Justin Skirry - Descartes Metaphysics of Human Nature

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature

Continuum Studies in Philosophy: Series Editor: James Fieser, University of Tennessee at MartinAndrew Fiala, Tolerance and the Ethical Life Christopher M. Brown, Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus Justin Skirry, Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human Nature Matthew Simpson, Rousseau's Theory of Freedom David A. Roberts, Kierkegaard's Analysis of Radical Evil James J. Delaney, Rousseau and the Ethics of Virtue Alexander W. Hall, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus Robert Dyson, St Augustine of Hippo Tammy Nyden-Bullock, Spinoza's Radical Cartesian Mind Ryan Hickerson, The History of Intentionality Daniel Whiting, The Philosophy of John McDowell

Descartes and the Metaphysics of Human NatureJustin Skirry

continuumL O N D O N N E W Y O R K

Continuum The Tower Building, 11 York Road, London SE1 7NX 15 East 26th Street, New York NY 10010 www. continuumbooks. com Justin Skirry 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without orior oermission in writing from the tmblishers. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN: 0-8264-8637-1 (hardback) Typeset by Kenneth Burnley, Wirral, Cheshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd, Chippenham, Wiltshire

Contents

Acknowledgements Abbreviations

vii ix

Introduction 1 Substance and Mode 1.1 Scholastic Substance 1.2 Substantial Form and Per Se Unity 1.3 Accidents 1.4 Cartesian Substance and Subject 1.5 The Mode-Substance Relation 1.6 Cartesian Substance and Self-Subsistence 1.7 Descartes's Definition of Substance 1.8 Cartesian vs Scholastic Substance Cartesian Attributes and their Conceptual Distinction 2.1 The Standard Account: A Summary 2.2 The Doctrine of Distinctions 2.3 Descartes's Confusion and the Formal Distinction 2.4 Cartesian Attributes 2.5 Some Textual Objections 2.6 The Textual Inconsistency 2.7 The Metaphysical Inconsistency 2.8 Substance and a Plurality of Attributes Cartesian Bodies 3.1 The Monist Position 3.2 The Vacuum and the Problem of the Real Distinction 3.3 Particular Bodies Are Substances 3.4 The Rejection of Substantial Forms 3.5 Material Forms and the Human Body 3.6 Conclusion

1 11 11 14 17 19 23 27 30 34 39 39 41 46 53 56 59 63 66 70 71 76 80 80 87 92

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3

vi

Contents

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The 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6

Substantial Union Argument The Sailor in a Ship Analogy Unity and the Confused Modes of Sensation The Union Resulting in an Unum Quid Causal Interaction Evaluation Prove too Little/Prove too Much

97 98 102 106 109 112 117 121 121 126 131 136 140 145 147 152 156 159 163 167171 111

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Cartesian Hylomorphism 5.1 Descartes Among the Pluralists 5.2 The Substantial Form of Human Being 5.3 Complete and Incomplete Substances 5.4 The Whole in the Whole and the Whole in Any One of its Parts 5.5 What Am I? Descartes's Dissolution to the Mind-Body Problem 6.1 The Primitive Notion of Mind-Body Union 6.2 Composite Natures and their Parts 6.3 The True and Immutable Nature of Human Being 6.4 Thinking-Extended Composites 6.5 Dissolving the Mind-Body Problem 6.6 Formal Causal InteractionBibliography Index

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Acknowledgements

Chapter 2 was originally published as 'Descartes's conceptual distinctionand its ontological import' in the Journal of the History of Philosophy.

Chapter 4 was published as 'Does Descartes's real distinction argumentprove too much?' in American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. Many

thanks are due to the referees of these journals for their helpful comments. Thanks are also owed to their editors for permission to reprint them here. Paul Hoffman and Tad Schmaltz are also owed debts of gratitude for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of Chapter 4. An early version of Chapter 5 was first presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association and subsequently published in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association

under the title 'A hylomorphic interpretation of Descartes's theory of mind-body union'. I am grateful for permission to reprint a revised version of that essay here. Thanks are owed to J. A. Cover, Jeffrey Brower, William L. Rowe and Michael Jacovides for their rigorous scrutiny of an earlier version of the entire manuscript. Finally, although his influence on this study is much greater than the citations might suggest, this work is greatly indebted to Paul Hoffman's articles, 'The unity of Descartes's man' and 'Cartesian Composites'.

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Abbreviations

AT

Descartes, Rene (1974-89), Ouevres de Descartes, 11 vols, eds Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris: Vrin. References are made to volume and page number. Descartes, Rene (1984-91), The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, 3 vols, trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch and Anthony Kenny, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. References are made to volume and page number. Suarez, Francisco, Metaphysical Disputations, Biblioteca Hispanica de Filosophia. References are made by disputation, section and article. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles. References are made by volume and chapter. Eustachius of St Paul (1609), Summa Philosphica Quadripartite, Paris: Carolus Chastelain. Reference is made to part, treatise number and article. Aquinas, Thomas, Summa Theologiae. Standard references are made to part, question and article.

CSM/CSMK

MD

SCG SPQ

ST

For Sarah Jane in loving appreciation

Introduction

Vere Chappell makes a distinction between hard and soft varieties of dualism and unionism.1 Although it is impossible for both hard dualism and hard unionism to be true, since mind and body cannot be both actually two things and actually one, it is possible for both hard dualism and soft unionism or soft dualism and hard unionism to be true. Most scholars maintain that Descartes's theory of mind and body commits him to hard dualism and soft unionism. On this account, mind and body are two things that actually exist apart, i.e. hard dualism, but they are united into a human being in a soft sense, for otherwise mind and body would not be two but one.2 But, soft dualism is also consistent with hard unionism. On this account, mind and body are distinct in a weak sense, while they are united in a strong or hard sense to make one, whole human being.3 This would mean that mind and body are actually united to form one thing but are potentially two. This book defends a version of this latter thesis. This book argues that the nature of Descartes's human being is the result of the mind's per se unity with a properly disposed human body. This means that Descartes maintained a fundamentally hylomorphic theory of mind-body union roughly in line with his scholastic predecessors and contemporaries. This kind of unity results in something that is actually one but potentially two, i.e. soft dualism/hard unionism. But, the hard dualism/soft unionism thesis has the most currency among scholars and is the traditional understanding of Descartes's metaphysics of human nature accepted by just about any philosopher who has taught the Meditations in an introductory level course. The first three chapters of this book are intended to lay to rest certain misunderstandings about Descartes's basic metaphysical commitments that give rise to this widely accepted, but mistaken, view. For instance, several scholars maintain that Descartes's human being cannot be a substance since it depends on mind and body for its

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existence. Chapter 1 closely examines Descartes's definition of substance and its conceptual relations with its scholastic counterpart in response to this concern. This chapter shows that scholastic substances are composites of a substantial form united per se with matter so as to make one, complete substantial or self-subsisting nature in a given species. Then Descartes's definition of substance is established as primarily a selfsubsisting being and secondarily as a subject of accidents as with the scholastic doctrine. One important result is that the kind of ontological independence required for being a created Cartesian substance just is non-inherence in some other thing. But, the dependence of something on its essential parts does not exclude it from the category of substance. Another important result is that Descartes's doctrine differs from the scholastic's in that a complete substance need not be a composite of form - and matter. Hence, a scholastic substance is also a Cartesian substance but not the other way around. Another misunderstanding stems from Descartes's claim that the two ultimate kinds of substance have one principal attribute each. Many take this to mean that a Cartesian substance can have one and only one principal attribute. Chapter 2 helps make metaphysical room for a Cartesian substance with both principal attributes, viz a human being, by examining Descartes's doctrine of attributes through their conceptual distinction. It is established that, contrary to current scholarship, the distinction among attributes is not a product of the mind's activity but is discovered in re. In effect, Descartes's conceptual distinction just is Scotus' formal distinction understood as a rational distinction ratiocinatae, or a rational distinction of 'reasoned reason'. Hence, every substance is composed of the attributes of being, order, duration and number. Since every substance is composed of a plurality of attributes, there is metaphysical space for a substance composed of both principal attributes. Along the way the distinction between formal identity (i.e. an identification of definition or essence) and real identity (i.e. an identification within a definition or essence) is established and is eventually used to make sense of Descartes's distinction between a unity of essence and a unity of composition in Chapter 6. Two other difficulties arise due to Descartes's metaphysics of body in general and the human body in particular. One is that most scholars believe that particular Cartesian bodies are not substances themselves but modes of the one extended substance that is the entire physical universe. But, if this were true, then the body would be united to the mind as a mode is united with its underlying substance and not to make

Introduction

3

one, whole substance. The other difficulty is that Descartes's claim that the essence or nature of body is nothing but extension has led some to argue that the mind would have to be the form of the human body for Descartes, if his theory is hylomorphic, because he cannot have recourse to a substantial form of corporeity, as some of the scholastics did, given his rejection of substantial forms in physics. But, the mind or soul only has the faculties of intellect and will and, therefore, it cannot be the form of the body. Chapter 3 addresses both of these concerns. First, although the claim runs up against some difficulties with other aspects of Descartes's metaphysics, the evidence indicates that particular bodies are substances. Second, even though extension is the essence of the genus 'body', the configuration and motion of a given part of that extension constitutes that species of body. So, a certain configuration and motion of parts results in a cow body, whereas another results in a human body, which, strictly speaking, must have a disposition for union with the mind. Descartes's rejection of substantial forms is also examined in order to elucidate certain aspects of his metaphysics of body as well as provide the groundwork for the claim made in Chapter 5 that the Cartesian mind is the substantial form of human being. The remaining three chapters specifically address the theory of mind-body union. Chapter 4 reconstructs and evaluates Descartes's argument for the union of mind and body found in the Sixth Meditation. It shows that this is in fact an argument for their per se unity into a true human nature and against any theory maintaining they are united per accidens. Chapter 5 explicates how this per se unity works within Descartes's metaphysics. Here it is argued that (1) the mind is the substantial form of human being, (2) mind and a properly disposed human body are two incomplete substances in a particularly Cartesian sense, and (3) these two incomplete substances unite per se to form one, whole and complete human nature in a Scotistic or Ockhamistic fashion. Finally, Chapter 6 examines Descartes's other remarks on composite natures and how this strong unionism account avoids the traditional problem of mind-body causal interaction. However, before moving on to the main text, it is important to address one last, but quite important, impediment to the soft dualism/hard unionism view offered here. This is the issue of Descartes's sincerity. Many commentators take Descartes's use of scholastic language as a veil for his real views. Indeed, this assumption underlies Gilson's famous dictum of how Descartes practises the art of putting 'new wine in old bottles'.4 Henri Gouhier goes so far as to say that 'what Descartes retains

4


from scholastic philosophy is precisely what is not philosophical'.5 In more recent scholarship, David Yandell has argued that Descartes probably unpacks the notion of 'substantial union' in terms of efficient causal interaction and not in the traditional sense of a union of a substantial form with matter.6 Rozemond also goes through great pains to dismiss Descartes's use of scholastic language based on what she takes to be inconsistencies between their traditional meaning and other aspects of Descartes's metaphysics. This, of course, implies that Descartes is being disingenuous in his use of scholastic terminology. Of course, these examples do not exhaust the vast prejudice among scholars that Descartes is being dishonest under these circumstances. Yet, no one really argues for this thesis. One possible reason lies with Descartes's famous decision not to publish The World in light of Galileo's house arrest. Hence, it might seem that Descartes was fearful of being persecuted for his views. Although this may have been true in the early 1630s, he seems to have regained his courage in the late 1630s and 1640s. For all of the main theses put forth in The World, such as providing scientific explanations without recourse to substantial forms, real qualities, or prime matter, eventually see the light of day in his moremature works: the Discourse on Method, the Meditations and the Principles.

Indeed, in a 13 March 1641 letter to Mersenne, Descartes claims that those who condemned Galileo are 'people who confound Aristotle with the Bible and abuse the authority of the Church': They would have my views condemned likewise if they had the power; but if there is ever any question of that, I am confident I can show that none of the tenets of their philosophy accords with the Faith so well as my doctrines. (AT III 349-50: CSMK 177) So, even though some may want to condemn his views, they do not have the power to do so and, moreover, Descartes is confident that his philosophy is more in accordance with the Catholic faith than the Aristotelian philosophy practised in the schools. Therefore, whatever trepidation Descartes felt at the time he suppressed The World is replaced by a new confidence in his own philosophy and personal safety by 1641. Descartes's use of scholastic language to describe the union of mind and body should also be taken as sincere given his main philosophical concerns, viz to lay the foundation for his mechanistic physics:

Introduction

5

These six Meditations contain all the foundations of my physics. But please do not tell people, for that might make it harder for supporters of Aristotle to approve them. I hope that readers will gradually get used to my principles, and recognize their truth, before they notice that they destroy the principles of Aristotle. (AT III 297-8: CSMK 173) In this excerpt from a 28 January 1641 letter to Mersenne, Descartes states that the Meditations contain all the principles of his physics and implies that Aristotle, and not the Catholic Church, is his main opponent. This suggests that the underlying purpose of the Meditations is to lay a non-Aristotelian foundation for his mechanistic physics. As argued in Chapter 3, this entails a rejection of the use of substantial forms and real qualities in scientific explanations. This, in turn, makes way for efficient or mechanistic causal explanations without recourse to final or formal causal principles as Descartes understood the scholastic usage. So, his main agenda is to promote his mechanistic physics. Hence, it would make no sense for him to take issue with the scholastics on issues not bearing directly on this concern, viz the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the union of mind and body into one, whole complete human being. This may raise the spectre of whether or not Descartes genuinely believed in these fundamental Catholic doctrines. But, although he was no saint, it is reasonable to suppose, at least without evidence to the contrary, that he was a typical Catholic layperson; he believed in the basic doctrines of the church even though he may not have lived by them every day of his life. Indeed, as mentioned above, Descartes thought his philosophy was more in accordance with Catholicism than the philosophy of Aristotle. So, these most obvious reasons for maintaining Descartes's insincerity for these matters just do not hold water. It is rare, however, that anyone ever really argues that Descartes is being insincere. Strangely enough, most scholars maintaining Descartes's insincerity have assumed the burden of proof is on those wishing to take him sincerely to show that he is being sincere. But, the Principle of Charity dictates that a text should be taken as sincere unless good reasons are given for believing otherwise. Accordingly, the burden of proof is on those who wish to show Descartes insincere in his use of scholastic terminology.7 Although an argument claiming a blanket insincerity is unlikely, not to mention useless, arguments for insincerity could be levelled on a passage-by-passage basis.

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One such argument has been made against Descartes's most explicit discussion of the subject of mind-body union, i.e. his correspondence with Henri de Roy or Henricus Regius. Rozemond, for instance, suggests that the letters to Regius, particularly those of December 1641 and January 1642, cannot be used as textual support for the hylomorphic account, because '[Descartes] is explicitly engaged in advising Regius about how to respond to his opponents . . . One may simply infer that Descartes's advice in this letter cannot be regarded as expressing his own views.'8 Rozemond, however, does not take this route but prefers to criticize these passages on other grounds. Her other criticisms will be addressed in their appropriate places. Here it is argued that Descartes is not merely advising his friend on how to handle his opponents. Instead, he is defending his philosophy against those who were attacking it based on Regius's incautious expression of it. Let us begin by placing these letters within their historical context. Regius was appointed to the Chair of Medicine at the University of Utrecht in 1638. After his appointment Henri Regneir or Henricus Reneri, who was a friend of both Regius and Descartes, exposed Regius to the Discourse on Method. Regius also saw the Meditations in manuscript and even provided some punctuation and spelling corrections as well as a few objections (AT III 63-6: CSMK 146-8). As a result, Regius was compelled by Descartes's natural philosophy and he became a disciple. In 1641 Regius engaged in two sets of disputations. His intent was to espouse his ideas on a Cartesian physics, which he had been teaching privately at the time. But the new rector, the theologian Gysbertus Voetius, with whom Regius initially had a good relationship but would later turn sour, decided that the Chair of Medicine should not openly encroach upon the domain of philosophy. So it was decided that Regius submit a series of medical disputations and present an outline of natural philosophy or physics as an introduction to theoretical medicine. These theses were published under the title Physiology or the Science of Health. What is important for present purposes is that this outline is decidedly Cartesian. He provides fairly detailed accounts of bodily function in terms of the 'disposition of parts' and claims that the soul is a thinking substance.9 The first disputation did not arouse much opposition. But another series of disputations was started on 24 November 1641 wherein Regius presented his views in a more compact way thereby losing the medical flavour of the previous theses. This more compact style also made his theses appear more aggressively anti-Aristotelian than the previous

Introduction

7

disputation, even though he had made no substantive changes. The final day of this disputation was 8 December 1641 and ended with a tumultuous uproar, which Descartes attributed to Voetius but others attributed to Regius.10 This second disputation gave rise to a great controversy due largely to Regius's claim that a human being is an ens per accidens, which seemed contrary to the orthodox view that it is an ens per se. Descartes's letters to Regius dated December 1641 and January 1642 address the theses of this second disputation and advise Regius on how best to defend against Voetius. A closer look at the correspondence with Regius in May 1641 and January and February 1642 will shed light on the extent to which Descartes considered himself to be defending his own philosophy. The first two letters of 1641 were written in May of that year, and therefore occur prior to the second disputation. But, they do shed some light on the issue at hand. In the first letter Descartes responds to Regius's claim that the soul has a threefold nature: Our entire dispute concerning the threefold nature of the soul is more verbal than real. In the first place, a Roman Catholic is not allowed to say that the soul in man is threefold, and I am afraid that people will impute to me the views expressed in your thesis. So I would prefer you to avoid this way of talking. (AT III 369: CSMK 181) In this letter, Descartes realizes that people will see Regius as a representative of his views. This is confirmed in the second letter of May 1641: I certainly cannot complain that you and M. de Raey have been so kind as to place my name at the head of your theses; but on the other hand I do not know how I can thank you for it. I see only that it means further work for me. For people will believe henceforth that my opinions are the same as yours, and so I shall be unable to extricate myself from having to defend your propositions as best I can. So I shall have to examine with extreme care what you sent me to read, for fear of letting something pass which I would not wish to defend. (AT III 371: CSMK 181) Descartes continues on to point out those aspects of Regius's theses about the soul with which he disagrees and to provide clarifications of his own views regarding sensation and growth in human beings. Since

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Regius and de Raey put Descartes's name at the head of their theses (presumably for the first disputation), it is quite likely that people would see Regius as expressing Descartes's views. Indeed, Descartes is sure that this would happen and goes to some pains to make sure that Regius expresses his views correctly so that he is not forced to defend a position that is not his own. After the uproar of 8 December 1641 concluding the second disputation, Voetius and the theology faculty added three corollaries to a disputation already scheduled for 18 December. These corollaries were directed at Regius's controversial theses, although he was not mentioned by name. Descartes then proposed that Regius respond by publishing an open letter to Voetius. He proceeds to draft this letter 'in the form I would think it ought to take, were I in your position' in a letter dated January 1642 (AT III 494: CSMK 206). Descartes's and Regius's defence was successful according to Descartes's February 1642 letter to his disciple: As far as I hear from my friends, everyone who has read your reply to Voetius praises it highly and very many have read it. Everyone is laughing at Voetius and say he has lost hope for his cause, seeing that he has had to call on the assistance of the magistrates for its defense. As for substantial forms, everyone is denouncing them; and they are saying quite openly that if all the rest of our philosophy were explained in the manner of your reply, everyone would embrace it. (AT III 528-9: CSMK 210) Regius's reply was published on 16 February 1642 and is presumably the open letter originally drafted by Descartes in the January 1642 letter. Notice that Regius's reply had the desired effect in that people were embracing 'our philosophy'. Although Regius (directly) and Descartes (indirectly) were impugned for supposedly believing certain things about human beings, what must be borne firmly in mind is that Voetius is attacking Regius's incautiously stated Cartesian thesis that a human being is an ens per accidens. These considerations indicate that Descartes is not merely helping Regius get out of hot water but is defending his own views from attack. In fact, as will be seen below, Descartes makes the same response to what amounts to the same objection by Arnauld in the Fourth Objections. Therefore, the correspondence with Regius, including the January 1642 letter containing Descartes's draft of the open letter to Voetius, should be taken

Introduction

9

as expressing Descartes's considered view on mind-body union, since he is helping Regius respond to objections made against his (Descartes's) metaphysics.11 With this said, it is now time to discuss Descartes's definition of created substance.

NOTES1 Vere Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien', in Jean-Marie Beyssade and Jean-Luc Marian (eds) Descartes: objecter et responder (Paris: Vrin, 1994), pp. 403-26. The terms Chappell uses are actually hard and soft dualism and hard and soft unitarianism.This latter term has been replaced with 'unionism' in order to avoid confusion between hard unitarianism (i.e. unionism) and scholastic unitarianism as opposed to scholastic pluralism, which figures prominently in chapters 1 and 5. 2 See Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien'; Marleen Rozemond, Descartes's Dualism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998); Stephen Voss, 'Descartes: the end of anthropology', in John Cottingham (ed.) Reason, Will and Sensation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994); and David Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism? The nature of the union of mind and body', British Journal for the History of Philosophy 7 (1999): 199-217 for explicit arguments for the hard dualism/soft unionism position. 3 See Janet Broughton and Ruth Mattern, 'Reinterpreting Descartes on the notion of the union of mind and body', Journal of the History of Philosophy 16 (1978): 23-32; Marjorie Grene, Descartes Among the Scholastics (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991); Paul Hoffman, 'The unity of Descartes's man', The Philiosophical Review 95 (1986): 339-69 and 'Cartesian composites', Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 (1999): 251-70; R. C. Richardson, 'The "scandal" of cartesian interactionism', Mind 91 (1982): 20-37; Tad Schmaltz, 'Descartes and Malebranche on mind and mind-body union', Philosophical Review (April 1992): 281-325 for those arguing for some variety of this thesis. 4 Etienne Gilson, Etudes sur le Role de al Pensee Medievale dans la Formation du Systeme Cartesien (Paris: Vrin, 1951), p. 247. 5 Henri Gouhier, Le Pensee Metaphysique de Descartes (Paris: Vrin, 1962), p. 351. 6 Yandell, 'Did Descartes abandon dualism?', pp. 210-11. 7 This is not to deny that Descartes chose his words carefully and employed certain rhetorical techniques to get people to see things his way without levelling an out-and-out attack on Aristotelian principles of scientific explanation. As such, his texts should be read carefully but not read into to such an extent that the terms used, e.g. 'substantial union', lose their meanings entirely. 8 Chappell maintains a similar position. See Chappell, 'L'homme cartesien', p. 411.

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9 Theo Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch: Early Reactions to Cartesian Philosophy

1637-1650 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1992), pp. 13-14. 10 Verbeek, Descartes and the Dutch, pp. 16-17 11 It is noteworthy that Desmond Clarke assumes Descartes's sincerity in these letters and uses them in support of his account of the rejection of substantial forms as principles of scientific explanation. See Desmond Clarke, Descartes's Theory of Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), especially chapter 1. Hoffman also defends these letters as textual support for the hylomorphic account of mind-body union. He points out that Descartes offers the exact same solution to Arnauld in the Fourth Replies. As such Descartes is not making things up to defend Regius but is expressing a view published as his own. Paul Hoffman, 'Cartesian composites', p. 261.

CHAPTER I

Substance and Mode

Any examination of Descartes's theory of mind-body union should begin with a clear understanding of some of his basic metaphysical commitments. One such commitment is his substance-mode ontology. Yet, despite the importance of understanding this ontology, it has received very little attention in the literature. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a detailed examination of Descartes's conceptions of substance, mode and the senses in which each is ontologically independent or dependent. Once these issues are firmly grasped, they can be used to clarify other aspects of his metaphysics of body and his doctrine of human nature. The chapter begins with a discussion of the pertinent aspects of the scholastic conceptions of substance and accident, and then moves on to establish Descartes's definition of substance as an ultimate determinable and his account of a mode as a determinate way or manner of being.

1.1 SCHOLASTIC SUBSTANCE The late scholastic philosophy Descartes confronted at the beginning of the seventeenth century has its origins in Thomas Aquinas' interpretation and appropriation of Aristotle's thought. Fundamental to Aristotle's metaphysics (at least as Aquinas understood him) is the doctrine of matter and form which, in turn, were unpacked by means of the distinction between potency and act. Matter is the stuff out of which something is made, while the form of that matter or stuff is what makes that thing the kind of thing that it is. Take for example a marble statue of Plato. The marble is the matter out of which the statue is made. Now before it is a statue of anything and merely a hunk of marble, it has the potential for being any number of things, e.g. a statue of a horse, an altar, a table, etc. The artisan takes this hunk of marble with its vast potential and then

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bestows on it the form of Plato. In so doing, the artisan actualizes the potential in the marble for having the form of Plato and for thereby being a statue of Plato. So, matter is the potency for being something and the form is what actualizes this potential. It is also important to note that basically there are two kinds of form. One is the form that actualizes the potential in matter for being a selfsubsisting species of thing, e.g. a tree, a dog, or a human being. By Descartes's time this sort of form was known as a 'substantial form'. The union of a substantial form with matter results in a substance with a complete nature within a given species. The other kind of form is the accidental form. This form actualizes a potential in a substance for having some feature. For example, Socrates is a substance composed of matter and the substantial form of human being, i.e. the intellectual soul. This substance has the potential for taking on certain accidents, e.g. sitting or standing. The forms of sitting and standing are accidental to the substance, Socrates, because they are not part of his nature or essence (i.e. what it is to be human). That is, Socrates is still a human being whether he has the form of sitting or the form of standing. Although some deep divisions arose among later scholastic thinkers about how this metaphysics of substance worked, the basic notions of substance and accident, form and matter, and act and potency were the foundations of scholastic metaphysics from Aquinas onward. However, despite these differences, all scholastic philosophers maintained the following three suppositions about substances and accidents. First, substances are subsistent per se; that is, unlike accidents, substances do not reside or inhere in some other thing as in a subject. Second, substances are also per se unities of a substantial form with matter, which together compose one, whole substantial nature within a given species and not a mere aggregate of such substantial natures like a pile of stones or a house. Third, accidental properties that can change without a change in the substance itself require inherence in some substantial nature, and therefore such accidents presuppose a substantial nature with the capacity for having that kind of accident. Each of these suppositions will be addressed in turn. Aquinas and those medieval philosophers coming after him all maintained that a substance is primarily something existing per se, i.e. through or by itself, such that it does not require any other being besides itself in order to exist. This does not mean that created substances are not causally dependent on God or even other creatures for their existence, but only that their natures do not contain any reference to some other

Substance and Mode

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thing as is the case with accidents. This characterization is found in the following passage from Aquinas' Summa Theologicae: Now being belongs properly to subsisting things, whether they be simple, as in the case of separate substances, or composite, as in the case of material substances. For being belongs to that which has being - that is, to what subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are called beings, not as if they themselves were, but because something is by them; as whiteness is called a being because its subject is white by it. Hence, according to the Philosopher, an accident is more properly said to be of a being than a being.1 In this passage, Aquinas is contrasting the ontological independence of substances with the sort of ontological dependence had by accidents: an accident does not subsist by its own being but exists by virtue of being ofa being.

Although Aquinas indicates that accidents are not subsistent beings, he does not specify the sort of ontological dependence required by them. Eustachius of St Paul, a scholastic contemporary of Descartes's, provides the following definition of substance, which he contrasts with the notion of an accident: Substance in general can be defined: A being subsisting or existing through itself . . . But nothing [is] in another and subsists or exists through itself which does not exist in another as though inhering in a subject; according to which a substance differs from an accident which is not able to exist through itself (per se) but in another . . .2 On this account, accidents are not self-subsistent, because their natures require some other being in order to exist such that they exist in alio or in another in that they ultimately inhere in a substance as in a subject. Therefore, non-inherence in some other thing is the kind of ontological independence required for something to be a scholastic substance. However, it is also important to note that, although self-subsistence is a necessary condition for being a substance, this by itself is not sufficient. The further requirement of being the result of a per se unity of a substantial form with matter is the subject of the next section.

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1.2 SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND PER SE UNITY Again, despite some differences in the details, all scholastic philosophers agreed to the following two theses. First, a complete substantial nature is a combination of a substantial form with matter. These were considered complementary parts such that matter is the potentiality for being a specific kind of thing, while the substantial form is the principle by which that potentiality is actualized. Second, matter must be actualized by at least one substantial form in order to be a composite substance and, as a result, to have the potential for receiving certain kinds of accidents. These two somewhat vague theses are fleshed out in this and the following section. Traditionally, a substantial form was defined as a form that gives being to a thing. However, Francisco Suarez, another one of Descartes's near contemporaries,3 considered this formulation too vague and proposed his own: 'a certain simple and incomplete substance which, as the act of matter, constitutes with it the essence of a composite substance'.4 This essence is ultimately established by that form's final cause, i.e. purpose or goal of being a species of thing. Aristotle provides the following example: If then it is both by nature and for an end that the swallow makes its nest and the spider its web, and plants grow leaves for the sake of the fruit, and send their roots down (not up) for the sake of nourishment, it is plain that this kind of cause is operative in things which come to be and are by nature. And since 'nature' means two things, the matter and the form, of which the latter is the end, since all the rest is for the sake of the end, the form must be the cause in the sense of 'that for the sake of which'.5 According to this passage, the form establishes the end of a species of substance. In the case of organisms, the end is the maintenance of life or some other goal characteristic of that species of organism. For instance, the goal of a swallow is to maintain its swallow-life and a characteristic goal of the swallow-life is making a nest. So, the goal of a swallow-life is the cause for the sake of which the rest of the organism is organized. Hence, this goal determines the configuration of matter so that it has certain parts of a certain size and shape, which bear certain causal relations with one another that are conducive to achieving its goal of being a species of thing, viz a swallow. As a result, the swallow insofar as

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it is a species of thing has its own set of capabilities. For example, swallows are capable of making nests, flight, etc. So, it is important to bear in mind that the purpose bestowed on a thing by its substantial form is the ultimate cause of everything that species of thing essentially is. Another point of agreement among scholastic thinkers was that complete substantial natures must have per se unity. Since this issue is also of vital importance for understanding Descartes's theory of mind-body union, an examination of Suarez's account of this sort of unity will prove helpful. According to Suarez, a substantial nature has per se unity when it is complete in a given species. These specifically complete substantial natures can be either simple or composite. For instance, angels have simple natures since they are not composed of form and matter but of form alone, and as such they do not require anything else to complete their natures. Substantial natures that are composite are complete when the requisite combination of form and matter obtains such that nothing else is required for that thing to be that species of thing.6 Suarez explains further that the word 'unity' just means 'lack of division'. This forms the basis of a criterion for determining whether or not something is a complete nature and, therefore, has per se unity: And this is both confirmed and emphasized; for, if the nature has of itself the negation of division, then division will be incompatible with it, because that which belongs to a nature from itself is inseparable from it, and its contradictory is thereby rendered always incompatible . . .7 The inseparability of a feature from the nature of the thing marks the 'lack of division' characteristic of a complete nature, because if this feature were separated, a contradiction would result. So, it is important to bear in mind that the per se unity of a scholastic substance is required for something to be a complete kind or species of thing. The considerations of this and the previous section indicate two necessary conditions for being a scholastic substance. The first requirement is self-subsistence. This means that all substances are capable of existing without inhering in some other thing as is the case with accidents. But, something could self-subsist but not, strictly speaking, be a substance, viz the human soul, and so another requirement is needed. This second requirement is per se unity. In the case of terrestrial things, this means a union of a substantial form with matter so as to form a complete species of thing. So, on Aquinas' account, the human soul selfsubsists but is not a complete nature, because it does not constitute the

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entire human nature but only the active part of it. A complete human nature or substance is composed of the per se unity of the intellectual soul with matter. Although all scholastic thinkers accepted these two requirements, the conditions necessary for having this per se unity of form with matter was a bone of contention between them. Aquinas argued that the per se unity of a substance can be preserved only if one substantial form is united directly with prime matter, which is pure potentiality, so that all of a substance's actuality is received from this one substantial form. Aquinas, as well as others maintaining a similar position, e.g. Suarez, argued that a being composed of matter and more than one substantial form cannot possess per se unity but can be united only per accidens. This is because such an aggregate of particular substantial natures would not be unified for the sake of one and the same specific end, but rather for the sake of a plurality of ends. For example, each particular stone of a pile of stones has the same specific end in the sense that each particular stone is the same species of thing such that the matter of each is organized for the sake of being a stone. But, each stone does not share the same end in the sense that each is a particular instantiation of this specific kind of thing. Hence, a pile of stones is a plurality of particular instantiations of specific ends but are not subordinated to some higher end for the sake of which the whole pile is organized and thereby united to form one thing. Since there is no one, ultimate end for the pile of stones, it does not have per se unity or being, and therefore it is not a scholastic substance. Accordingly, on Aquinas' account, a being composed of more than one substantial form would be a mere aggregate of a plurality of unified ends without an ultimate end unifying the whole into one single thing. Many of Aquinas' successors took issue with this Unitarian line of argument. Perhaps the most famous of these detractors is Duns Scotus.8 He argued that all living terrestrial substances are composed of two substantial forms and matter. While Aquinas argued that a function of this one substantial form is to quantify and organize matter into the species of body required for being a specific substantial nature, Scotus argued that a different substantial form, viz the form of corporeity, performs this function. He does this by making a distinction between complete and incomplete substances. On this account, the form of corporeity makes a body the kind of body that it is, conferring on it the potentiality (or disposition) to receive a specific substantial form.9 For example, a form of corporeity actualizes the potential in matter for being a cow body which, in turn, now has the potential for being a living, sensing cow. The

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substantial form of bovinity then actualizes this potential for bovine-life in this properly disposed cow body. Accordingly, the entire being, including the cow body, is organized for the sake of the ultimate end of bovine life. Hence, on this pluralist account, a substantial nature can have a plurality of substantial forms and still have per se unity so long as the entire being is united for the sake of one, ultimate end. This brief exposition of some of the fundamental features of scholastic substance is important for understanding Descartes's substancemode metaphysics in general and his theory of mind-body union in particular for two reasons. First, the similarities and differences between the scholastic conception of substance and Descartes's definition of it will be made more evident. Indeed, Descartes's rejection of final causes in physics, discussed more fully in 3.4, amounts to rejecting the per se unifying principle so important for the scholastic metaphysics. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that Descartes's definition of substance focuses quite heavily on the self-subsistence condition. Second, it will help provide a richer and more detailed understanding of Descartes's conception of a complete substantial nature with respect to both the principal attributes of thinking and extension as well as the nature of a human being discussed in subsequent chapters. But, before moving on to examine Descartes's definition of substance, a brief account of accidental forms within the scholastic tradition is in order.

1.3 ACCIDENTS Accidental forms, unlike substantial forms, do not complete a substantial nature but require a substantial nature in order to exist. In this way, the primary difference between scholastic substantial natures and accidents lies in the inherence of the latter in a subject and the noninherence of the former. This implies that generally accidents are ontologically dependent on some underlying substance or substratum and, therefore, accidents are not self-subsistent beings. Furthermore, this means that accidents are logically and metaphysically posterior to complete substantial natures, and so it is not internal to a substantial nature but exterior to it. So, something exterior to some substantial nature can come and go (with the exception of propria to be discussed below) without corrupting that nature. For example, Socrates may accidentally have hair at one time in his life and no hair at some later time. Yet, Socrates is still Socrates whether or not he has hair. Hence, this

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particular substantial thing, Socrates, preserves its identity over time throughout such a change, because having or not having hair is external, or accidental, and not internal or essential to that substantial nature. This brief discussion of accidental forms brings to the fore a substance's role as the ultimate subject in which accidents inhere. In the following passage, Suarez indicates that this role for substances is a result of their self-subsistent nature: 'to be under' (substare) is the same as to be under others as their support and foundation . . . According to this interpretation, there are two notions or properties indicated by the verb 'standing under' (substans) and the name 'substance' (substantia). One is absolute, namely, to exist in itself and by itself (per se), something which, owing to its simplicity, we explain as the negation of existing in a subject; the other is relative, it has to do with supporting the accidents.10 According to this passage, absolutely speaking a substance is a selfsubsisting thing, because it does not require inherence in anything else to exist and is the subject of accidents only in a relative sense when spoken of with reference to accidents. Accordingly, substances are primarily selfsubsisting beings with complete substantial natures and only secondarily are they the subjects of accidents. But, accidents must inhere in some other thing (in alid) in order to exist and, therefore, their existence is not through themselves (per se) but through another (per alid). Now an accident's ontological dependence in alio can have at least two different causes: one cause is that of an extrinsic agent while the other is the activity of the substantial nature in which it inheres: [A]ctuality is found in the subject of the accidental form prior to its being found in the accidental form; and therefore the actuality of the accidental form is caused by the actuality of the subject. So, the subject, inasmuch as it is in potentiality, is receptive of the accidental form; but inasmuch as it is in act, it produces it. This I say of the proper and per se accident; for with regard to the extraneous accident, the subject is receptive only; and such an accident is caused by an extrinsic agent.11 The first sentence reiterates the claim made in 1.1 that accidents require a substantial form united per se with matter in order to exist. That is, the absolute actuality bestowed upon a thing in completing its specific and

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complete substantial nature by a substantial form is logically and sometimes temporally prior to its further, albeit limited, actualization by an accidental form. In this way, the actuality or existence of the accident is explained by this substantial actuality, for an actual subject in which to inhere is required for the existence of the accident. The second sentence indicates that the subject is the cause of all its accidents in at least two ways. First, the subject has that accident potentially and so it is the material cause of all its accidents. Second, some accidents are caused by their subject insofar as that subject is active. This activity is internal to that substantial nature and results in the production of the proper and per se accidents or propria, and so they are not caused by some extrinsic agent. There are several features of these propria or properties that are germane to this study. First, these propria were understood to be capacities or dispositions for having certain kinds of accidents that were entailed by that kind of substantial nature but were not considered to be internal parts of that nature. For example, risibility is an accident entailed by the substantial nature of human being without being internal to that nature. That is, the ability to laugh is not part of the real definition or essence of a human being but results from it in that every human being has the capacity to laugh. Accidentia propria or proper accidents are actualizations, instantiations or determinations of a substantial nature's propria. For instance, actually laughing is an actualization of the capacity or potential for laughter (i.e. the proprium of risibility). This brief discussion of the scholastic doctrine of accidents and propria will become especially important in Chapters 4 and 6 where ascribing accidents (i.e. modes) to their appropriate substantial natures will be imperative for understanding Descartes's theory of mind-body union. But first it is important to come to a clear understanding of Descartes's own substance-mode ontology.

1.4 CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE AND SUBJECT Commentators generally maintain that Descartes offered at least two different definitions of substance. One is found in the Second Replies where 'substance' is defined as the subject in which resides all that we perceive (i.e. properties, qualities or attributes). The other is found at Principles 1.51. Here Descartes claims that a substance is something depending on nothing else for its existence. Strictly speaking, only God

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is a substance in this sense, but creatures requiring only God's concurrence to exist are substances in a qualified sense. Peter Markie stands apart from other scholars by offering a third definition found in the Synopsis to the Meditations where Descartes talks about 'pure substances'.12 The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an examination of the definitions of substance apparently offered in the Second Replies and the Principles in order to bring important elements of Descartes's substance-mode ontology into clearer focus and set the stage for further considerations of his theory of mindbody union. A discussion of Markie's proposed third definition will be saved for Chapter 3, since the Synopsis passage on which this claim is based is also central to the issue about whether or not particular bodies are substances. In the geometrical exposition of the Second Replies, Descartes lists several definitions, the fifth of which is: Substance: This term applies to every thing in which whatever we perceive immediately resides, as in a subject, or to everything by means of which whatever we perceive exists. By 'whatever we perceive' is meant any property, quality or attribute of which we have a real idea. The only idea we have of substance itself, in the strict sense, is that it is the thing in which we perceive (or whatever has objective being in one of our ideas) exists, either formally or eminently. For we know by the natural light that a real attribute cannot belong to nothing. (AT VII 161: CSM II 114) There are two features of this passage germane to the present discussion. First, Descartes defines substance as the subject in which whatever we perceive, viz properties, qualities or attributes, resides. This raises a question about the nature of this subject: Is it a bare particular or a concrete individual thing? On the bare particular reading, a substance would be a featureless substratum in itself but would have the capacity for taking on a variety of different features. That is, it would actually be no thing at all but would potentially be any thing whatsoever. On this account, a concrete individual would be constituted by a bare particular and the properties, qualities or attributes residing in it. On the concrete individual reading, these properties would reside in discrete things, such as particular minds or particular bodies. On this account, such properties reside in something constituted by some set of features, e.g. a principal attribute. Louis Loeb understands Descartes as endorsing some version of the bare particular or bare substratum view and proceeds to criticize it

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through some of the objections raised against this theory by John Locke.13 However, other scholars, such as Peter Markie, Marleen Rozemond and Matthew Stuart, have offered compelling grounds for rejecting any bare particular account of Descartes's theory of substance.14 A detailed rehearsal of these arguments would lead us too far afield, but suffice it to say that Descartes is quite clear that all properties, qualities or attributes presuppose some nature or essence. In the case of mind and body these are the principal attributes of thinking and extension {Principles 1.53, ATVIIIA 25: CSM I 210. See also AT VIIIA 30-1: CSM I 215). Descartes also claims in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet that extension is the subject of modes or modifications such as shape and that the modes of thinking are present in thinking things (ATVIIIB 348-9: CSM I 297-8).This indicates that individual extended and thinking things are metaphysical preconditions for the existence of their properties, qualities, or other attributes, for otherwise there would be no subject in which they could reside as mentioned in the discussion of the scholastic conception of accidents at 1.3. The second feature of the Second Replies account germane to this discussion is the remark that there is no idea of substance itself but only ideas of those things of which we have a real idea. Here Descartes is explicit in limiting this perception to whatever is found in the objective reality of a 'real idea'. Descartes is not explicit about his meaning of this term but, presumably, he means to distinguish those properties, qualities or attributes that are really found in perceived things from those that are found in the mind alone, e.g. colour, taste. This veridical perception of a property, quality or attribute, in addition to the principle that a 'real attribute cannot belong to nothing' and, therefore, must belong to something, permits the inference from a perceivable attribute really in the thing itself to a subject of residence. So, it is important to bear in mind that Descartes's language of ideas is not intended to suggest that these properties, qualities or attributes are mere products of the mind, but rather they are found in things themselves. Hence, properties, qualities and attributes have real ontological dependence on real, concrete individual things. Bearing this conclusion in mind, an examination of this notion of substance can now be pursued. It is important first to notice that the definitive nature of this 'definition' should be taken with a grain of salt. This account of substance is listed as a definition in a short geometrical exposition of the Meditations^ which was composed in response to a suggestion made at the end of the Second Objections. The suggestion was

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made in order to give Descartes the opportunity 'to fill the mind of each reader so that he could see everything, as it were, at a single glance' (AT VII 128: CSM II 92). Descartes first responds by explaining the extent to which the Meditations already followed this method by first distinguishing between the order and method of demonstration. The Meditations follows a geometrical order in that '[t]he items which are put forward first must be known entirely without the aid of what comes later; and the remaining items must be arranged in such a way that their demonstration depends solely on what has gone before' (AT VII 155: CSM II 110). The main difference between the Meditations and the geometrical exposition is that the former uses the method of analysis by leading the reader along the path of discovery, while the latter uses the synthetic method, which starts with a set of definitions, axioms and postulates from which the desired conclusions are derived. Descartes goes on to explain that, on the one hand, analytic demonstration requires close attention from the reader, and so people overly disposed to finding counter-arguments may miss the minute details and, therefore, not fully understand the necessity of the conclusions. On the other hand, synthetic demonstration is much easier to follow since any doubt can be put to rest by a quick look at the stipulated definitions, axioms and postulates (AT VII 156: CSM II 110-11). But, even though synthetic demonstrations work quite well in geometry where everyone agrees to the common notions, it does not work so well when demonstrating metaphysical truths due to the amount of effort it takes to formulate them clearly and distinctly. As such, if put forward in isolation, these common notions, although even more evident than those of geometry by those who attend to them, would be easily denied by those who like to contradict for the sake of it (AT VII 157: CSM II 111). Descartes then decides to 'append here a short exposition in the synthetic style, which will, I hope, assist my readers a little' but with the following caveat: But they [i.e. Descartes's readers] must please realize that I do not intend to include as much material as I put in the Meditations, for if I did so I should have to go on much longer than I did there. And even the items that I do include will not be given a fully precise explanation. This is partly to achieve brevity and partly to prevent anyone supposing that what follows is adequate on its own. (AT VII 159: CSM II 113)

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So the geometrical exposition of the Second Replies, including its definitions, axioms and postulates, should not be expected to be complete or wholly precise given the nature of employing synthetic demonstration in metaphysics and Descartes's explicit disavowal that it is a precise or adequate explication of the Meditations. Hence, it should come as no surprise if the Second Replies 'definition' of substance turns out not to be definitive. Indeed, upon closer examination, being the subject in which properties, qualities or attributes reside is not sufficient for being a substance for Descartes and so this account cannot be definitive. A counterexample is found in an April 1641 letter to Thomas Hobbes. There Descartes claims that the direction or 'determination' of motion resides in the accident (i.e. property, quality or attribute) of motion itself, '[fjor there is no awkwardness or absurdity in saying that an accident is the subject of another accident just as we say quantity is the subject of other accidents' (AT III 355-6: CSMK 178). Hence, being the subject in which properties, qualities or attributes reside is not sufficient for being a substance, because this subject could itself be a property, quality or attribute requiring residence in some other subject.15 As a result, this definition would not adequately distinguish substances from the properties, qualities or attributes residing in them, and therefore it is not definitive. This, however, is not to say that being the subject of accidents is wholly superfluous to being a Cartesian substance. In fact, a closer look at the ontological dependence of these properties, qualities or attributes on an underlying substance will help shed more light on this issue.

1.5 THE MODE-SUBSTANCE RELATION Although the Second Replies 'definition' of substance is not really definitive, it expresses a central component of Descartes's fundamental ontology, namely, that these properties, qualities or attributes bear a relation of 'residence' in some underlying subject. But how should the relation of 'residence' be unpacked? Answering this question will help bring into clearer focus the sort of ontological dependence and independence necessary for adequately distinguishing substances from modes in his truly definitive account of substance at Principles 1.51. But before discussing the relation itself, it is important to get clear on what Descartes means by the words 'property', 'quality' and 'attribute' in this context.

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Help can be found in Descartes's description of the ambiguity of theword 'attribute' in Comments on a Certain Broadsheet:

We must take care here not to understand the word 'attribute' to mean simply 'mode', for we term an 'attribute' whatever we recognize as being naturally ascribable to something, whether it be a mode which is susceptible of change, or the absolutely immutable essence of the thing in question. Thus God has many attributes, but no modes . . . The extension of a body, moreover, may take on various different modes: a body's being spherical constitutes one mode, being square a different mode. But considered in itself, the extension itself - the subject of these modes - is not a mode of the corporeal substance, but an attribute which constitutes its natural essence. (ATVIIIB 348-9: CSM I 297) According to this passage, 'attribute' is ambiguous between an unchangeable, essential property in which modes reside and a changeable mode or modification residing in this essential property or attribute. This latter sense of'attribute' will be discussed in more detail in 2.4. But now it is important to ask: What sense of'attribute' is Descartes using in the Second Replies account of substance? The answer can be found with further help from Principles 1.56 where Descartes exhibits the strict senses of'mode', 'quality' and 'attribute': By mode, as used above, we understand exactly the same as what is elsewhere meant by an attribute or quality. But we employ the term mode when we are thinking of a substance as being affected or modified. (ATVIIIA 26: CSM I 211-12) In the first sentence, Descartes is explicit that 'attribute' and 'quality' can also be used in the sense of 'mode', which is described in the second sentence as an affection or modification of a substance. These passages, as well as the use of these terms in the Second Replies, indicate that 'attribute' and 'quality' are synonymous with 'mode' in the context of the geometrical exposition. Moreover, since 'property' is also in this list of what resides in a subject, it is reasonable to suppose that it, too, is being used in this way. So, the residence relation of a property, quality or attribute in a substance should be understood along the lines of the relation of an affection or modification of an essential attribute.

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Further guidance can be found in the meaning of the term itself. Daniel Garber has made the observation that the Latin term modus, which just means 'way' or 'manner', suggests that a mode is nothing but a way or manner of being.16 This suggestion is corroborated in a 1645 letter to Mesland where Descartes states that a body's surface is nothing but a 'mode or manner of being' (AT IV 163-4: CSMK 241). Moreover, at Principles 1.64, Descartes claims that the principal attributes of extension and thinking can, in some sense, be recognized as modes of a substance 'insofar as one and the same mind is capable of having many different thoughts, and one and the same body, with its quantity unchanged, may be extended in many different ways (modis)' (AT VIIIA 31: CSM I 215). These considerations indicate that modes are ways or manners of being something. Garber also suggests that these different ways or modes of being are either propria or accidentia propria. For example, the capacity for having size would be a proprium of extension, because it is a deductive consequence of this kind of thing; and actually have the size 100 x 80 x 60 cm would be an accidentium proprium, because it is a particular determination or actualization of this capacity. Moreover, the capacity for understanding, for example, is not a consequence of being extended but only of being a thinking thing, and so understanding is only a way or mode of being a mental kind of thing. Similarly, thinking things do not have the capacity for modes of size. Hence, these two ultimate kinds of things or substances entail a set of capacities for having certain kinds of modes, and as such these entailed capacities are the propria for that kind of substance. This account of modes as ways or manners of being brings to the foreground the sort of ontological dependence they have on the substances in which they reside. At Principles 1.61, Descartes says that a distinction between a mode and its substance 'can be recognized from the fact that we can clearly perceive a substance apart from the mode which we say differs from it, whereas we cannot, conversely, understand the mode apart from the substance' (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 214). This means that modes ontologically depend on an underlying substance such that it is inconceivable for them to exist independently of a substance even by the power of God. This notion of a 'mode' should then be contrasted with the late scholastic doctrine of 'real accidents'. These are accidents that can exist without an underlying substance at least by the power of God. It was invoked by scholastic thinkers in order to explain the miracle of the Eucharist. The point is that certain accidents of the bread, e.g. its colour, remain even though the bread's substance has been replaced by

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the body of Christ. Although Descartes provides his own account of the Eucharist after being pressed by Father Mesland, this is not important for present purposes but only that modes, unlike real accidents, cannot exist separately from an underlying substance. Cartesian accidents, then, are just modes or ways of being something. For example, some shape cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without extension, because the notion of a non-extended shape is unintelligible. But extension can be clearly and distinctly understood without any particular shape. For example, this hunk of clay exists regardless of whether it is shaped in a spherical, cubical, cylindrical or any other way. As such, shape is just a way or manner of being extended. Similar considerations apply to thinking and the modes of thought. For instance, the idea that 2 + 2 = 4 cannot be clearly and distinctly understood without thinking, because an idea that is not a thought is unintelligible. But thinking can be clearly and distinctly understood without any particular idea. That is, it need not have the idea that 2 + 2 = 4 in order to exist but may have any number of different, particular ideas. This means that particular modes are just determinate ways of being extended or thinking while extension and thinking themselves are determinable (i.e. have the capacity for being determined) in these multifarious ways. For example, a particular shape, such as spherical, requires something that can be shaped in that way and, in turn, being shaped just is a determinate way of being extended. On this account, spherical is a determinate of the determinable shape, and shape is a determinate of the determinable extension. But extension is not a determinate of another determinable, since it depends on God alone for its existence (AT VIIIA 25: CSM I 210) and God does not admit of any modification (AT VIIIA 26: CSM I 211 and ATVIIIB 348: CSM I 297). Thus extension is what Jorge Secada calls an 'ultimate determinable', i.e. a determinable that does not determine a higher order determinable.17 Of course, a similar story can be told about the modes of thinking. For example, a determinate idea, such as the understanding that 2 + 2 = 4, is a determinate way of understanding and, in turn, understanding is a determinate way of thinking. But thinking requires only God's concurrence to exist and so it does not determine a higher order determinable. Therefore, thinking is also an ultimate determinable. Bearing these considerations in mind, it is now time to turn to the Principles account of substance.

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1.6 CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE AND SELF-SUBSISTENCE Descartes describes substance in the following way at Principles 1.51: By substance we can understand nothing other than a thing which exists in such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence. And there is only one substance which can be understood to depend on no other thing whatsoever, namely God. In the case of all other substances, we perceive that they can exist only with the help of God's concurrence. (ATVIIIA 24: CSM I 210) Notice that, strictly speaking, only God is a substance, because only he subsists without requiring anything else at all. This, however, is not true for creatures, for everything requires God's creative and conservative activity in order to exist. But, 'substance' can be applied in a qualified sense to those creatures requiring only God's concurrence to exist. This implies that created substances, although ontologically dependent on God, are not ontologically dependent on any other creature. However, this ontological independence from other creatures should not be understood as being absolute. Indeed, the wording of the passage itself leaves room for created substances to be ontologically dependent in at least two1 Q

ways. The first is that this ontological independence is limited to depending on no other thing (nulla alia re) for its existence. As such, an internal dependence on a thing's own nature does not exclude it from the category of substance. For example, God's dependence on his attributes does not mean he is not a substance, but rather his ontological independence stems from his not depending on anything external to his nature in order to exist. This applies to created substances in that they depend on God for their existence but not on any other created thing. For instance Joe's ontological dependence on thinking would not mean that Joe (or Joe's mind) is not a substance since this is a dependence that is internal and not external to his nature. Second, it is evident from everyday experience that some creatures are (at least partially) ontologically dependent on other creatures for their existence, if we take Descartes's avowed concurrentism seriously. For example, some things need parents, food, water, etc. in order to exist.19 But actually depending on other creatures to exist does not disqualify a creature from the category of substance so long as its existence can be clearly and distinctly understood such that we know God could have created that thing alone

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without anything else. On this account, the ontological independence enjoyed by created substances is rooted in the possibility of existing without any other created thing (see Principles 1.60, AT VIIIA 28-9: CSM I 213).20 But what sort of ontological independence is this? Louis Loeb, for instance, has claimed that the relevant sort of ontological independence is causal independence from any other creature besides God.21 But, before moving on to evaluate this claim, it is important to be clear about the sense of 'cause' operative in his formulation. Loeb is explicit about this issue when he claims that ' [m] ost (familiar) causal relations obtain between objects, events, or states which are not simultaneous'.22 He then goes on to claim that a substance's ontological independence is causal but a mode's dependence on its underlying substance is non-causal. The characterization of the modesubstance relation as non-causal is not wholly accurate since it neglects the distinction between the four Aristotelian causes accepted not just in the schools but more generally at Descartes's time, viz efficient, final, formal and material. Although this is not the place for a detailed explication of the Aristotelian taxonomy of causation and causal explanation, a brief remark about efficient and material causes is in order. Notice that Loeb is conceiving causation as nothing but an efficient causal relation wherein one object or event brings about the existence of another object or event. For example, one moving billiard ball striking a second billiard ball brings about the existence of motion in the second billiard ball. Surely Loeb is correct in noticing that this is not the sort of relation obtaining in the mode-substance relation, but this is not to say that there is not a causal relation in one of the other three Aristotelian senses of the term. Descartes and his contemporaries would not have maintained there is no causal relation between a mode and its underlying substance. As discussed in 1.5, a mode would be at least materially causally dependent on an underlying substance in that the potential for having that kind of mode plays a part in the explanation of why that thing has that mode. So, such a relation would not be 'non-causal' in this sense. As such, Loeb's distinction between the causal independence of substances and the non-causal dependence of modes is not an accurate description of these respective relations. Based on these considerations, any evaluation of Loeb's causal independence account of a substance's ontological independence should focus on efficient causal independence. Loeb argues that a created substance qua ontologically independent thing is by definition not efficiently causally dependent on any other substance qua subject. This is

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quite puzzling given his earlier account of a mode's dependence on a substance as non-efficiently causal. Since he unpacks ontological independence as efficient causal independence, modes are not causally dependent on substances, and so they, too, would be causally independent things or substances on this account. It is important to note that Loeb changes his formulation from being causally independent from another substance qua subject to causal independence from any other entity except God. However, he does this for reasons other than those raised here.23 Loeb's efficient causal account of the ontological independence of created substances described at Principles 1.51 yields the following formulation: x is a created substance if and only if it is possible for x to exist efficiently causally dependent on God alone but efficiently causally independent from any other creature. In other words, there is some possible world in which that creature exists without efficiently causally depending on any other creature. But, as Markie discovered, efficient causal independence from other creatures alone is not sufficient for being a substance. For example, an individual mind can be clearly and distinctly understood to exist without any other individual mind and without any body whatsoever (AT VIIIA 29: CSM I 213). So, God has the power to create a possible world with a particular finite mind as its only existent. Moreover, since this mind must have some determinate thought in order to be thinking and, therefore, continue to exist, it has some mode of thinking. Now, if efficient causal independence from creatures was sufficient, not only the mind but also its mode would be a substance, because the mode would not efficiently causally depend on anything except God, including the mind it determines, because this is not an efficient causal relation. Hence, efficient causal independence alone is not sufficient for being a substance, since modes would also be substances on this account.24 This implies that some other sort of ontological independence is necessary for distinguishing substances from modes. Indeed, Descartes is very interested in sharply distinguishing these two fundamental pieces of his ontology. In fact, he draws a contrast between substances and modes in at least two places in order to explicate his conception of substance. For instance, in an addition to the French edition of the Principles, Descartes makes the following clarification: In the case of created things, some are of such a nature that they cannot exist without other things, while some need only the ordinary

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concurrence of God in order to exist. We make this distinction by calling the latter 'substances' and the former 'qualities' or 'attributes' of those substances. (ATVIIIA 24: CSM I 210) Presumably the terms 'qualities' and 'attributes' are being used in the same sense as in the Second Replies to mean 'mode'. Descartes makes the same contrast in a 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes, 'We mean only that [substance] is the kind of thing that can exist without any other created thing, and this is something that cannot be said about the modes of things' (AT III 429: CSMK 193-4). Based on these passages, substances are not ontologically dependent on other creatures in the way that modes are dependent. This implies that created substances are ontologically independent in that they do not reside in some other thing as in a subject. That is, they do not determine a higher order determinable, which means they just are ultimate determinables.25 The distinction between a determinate and an ultimate determinable permits a clear demarcation between mode and substance for Descartes. To illustrate this point let us return to that possible world with the one finite mind and its mode as the only existents. On the one hand, the determinate thought is not a substance because, although it can exist depending efficiently causally on God alone, it is a determinate way of thinking, and so ontologically depends on something capable of being determined in that way, viz a mind. On the other hand, the mind can exist while efficiently causally relying only on God's concurrence alone but without determining him, since God is incapable of any modification. That is, thinking does not determine a higher order determinable and is, therefore, an ultimate determinable. Hence, the relevant sort of ontological independence and dependence needed to clearly distinguish substances from modes is that of a determinated dependence on its determinable and an ultimate determinable's freedom from determining any other thing.

1.7 DESCARTES'S DEFINITION OF SUBSTANCE The previous sections have laid the groundwork for understanding Descartes's considered definition of substance. First, in 1.4 it was shown that the Second Replies 'definition' is not really definitive given the limited nature of the geometrical exposition in which it appears and the counterexample of accidents or modes residing in other accidents in the 1641

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letter for Hobbes. 1.5 elaborated on the kind of ontological dependence modes have on substances by means of the determinate-determinable relation. Then 1.6 showed how the relation of determining a determinable and not determining a higher order determinable can be used to clearly distinguish substances from modes. The purpose of this section is to establish that self-subsistence, in the sense of being an ultimate determinable, is Descartes's one and only definition of substance. This conclusion can be established through a closer look at the contrast drawn between substance and accident commonly made at Descartes's time as well as how Descartes puts the notion of self-subsistence to work in arguing against the existence of incomplete substances and real accidents. Descartes also uses the language of self-subsistence in discussing the qualified sense in which some creatures are substances in the 1641 letter to Hyperaspistes cited above: 'This does not mean that they should not be called substance, because when we call created substance selfsubsistent (per se subsistat) we do not rule out the divine concurrence which it needs in order to subsist (subsistendum)' (AT III 429: CSMK 193). The same equivalence made between subsisting and not inhering in a subject is found not only in Eustachius' textbook cited above in 1.1, but also in some of the philosophical lexicons of the time. For instance, in the Lexicon Philosophicum of Rudolph Goclenius first published in 1613, 'subsistere' is defined as 'what is subsisting being, not being in a subject of inherence'. Another example is found in the Lexicon Philosophicum: Terminorum Philosophis Usitatorum of Johannes Micraelius first published in 1662, 'Subsistence (Subsistere) signifies what has complete being through itself (per se) [and] not as an accident inhering in a subject, or as parts bound to a whole.'26 He then defines substance by means of self-subsistence: 'Substance is a being subsisting through itself (per se).' This definition, as well as Eustachius', indicates that defining substance as self-subsisting being was not an uncommon practice around Descartes's time. Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that Descartes defines substance in this way as well. Moreover, Descartes's arguments against incomplete substances and real accidents indicate that self-subsistence is both necessary and sufficient for being a created Cartesian substance. The following argument against the existence of incomplete substances is made in the FourthReplies:

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I am aware that certain substances are commonly called 'incomplete'. But if the reason for calling them incomplete is that they are unable to exist on their own, then I confess I find it self-contradictory that they should be substances, that is, things which subsist on their own, and at the same time incomplete, that is, not possessing the power to subsist on their own. (AT VII 222: CSM II 156-7) In this passage, he argues that a substance cannot be 'incomplete' in the sense of not being self-subsistent. In order for the charge of self-contradiction to hold, self-subsistence must be a necessary condition for being a created substance. For if it were merely sufficient, then an inability to exist on its own would not be enough to exclude incomplete substances from the category of substance proper, since the entity in question could satisfy some other sufficient condition. He goes on to explain that something can be incomplete in one sense but complete in another, i.e. qua substance. It can be incomplete insofar as it is a part of a whole but complete in that it is a self-subsisting part, i.e. it is a part not bound to a whole, and as such it is a substance (AT VII 222: CSM II 157).27 Hence, self-subsistence is also used as a sufficient condition for being a substance in this passage. Furthermore, the argument in the Sixth Replies against the existence of real accidents, which were understood to be accidents that can exist without residing in a subject, at least by the power of God, also uses selfsubsistence as a necessary and sufficient condition for being a substance: [I]t is completely contradictory that there should be real accidents, since whatever is real can exist separately from any other subject; yet anything that can exist separately in this way is a substance, not an accident. (AT VII 434: CSM II 293) First, according to this passage, accidents do not self-subsist but reside in a subject by their very natures, and as such the notion of a real accident just is the notion of something both self-subsisting and not self-subsisting. Again, ontological independence in the sense of not residing in a subject must be a necessary condition in order for the contradiction to arise. Second, Descartes's claim that 'anything that can exist separately in this way [i.e. 'separately from any other subject'] is a substance, not an accident' just is to use not residing in a subject as a sufficient condition for being a substance. Therefore, Descartes uses self-subsistence as both a necessary and sufficient condition for being a substance in this passage as well.

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Further support for the definitive nature of the Principles account of substance is found in both the Third Meditation and another portion of the Fourth Replies. In the Third Meditation, Descartes claims that 'I think that a stone is a substance, or is a thing capable of existing per se' (AT VII 44: CSM II 30). The context of the passage indicates that the capacity for existing independently (per se apta est existere) is just what it is to be a substance. Descartes makes basically the same claim, albeit in a less careful manner, in the Fourth Replies: 'the notion of a substance is just this (hoc est) that it can exist by itself (per se), that is, without the aid of any other substance' (AT VII 226: CSM II 159). It is first important to note that Descartes's claim that the notion of substance 'is just this' (hoc est) means that what follows is supposed to be definitive. However, commentators such as Loeb and Bernard Williams understand this definition to be blatantly circular since Descartes is defining substance by means of existing without any other substance.28 Although this is not Descartes's most careful formulation, it is not circular despite appearances to the contrary. For, in this passage, Descartes is merely expressing the contrast between self-subsisting things or substances and non-subsisting things or modes: a substance does not require some other substance to exist in that substances, by definition, do not reside in some other thing as in a subject as is the case with modes. Based on these textual considerations, self-subsistence or being an ultimate determinable is both necessary and sufficient for being a Cartesian substance. The definition of created Cartesian substances offered here can be formulated as follows: CS: x is a created substance if and only if x is an ultimate determinable. This, of course, requires a definition of'ultimate determinable': UD: x is an ultimate determinable if and only if (1) x is a determinable, i.e. x is a subject in which modes reside; and (2) x does not determine a higher order determinable, i.e. x can exist without residing in any other thing as in a subject. So, given the bi-conditional nature of CS and UD, it follows that: CS*: x is a created substance if and only if (1) x is a determinable, i.e. x is a subject in which modes reside; and (2) x does not determine a

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higher order determinable, i.e. x can exist without residing in any other thing as in a subject. Interestingly enough, CS* takes into account Markie's point that the Second Replies and Principles accounts of created substance are flipsides of one another in that the former 'defines' substance by its ontolog

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Justin Skirry - Descartes Metaphysics of Human Nature

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