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Suggestions made by the PEI Safety Committee are for informational purposes only. PEI assumes no responsibility for the results produced from the advice offered by the committee. Submit incidents for inclusion in a future “SafetyLetter” to [email protected]. All information will remain anonymous. This newsletter and other safety resources provided by PEI are intended for use solely by member companies. Permission is granted to reprint, transmit or redistribute this material for your own use as long as the source is credited to Petroleum Equipment Institute and there is no charge to end users. Copies of any document based on this material must be shared electronically with PEI at [email protected]. July 2020 A flash fire injured three contractors performing a petroleum line tightness test at a fueling station. The fire originated in a tank sump. A previous worker failed to close a ball valve, so vapor leaked into the sump. A worker entered the tank sump to close the ball valve. The friction from closing the ball valve sparked a flash fire in the sump that spread through the product line conduit and created flash fires in four other dispenser sumps. An investigation determined the contractor pressurized the product lines with oxygen instead of nitrogen as required. The oxygen and vapor-rich environment caught fire easily. In addition, previous workers failed to mark the compressed gas canister properly to identify its contents. The PEI Safety Committee recommends properly identifying the contents of all compressed gas canisters used for line testing or other uses on-site and following Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) recommendations for proper compressed gas storage and use. The contractors failed to follow all proper confined space entry protocols, including LEL testing and proper barricading. In addition, a jobs safety analysis would have prevented misunderstandings by the contractors and ensured their adherence to the fire triangle and identification of potential ignition sources before working amid vapors. Friction sources include ball valves and removal of risers, bolts or devices screwed into location. OSHA 1910.101(a) Inspection of compressed gas cylinders states each employee shall determine visually that compressed gas cylinders under his control are safe. In addition, the Hazardous Materials Regulations of the Department of Transportation (49 CFR parts 171-179 and 14 CFR part 103) state that visual and other inspections shall be conducted. Where those regulations may not apply, visual and other inspections shall be conducted in accordance with Compressed Gas Association Pamphlets C-6-1968 and C-8-1962. The PEI Safety Committee suggests all companies that use compressed gas regularly review all applicable compressed gas regulations. In addition, companies must store compressed gas cylinders properly at the highest levels to avoid mixing up compressed gas types.
