Patricia Sto. Tomas vs Rey SalacThese consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.FACTS: On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 that, for among other purposes, sets the Government policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in distress.G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)Sections 29 and 30 of the Act1rllcommanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, DodgieBelonio, LolitSalinel, and Buddy Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96.2rllSalac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.RULING OF RTC: On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, etal.s petition and ordered the government agencies mentioned to deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs.The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the case before the Court, claiming that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and performing artists. The Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened for the same purpose.4rllOn May 23, 2002 the Courtissued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its decision.G.R. 167590(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila, seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of Section 10 but the Court will take up this point later together with a related case.)Ruling of RTC: The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters11rlland for that reason gives undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with government licenses or authorities.Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties. It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 1002212rllwhich increased even more the duration of the penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79,and G.R. 184298-9917rll(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter JasminCuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.Ruling of NLRC: The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits arising from their daughters death from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due credence to the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.Ruling of CA: Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA).On June 28, 2006 the CA held Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with Becmen having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to this Court.ISSUE: WON the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the corporate directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money claims and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.HELD: the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.In the case of Becmen and White Falcon,while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the cause of Jasmins death, there is no mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenorsGumabay, et al., Becmens corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their companys particular actions or omissions in Jasmins case.As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.blrlllbrrWHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and academic.In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court ofManila dated December 8, 2004 and DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenorsEufrocinaGumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicia and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.rllbrrTEOFILO EVANGELISTA, v.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,G.R. No. 163267FACTS:In an Information[6]datedJanuary 31, 1996, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 1 of PD 1866 allegedly committed as follows:That on or about the 30thday of January 1996, at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Pasay City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following items:1.One (1) Unit 9mm Jericho Pistol,Israelwith SN F 36283 with one (1) magazine;2.One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel Submachine gun with SN 931864 with two (2) magazines;3.Nineteen (19) 9mm bullets.bwithout the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.Version of the ProsecutionIn the morning ofJanuary 30, 1996, MaximoAcierto, Jr. (Acierto), a Customs Police assigned at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) District Command, was informed by his superior that a certain passenger of Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight No. 657 would be arriving fromDubaibringing with him firearms and ammunitions.Shortly after lunch, Acierto, together with Agents Cuymo and Fuentabella, proceeded to the tube area where they were met by a crewmember who introduced to them herein petitioner. Acierto asked petitioner if he brought firearms with him and the latter answered in the affirmative adding that the same were bought inAngola.Thereupon, Acierto was summoned to the cockpit by the pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata (Capt. Nadurata), where the firearms and ammunitions were turned over to him.Petitioner was then escorted to the arrival area to get his luggage and thereafter proceeded to the examination room where the luggage was examined and petitioner was investigated.In open court, Acierto identified the firearms and ammunitions.During the investigation, petitioner admitted before Special Agent ApolonioBustos (Bustos) that he bought the subject items inAngolabut the same were confiscated by theDubaiauthorities, which turned over the same to a PAL personnel inDubai.Upon inquiry, the Firearms and Explosive Office (FEO) inCampCramecertified that petitioner is neither registered with said office[11]nor licensed holder of aforesaid firearms and ammunitions.Bustos likewise verified from the Bureau of Customs, but his effort yielded no record to show that the firearms were legally purchased.Among the documents Bustos had gathered during his investigation were the Arrival Endorsement Form[12]and Customs Declaration Form.[13]A referral letter[14]was prepared endorsing the matter to the Department of Justice.Bustos admitted that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when the latter admitted that he bought the firearms inAngola.SPO4 Federico Bondoc, Jr. (SPO4 Bondoc), a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) and representative of the FEO, upon verification, found that petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder.His office issued a certification[15]to that effect which he identified in court as Exhibit A.After the prosecution rested its case, petitioner, with leave of court, filed his Demurrer to Evidence,[16]the resolution of which was deferred pending submission of petitioners evidence.[17]Version of the DefenseThe defense presented Capt. Nadurata whose brief but candid and straightforward narration of the event was synthesized by the CA as follows:x xx On January 30, 1996, he was approached by the PAL Station Manager in Dubai, who informed him that a Filipino contract worker from Angola who is listed as a passenger of PAL flight from Dubai to Manila, was being detained as he was found in possession of firearms; that if said passenger will not be able to board the airplane, he would be imprisoned in Dubai; and that the Arabs will only release the passenger if the Captain of PAL would accept custody of the passenger [herein petitioner] and the firearms.Capt. Nadurata agreed to take custody of the firearms and the passenger, herein appellant, so that the latter could leaveDubai.The firearms were deposited by the Arabs in the cockpit of the airplane and allowed the appellant to board the airplane. Upon arrival inManila, Capt. Nadurata surrendered the firearms to the airport authorities.Meanwhile, in view of the unavailability of the defenses intended witness, NiloUmayaw (Umayaw), the PAL Station Manager inDubai, the prosecution and the defense agreed and stipulated on the following points:1.That PAL Station Manager Mr. NiloUmayaw was told by a Dubai Policethat firearms and ammunitions were found in the luggage of a Filipino passenger coming fromAngolagoing to thePhilippines;2.That he was the one who turned over the subject firearms to Captain Edwin Nadurata, the Pilot in command of PAL Flight 657;3.That the subject firearms [were] turned over atDubai;4.That the said firearms and ammunitions were confiscated from the accused Teofilo Evangelista and the same [were] given to the PAL Station Manager who in turn submitted [them] to the PAL Pilot, Capt. Edwin Nadurata who has already testified;5.That [these are] the same firearms involved in this case.[18]Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:: In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: (One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets) and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months to Twenty (20) Years.Ruling of the Regional Trial Court:In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds accused TEOFILO E. EVANGELISTA guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 1, P.D. 1866 as amended (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions: One (1) Unit 9mm Jerico Pistol, Israel with SN F-36283 with one (1) magazine; One (1) Unit Mini-Uzi 9mm Israel submachine gun with SN-931864 with two (2) magazines and nineteen (19) 9mm bullets and hereby sentences him to imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day to Eight (8) Years and a fine ofP30,000.00.The above-mentioned firearms are hereby ordered forfeited in favor of the government and [are] ordered transmitted to the National Bureau of Investigation,Manilafor proper disposition.Ruling of the Court of Appeals:On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its Decision datedOctober 15, 2003.It ruled that the stipulations during the trial are binding on petitioner.As regards possession of subject firearms, the appellate court ruled that Capt. Naduratas custody during the flight fromDubaitoManilawas for and on behalf of petitioner.Thus, there was constructive possession.Petitioner moved for reconsideration[23]but it was denied by the appellate court in itsApril 16, 2004Resolution.IssuesWON The Court of Appeals gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from the charge of Presidential Decree No. 1866, Illegal Possession of Firearms.WONThe Court of Appeals gravely erred in not holding that Evangelista was never in possession of any firearm or ammunition within Philippine jurisdiction and he therefore could not have committed the crime charged against him.WON The Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that Evangelista committed a continuing crime.WONThe Court of Appeals gravely erred in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation.[24]Ruling of the Supreme Court: We find the appeal devoid of merit.At the outset, we emphasize that under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review oncertiorarishall only raise questions of law considering that the findings of fact of the CA are, as a general rule, conclusive upon and binding on the Supreme Court.[25]In this recourse, petitioner indulges us to calibrate once again the evidence adduced by the parties and to re-evaluate the credibility of their witnesses.On this ground alone, the instant petition deserves to be denied outright.However, as the liberty of petitioner is at stake and following the principle that an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review, we are inclined to delve into the merits of the present petition.In his bid for acquittal, petitioner argues that he could not have committed the crime imputed against him for he was never in custody and possession of any firearm or ammunition when he arrived in thePhilippines.Thus, the conclusion of the appellate court that he was in constructive possession of the subject firearms and ammunitions is erroneous.Petitioner contends that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case filed against him.He claims that his alleged possession of the subject firearms transpired while he was at theDubaiAirportand his possession thereof has ceased when he left for thePhilippines.He insists that sinceDubaiis outside the territorial jurisdiction of thePhilippinesand his situation is not one of the exceptions provided in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, our criminal laws are not applicable.In short, he had not committed a crime within thePhilippines.Indeed it is fundamental that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.[29]In order for the courts to acquire jurisdiction in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.If the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.[30]Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition for which he was charged was committed in thePhilippines.The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms in thePhilippines.And more than mere possession, the prosecution was able to ascertain that he has no license or authority to possess said firearms.It bears to stress that the essence of the crime penalized under PD 1866, as amended, is primarily the accuseds lack of license to possess the firearm.The fact of lack or absence of license constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession of firearm. Since it has been shown that petitioner was already in thePhilippineswhen he was found in possession of the subject firearms and determined to be without any authority to possess them, an essential ingredient of the offense, it is beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was perpetrated and completed in no other place except thePhilippines.Moreover, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.In this case, the information specifically and categorically alleged that on or aboutJanuary 30, 1996petitioner was in possession, custody and control of the subject firearms at theNinoyAquinoInternationalAirport,Pasay City,Philippines, certainly a territory within the jurisdiction of the trial court.In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the present charge happened inDubai.It may be well to recall that while inDubai, petitioner, even in a situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and ownership of the firearms.Furthermore, there is no record of any criminal case having been filed against petitioner inDubaiin connection with the discovered firearms.Since there is no pending criminal case when he leftDubai, it stands to reason that there was no crime committed inDubai.The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies.[31]Petitioner finally laments the trial courts denial of the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the investigating prosecutor due to the latters finding of lack of probable cause to indict him.He argues that such denial effectively deprived him of his substantive right to a preliminary investigation.Still, petitioners argument fails to persuade.There is nothing procedurally improper on the part of the trial court in disregarding the result of the preliminary investigation it itself ordered.Judicial action on the motion rests in the sound exercise of judicial discretion.In denying the motion, the trial court just followed the jurisprudential rule laid down inCrespo v. Judge Mogul[32]that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests on the sound discretion of the court.The court is not dutifully bound by such finding of the investigating prosecutor.InSolar Team Entertainment, Inc v. Judge How[33]we held:It bears stressing that the court is however not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since the court is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case, and may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.Reliance alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determineprima faciecase.Consequently, petitioner has no valid basis to insist on the trial court to respect the result of the preliminary investigation it ordered to be conducted.WHEREFORE,the petition isDENIED.The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21805 affirming the January 23, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated January 23, 1998, convicting petitioner Teofilo Evangelista of violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six years and one day to eight years and to pay a fine ofP30,000.00 isAFFIRMED.

Bonifacio, et al. vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 129, et al. G.R. No. 184800; 5 May 2010Facts: Upon the complaint filed by Jessie John P. Gimenez (Gimenez) on behalf of the Yuchengco Family (particularly, former Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco and Helen Y. Dee) and the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. (Malayan), 13 Informations for libel were filed with the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) against officers, trustees and a member of the Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI), and a certain John Doe, the administrator of the website www.pepcoalition.com, which provides a forum for planholders of Pacific Plans, Inc. a wholly owned subsidiary of Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation, also owned by the Yuchengco Group of Companies to seek redress for being unable to collect under their pre-need educational plans after PPI, due to liquidity concerns, filed for corporate rehabilitation with prayer for suspension of payments. The Informations alleged that the accused, holding legal title to the said website, maliciously published therein the following defamatory article against the Yuchengco Family and Malayan:Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x xFor sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill us na. x x xHowever, on appeal, the Secretary of Justice directed the withdrawal of the Informations for lack of probable cause, opining that the crime of internet libel was non-existent. On motion of the accused, the RTC, albeit finding probable cause, quashed the Informations for failure to allege that the offended parties were actually residing in Makati at the time the offense was committed as in fact they listed their address in Manila, or to allege that the article was printed and first published in Makati. The prosecution moved for reconsideration, arguing that even assuming the Information was deficient it merely needed a formal amendment. The RTC granted the motion and ordered the prosecution to amend the Information to cure the defect of improper venue. The prosecution amended the Information to show that the website was accessible in Makati City and the defamatory article was first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City. After the RTC admitted the Amended Information, several of the accused (petitioners) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Supreme Court faulting the RTC.Issues: (1) Whether or not petitioners, in filing the petition directly to the Supreme Court, violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition dismissible; and(2) whether or not the RTC gravely abuse its discretion when it admitted the Amended Information.Held: (1) Strict observance of the judicial hierarchy of courts requires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. Thus, petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTC should be filed in the Court of Appeals. The rule, however, admits of certain exceptions as when the case involves purely legal questions. In this case, petitioners raised a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal complaints for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 4363.(2) The Amended Information was insufficient to vest jurisdiction in Makati.Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places, namely: (a) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense; or (b) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. The prosecution chose the second.Before Article 360 of the RPC was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. Article 360 was amended by RA 4363 to state that such action should be brought where the article was printed and first published. The evil sought to be prevented by the amendment was the indiscriminate or arbitrary laying of the venue in libel cases in distant, isolated or far-flung areas, meant to accomplish nothing more than to harass or intimidate an accused, especially when the offended party is a person of sufficient means or possesses influence, and is motivated by spite or the need for revenge.If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any inclination to harass.The same measure cannot be reasonably expected when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on a website on the internet as there would be no way of determining the situs of its printing and first publication. To equate first access to the defamatory article on petitioners website in Makati with printing and first publication would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and prevent. For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.Contrary to petitioners claim, the venue requirements, under Article 360 of the RPC, for libel actions filed by private persons cannot be considered unduly oppressive as they still allow such persons to file the civil or criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter was printed and first publishedDisposition: The RTC was directed to quash the Amended Information and to dismiss the case. Ponente: J. Conchita Carpio-MoralesVote: 5-0UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES. G.R. No. 192565. February 28, 2012.Facts: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City.

In both cases, Desi Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati.Tomas filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do not constitute an offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied.When the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented".

The petition, however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.Issue:Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to the trial court?Held:The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue for the criminal action.The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following so, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art. 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.

If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed.CUENCA VS. PCGGThe FactsRespondent UHC is a wholly owned subsidiary of Independent Realty Corporation (IRC). UHC had an authorized capital stock of PhP 200,000,000 of which 401,995 shares worth PhP 40,199,500 were subscribed and PhP 10,050,000 was paid up by IRC. Five stockholders of IRC held qualifying shares in UHC and served in its Board of Directors. UHC became an inactive holding company until the later months of 1978.In 1978, petitioner Rodolfo M. Cuenca and his familys holding company, petitioner CIC, negotiated and reached an agreement with respondents IRC and UHC, whereby petitioners Cuenca and CIC would purchase all the shares of stock and subscription rights of IRC in UHC for PhP 10,000,000 and assume IRCs unpaid subscription of PhP 30,000,000. Petitioners Cuenca and CIC were then the controlling stockholders of the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP), now the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation (Sta. Ines), and Resort Hotels Corporation (Resort Hotels). In order to build up UHC as his flagship company, petitioner Cuenca transferred to UHC the shares of stocks in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels worth PhP 67,233,405, with UHC assuming Cuencas various bank obligations, some or all of which were secured by pledges or liens on the stocks.On October 21, 1978, petitioner Cuenca was elected Chairperson and President of UHC at a special stockholders meeting in accordance with the acquisition plan, and through UHC, Cuenca continued to control and manage CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels. Pursuant to the acquisition plan and agreement with IRC, Cuenca and CIC transferred their shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels to UHC, which in turn paid PhP 10,000,000 to IRC. In addition, petitioners assumed IRCs unpaid subscription of PhP 30,000,000 in UHC. The only remaining matter to be accomplished was the transfer of the stocks and subscription rights of IRC in UHC to petitioners, but despite demand, IRC did not comply.In 1986, the instant controversy between petitioners and respondent IRC was overtaken by dramatic political events. President Marcos was ousted in a bloodless revolution and left behind an unbelievably large amount of funds and assets that were sequestered by the new government of President Aquino through PCGG. In July 1987, because of Marcos nominee Jose Yao Campos sworn statement, respondent PCGG directed Santos Luis Diego, President of IRC, to dissolve all the boards of directors of IRCs fully-owned subsidiaries. A year later, it turned over IRC and its subsidiary, UHC, to the Asset Privatization Trust (APT) for rehabilitation, conservation, or disposition, enabling APT to assign one share of stock in IRC and in each of its 25 subsidiaries, including UHC, to PaternoBacani, Jr.Amidst this state of affairs, petitioners filed the October 2, 1991 Complaint6against IRC, UHC, APT, and Bacani before the Makati City RTC, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 91-2721, to compel IRC to transfer all its stock and subscription rights in UHC to them or order IRC and UHC to return and re-convey to them all the assets and shares of stock in CDCP, Sta. Ines, and Resort Hotels that they had transferred to UHC.The Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtAccordingly, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and as against defendants IRC and UHC, who are hereby ordered to immediately return and reconvey to plaintiffs all of the shares of stocks and stock subscriptions in Philippine National Construction Corporation (formerly known as Construction and Development [Corporation] of the Philippines), Resort Hotels Corporation and Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation, including those transferred by plaintiffs to UHC such as the 24,780,746 shares in CDCP/PNCC, the 468,062 shares in Resort Hotels Corporation and the 23,748,932 shares in Sta. Ines Melale Forest Products Corporation plus all fruits thereof such as stock and cash dividends and stock splits.The plaintiffs prayer for damages and attorneys fees are hereby DENIED.The counterclaim of defendants UHC and IRC for damages and attorneys fees is hereby DENIED for lack of evidence.The appointment of JAIME C. LAYA as Receiver of defendant UHC is hereby MAINTAINED until finality of this Decision and full execution of this Decision or full compliance herewith by defendants.24The Ruling of the Court of AppealsThrough its assailed Decision, the appellate court reversed the Makati City RTCs Decision, granted the petition filed by PCGG, and dismissed the instant case for lack of jurisdiction. The appellate court ratiocinated that the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction to hear the instant case involving petitioners and the sequestered respondents corporations. It held that the recourse of parties, petitioners in the instant case, who wish to challenge respondent PCGGs acts or orders, would be to the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Executive Order No. (EO) 14 issued on May, 7, 1986,27which ordained that this body alone had the original jurisdiction over all of respondent PCGGs cases, civil or criminal, citingPCGG v. Pea28as authority. The appellate court appliedRepublic v. Sandiganbayan29on the issue of sequestration by respondent PCGG of UHC, CIC, and CDCP (now PNCC) against petitioner Cuenca, the Marcos spouses, their relatives, friends, and colleagues.The CA applied the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment that any rule which had already been authoritatively established in a previous litigation should be deemed the law of the case between the same parties. As such, the appellate court adopted the ruling inRepublicon the continuing force of the order of sequestration and concluded that, indeed, respondent UHC is a sequestered company. The CA did not find merit in petitioners contention that sequestration did not affect their transaction with respondents as it arose before PCGG was created.Even if petitioners had initially a cause of action, the CA ruled that the complaint was certainly affected by the passage of the law charging respondent PCGG with the performance of certain tasks over the subject matter of the action; and that the same subject matter had become subject to the new exclusive jurisdiction vested in the Sandiganbayan at the time petitioners filed the instant case..The IssuesPetitioners raise the following grounds for our consideration:THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISMISSING CIVIL CASE NO. 91-2721 BELOW ON THE GROUND THAT THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE CASE.A. THE FACT ALONE THAT RESPONDENT UHC MAY HAVE BEEN SEQUESTERED DID NOT DIVEST THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ITS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PETITIONERS COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO. 91-2721 BELOW.B. THE COURT OF APPEALS RELIANCE ON THE CASE OFREPUBLIC VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, 240 SCRA 376 (1995), IS MISPLACED.C. THE COURT OF APPEALS APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF CONCLUSIVENESS OF JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS.32The Courts RulingThe petition must fail.The core issue before us is that of jurisdiction. In gist, petitioners argue that UHC was not sequestered, and even if it was sequestered, the trial court still has the jurisdiction to hear the case for rescission of contract or specific performance, and conclude that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply in the instant case.Issue of JurisdictionJurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try, and decide a case.33Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law while jurisdiction over the person is acquired by his/her voluntary submission to the authority of the court or through the exercise of its coercive processes. Jurisdiction over the res is obtained by actual or constructive seizure placing the property under the orders of the court.34We are primarily concerned here with the first kind of jurisdiction, that is, jurisdiction over the subject matter.Petitioners contend that even if UHC was indeed sequestered, jurisdiction over the subject matter of petitioners Complaint for enforcement or rescission of contract between petitioners and respondents belonged to the RTC and not the Sandiganbayan. Petitioners citedPhilippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Court of Appeals,35involving Philippine Casino Operators Corporation (PCOC) which was sequestered on March 19, 1986. In said case, this Court held that the fact of sequestration alone did not automatically oust the RTC of jurisdiction to decide upon the question of ownership of the disputed gaming and office equipment as PCGG must be a party to the suit in order that the Sandiganbayans exclusive jurisdiction may be correctly invoked, and as Section 236of EO 14 was duly applied inPCGG v. Pea37andPCGG v. Nepomuceno,38which ineluctably spoke of respondent PCGG as a party-litigant.Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant caseA rigorous examination of the antecedent facts and existing records at hand shows that Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the instant case.Thus, the petition must fail for the following reasons:First, it is a fact that the shares of stock of UHC and CDCP, the subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721 before the Makati City RTC, were also the subject matter of an ill-gotten wealth case, specifically Civil Case No. 0016 before the Sandiganbayan. In Civil Case No. 91-2721 of the Makati City RTC, petitioners prayed for a judgment either transferring the UHC shares or restoring and reconveying the PNCC shares to them. In the event a final judgment is rendered in said Makati City RTC case in favor of petitioners, then such adjudication tends to render moot and academic the judgment to be rendered in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016 considering that the legal ownership of either the UHC or PNCC shares would now be transferred to petitioners Rodolfo Cuenca and CIC. Such adverse judgment would run counter to the rights of ownership of the government over the UHC and PNCC shares in question. It must be remembered that on March 21, 1986, a Sworn Statement41executed by Mr. Jose Y. Campos in Vancouver, Canada, whereby Mr. Campos, a crony and close business associate of the deposed President Marcos, named and identified IRC and UHC (a wholly-owned subsidiary of IRC) as among the several corporations organized, established, and managed by him and other business associates for and in behalf of the former President Marcos. Subsequently, the UHC and IRC shares were surrendered and turned over by Mr. Campos to PCGG, transferring, in effect, the ownership of the shares to the Government.Moreover, inasmuch as UHC was impleaded in Civil Case No. 0016 as a defendant and was listed among the corporations beneficially owned or controlled by petitioner Cuenca, the issue of the latters right to acquire ownership of UHC shares is inexorably intertwined with the right of the Republic of the Philippines, through PCGG, to retain ownership of said UHC shares.It must be borne in mind that the Sandiganbayan was created in 1978 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.42Said law has been amended during the interim period after the Edsa Revolution of 1986 and before the 1987 Constitution was drafted, passed, and ratified. Thus, the executive issuances during such period before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution had the force and effect of laws. Specifically, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued the following Executive Orders which amended PD 1606 in so far as the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over civil and criminal cases instituted and prosecuted by the PCGG is concerned,viz:a) EO 1, entitled "Creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government," dated February 28, 1986;b) EO 2, entitled "Regarding the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, Their Close Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees," dated March 12, 1986;c) EO 14, entitled "Defining the Jurisdiction over Cases Involving the Ill-gotten Wealth of Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, Members of their Immediate Family, Close Relatives, Subordinates, Close and/or Business Associates, Dummies, Agents and Nominees," dated May 7, 1986; andd) EO 14-A, entitled "Amending Executive Order No. 14," dated August 18, 1986.Bearing on the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over cases of ill-gotten wealth, EO 14, Secs. 1 and 2 provide:SECTION 1. Any provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, thePresidential Commission on Good Governmentwith the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, is herebyempowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it underExecutive Order No. 1, dated February 28, 1986 andExecutive Order No. 2, dated March 12, 1986, as may be warranted by its findings.SECTION 2. ThePresidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with theSandiganbayan, which shall haveexclusive and original jurisdiction thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)Notably, these amendments had been duly recognized and reflected in subsequent amendments to PD 1606, specifically Republic Act Nos. 797543and 8249.44In the light of the foregoing provisions, it is clear that it is the Sandiganbayan and not the Makati City RTC that has jurisdiction over the disputed UHC and PNCC shares, being the alleged "ill-gotten wealth" of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos and petitioner Cuenca. The fact that the Makati City RTC civil case involved the performance of contractual obligations relative to the UHC shares is of no importance. The benchmark is whether said UHC shares are alleged to be ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses and their perceived cronies. More importantly, the interests of orderly administration of justice dictate that all incidents affecting the UHC shares and PCGGs right of supervision or control over the UHC must be addressed to and resolved by the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, the law and courts frown upon split jurisdiction and the resultant multiplicity of suits, which result in much lost time, wasted effort, more expenses, and irreparable injury to the public interest.Second, the UHC shares in dispute were sequestered by respondent PCGG. Sequestration is a provisional remedy or freeze order issued by the PCGG designed to prevent the disposal and dissipation of ill-gotten wealth.45The power to sequester property means toplace or cause to be placed under [PCGGs] possession or control said property, or any building or office wherein any such property or any records pertaining thereto may be found, including business enterprises and entities, for the purpose of preventing the destruction of, and otherwise conserving and preserving the same, until it can be determined, through appropriate judicial proceedings, whether the property was in truth ill-gotten. (Silverio v. PCGG, 155 SCRA 60 [1987]).46Considering that the UHC shares were already sequestered, enabling the PCGG to exercise the power of supervision, possession, and control over said shares, then such power would collide with the legal custody of the Makati City RTC over the UHC shares subject of Civil Case No. 91-2721. Whatever the outcome of Civil Case No. 91-2721, whether from enforcement or rescission of the contract, would directly militate on PCGGs control and management of IRC and UHC, and consequently hamper or interfere with its mandate to recover ill-gotten wealth. As aptly pointed out by respondents, petitioners action is inexorably entwined with the Governments action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealththe subject of the pending case before the Sandiganbayan. Verily, the transfer of shares of stock of UHC to petitioners or the return of the shares of stock of CDCP (now PNCC) will wreak havoc on the sequestration case as both UHC and CDCP are subject of sequestration by PCGG.Third,Philippine Amusement and Gaming CorporationandHoliday Inn (Phils.), Inc.47are not analogous to the case at bar. The first dealt with ownership of gaming and office equipment, which is distinct from and will not impact on the sequestration issue of PCOC. The second dealt with an ordinary civil case for performance of a contractual obligation which did not in any way affect the sequestration proceeding of NRHDCI; thus, the complaint-in-intervention of Holiday Inn (Phils.), Inc. was properly denied for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.In both cases cited by petitioners, there was a substantial distinction between the sequestration proceedings and the subject matter of the actions. This does not prevail in the instant case, as the ownership of the shares of stock of the sequestered companies, UHC and CDCP, is the subject matter of a pending case and thus addressed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Sec. 2 of EO 14 pertinently provides: "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof."The above proviso has been squarely applied inPea,48where this Court held that the exclusive jurisdiction conferred on the Sandiganbayan would evidently extend not only to the principal causes of action, that is, recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth, but also to all incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to such cases, including a dispute over the sale of the shares, the propriety of the issuance of ancillary writs of relative provisional remedies, and the sequestration of the shares, which may not be made the subject of separate actions or proceedings in another forum. Indeed, the issue of the ownership of the sequestered companies, UHC and PNCC, as well as IRCs ownership of them, is undeniably related to the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth and can be squarely addressed via the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.Fourth, while it is clear that the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only encompasses cases where PCGG is impleaded, such requirement is satisfied in the instant case. The appellate court clearly granted PCGGs petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 49686, assailing the trial courts denial of its Motion for Leave to Intervene with Motion to Dismiss. Thus, the trial courts April 20, 1998 Order was reversed and set aside by the appellate court through its assailed Decision. Consequently, PCGG was granted the right to intervene and thus became properly impleaded in the instant case. Without doubt, the trial court has no jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No. 91-2721..Respondent UHC duly sequestered by PCGGThe trial court ruled that respondent PCGG could not stop the transfer of the shares of respondent UHC in CDCP to petitioners as there was no proof of sequestration except a writ of sequestration of Cuencas stocks in CDCP. On the other hand, petitioners contend that the appellate courts reliance onRepublic49is misplaced. They point out that neither PCGG nor respondent corporations relied on said case. Besides, petitioners contend that the Courts statements in said case did not constitute a ruling but mere references to unproven allegations by PCGG in its complaint against Cuenca in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0016; and as such, it cannot be relied upon to hold that UHC was a sequestered corporation. As it is, petitioners conclude that it was a mereobiter dictumwhich was not essential to the disposition of the aforecited case and thus, it is not binding upon the parties for purposes ofres judicataor conclusiveness of judgment.We are not moved by petitioners submission.While it may be true that inRepublic, our statement on Civil Case No. 0016, as cited by PCGG, refers to the allegations in the complaint filed by PCGG against petitioner Cuenca,50we nonetheless stated in said case the fact of the sequestration of the assets and records of Rodolfo Cuenca, UHC, CIC, CDCP, San Mariano Mining Corp., etc. on May 23, 1986 and July 23, 1987. We took factual notice of the sequestration of various companies and properties in said case, thus:aIII. Orders of Sequestration issued by PCGGDuring 1986 and 1987 numerous orders of sequestration, freezing or provisional takeover of companies or properties, real or personal, were issued and implemented. Among those were the orders handed out against the firms or assets hereunder listed, with the dates of sequestration, freezing or take-over, to wit:SUBJECTS/OBJECTS OF SEQUESTRATION DATEi. Assets and records of Rodolfo Cuenca, May 23, 1986,Universal Holdings Corp., Cuenca July 23, 1987Investment Corporation, PhilippineNational Construction Corp. (formerlyCDCP), San Mariano Mining Corp., etc.51From the foregoing account, we concluded that UHC had indeed been sequestered by the PCGG in 1986 and 1987. Consequently, the appellate court properly applied Republic as basis for its finding that UHC was a sequestered company. Since the issue of sequestration has been resolved, we see no need to delve into the issue of conclusiveness of judgment. Suffice it to say that with the unequivocal finding that UHC was indeed sequestered, then it is the Sandiganbayan, not the Makati City RTC, that has exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 91-2721.WHEREFORE, the instant petition isDISMISSEDfor lack of merit. The January 6, 2003 Decision and July 15, 2003 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 60338 and CA-G.R. SP No. 49686 areAFFIRMEDin toto. No costs.Asia Intl Auctioneers, Inc. vs. Parayno, Jr G.R. No. 163445FACTS: Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7227 creating the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and extending a number of economic or tax incentives therein.On June 3, 2003, then CIR Guillermo L. Parayno, Jr. issued Revenue Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 31-2003 setting the "Uniform Guidelines on the Taxation of Imported Motor Vehicles through the Subic Free Port Zone and Other Freeport Zones that are sold at Public Auction." This was later amended by RMC No. 32-2003, to wit:II. The imported motor vehicles after its release from Customs custody are sold through public auction/negotiated sale by the consignee within or outside of the Freeport Zone:A. The gross income earned by the consignee-seller from the public auction/negotiated sale of the imported vehicles shall be subject to the preferential tax rate of five percent (5%) in lieu of the internal revenue taxes imposed by the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, provided that the following conditions are present:1. That the consignee-seller is a duly registered enterprise entitled to such preferential tax rate as well as a registered taxpayer with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).2. That the total income generated by the consignee-seller from sources within the customs territory does not exceed thirty percent (30%) of the total income derived from all sources.B. In case the consignee-seller is a registered enterprise and/or locator not entitled to the preferential tax treatment or if the same is entitled from such incentive but its total income from the customs territory exceeds thirty percent (30%) of its entire income derived from the customs territory and the freeport zone, the sales or income derived from the public auction/negotiated sale shall be subjected to the regular internal revenue taxes imposed by the Tax Code. The consignee-seller shall also observe the compliance requirements prescribed by the Tax Code. When public auction or negotiated sale is conducted within or outside of the freeport zone, the following tax treatment shall be observed:1. Value Added Tax (VAT)/ Percentage Tax (PT) VAT or PT shall be imposed on every public auction or negotiated sale.2. Excise Tax The imposition of excise tax on public auction or negotiated sale shall be held in abeyance pending verification that the importers selling price used as a basis by the Bureau of Customs in computing the excise tax is correctly determined.Petitioners Asia International Auctioneers, Inc. (AIAI) and Subic Bay Motors Corporation are corporations organized under Philippine laws with principal place of business within the SSEZ. They are engaged in the importation of mainly secondhand or used motor vehicles and heavy transportation or construction equipment which they sell to the public through auction.Petitioners filed a complaint before the RTC of Olongapo City, praying for the nullification of RMC No. 31-2003 for being unconstitutional and anultra viresact.Subsequently, petitioners filed their "First Amended Complaint to Declare Void, Ultra Vires, and Unconstitutional [RMC] No. 31-2003 dated June 3, 2003 and [RMC] No. 32-2003 dated June 5, 2003, with Application for a Writ of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction"to enjoin respondents from implementing the questioned RMCs while the case is pending.The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its "Comment (In Opposition to the Application for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction)."Respondents CIR, Regional Director and Revenue District Officer submitted their joint "Opposition (To The Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order by Petitioners)."Then Secretary of Finance Jose Isidro N. Camacho filed a Motion to Dismiss the case against him, alleging that he is not a party to the suit and petitioners have no cause of action against him. Respondents CIR, BIR Regional Director and BIR Revenue District Officer also filed their joint Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that "the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint" and "a condition precedent, that is, exhaustion of administrative remedies, has not been complied with."TRIAL COURT: Petitioners application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby GRANTED with an injunction bond in the amount of Php 1 Million.PETITIONERS: filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case.Meantime, BIR Regional Director Danilo A. Duncano sent a Preliminary Assessment Noticeto the President of AIAI, informing him of the VAT due from the company for the auction sales conducted on June 6-8, 2003 as per RMC No. 32-2003, plus surcharge, interest and compromise penalty. Thereafter, a Formal Letter of Demand19 was sent.CA: Granted the petition of respondents. Public respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 74, of Olongapo City is hereby declared bereft of jurisdiction. Accordingly, said Civil Case No. 275-0-2003 is herebyDISMISSEDand the assailed Order dated August 1, 2003,ANNULLEDandSET ASIDE.AIAI: Petition for Review on Certiorari with an application for a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin respondents "from pursuing sending letters of assessments to petitioners."SC: Petitioners (AIAI) contend that there were fatal procedural defects in respondents petition for certiorari with the CA. They point out that the CA resolved the issue of jurisdiction without waiting for the lower court to first rule on the issue. Also, respondents did not file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts order granting the writ of preliminary injunction before filing the petition with the CA.The arguments are unmeritorious.Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case. The issue is so basic that it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.In fact, courts may take cognizance of the issue even if not raised by the parties themselves. There is thus no reason to preclude the CA from ruling on this issue even if allegedly, the same has not yet been resolved by the trial court.As to respondents failure to file a motion for reconsideration, we agree with the ruling of the CA, which states:It is now settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration is not always sine qua non before availing of the remedy of certiorari. Hence, the general rule of requiring a motion for reconsideration finds no application in a case where what is precisely being assailed is lack of jurisdiction of the respondent court. And considering also the urgent necessity for resolving the issues raised herein, where further delay could prejudice the interests of the government, the haste with which the Solicitor General raised these issues before this Court becomes understandable.Now, to the main issue: does the trial court have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case?Petitioners contend that jurisdiction over the case at bar properly pertains to the regular courts as this is "an action to declare as unconstitutional, void and against the provisions of [R.A. No.] 7227" the RMCs issued by the CIR. They explain that they "do not challenge the rate, structure or figures of the imposed taxes, rather they challenge the authority of the respondent Commissioner to impose and collect the said taxes." They claim that the challenge on the authority of the CIR to issue the RMCs does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).Petitioners arguments do not sway. R.A. No. 1125, as amended, states:Sec. 7. Jurisdiction.The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided(1)Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, orother matters arising under the National Internal Revenue Code or other laws or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (emphases supplied)In the case at bar, the assailed revenue regulations and revenue memorandum circulars are actually rulings or opinions of the CIR on the tax treatment of motor vehicles sold at public auction within the SSEZ to implement Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227 which provides that "exportation or removal of goods from the territory of the [SSEZ] to the other parts of the Philippine territory shall be subject to customs duties and taxes under the Customs and Tariff Code and other relevant tax laws of the Philippines." They were issued pursuant to the power of the CIR under Section 4 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Section 4. Power of the Commissioner to Interpret Tax Laws and to Decide Tax Cases.The power to interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by the Secretary of Finance.The power to decidedisputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, orother matters arising under this Code or other laws or portions thereof administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue is vested in the Commissioner, subject to the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax Appeals. (emphases supplied)Petitioners point out that the CA based its decision on Section 7 of R.A. No. 1125 that the CTA "shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction to reviewby appeal" decisions of the CIR. They argue that in the instant case, there is no decision of the respondent CIR on any disputed assessment to speak of as what is being questioned is purely the authority of the CIR to impose and collect value-added and excise taxes.Petitioners failure to ask the CIR for a reconsideration of the assailed revenue regulations and RMCs is another reason why the instant case should be dismissed. It is settled that the premature invocation of the court's intervention is fatal to one's cause of action. If a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy must first be exhausted before the courts power of judicial review can be sought. The party with an administrative remedy must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the court. PETITION DENIEDHeirs of Santiago Nisperas vs Nisperas-Ducusin G.R. No. 189570Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the July 13, 2009 Decisionand Resolutionof the Court of Appeals The appellate court affirmed the Decisionof the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) upholding the validity of the Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer and Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. CLOA-623 issued in favor of respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin.The instant case stemmed from a complaint filed by petitioners with the DARAB alleging:The 15,837-square-meter parcel of land subject of the instant case is part of the 58,350-square-meter agricultural land in Pao Sur, San Fernando City, La Union acquired by Santiago Nisperos, the predecessor of petitioners, during his lifetime. He declared said property for taxation purposes starting December 1947.When Santiago and his wife Estefania died, they were survived by their nine children: Tranquilino, Felix, Olling, Maria, Lenardo, Millan, Fausto, Candido and Cipriana. The heirs of Santiago, petitioners herein, claim that the subject property was occupied, controlled and tilled by all nine children of Santiago.During the time when Maria and Cipriana were overseeing the property, Maria took respondent Marissa Nisperos-Ducusin, a daughter of their cousin Purita, as her ward and raised her like her own child.On February 12, 1988, Maria and Cipriana, acting as representatives of their other siblings, executed a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa in favor of petitioners over the 58,350-square-meter property and another 46,000-square-meter propertyOn April 28, 1992, a Deed of Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT) over the subject property was executed between Maria and Cipriana as landowners, and respondent, who was then only 17 years old, as farmer-beneficiary. Deed was notarized by Notary public Atty. Caoayan.Certificate of Land Ownership Award. was issued to respondent by the DAR over the subject property.Alleging fraud on the part of respondent which petitioners claim to have discovered only in August 2001, petitioners filed a complaint on September 6, 2001 with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of San Fernando City, La Union. Unfortunately, no settlement between petitioners and respondent was reached prompting the MARO to issue a Certificate to File Action.Petitioners filed with the DARAB a complaint for annulment of documents and damages against respondent. Petitioners contended that the transfer of ownership over the subject land was made without the consent of the heirs of Santiago and that respondent took advantage of Marias senility and made it appear that Maria and Cipriana sold said property by virtue of the VLT. They further alleged that said document was falsified by respondent because Maria could not anymore sign but could only affix her thumbmark as she did in a 1988 Deed of Donation.Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss petitioners complaint. She argued that the action for annulment has already prescribed.DARAB Regional Adjudicator: the DARAB Regional Adjudicator denied respondents Motion to Dismiss and ordered her to file her answer to the complaint. Respondent denied the allegations of fraud and falsification, and insisted that she is a bona fide beneficiaryDARAB Regional Adjudicator: Annuled VLT and OCT/CLOA in respondents name.Respondent: Respondent contested the Regional Adjudicators decision before the DARAB alleging that the Regional Adjudicator committed grave abuse of discretion. She added that the Regional Adjudicator went beyond the scope of his authority by directing the parties to litigate the issue of ownership before the court.DARAB: rendered a Decision reversing the decision of the Regional Adjudicator and upholding the validity of the VLT and respondents title. Dismissed petitioners claim of fraud since the VLT was executed in the presence of DAR-MARO Susimo Asuncion, signed by three instrumental witnesses and notarized by Atty. Roberto E. Caoayan of the DAR.PETITIONER: Aggrieved, elevated the case to the CA via a petition for review.CA: 7/13/2009 Held that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proving that fraud attended the execution of the VLT. It also agreed with the DARAB that considering a certificate of title was already issued in favor of respondent, the same became indefeasible and incontrovertible by the time petitioners instituted the case in January 2002, and thus may no longer be judicially reviewed.PETITIONER: CA erred in their ruling.SC: We set aside the assailed Decision and Resolution.The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and not with the DARAB.Section 1, Rule II of the 1994 DARAB Rules of Procedure, the rule in force at the time of the filing of the complaint by petitioners in 2001, provides:SECTION 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to cases involving the following:f) Those involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) and Emancipation Patents (EPs) which are registered with the Land Registration Authority;However, it is not enough that the controversy involves the cancellation of a CLOA registered with the Land Registration Authority for the DARAB to have jurisdiction. What is of primordial consideration is the existence of an agrarian dispute between the parties. Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an agrarian dispute as "any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements" and includes "any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint or petition. Considering that the allegations in the complaint negate the existence of an agrarian dispute among the parties, the DARAB is bereft of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same as it is the DAR Secretary who has authority to resolve the dispute raised by petitioners

G.R. No. 180705 November 27, 2012EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESFacts:(Background case: Cocofed v Republic)In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was or ought to be issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having the largest membership.The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees ("P.D.") purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on the first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names x x x. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to finance various projects and/or was converted into various assets or investments.11Relevant to the present petition is the acquisition of the First United Bank ("FUB"), which was subsequently renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank ("UCPB").Apropos the intended acquisition of a commercial bank for the purpose stated earlier, it would appear that FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangcos group (collectively, "Pedro Cojuangco") had control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of Pedro Cojuangcos shares in FUB. However, as later events unfolded, a simple direct sale from the seller (Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear that Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the formers FUB controlling interests. Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two deeds. The first one was simply denominated as Agreement, dated May 1975, entered into by and between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and in behalf of "certain other buyers", and Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly accorded the option to buy 72.2% of FUBs outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option shares," for brevity), at PhP 200 per share. On its face, this agreement does not mention the word "option."The second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had PCA, for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for PhP200.00 per share. As additional consideration for PCAs buy-out of what Cojuangco would later claim to be his exclusive and personal option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully paid shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangcos equity position in FUB, later UCPB, the PCA agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the second agreement to cede over to the former a number of fully paid FUB shares out of the shares it (PCA) undertakes to eventually subscribe. It was further stipulated that Cojuangco would act as bank president for an extendible period of 5 years.Apart from the aforementioned 72.2%, PCA purchased from other FUB shareholders 6,534 shares of which Cojuangco, as may be gathered from the records, got 10%..As of June 30, 1975, the list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with 129,955 shares.14It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangcos equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUBs capital stock (the equivalent of 158,840 and 649,800 shares, respectively). In all, from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800 shares) = 95,304.Shortly after the execution of the PCA Cojuangco Agreement, President Marcos issued, on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing x x x as narrated, PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with "readily available credit facilities at preferential rate" x x x.Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquinos revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and associates. Apropos thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (EO) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all series of 1986. E.O. 1 created the PCGG and provided it with the tools and processes it may avail of in the recovery efforts;17E.O. No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten assets and properties come in the form of shares of stocks, etc., while E.O. No. 14 conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with the proviso that "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly" to the civil cases filed under the EO. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued numerous orders of sequestration, among which were those handed out x x x against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the names of (a) the more than a million coconut farmers, (b) the CIIF companies and (c) Cojuangco, Jr., including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.The Republic interposed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., praying that a summary judgment be rendered:a. Declaring that Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is unconstitutional insofar as it validates the provisions in the "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement x x x" dated May 25, 1975 providing payment of ten percent (10%) commission to defendant Cojuangco with respect to the FUB, now UCPB shares subject matter thereof;b. Declaring that x x x Cojuangco, Jr. and his fronts, nominees and dummies, including x x x and Danilo S. Ursua, have not legally and validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares; andc. Declaring that the government is the lawful and true owner of the subject UCPB shares registered in the names of Cojuangco, Jr. and the entities and persons above-enumerated, for the benefit of all coconut farmers. x x xFollowing an exchange of pleadings, the Republic filed its sur-rejoinder praying that it be conclusively declared the true and absolute owner of the coconut levy funds and the UCPB shares acquired therefrom.Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the x x x (PCA) was the "other buyers" represented by defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro Cojuangco (on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex "A"of the agreement) and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement.Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. did not own any share in the x x x (FUB) prior to the execution of the two AgreementsDefendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in addition to the 137,866 FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB stockholders sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of FUB shares purchased by PCA increased from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES referred to in the Agreement of May 25, 1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not make said admission as to the said 6,534 shares in excess of the 137,866 shares covered by the Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the Agreement, described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority" and incorporated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 by reference, refers to the "AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COCONUT FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA (Annex "B" for defendant Cojuangcos OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. dated September 18, 2002).Sandiganbayan DecisionOn July 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed PSJ-A, ruling in favor of the Republic, disposing insofar as pertinent as follows:WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by plaintiff.1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law because of the non-publication of the said Agreement.2. Regarding the questioned transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB shares" which cost the PCA more than Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we declare, that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB shares to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable consideration, and therefore null and void:a. The 14,400 shares from the "Option Shares";b. Additional Bank Shares Subscribed and Paid by PCA, consisting of:1. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;2. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and3. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the Agreement.3. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.4. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by thePCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.As earlier explained, the core issue in this instant petition is Part C of the dispositive portion in PSJ-A declaring the 7.22% FUB (now UCPB) shares transferred to Cojuangco, plus the other shares paid by the PCA as "conclusively" owned by the Republic. Parts A and B of the same dispositive portion have already been finally resolved and adjudicated by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic on January 24, 2012.From PSJ-A, Cojuangco moved for partial reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution of December 28, 2004, denied the motion.Hence, the instant petition.Issue: W/N the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil Case No. 0033-A, an "ill-gotten wealth" case brought under EO Nos. 1 and 2, to declare the Cojuangco UCPB shares acquired by virtue of the Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement and/or the PCA Agreement null and void because "not supported by valuable consideration"?Ruling:THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUBDIVIDED AMENDED COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE SHARES ALLEGEDLY ACQUIRED BY COJUANGCO BY VIRTUE OF THE PCA AGREEMENTS.The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints has peremptorily been put to rest by the Court in its January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic. There, the Court, citing Regalado27and settled jurisprudence, stressed the following interlocking precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor will be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.The Republics material averments in its complaint subdivided in CC No. 0033-A included the following:CC No. 0033-A12. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. served as a public officer during the Marcos administration. During the period of his incumbency as a public officer, he acquired assets, funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from legitimately acquired property.13. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his association, influence, connection, and acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as when he a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of Defendants x x x Maria Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua etc., the purchase by . . . (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the x x x (FUB) which was subsequently converted into a universal bank named x x x (UCPB) through the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) being initially in the amount of P85,773,100.00 in a manner contrary to law and to the specific purposes for which said coconut levy funds were imposed and collected under P.D. 276, and with sinister designs and under anomalous circumstances, to wit:(i) Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds as a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds with which to exercise his private option to buy the controlling interest in FUB; thus, claiming that the 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB could only be purchased and transferred through the exercise of his "personal and exclusive action option to acquire the 144,000 shares" of the bank, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA, x x x executed on May 26, 1975 a purchase agreement which provides, among others, for the payment to him in fully paid shares as compensation thereof 95,384 shares worth P1,444,000.00 with the further condition that he shall manage and control the bank as Director and President for a term of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years and to designate three (3) persons of his choice who shall be elected as members of the Board of Directors of the Bank;(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of government funds to advance his own private and commercial interests, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of PD 755 (a) declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and fiduciary and trust funds and do not form part of the general funds of the National Government, conveniently repealing for that purpose a series of previous decrees, PDs 276 and 414, establishing the character of the coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary, trust and governmental funds; (b) confirming the agreement between Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA on the purchase of FUB by incorporating by reference said private commercial agreement in PD 755;(iii)To further consolidate his hold on UCPB, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. imposed as consideration and conditions for the purchase that (a) he gets one out of every nine shares given to PCA, and (b) he gets to manage and control UCPB as president for a term of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years;(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal with and make use of the coconut levy funds x x x Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an unconstitutional de