Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
38
THE STATE ROLE AND THE DYNAMICS OF THE NATIONAL AND
SUB-NATIONAL RELATIONS ON DISASTER MANAGEMENT
POLICIES: CASE STUDY ON ACEH’S RECONSTRUCTION AND
REHABILITATION AGENCY (BRR) POST-TSUNAMI (2005-2009)
Sabil Rachman1
Abstract
This study discusses the State Role and the Dynamics of the central and regional
relations on the Disaster Management Policies which specifically organized an
analysis on Aceh’s Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency after the 2005-2009
tsunami. The perspective that will be seen centers on the state role in managing
the Aceh Tsunami and its implication when connected with the relations of Aceh’s
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rekonstruksi dan Rehabilitasi
Aceh / BRR) that represents the state or the central government with the local
government that has been harboring problems. The position and the perspective
of the central government or its mindset towards Aceh and how Aceh views the
central government post-tsunami will be discussed in this study as well.
Key Word: State Role, Disaster Management Policy, National and sub-national
relation.
INTRODUCTION
The Aceh Tsunami that occurs on the 26th of December did not only
affect the lives in Aceh, but it is also an interesting topic to read from a political
perspective. The tsunami pushed the regime of Susilo Bambag Yudhoyono and
Jusuf Kalla and the United Indonesia Cabinet to publish the Government
Regulations in Lieu of Law (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang /
PERPU) as the political coverage and constitution to form the Aceh’s
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (BRR) after the tsunami. Various
political dimensions can be seen, such as the use of the reconstruction and
rehabilitation process as a method for the elites to gain a respectable image.
The effect of the tsunami in Aceh can be seen by its incalculable number
of casualties. The devastating natural disaster caused the death of approximately
two-hundred and twenty thousand lives, the disappearance of more than thirty-
seven thousand people, and the evacuation of approximately five-hundred and
twenty-seven people. The damage done the infrastructure and public facilities is
appalling. It destroyed roads, bridges, schools, and hospitals, immobilizing the
public services. The facilities and infrastructure of the government was
demolished in almost every regency, with the addition of the casualties from the
1 Sabil Rachman is a Political lecture in Department of Political Science, University of Indonesia.
Can be contacted by email: [email protected]
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
39
bureaucratic apparatus. This condition resulted in the immobilization of the
government and the reconstruction to the point that the central government
declared the Aceh tsunami, through the President in December 27th in 2004, as a
national disaster.
Constitutionally, the state has a clear role and authority in giving services
to the people who are affected by the natural disaster without looking at their
social background, economy, politics, and religion, as well as their culture. In
various theories, like Budiardjo said, every nation, regardless of their ideologies
should establish its functions, such as: (1) implementing law and order, (2) fight
for the people’s welfare, (3) attempt to have stronger defense, (4) enforce justice,
and (5) make room for freedom.2 When the President has declared the tsunami in
Aceh as a national disaster, then it should be the responsibility of the state and the
central government. This means that the state should be the most active in
managing Aceh post-tsunami. In implementing the roles of the state, the
government, with the support of the People’s Representative Council, formed the
BRR that is responsible for the rehabilitation and reconstruction process post-
tsunami through cooperation with various parties from both domestic and
international communities.
Affiliated domestic institutions comes from Jakarta, Surabaya, Bandung,
Yogyakarta, Makassar, Lampung, Medan, Padang, Banda Aceh, and other cities.
The categorization of the domestic institutions consists of the constituents of the
local government, non-governmental organizations, the strength of the civil
society, both the constituents of the people’s organization and political parties.
The international communities consists of non-governmental organizations,
institutions of international donors that represented the United Nations, corporate
institutions, and religious institutions.
Although the numerous parties involved in the reconstruction and
rehabilitation process in Aceh post-tsunami has shown solidity and empathy
towards issues concerning humanity, it needed to be directed and coordinated so
that these institutions do not overlap each other with their agendas so that they
will not lose their focus. The state represented by BRR must synchronize they
agendas towards the institutions so that the politics concerning its aid will be
avoided.
To comprehend the institutions from the domestic and international
communities that participated in the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh
post-tsunami, a table is shown below:
Tabel 1
International Agencies
ADB Asia
Americans Foundation United States
AUS-AID Australia
2Miriam Budiardjo,The Foundations of Political Science, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama,
1966, hal 46
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
40
Australian Government Australia
CIDA Canada
Caritas Austria Austria
Caritas CZECH Republic Czech Republic
Caritas Germany Germany
Caritas Switzerland Switzerland
Catholic Relief Service United States
JICA Japan
JBC Japan
LEAP United Kingdom
Italian Cooperation Italy
Mercy Malaysia Malaysia
Save the Children United States
Unicef United Nations
UNHCR United Nations
USAID United States
USINDO United States – Indonesia
UNDP United Nations
UNESCO United Nations
ARABSAUDI Arab
Sumber: BRRNAD-NIAS (2005)
Tabel 1.2
Domestic Agencies
No Name of Institution
1 LSM Silfa Indonesia
2 Aceh People Forum
3 LPSMD
4 Yayasan Bina Aneok Nangroe
5 Yayasan Sosial Kreasi
6 YBS
7 PMI
8 Yayasan Bunda Tzu Chi Indonesia
9 Yayasan Forum Bangun Aceh
10 World Vision Indonesia
11 AMDA Indonesia
12 Honda Astra Motor
13 Walhi
14 Bakrie Group
15 IBM
16 EXXON Mobil
Source: BRR Report Book, 2005 / BRR Report Book, 2005
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
41
This data shows that in the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in
Aceh, aids from the BRR which is the institution that represents the state in the
process, aid that are given by groups, and by the communities of the casualties,
are accepted in Aceh, especially the aid given by volunteers during the response
time which lasted for six months from December 26th 2004 until April 26th 2005.
The high number of donors and institutions from various areas and states, like the
ones mentioned above, have arise questions such as whether the presence of these
donors and institutions can replace the role of the BRR and how the BRR can
coordinate with the institutions, such as the one mandated by Perpu No. 2 year of
2005 concerning the formation of the BRR.
After the emergency response time, the government stopped the activities
of the volunteers from abroad and the international communities with the
exception of foreign volunteers consisting of doctors and medical teams. These
medical aids were given a one year extension in Aceh. However, the
government’s actions have brought numerous reactions. Due to the government’s
limitations, the People’s Representative Council and non-governmental
organizations requested the government to delay stopping the aid from by the
international communities because Aceh was still in serious need of help. The
non-governmental organizations that doubted the government’s capability to
handle the issues in Aceh is included in in the Kelompok Masyarakat Peduli Aceh
(KEMAPA) which states the doubt of the people of Aceh concerning the
government’s capability to handle the issues that arises after the tsunami by
demonstrating in front of the United Nations office in Jakarta on January 25th
2005.The government’s limitation, as mentioned above, demands and requires the
government to build synergy and cooperation with other parties. In this context,
the formation of a new institution that will represent the state in the building of
synergy and cooperation that has excellent coordination and communication skills
with domestic and international institutions. It should also have credibility and
technical proficiency that is supported by the authority and political legitimacy.
Based on this, the government forms an institution through Perpu No.2 of 2005,
Aceh’s Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency.
As an institution that represents the state and the central government, the
BRR has a difficult task. After the tsunami, the situation is not conducive if seen
from a political perspective and security because of GAM and their demand that
Aceh should be autonomous from the central government. In this context, the
BRR will move in two kinds of orientation, carrying out the rehabilitation and
construction duties and act as a mediator between the central government and
Aceh. Therefore, the BRR could also take part in strengthening the relations
between the central government and Aceh because it is an important factor in the
implementation process of the autonomous region, or in this context, the
implementation of special autonomy that occurs consistently.
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
42
THEORY
The BRR, its authority and its political position As a state representative, the BRR have direct responsibility to the
president, their authority is quite considerable. One of its authorities is the ability
to coordinate with domestic institutions (central government, business world,
people’s organization, and non-governmental organization), international
communities, donor countries, and non-governmental organization that
participates in aiding the rehabilitation and reconstruction in Aceh post-tsunami.
If seen from the perspective of the central government, then the
formation of the BRR was very urgent because the damage the Aceh tsunami has
done is appalling. This situation requires the responsibility of the state with its
considerable amount of authority to handle the problems that arise. However, the
formation of the BRR and its commitment to the state in dealing with the damages
of the tsunami through rehabilitation and reconstruction has to be carried out
according to the political policies of the state, which is the implementation of
special autonomy.
This means that the authority of the BRR cannot be faced with the
political regulation of the state that has been applied in Aceh as the solution to the
dynamics and political contextualization between the central government and
Aceh with its very deterministic historical resistance where the state or central
government views Aceh as a foe, especially GAM. Therefore, the BRR needs to
be put in a political landscape that is wider than re-actualizing its presence based
on Perpu without observing the political dynamics occurring.
One of the important aspects the BRR needs to do is to carry out its task
according to the Perpu number 2 of 2005, but avoid the weakening of the role and
participation of the local government as an important local power to carry out the
reconstruction as an implementation of passion and commitment that is build on
Aceh’s special autonomy. Provided that the commitment is implemented, the
BRR will show its coherence and its capability to synergize with the instruments
of the local authorities, instead of weakening one another.
However, the BRR became a weakening factor or a limitation to the role
of the area’s size which is more ideal with local Aceh stakeholder, especially the
central government. The BRR does not give the proper role to the local
government although the ones who understand the geography and culture of Aceh
is the local government. Consequently, the people of Aceh started having a
skeptical view towards the relations between the central government which is
represented by the BRR and the local government of Aceh, as well as the civilians
in Aceh.
When the BRR’s domination started to increase, it is said to be
detrimental and destructive because the roles of the locals will be abolished. One
of the aspects that has been an issue, if seen from the effort to strengthen and give
the roles of local human resources which has been criticized the the people of
Aceh, is the process and the staff recruitments, as well as the leaders on the
manager level which does not use local human resources. Hence, they demand
that there should be at last a sixty to seventy percent number of locals when they
recruit.
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
43
The policies of the BRR which tend to give off the impression that they
are ignoring the position and importance of the area is actually contradicting its
motivation of the whole process of the state’s political policy that demands the
fulfillment of the importance of all parties because the polices made are not
directed to a certain party but it is applied to all and is liberal. This matter is in
accordance with the liberal idea about the purpose of taking policies that is
theoretically carried by Wayne Parsons (2005)3 which is based on the belief that
the state role is to manage the public and its issues and also handle the aspects of
social life and the economy that can longer he handled by the market.
This points to Parsons’ theory. In this context, the government has no
choice but act, and a state intervention becomes important. However, considering
the politics related with the political relations of the central government and Aceh
with is strengthened and supported by political regulations and approach in the
form of special autonomy and the conditions in its implementation. Therefore, the
states represented by the BRR cannot forget the important dimensions of special
autonomy where Aceh is placed in a strategic level and decides, or in other words,
Aceh has political privilege before the central government.
However, the realization of their ideals seem to meet a dead end. This is
caused by the failure of the BRR to project a strong commitment to synergize with
the provincial authorities. In its relationship with the local government, the BRR
does not take into account the condition and role of the local government, both
provincial and regency. It has already been proven by the deficient coordination
done by the BRR and the local government, especially in the implementation or
realization of the program. This often makes the BRR as the sole actor in the
rehabilitation and reconstruction process after the Aceh tsunami.
Considering the conditions and the affect of the tsunami, the steps the
BRR took, as shown above, is understandable, especially during the early stages
of implementation where the local government’s consolidation after the tsunami,
especially in 2005-2007, is not yet well-arranged. However, after 2007, when the
election of the head of the area, especially the governor and vice-governor was
materialized and chosen directly with strong political legitimacy. The
consolidation of bureaucratic agencies has also functioned and deemed capable of
carrying out its duties and the construction. The BRR should have been able to
transfer part of its authority to the head of the Aceh government, both provincial
and regency.
The expectations towards the devolution of part of the BRR’s authority to
the local government without strong reasons, according to Ryaas Rasyid, is
evidence that as president and the one responsible towards the structure of the
BRR, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono does not have a good vision towards
provincial autonomy or special autonomy in Aceh. The implication towards the
choice of the BRR to nullify the transfer of authority to the province is the low
level of Aceh’s local stakeholder’s trust that the BRR could make a difference and
3 Wayne Parsons: An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis, Jakarta: Kencana
Prenadamedia, 2005
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44
contribute to the relations of the central government with Aceh which is
increasingly improving.
METHOD
This research is using contructive approach with qualitative method
where it is using qualitative data. This research try to collect data from people
with direct interview and secondary data like appropriate document in order to fill
and complete this research. Thus, this research could give an explanation and
summary about central and local relation in managing disaster.
DISCUSSION
The Realization and Implementation of the BRR Program
According to Perpu Number 2 of 2005, the BRR is obligated to focus on
the rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Aceh after the tsunami. However,
the priorities must have a scale depending on the demands and needs of the
victims and it should be manifested according to the results of the research which
leads to the four top priorities which are the sectors of education, healthcare,
housing, and infrastructure. These choices does not mean that the other aspects are
unimportant, but these four sectors are the most important ones.
The increasing pressure and volitions as well as different demands from
both the victims of the Tsunami and the Aceh stakeholder requires the BRR to
coordinate and communicate with all the parties so that the implementation of the
BRR’s priority program will function well. Therefore, the BRR must prioritize the
coordination with the local government because the local government understand
all the aspects related with the people of Aceh, both their culture and their needs.
This is crucial because the choices BRR makes should conform to these aspects.
Hence, the urgency of good coordination and communication between the BRR
and the local government lies on these importance.
The theoretical analysis is that conceptually, polices need to accentuate
how far all the policies that has been defined can be implemented consistently
based on the original panning. The implementation of the policies is hard because
it depends on the condition of the surroundings, externally and internally.
Theoretically, the challenges in the implementation of the policies will affect the
process of reaching the goal of the program.
Based on this view, the coordination factor with the local government is
important in explaining the implementation of the BRR’s policy concerning the
four sectors which consist of education, healthcare, housing, and infrastructure, as
a priority. The accentuation of the four priority programs of the BRR will give
the solution to the other issues that is faced by the victims, both long-term and
short-term. However, the outside sectors outside of the ones mentioned above is
also important.
The implementation of the priority program comes from the BRR’s
policies and authority uses the most budget. In the four priority sectors, other than
being the central of the BRR activity, it also became the focus of interest of
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45
various groups that participates and act in the reconstruction in Aceh post-
tsunami, such as governmental organizations and the people’s organizations, both
domestic and international.
To explain publically the results of the BRR’s works that points to the
priority sectors for rehabilitation and reconstruction is, as Kuntoro
Mangkusubroto (Head of the BRR) said, which is as many as 134.000 houses
were built, 3600km of new road, 12 air fields, 20 docks, 1500 schools, 39.000
teachers who have received training, 1000 healthcare facilities, 987 governmental
buildings, 195.000 small and medium-sized enterprises, and 70.000 acres of land
for farming is back on production. The program came to realization with the
financial support of approximately seventy-two trillion rupiahs from the budget
given by APBN as well as from domestic and international institutes and donor
countries. Therefore, the BRR’s success, as Kuntoro Mangkusubroto said, is not
because of itself but because of others as well.
However, it is hard to deny the fact that the BRR is not as accomplished as
we have seen or has not reached its goals. The end of the BRR in 2009 has
resulted in various issues due to the fact that the program which has been
categorized into four parts cannot be achieved by the BRR. In fact, the percentage
of failure is quite large, causing the program to be given to the The Aceh
Reconstruction Sustainability Agency (Badan Kesinambungan Rekonstruksi Aceh
/ BKRA) by using the remaining budget, which sums up to approximately 5,6
trillion Rupiah.
The failure of the BRR in doing its tasks are caused by two factors. First,
the BRR elites are overly dominant in the process of decision making and
determination of programs. The leaders of the BRR does not take into
consideration the local authorities in making the decisions and determining the
programs, although the local authorities hold formal offices within the BRR.
Furthermore, the BRR does not include public figures and local activists who is
familiar with Aceh in a more detailed level. ON the contrary, the BRR tends to
involve international institutes and foreign non-governmental organizations.
Second, the BRR is weak in its coordination with the local government. The BRR
prefers to run independently and only involves other parties in the field.
By not involving the local government and seeing the weak coordination
between BRR and the local government during the rehabilitation and
reconstruction program shows that the relations between the central government
and Aceh is weak. Aceh, in this context, can be taken as an example of how the
central government can dominate a region. Although Aceh appeared to be a
special region with its own special autonomy, it doesn’t have much power or
influence during the process of rehabilitation and reconstruction in the face of the
BRR which is the representation of the government.
This reality contradicts with the principles of decentralization and
regional autonomy that is formulated in the law of the local government as well as
the will to strengthen the relationship between the central government and the
local government. From the perspective of decentralization and regional
autonomy that is applied in Indonesia presently follows the money follows
function and no mandating without funding principles. However, in the
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46
rehabilitation and reconstruction process in Aceh, the relations between the
governments and sub-government tends to neglect the principles. The central
government is the main actor that dominates the regions with the BRR as the
representation of the ruler’s regime.
International Aid: Motivating, Importance and its Implications
The flow of foreign aid into post tsunami Aceh could not escape the
attention and provocation of the international as well as domestic news.
Furthermore, the catastrophe in Aceh could have replaced Africa as the top source
disaster related news. The tsunami in Aceh was the turning point of the world’s
attention to the occurrence of disaster in Asia, as said by Vanderbilt. If Africa was
previously the main focus of the world regarding disasters, then the 2004 tsunami
made Asia the main focus, replacing Africa in the process. This is caused by the
domination of the news in the international mass media canopy, namely ever since
the natural disaster that happened on the 26th of December until the beginning of
2005. The natural disaster was in the news for a considerable amount of time,
lasting more than any other natural disasters that have ever occurred. In average,
the tsunami is covered by various international televisions and is broadcasted 43,5
minutes every day for six weeks.
The global media’s tendency to strengthen is beneficial to the state
because then there will be volunteers and international aid. According to Van
Belle Douglas (2008)4, the Aceh tsunami is a disaster that manifested in three
forms which is the disaster, the extended media coverage, and the international aid
that flowed to the region. However, Van Belle denies the opinion that media
becomes a controlling factor that drove the motivation to provide post-tsunami
aid. Basically, Belle rejects media determination in the output in the policies of
foreign humanitarian assistance. According to Belle, the policies of international
aid is determined by three factors: humanitarian motivation, strategic motivation,
and capitalistic-economy motivation.
The presence of donors and international institutions in aiding Aceh post-
tsunami will strengthen the rise of global solidarity for Aceh. This appears to be a
global will that started from the assumption that the world’s civilization is one, so
if an entity experience gradation, then it will affect and threated the degradation of
the world’s civilization.
The explanation above is important for when it is relate to the motivation
of the presence of donor institutions, from both the state as well as from the non-
governmental organizations present in Aceh post-tsunami because of
humanitarian reasons, like Kuntoro Mangkusubroto said, if a state is experiencing
a disaster, especially a tsunami that has caused numerous casualties and destroyed
the public facilities, the primary action to take is to open up and welcome
volunteers. The state should not reject help from anyone as long as it is for
humanitarian reasons. The same thing is done in Aceh during the early post-
tsunami period and during the rehabilitation and construction period.
4 Van Belle, Douglas: Agenda Setting and Donor Responsiveness to Humanitarian Crisis and
Development Aid, Harvard World Bank Workshop, 29-31, May 2008
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
47
Several countries that came during the rehabilitation and reconstruction
period were Japan, Malaysia, Australia, Mexico, United States, Saudi Arabia,
Germany, United Kingdom, Korea, China, Holland, Italy and others. They came
to show their empathy and concern, as well as their aid. I see that everything is for
the good of Aceh post-tsunami, and that is my view as someone who has met all
the representative of the donor countries and international institutions during the
early post-tsunami period and during the rehabilitation and reconstruction in
Aceh.
To give faith towards the institutions that participates, Kuntoro flew to
Stockholm in Sweden to meet with all the states and international donor
institutions to discuss important matters, the agendas and comprehensive planning
of the BRR. Kuntoro ensures the donor countries and international institutions that
the state or the BRR guarantees that no unwanted event causing the lives of
people will happen while they are in Aceh when doing humanitarian activities
with the BRR. Kuntoro’s visit was done very discretely before performing the
task as the head of the BRR that is probably unknown to many parties, including
the National Intelligence Agency (Badan Intelijen Nasional / BIN).5
International communities and foreign institutions are more active and
involved than domestic institutions, which shows that nationalism has been
ignored and that there is there is dependence on international communities. In the
international aid theory that is expressed by Morgentau, where part of the
objectives of international aid policies, which are military, prestige, humanitarian,
economy, and subsistence has shown a significant effect.
According to Morgenthau (1962: 302-309)6, the vast majority of
international aid is identified to be political and economical in nature, and only
some is due to humanitarian foreign aid because things that are supposed to be
non-political can turn into something political when it is present in a political
setting. Therefore, the foreign aid motivation from donor countries, can only be
divided into two categories which are economical and political. In the post-
tsunami Aceh, this theory can be used to measure how far the aid from other
countries and donor institutions has political motivation to do a policy
intervention that could disturb the sovereignty and identity of the region.
In this context, the aspect of globalization is influential. Globalization
dismisses the limitations of countries. The issues faced by a country, such as the
Aceh tsunami can easily become a cross-country problem, and can even become a
global issue.
According to Tabb (2006: 31-32)7, it is not always easy to understand
that globalization is a political and debate process about how globalization is often
conveyed in a good and bad dichotomy.
Because of that, within the context of building or the rehabilitation and
the reconstruction of Aceh post-tsunami, BRR acts as a representation of the
5 Interview with Ahmad Human Hamid on December 27th 2014 in Banda Aceh 6 Morgenthau: “Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, The American Political Science Review L VI
1962, Pg. 302-309 7 William J. Tabb: Tabir Politik Globalisasi, translated by Uzair Fauzan and others, Yogyakarta:
Lafadi Pustaka, 2006, Pg. 31-32
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
48
nation in a dominant manner, but it is ironically unable to carry out tasks
concerning globalization. This matter then forces the national institution to be
present politically as BRR exposes itself towards global elements, including
various aids and grants along with international loans. If this subject were to be
placed within the context of the internal reconstruction of Aceh, then BRR, as it is
faced with local governments and stakeholders in Aceh, will truly perform and
reveal itself as a super body foundation in carrying out its authority and role,
despite its nature of being an ad hoc national institution to rehabilitate and
reconstruct Aceh post-tsunami. On the other hand, it will be distinctively different
if BRR were to face international institutions, primarily those that have the
commitment to participate in the process of rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh
with considerable funding.
Therefore, the power relations between BRR and the local governments
of Aceh often take place in a “hot and cold” atmosphere. It is then understandable
that it is uncommon for the local governments, of both provinces and regencies, to
protest the demeanor, manner, and performance of BRR. The leaders of this local
government repeatedly criticize the attitude of BRR to be “uncompromising” and
tending to be selfish, yet ironically, they are unable to do much concerning the
behaviors of BRR themselves.
There are at least two causes to this problem. First, these regional leaders
of Aceh heavily depend on BRR economically. Second, BRR facilitates the
resources, mainly the funds and manpower—two issues in which the local
governments in Aceh lack. These are the reasons that the power relations in Aceh
during its period of rehabilitation and reconstruction post-tsunami are dominated
by BRR. This explanation is deliberately brought up for it is crucial to compare
and contrast the behaviors of BRR with the local governments and domestic
powers on one side and on the other side, the international institutions and
external donors, along with NGOs.
However, it is evident that BRR is being publicized in how the institutions that
represent this country place the involvements and international aids as a variable
or factor that is essential in the processes of rehabilitation and construction. The
strength of the collaboration between BRR and the international institutions and
donors sets aside the role and potentials of domestic and local Aceh. Although
BRR does not violate this collaboration, it is assessed to be stagnant in supporting
the participation of domestic and local governments in Aceh.
CLOSING
The rehabilitation and reconstruction agency (BRR) of Aceh post-
tsunami, as an ad-hoc institution that represents the central government of Aceh
with a great and vast authority, to a certain level reveals its potentials and success
in rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh post-tsunami; yet in a more substantial
level, the targets and plans of BRR cannot be deemed entirely successful, not to
mention BRR’s passing down of the problems in Tanah Rencong that could
potentially be “time bombs” themselves. A number of policies and programs
designed by BRR in the fields of education, health, estates, settlements, and
Journal of New Government Paradigm Volume 2, 2nd Edition, 2015
49
infrastructure are yet to be completed entirely. Consequently, BRR did not truly
have a happy ending when its term in Aceh had ended in 2009.
In practice, BRR’s attempts of rehabilitation and reconstructions appears
as if it had been done by a dominant single actor, failing to include local
governments in deciding policies and arranging programs, also in the realization
of the mentioned policies and programs. Hence, it is reasonable that the local
governments and non-government organizations, along with the leaders of the
people of Aceh often criticizes the performance of BRR. BRR even fails to
coordinate with the local governments and other stakeholders. Although formally
a number of regional leaders (Governor/Regent/Mayor) gain significant roles in
the structure of the implementing agency of BRR, in the same time, BRR leans
towards the international institutions and donors along with the foreign NGOs.
Within the context of central-region relations, rehabilitation and
reconstruction programs tend to avoid the principles of territorial decentralization
and autonomy. The minimalism of the role given by the central government
necessitates the local governments to be present as but limited to a supporting
system in the program of rehabilitating and reconstructing Aceh post-tsunami
when in fact, in the context of the relations between central and regions where
autonomous regions possess considerable authority in the process of rebuilding in
its area, it is mandated by the constitution of the local government.
Consequently, this matter leans towards the central-region relations
theory that the central government prioritizes the centralistic aspect of power, as
opposed to the effort to push and put into practice the principles of
decentralization and autonomy. In addition, the endeavors of the rehabilitation and
reconstruction has coincidentally become a political “blessing” itself for Presiden
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono in the field of politics and also an advantage for the
leaders of BRR to be able to gain significant political positions and offices in the
regime of SBY-Budiono in the election of 2009.
REFERENCE
Budiardjo, Miriam. The Foundations of Political Science, Jakarta: Gramedia
Pustaka Utama, 1966, Pg. 46
Parsons, Wayne J. An Introduction to the Theory and Practice of Policy Analysis,
Jakarta: Kencana Prenadamedia, 2005
Van Belle, Douglas. Agenda Setting and Donor Responsiveness to Humanitarian
Crisis and Development Aid. Harvard World Bank Workshop, 29-31,
May 2008
Morgenthau. “Political Theory of Foreign Aid”, The American Political Science
Review L VI 1962, Pg. 302-309
Tabb, William J. Tabir Politik Globalisasi, translated by Uzair Fauzan and others,
Yogyakarta: Lafadi Pustaka, 2006, Pg. 31-32
Interview with Ahmad Human Hamid on December 27th 2014 in Banda Aceh