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Judgement, Motivation and Reason

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Judgement, Motivation and Reason. Sarah Sawyer University of Sussex. Three Debates. Three Debates. .. the nature of representation in thought. Three Debates. .. the nature of representation in thought .. the connection between a subject’s moral judgements and her motivation to act. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Judgement, Motivation and Reason Sarah Sawyer University of Sussex
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Page 1: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Sarah SawyerUniversity of Sussex

Page 2: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three Debates

Page 3: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three Debates

1. .. the nature of representation in thought

Page 4: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three Debates

1. .. the nature of representation in thought

2. .. the connection between a subject’s moral judgements and her motivation to act

Page 5: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three Debates

1. .. the nature of representation in thought

2. .. the connection between a subject’s moral judgements and her motivation to act

3. .. the connection between a subject’s reasons for action and her subjective motivational set.

Page 6: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Internalism: –prioritises the perspective of the individual

Page 7: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Internalism: –prioritises the perspective of the individual

• Externalism: –emphasises the importance of facts that

may well lie outside the individual’s perspective

Page 8: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

I take the first debate to be primary:

Page 9: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

I take the first debate to be primary:

(i) the other two debates presuppose that there are representational states

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I take the first debate to be primary:

(i) the other two debates presuppose that there are representational states;

(ii) an externalist understanding of representation in thought has the resources to overcome the apparent disagreements evident in the debates concerning moral judgement and reasons for action.

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• The general aim:– to show that representational externalism

binds the debates inextricably together.

• The specific aim:– to elaborate a new moral theory, which I

call ‘moral externalism’.

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Section 1:

Representational Content in Thought

Page 13: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three main aspects of the externalist theory:

Page 14: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three main aspects of the externalist theory:

(i) what an individual represents in thought depends in part, but essentially, on relations she bears to her environment;

Page 15: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three main aspects of the externalist theory:

(i) what an individual represents in thought depends in part, but essentially, on relations she bears to her environment;

(ii) an individual can think with a concept that she grasps incompletely;

Page 16: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Three main aspects of the externalist theory:

(i) what an individual represents in thought depends in part, but essentially, on relations she bears to her environment;

(ii) an individual can think with a concept that she grasps incompletely;

(iii) thought is governed by norms that do not derive from the subjective resources of the individual thinker - the norms of thought derive in part from the nature of the world beyond the individual.

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Section 2:

Moral Judgement and Motivation

Page 18: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Moral judgements involve moral concepts:

– right, wrong, good and bad (‘thin’ moral concepts)

– fairness, kindness, spite, discretion, blame, guilt, enterprise, industry, assiduity, treachery, promise, offence, brutality, malice, courage, deceit, gratitude, and exploitation

(‘thick’ moral concepts)

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• Moral judgements—judgements involving such concepts—appear to be motivating.

Page 20: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Moral judgements—judgements involving such concepts—appear to be motivating.

• That there is a connection between moral judgement and motivation is generally agreed.

Page 21: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Moral judgements—judgements involving such concepts—appear to be motivating.

• That there is a connection between moral judgement and motivation is generally agreed.

• It is the nature of the connection that is disputed.

Page 22: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Motivational judgement internalism:– the connection between moral judgement and

motivation is an ‘internal’ or conceptual one.

Page 23: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Motivational judgement internalism:– the connection between moral judgement and

motivation is an ‘internal’ or conceptual one.

• Motivational judgement externalism:– the connection between moral judgement and

motivation is external in the sense that whether or not one is motivated depends on factors external to the moral judgement itself.

Page 24: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

The Amoralist

Page 25: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

The Amoralist

• Motivational externalists maintain that the amoralist is possible.

Page 26: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

The Amoralist

• Motivational externalists maintain that the amoralist is possible.

• Motivational internalists reject the very coherence of the amoralist.

Page 27: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• I want to suggest that there is no inconsistency in maintaining both:

(i) that the connection between moral judgement and motivation is conceptual (as the internalist does), and

(ii) that the amoralist is conceptually coherent (as the externalist does).

Page 28: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

(Q) How can this be?

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(Q) How can this be?

An externalist account of representational content provides the answer …

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• Moral judgements involve moral concepts; moral concepts (just like non-moral concepts) are representational and hence externally individuated; and as such, individual thinkers can think with a moral concept that they grasp only incompletely.

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• Moral judgements involve moral concepts; moral concepts (just like non-moral concepts) are representational and hence externally individuated; and as such, individual thinkers can think with a moral concept that they grasp only incompletely.

• Even if a subject who grasped a moral concept fully would be motivated to act, since it is possible to make a moral judgement involving a concept that one does not fully grasp, it is possible to make a moral judgement but fail to be motivated.

Page 32: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Alice

Page 33: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Alice

• After the change in her theoretical views, Alice continues to make … moral judgements involving the concept fair—but she is no longer motivated appropriately by the judgements because … she ceases to recognise their moral force.

Page 34: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Alice

• After the change in her theoretical views, Alice continues to make … moral judgements involving the concept fair—but she is no longer motivated appropriately by the judgements because … she ceases to recognise their moral force.

• It looks as if we have a case of moral judgement without motivation, and this precisely because we have a subject who grasps a moral concept incompletely.

Page 35: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Four prima facie internalist responses ….

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(i) Subsequent to the development of her new theory, Alice lacks the concept of fairness.

Page 37: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

(ii) What look to be judgements of fairness after the development of her theory are in fact judgements merely about what other people call ‘fair’.

Page 38: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

(iii) Some interfering factor is, after the development of her theory, preventing her motivation from manifesting itself.

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(iv) Alice’s judgements about fairness and unfairness cease to be moral judgements after she develops her moral theory.

Page 40: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• The example shows that a good-willed person can make a moral judgement (that a particular state of affairs is unfair, say) and yet fail to be motivated to act accordingly.

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• The example shows that a good-willed person can make a moral judgement (that a particular state of affairs is unfair, say) and yet fail to be motivated to act accordingly.

• The lack of motivation is to be explained by the incomplete grasp of the moral concept involved in the moral judgement.

Page 42: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• The example shows that a good-willed person can make a moral judgement (that a particular state of affairs is unfair, say) and yet fail to be motivated to act accordingly.

• The lack of motivation is to be explained by the incomplete grasp of the moral concept involved in the moral judgement.

• In this way, the possibility of the amoralist can be seen to be consistent with there being a conceptual connection between moral judgement and motivation.

Page 43: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Externalist motivational internalism (EMI):necessarily, if an individual makes a sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in that moral judgement, then she will be motivated to some extent to act in accordance with it.

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Section 3:

Moral Reasons and Motivation

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• Reasons internalism:– a subject’s normative reasons for action

necessarily derive from her subjective motivational set.

Page 46: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Reasons internalism:– a subject’s normative reasons for action

necessarily derive from her subjective motivational set.

• Reasons externalism:– a subject’s normative reasons exist independently

of her individual motives.

Page 47: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Both have intuitive appeal

• The internalist position is supported by the natural thought that reasons for action must be capable of moving an agent to act.

Page 48: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Both have intuitive appeal

• The internalist position is supported by the natural thought that reasons for action must be capable of moving an agent to act.

• The externalist position is supported by the natural thought that recognition of a reason to act is recognition of a consideration in favour of acting—that is, recognition of some objective value that exists independently of one’s motives.

Page 49: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• prima facie one must choose between:

– reasons that are essentially motivational because subjective, and

– reasons that are essentially divorced from motivation because objective.

Page 50: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• (EMI) opens up the possibility that a subject’s normative reasons for action may be necessarily connected to her subjective motivational set, even though not derived from her subjective motivational set.

• Consequently, it opens up the possibility that moral reasons may be both objective and essentially action-guiding.

Page 51: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Externalist motivational internalism (EMI):necessarily, if an individual makes a sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in that moral judgement, then she will be motivated to some extent to act in accordance with it.

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The reconciliation ….

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• According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements.

Page 54: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements.

• But given externalism about representational content, a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would necessarily have a full understanding of the nature of morality.

Page 55: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements.

• But given externalism about representational content, a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would necessarily have a full understanding of the nature of morality.

• Consequently, the moral judgements of such a subject would of necessity be correct moral judgements.

Page 56: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements.

• But given externalism about representational content, a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would necessarily have a full understanding of the nature of morality.

• Consequently, the moral judgements of such a subject would of necessity be correct moral judgements.

• But correct moral judgements just are judgements the content of which state objective reasons for acting.

Page 57: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• According to (EMI), a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would be motivated to act in accordance with her sincere moral judgements.

• But given externalism about representational content, a subject who possessed a full grasp of the moral concepts would necessarily have a full understanding of the nature of morality.

• Consequently, the moral judgements of such a subject would of necessity be correct moral judgements.

• But correct moral judgements just are judgements the content of which state objective reasons for acting.

• As such, objective reasons would be motivating for such a subject precisely because objective reasons would provide the content of her moral judgements, which are, according to (EMI), essentially motivating and action-guiding.

Page 58: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Externalist reasons internalism (ERI): necessarily, if an individual makes a sincere moral judgement, and she has a full grasp of the concepts involved in that moral judgement, then the content of her moral judgement will state an external, objective normative reason to act.

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(EMI) and (ERI), with their essential reliance on externalism about representational content:

Moral Externalism

Page 60: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Moral Externalism• a form of moral cognitivism – moral judgements are truth-evaluable

• a rejection of the Humean theory of motivation– moral judgements (beliefs) can motivate in the

absence of desires

• a robust form of moral realism– moral concepts refer to objective moral properties

Page 61: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• Moral externalism is committed neither to:– (a) the claim that there are exceptionless general

moral principles, nor to – (b) the claim that there is a systematic procedure

for determining in a given context the correct answer

Page 62: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

Section 4:

Conclusion

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• This paper has been primarily concerned with the implications of externalism about representational content for the nature of moral judgements and the nature of moral reasons.

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• The resulting view, moral externalism, provides:

– (i) a way in which moral judgements can be internally connected to motivation even though it is possible to fail to be motivated by one’s sincere moral judgements;

– (ii) and a way in which moral reasons can be essentially action-guiding even though objective.

Page 65: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

• The view is also part of a broader view according to which norms of thought and action are objective in being determined by the world beyond the individual, but do not as a result lie essentially beyond her grasp.

Page 66: Judgement, Motivation and Reason

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