhandsthatthereissomethingtherethatsupportsthatresistance.Itmustbegrantednowthatthatsomethingisabeingthatactsthere,asmuchasthatbeingthatcausesbodiestodescendtowardsthecen-ter.Hereissomethinginthesepartsofspacethatofitselfproduces effects, without previously being acted upon.Forthatbeingthatlaysanarrestonbodiesinmotion,andimmediatelystopsthemwhentheycometosuchlimitsand bounds, certainly does asmuch as that being thatsetsabody inmotionthatwasbeforeat rest.Nowthisbeing, actingaltogetherof itself,producingneweffectsthatareperfectlyarbitrary,andthatarenowaynecessaryof themselves,mustbe intelligentandvoluntary.Thereisnoreasoninthenatureofthethingitselfwhyabody,whensetinmotion,shouldstopatsuchlimitsmorethanatanyother. Itmust thereforebesomearbitrary,activeandvoluntarybeingthatdeterminesit.(6.378)
Why is resistance arbitrary?The term ‘arbitrary’ suggests twodiffer-ent things in Edwards’s context: something arbitrary is somethingcontingent(orat leastnotnecessary invirtueof itsownnature),orelsesomethingthathastodowith liberum arbitrium,freewill.Ifhe’stoavoidbeggingthequestion,Edwardsmusthavethefirstsenseinmind.Hemustbethinkingthatwhentwoatomscollide,it’snotnec-essary—orat leastnotnecessary invirtueof thenaturesof thetwo
between the continuousparts is necessary in order totheexistence,theminddoesnotsointuitivelyseehow.But yet gravity is a quality more primary in these re-spects,andmoreessential,thanmobilityis,whichnoneseekareasonfororintheleastquestiontobeaprimaryquality ofmatter. (Things to be Considered an[d] Written Fully About 31,6.290)
Thus, he argues, if you think that gravity involves direct divine in-tervention, you shouldalso think that solidity involvesdirectdivineintervention:
Andwhyisitnoteverywhitasreasonablethatweshouldattributethisactionoreffect[resistance]totheinfluenceofsomeagent,asthatotheractionoreffectwhichwecallgravity…?Wedonot think it sufficient to say it is thenature of theunknown substance in theone case; andwhyshouldwethinkitasufficientexplication…intheother?Bysubstance,Isupposeitisconfessed,wemeanonly‘something’,becauseofabstractsubstancewehavenoideathatismoreparticularthanonlyexistenceingen-eral.Nowwhyisitnotasreasonable,whenweseesome-thingsuspendedintheair,settomovewithviolenceto-wardstheearth,torestinattributingofittothenatureofthesomethingthatisthere,aswhenweseethatmotion,whenitcomestosuchlimits,allonasuddencease?Forthisisallthatweobserveinfallingbodies.Theirfallingistheactionwecallgravity;theirstoppinguponthesurfaceoftheearththeactionwhencewegaintheideaofsolidity.(The Mind 61,6.378)
Edwards’sconclusion,atthispoint,isthatthereisnomind-indepen-dentmatterandnobodilypowers—restrictedversionsofno created substance andno created powers.Infact,theargumentwe’veseensofarissues in restricted versions ofall the fundamental ontological prin-ciples.Itshowsthatbodiesarecontinuallybeingcreated,inthesensethattheirexistenceateachmomentrequiresupholdingbysomethingbeyondthemselves. Italsoexplainswhyimmaterialismimpliesare-strictedversionofno enduring things:theexerciseofdivinepower,anaction,isn’teventhekind ofthingthatmightendurethroughtime.Fi-nally,itimpliesarestrictedversionofno action at a distance,becauseaf-teradoptingimmaterialism,Edwardsreinterpretseverydaylanguagesothattalkofaspiritbeinginsomeplaceistalkofitbeingabletoactonsomething(Misc. 264,13.370).Iftheonlypossibleagentsarespiritsandaspiritiswhereitacts,thenit’strivialthatthecauseiswheretheeffectis.
The third and final stage of Edwards’s argument formonism ex-tends these conclusions tominds. This happens very quickly—per-hapstooquickly.Afterarguingthatthereisnomaterialsubstance,Ed-wards—oncemorelikeBerkeley—considerstheobjectionthatifweabandonmaterialsubstance,weshouldabandonbeliefinimmaterial substancestoo:
Answer:True, for this iswhat is supposed, thatall exis-tenceisperception.Whatwecallbodyisnothingbutaparticularmodeofperception;andwhatwecallspiritisnothingbutacompositionandseriesofperceptions,or
IsaidearlierthatEdwardsspeaksofupholdingwherehiscontem-porariesandpredecessorsmightspeakofcausationorinherence.Inthefirstargument,itlookslikewhatupholdsresistanceissimplywhatresistanceinheresin.Butinthesecondargument,it lookslikewhatupholdsresistanceiswhatcauses it.Sothenwhyisthesecondargu-mentsupposedtobesufficientonitsown?Whydoesn’titleaveopenthepossibilitythatresistanceisexercisedbyGodbutinheresinsome-thingelse—amaterialsubstance,forinstance?Inotherwords,whyisthisanargumentforimmaterialisminsteadofjustanargumentforoc-casionalism?Malebranche,forinstance,wouldgrantthattheactionswe attribute to bodies are in factGod’s actions, but still accepts theexistenceofmaterialsubstances.
Thedifferenceisthis:Malebranchewouldnotbehappywiththefirst stageofEdwards’s argument, thatbodies arenothingover andabove the power of resistance. Malebranche’s bodies have somefundamental, categorical features—they are extended substances.
Essence or Substance of a thing’. Butthisisnotaterriblysatisfyingexpla-nation.ItstillleavesusthinkingthatEdwardsshould haveconsideredthepossibilitythatthoughtsareupheldbyacreatedsubstance.AnditishardtosquareacommitmenttotheMoreannotionofsubstanceassubstratumwithEdwards’scommitmenttothesubstantialityofGod(“NotesonKnowledgeandExistence”,6.398).
Edwards, like Spinoza, is amonist: he holds that there is only onesubstance.Spinozaissometimesreadasmakingthefurther,farmoreradicalclaimthatthereisonlyonething,therebydenyingtherealityofmodesaltogether.(This is theviewrecentlycalled“existencemo-nism”.)Alternately,Spinoza issometimesreadasholdingthat thereisonlyonefundamental thing,althoughithasaspartsrealthingsthatareposteriortothewhole.(Thisistheviewrecentlycalled“prioritymonism”.21)Isharethedominantviewthatbothreadingsareincorrect:Spinoza’smodesarerealthings,andtheyarenotpartsoftheonesub-stance.22IshallnotdefendthisreadingofSpinozahere.Ibringitupsolelyasawaytoraisethequestion:IsEdwardsamonistaboutthings,
20.Inanycase,Edwardsholdsthatthemindissometimeswithoutactsorexer-cises(The Mind 69,6.384–385).Hencehecannotholdthatthemindisalwaysthinkingorthattheessenceofthemindisthought.
21. For the terms ‘existencemonism’ and ‘prioritymonism’, see Schaffer 2010.TheexistencemonistreadingofSpinozawassuggestedbyPierreBayleandwasstandardamongtheGermanIdealists.SeeMelamed2012fordetails.
The argument is farmore stripped down in the case ofminds. Ed-wards’s argument againstmaterial substance involves three strands.One is a setof claimsabout space, extension, andprimaryand sec-ondaryqualities.Thisfallsoutofthepictureintheargumentagainstthinking substance, because it would be irrelevant. Another is theclaim thatwhateverupholdsqualitiesmustbeavoluntary thinkingagent.Thistoofallsoutofthepictureintheargumentagainstthinkingsubstance,becauseitwouldbeunhelpful:iftherewerecreatedthink-ingsubstances,presumablytheywouldbevoluntarythinkingagents.The last strandofEdwards’sargumentagainstmaterial substance istheclaimthatonlyGodcanupholdqualitiesbecauseabaresubstra-tumisinconceivable,andEdwardsreiteratesthisclaiminthecaseofthinkingsubstance:
senseunreal,for“Godandrealexistencearethesame”(The Mind 15,6.345).23
Onemight conclude that there is simply a tension in Edwards’sthought.24However,Ithinkwecandobetterthanthat.WeknowthatEdwards’sGodisreal.ButweneednotchoosebetweenassigningthecreatedworldarealityequaltoGodanddenyingitrealityaltogether.Wecan instead readEdwardsasholding that therearedifferentde-greesofreality.God’srealityisabsoluteorindependent reality;creatureshavealesser,dependentformofreality.
Three considerations speak in favor of ascribing this view toEd-wards.First,thereissometextualevidencethathedistinguishesdif-ferentdegreesofreality,althoughitishardlyoverwhelming(seee. g.The Mind 61,6.381;The Mind 64,6.382;The Nature of True Virtue 1,8.546n; The Nature of True Virtue 3,8.571;Misc. tt,13.190).Second,becauseascribing thisdistinction toEdwards allowsus to avoid readinghismetaphysicsascontainingasignificanttension,ithasagreatdealofexplanatoryvalue.Third,itfitsnaturallywiththemodelofemanation:thelightstreamingfromthesunisnotnothing,butitisalsonotathingonanontologicalparwiththesunitself.
23. InthebackgroundhereisEdwards’sMalebrancheanconceptionthat“thefirstBeing,theeternalandinfiniteBeing,isineffect,Beingingeneral;andcom-prehendsuniversalexistence” (Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World 1.4,Dissertation Concerning the End for which God Created the World 1.48.461).
Edwardshassurprisingly little tosayabout thepositivestatusoftheworld.Throughouthiswork,heisfarmoreinclinedtosaywhatcreaturesarenotthanwhattheyare.ButthereiscertainlysomereasontothinkofcreatedperceptionsasthingsintheirownrightandtoreadEdwardsasamonistaboutsubstancesbutnotaboutthings.Themerefactthathespeaksofcreationseemstoimplythatthereissomething,somethingorthings,thatGodcreated.Moreover,it’shardtoseehowEdwards’smoralandtheologicalpurposescouldbereconciledwithaflatdenialoftherealityofindividualhumanbeings.
Moreover, Edwards’s dominant model for understanding the re-lation betweenGod and the creation is the neo-Platonistmodel ofemanation:
Alldependentexistencewhatsoeverisinaconstantflux,everpassingandreturning; renewedeverymoment,asthecolorsofbodiesareeverymoment renewedby thelight that shines upon them; and all is constantly pro-ceedingfromGod,aslightfromthesun.“Inhimwelive,andmove,andhaveourbeing.”(Original Sin 4.3,3.404)
Creaturesare “imagesandshadows” (Images of Divine Things, 11.127)or“shadowsofbeing”(Misc. 362,13.434).Thecreatedworldisinsome
This letsusgiveamorepreciseanswer towhetherEdwards isasubstancemonistorathingmonist.Heholdsthatthereisonlyonesubstanceandthatthereisonlyoneabsolutelyorindependentlyrealthing.Atthesame,therearemanythingswithalesser,dependentre-ality—adegreeofrealityconsistentwiththeirnotbeingmaterial,notbeingsubstantial,notbeingabletoact,andnotbeingabletoendure.ThisisnotthemeretypemonismofBerkeleyandHobbes:itisaclaimabout the number of substances, not just the number of substance-types. It isnotthemonismofSpinoza, forthosewhothinkthatSpi-nozaisamonistofonekindoranother.Itisnotaformofexistenceorprioritymonismasdefinedabove:Edwards’screatedworldisathinginsomesense,anditisnotapartofGodinanysense.Butitisstillaformofmonism.
Bibliography
GeorgeBerkeley.1988[1710].A Treatise concerning the Principles of Hu-man Knowledge. Ed.RogerWoolhouse.Harmondsworth: PenguinBooks.
René Descartes. 1985. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. 1.TranslatedbyJohnCottingham,RobertStoothoff,andDugaldMur-doch.CambridgeandNewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress.
JonathanEdwards.1957–2008. The Works of Jonathan Edwards.Gen.eds.PerryMiller(vols.1–2),JohnE.Smith(vols.3–9),andHarryS.Stout(vol. 10–26).NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress.Alsoatedwards.yale.edu,extendingto73volumes.
NormanFiering.1982.Jonathan Edwards’s Moral Thought and Its British Context.ChapelHill:UniversityofNorthCarolinaPress.
