ADVOCACY IS OUR BUSINESS
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
JSS BA RRI STERS RULES A P R I L 2 0 2 0
Volume 2 Issue 17
Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP is pleased to provide summaries of recent Court Decisions which consider the Alberta Rules of Court. Our website, www.jssbarristers.ca, also features a fully searchable Rules database containing all past summaries up to, and including, our latest release. Below is a list of the Rules (and corresponding decisions which apply or interpret those Rules) that are addressed in the case summaries that follow.
1.1 • ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
1.2 • FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB87
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB88
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB90
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
• NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45
• OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
1.3 • STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94
2.11 • TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97
2.22 • FITZPATRICKVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICALTHERAPISTSOFALBERTA,2020ABCA88
2.31 • FITZPATRICKVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICALTHERAPISTSOFALBERTA,2020ABCA88
3.15 • QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55
• AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81
• WILCOXVALBERTA,2020ABCA104
3.27 • REYESVDYCK,2020ABQB154
3.28 • AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81
3.37 • OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102
3.40 • OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102
3.44 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89
3.45 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89
3.56 • WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161
3.68 • SNAYCHUKVEDMONTON(CITY)2020ABQB1
• PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABQB6
• SMITHVMOORE-JUZWISHIN,2020ABQB49
• QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55
• FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB87
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB88
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Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
3.68 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB90
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94
• TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97
• SMITHVMOORE-JUZWISHIN,2020ABQB108
• JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126
• WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161
• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2020ABQB175
• RUDICHUKVGENESISLANDDEVELOPMENTCORP,2020ABCA42
• AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81
• WILCOXVALBERTA,2020ABCA104
3.75 • PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABQB128
4.1 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45
4.2 • ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45
4.4 • ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
4.22 • CONOCOPHILLIPSCANADAOPERATIONSLTDV1835651ALBERTALTD,2020ABQB14
• PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABCA36
• PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
• PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,
2020ABCA47
• POOLEVCITYWIDETOWINGANDRECOVERYSERVICELTD,2020ABCA102
4.23 • PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,
2020ABCA47
4.29 • DIRKVTOEWS,2020ABQB16
• DAYVWOODBURN,2020ABQB75
• STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2020ABQB160
4.31 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• LOFSTROMVRADKE,2020ABQB122
• ATWALVGILL,2020ABQB146
• NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45
4.33 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB89
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• LOFSTROMVRADKE,2020ABQB122
• ATWALVGILL,2020ABQB146
4.34 • OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102
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5.1 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
5.4 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
5.6 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
5.13 • BEHMVHANSEN,2020ABQB52
• OMNIARCHCAPITALCORPORATIONVBISHOP,2020ABQB102
5.15 • 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33
• COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93
5.25 • FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66
5.29 • COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93
5.31 • COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93
5.33 • PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB90
5.34 • NOVAPOLEINTERNATIONALINC.VPERMASTEELCONSTRUCTIONLTD,2020ABCA45
6.3 • OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
6.4 • OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
6.6 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
6.10 • NEXENENERGYULCVITPSA,2020ABQB83
6.11 • 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
• WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125
6.14 • KUZOFFVTALISMANPERUBVSUCURSALDELPERU,2020ABQB111
• SSCNORTHAMERICA,LLCVFEDERKIEWICZ,2020ABQB176
6.37 • ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
7.3 • PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABQB6
• 1490703ALBERTALTDVCHAHAL,2020ABQB33
• FRANIELVTORONTO-DOMINIONBANK,2020ABQB66
• PIIKANINATIONVMCMULLEN,2020ABQB92
• COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93
• TAVALBERTA(CHILDREN’SSERVICES),2020ABQB97
• KUZOFFVTALISMANPERUBVSUCURSALDELPERU,2020ABQB111
• WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161
• SSCNORTHAMERICA,LLCVFEDERKIEWICZ,2020ABQB176
• RUDICHUKVGENESISLANDDEVELOPMENTCORP,2020ABCA42
• AL-GHAMDIVCOLLEGEANDASSOCIATIONOFREGISTEREDNURSESOFALBERTA,2020ABCA81
7.7 • WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125
7.11 • WESTMANVELGER,2020ABQB125
8.16 • DIRKVTOEWS,2020ABQB16
9.2 • WESTEDMONTONMALLPROPERTYINCVPROCTOR,2020ABQB161
9.4 • SNAYCHUKVEDMONTON(CITY)2020ABQB1
• SMITHVMOORE-JUZWISHIN,2020ABQB49
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9.4 • QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55
• SMITHVMOORE-JUZWISHIN,2020ABQB108
• JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126
• YAREMKEVICHVJACULA,2020ABQB175
9.15 • KIMVCHOI,2020ABQB51
• 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198
10.10 • FLEMINGVFLEMING,2020ABQB85
10.11 • FLEMINGVFLEMING,2020ABQB85
10.28 • SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
10.29 • BLOUGHVBUSYMUSICINC,2020ABQB19
• CRESSMANESTATE(RE),2020ABQB42
• ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54
• QUAYEVLAWSOCIETYOFALBERTA,2020ABQB55
• DAYVWOODBURN,2020ABQB75
• SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
• MOTTAVDAVISWIREINDUSTRIESLTD,2020ABQB136
• STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2020ABQB160
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
10.30 • SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
10.31 • ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54
• DAYVWOODBURN,2020ABQB75
• SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
10.32 • ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54
• SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
10.33 • DIRKVTOEWS,2020ABQB16
• BLOUGHVBUSYMUSICINC,2020ABQB19
• CRESSMANESTATE(RE),2020ABQB42
• ELDERADVOCATESOFALBERTASOCIETYVALBERTA,2020ABQB54
• ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74
• DAYVWOODBURN,2020ABQB75
• SELLERSVSELLERS,2020ABQB79
• MOTTAVDAVISWIREINDUSTRIESLTD,2020ABQB136
• STALZER(ESTATE)VSTALZER,2020ABQB160
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
• ALKADRIVALKADRI,2020ABCA82
10.34 • DIRKVTOEWS,2020ABQB16
10.35 • GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
10.42 • CANLANKAVENTURESLTDVCAPITALDIRECTLENDINGCORP,2020ABQB96
10.48 • CONOCOPHILLIPSCANADAOPERATIONSLTDV1835651ALBERTALTD,2020ABQB14
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
10.53 • LYMER(RE),2020ABQB157
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11.25 • NEXENENERGYULCVITPSA,2020ABQB83
• 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198
11.27 • 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198
11.31 • NEXENENERGYULCVITPSA,2020ABQB83
• 801SEVENTHINCVCNOOCPETROLEUMNORTHAMERICAULC,2020ABQB198
12.36 • BLANEYVMURPHY,2020ABQB196
13.6 • KOCHVKOCH,2020ABQB65
• ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74
• STISIDORECO-OPLIMITEDVAGGROWTHINTERNATIONALINC,2020ABQB94
13.7 • JRB’SWELDINGSERVICESINCVFAMILYDIVISION,2020ABQB126
13.13 • BEHMVHANSEN,2020ABQB52
13.18 • COUNTYOFVULCANVGENESISRECIPROCALINSURANCEEXCHANGE,2020ABQB93
• ALSTONVHAYWOODSECURITIESINC,2020ABQB107
13.19 • BEHMVHANSEN,2020ABQB52
14.2 • FITZPATRICKVCOLLEGEOFPHYSICALTHERAPISTSOFALBERTA,2020ABCA88
14.5 • STEWARTVSCHUMACHER,2020ABQB133
• HAYDENVHAYDEN,2020ABCA37
• OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
• ALKADRIVALKADRI,2020ABCA82
• PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA116
14.8 • GEZEHEGNVALBERTA(APPEALSCOMMISSIONOFTHEWORKERS’COMPENSATIONBOARD),
2020ABCA48
14.14 • PACEVECONOMICALMUTUALINSURANCECOMPANY,2020ABCA67
14.17 • PACEVECONOMICALMUTUALINSURANCECOMPANY,2020ABCA67
14.37 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
• GEZEHEGNVALBERTA(APPEALSCOMMISSIONOFTHEWORKERS’COMPENSATIONBOARD),
2020ABCA48
14.38 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
14.40 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
14.41 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
14.46 • EDMONTON(POLICESERVICE)VDELUCA,2020ABCA31
14.47 • KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91
• RANCHERCONSTRUCTIONLTDVSCOTTCONSTRUCTION(ALBERTA)LTD,2020ABCA112
14.48 • OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
• PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABCA85
14.55 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
14.56 • PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
14.57 • PROSPERPETROLEUMLTDVHERMAJESTYTHEQUEENINRIGHTOFALBERTA,2020ABCA85
14.60 • KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91
14.61 • KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91
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14.64 • PACEVECONOMICALMUTUALINSURANCECOMPANY,2020ABCA67
14.65 • PACEVECONOMICALMUTUALINSURANCECOMPANY,2020ABCA67
• KENTVMACDONALD,2020ABCA91
14.67 • PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERSINCVPERPETUALENERGYINC,2020ABCA36
• PIIKANINATIONVRAYMONDJAMESLTD,2020ABCA41
• PACERHOLDINGSCONSTRUCTIONCORPORATIONVRICHARDPELLETIERHOLDINGSINC,
2020ABCA47
• POOLEVCITYWIDETOWINGANDRECOVERYSERVICELTD,2020ABCA102
14.71 • OZARKRESOURCESLTDVTERICPOWERLTD,2020ABCA51
14.72 • EDMONTON(POLICESERVICE)VDELUCA,2020ABCA31
SCHEDULE C • ANNETTVENTERPRISERENT-A-CARCANADALTD,2020ABQB74
• CANLANKAVENTURESLTDVCAPITALDIRECTLENDINGCORP,2020ABQB96
• MOTTAVDAVISWIREINDUSTRIESLTD,2020ABQB136
• GOCOMMUNITYCENTREVCLARKBUILDERSANDSTANTECCONSULTINGLTD,2020ABQB203
ALSTON V HAYWOOD SECURITIES INC, 2020 ABQB 107 (EAMON J)Rules 1.1 (What These Rules Do), 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.4 (Standard Case Obligations), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay), 6.11 (Evidence at application hearings), 6.37 (Notice to Admit) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
EamonJ.dealtwithanAppealofaMaster’sDecisionto
dismissthePlaintiffs’Actiononthebasisofdelaypursuant
toRules4.31and4.33(the“UnderlingAction”).The
MasterdismissedtheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRule
4.31againstallDefendantsduetothePlaintiffs’delay
inmovingtheActionforwardandtheresultingprejudice
sufferedbytheDefendants.TheMasteralsowouldhavealso
dismissedtheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRule4.33.
TheAppellantsraisedconcernsthattheMasterhadignored
theirsubmissionsgenerallyandspecificallywithrespect
tothechronologyoftheUnderlyingActioncontained
predominantlyintheirResponsetoNoticetoAdmitFacts.
JusticeEamonreviewedtheapplicableRulesof6.37,
6.11,13.18andrejectedthisassertion.HisLordship
foundthataNoticetoAdmitunderRule6.37callson
anopposingpartytoprovideadmissionstodispensewith
proofofspecificfacts;however,therequiredexplanation
isnotevidencethatcanbeusedagainstthepartyseeking
theadmission.Topermitthatusewouldcircumventthe
requirementforproperAffidavitsorotheradmissible
evidenceonApplicationsunderRules6.11and13.18and
defeattheobjectivesofefficientandfairproceedingsunder
theFoundationalRules1.1and1.2.JusticeEamonfound,
inessence,thatthisuseofRule6.37wouldallowaparty
onwhomaNoticetoAdmitisservedtomakewideranging
assertionsoffactwithoutanymeansofchallengebycross-
examination.
JusticeEamonreviewedthefactualhistorybetweenthe
partiesandconcludedthattheAppellantshadfailedto
complywiththeirobligationsundereachofRules4.1,
4.2and4.4.Namely,theyfailedtoeffectivelymanagethe
litigationbyfailingtodisclosevariousrecordswhichthey
knewtheDefendantswanted(Rules1.2(2)(d)and4.2(a)),
andfailedtocooperateinschedulingarecordsproduction
Applicationonthespeciallistknowingthatthereasonable
deadlinefordiscovery(identifiedbytheparties)hadlong
passed(Rule4.4(1)(b)).Accordingly,JusticeEamon
dismissedtheAppeal.
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FRANIEL V TORONTO-DOMINION BANK, 2020 ABQB 66 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 5.25 (Appropriate Questions and Objections) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThiswasanApplicationforanOrdertocompelthe
Defendanttoanswerquestionsandproviderepliesto
UndertakingsfromtheQuestioningofitscorporate
representative.Beforebeginninghisanalysis,Master
RobertsonnotedthatitseemedtheDefendant’sposition
wasthatitowednodutyofcaretothePlaintiffandthatit
wasnotobligedtoprovidecandidanswerstothequestions
thatwereasked–henotedthatifthisbeliefguidedthe
objectionstothequestionsitwasanerror.Thescopeof
questionsthatapartyisallowedtoaskisdeterminedby
thepleadings,andtherewasnoApplicationbroughtbythe
DefendanttostrikepursuanttoRule3.68noranApplication
forSummaryDismissalpursuanttoRule7.3.Inaddition,
Rule1.2directsallpartiestousetheRulesto“toprovide
aneffective,efficient,andcrediblesystemofremediesand
sanctionstoenforcetheserulesandordersandjudgments.”
OneofthequestionstheDefendantobjectedtowas
regardingwhomadethedecisiontorefusethePlaintiff’s
compensation,claimingthattheanswerwassubjectto
litigationprivilege.MasterRobertsonexplainedthatthe
propergroundsofobjectionwerelistedinRule5.25(2),
andamongstthemwas“anyothergroundrecognizedat
law”.Henotedthatinformationtoidentifyawitnessisnot
privileged.Further,caselawsuggestedthatifarational
strategyexistedforwantingtoknowtheanswertoa
question,thenitshouldbesufficient,andinthisinstance
therewasarationalstrategyforwantingtoknowtheanswer
tothequestion.MasterRobertsonfoundtheDefendant’s
absoluterefusaltoanswerthequestiontroublingandnoted
thatiftheycontinuedtoassertthattheanswerwasnot
relevant,theywouldhaveadifficulttimeiftheydecidedto
adduceevidencelateratTrial.
MasterRobertsondetermined,amongstotherthings,thatan
Orderwouldbeissuedwithspecificdirectionsregardingthe
objectionsthatweregiventoquestionsandUndertakingrequests.
PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 87 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
ThiswasanApplicationbytheDefendant,McMullen,
seekingleaveto“recuse”AssociateChiefJusticeRooke
fromhearingmattersasCaseManagementJusticeinthese
Actions.ThePlaintiffopposedtheApplication,arguingthat
itwasfrivolous,irrelevantorimproper,anabuseofprocess,
andthatitdisclosednoreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess
pursuanttoRule3.68(2).AssociateChiefJusticeRooke
agreed,giventhattheDefendanthadmostlyprovidedbare
allegationsandunsubstantiatedconclusorystatements.
ThePlaintiffalsoopposedtheApplicationbecauseitdid
“notgotoresolvingtherealissueindisputeorfacilitatethe
quickestmeansofresolvingtheclaimattheleastexpense”
andwasthereforeinconsistentwithRule1.2.Associate
ChiefJusticeRookeagreed.TheDefendant’sApplication
wasdismissedwithCosts.
PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 88 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
IntwocomplexActionsjointlymanagedbyAssociateChief
JusticeRooke,theself-representedDefendant,McMullen,
broughtsixApplicationsforleaveseekingtochallengethe
conductofvariouslawfirmsandtheCourt.AssociateChief
JusticeRookedecidedeachApplicationforleaveseparately.
InoneApplicationforleave,theDefendantsought
disqualificationofalawfirmactingforpartiesadverse
ininteresttohim,whetherwithrespecttotheActions
generallyorwithrespecttoarelateddisqualification
Applicationbroughtagainstanotherlawfirm.TheCourtwas
notsatisfiedthattheDefendanthadofferedanyevidence
orlegalpropositiontoestablishaconflictofinterestor
abuseofprocess,andnotingnoreasonablelikelihoodof
success,deniedleave.Moreover,AssociateChiefJustice
RookeidentifiedtheDefendant’spursuitofdisqualification
asacolourableattempttoinduceaconflictofintereston
whichtogroundthedisqualification,constitutinganabuse
ofprocesscontrarytoRules3.68(2)and1.2.
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PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 89 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 3.44 (When Third Party Claim May be Filed), 3.45 (Form of Third Party Claim), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheDefendant,McMullen,soughtleavetobringaThird
PartyClaimagainstseveralindividualsandlawfirms
(the“ProposedThirdParties”).TheCaseManagement
JusticedeniedtheleaveApplicationforseveralreasons
including:theDefendantfailedtofileandservetheThird
PartyClaimsunderRule3.45(c)(i)withinsixmonthsof
filinghisStatementofDefence;theCourtfoundtherehad
beeninordinatedelaybytheDefendant,andtherewereno
credibleorreasonableexcusesforthedelay;andtherewas
noreasonablelikelihoodofsuccess.
TheDefendantattemptedtoexplaintheinordinatedelayby
arguinghe“wasdisinclinedtotakestepswhichmayhave
theeffectofresettingthethreeyear‘dropdead’clock”
pursuanttoRule4.33,buttheCourtfoundthatthereasons
forthedelayvis-à-visthePlaintiffinrespectofRule4.33
donothaverelevancetothedelayvis-à-vistheProposed
ThirdParties.
TheDefendantalsotriedtoclaimcontributionfromthe
ProposedThirdPartiesunderRule3.44butfailedtoallege
adutyowedbytheProposedThirdPartiestohimself.The
CourtconfirmedthataThirdPartyClaimcannotbeusedto
enforcedutiesowedbytheProposedThirdPartiestothe
Plaintiff.
TheCourtfoundtheDefendant’sfailuretoproceedina
timelybasiswasanabuseofprocessunderRule1.2and
determinedithadnolikelihoodofsuccessunderRule
3.68.RookeA.C.J.dismissedtheApplication.
PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 90 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 5.33 (Confidentiality and Use of Information)
IntwocomplexActionsjointlymanagedbyAssociateChief
JusticeRooke,aselfrepresentedDefendant(“McMullen”)
broughtanApplicationforleave(the“TPCLeave
Application”)toassertaThirdPartyClaimagainstseveral
CIBCentitiesandBlake,Cassels&GraydonLLP(“Blakes”).
Inresponse,BlakesbroughtanApplicationforleave
tostriketheTPCLeaveApplication(the“StrikeLeave
Application”)andJensenShawaSolomonDuguidHawkes
LLP(“JSS”)broughtanApplicationforleavetofind
McMullenincontemptofCourt(the“ContemptLeave
Application”).
AssociateChiefJusticeRookestayedtheTPCLeave
ApplicationuntilfurtherCourtOrder,astheApplication
couldnotproceeduntilthesubstanceoftheStrike
LeaveApplicationandContemptLeaveApplicationwere
determined.
InconsideringtheContemptLeaveApplication,Associate
ChiefJusticeRookefoundthatleaveshouldbegranted
onanApplicationiftheApplicationdoesnotconflictwith
thepurposesoftheRules,asoutlinedinRule1.2,and
disclosesareasonablelikelihoodofsuccesspursuantto
Rule3.68.AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthatthere
wassomeevidenceofMcMullen’scontemptandgranted
JSSleavetomaketheContemptLeaveApplication.
InconsideringtheStrikeLeaveApplication,Blakesargued
thatMcMullenhadrelieduponprivilegeddocumentsand
recordsthataresubjecttotheimpliedundertakingrule
ascodifiedinRule5.33.Specifically,Blakesallegedthat
McMullenreliedoninformationfromanotherActionwhich
McMullenwasnotapartyto,withoutCourtOrderand
withoutconsent,contrarytoRule5.33.AssociateChief
JusticeRookefoundthattheargumenthadsomemeritand
mettherequirementsforleaveunderRules1.2and3.68.
HisLordshipalsograntedBlakesleavetomaketheStrike
LeaveApplication.
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PIIKANI NATION V MCMULLEN, 2020 ABQB 92 (ROOKE ACJ)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 4.1 (Responsibilities of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
TheDefendant,DaleMcMullen(“McMullen”),broughtan
ApplicationforleaveregardingtheunderlyingActionof
Piikani Nation (Nation) et al v McMullen et al,QBAction
No.100110326(the“UnderlyingAction”),tostrikeor
dismisstheUnderlyingActionpursuanttoRules4.31,
4.33,7.3,or3.68.Inthefourthalternative,McMullen
soughtleavetobringanApplicationtostriketheUnderlying
ActionforbreachofacovenantbythePiikaniNation(the
“Nation”)tocausethePiikaniInvestmentCorporation
(“PIC”)totakeinsurancetoindemnifyMcMullenforlosses
andinjuryallegedintheUnderlyingAction(collectively
the“LeaveApplication”).Thiswasthesixthsuchleave
decisionintheUnderlyingAction(“LeaveDecision#6”).
RookeA.C.J.,astheCaseManagementJustice,referenced
andrepeatedmuchofthehistoricalsettinggivingrise
totheotherfivedecisionsprecedingLeaveDecision#6.
Reviewingthecomplexproceduralhistoryamongthe
parties,AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthatthe
UnderlyingActioninvolvedcomplexmattersoffactandlaw
thatcouldnotbeclearlydeterminedwithoutacomplete
Trial.HisLordshipnotedfurtherthattheNation’sclaims
intheUnderlyingActionwerenothopelessunderRule
3.68,asitwasnotplainandobviousthattheycouldnot
succeed.Further,AssociateChiefJusticeRookenoted
thattheallegedagreementwhichMcMullenreliedupon
forthefourthalternativereliefwasclearlystillinissue,
astheNationhaddeniedthattheallegedagreementwas
validorenforceable.Accordingly,AssociateChiefJustice
RookedeniedMcMullen’sLeaveApplicationpertainingto
SummaryDismissalunderRule7.3,abuseofprocessunder
Rule3.68;andtheallegedbreachofcovenant.
TurningtothereliefsoughtunderRules4.31and4.33,
AssociateChiefJusticeRookefoundthattheremaybe
“oddstaken”onwhetherMcMullen’sproposedApplications
undertheseRuleswouldbesuccessful,andwhatCosts
mayflowfromadecisiononthoseissues.Accordingly,
AssociateChiefJusticeRookeconcludedbyallowingthe
LeaveApplicationtoproceedonthesetwoheadsofrelief.
HisLordshipcautionedthatallaspectsoftheUnderlying
ActioncontinuetointerferewithRule1.2,andreiterated
theobligationofthepartiestoresolvetherealissuesin
disputebyfacilitatingthequickestmeansofresolvingthe
disputeattheleastexpenseanddelay.
HisLordshipconcludedbynotingthatLeaveDecision
#6wasstayeduntilfurtherOrderoftheCourt,withthe
intentthatitwouldcontinuetobestayeduntiltheissue
ofMcMullen’sotheroutstandingApplicationtodisqualify
GowlingsLLPastheNation’scounselwasdetermined.
GO COMMUNITY CENTRE V CLARK BUILDERS AND STANTEC CONSULTING LTD, 2020 ABQB 203 (RENKE J)Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 5.1 (Purpose of this Part), 5.4 (Appointment of Corporate Representatives), 5.6 (Form and Contents of Affidavit of Records), 6.6 (Response and Reply to Application), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award), 10.35 (Preparation of Bill of Costs), 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Service Tax) and Schedule C
TheDefendantssuccessfullyappealedfromtheDecision
ofaMasterdismissingtheirApplicationtosummarily
dismisstheclaimsagainstthem.TheirAppealswere
allowed,andtheclaimsagainstthemweresummarily
dismissed.ThepartiescouldnotagreeastoCosts,sothey
providedwrittensubmissionstoRenkeJ.TheDefendants
werewhollysuccessfulonAppealandthereforeentitled
toCosts–buttheyalsosoughtelevatedCosts,Costs
respectinganuncontestedthird-partyproductionOrder,
extraCostsonaccountofa“latefiled”Affidavitbya
witnessforthePlaintiff,Costsforsecondcounselon
Appeal,disbursementsforatranscript,andrepaymentof
theCostsawardedbytheMasterintheDecisionbelow.The
PlaintiffalsoquestionedwhetherGSTwaspayableonthe
Defendants’CostsunderRule10.48.
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Attheoutset,RenkeJ.notedthatthePlaintiffhadeither
expresslyorimplicitlyconcededthatCostswereowedtothe
DefendantsastheyhadbeenwhollysuccessfulonAppeal,
thatsecondcounselCostsonAppealshouldbeallowed,
thattheDefendantsshouldrecovertheCoststheypaid
pursuanttotheMaster’sOrderintheDecisionbelow,andthat
disbursementsforTranscriptsshouldbeincluded.However,
thepartiescouldnotagreeontheelevatedCostssoughtby
theDefendants,Costsrespectinganuncontestedthird-party
productionOrder,ortheDefendants’entitlementtoextraCosts
relatingtoa“latefiled”AffidavitbyawitnessforthePlaintiff.
RenkeJ.consideredthePlaintiff’sassertionthatthe
DefendantswerenotentitledtoGSTaspartoftheirCosts.
PursuanttoRule10.48(2),GSTcannotbeclaimedwhere
theamountisrebate-ableorrefundableundertheExcise
Tax Act,RSC1985,cE-15.RenkeJ.alsoreferenced
thewarrantyundertheGSTclaiminaForm44Billof
CostscontemplatedbyRule10.35(1).HisLordshipnoted
thattheDefendantshadnotbeenabletorespondtothis
assertion,andorderedtheDefendantstodosowithin45
days,failingwhichtheywouldbedeemedtohaveconceded
thatGSTwasnotpayable.
RenkeJ.didnotagreewiththePlaintiff’sassertionthat
theDefendantsshouldnotbeawardedCostsrelatingto
anuncontestedthird-partyproductionOrderbecausethe
informationsoughtthroughtheOrderwas“duplicative”,
andRenkeJ.thereforeawardedthoseCosts.
HisLordshipthenconsideredwhethertheDefendants
wereentitledtoextraCostsonaccountofthePlaintiff’s
“latefiled”Affidavit,andnotedthatpursuanttoRules
6.6(1)and(3),Affidavits(andotherevidence)aretobe
servedontheotherparties“areasonabletimebeforethe
[A]pplicationistobeheardorconsidered”,andthat“the
Courtmayimpose[C]ostsonthepartywhodidnotgive
reasonablenotice”.RenkeJ.heldthattheAffidavithad
beenfiledwithinareasonableperiodoftimebeforethe
Applicationwasheard,andthereforetheDefendantswere
notentitledtoCostsrelatingtoit.
RenkeJ.nextconsideredtheDefendants’claimsfor
elevatedCosts.BothDefendantsclaimedforCostsbased
onColumn5ofScheduleC,withdifferentmultipliers.
OneDefendantalsoalternativelysoughtCostsonapartial
indemnitybasisat54%ofitslegalfees.ThePlaintiff
arguedthattheDefendantsshouldbeentitledtoCosts
basedonColumn4ofScheduleC,withamultiplierof
1.5toaccountforinflation.HisLordshipnotedthatthe
RuleswereamendedonMarch17,2020tosubstitutea
newDivision2tariffforScheduleC,whichadjustedthe
columnrangesupward,andwhichrelieved“someofthe
inflationarypressuremotivatingdifferentapproachesto[C]
osts”.However,thematterbeforeRenkeJ.wasrequiredto
bedecidedundertheunamendedScheduleC.
RenkeJ.reviewedthepurposesbehindtheCostsregime,
includingthatCostsshould“justly”beallocatedtothe
unsuccessfullitigantunderRule10.29(1),andthatCosts
shouldbeproportionate,promoteefficiency,andremain
inlinewiththeFoundationalRules,includingRule1.2.
HisLordshipconsideredtheframeworkforconsidering
CostsawardsdescribedthroughRules10.31and10.33,
notingthattheyasktheCourttoconsiderseveralfactorsin
assessingCosts.HisLordshipemphasizedthatthedecision
toawardCostsisdiscretionary,butthatdiscretionmust
beexercisedjudiciallyandinlinewiththefactorssetout
inRule10.33.HisLordshipfurthernotedthatthetariff
inScheduleCwassetin1998andwasnotrevisedbythe
newRulesin2010.Whiletheywereintendedtopartially
reimburselitigants“intheneighbourhoodof30-50%of
actualcosts”,theynolongerdoso.
HisLordshipalsoconsideredseveralpolicyconcerns
respectingwhetheranadjustmentforinflationshouldbe
made,oranyothertoolsshouldbeusedtoarriveatajust
andfairCostsAward.RenkeJ.notedthatRules10.31(1)
and(3)expresslypermit“anarrayoftoolsormechanisms
forarrivingatareasonablecostsaward”,andthatprevious
caseshavepermittedtheuseofan“inflationaryfactor”,
Costsmultipliers,orawardsbasedonapercentageofthe
actuallegalfeesincurredbythesuccessfulparty.
RenkeJ.notedthattheDefendantswere“completely
successful”andthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwas“not
significantlyabove”theColumn5thresholdandthe
proceedingswerenotunusuallylong,butwere“atleast
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moderately[…]complex”.Further,HisLordshipconsidered
theparties’conductinthelitigationwhichlengthenedthe
Action,perRule10.33(2)(g),andnotedtheDefendants’
concernsthatthePlaintiffhadwithheldsomeimportant
recordsuntilaftertheApplicationsbeforetheMasterwere
heard—someofwhichweredisclosed“onlyabout2
weeksbeforetheappeal”.ThePlaintiffsarguedthattheir
corporaterepresentativeshadnotintentionallywithheldthe
records,andthattheDefendantswerepartiallyresponsible
fortheirfailuretodisclosethemastheyhadfailedtocross-
examineawitnessonhisAffidavitofRecords.RenkeJ.
disagreedandnotedthatevenifthePlaintiff’sprincipals
hadnotintentionallyactedimproperly,theyhadacted
“unreasonably”andengagedin“misconduct”withinthe
meaningofRule10.33(2)(g).PursuanttoRule5.1,one
ofthepurposesofPart5oftheRulesistoencourageearly
disclosureoffactsandrecords.PursuanttoRule5.6(1),
anAffidavitofRecordsisrequiredtodiscloseallrelevant
andmaterialrecords.Further,underRule5.4(2)corporate
representativesarerequiredto“informthemselvesof
relevantandmaterialrecords”andinformation.Renke
J.alsoconsideredtheDefendants’legalfees,the
reasonablenessofthePlaintiff’sclaim,theparties’relative
economicimbalances,thePlaintiff’sconcessionrespecting
inflation,andthereputationalimpactofthelitigationas
partofHisLordship’sanalysisof“anyothermatter”under
Rule10.33(1)(g).HisLordshipultimatelyawardedCosts
underColumn5ofScheduleC,adjustedforinflationusing
a1.5multiplier,withafurthermultiplierof1.5forcertain
stepstakenintheAction.
NOVA POLE INTERNATIONAL INC. V PERMASTEEL CONSTRUCTION LTD, 2020 ABCA 45 (STREKAF, KHULLAR AND PENTELECHUK JJA) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of These Rules), 4.1 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage Litigation), 4.2 (What the Responsibility Includes), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 5.34 (Service of Expert’s Report)
InSeptemberof2016theRespondentsappliedtohave
theunderlyingActionsdismissedpursuanttoRules4.33
and4.31.TheMasterhadrefusedtodismissthoseActions,
andtheChambersJudgeallowedtheAppealoftheMaster’s
DecisionanddismissedtheunderlyingActionspursuantto
Rule4.31.TheAppellantsthenappealedthatDecisionof
theChambersJudge.
TheAppellantssubmittedthatwhentheChambersJudge
determinedthattheAppellantshadconcededthatthe
delaywasinexcusable,theJudgehaderred.Theyfurther
submittedthatthisledtotheJudgemistakenlypresuming
thatsignificantprejudicewasestablishedpursuanttoRule
4.31(2).TheCourtdeterminedthatwhethertheAppellants
hadconcededthepointornotwasnotrelevantasthe
ChambersJudgehadundertakenherownanalysis.
InassessingwhethertheChambersJudgeerredin
determiningwhetherthedelaywasinexcusable,theCourt
notedthattheRulesplacedanobligationonallparties
to“toadvanceanactioninatimelyandcost-effective
way”andreferredtoRules1.2,4.1and4.2.TheCourt
notedthatRule5.34providedthataTrialdatecouldnot
bescheduledunlessexpertreportshadbeenexchanged.
TheRulesdidnotpermitapartytorefusetoconduct
Questioninguntilexpertreportswereprovided.Inthe
underlyingActions,theRespondentsandtheAppellants
agreedtodelayQuestioninguntilexpertreportswere
provided.TheCourtdeterminedthattheChambersJudge’s
failuretoconsidertheroleoftheRespondentsinthe
arrangementtohaveexpertreportsexchangedbefore
QuestioningwasanerrorinprincipleandtheAppealwas
allowed.
OZARK RESOURCES LTD V TERIC POWER LTD, 2020 ABCA 51 (ANTONIO JA) Rules 1.2 (Purpose and Intention of these Rules), 6.3 (Applications Generally), 6.4 (Applications Without Notice), 14.5 (Applications Only With Permission), 14.48 (Stay Pending Appeal) and 14.71 (Interlocutory Decisions)
ThiswasanApplicationtorestoreanAppeal,tostayalower
Court’sOrderpendingtheAppeal,and,inthealternative,
forpermissiontoAppeal.AlloftheApplicant’sApplications
weredismissed.
TheApplicantfiledaNoticeofAppealarguing,amongst
otherissues,thattheChambersJudgeerredinfailingto
heartheApplicantanddenyingtheApplicant’srequest
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foranadjournment,ingrantingtheOrdertheRespondent
soughtnotwithstandingtheirfailuretocomplywithRule
6.3.Rule6.3statesthatanApplicationmustbeinan
appropriateform,listcertainthings,andbefiledandserved
onallpartiesandpeopleaffectedbytheApplicationfiveor
moredaysbeforeitwastobeheard.
TheApplicantarguedthatpermissionwasnotrequiredto
Appeal.TheCourt,however,foundthattheAppealfrom
theadjournmentclearlyfellunderRule14.5(1)(b),and
thereforepermissionwasrequired.Regardless,theAppeal
wasmoot.
InaddressingtheApplicant’salternativeargument,Her
Ladyshipconsideredthetestforgrantingpermissionto
AppealunderRule14.5(1)(b).Thetestaskedwhetherthe
Appealraisedseriousquestionsofgeneralimportance,
andwhetherithadareasonablechanceofsuccess.
JusticeAntonionotedthattheApplicant’sargumentthat
theChambersJudgeerredinproceedingnotwithstanding
theRespondent’sfailuretocomplywithRule6.3,failed
toconsiderRule6.4whichpermitsJudgestoproceed
withanApplicationdespiteRule6.3iftheyweresatisfied
thatnonoticewasnecessary,orthatservingnoticeofthe
ApplicationcouldcausetheApplicantunduehardship.
JusticeAntonionotedthatpursuanttoRule1.2,the
roleofaChambersJudgeistobalancetimelinessand
cost-effectivenesswhenmakingafairdetermination.
HerLadyshipdeterminedthatnoneoftheApplicant’s
argumentshadareasonablechanceofsuccess.
TheApplicantalsosoughttohavetwoOrdersstayed.Rule
14.48allowsforstaysofApplicationspendingAppeal;
howevertherewasnoAppealofoneoftheOrders,so
itcouldnotbestayed.TheApplicanthadarguedthat
Rule14.71allowedtheCourttostayanOrderdespite
therehavingbeennoAppeal.Therewas,however,no
remainingcontextinwhichtoconsiderRule14.71,andthe
Applicationsforstaysweredismissed.
ST ISIDORE CO-OP LIMITED V AG GROWTH INTERNATIONAL INC, 2020 ABQB 94 (FRIESEN J)Rules 1.3 (General Authority of the Court to Provide Remedies), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
FollowingsuccessatTrial,thePlaintiffsoughtleaveto
amenditsStatementofClaimtoincludeaprayerfor
prejudgmentinterest.TheCourtfirstconsideredwhether
anawardofprejudgmentinterestcouldbegrantedwhere
thatremedyhadnotbeenpleaded.Inpart,thePlaintiff
arguedtheCourt’sbroadauthoritysetoutinRule1.3to
grantaremedy“whetherornotitisclaimedorsought”.
TheDefendantarguedthatRule13.6(2)(c)(iii)specifically
requiresthattheparticularsofinterestbepleaded.The
Courtheldthatprejudgmentinterestmustbepleaded
wheresought.
TurningtothePlaintiff’srequestforleavetoamend,the
Defendantarguedthattheproposedamendmentwas
hopeless.TheCourtdescribedahopelessamendment
asonethatwouldhavebeenstruckiforiginallypleaded.
JusticeFriesenconsideredtheconditionsforstriking
apleadingunderRule3.68,findingthattheaddition
ofaprayerforprejudgmentinterestdidnotmeetthose
conditions.TheCourtgrantedleavetoamendthe
StatementofClaimandorderedprejudgmentinterestas
claimedintheamendment.
TA V ALBERTA (CHILDREN’S SERVICES), 2020 ABQB 97 (DEVLIN J) Rules 2.11 (Litigation Representative Required), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffs(“TA”andherchildren)filedaStatement
ofClaimagainstnumerouspartiesafterthechildrenwere
apprehendedbyEdmontonChildren’sServices.TheClaim
made“broadassertions”andsought“broadremedies”
relatingtochildwelfarepoliciesinvolvingindigenous
children.TheDefendantsappliedtostriketheStatement
ofClaimpursuanttoRule3.68asanabusivecollateral
attackonchildprotectionproceedingswhichwerestill
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underway,andbecauseitdisclosednocauseofaction.
TwooftheDefendants,whowereaccusedofnegligence
anddefamationrelatingtotheirfindingsinapsychological
report,alsoappliedforSummaryDismissaloftheAction
againstthem.
First,DevlinJ.notedthatTAbroughttheActioninherown
nameandinthenamesofhersixminorchildren,butthat
shewasneverappointedastheirlitigationrepresentativeas
requiredbyRule2.11.DevlinJ.dismissedtheActionasit
relatedtothechildren,withoutprejudicetoitbeingbrought
inaccordancewiththeRulesatafuturetime.
Next,DevlinJ.reviewedRule3.68.HisLordshipnoted
thattheorderscomplainedofinthechildprotection
proceedingswerenotappealed,andthatattemptingto
relitigateamatteralreadydeterminedisanabuseof
process.Further,DevlinJ.determinedthatthewrongs
complainedofbythePlaintiffdidnotcreatecausesof
actionagainsttheDefendants,andthattheremedies
shesoughtweremostlybeyondthejurisdictionofthe
Court.Assuch,theStatementofClaimwasstruckinits
entirety,exceptforthedefamationclaimrespectingthe
psychologicalreport.
DevlinJ.thenconsideredtheSummaryDismissal
Application,andnotedthatRule7.3(b)allowsaDefendant
toseekSummaryDismissalwherethereisnomerittoall
orpartofaclaim.HisLordshipreviewedtheframework
fordeterminingwhetheraclaimissuitableforSummary
DismissalfromWeir-Jones Technical Services Incorporated
v Purolator Courier Ltd,2019ABCA49,andheldthat
SummaryDismissalwasappropriateinthecircumstances.
TheApplicantshadfiledanexpertreportdemonstrating
thattheyhadmetthestandardofcare,alongwithevidence
thatthereportwascreatedinasituationofqualified
privilege,whichprovidedafulldefencetothedefamation
claim.TAhadnotfiledanyevidenceinresponse.Assuch,
thefactscouldbeprovenonabalanceofprobabilities,and
therewerenogenuineissuesrequiringaTrial.
FITZPATRICK V COLLEGE OF PHYSICAL THERAPISTS OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 88 (HUGHES JA)Rules 2.22 (Self-Represented Litigants), 2.31 (Withdrawal After Trial Date Scheduled) and 14.2 (Application of General Rules)
ThePlaintiffs,beinganindividualandhercorporation,
appealedtheSummaryDismissaloftheirAction.
Approximatelytwomonthspriortothehearingbeforethe
CourtofAppeal,Plaintiffs’counselsoughttowithdrawfor
non-paymentoffees,seekingthepermissionoftheCourt
requiredpost-JudgmentunderRule2.31,arguingthatRule
2.31appliedtoappellatepracticebyoperationofRule14.2.
DrawingontheSupremeCourtofCanada’spronouncement
inR v Cunningham,2010SCC10,JusticeHughesset
outtoconsiderseveralfactors,aswellasthestandards
enunciatedintheLawSocietyofAlberta’sCode of Conduct.
TheCourtultimatelyfoundinfavourofwithdrawal,
notwithstandingtheharmtotheadministrationofjustice
whichwouldbecauseduponadjournmentoftheAppeal
Hearing,inthelikelyeventthattheallottedtimecouldnot
beotherwiseusedbytheCourtonshortnotice.
Giventhatthewithdrawalwasgranted,andgiventhatcase
lawinterpretingRule2.22hasfoundthatanindividualis
prohibitedfromactingonbehalfofacorporation,theCourt
proactivelyorderedthatthecorporatePlaintiff’sAppeal
wouldbedeemedabandonedunlessthecorporatePlaintiff
retainedcounselthreemonthsbeforetherescheduled
Appealhearing.
QUAYE V LAW SOCIETY OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 55 (ROOKE ACJ) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs)
TheApplicanthadpreviouslymadeanOriginating
ApplicationseekingJudicialReview,whichAssociateChief
JusticeRookehadruledtobeanApparentlyVexatious
ApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”)andhadordered,
pursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”),thatthe
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reasonableprospectofsuccesswithinthemeaningofRule
3.68;andsummarilydismissedotherclaimswhichlacked
meritpursuanttoRule7.3.GossJ.wentontodeclarethe
Appellantavexatiouslitigant,referringtovarioussituations
ofvexationorabuseofprocessasoutlinedinRules3.68(2)
(c)and(d).
InaffirmingallofGossJ.’sfindings,theCourtofAppeal
notedthatHerLadyshiphadcorrectlyreviewedthelawwith
respecttoApplicationstostrikepursuanttoRule3.68,
andSummaryDismissalpursuanttoRule7.3,bothwith
referencetoHryniak v Mauldin,2014SCC87.
TheCourtofAppealalsoaffirmedGossJ.’sDecisionson
Rule3.15,findingthattheAppellant’sApplicationfor
JudicialReviewhadnotbeenfiledorservedintime.The
Appealsweredismissed.
WILCOX V ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 104 (GRECKOL JA)Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review) and 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies)
AnOriginatingApplicationfiledbytheAppellantforhabeas
corpuswasprocessedinaccordancewithCivilPractice
NoteNo.7(“CPN7”).
TheChambersJudgeruledtheApplicationtobean
ApparentlyVexatiousApplicationorProceeding(“AVAP”)and
ordered,pursuanttoCPN7,thattheAppellanthad14daysto
providetheCourtwithwrittensubmissionsto“showcause”
astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbestruckpursuanttoRule
3.68.TheChambersJudgereviewedthewrittensubmissions
providedbytheAppellanttotheCourtanddeterminedthat
theAVAPshouldbestruckpursuantRule3.68.
TheAppealCourtnotedthatalowerCourt’sdecisionto
strikeapleadingpursuanttoRule3.68isgenerallyentitled
todeferenceabsentanerroroflaw,thoughwhetheraclaim
constitutesanabuseofprocessisreviewedforcorrectness.
TheAppealCourtfoundthattheChambersJudgeerred
inholdingthatthepleadingsamountedtoanabusive,
vexatiousfiling.
Applicanthad14daystoprovidetheCourtwithwritten
submissionsto“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshould
notbestruckpursuanttoRule3.68.RookeA.C.J.reviewed
thewrittensubmissionsprovidedbytheApplicanttothe
CourtanddeterminedthattheAVAPshouldbestruck
pursuanttoRule3.68.
Inaddition,RookeA.C.J.foundthattheApplicantdidnot
explainwhytheApplicationwasservedontheRespondents
weeksafterthesix-monthperiodprovidedforfilingand
servinganApplicationforJudicialReviewincontravention
ofRule3.15(2).
TheCourtalsoorderedtheApplicanttopayeachofthe
Respondents$1,000.00inCosts,citingRule10.29(1)
fortheprinciplethatthesuccessfulpartyispresumptively
entitledtoCostsunlesstheCourtotherwiseorders.The
CourtalsodispensedwiththeApplicant’sapprovalofthe
formofOrderpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
AL-GHAMDI V COLLEGE AND ASSOCIATION OF REGISTERED NURSES OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 81 (COSTIGAN, WATSON AND FEEHAN JJA) Rules 3.15 (Originating Application for Judicial Review), 3.28 (Effect of Not Serving Statement of Claim in Time), 3.68 (Significant Deficiencies), and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
Havingbeenfoundavexatiouslitigantincontemptof
Court,theAppellantappealedtheentiretyoftwoDecisions
renderedbyGossJ.InthefirstDecision,HerLadyship
determinedthatnofurtherActioncouldbetakenagainst
Defendantswhowerenotservedintime,pursuantto
Rule3.28;strucksomeActionswhichhadnoreasonable
prospectofsuccessonthebasisofRule3.68;andalso
summarilydismissedsomeActionspursuanttoRule7.3.
InthesecondDecisionunderAppeal,GossJ.had
dismissedfourActionspursuanttoRule3.15,asthe
OriginatingApplicationforJudicialReviewwasneither
servednorfiledintime;foundthatotherActionscouldnot
moveforwardaspartieswerenotservedintimeasrequired
byRule3.28;strucksomeActionswhichdisclosedno
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TheAppealCourtalsofoundthattheChambersJudgeerred
inholdingthattheAppellant’shabeas corpusApplication
combinedincompatiblepleadings.TheCourtunderscored
thatunderRule3.15(1)(a),JudicialReviewandhabeas
corpusarepartsofthesameprocess.GreckolJ.A.allowed
theAppeal.
REYES V DYCK, 2020 ABQB 154 (BURROWS J)Rule 3.27 (Extension of Time for Service)
HavingfailedtoserveaStatementofClaimintime,the
PlaintiffinapersonalinjuryActionsoughttoextendthe
serviceperiod.ThePlaintiffrelieduponRule3.27(1)(a),
whichallowsforrelaxationoftheserviceperiodwherea
DefendantcausesaPlaintifftoreasonablybelievethat
theDefendanthasbeenserved,orthatliabilitywasnot
beingcontested.Atfirstinstance,MasterSchulzpermitted
theextension.OnAppeal,JusticeBurrowsconfirmed
theextension,findingthattheDefendant’sadjusterhad
lulledthePlaintiff’slawyerintobelievingthateitherthe
Defendanthadbeenserved,orthatliabilitywasnotbeing
contested,andthat“lulling”,evenwhereunintentional,
amountsto“causing”forthepurposesofRule3.27.
OMNIARCH CAPITAL CORPORATION V BISHOP, 2020 ABQB 102 (DILTS J)Rules 3.37 (Application for Judgment against Defendant Noted in Default), 3.40 (Continuation of Action Following Judgment), 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay), 4.34 (Stay of Proceedings on Transfer or Transmission of Interest) and 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others)
ThePlaintiffsclaimedagainstseveralDefendants.After
thePlaintiffssettledwithsomeoftheDefendantsand
notedothersindefault,onlyoneDefendantremained.
ThePlaintiffsassignedtheirlitigationintereststoanew
corporation,andtheActionwasautomaticallystayed
pursuanttoRule4.34.
ThisDecisiondealtwiththreeApplications:(1)the
PlaintiffsappliedtocontinuetheActionafteritwasstayed
pursuanttoRule4.34;(2)theremainingDefendantapplied
todismisstheActionagainstitpursuanttoRule4.31;and
(3)thePlaintiffsalsosoughttoproceedwithanoralhearing
toassestheirdamagesclaimedagainsttheDefendantswho
hadbeennotedindefault.
DiltsJ.firstconsideredwhethertheActionshouldbe
permittedtocontinueunderRule4.34andexplainedthat
pursuanttotheRule,anActionisautomaticallystayed
whentheinterestorliabilityofapartyistransferredto
anotherperson,andmaybere-starteduponthePlaintiff’s
Application.InassessingwhetheranActionmaybe
continued,theCourtshouldconsiderwhethertherewere
validreasonsfortheassignment,andwhetherthereare
policyorotherconcernstosuggestthattheActionshould
notbecontinued.Nosuchconcernsexisted,andDiltsJ.
orderedthattheActionbecontinuedasawhole.
HerLadyshipalsoexplainedthatunderRule4.34(4),ifan
ApplicationtolifttheRule4.34stayisnotmadewithin
areasonableperiodoftime,theDefendantmayapplyto
dismisstheActionfordelaypursuanttoRule4.31.Itwas
throughthismechanismthattheremainingDefendant
appliedpursuanttoRule4.31todismisstheAction.
DiltsJ.explainedthatunderRule4.31,theCourtmust
assesswhetherdelayinprosecutingtheActionasawhole
resultedinsignificantprejudicetoaparty.IftheApplicant
demonstratedinordinateandinexcusabledelay,then
significantprejudiceispresumedandtheburdenshiftsto
theRespondenttorebutthepresumption.DiltsJ.found
thattherehadbeendelayintheAction,butnoinordinate
orinexcusabledelaysincethedelaywasnot“muchin
excess”ofwhatwasreasonableinthecircumstances.
Further,DiltsJ.heldthatthedelaydidnotresultin
significantprejudicetotheremainingDefendant.The
remainingDefendantarguedthatithadnotbeennotified
ofthePlaintiffs’settlementwithsomeoftheother
Defendants,andasaresultitwasprejudicedbecause
ithadlosttheopportunitytoobtainaproceduralOrder
toclaimcontributionorindemnityfromthesettling
Defendants,andwouldbeunabletoquestionorobtain
recordsfromcertainwitnesses.HerLadyshipnotedthat
theremainingDefendantstillhadtherighttoapplyforan
Orderrequiringproductionofthirdpartyrecordspursuant
toRule5.13,andthateveniftheremainingDefendant
hadsufferedprejudice,itwasnotasaresultoflitigation
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delay–rather,itwasasaresultof“theactionorinaction
ofthePlaintiffsandtheirformercounsel”.HerLadyship
concludedthattheActionshouldnotbedismissedfordelay
pursuanttoRule4.31.
Finally,DiltsJ.heldthatthePlaintiffscouldproceedwith
anassessmentofdamagesagainsttheDefendantsthathad
beennotedindefault.TheremainingDefendantobjected
totheassessmentonthebasisthatitcouldbeprejudiced
by“anydeterminationofthePlaintiffs’losseswithoutits
fullparticipation”.HerLadyshipacceptedthePlaintiffs’
argumentsthatRules3.37and3.40expresslyallowa
Plaintifftoengageinadamagesassessmentagainstonly
someDefendants,whilecontinuingtheActionagainst
others.Further,DiltsJ.notedthatallowingthePlaintiffsto
proceedwithadamagesassessmentagainstthedefaulting
Defendantswouldassisttheminrecoveringtheirlosses
withoutunduedelay,andwouldnotcauseunfairnesstothe
remainingDefendantasanydamagesagainstitcouldbe
assessedindependentlyonamorecompleterecordafter
documentproduction,Questioning,andTrial.
WEST EDMONTON MALL PROPERTY INC V PROCTOR, 2020 ABQB 161 (MAH J) Rules 3.56 (Right to Counterclaim), 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 9.2 (Preparation of Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiffssoughtanInjunctionagainstaformertenant
preventingherfromdefamingthem.ThePlaintiffsalso
soughttostriketheDefendant’spleadingsunderRule3.68,
andsoughtSummaryJudgmentofaStatementofClaim
andaCounterclaimbroughtbyanon-partypursuanttoRule
7.3.ThePlaintiffsalsosoughtadeclarationunderCivil
PracticeNote7thattheDefendantwasavexatiouslitigant.
TheDefendanthadaddedanon-partytothelistof
Defendants.JusticeMahfoundthat,pursuanttoRule3.56,
aCounterclaimmadebyanon-partyisanullity.Further,
theCourtfoundthattheDefendantwasessentiallyseeking
torelitigatesomethingforwhichafinalCourtOrderhad
alreadybeenissued,andthatthisamountedtoanabuseof
processpursuanttoRule3.68(2)(d).Inaddition,theCourt
foundthatnocauseofactionunderlaytheCounterclaimfor
monetarydamagesof$35million.Forthesereasons,the
CourtstrucktheCounterclaim.
InconsideringRule7.3,theCourtfoundthattherecord
wascompleteandallowedtheCourttomakethenecessary
findingsoffact,andheldthattherewasnogenuineissue
requiringaTrial.MahJ.grantedthePlaintiff’sApplication
forSummaryJudgment.
Lastly,theCourtruledthat,withrespecttotheOrderfrom
thisDecisiontheDefendant’sapprovalwasnotrequired
pursuanttoRule9.2(4)(c).TheCourtdidnotfindit
necessarytodecideiftheDefendantwasavexatious
litigantastheCourthadalreadystrucktheDefendant’s
pleadings.
SNAYCHUK V EDMONTON (CITY), 2020 ABQB 1 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
ThiswasanApplicationreviewedbyAssociateChiefJustice
NielsenasbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor
Proceeding(“AVAP”).PursuanttoCivilPracticeNote7,
AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenorderedthattheApplicant
had14daystoprovidewrittensubmissionstotheCourt
to“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbestruck
pursuanttoRule3.68.
AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenalsoruledthatthe
Applicant’sapprovaloftheOrdergrantedwasdispensed
withpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INC V PERPETUAL ENERGY INC, 2020 ABQB 6 (NATION J) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
PricewaterhouseCoopersInc.(“PWC”)wastheTrusteein
bankruptcyoftheestateofSequoiaResourcesCorp.PWC
filedaStatementofClaimdeclaringanassettransactionto
bevoidasagainsttheTrustee,orinthealternative,seeking
Judgmentinexcessof$217million.TheDefendantswere
PerpetualEnergyInc.andanumberofitsrelatedentities,
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andoneofPerpetualEnergyInc.’sdirectors.Sequoia
ResourcesCorp.wasformerlyPerpetualEnergyOperating
Corp.,arelatedentityoftheDefendants.
TheStatementofClaimraisedfourdifferentclaims:(i)a
claimundertheBankruptcy and Insolvency Act,RSC1985,
cB-3(the“BIA”)fortheundervaluedassettransaction;(ii)
anoppressionclaim;(iii)apublicpolicyclaim;and(iv)a
claimagainstthedirector.
TheDefendantsfiledanApplicationtohavetheclaims
struckorsummarilydismissedunderRules3.68(2)(b)and
7.3(1)(b).
JusticeNationnotedthatinaccordancewithRule3.68(3),
noevidencemaybesubmittedwhenmakinganApplication
underRule3.68(2)(b).TheCourtmustacceptthe
allegationsintheStatementofClaimastrueforthepurposes
oftheApplicationunlesstheyareassumptions,speculation,
patentlyridiculous,orincapableofproof.JusticeNation
alsonotedthatalthoughnoevidencemaybesubmitted,a
Courtmayconsiderthecontentofanydocumentreferred
tointheStatementofClaim.ACourtmayalsoconsiderthe
circumstancesandlitigationhistorytodeterminewhetherthe
pleadingdisclosesareasonableclaim.
InconsideringanApplicationpursuanttoRule7.3(1)(b),
JusticeNationnotedthattheDefendants“needtoestablish
thereisnomerittotheparticularclaim”andthatSummary
JudgmentorSummaryDismissalisonlyappropriatewhen
aCourtcanmakenecessaryfindingsoffactsandapplythe
law,andtheprocessisaproportionate,expeditious,and
lessexpensivemeansofachievingajustresult.
InconsideringtheseRules,JusticeNationfoundthat
theoppressionclaimdisclosednoreasonableclaimand
wasstruckpursuanttoRule3.68.HerLadyshipcameto
thisconclusionasPWC(astheTrustee)wasnotaproper
“complainant”forthepurposesoftheBIA.JusticeNation
alsostruckthepublicpolicyclaimunderRule3.68as
HerLadyshipdeterminedthatitdisclosednocauseof
action.Theclaimsbroughtagainstthedirectorwerebarred
byareleaseexecutedbetweentheparties,andtherefore
JusticeNationdeterminedthattheclaimsshouldbestruck
underRule3.68fordisclosingnoreasonableclaim,and
summarilydismissedunderRule7.3.
TheclaimsundertheBIAwereallowedtostandandwere
notstruckordismissedpursuanttoRules3.68or7.3,
respectively.
SMITH V MOORE-JUZWISHIN, 2020 ABQB 49 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
TheCourtdeterminedthattheStatementsofClaimfiled
bythePlaintiffwereApparentlyVexatiousApplicationsor
Proceedingsbecausetheyhadmanyelementssuggesting
theymaybehopelessandabusive.ThePlaintiffhadmade
bald,unsupportedallegations,andrequestedexcessive,
impossibleordisproportionateremediesforwhichthe
StatementsofClaimcontainednofactualfoundation.
TheCourtdeterminedthatbothStatementsofClaimshould
bereviewedpursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo.7(“CPN7”)
todeterminewhethertheyshouldbestruckunderRule
3.68,andtheCourtrequestedwrittensubmissionsfromthe
PlaintiffpursuanttoCPN7.TheCourtdirectedtheClerkof
theCourttoprepareandserveaninterimOrderstayingthe
ActionspursuanttoRule9.4.
SMITH V MOORE-JUZWISHIN, 2020 ABQB 108 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
ThePlaintiffhadpreviouslyfiledtwoStatementsofClaim
whichtheDefendantsreferredtoreviewunderCivilPractice
NoteNo7(“CPN7”)asconstitutingApparentlyVexatious
ApplicationsorProceedings(“AVAPs”).AssociateChief
JusticeNielsenconductedthereview,concludingthat
theStatementsofClaimwereAVAPs,andorderedthat
thePlaintiffhad14daystoprovidetheCourtwithwritten
submissionsto“showcause”whytheAVAPsshouldnotbe
struckpursuanttoRule3.68.
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ThePlaintiffprovidedwrittensubmissionswithrespectto
eachoftheStatementsofClaim.AssociateChiefJustice
Nielsenreviewedthewrittensubmissionsanddetermined
thattheStatementsofClaimshouldbestruckpursuant
Rule3.68.TheCourtalsodispensedwiththePlaintiff’s
approvaloftheOrdergrantedpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
JRB’S WELDING SERVICES INC V FAMILY DIVISION, 2020 ABQB 126 (NIELSEN ACJ)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies), 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders) and 13.7 (Pleadings: Other Requirements)
ThiswasanApplicationreviewedbyAssociateChiefJustice
NielsenasbeinganApparentlyVexatiousApplicationor
Proceeding(“AVAP”).PursuanttoCivilPracticeNoteNo7
(“CPN7”),AssociateChiefJusticeNielsenorderedthatthe
Applicanthad14daystoprovidewrittensubmissionstoHis
Lordshipto“showcause”astowhytheAVAPshouldnotbe
struckpursuanttoRule3.68.Inpart,theCourtnotedthat
anallegationofmisrepresentationhadnotbeenpleaded
withsufficientparticularityasrequiredbyRule13.7.
TheCourtalsoruledthattheApplicant’sapprovaloftheOrder
grantedwasdispensedwithpursuanttoRule9.4(2)(c).
YAREMKEVICH V JACULA, 2020 ABQB 175 (MICHALYSHYN J)Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 9.4 (Signing Judgments and Orders)
TheCourtinthiscasehadpreviouslydeterminedthatthe
StatementofClaimfiledbythePlaintiffwasanApparently
VexatiousApplicationorProceedingbecauseithadmade
bald,unsupportedallegationsthatdidnotprovideabasis
fortheDefendantortheCourttorespond.ThePlaintiffwas
given14daystofileawrittensubmissionsettingouthow
herStatementofClaimprovidedanadequatebasisforthe
DefendantandtheCourttomakeameaningfulresponse.
ThePlaintiffsubmittedwrittensubmissionsasperthe
previousCourtOrder.
TheCourtconsideredthePlaintiff’swrittensubmissionsand
foundthePlaintiffhadfailedtoshowthatherStatementof
Claimwasnothopeless,andstrucktheStatementofClaim
underRule3.68.TheCourtwastoprepareandservean
interimOrderstayingtheActionswhichdidnotrequirethe
Plaintiff’sendorsementpursuanttoRule9.4.
RUDICHUK V GENESIS LAND DEVELOPMENT CORP, 2020 ABCA 42 (VELDHUIS, STREKAF AND PENTELECHUK JJA) Rules 3.68 (Court Options to Deal with Significant Deficiencies) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffsappealedadismissaloftheirSummary
JudgmentApplication,andoneoftheDefendantscross-
appealedadismissalofhisApplicationtostrikethe
Plaintiffs’StatementofClaim.
ThePlaintiffsinthiscaseweretwoformeremployeesof
GenesisLandDevelopmentCorp.(“Genesis”)whofileda
claimforwrongfuldismissalagainsttheirformeremployer.
TheemployeesalsobroughtclaimsagainsttheChairofthe
BoardofDirectors(“Griggs”)fornegligenceandinducing
breachofcontract.
ThePlaintiffshadappliedforSummaryJudgmentpursuant
toRule7.3againstGenesisforwrongfuldismissal.A
MasterhadgrantedSummaryJudgment,butthatholding
wasoverturnedonAppealtotheCourtofQueen’sBench.
BeforetheCourtofAppeal,thePlaintiffsarguedthatthe
ChambersJudgehadmadeapalpableandoverriding
errorinconcludingtherewasacredibilitycontestwhich
wouldrequireaTrial.TheCourtofAppealfoundnosuch
error.TheCourtofAppealheldthatthereweresufficient
inconsistenciesintheevidencefortheChambersJudgeto
makethatfinding.ThePlaintiff’sAppealwasdismissed.
Separately,Griggsbroughtanunsuccessfulmotiontostrike
aclaimunderRule3.68(1)(a)and(2)(b),whichhethen
appealed.TheCourtofAppealcitedKnight v Imperial
Tobacco Canada Ltd.,2011SCC42fortheprinciplethata
claimshouldonlybestruckwhen,assumingthefactspleaded
tobetrue,thepleadingdisclosesnoreasonablecauseof
action.TheCourtfoundthatGriggshadfailedtodemonstrate
thefactspleadeddidnotdiscloseareasonablecauseof
action.TheCourtofAppealdismissedGriggs’cross-Appeal.
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PROSPER PETROLEUM LTD V HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 128 (ROMAINE J)Rule 3.75 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to Originating Application)
RomaineJ.heardanApplicationbyathirdpartytohave
itaddedasaRespondenttotheActioncommencedby
OriginatingApplication.Rule3.75providesthattheCourt
mayaddapersonasaRespondenttoanOriginating
Application“iftheCourtissatisfiedtheordershouldbe
made.”
TheCourtdeterminedthattherewerenolegally-recognized
interestsofthethirdpartythatwouldbeaffectedby
theApplication,norwoulditslegalrightsbeaffected.
Furthermore,theCourtfoundthataddingthethirdparty
wouldcausecost,complexityanddelayanditwasnotjust
andconvenienttoaddthethirdpartytotheAction.Lastly,
theCourtconfirmedthatthethirdpartyhadnotestablished
thatithadaninterestthatneededtobeprotected.The
CourtdeniedtheApplication.
CONOCOPHILLIPS CANADA OPERATIONS LTD V 1835651 ALBERTA LTD, 2020 ABQB 14 (MASTER ROBERTSON)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 10.48 (Recovery of Goods and Services Tax)
ThePlaintiffsbroughtanApplicationforSecurityforCosts
ineachoftworelatedActionswhichconcernedentitlement
tomineralinterestsasbetweenlessors,activelessees,
andatoplessee.TheRespondentwasthetoplesseeand
acorporateentity,promptingtheCourt’sconsiderationof
section254oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,c
B-9,whichprovidesforaSecurityforCostsawardagainsta
corporatePlaintiff.
MasterRobertsonnotedconflictingauthorityonthe
interplaybetweenRule4.22,respectingSecurityfor
Costsgenerally,andsection254.Whilesection254was
technicallynotinissueastheRespondentcorporation
wasaDefendantandnotaPlaintiff,MasterRobertsonwas
nonethelesspreparedtoreadsection254andRule4.22
together.
MasterRobertsonalsonotedconflictingauthorityasto
theproofofaRespondent’sinabilitytopaywhichshifts
theevidentialonustotheRespondent.TheCourtdidnot
requireproofonabalanceofprobabilities,butrather
“areasonablebasistoshow,oratleastthereisenough
evidencetoinfer,thattherespondentAlberta-based
litiganthasinsufficientassets,theburdenthenshiftsto
therespondenttodemonstratethatitdoeshavesufficient
assets.”
TheCourtthenappliedthefactorssetoutinRule4.22
tothecircumstances.Therewasenoughevidenceforthe
CourttobesatisfiedoftheRespondent’simpecuniosity,
shiftingtheonustotheRespondent,butlittleevidenceon
anyotherkeypoint.TheCourtsawfittodrawanadverse
inferenceagainstthePlaintiffs,assumingthestrengthof
theRespondent’sposition,ultimatelydecliningtogrant
SecurityforCosts.Inpassing,theCourtobservedthatthe
Plaintiffs’claimforGSTwasinappropriate,asRule10.48
“preventstherecoveryofGSTinacostsawardwherethe
partyclaimingthecostsreceivesaninputtaxcreditunder
theExcise Tax Act”.
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS INC V PERPETUAL ENERGY INC, 2020 ABCA 36 (VELDHUIS JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)
ThePlaintiff’sclaimshadbeensummarilydismissedand/
orstruck.OnAppeal,theDefendantssoughtSecurityfor
Costs.
AsthePlaintiffwasabodycorporate,theCourtnoted
theunsettledauthorityrespectingwhetherSecurityfor
CostsistobeassessedagainstRule4.22,asreferredto
inRule14.67forthepurposesofAppeal,orsection254
oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,cB-9(the
“Business Corporations Act”).JusticeVeldhuisdeclinedto
resolvetherelationbetweenRule4.22andsection254,
findingthatbothteststhereunderweresatisfiedinfavourof
theDefendantsinthecircumstances.ThePlaintiff’sTrustee
inbankruptcyhadrefusedtoprovidecurrentfinancial
disclosuretorebutthedatedevidenceofimpecuniosity
advancedbytheDefendants.
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Withrespecttoquantum,theCourtwasnotsatisfiedthat
Costsestimatedonasolicitor-clientbasiswereappropriate,
butdidelecttograntCostsestimatedonanenhanced
basistoaccountforthevolumeofevidenceintheAppeal
RecordandthePlaintiff’sintentiontoseekleavetofilea
50-pageFactum.TheCostsawardwasthenreducedby
20%,reflectingtheproportionofthePlaintiff’sclaimwhich
JusticeVeldhuischaracterizedasrelatingtooppression,
inlightoftheprohibitioninsection243oftheBusiness
Corporations ActonawardingSecurityforCostsagainsta
complainantofoppression.
PIIKANI NATION V RAYMOND JAMES LTD, 2020 ABCA 41 (STREKAF JA)Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges), 14.38 (Court of Appeal Panels), 14.40 (Applications to Single Appeal Judges), 14.41 (Responses to Applications to Single Appeal Judges), 14.55 (Responsibility of Parties to Manage an Appeal), 14.56 (Orders to Facilitate Appeal) and 14.67 (Security for Costs in Appeal)
TheCourtgrantedtheRespondents’Applicationfor
SecurityforCosts,anddismissedacross-Applicationbythe
Appellantseekingvariousformsofreliefincluding:seeking
todisqualifycounselfromactingfortheRespondents,to
setasideorvarypreviousOrdersoftheCourt,andastayof
theSecurityforCostsApplication.
TheAppellantcharacterizedherApplicationasbeingforadvice
anddirection.TheCourtconfirmedthatwhiletheAppellant
couldseekadviceanddirectionrelatedtotheAppealpursuant
toRule14.56andRule14.55(bywhichaJudgeortheCase
ManagementOfficercouldgrantproceduralorotherOrdersto
ensureanAppealismanagedproperly),ultimatelythecross-
ApplicationwasnottheappropriateforumfortheAppellantto
seektherequestedrelief.
TheCourtconfirmedthatpursuanttoRules14.37and
14.38,ApplicationsbroughtbeforeasingleJudgeinthe
contextofanAppealmustbeforthepurposeofaddressing
mattersincidentaltotheAppeal,providedsuchmatters
werenotrequiredtobeheardbyapaneloftheCourtof
Appeal.TheCourtdeterminedtheAppellant’sApplication
wasnotincidentaltotheAppealand,inregardtoseekingto
setasideorvarypreviousCourtOrders,theApplicationwas
moreappropriateforapanel,notasingleAppealJudge.
TheCourtsuggestedthattheAppellantcouldpursuean
ApplicationtodisqualifytheRespondents’counselat
alaterdateaslongasthepartiesfiledtheirmaterials,
ascontemplatedinRules14.40and14.41,byadate
directedbytheCourt.
RegardingtheRespondents’SecurityforCostsApplication
pursuanttoRule14.67(1),theCourtorderedthatthe
AppellantprovideSecurityforCosts.TheCourtconsidered
thefactorslistedinRule4.22anddeterminedthatitwas
unlikelythattheRespondentswouldbeabletorecover
theirCostsoftheAppealfromtheAppellantiftheAppeal
wasdismissed;therewasnoevidencethattheAppellant’s
abilitytocontinuetheAppealwouldbeundulyprejudiced
byanOrderforSecurityforCosts;anditwasappropriateto
requireSecurityforCoststobeposedbytheAppellant.
PACER HOLDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION V RICHARD PELLETIER HOLDINGS INC, 2020 ABCA 47 (O’FERRALL JA) Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order), 4.23 (Contents of Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)
TheRespondentintheAppeal,PacerHoldingsConstruction
Corporation(“Pacer”),soughtanOrderdirectingthe
Appellant,RichardPelletierHoldingsInc.(“Pelletier”),to
paySecurityforCosts,andtoliftthestatutorystayofthe
BankruptcyOrdergrantedtoPelletier.
InapplyingRules14.67(1)and4.22,whichsetoutthe
Court’sconsiderationsinassessingwhetherSecurityfor
Costsshouldbeordered,theCourtfoundthat:(a)itwas
uncertainwhetherPacerwouldbeabletoenforcean
OrderorJudgmentagainstPelletier’sassetsinAlberta;(b)
PelletierhadnoassetstopayaCostsAward;(c)themerits
ofPelletier’sAppealwerequestionable;and(d)aSecurityfor
CostsOrderwouldnotundulycompromisePelletier’sability
tocontinuetheAppeal.O’FerrallJ.A.consideredtheabove
factorsandfoundthatSecurityforCostswaswarranted.
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Next,theCourtaddressedwhichcolumninScheduleC
wouldbeappropriatefortheSecurityforCosts.TheCourt
notedthatiftheappealedBankruptcyOrderwasultimately
foundtobevalid,assetsexceeding$1.5million(the
Column5amount)mayultimatelybecomerecoverable.
Therefore,theCourtawardedSecurityforCostsreflectiveof
Column5ofScheduleC.
TheCourtwaspreparedtoorderthattheSecurityforCosts
strictlycomplywithRule4.23,butgavethepartiesan
opportunitytotrytoagreeontheirownarrangementfirst.
InregardtotheApplicationtoliftthestatutorystayofthe
BankruptcyOrder,theCourtfoundthat“theappealisnota
strongoneand…theapplicantwillbeprejudicedifthestay
isnotliftedandtherespondentwillnot.”TheCourtfound
thatitwasintheinterestsofjusticetoliftthestay.
POOLE V CITY WIDE TOWING AND RECOVERY SERVICE LTD, 2020 ABCA 102 (FEEHAN JA) Rules 4.22 (Considerations for Security for Costs Order) and 14.67 (Security for Costs)
ThiswasanApplicationbythePlaintiffforastaypending
theAppealofanOrder,andaCross-Applicationbythe
DefendantforSecurityforCosts.JusticeFeehanexplained
thattheapplicableRulesforSecurityforCostswereRule
4.22and14.67.FeehanJ.A.explainedthatanApplicant
bearstheburdenofestablishingthatonabalanceof
probabilities,grantinganOrderforSecurityforCostswould
bejustandequitable,andthatRule14.67providesthat
whereapartydoesnotprovideSecuritywhenordered,that
anAppealisdeemedtobeabandoned.
IndecidingwhethertomakesuchanOrder,theCourtmust
takeintoconsiderationtheelementscontainedwithinRule
4.22.JusticeFeehanexploredtheRule4.22factorsin
relationtothefactsofthecase.ThePlaintiff’sdirefinancial
situationandotherunpaidCostsOrdersweighedinfavour
ofgrantingaSecurityforCostsOrder.Themeritsofthe
AppealandpotentialprejudiceagainstthePlaintiffbeing
abletopursuetheAppealifanOrderwasgrantedweighed
againstgrantingtheOrder.JusticeFeehandeterminedthat
onabalanceitwouldnotbejustandreasonabletograntan
OrderforSecurityforCostsanddismissedtheApplication,
anddismissedtheDefendant’sApplication.
ThePlaintiff’sstayApplicationwasgrantedinrespectof
onlypartoftheOrderthatwasbeingappealed.
DIRK V TOEWS, 2020 ABQB 16 (ASHCROFT J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 8.16 (Number of Experts), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 10.34 (Court-Ordered Assessment of Costs)
ThePlaintiffappliedforsolicitor-clientCostsorenhanced
Costs,andfulldisbursementsfollowinghersuccessatTrial.
ThePlaintiffclaimed,amongotherthings,thatshewas
entitledtodoubleCostsfromthedateofaFormalOffer
issuedpursuanttoRule4.29.TheCourt,however,found
therewasnocompromiseintheFormalOfferandtherefore
itdidnotfallunderRule4.29anddoubleCostswerenot
appropriate.
TheCourtconsideredtheCostsinlightofthefactorsin
Rule10.33andfoundthatsolicitor-clientCostswerenot
warranted,butinsteadawardedCostsonaparty-and-party
basisandappliedaninflationadjustmentfactortoaccount
forScheduleCbeingoutofdate.
Regardingthedisbursements,theDefendantobjectedto
severalofthePlaintiff’sexpertfeesandpointedtoRule
8.16(1)whichstatesthat“unlesstheCourtotherwise
permits,nomorethanoneexpertispermittedtogive
opinionevidenceonanyonesubjectonbehalfofaparty.”
TheCourtagreedwiththeDefendantanddisallowedseveral
expertfeesthatitconsideredtobeduplicative.
TheCourtdirectedallremainingissuesregardingfeesand
disbursementstotheAssessmentOfficerpursuanttoRule
10.34.
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DAY V WOODBURN, 2020 ABQB 75 (RENKE J) Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
ThiswasaDecisionregardingcostsfollowingRenke
J’sdismissalofthePlaintiff’sAction.Themainissue
ontheApplicationwaswhethertheDefendant(“EPS”)
shouldreceivedoubleCostsforlitigationstepsfollowing
itsFormalOffertoSettle,pursuanttoRule4.29.The
Courtdeterminedthat,althoughthePlaintiff’sActionwas
defeated,EPSshouldnotbeawardeddoubleCosts,as
itsFormalOffertoSettlewasnot“genuine”enough,as
definedbythecaselaw.
ThepartiesagreedthatanawardofCostsfallswithina
TrialJudge’sdiscretion,pursuanttoRules10.29(1),10.31
and10.33.Thepartiesalsoagreedthatanoffertosettle
mustbe“genuine”forittoattractdoubleCosts.TheCourt
reviewedthecriteriafora“genuineoffer”,citingShelleyJ.
inBruen v University of Calgary,2018ABQB650.
Amongstotherfactors,agenuineoffertosettleshould:(1)
containanelementofcompromise;(2)realisticallyreflect
themeritoftheparties’relativepositionsatthetimeofthe
offer;and(3)bemadewithareasonableexpectationof
acceptanceratherthansolelytoinvokedoubleCostslater.
Anoffertosettleislikelytobefoundgenuinewhereatthe
timeofoffer,theofferorhasalreadyincurredsubstantial
legalcosts,andwheretheActionhasnoobviousmerit.An
offertowaiveCostsislesslikelytobegenuinewhenitis
“madeatanearlystageoflitigation,wheretherehasbeen
minimaldisclosureandquestioning”.
Initsassessmentofgenuineness,theCourtaskedwhether
theFormalOffertoSettleinthiscasereflectedanobjective
viewoftherelativemeritsoftheparties’positions.The
CourtfoundthatEPS’offertosettledidnotproperlyreflect
themeritsoftheparties’positionsatthetimeofoffer.
Amongstotherthings,theadmissibilityofcertainevidence
hadnotyetbeenresolved,therewasvideoevidencethat
couldhavesupportedthePlaintiff’scontentions,andon
theevidence,onereasonablepotentialoutcomeoftheTrial
couldhavebeenthatthePlaintiff’sclaimwasmeritorious:
“whentheofferwasmadeandwhileitwasopen,the
outcomeofthecasewasunpredictableanddependent
entirelyonevidence,credibilityofwitnesses,andfact-
findingattrial”.
Ultimately,theCourtfoundthatagenuineofferwouldhave
includedsomecompensationbeyondEPSforegoingits
Costs.TheCourtdidnotawardEPSdoubleCosts,butdid
awardCoststoEPSunderColumn2ofScheduleC.
STALZER (ESTATE) V STALZER, 2020 ABQB 160 (LOPARCO J)Rules 4.29 (Costs Consequences of Formal Offer to Settle), 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
ThiswasaDecisionregardingCostsfollowingaSummary
Trialregardingthefinaldivisionofmatrimonialproperty.
JusticeLoparcoexplainedthatRule10.29(1)providesthata
successfulpartyisentitledtoCostsagainstanunsuccessful
partyandthatRule10.33(1)providesseveralfactorsthat
theCourtmayconsiderinmakingaCostsAward.
TheApplicantsoughtdoubleCosts,asRule4.29provides
thatapartywhobeattheirFormalOffertoSettleis
entitledtodoubleCostsaftertheFormalOfferismade.
TheApplicanthadmadeaFormalOffertoSettleonthe
basisthattheRespondentwouldkeepsomeoftheassets
inexchangeforapaymentof$100,000.TheJudgment
arisingfromtheSummaryTrialheldthattheequalization
paymentduefromtheRespondentwas$105,524.25.
JusticeLoparcohadtoconsiderwhetheronepartywas
substantiallysuccessful,or,whethertherewasdivided
successleadingtonoCostsbeingawarded.JusticeLoparco
foundthatnopartyhadbeensubstantiallymoresuccessful
thantheother.HerLadyshipalsofoundthatthefinal
equalizationpaymentdidnotmeetthehighdegreeof
certaintythatwouldentitletheApplicanttodoubleCosts
pursuanttoRule4.29.JusticeLoparcodid,however,
ordertheRespondenttopaytheApplicant$2,500fornot
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respondingtoarequesttosetmattersdownforahearingin
atimelyfashionandfordelaysinfinalizinganoutstanding
issuepursuanttoRule10.29(g).
LOFSTROM V RADKE, 2020 ABQB 122 (GRAESSER J) Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
ThiswasanApplicationtodismisstwoActionsfordelay
pursuanttoRule4.31andRule4.33.TheActionsarose
fromthecollapseofacommonlawrelationshipbetween
Mr.LofstromandMs.Radke.Mr.Lofstrom’sfirstActionwas
forguardianshiprightsoverMs.Radke’sbiologicalchildren
(the“ParentingClaim”),andthesecondActionwasfor
divisionofcommonlawproperty(the“PropertyClaim”).
WithregardstotheParentingClaim,JusticeGraesser
firstconsideredRule4.33,whichrequirestheCourtto
dismisstheActiononApplicationifthreeormoreyears
havepassedwithoutsignificantadvanceintheAction.
JusticeGraesserfoundthatsignificantstepshadbeen
takenbyMr.LofstromtoadvancetheParentingClaimsince
August26,2016.Specifically,Mr.Lofstromhadmadean
ApplicationforaninterimparentingOrderin2017,which
wasa“significantstep”forthepurposesofRule4.33.
JusticeGraesserthenturnedtoconsiderRule4.31.Rule
4.31requiresanApplicanttoprovethatthePlaintiffhas
failedtosignificantlyadvancetheActionasaresultof
inordinate,inexcusabledelayandthattheApplicanthas
beensignificantlyprejudicedbythedelay.JusticeGraesser
foundthattwoyearsofinactionwasinordinateinthe
contextofparentingandcontactApplications.HisLordship
furthernotedthattherelationshiphadendedmorethan
fiveyearspriorandassuch,therewaspresumedprejudice
toMs.Radkeandherchildren.JusticeGraessercouldfind
noreasontoallowtheParentingClaimtoproceedand
thereforedismissedtheParentingClaimpursuanttoHis
Lordship’sdiscretionunderRule4.31.
WithregardstothePropertyClaim,Mr.Lofstromreliedon
theadvancesinacriminalproceedingtoarguethatthe
PropertyClaimwasbeingadvanced.Mr.Lofstromalso
filedanewAffidavitofRecordsbutretractedpreviously
disclosedrecords.JusticeGraesserfoundthatneither
thecriminalproceedingsnorthenewAffidavitofRecords
significantlyadvancedtheAction.Afterreviewingthe
proceedingsofthePropertyClaim,JusticeGraesserfound
thatnoneofMr.Lofstrom’sactivitiesafterAugust26,
2016constitutedasignificantadvanceoftheProperty
Claim.Specifically,Mr.Lofstrom’sfailuretoproduce
recordsandproceedtoQuestioning,asdirectedbytheCase
ManagementJustice,showedthatnosignificantstephad
beentakentoadvancetheAction.JusticeGraessergranted
Ms.Radke’sApplicationtodismissthePropertyClaimfor
delayunderRule4.33.JusticeGraesserthenconsidered
Rule4.31inthealternative.JusticeGraesserfoundthe
delayonthePropertyClaimtobeinordinateandthatMr.
Lofstromhadnoreasonableexcuseforthedelay,butthat
therehadnosignificantprejudicetoMs.Radke.Therefore,
JusticeGraessernotedthathewouldnothavegrantedthe
ApplicationtodismissthePropertyClaimunderRule4.31.
ATWAL V GILL, 2020 ABQB 146 (MASTER PROWSE)Rules 4.31 (Application to Deal with Delay) and 4.33 (Dismissal for Long Delay)
TheDefendantappliedtodismisstheActionfordelay
pursuanttoRules4.31and4.33.MasterProwserejected
theApplicationtodismisstheActionpursuanttoRule
4.33,butagreedtodismisstheActionfordelaypursuantto
Rule4.31.
PursuanttoRule4.33,MasterProwsefoundthata
DecisioninaseparateActioninvolvinganissuecommonto
theActionhadremovedoneofthelitigationissuesinthe
Action,andthereforeconstitutedasignificantadvance.
InassessingRule4.31,MasterProwsedeterminedthat
therehadbeenaninordinatedelaybecausedespite
elevenyearspassing,thematterhadnotbeensetforTrial.
Furthermore,hedeterminedthatthedelaywasinexcusable,
mostlythefaultofthePlaintiffs,andnotedthatthe
Plaintiffsdidnotrebutthepresumptionofsignificant
prejudicearisingfromRule4.31(2).AsMasterProwse
foundtherewasnocompellingreasonnottodismissthe
Actionfordelay,hedismissedtheActionagainstthe
DefendantpursuanttoRule4.31.
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BEHM V HANSEN, 2020 ABQB 52 (LEMA J)Rules 5.13 (Obtaining Records from Others), 13.13 (Requirements for all Filed Documents) and 13.19 (Requirements for Affidavits)
TheTrialoftheActionhadbeenadjournedinorderto
providethePlaintiffwithanopportunitytoobtainfurther
evidenceastotheDefendant’spossibleinterestina
business.FollowingtheadjournmentoftheTrial,the
PlaintifffiledanApplicationseeking,inter alia,anOrder
againstathird-partyindividual,Dr.Elloumi,underRule
5.13,whichprovidesaproceduretoobtainrecordsfrom
non-partiestolitigation.Dr.Elloumihadpreviouslysigned
anAffidavitpurportingsomeknowledgeoftheDefendant’s
businessinterest.
ServiceofDr.Elloumihadbeenanissue:theAffidavit
previouslyswornbyDr.ElloumiincludedtheDefendant’s
counsel’saddressforserviceasthepartyfilingthe
document.JusticeLemanotedthatRule13.19(1)requires
thatAffidavitsmustincludeallenumeratedaspects
underRule13.13.Rule13.13(2)(f)requiresanaddress
forservicefortheaffiant,andRule13.19requiresthat
theAffidavitbeinForm49.HisLordshipnotedthatthe
templateoftheformincludesasectionfortheaddressand
serviceofthepartyfilingthedocument,whichHisLordship
foundcouldbeadifferentaddressthanrequiredinRule
13.13(2)(f).
JusticeLemafoundthatDr.Elloumicouldnotbeserved
throughtheDefendant’scounsel.Astherewasnoaddress
forserviceforthethird-partyaffiantincludedinthe
Affidavit,HisLordshipsuggestedthatalternativeattempts
atserviceshouldbeattemptedbeforefilinganApplication
tovalidateservice.
1490703 ALBERTA LTD V CHAHAL, 2020 ABQB 33 (MASTER MASON)Rules 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records), 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
ThePlaintiffcorporationpurchasedresidentialreal
estatewhich,upontransferoftitle,remainedsubjectto
anencumbrancethatwasultimatelyenforcedthrough
foreclosure.ThePlaintiffbroughtanActionagainstseveral
lawyersthatithadretainedtoadministertheconveyance
(the“ConveyanceLawyers”).TheConveyanceLawyers
broughtanApplicationforSummaryDismissalontheground
thattheActionhadbeenfiledoutsidethelimitationperiod.
InconsideringtheSummaryDismissalApplication,Master
MasonreliedonseveralAffidavitsandcross-examination
transcripts.Thepartiesalsoreferredtoafiled“Bookof
Documents”whichcontainedthePlaintiff’sAffidavitof
Records.MasterMasonnotedthattherecordscontainedin
theAffidavitofRecordshadbeendeemedauthenticthrough
passageoftime,asprovidedforinRule5.15,andthat
admissiblerecordsdisclosedinanAffidavitofRecordscould
beconsideredintheApplicationpursuanttoRule6.11,but
notasevidenceofthetruthoftherecords’contents.
TheCourtheldthattherewassufficientundisputed
evidencetoinformthelimitationsissueandappliedthe
testforSummaryDismissalsetoutinRule7.3andclarified
bytheCourtofAppealofAlbertainWeir-Jones Technical
Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd.,2019ABCA
49.MasterMasondeterminedthatinjuryarisinginthe
courseofconveyancehadbeenobjectivelydiscoverable
morethantwoyearspriortothefilingoftheAction.The
ActionwasdismissedagainsttheConveyanceLawyers.
COUNTY OF VULCAN V GENESIS RECIPROCAL INSURANCE EXCHANGE, 2020 ABQB 93 (GRAESSER J)Rules 5.15 (Admissions of Authenticity of Records), 5.29 (Acknowledgment of Corporate Witness’s Evidence), 5.31 (Use of Transcript and Answers to Written Questions), 7.3 (Summary Judgment) and 13.18 (Types of Affidavit)
GenesisReciprocalInsuranceExchange(“Genesis”)and
theCountyofVulcan(“Vulcan”)appealedtheDecision
ofMasterBirkettunderRule7.3dismissingGenesis’
ApplicationforSummaryDismissaloftheActionand
Vulcan’sApplicationforSummaryJudgmentofitsclaims
againstGenesis(the“Appeals”).TheAppealsrelatedto
whetherinsurancecoverageexistedunderaninsurance
policyforVulcan(the“Policy”)inrelationtoerrorsallegedly
committedbyitsformerchieffinancialofficer.Master
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BirketthaddismissedbothApplicationsholdingthatmore
evidencewasneededtoproperlydecidetheissues.
Asapreliminarymatter,Vulcanarguedthattherecord
wasinsufficientforGenesis’SummaryDismissal
ApplicationbecauseGenesiswasrelyingonhearsay
evidenceinitsApplicationwithreferencetoitscorporate
representativeunderRules5.29and5.31(the“Corporate
Representative”)andtheCorporateRepresentative’s
understandingofvariousrecordsinevidence.Vulcan
cited,amongotherthings,Rule13.18(3)whichsaysthat
onlydirectevidencecanbeusedinApplicationsseeking
finalrelief.JusticeGraesseraddressedthisargumentby
reviewingtheseminaldecisionofWeir-Jones Technical
Services Incorporated v Purolator Courier Ltd.,2019
ABCA49andbyexplainingthattheabilityofacorporate
representativetobeabletoreviewdocumentsinthe
possessionofthecorporatebodyandsummarizethemor
tobeabletointroducesuchdocumentsintoevidenceisa
practicalnecessity.
JusticeGraesseralsoreviewedtheadmissibilityofalegal
opinionandvariousemailsandletterswrittenbyand
amongcouncillorsofVulcan,itsemployees,anditsformer
Reeve,whichVulcanarguedwerealsohearsay.Justice
Graesserexpresslynotedthatthehearsayargumentwas
contrarytothe“documentsinpossession”doctrineand
Rule5.15,andconcludedthatthisevidenceformedsome
oftheevidenceofVulcan.GraesserJ.emphasizedthatit
isnotnecessarytohavedirectevidenceofthesendersor
recipientsofbusinessrecordstomakethemadmissible.
JusticeGraesserreviewedtheprinciplesofSummary
JudgmentunderRule7.3andfoundthatthecasewas
suitableforsummaryprocedures.GraesserJ.notedthatthe
caseturnedlargelyontheinterpretationofthePolicyand
thatthefactswerenotsignificantlyindispute.HisLordship
addedthattheApplicationsweremadeafterdocument
productionandQuestioningbyeachparty.
AfteranextensivereviewofthefactsbeforetheCourt,
JusticeGraesserconcludedbyfindingthattherewere
enoughfactstofairlyandjustlyconclude,amongother
things,thatVulcanhadnotcompliedwithPolicyandthat
anycoverage,ifitexistedatall,wasnotavailabletoit.
Accordingly,JusticeGraessergrantedGenesis’Application
forSummaryDismissalofVulcan’sclaimsanddismissed
Vulcan’sApplicationforSummaryJudgment.
NEXEN ENERGY ULC V ITP SA, 2020 ABQB 83 (NIXON J) Rules 6.10 (Electronic Hearing), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)
TheApplicant,aSwisscompany,appliedtosetasidean
Orderforserviceex jurisonthebasisthatthePlaintiff
failedtocomplywithitsdisclosureobligationsinobtaining
theex parteserviceex jurisOrder.Italsosoughttostrike,
dismiss,orstaytheActionagainstit,arguingthattheCourt
eitherdidnothavejurisdictiontoheartheActionagainst
it,oralternativelythatitshoulddeclinetoexerciseits
jurisdictiontodoso.
Priortoenteringintoanycontracts,theApplicanthad
providedthePlaintiffwitha“Proposal”whichcontaineda
forumselectionclauseinfavouroftheCourtsofLausanne,
Switzerland.Thepartieshadalsoenteredintofour
Agreements,oneofwhichcontainedagoverninglawand
forumselectionclauseinfavourofAlberta.
NixonJ.firstconsideredthePlaintiff’sdisclosure
obligations.InobtainingtheOrderforserviceex juris,the
Plaintiffhadonlyreferencedoneoftheseveralagreements
(the“Agreements”)betweentheparties,andnotthe
ProposalorothersoftheAgreements.NixonJ.heldthat
ithadnotacteddeceitfullyorina“verymisleading”
manner;rather,ithadtakenthepositionthatitsclaimwas
solelybasedononeoftheAgreements,anddisclosedthat
AgreementinwholetotheCourt.Assuch,HisLordshipdid
notsetasidetheOrderonthebasisofnon-disclosure.
NextNixonJ.consideredwhethertheCourthadjurisdiction
toheartheAction.HisLordshipreviewedRule11.25(2),
whichsetsouttherequirementsforaserviceex juris
Order,andnotedthatcommencementdocumentsmaybe
servedoutsideofCanadaifthereisarealandsubstantial
connectiontoAlberta,andtheCourtpermitssuchservice
onanApplicationsupportedbyAffidavitevidence.The
partiesagreedthattheestablishmentofa“goodarguable
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case”fromtheoldRulesalsoremainsarequirementunder
Rule11.25(2),eventhoughitisnotexplicitlyreferencedin
theRule.HisLordshipalsonotedthattheCourtisentitled
torefertothecommencementdocumentandanymaterials
filedinsupportofanApplicationtosetasideservice
pursuanttoRule11.31(1)inassessingwhetherthetestfor
serviceex jurishasbeenmet.
NixonJ.foundthattheApplicationandAffidavitevidence
submittedbythePlaintiffsdiscloseda“goodarguable
case”.HisLordshipexplainedthata“goodarguablecase”
isestablishedwherethePlaintiffhasputforward“some
evidencethatthecaseitproposedtobringhasafoundation
infact”.Theevidence“neednotbebasedonfirst-hand
informationorrequireapositivefactualconclusion”.His
Lordshipfurtherheldthatarealandsubstantialconnection
toAlbertahadbeenestablished.Indoingso,NixonJ.
reviewedthelistof“presumptiveconnectingfactors”set
outbytheSupremeCourtinVan Breda v Village Resorts
Ltd,2012SCC17,aswellasthefactorslistedinRule
11.25(3).HisLordshipfoundthattheforumselection
clauseinfavourofAlbertawas“broad,unambiguous,and
unqualified”,andthattheProposalcontainingtheclausein
favourofLausannewasnotapplicable.
Finally,NixonJ.consideredwhethertheCourtshouldnot
exerciseitsjurisdictioninspiteoftheforumselection
clausenamingAlberta,onthebasisthatitisforum non
conveniens.Indoingso,HisLordshipnotedthatforum
selectionclausesareencouragedbecausetheycreate
certaintyincross-bordertransactions,andshouldonlybe
disregardedwheretheApplicantshows“strongcause”that
itshouldnotbecompliedwith.NixonJ.foundthat“strong
cause”hadnotbeenestablished-inparticularbecausethe
majorityofwitnessesweresituatedinAlberta,andthose
whowerelocatedinSwitzerlandcouldprovidetestimony
electronicallypursuanttoRule6.10.
WESTMAN V ELGER, 2020 ABQB 125 (BURROWS J)Rules 6.11 (Evidence at Application Hearings), 7.7 (Application of Other Rules) and 7.11 (Order for Trial)
ThiswasanApplicationfortheassessmentofpersonal
injurydamagesbywayofaSummaryTrial.ThePlaintiff
attemptedtorelyonunswornexpertevidence.Justice
BurrowsnotedthatAffidavitevidenceisrequiredtobe
usedwhentheCourtistodecideanApplication,pursuant
toRule6.11(1)(a).HisLordshipexplainedthatDivision3
oftheRulesdealswithSummaryTrialsandexplainedthat
pursuanttoRule7.7(2),Part6oftheRules(includingRule
6.11(1)(a))appliestoSummaryTrialsexcepttotheextent
modifiedbyDivision3.JusticeBurrowsnotedthatthereis
nothingwithinDivision3thatmodifiestherequirementthat
theCourtrelyonswornAffidavitevidencewhenconsidering
anApplication.HisLordshipconsideredorderingaTrialof
theissuepursuanttoRule7.11,whichallowstheCourt
todosoatanystageofaSummaryTrial,butultimately
heldthatthePlaintiff’smaterialsforhisApplication
weredeficient,andorderedthatthattheApplicationbe
adjournedsine dieuntilthedeficiencieswereremedied.
KUZOFF V TALISMAN PERU BV SUCURSAL DEL PERU, 2020 ABQB 111 (HOLLINS J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
JusticeHollinsdismissedtheAppellant’sAppealfroma
DecisionofaMastertosummarilydismisstheAction.
HerLadyshipnotedthatpursuanttoRule6.14(3),an
AppealfromaMastertoaJusticeoftheCourtofQueen’s
BenchisanAppealontherecordandthestandardof
reviewiscorrectness.
JusticeHollinsultimatelydeterminedthattheMasterhad
correctlydetermined,underRule7.3,thattheAppellant’s
claimwaswithoutmeritandthereforesubjecttoSummary
Dismissal.Specifically,theMastercorrectlyfoundthatit
waspossibletofairlyresolvethedisputeonasummary
basisastherewasnogenuineissueforTrial;theDefendant
hadsuccessfullyshownthattherewasnomerittothe
claim;thePlaintiffdidnotdemonstrateagenuineissue
requiringaTrial;anditwasappropriatetoexercisejudicial
discretiontosummarilyresolvethedispute.
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SSC NORTH AMERICA, LLC V FEDERKIEWICZ, 2020 ABQB 176 (FETH J)Rules 6.14 (Appeal from Master’s Judgment or Order) and 7.3 (Summary Judgment)
AMastergrantedSummaryJudgmentagainstthe
Defendants,FederkiewiczandKnowLimitsPrivateLending
Inc.TheDefendantssuccessfullyappealedtheSummary
Judgment.
JusticeFethnotedthatRule6.14(3)allowsanAppealfrom
aMaster’sJudgmenttorelyonadditionalevidencethatis
relevantandmaterialintheopinionoftheJudgehearing
theAppeal.HisLordshipfoundthatnewevidenceonly
neededtoberelevantandmaterialandisnotrequiredto
meetanyotherrequirementsforfreshevidencesuchasin
othertypesofappeals.Asaresult,JusticeFethaccepted
newevidenceonforeignlawsandotherevidencefrom
expertAffidavitsasrelevantandmaterialtotheAppeal.
JusticeFeththenconsideredwhetherthefactsofthecase
wereappropriateforSummaryJudgment.HisLordship
appliedRule7.3whichlimitsSummaryJudgmentonly
inthecasewherethereisnodefenceormerittoaclaim
(orpartofit)orwhentheonlyrealissuetobetriedisthe
amounttobeawarded.JusticeFethfoundthattheclaim
hadhighlycontestedandcomplicatedfacts.Summary
adjudicationwasnotappropriateforthedifficultfactual
questionsandcontestedfacts.
JusticeFethallowedtheAppealandsetasidetheSummary
Judgment.
KIM V CHOI, 2020 ABQB 51 (MICHALYSHYN J) Rule 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments and Orders)
TheApplicants(the“Chois”)appliedtosetasideanOrder
obtainedbytheRespondents(the“Kims”)inFebruaryof
2017,pursuanttoRule9.15.TheOrderatissueawarded
JudgmenttotheRespondents,plusinterestandsolicitor
andownclientCosts,andcertainotherreliefrelatingtothe
Chois’rightsasshareholdersanddirectorsofacorporation.
MichalyshynJ.consideredthetestforsettingasidea
DefaultJudgmentpursuanttoRule9.15(1),whichrequires
theCourttoaskthreequestions:(a)isthereanarguable
defence;(b)didtheApplicantnotintendtoallowthe
Judgmenttogobydefault,andcantheApplicantprovidea
reasonableexcuseforthedefault;and(c)didtheApplicant
movepromptlytosettheDefaultJudgmentasidewhen
itcametohisorherattention.Further,pursuanttoRule
9.15(3),theCourtretainsresidualdiscretiontograntthe
relief,evenifthetestisnotmet,iffairnessrequiresit.
MichalyshynJ.assessedtheevidenceanddeterminedthat
theChoishadestablishedareasonablymeritoriousdefence,
hadnotintendedtheJudgmenttogobydefault,andhad
movedpromptlytosetasidetheDefaultJudgmentwhen
theybecameawareofit.Therealquestionwaswhether
theirexcusesforthedefault-thattheycouldnotremember
beingadvisedbytheirlawyersthattheyhadagreedtothe
Applicationdate,andthatMr.Choihadbeenill-were
reasonable.HisLordshipnotedthattheburdenwasonthe
Choistodemonstratethattheyhadareasonableexcusefor
failingtoopposetheApplication,andheldthattheyhad
failedtodoso.They“kneworoughttohaveknown”about
theApplicationanddidnothingtorespondtoit,andthe
Kimshadalso“madevalidpoints[…]regardingtheChois’
apparentdisregardfortheproceedings”.
Nevertheless,MichalyshynJ.waspersuadedthatgiven
thecircumstancesofthecase,“fairnessdictate[d]that
notwithstandingtheabsenceofareasonableexcuse,the
Choisshouldhaveanopportunitytoadvancetheirpossibly
reasonablymeritoriousdefence.”HisLordshipalsoset
asidecertainreliefthatwasgrantedintheOrder,becauseit
hadnotbeensoughtintheKims’originalApplication.
Finally,MichalyshynJ.orderedthat“theChois’abilityto
advancetheirdefencewillbeconditionalonthepayment
forthwithof[C]oststotheKims”.HisLordshipasked
thepartiestoprovidefurthersubmissionsastothescale
ofCosts,butwarnedthatHisLordshipwouldnotorder
solicitor-clientCostsorSecurityforCosts.Rather,His
LordshipwouldbepreparedtoawardCostsinaccordance
withColumn4ofScheduleCorenhancedCosts.
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801 SEVENTH INC V CNOOC PETROLEUM NORTH AMERICA ULC, 2020 ABQB 198 (DILTS J)Rules 9.15 (Setting Aside, Varying and Discharging Judgments), 11.25 (Real and Substantial Connection), 11.27 (Validating Service) and 11.31 (Setting Aside Service)
Following801SeventhInc.’s(“801”)successfulreceipt
ofOrderspermittingserviceex juris,andsubsequently
validatingthatservice,MadamJusticeDiltspresidedover
thisApplicationtosetasidebothOrders.Indeterminingthat
theApplicationshouldbedismissed,HerLadyshipclarified
thatanApplicationtosetasideanOrderforserviceex juris
isproperlybroughtpursuanttoRule11.31,asopposedto
Rule9.15.JusticeDiltsalsoconcludedthatanOrderto
validateservicecanbegrantedpursuanttoRules11.27(1)
and11.27(4)(b)inamannerconsistentwiththeprinciples
oftheHague Convention,solongasevidencecanbeoffered
whichshowsthatservicewaseitheraffectedorfrustrated.
TheApplicantalsosoughttoinvalidatetheserviceex juris
OrderpursuanttoRule11.25(3)onthebasisthatseveral
misstatementsmadebythearticlingstudentwhoobtained
thatOrdercompoundedandwereultimatelyfatal.Madam
JusticeDiltsaddressedtheseapparentdeficiencies,and
concludedthatalthoughthearticlingstudentmayhave
conveyedsomefactualinconsistencies,thedispositive
evidencenecessarytodeterminewhethertogranttheex
parteApplicationwasproperlyputbeforetheCourt.
Lastly,MadamJusticeDiltsexaminedthethreshold
requirementreadintoRule11.25(3)thatanApplicant
mustdemonstrateagoodarguablecase.HerLadyshipheld
thattomakeoutagoodarguablecase,itisnotnecessary
totenderevidenceofeverysinglecauseofaction,asan
Applicantispermittedtopleadinthealternative.
FLEMING V FLEMING, 2020 ABQB 85 (LEMA J) Rules 10.10 (Time Limitation on Reviewing Retainer Agreements and Charges) and 10.11 (Who May Request Review of Lawyer’s Charges)
Aftertheirmatrimonialpropertywasdivided,aformerwife
challenged,amongotherexpenses,thequantumoflegal
feesanddisbursementsincurredbyherformerhusband
andchargedagainsttheproceedsofcertainlandsthathad
beendividedandsold.
Thehusbandarguedthatthewifewasbarredfrom
challengingthelegalfeespursuanttoRule10.10(2),which
requiresthatalawyer’schargesbereviewedwithin6months
ofthedateoftheaccountbeingsenttotheclient.Lema
J.agreedthatthechallengewasoutoftime,asmorethan
6monthshadgonebysincetheaccountwasissued.His
LordshipalsocommentedthatunderRule10.11,boththe
formerhusbandandwifewereconsidered“clients”entitled
tohavetheaccountreviewedpursuanttoRule10.10
becausetheywereeachliabletopaythelawyer’scharges.
SELLERS V SELLERS, 2020 ABQB 79 (RICHARDSON J) Rules 10.28 (Definition of “Party”), 10.29 (General Rules for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.30 (When Costs Award May be Made), 10.31 (Court-ordered Costs Award), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
AfterRichardsonJ.grantedaJudgmentofDivorce,divided
theparties’matrimonialproperty,andorderedthepayment
ofchildandspousalsupport,thepartiescouldnotagree
onCosts.Boththehusbandandwifearguedthattheyhad
been“moresuccessful”thantheotherintheAction,and
thereforethattheywereentitledtoCosts.
RichardsonJ.firstnotedthatauthoritytoawardCostsis
governedbyRules10.28to10.33,andthatCostsshould
beawardedinamannerthatisfair,efficient,just,and
cost-effective.HerLadyshipfurtherexplainedthatonegoal
ofCostsistooffsetthefinancialimpactofbeingforcedto
attendCourtwithoutvalidreason,andthatRule10.33lists
additionalfactorsthattheCourtmayconsiderinawarding
Costs.Ultimately,becausethepartiesenjoyedmixed
success,RichardsonJ.orderedthattheyeachbeartheir
ownCosts.
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BLOUGH V BUSY MUSIC INC, 2020 ABQB 19 (JONES J) Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
ThisCostsDecisionaroseoutoftwointerlocutory
Applicationsbroughttoaddressissueswithproductionof
documents,aswellasUndertakingsrefusedandobjections
raiseonQuestioningonanAffidavitofawitness.Jones
J.confirmedthatpursuanttoRule10.29andtheCourt’s
discretion,asuccessfulpartytoanApplicationisentitledto
Costspayableforthwithagainsttheunsuccessfulparty,and
theCourtwillconsiderthefactorssetoutinRule10.33,
specificallytherelativesuccessofthesuccessfulparty.The
Courtdeterminedthatthesuccessfulpartyhadachieved
“substantialsuccess”andwasentitledtoCosts.
IndeterminingtheproperquantumoftheCoststobe
awarded,giventhattheApplicationsweremattersnot
involvingmonetaryamounts,theCourtconsideredwhether
anawardshouldbebasedontheamountsoughtinthe
mainAction(whichwouldhaveengagedColumn4of
ScheduleC)or,asthemattershadnomonetaryamount,
ifColumn1ofScheduleCshouldbeusedassuggestedin
ScheduleC.
TheCourtawardedCostsinfavourofthesuccessfulparty
pursuanttoColumn1ofScheduleCpayableforthwith,rather
thaninthecauseasrequestedbytheunsuccessfulparty.
CRESSMAN ESTATE (RE), 2020 ABQB 42 (NATION J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs) and 10.33 (Court-Ordered Costs Award)
ThisDecisionrelatedtotwoquestionsputbeforetheCourt.
OneofthequestionstheCourtwastaskedwithdetermining
wasiftheApplicantwasresponsibletopayCostsasshe
haddiscontinuedherApplication.JusticeNationnoted
thatRule10.29wasthegeneralRuleforthepaymentof
litigationCostsandthatRule10.33listedseveralfactors
thattheCourtcouldconsiderwhendeterminingCosts
Awardsincluding“(1)theconductofanypartythatwas
unnecessary,orthatunnecessarilylengthenedordelayed
theaction;(2)arefusaltoadmitanythingthatshould
havebeenadmitted;and(3)whetheranyapplication
wasunnecessary,improperoramistake.”HerLadyship
createdatimelineofsalientfactsandappliedthelaw
tothosefacts.JusticeNationultimatelydecidednotto
awardsolicitor-clientCostsagainsttheApplicantdueto
theRespondent’sowncontributionstotheconfusionon
certainissuesandsuspiciouscircumstances.Instead,
theRespondentwasentitledtotaxableCostsagainstthe
ApplicantunderColumn5ofScheduleCforeachstep
takenbytheRespondentrelatingtocertainclaimswithina
certaintimeperiod.
ELDER ADVOCATES OF ALBERTA SOCIETY V ALBERTA, 2020 ABQB 54 (ROSS J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.31 (Court-Ordered Costs Award), 10.32 (Costs in Class Proceeding) and 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award)
TheDefendantinaClassActionsoughtanOrderforCosts
againstthePlaintiffsandtheircounsel,whichthePlaintiffs
opposed.ThePlaintiffscross-appliedforanOrderforno
Costs.JusticeRossnotedthattherelevantRulesinthe
proceedingwereRules10.29,10.31,10.32and10.33.
HerLadyshipexplainedthatthefactorsinRule10.33
relatedtotheamountofCostsawarded,andthatRule10.32
addressedwhetheraCostsAwardshouldbemadeagainstan
unsuccessfulrepresentativepartyinaClassAction.
JusticeRossconsideredthefactorssetoutinRule10.32,
whichrequiredtheCourttoconsiderthepublicinterest,
whethertheActioninvolvedanovelpointoflaw,whether
theproceedingwasatestcase,andaccesstojustice
considerations.HerLadyshipfoundthattheunderlying
Actionwasnotatestcaseandthatallthe10.32factors
weighedinthefavourofthePlaintiffs.Theissuesinthe
ClassActionproceedingwereissuesofpublicimportance,
andissuesofstatutoryinterpretationpresentinthe
underlyingActionthathadnotbeenpreviouslyanalyzedby
theCourtcouldbeconsideredanovelissue.Theclaimwas
potentiallymeritorious,triable,andwasbroughtforwardon
behalfofclassmemberswhoweredisadvantagedandinthe
interestsoftheiraccesstojustice.JusticeRossdismissed
theDefendant’sApplication,andgrantedthePlaintiffs’
ApplicationfornoCosts.
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MOTTA V DAVIS WIRE INDUSTRIES LTD, 2020 ABQB 136 (DEVLIN J)Rules 10.29 (General Rule for Payment of Litigation Costs), 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and Schedule C
ThiswasaDecisionregardingCostsfollowingaTrial.In
thepreviousTrialDecision,JusticeDevlinfoundthatthe
DefendanthadcausetoterminatethePlaintiff,butthe
DefendantalsoowedthePlaintiff$36,912forunpaid
vacationentitlement.Assuch,thePlaintiffwaspartially
successfulfollowingTrialandsoughtCosts.TheDefendant
alsosoughtCosts,asitwassuccessfulindefendingalarge
portionofthePlaintiff’soriginalclaim.
JusticeDevlinnotedthatCostsareawardedas
compensationandarehighlydiscretionary.Pursuantto
Rule10.29,thesuccessfulpartyisnormallyentitledto
Costs.JusticeDevlinconsideredtheTrialinitsentiretyand
determinedthesuccessfulpartytobethePlaintiff.
JusticeDevlinreliedonitem1(3)(b)undertheFramework
ofScheduleC,whichdictatesthatthecolumnforaCosts
AwardagainstaDefendantisdeterminedbytheamount
recovered,nottheamountclaimed.AsthePlaintiffwas
awarded$36,912,thisputtheCostsAwardinColumn1of
ScheduleC.
JusticeDevlinthenturnedtoRule10.33todeterminethe
appropriatefactorsapplicableinmakingtheCostsAward.
JusticeDevlinfoundthattheTrialshouldhavebeenshorter,
andthatpartoftheblameforthelengthoftheTrialsat
withthePlaintiff.HisLordshipthenreducedtheCosts
AwardfortheextraTrialtimeonthePlaintiff’sunsuccessful
portionofhisclaim,namelytwoandahalfdays.Pursuant
toitem1(3)(b)undertheFrameworkofScheduleC,
thereductionwascalculatedonColumn3toreflectthe
unsuccessfulamountclaimedbythePlaintiff.
ANNETT V ENTERPRISE RENT-A-CAR CANADA LTD, 2020 ABQB 74 (RENKE J) Rules 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award), 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements) and Schedule C
ThisDecisiondealtwiththeparties’entitlementtoCosts
aftertheTrialoftheAction.
ThePlaintiffhadoriginallyclaimedagainstEnterprise
Rent-a-CarCanadaLimited(“Enterprise”)andtheCalgary
PoliceService(“CPS”),butlaterdiscontinuedhisAction
againstCPSonawithoutCostsbasis.Thereafter,Enterprise
obtainedaConsentOrderpermittingittoserveaThird
PartyNoticeonCPS.AftertwoweeksofTrial,thePlaintiff
andEnterprisereachedasettlement.Thereafter,theCourt
foundthatCPSwasnotliabletothePlaintifforEnterprise.
InitsrulingonCosts,theCourtfirstaddressedthe
questionofwhatCostscolumninScheduleCappliedfor
determiningCPS’sCosts.Thepartiescouldnotagreeas
totheapplicableCostscolumnbecausethePlaintiffhad
claimedforgeneraldamagesintheamountof$200,000,
andpecuniaryandspecialdamageswithoutquantifying
them.JusticeRenkecommentedthatthePlaintiff’s
pleadingsmayhavebeendeficient,astheydidnotcontain
anestimateoftheamounttobeclaimedasrequiredby
Rule13.6(2)(c)(ii).Later,whileatTrial,Enterprisehas
valuedthePlaintiff’sclaimat$1.5millionor$1.7million;
andtheninitsclosingsubmissions,hadstateditwas
seekingcontributionof$303,750basedonitsshareof
thesettlementamount.JusticeRenkeconsideredRule
10.33(1)andnotedthattheRule“referstotheamount
claimed[inthepleadings]andtheamountrecoveredas
mattersthatmaybeconsideredinacostsaward.”His
Lordshipalsohighlightedtwoobjectivesofatariffoffees
(ScheduleC,Division2):(1)toprovidecertaintytoparties;
and(2)topromoteparityorfairnessforlitigantsthrough
similartreatment.TheCourtfoundthatColumn3of
ScheduleCwastheappropriateonefordeterminingCPS’s
Costs,asboththePlaintiff’spleadingsandthesettlement
amountsfellunderColumn3.
JusticeRenkenextconsideredwhetherEnterpriseshould
payallofCPS’sCosts,oronlythoseCostsincurredafterit
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serveditsThirdPartyNoticeonCPS.TheCourtfoundthat
therewasnothingthatdisentitledCPStoCostsfromthe
beginningoflitigation.
ALKADRI V ALKADRI, 2020 ABCA 82 (O’FERRALL JA)Rules 10.33 (Court Considerations in Making Costs Award) and 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)
Theparties,AntoineAlkadri(the“Applicant”)andKhaled
Alkadri(the“Respondent”)werebrotherswhohad
startedthecompanyTiles4Less(the“Company”).The
brothers’businessrelationshipbecamecontentiousand
theRespondentfiledanoppressioncomplaintpursuantto
section242oftheBusiness Corporations Act,RSA2000,c
B-9(the“Act”)againsttheCompanyandtheApplicant(the
“UnderlyingAction”).
TheApplicantsoughtpermissiontoappealaninterlocutory
Order(the“Order”)inwhichtheCaseManagementJudge
(“CMJ”)hadorderedtheCompanytopaytotheRespondent
interimCoststocover,amongotherthings,legalfeesand
disbursementspursuanttosection243(4)oftheAct(the
“Appeal”).TheApplicantargued,amongotherthings,that
theCMJerredinexercisinghisdiscretiontoawardinterim
CostsbyfailingtoconsiderthefactorsinRules10.33(2)(a)
and(f).TheApplicantsubmittedthattheRespondenthad
delayedtheUnderlyingActiontherebyincreasingthecost
oftheproceedings,andthatthisconductshoulddisentitle
himtoanyassistance.
O’FerrallJ.A.foundthatpursuanttoRule14.5(1)(e),an
ApplicantmustreceivepermissiontoappealaDecisionas
toCostsonly.TheApplicantmustbeabletodemonstrate:
(a)agoodarguablecase;(b)issuesofimportancetothe
partiesandingeneral;(c)thattheAppealhaspractical
utility;and(d)thatnodelayinproceedingswillbecaused
bytheAppeal.
JusticeO’FerrallnotedthatCostsawardsarediscretionary
andarereviewableonthestandardofpalpableand
overridingerror.Afterreviewingtherelevantfactualhistory,
HisLordshipfound,asdidtheCMJ,thattheRespondent
owned40%oftheCompanyandtheOrderwasdraftedto
operateasaloan,securedbywayofConsentJudgment
infavouroftheCompanyasagainsttheRespondent.
Accordingly,iftheRespondentwastolosetheUnderlying
Action,hewouldhavetorepaytheloan.JusticeO’Ferrall
furtherfound,asdidtheCMJ,thatitappearedthatsome
ofthedelaywasduetotheinactionoftheCompanyand
theApplicant.Accordingly,O’FerrallJ.A.dismissedthe
Applicants’ApplicationforpermissiontoAppeal.
CANLANKA VENTURES LTD V CAPITAL DIRECT LENDING CORP, 2020 ABQB 96 (HALL J) Rule 10.42 (Actions within Provincial Court Jurisdiction) and Schedule C
ThiswasaDecisionregardingCosts.ThePlaintiffhad
madeclaimsinrespectoffourdifferentmortgages.Three
oftheclaimsfailed,butJusticeHallfoundinfavourofthe
Plaintiffforthefourthclaim.Damageswereassessedat
$25,000.
ThePlaintiffmaintainedthatitshouldbeawardedCosts
asthesuccessfulparty.ThePlaintifffurtherarguedthat
ScheduleCisoutdatedanddoesnotproperlyreflecta
litigant’sactuallegalcosts.ItarguedthatCostsshouldbe
40%to50%ofactuallegalcosts,yieldingatotalofover
$106,000.
TheDefendantarguedthatitwassubstantiallysuccessful
initsdefenceandsoughtCostsinaccordancewithColumn
2ofScheduleC.Inthealternative,ifCostsweretobe
awardedtothePlaintiff,theDefendantarguedthatthe
CostsshouldbelimitedbyRule10.42(2)(a).Pursuant
toRule10.42(2)(a),whereanActionisbroughtinthe
CourtofQueen’sBenchbuttheamountawardeddoesnot
exceedthejurisdictionoftheProvincialCourt,thenCosts
mustbeassessedatnomorethan75%oftheColumn1of
ScheduleCunlesstheCourtotherwiseorders.
JusticeHallfoundthatneitherofthepartieswas
particularlysuccessfulatTrial.HisLordshipagreedwith
theDefendantthatRule10.42(2)(a)applied,andawarded
75%ofColumn1tothePlaintiff,equatingtoCosts
awardedof$11,907.43.
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anadultinterdependentpartnershipaswell.The“special
circumstances”portionofthetestdoesnotoftencreate
animpedimenttomatrimonialorfamilylawcases.Infact,
interimCostsareoftengrantedinthattypeoflitigation.
HisLordshipfoundthatthenatureofthelitigationinthe
underlyingActionwasonewhichfellwithinthescopeof
casesoftenrecognizedinthethirdpartofthetest;however,
thepresumptionwasrebuttable.JusticeFethalsonoted
thatevenifallthreepartsofthetestweremet,granting
CostswasstillattheCourt’sdiscretion.
HisLordshipappliedthetesttothefactsandfound
thatalthoughtheApplicanthadmetthesecondand
thirdelementsofthetest,shehadnotdemonstrated
impecuniosity.JusticeFethdismissedtheApplicationfor
advanceCosts,grantedinterimpartnersupportsubjectto
setoff,andreservedtheApplicationforretroactivesupport
forTrial.
KOCH V KOCH, 2020 ABQB 65 (KENNY J)Rule 13.6 (Pleadings: General Requirements)
ReasonsforJudgmentwereissuedinthisfamilylaw
disputeonOctober5,2017.Severalissuesremained
outstandingbetweenthepartiesfollowingJudgment.One
issuewaswhetherinterestwasowedonthesaleofsome
ofthematrimonialproperty.JusticeKennyreferredto
Rule13.6whichrequiresapartytospecificallypleada
statementofanyinterestclaimed,thebasisfortheinterest,
andthemethodofcalculatingtheinterestintheStatement
ofClaim.
JusticeKennyreviewedtheStatementofClaim.The
Judgment Interest Act,RSA2000,cJ-1waspleadedin
theStatementofClaimfortheclaimforstatutorypre-
judgmentinterest.HerLadyshipnotedthatadifferent
interestratewasraisedinargumentwhichhadnotproperly
beenpleaded,butthatawardingpre-judgmentinterest
wasdiscretionary.Ultimately,JusticeKennyorderedpre-
judgmentinterestinthelumpsumof$30,000.
LYMER (RE), 2020 ABQB 157 (MASTER SMART)Rule 10.53 (Punishment for Civil Contempt of Court)
ThebankruptApplicantinthiscasesoughtadeclaration
fromtheCourtthathehadpurgedhiscontempt.Hehad
previously,onnumerousoccasions,providedfalseor
incompleteinformationtocreditorsthathadopposedhis
dischargefrombankruptcydespiteCourtOrdersrequiring
completeandhonestproduction.
MasterSmartconsideredRule10.53(3)whichallowsthe
Courttowaiveorsuspendapenaltyorsanction“[i]fa
persondeclaredtobeincivilcontemptofCourtpurgesthe
person’scontempt.”
Ultimately,MasterSmartdeterminedthatthemostrecent
productionoftheApplicantfailedtoanswerthecentral
questiontothelitigation(i.e.wherehadthemoneygone?)
and,therefore,theApplicanthadfailedtopurgehis
contempt.
BLANEY V MURPHY, 2020 ABQB 196 (FETH J)Rule 12.36 (Advance Payment of Costs)
ThiswasanApplicationforongoingandretroactive
interimpartnersupportandforadvanceCosts.Rule12.36
addressesadvanceCostsinthefamilylawcontext.FethJ.
exploredthecaselawthatdevelopedaroundtheRule,and
notedthatthecaselawprovidesathree-parttestthatalso
appliesinfamilylawandmatrimonialcases.
FethJ.explainedthatthethreeparttestconsidersfirst,
theimpecuniosityoftheApplicant;second,whetherthe
Applicanthasestablisheda“primafaciecaseofsufficient
merit”,andthird,whether“specialcircumstances
bringingtheclaimwithintheclassofcasestowhichth[e]
extraordinaryremedyapplies”.HisLordshipexplainedthat
inmaritallitigation,thesecondpartofthetestisusually
metduetoarebuttablepresumptionthatadisputearising
fromtheprocessofmarriageanddivorcewasa“prima
faciecaseofsufficientmerit”;however,thisApplication
arosefromadisputeinacommonlawrelationship.
JusticeFethnotedthatthepresumptionfoundinmarital
litigationlogicallyandoftenfollowsforclaimsbasedon
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HAYDEN V HAYDEN, 2020 ABCA 37 (ROWBOTHAM JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)
TheApplicantinthiscasesoughtpermissiontoappealfrom
theDecisionofasingleAppealJudgetoapanelofthree
judges,pursuanttoRule14.5.
RowbothamJ.A.determinedthattheApplicantdidnot
meetthetestforpermissiontoappealfromthedecisionof
asingleJudge;specifically,theApplicantfailedtoestablish
(a)aseriousquestionofgeneralimportance;(b)apossible
erroroflaw;(c)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or
(d)amisapprehensionofimportantfacts.
RowbothamJ.A.confirmedthattheApplicationdidnot
meritthescrutinyofthreeAppealJudgesanddismissedthe
ApplicationtoforpermissiontoAppeal.
PIIKANI NATION V RAYMOND JAMES LTD, 2020 ABCA 116 (STREKAF JA)Rule 14.5 (Appeals Only With Permission)
TheApplicantsoughtpermission,pursuanttoRule14.5(1)
(a),toappealthedecisionofStrekafJ.A.(the“Application
toAppeal”)whichgrantedSecurityforCoststothe
RespondentsinrelationtotheApplicant’sAppealofan
interlocutoryOrdergrantedbyaCaseManagementJudge
toafullpanel,anddismissingthebulkoftheApplicant’s
cross-Application(the“UnderlyingApplication”).
JusticeStrekafreviewedsomeoftheconsiderablefactual
historyintheUnderlyingApplicationandtherelevant
jurisprudenceapplicabletoRule14.5.HerLadyship
outlinedthetestandfactorstoconsiderinallowingan
ApplicationtoAppealandnotedthatpermissioncanbe
grantediftheApplicantestablishesthatthereis:(a)a
questionofgeneralimportance;(b)apossibleerrorof
law;(c)anunreasonableexerciseofdiscretion;or(d)a
misapprehensionofimportantfacts.
JusticeStrekaffound,inter alia,thattheApplicantsought
torelyonanAffidavitwhichcontainedwrittenargument
(whichwasnotproperlythesubjectofanAffidavit),
attemptedtorelitigatethemeritsoftheCostsAwardthat
STEWART V SCHUMACHER, 2020 ABQB 133 (ROOKE ACJ)Rule 14.5 (Appeals only with Permission)
InanunderlyingActionallegingharassment(the“Action”)
commencedbyaradioannouncer(the“Plaintiff”)against
oneofherlisteners,theApplicant/Defendant,John
Schumacher(“Mr.Schumacher”),hadpreviouslymade
anApplication(the“Application”)whichAssociateChief
JusticeRookeruledtoexhibitseveralindiciaofabusive
litigation.HisLordshiphadimposedinterimCourtaccess
restrictionsonMr.Schumacherandinvitedhimandthe
Plaintifftoprovidewrittensubmissionsaddressingtwo
questions:(1)whetherMr.Schumachershouldbesubject
toindefiniteCourtaccessrestrictions;and(2)ifso,what
formthoseCourtaccessrestrictionsshouldtake.
BecauseMr.Schumacherhadattemptedtobringthe
Plaintiff’semployer,aradiostationanditsowner(the
“RadioStation”andthe“Owner”,respectively)intothe
litigation,theywerealsoinvitedtomakesubmissions.The
CourtreceivednosubmissionsfromthePlaintifforMr.
Schumacherbutdidreceiveajointsubmissionfromthe
RadioStationandOwner(the“Owner’sSubmission”).
Afterreviewingtherelevantproceduralhistoryandthe
Owner’sSubmission,AssociateChiefJusticeRooke
foundthatthecircumstancesofthecase,inparticular
theconcernforthesafetyofMs.Stewart,weighedin
favourofindefiniteCourtaccessrestrictionsasagainst
Mr.Schumacher.HisLordshipprovidedalitanyof
prohibitionsandrestrictionsasagainstMr.Schumacher
whichincludedarequirementthatMr.Schumachermust
applytoasingleAppealJudgeforleavetocommenceor
continueanyAppeal,Application,orotherproceedingin
theAlbertaCourtofAppeal,andifasingleAppealJudge
grantedMr.SchumacherleavetocommenceanAppeal,
thenMr.Schumachermayberequiredtoapplyforfurther
permissiontoAppealunderRule14.5(1)(j).
HisLordshipconcludedbynotingthattheCourt
wouldprepareandfiletheappropriateOrdertoreflect
thisDecision,andthatapprovalofthatOrderbyMr.
Schumacherwasnotrequired.
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HerLadyshipfoundthattheAppealwasnothopelessor
frivolousandgrantedtheApplicationtoextendthetimeto
appealpursuanttoRule14.37(2)(c).
PACE V ECONOMICAL MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 2020 ABCA 67 (STREKAF JA)Rules 14.14 (Fast Track Appeals), 14.17 (Filing the Appeal Record – Fast Track Appeals), 14.64 (Failure to Meet Deadlines) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)
TheAppellant,RochellePace(“Ms.Pace”),soughtto
restoreanAppealthatwasstruckbytheRegistrarfor
failuretocomplywiththedeadlinesforaFastTrackAppeal
pursuanttoRules14.17(1)and14.64.Ms.Pacehad
commencedanActioninAugustof2014againstthedriver
ofanATVonwhichshewasapassengerforinjuriesshe
sustainedasaresultofanaccidentwhentheATVstruck
atree(the“UnderlyingAction”).TheRespondentinsurer,
whowasaddedasaThirdPartytotheAction,applied
toamendthedriver’sAmendedStatementofDefenceto
particularizethecausationissueandtopleadadditional
defences(the“UnderlyingApplication”).TheUnderlying
ApplicationwasgrantedbyaChambersJudgeandappealed
byMs.Pace.
Ms.PacehadindicatedonherNoticeofAppealthatthe
AppealwasnotrequiredtobedealtwithasaFastTrack
Appeal.ByaletterdatedthesamedaytheAppealwas
filed,theCourt’sCaseManagementOfficeradvisedthe
partiesthattheAppealwasaFastTrackAppealpursuant
toRule14.14.Ms.Pacefailedtomeetthedeadlinesofa
FastTrackAppealunderRule14.17andaccordingly,the
Appealwasstruck.
StrekafJ.A.foundthatanAppealthathasbeenstruck
mayberestoredpursuanttoRule14.65(1).HerLadyship
reviewedtherelevantjurisprudencenotingthatthetest
torestoreanAppealiswell-settledandbasedonfive
factors:(1)arguablemerit;(2)explanationforthedefect
ordelaythatcausedtheAppealtobetakenoffthelist;
(3)reasonablepromptnessinmovingtocurethedefect
andhavetheAppealrestored;(4)timelyintentionto
proceedwiththeAppeal;and(5)potentialprejudicetothe
Respondents(includingthelengthofthedelay).
gaverisetoacontemptOrder,andprovidedinformation
thatcouldhavebeen,butwasnot,providedinthe
UnderlyingApplication.
StrekafJ.A.furtheremphasizedthatthequestionof
whetherSecurityforCostsisappropriateisdiscretionary,
and,giventhattheApplicanthadnotdemonstratedany
importantlegalissuewhichwasraisedbytheDecisionto
grantSecurityforCosts,theApplicanthadnotmetthe
applicabletesttogranttheApplicationforpermissionto
Appeal,andtheApplicationwasdismissed.
GEZEHEGN V ALBERTA (APPEALS COMMISSION OF THE WORKERS’ COMPENSATION BOARD), 2020 ABCA 48 (SCHUTZ JA) Rules 14.8 (Filing a Notice of Appeal) and 14.37 (Single Appeal Judges)
TheApplicantunsuccessfullypursuedJudicialReviewof
adecisionfromtheAppealsCommissionoftheWorkers
Compensation Act,RSA2000,cW-15.Withinthemonth
followingtheJudicialReviewDecision,theApplicantfiled
anApplicationtoextendthetimetoappealratherthana
NoticeofAppeal.
JusticeSchutzconsideredRule14.8(2)(iii),whichrequires
theApplicanttofileNoticeofAppealwithinonemonthof
thedateoftheDecision.JusticeSchutzthenconsidered
Cairns v Cairns,1931CanLII471(ABCA),forthefactors
whichshouldguidetheCourt’sexerciseofdiscretionon
whethertoextendthetimetoappeal:(1)whetheran
intentiontoappealwasheldbytheAppellantwhilethe
righttoappealexisted;(2)whetheranexplanationexists
whichservestojustifyorexcusethelateness;(3)whether
theopposingpartywasseriouslyprejudicedbythedelay;
(4)whethertheAppellanthadtakenbenefitsofthe
JudgmentfromwhichanAppealissought;and(5)whether
theAppealhasareasonablechanceofsuccess.
JusticeSchutzdidnotaddressthefourthfactorbutfound
thattheApplicanthadmadeoutthefirstthreefactors.
JusticeSchutzthenturnedtoconsiderwhetherthe
Applicanthadareasonablechanceofsuccess.Although
JusticeSchutzindicatedthattheAppealmaybedifficult,
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JusticeStrekafemphasizedthatnosinglefactoris
determinative.Weighingthesefactors,JusticeStrekaf
concludedthatitwasintheinterestsofjusticetorestore
theAppeal;howeverHerLadyshipawardednoCosts
toeitherparty,determiningthat,whileMs.Pacewas
successful,theApplicationwasoccasionedbyMs.Pace’s
failuretocomplywiththedeadlinesinRule14.17.
EDMONTON (POLICE SERVICE) V DELUCA, 2020 ABCA 31 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 14.46 (Application to Reconsider a Previous Decision) and 14.72 (Binding Precedents)
In2007,theAlbertaCourtofAppealpronouncedthe
DecisionofEdmonton Police Association v Edmonton
(City of),2007ABCA147(“Murdoch”).Theissuebefore
theCourtinMurdochwaswhetheradisputebetweenthe
EdmontonPoliceAssociationandtheCityofEdmonton
wasalabourrelationsmatterthatshouldbedealtwithby
grievanceunderacollectiveagreement,orwhetheritwasa
matterofpolicedisciplinethatshouldbedealtwithunder
thePolice Service Regulation,AltaReg356/1990.Eleven
yearslater,theApplicant,theChiefoftheEdmontonPolice
Service(the“Chief”),inanunderlyingAppealofaDecision
fromtheLawEnforcementReviewBoard(the“Underlying
Decision”),appliedtotheCourtofAppealtoreconsiderits
earlierprecedentsetinMurdoch.
FeehanJ.A.notedthatRules14.46and14.47allowa
paneloftheCourttograntpermissionforapartytoargue
thatapriorprecedentialDecisionshouldbereconsidered.
Citingtherelevantjurisprudence,JusticeFeehannotedthat
thispowershouldbeexercisedcautiouslyandbyapplying
abalancedanalysisofthefollowingfactors:(a)ageofthe
Decision;(b)whethertheDecisionhasbeenreliedupon
soastocreatesettledexpectations;(c)treatmentofthe
issuebyotherAppealCourts;(d)whethertheDecision
hasanobvious,demonstrableflaw;and(e)whetherit
wasclassifiedas“ReasonsforJudgmentReserved”ora
“MemorandumofJudgment”.
Inbalancingthesefactors,JusticeFeehanfoundthat
whileMurdochwasdecidedin2007,theimpactofthe
DecisionwasnotmadeclearuntiltheUnderlyingDecision
inOctoberof2018.Given,amongotherthings,that
bothMurdochandtheUnderlyingDecisionwereboth
MemorandaofJudgmentandthattheseDecisionshave
notresultedinsettledexpectations,HisLordshipgranted
theChief’sApplicationtoreconsidertheCourtofAppeal’s
decisioninMurdoch.
KENT V MACDONALD, 2020 ABCA 91 (FEEHAN JA)Rules 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal), 14.60 (Judicial Dispute Resolution of an Appeal), 14.61 (Suspension of Time Periods) and 14.65 (Restoring Appeals)
TheApplicantsappliedtorestoretheirAppealthathad
beenpreviouslystruckforfailuretofiletheAppealRecord
withinthetimesetoutintheRules.
UnderRule14.65,onApplicationofapartyunderRule
14.47,asingleCourtofAppealJudgecanrestorean
AppealthathadbeenstruckbyoperationoftheRules.
TheCourtfoundthattherewasarguablemerittothe
Applicants’Appeal,thattheApplicantsmovedwith
reasonablepromptnesstohavetheAppealrestored,had
intentionintimetoproceedwiththeAppeal,anddidnot
causeprejudicetotheRespondents.FeehanJ.A.foundthat
theApplicantshadmetthetestforrestoringtheAppeal
byprovidinganexplanationforthedelaywhichcausedthe
Appealtobestruck.
InrestoringtheAppeal,FeehanJ.A.encouragedtheparties
toconsideranappellateJudicialDisputeResolution
pursuanttoRules14.60and14.61.
RANCHER CONSTRUCTION LTD V SCOTT CONSTRUCTION (ALBERTA) LTD, 2020 ABCA 112(VELDHUIS JA)Rule 14.47 (Application to Restore an Appeal)
TheApplicant,ScottConstruction(Alberta)Ltd.,applied
torestoreitsAppealafterithadbeenstruckanddeemed
abandonedduetotheAppellant’sfailuretofiletheirAppeal
Recordwithintherequireddeadline.
JusticeVeldhuislistedtherelevantfactorsforwhetherto
restoreanabandonedAppeal:(i)whethertheApplicant
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Jensen Shawa Solomon Duguid Hawkes LLP
aconcurrentApplicationtobeaddedasaRespondent,or
alternativelyforintervenorstatus,ontheAppeal.
AlbertaappliedforthestaypursuanttoRule14.48.Justice
StrekafadoptedthetestforastaypendingAppealfromRJR
MacDonald v Canada,1994CanLII117(SCC):(1)aserious
questionmustbedeterminedonAppeal;(2)theApplicant
willsufferirreparableharmifthestayisnotgranted;and(3)
thebalanceofconveniencefavoursgrantingthestay.Justice
StrekaffoundthatAlbertahadmettheironusonallthree
partsofthetestandgrantedthestay.
FMFNappliedtobeaddedasaRespondenttothe
AppealpursuanttoRule14.57.JusticeStrekafapplied
thetestfromCarbon Development Partnership v Alberta
(Energy and Utilities Board),2007ABCA231,inorderto
determinewhethertheApplicanthasalegalinterestinthe
outcomeoftheAppeal.TodetermineiftheApplicanthasa
legalinterest,theCourtmustconsiderwhetheritisjustand
convenienttoaddthepartyandwhethertheApplicant’s
interestcouldonlybeadequatelyprotectedifgrantedparty
status.JusticeStrekaffoundthatFMFNdidnotmeetthe
testasthesubjectmatteroftheAppealdidnotnecessarily
affectthelegalinterestsofFMFN.TheApplicationunder
Rule14.57wasdenied,butJusticeStrekafdidgrant
intervenorstatustoFMFN.
intendedintimetoproceedwiththeAppeal;(ii)the
Applicant’sexplanationforthedelayordefectcausingthe
Appealtobedeemedabandoned;(iii)whethertheApplicant
movedwithreasonablepromptnesstohavetheAppeal
restored;(iv)whethertheAppealhasarguablemerit;and
(iv)whethertheRespondenthassufferedanyprejudice.
JusticeVeldhuisheldthatthefactorsshouldbeconsidered
asawholeandthataDecisiontorestoreanAppealis
discretionary.InHerLadyship’sconsiderationofthefactors,
shefoundthattheApplicant’sAppealdidnothavearguable
meritandthatitwasnotintheinterestofjusticetorestore
theAppeal.JusticeVeldhuisdismissedtheApplication.
PROSPER PETROLEUM LTD V HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN IN RIGHT OF ALBERTA, 2020 ABCA 85 (STREKAF JA)Rules 14.48 (Stay Pending Appeal) and 14.57 (Adding, Removing or Substituting Parties to an Appeal)
AmandatoryinterimInjunctionwasgrantedbyaChambers
JudgewhichtheApplicants,HerMajestyintheRightof
Alberta,theLieutenantGovernorinCouncilandtheMinister
ofEnergy(collectively,“Alberta”)soughttostaypending
Appeal.TheInjunctionorderedAlbertatodecidewhether
toauthorizeProsperPetroleumLtd.’soilsandsproject
within10days.FortMcKayFirstNation(“FMFN”)made
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