Supreme Court Justice David Hackett Souter

And

Fort Sane v. Banks Opinion

Ryan WulpiPOLY 320: Politics of the Supreme Court

Professor Georgia UlmschneiderFall 2005

‘Soutie’

David Hackett Souter was born in Melrose, Massachusetts on September 17, 1939

to Joseph A. Souter and Helen Hackett Souter. The Souter’s were an upper-middle class

deeply religious Episcopalian family and David was an only child. Joseph Souter was a

banker and Helen Souter was a homemaker while young David spent his summers in

Weare, New Hampshire at his maternal grandparents’ farmhouse. When he was 11 years

old, his grandparents died, and he moved with his parents to the farmhouse in Weare,

where to this day he spends his summers (Goldberg 1997). David arrived at school in

Weare with a large leather briefcase and some students quickly dubbed him “Suitcase

Soutie (Yarbrough 2005).” He was also a prodigious student in high school and was

voted “most sophisticated” and “most likely to succeed” by his classmates. Described by

more than one classmate as a bookworm, he often completed his assignments weeks in

advance (Grazia 1997).

Perhaps the greatest influence on Souter’s life was a distant relative that he

affectionately referred to as “Aunt Harriet.” Harriet Moulton Bartlett was raised in a

Cambridge home with two maids, but chose a life of work instead of leisurely pursuits.

“Aunt Harriet” was politically conservative but socially progressive and graduated Phi

Beta Kappa from Vassar and went on to receive a master’s from the University of

Chicago. She set off to be a pioneer in medical social work at Boston’s Massachusetts

General Hospital where she served as a Simmons College professor and director of its

medical social work program from 1948 to 1957. Harriet Bartlett, like the future Justice

Souter, never married, but she always insisted on being the center of attention wherever

she happened to be. According to Melvin Levine, a close friend of Souter’s from their

time together at Oxford as Rhodes scholars, David “worshipped this woman.” After

meeting Harriet on a trip of hers to Oxford, Levine was convinced that Souter had

adopted most of his mannerisms and speech from her (Yarbrough 2005).

College Years

Upon graduation from high school, Souter went onto Harvard where he graduated

magna cum laude with a degree in philosophy (Paddock 1996). While at Harvard, Souter

decided to pursue a career in law rather than theology. In an interview at the time of his

appointment in 1976 as New Hampshire’s attorney general, he credited his decision to a

reading assignment at Harvard, a significant series of lectures on the Bill of Rights by

federal appeals court judge Learned Hand (Yarbrough 2005). Souter described the

lectures, published a year after he graduated from high school, as “a beautiful exposition

of the importance of classic judicial restraint in the construction of the Bill of Rights. I

read it and reread it,” he said, “and from that came my fatal commitment to the law. And

with that commitment a philosophy of constitutional constriction of the law.” Broad

interpretations of written law, he warned, threatened public acceptance of judicial

decisions and thus the law’s social foundation. “The more we allow language to be

debased, the more free-swinging we are in our interpretation of legal language, the

greater risk we run of having the public perceive our actions as arbitrary and personal, not

grounded in the constitutional process (Yarbrough 2005).” At Harvard his senior honors

thesis dealt with judicial positivism as implied by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.

According to Souter, Holmes’ philosophy signified that good judges should never act on

the basis of political predilections or ideology (Grazia 1997). This is a little

foreshadowing of his tendencies later on the Supreme Court, from separating his political

predilections and from not ignoring precedent.

According to Levine, whatever Souter’s image was with some of his high school

classmates, he found him “’an awful lot of fun to be with…. He was the life of the party,

and he insisted on being the life of the party. He would hold forth with his little glass of

scotch in one corner and he would always attract an audience…He was a very

conscientious student, but not what people would call a ‘grind.’ He still could relax and

have a good time. He loved being witty, and he was incredibly witty – just a marvelous

sense of humor (Yarbrough 2005).’” This sounds like the description of “Aunt Harriet”

and gives a little more insight to David Hackett Souter. This is how Souter is described

by most of his classmates and co-workers after high school as there has not been a bad

remark about him in anything that I have read.

During the first semester of his senior year, Souter interviewed for the Rhodes

scholarship and came out tops on the list in the state committee and in the New England

committee. Thirty-two Americans left for Oxford in the fall of 1961, which in those days

they traveled by ship with the trip taking four to five days. At Oxford, Souter was a

student at Magdalen College, one of the revered university’s oldest (founded 1458) and

most distinguished colleges (Yarbrough 2005). As far as his love life went during

college, law school, and afterward, Souter had dated several women. His principal

romantic interest was Ann Grant, daughter of a New Hampshire superior court judge,

whom he had known since high school. Mel Levine has said that Souter was always

talking about her, that in fact he was quite “infatuated” with her (Yarbrough 2005). The

two fell in love, but their relationship eventually ended. David, high school friend Vicki

McLaughlin Maiben suggests, was always the person for whom “’everything had to be in

order. He would not consider marriage or a long-term relationship’” until his education

was finished. She thinks that this was the reason the relationship ended (Yarbrough

2005). Levine supposes that because Souter so idealized this relationship that no other

relationship could compare. At the time of Souter’s Supreme Court nomination, Ann

Grant Stanley told a reporter, “’I don’t recall talking about not seeing each other [any

longer]. We just didn’t see each other.’” This and another relationship later on in his life

– some of his friends believe, left him thoroughly devastated (Yarbrough 2005).

Life after College

He worked for a couple of years in private practice upon graduating from

Harvard. In 1966, Souter finished law school and became an associate at Orr and Reno in

Concord, New Hampshire. Much of the firm’s work consisted of civil matters, including

corporate law and taxation, wage and hour issues, and real estate, as well as probate and

trust advice and administration. But most of his limited trial experience with the firm

was criminal rather than civil (Yarbrough 2005). Souter stayed with Orr and Reno for

two years and left in 1968 to take a position with the New Hampshire attorney general’s

office working for George Pappagianis. He would find public service decidedly more

gratifying than private practice. He served a decade in the attorney general’s office – as

assistant attorney general, 1968-71; as deputy attorney general, 1971-76; and as the

state’s chief law enforcement officer, 1976-78 (Yarbrough 2005). During this time he

hired Bill Glahn and Tom Rath, who became two of his closest friends. They both

describe him as “’very funny and a gifted story teller. He’s got a great recollection for

detail…and a wonderful sense of humor.’” They go on to talk about how he would

entertain his friends at the farmhouse in Weare although “’you kind of have to weave

your way through the piles of books and find a place to sit.’” For the children of his

friends, Souter would become a beloved uncle figure. As Bill Glahn put it, “’my kids

think he walks on water (Yarbrough 2005).’”

In many ways, Souter fit the stereotype of the tight-fisted New Englander, with

Tom Rath only half-joking when he said that his friend put ‘C’ in ‘Cheap.’ The times

that Souter picked up a restaurant check were sufficiently rare as to invite comment. His

Weare house became progressively more dilapidated (Yarbrough 2005). David Souter

led a quiet, unassuming life in New Hampshire, which did not change much even when

he moved to Washington. He still drives the same car that he did when he was nominated

to the highest court in the land – a 1987 Volkswagen Golf and his typical lunch fare

consists of cottage cheese and an apple (Goldberg 1997). His frugality with state funds

enhanced his standing with New Hampshire voters. In 1976 he passed on the opportunity

to attend the December annual convention of the National Association of Attorneys

General in Honolulu. Souter considered the thousand dollar estimated cost of the trip

“frankly…a lot of money.” He was also concerned about the impression that the trip

would create in the public eye. “I figured,” he told a reporter, “that there was no way in

the world that anyone is ever going to believe that I had gone to Honolulu, Hawaii, in the

middle of December, solely for the value of the seminars (Yarbrough 2005).” This is one

of the many reasons that I find Justice Souter so interesting. From everything that I have

read he just seems so ingratiating and down to earth, even though some friends have

described him as ‘aristocratic.’

New Hampshire Judge

Two years after that in 1978 he started his ascension through the ranks of the

state judiciary (Grazia pg. 1809). He was appointed a superior court judge by Governor

Meldrim Thomson and his friend Tom Rath succeeded him as state attorney general. He

quickly gained a reputation as a stickler for propriety on the bench and invoked a

demanding recusal policy for himself. He also proved himself as a jurist who treated

everyone in the courtroom, including defendants, with respect and dignity (Yarbrough

2005). Although he was known as a tough sentencer, colleagues found him to be a

compassionate judge. In one case a man was charged with stealing a dollar from his

employer. The state told him that if the case went to trial, he would get a four-year

sentence. They offered him a two-year sentence which he accepted against his lawyer’s

advice. When the plea was being formalized in court, Souter refused to take the plea

because he thought it to be cruel and inhumane to put someone in prison for two years for

stealing a dollar (Greenhouse 1990). This is a great example of the kind of person that

David Souter is and why his friends are so enamored with him and why his colleagues

described him as “pro-fair trial,” despite his background as a prosecutor (Yarbrough

2005). In 1983 he was elevated to the New Hampshire Supreme Court (Epstein 1994).

In April 1990 President George H.W. Bush appointed him to the U.S. First Circuit

Court of Appeals. Just three months later Bush nominated Souter to replace William J.

Brennan. He was the quintessential “stealth nominee” because there was not much of a

paper trail to investigate although he had over two hundred state supreme court opinions

(Holland 2004). Aside from a couple of newspaper articles, Souter’s only publication

was tribute to Justice Laurence Ilsley Duncan who served on New Hampshire’s high

court from 1946 to 1976 (Yarbrough 2005). The Senate Judiciary Committee hearings

lasted for 20 hours, which at the time was the second longest in history trailing only the

failed nomination of Robert Bork. In the end the only committee member that voted

against Souter was Edward Kennedy and in due course he was confirmed 90-9 in the full

Senate (Grazia 1997).

Judicial Philosophy

Souter has been a complete enigma to court observers and fellow judges alike.

He was nominated by a Republican president but after the first couple of terms turned out

to be one of the more liberal voices on the Rehnquist Court. He has been labeled a New

England Republican which I have come to find out is basically a fiscal conservative and

social liberal. This label is a perfect fit for ‘Soutie’, who in his own words has basically

had the same response. He told the committee that he was opposed to using original

intent as a method of constitutional jurisprudence (Grazia 1997). Souter has described

himself as an “interpretationist,” who embraces a strict construction of the Constitution’s

language but reads its words “in light of contemporary conditions, and is not bound by

[the framers’] original meaning (Yarbrough 2005).” I take this to mean that Souter

agrees with the way that the framers’ built the Constitution but that one had to take into

account present factors and that the framers’ could not have foreseen some of the things

that would challenge this country in the future. People call this type of interpretation one

of a ‘living Constitution.’

Walter Rudman, Souter’s friend and at one point his boss, speculated that Oliver

W. Holmes and the second Justice John Marshall Harlan were his favorites. Holmes was

a fiscal conservative, regularly declaring unconstitutional federal and state regulations of

business and industry. He also generally endorsed broad interpretations of freedom of

speech and related civil liberties guarantees (Yarbrough 2005). The second Justice

Harlan, ‘[H]e had no agenda. He did not go into a case with certainty about how it

should come out. He struggled to be disinterested. That did not mean unconcerned; he

cared deeply. It meant that he tried genuinely to understand both sides of the argument

(Yarbrough 2005).” Yarbrough goes on to say that Harlan was also respectful of the past,

even joining the application of precedent cases in which he had originally dissented,

“[h]is mind was open to fresh applications of the Constitution to meet new threats.” This

is fitting that these two Justices were his favorite justices, as he has followed these two in

their interpretations of the Constitution.

Before the Senate hearings, Souter was described as being impersonal and being

out of touch with the problems of the average American. In his opening statement he

addressed these concerns to try and dispel this theory. It is a very telling quote and

typifies his personality and ideology; he says “[W]hatever court we are in, whatever we

are doing, whether we are on a trial court or an appellate court, at the end of our task

some human being is going to be affected. Some human life is going to be changed in

some way (Yarbrough 2005).” This gives a very significant look into Souter’s

predilection for individual rights. During the confirmation hearings Senator Strom

Thurmond was the first to question the nominee. He wondered what Souter thought

about the senator’s major Warren Court thorn, Miranda v. Arizona. It would be a

mistake, the nominee replied, for any court “to be unwilling ever to reexamine the

wisdom of” its decisions. But he also insisted that the Court should never be swayed “by

the politics of the moment (Yarbrough 2005). He was also described by friends as one

hardly to yield to public pressure, “the kind of guy who could take it; he thought the law

trumped public outcry (Grazia 1997).” He also described himself as undogmatic and

middle-of-the-road in judicial temperament and frustrated liberals and conservatives alike

by refusing to endorse a traditional conservative philosophy (Holland 2004).

Souter also holds a commitment to an essentially common law jurisprudence and

its emphasis on stare decisis (Yarbrough 2005). This most likely comes from his days at

Oxford which I have learned has a common law tradition. The force of precedent is also

a major part of common law tradition. And whatever Souter’s personal political

preferences, the civil liberties precedents he confronted on the Supreme Court were

essentially the expansive rulings of the Warren and Burger eras (Yarbrough 2005).

Unlike some others on the Court, Souter has been unwilling to tear down existing

precedents without significant justification. This is one of the many reasons that he

endears himself to me and many others that have studied the Court. Admittedly I have

not studied the Court to the extent as some of the authors of the articles that I have read

but I am equally impressed with this jurist and his views.

With his father being a banker, it’s no wonder that Souter grew up to be a fiscal

conservative and with a role model such as ‘Aunt Harriet’ who was a fiercely

independent woman in the early 1900’s, one can opine where he got his social liberalism

from. I find that Justice Souter and I have a lot in common, at least in our views, if not

our intelligence and education. Growing up in an intensely, independent single parent

household, I too have a penchant for individual liberties and the rights of the accused.

Being in the financial industry myself for the last 6 years, I also have a leaning towards

fiscal conservativism if not the same penchant for economic due process and free

enterprise. Being such a private man, as has been established by many of the people who

know Souter and have written articles or books about him, he has a special place in his

heart for privacy matters. This no doubt comes from growing up in a small village in

New Hampshire where the neighbors still intensely guard his privacy and have since his

nomination. He has always been a private man and in this fact one can see why he is a

staunch believer in individual rights and liberties.

After September 11th, he was also weary of the Bush administration claims of

practically unlimited presidential authority over suspected terrorists (Yarbrough 2005).

This will have specific applications when we talk about the wiretap of the conference

room when Banks met with his attorney, Sherry Mason. Several opinions written by

State Justice Souter showed respect for individual liberties (Press 2004).

City of Fort Sane v. Rob Banks

Something that was not touched on during oral argument and again during our

conference is whether the ordinance itself was constitutional. Regretfully I am bringing

this up now although it should have been addressed earlier. According to the Second

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution: “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the

security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be

infringed (Findlaw.com 2005).” This would then open the question of whether or not the

city had the right to enforce this ordinance. But for the sake of opening a new argument I

will stick to the facts that we have.

According to the briefs filed by the petitioners and respondents, on March 3,

2003, two Fort Sane police officers, Rambo and Lawless, were patrolling the downtown

streets with their newly supplied PEEPERs. This device is basically a handheld gun

detector that operates by reading electromagnetic radiation. Every human being emits

such radiation; as do all objects with a temperature above absolute zero. All emissions,

however, are not alike. From what I understand, a properly calibrated electromagnetic

imager can thus determine whether a person is carrying a gun under his/her clothes; the

weak electromagnetic emissions of the metal will block the stronger emissions of the

body behind it and thus – just as with an x-ray machine – create a gun-shaped ‘shadow’

on the displayed image of the person’s body. Unlike an x-ray machine this device is

purely passive and from what I can gather this device will not read anything unless a gun-

shaped metal object appears on the person’s body.

The officers testified that they were randomly scanning pedestrians with their

PEEPERs, Rambo’s PEEPER ‘went off,’ displaying an image of a passing pedestrian,

including the image of a concealed weapon, which happened to be a handgun with a

butterfly trigger. The officers had remembered a previous bulletin alerting them to be on

the lookout for a handgun with a butterfly trigger that had been used in a previous bank

robbery. According to the respondents, the officers detained the man who went by the

name of Rob Banks. Officer Lawless proceeded immediately to Mr. Banks’ residence

which happened to be a motor home parked in the driveway of the property, hooked up to

a house’s utilities, which happened to be his father’s property. The father was asked for

permission to search the motor home and it was granted. The ensuing search turned up

hand grenades, a Bush mask, like the one used in the robbery, a Quran, a street map of

downtown Chicago, and a recent grade report from certain chemistry classes that Mr.

Banks had taken at Fort Sane University. Upon his arrest, Mr. Banks was placed in a

federal facility due to concerns over possible links to terrorism. While being held, federal

agents monitored the meetings he had with his attorney, authorized by the Attorney

General of the United States, Alberto Gonzalez. Rob Banks was convicted in a state

court of robbery and possession of a concealed weapon.

The first issue at stake in this case is whether the City of Fort Sane’s use of the

PEEPER is constitutional. The city enacted an ordinance that criminalized the carrying

of concealed firearms by anyone except law enforcement officers, although more was

thought to be needed to curb gun violence and the PEEPER was Fort Sane’s response.

The use of the PEEPER on its face seems to be a violation of the 4th Amendment.

According to the 4th Amendment “[T]he right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or

affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or

things to be seized (Findlaw.com 2005).” The random scanning of people without

probable cause violates this amendment. The petitioners argued that because Mr. Banks

was in public that there was little or no expectation of privacy. They went on to state that

in this setting the PEEPER was as reasonable as a metal detector or a police dog in a

public building. This seems like quite a stretch in this context. When people walk into a

building with metal detectors they have a choice to be scanned, if they wish to continue

into the building they will be scanned, if they choose not to be scanned they cannot enter,

it’s as simple as that. Mr. Banks did not have a choice on whether he wanted to be

scanned with the PEEPER, and even beyond that if you do not need his consent, probable

cause should at least be considered necessary to constitute a search. The officers testified

that Mr. Banks was scanned randomly as part of a crowd walking the downtown area. If

we wanted to catch all persons carrying concealed weapons, why do we not just install

metal detectors outside the front doors of our citizens’ homes? It seems to me that would

eliminate a lot of the manpower that our law enforcement officers exert scanning crowds

with their PEEPERs. I am under the opinion that on this fact of the case the 4th

Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made relevant to the States

by the 14th Amendment, ‘protects people, not places,’ and therefore applies as much to

the citizen on the streets as well as the home or elsewhere. The issue in this case is not

the correctness of the police conduct but the admissibility of the evidence uncovered by

the search and seizure. There have been times where a search has been held to be

reasonable, without a warrant, when the officers’ safety has been at risk. This is clearly

not the case in this instance. The officers in this case randomly chose Mr. Banks out of a

crowd and as was held in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, on my vote in the majority, that

these searches to ‘generally control crime’ were unconstitutional. And from Union

Pacific Railroad Company v. Botsford the Court found that “[N]o right is held more

sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every

individual to the possession and control of his own person, and is entitled to be free from

unreasonable governmental intrusion.” By committing these searches without suspicion,

we are saying to the public that you are guilty until proven innocent.

Moving on to the other facts of this case, where the mobile home was searched

and whether this was also a violation of the 4th Amendment. This part of the case gave

me more trouble than the first component, strictly on the basis that consent was given by

the petitioner’s father for the mobile home to be searched. The mobile home was on his

property therefore Lincoln Banks had the authority to give consent to search. On the

other hand, would the officers have been on the scene of this mobile home had they not

found Rob Banks in violation of the Fort Sane concealed weapon ordinance? Certainly

the officers had reasonable amount of time to secure a search warrant without fear of

evidence within the mobile home as Rob Banks was being ‘detained.’ The argument was

made that because the mobile home was hooked up to the utilities of a house on the

property that it was a residence and that consent given by the owner of the property was

sufficient to search the premises without a warrant. But in Chimel v. California the Court

ruled, in a 7-2 decision, that a searches “incident to arrest” are limited to the immediate

control of the suspect. While police could reasonably search and seize evidence on or

around the arrestee’s person, they were prohibited from searching through his home

without a warrant. The Court emphasized the importance of warrants and probable cause

as necessary safeguards against government abuse. The argument was also forwarded

that the mobile home was actually a vehicle and if that was the case the search would still

be in violation of the Constitution for the reason of stare decisis as it pertains to Knowles

v. Iowa. The question presented in that case was: “[C]an a search of a stopped vehicle,

that occurs prior to the suspect’s arrest be sustained under the “search incident to arrest”

exception that permits officers to search stopped vehicles without first obtaining a search

warrant? In a unanimous opinion the Court held that full stopped-car searches can only

be conducted when the officer’s safety is at risk. This was clearly not the case in Fort

Sane v. Banks as Mr. Banks was being detained by Officer Rambo when Officer Lawless

went to search the residence.

The next element of this case is the monitoring of the meetings between the

suspect and his attorney, Sherry Mason. Because of the evidence found and admitted into

the lower courts, Mr. Banks was deemed an imminent terrorist threat and put under

surveillance authorized by Attorney General Gonzalez. The evidence found and

presented was a George W. Bush mask used in the original bank robbery, hand grenades,

a deposit receipt from an account with a bank in the Cayman Islands, a Quran, a street

map of downtown Chicago, a report card of chemistry classes that he had taken at local

college. The case the Attorney General makes of a terrorist threat is a flimsy one.

Should every Muslim, chemistry major and trust fund child who has taken a recent trip to

Chicago be considered a terrorist? It appears to me that we would have to put quite a few

people under surveillance if this is the case. Not to mention that this flies in the face a

fundamental right that we afford all U.S. citizens, an attorney-client privilege and also the

fact that all U.S. citizens deserve a fair trial and due process of the law. To receive a fair

defense, Mr. Banks’ attorney needs to have all the information that he can give her. If we

are monitoring these meetings, who’s to say that any evidence gathered in this

surveillance would not be used against him in court? As was stated by my esteemed

colleague, Justice Stevens, in our decision conference, this is a slippery slope that is

being walked and has a serious cost in inhibiting the defense attorney's ability to

represent their clients. The Sixth Amendment's right to counsel cannot be served while

the government is a third party present at attorney-client meetings. If we keep eroding

the rights of our citizens, when do we stop? How far do we go to ‘protect’ Americans?

The more liberties and freedoms the government eats away at, in the name of

‘protection,’ the more we lose. The goal of our ‘war on terrorism’ is to protect our

freedoms, but if we keep grinding them down, what will we have left? Another factor

that was not mentioned in either the oral argument or the decision conference is the fact

that Mr. Banks was being held in a federal facility when he was convicted in a state court

and there currently have been no charges of terrorism.

It is of this Court’s opinion, in a 7-1 decision, that we conclude that the gun

admitted as evidence against Mr. Banks was unconstitutional in its seizure and cannot be

used against him. Officers Lawless and Rambo did not have probable cause to use the

PEEPER against Mr. Banks. We have already stated in an earlier case that if an officer

observes unusual or suspicious behavior [392 U.S. 1, 67] he is permitted to conduct a

stop and search the individual. This option was available to the officers in this case,

which brings us back to the point that Mr. Banks was chosen at random and was not

exhibiting any suspicious behavior. If we allowed all law enforcement officers to use

these PEEPERs against all persons devoid of any suspicious actions, then what rights do

we have as they pertain to our persons? If we allow this to happen, the next thing we

know we will open our eyes and be living in George Orwell’s “1984.”

Bibliography

Epstein, L. (1994). The Supreme Court Compendium: Data, Decisions & Developments. Washington, D.C., Congressional Quarterly.

Findlaw.com (2005). U.S. Constitution Second Amendment.

Goldberg, J., Ed. (1997). The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions Volume 5. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions. New York, Chelsea House.

Grazia, E. d., Ed. (1997). The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions Volume 5. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions. New York, Chelsea House.

Greenhouse, L. (1990). An 'Intellectual Mind': David H. Souter. New York Times. New York: 1.

Holland, G. (2004). David Souter: The justice is still a mystery man after 14 years in capital. Associated Press: 888 words.

Paddock, L. (1996). Facts About the Supreme Court. New York & Dublin, New England Publishing Associates, Inc.

Associated Press. "Judge's papers offer unique view of Souter." The Union Leader Manchester NH). Manchester: 684 words.

Yarbrough, T. E. (2005). David Hackett Souter: Traditional Republican on the Rehnquist Court. New York, Oxford University Press.

Supreme Court Cases

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) Docket: 770

City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) Docket: 99-1030

City of Fort Sane v. Banks, 1 U.S. 1 (2005) Writ of certiarori

Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) Docket: 97-7597

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) Docket: 67