K-12 Business Engagement

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1/43

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement in K-12 Education PolicyAuthor(s): John W. SippleSource: American Educational Research Journal, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 447-488Published by: American Educational Research AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1163547 .

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2/43

American

Educational

Research

ournal

Fall

1999,

Vol.

36,

No.

3,

pp.

447-488

Institutional

Constraints

on

Business

Involvement

in K-12 Education

Policy

John

W.

Sipple

Cornell

University

With ach

passing

decade,

the

U.S.

ublic

educational

ystem

has

been

under

increasing

scrutiny

and

pressure

to

change.

This

pressure

has

come

from

many

ronts--including,

the

media,

parents,government,

and

business. n

this

study,

I

examine

the

actions

of

a

group

of

business eaders

representing

severalmultinational

corporations

s

they ry

o

affecteducationpolicy

n

the

state

ofMichigan.Ifocus

special

attentionon the environments n which the

corporations

nd

K-12public

schools

operate

and

uncover

he

relationships

between

the

many agents calling

or

school

improvement.

The

act

that this

grouptook a thoughtful pproach nd had a significant mpacton education

reform

s

by

no

means an indication that other

business

groups

will do the

same. Given

enough good information

and

time to

reflect

on the

complex

issues

surrounding

chools,

t

is

possible

hat

business eadersand

educators

can reach

consensus on a

direction

or

educational

reform.

JOHN

W.

SIPPLE s

an

Assistant

Professor,

Department

of

Education,

421

Kennedy

Hall,

Cornell

University,

Ithaca,

NY

14853.

His

specializations

are

organi-

zational

studies and

educational

administration

and

policy.


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3/43

Sipple

Throughout

the

past

4

decades,

there has

been

a

notable

increase

n

the

politicization

of

K-12

public

schooling.

Whereas

early

reform

efforts

focused

narrowly

on

local school

activity,

more

recent

reformefforts

com-

monly target higherlevels of governmentand advocate new models and

templates

for

broad

segments

of the educational

system

(Cibulka,

1996;

Cohen,

1990).

This shift has served to increase

governmental

and

elite

influenceon

the

public

educational

ystem.

While he additionof new

players

into the

arenaof education

policymaking

s

undisputed,

he role and

impact

of the new

agents

is the

topic

of much debate and

controversy.

To

better

understand

movements

n

contemporary

ducational

policy,

it

is

necessary

o

carefully tudy

the

agents promoting

eform

deas,

how

they

interact

with state

government,

and

how

ideas are

advanced

in

the formal

policymakingprocess.Thepresentstudyaddresses ssuesof whowill shape

the

futureof

public

education

and

how

they

will

do it.

In

doing

so,

I

pay

careful

attention o the forces

constraining

nd

shaping

the

behaviors

of an

interest

group

of business eaders

working

o

shape

stateK-12

public

education

policy.

Centralo this

study

are

the rolesand actionsof the stateand those of

business

leaders.

Specifically,

examine the actions of a

group

of business leaders

representing

everal

multinational

orporations

s

they

try

o

affecteducation

policy

in the state of

Michigan.

focus

special

attentionon the

environment

in which the business eadersand K-12

public

schools

operate

n

Michigan.

The Role of the State

The Tenth Amendment o

the United

StatesConstitution

xplicitly

reserves

powers

not

delegated

o

the

federal

government

o individual

tatesor to the

people.

The federal

Constitution

s

silent

on

issues of

education,

although

every

stateconstitutionncludesan

educationclause.The clauses

denote

the

states'

responsibility

or and

commitmento

educating

heir

children.Further-

more,

t has been

common

practice

orstates

o further

elegate

responsibility

for

funding

and

operating

choolsto

localschool districts. or

his

reason,

early

schoolreformers-including usiness eadersandacademics-focusedprima-

rily

on the

local

level,

exerting

imited

fforton state

policy agents

and

issues.

In recent

years,

provoked

by

court

decisions

on issues of

racialand

fiscal

equality,

tate

governments

ave

increased heir

role

in

K-12

public

education

(Brown

v. Board

ofEducation,

1954;

Firestone,Bader,

Massel,

&

Rosenblum,

1992;

Mazzoni,

1993;

San

Antonio

Independent

School

District

v.

Rodriquez,

1973;

Tyack

&

Cuban,

1995).

The Role

of Business

In

addition o states

aking

a

greater ole neducationpolicy,severalnfluential

organizations

ave drawna

link

between

school

performance

nd

the nation's

economic

well-being(e.g.,

the

National

Commission

n

Excellence n

Educa-

tion and

its much

publicized

report,

A

Nation at

Risk).

Motivated

by

this

assumed

ink,

American

orporate

eaders

began

to

commit ime

and

corporate

resourcesto

education

reform n

nearly every

state in

the

union

(Business

Roundtable, 991;

Plotke,

1992).

In

June

of

1989,

President

Bush

participated

448




4/43

Institutional Constraints on Business

Involvement

in the annual

meeting

of the Business

Roundtable

hereafter

National

Roundtable,

an

organization

of

more

than

200

CEOs

from

the nation's

largest corporations)

and

formally

challenged corporate

America

to

bring

its

expertise

and

resources

to bear on the education reform movement. Thischallenge had great symbolic

value as it served to move the

interests of business from

being

just

one of

many

voices

in the

"babble"

Cohen,

1990)

to

a formal seat at

the

policymaking

table.

The National

Roundtable

quickly

decided that

advocating

educational

change

and

improvement

at the

national level was not an

efficient use

of their

resources.

By

mid-1989,

all

of the

National

Roundtable CEOs had

"adopted"

a

state

in

which to

involve themselves

in

issues of

education reform.

Six

National

Roundtable

companies

adopted Michigan,

the

focus of this

study:

Dow,

GeneralMotors,Kellogg,Kmart,Upjohn,andWhirlpool.Joseph Antonini,CEO

of

Kmart,

was asked

by

John

Akers,

CEO of

IBM

and

leader of the

National

Roundtable's

education

initiative,

to

lead

the effort in

Michigan.

Thus,

the

Michigan-Business

National

Roundtable

(MI-Roundtable)

was

founded

in the

fall

of

1989.

The

central focus of

this article is a

case

study

of the

MI-Roundtable.

Specifically,

I

explore

the

direct and

indirect

influences

and

constraints on the

formation

and

activity

of the

MI-Roundtable s it

attempted

to alter

educational

policy

in

Michigan.

This

organization

is

but

one of

many

parties

calling

for

improved performance of the Michigan public educational system, although it

holds

a

special place

owing

to its

considerable

resources,

its

position

within the

polity,

and its

vested

interest

in

improving

the

products

of the

public

schools.

Why Study

Business

Involvement?

Attention

should

be

paid

to the

MI-Roundtable

for three

reasons.

First,

the

organization

is one

of

38

state-level

coalitions

operating today.

Little

s

known

about these

coalitions,

and

yet they

possess

great potential

for

power

and

influence. The

member

corporations'

scope

and

influence

span

local,

state,

and

nationalboundaries,and they are involved in policy networkson myriad ssues

(e.g.,

tax,

health

care,

environmental

law).

In

addition,

the financial

resources

available

to the

coalitions are

sizable.

For

instance,

the focus of

this

study,

the

MI-Roundtable,

has an

annual

budget

of

more

than

$250,000,

with

each

corporation paying

substantial

annual dues

(approximately

$20,000-$30,000

per

year).

Second,

there is

no

shortage

of

debate,

controversy,

and

skepticism

surrounding

business

involvement in

education reform.

Critics

question

the

values

and

motivations of

business as

it

tries to

alter school

policy

and

practice

(Borman, Castenell, & Gallagher, 1993; Cuban, 1992;Kearns& Doyle, 1988;

Kozol,

1991;

Ray

&

Mickelson,

1990).

Finally,

this

century

(and

specifically

the

latter

wo

decades)

has

witnessed

a

significant

shift

in

attention and

power

(e.g.,

policy

decisions,

funding,

and

legal

control)

from

local

schools

and

school

districts o

state

administratorsand

policymakers.

In the

latter half

of

the

20th

century,

the

most

dramatic

shifts

in

the

institutional

environment

of

schools

have been in

the

relationship

of

449




5/43

Sipple

public

education to the state

(Cibulka,

1995).

Whereas

he

focus of

school

policy

had

traditionally

een

on

norms,

tructures,

olitics,

and

power

within

schools,

recent

attentions

turning

o

externalnfluences nd

demands,

namely

the relationshipwith the stateand federalgovernments, ourts,parents,and

the business

community

Cibulka,1996;

Tyack

&

Cuban,

1995).

In

addition,

current

research has

identified

institutional

ectors

within

society,

one

of

which-the

American

ublic

educational

ystem--is

of

particular

elevance

or

this

study

(Rowan

&

Miskel,

1999;

Scott

&

Meyer,

1991).

Given

the

increase

in

attention

paid

to the

forces at work

in the broad

sector,

or

"field"

of

education,

ttention o

specificorganizations

perating

n

this

sphere

s

of

great

value.

The

purpose

of

this

study

is to

analyze

the

context

in

which

an

interest

groupof business leaderssoughtto become a catalyst or state education

reform.

To this

end,

I

use data

rom

documents nd

nterviews

onductedwith

individuals

oth

in

and

outsideof the

MI-Roundtable

o

describe he

environ-

ment n

which the

MI-Roundtableormed

and

analyze

how a

variety

of

forces

influenced he

business

group's

actions.

Froma

more

heoretical

perspective,

the

MI-Roundtablentereda

complex,

though

well-established,

nstitutional

environment

f K-12

education.

This

environmentncluded

ong-term

istori-

cal

roots

and

well-established

egal

rameworksnd

power

relationshipsMeyer,

Scott,

Strang,

&

Creigton,

1988).

Conceptual

erspectives

At

first

blush,

t

would seem

to

make

sense to

study

nterest

roups

advocating

educational

mprovement

using

well-established

heories

of

interest

group

behavior.

Such

theories

(Olson,

1965;

Truman,

1951)

attempt

to

describe

when,

how,

and

why

organizations

orm

and act.

The

literature

uggests

that

the

motivationor

nterest

roup

activity

s

generally

ssumed o

originate

rom

the

innate

nterests

f

participants

r the

pursuit

f

rational

nd

personal

gain.

The

rational

ecision-making

model

in which

individuals

make

decisionsand

participaten organizationshat promoteor ensure personalgain is well

known.

However,

in

terms

of

understanding

nterest

group

behavior,

the

model

s limited

and

does

not

describeor

predict

he

bounds

placed

on

interest

group

participants.

s

recent

empirical

tudies

suggest,

neither

explanation

s

satisfying.

A

more

complete

understanding

f the

external

pressures

ffecting

interest

groups

is

necessary.

Interest

group

theories

seem

to

assume

that

participants

ave an

inherent

policy

interestor

a narrow

desirefor

functional

gain.

But

hese

propositions

o not

explain

consistent

ehavior

cross

ndividu-

als from

diverse

backgrounds

nd

experiences.

Other

orces

seemingly

must

be at work shapingand limitingchoice alternativesScott,1995).It is this

limitation f

interest

roup

theories

hat

spurred

he

present

nvestigation

nto

the

institutional

orces

acting

on the

participants

n

the

MI-Roundtable.

Critical

o the

study

of

organizational

ehavior

and

environmental

dap-

tation s a

focus on

and

understanding

f

the

relationship

etween

organiza-

tions

and

their

external

environment.

Contingent

on

the

perspective

that

organizations

re

open

systems

Katz

&

Kahn,1978;

Scott,

1992),

he

external

450




6/43

Institutional Constraints on Business Involvement

environment

of

organizations

was once

thought

o include

only

those

formal

actorswith which

organizations

xchanged

information nd resourcesor

a

moresubtlediffusion

of

norms

Selznick,

1949).

According

o Scottand

Meyer

(1991,p. 111),"While uch views are notwrong, theyareclearly ncomplete

and limited."

n

the last two

decades,

conceptualizations

f

organizational

environments ave broadened.

One

of

the most

significant hanges

s the

view

of environments s more

complex,

rational,

nd

layered

hanhad

been

once

thought (Meyer,

1994; Scott,

1994).

Another

s that

organizationsactively

participate

n

organization-environment

elationsand do not

simply

act

as

passive

pawns

(DiMaggio,

1998;

Dimaggio

&

Powell,

1991a;Zucker,

1988).

Scott

(1995)

suggests

that no

organization

can

be

judiciously

understood

unless

the

environmentalnorms and

expectationsaccording

o which

the

organizationoperatesare understoodand taken into account.Institutional

theory

provides

a

framework

with

which

to

analyze

the

environmentof the

MI-Roundtableand can

act as a

guide

to

predict

how and

why

the

roundtable

responds

to its

environment.

In this

case,

the

MI-Roundtable

must

be viewed

as one of

many

interest

groups

working

to

improve

the

public

educational

system

or,

in

institutional

erms,

one of

many

nstitutional

gents

nteracting

n

the

sector

of

public

education.

During

such

interaction,

the

MI-Roundtable s

shaped

by

and

shapes

the formal

rules,

norms,

and belief

systems

thatmake

up

the

institutional environment.

To analyze and investigatethe formationand impactof institutions,Idraw

from

both Cibulka

(1995)

and

Scott

(1995)

in

defining

an

institution as a

socially

defined

purpose

around

which

normative,

cognitive,

and

regulative

structures

emerge

to

provide

stability

and

meaning

to social

behavior. Institu-

tionalization is

the

intentional or

unintentional

(Cibulka,

1995)

process "by

which social

processes,

obligations,

or

actualities come to

take on a

rulelike

status

in

social

thought

and

action"

(Meyer

&

Rowan,

1977,

p.

341).

The

emergence

of

institutions n a

society,

or bounded

units within a

society,

results

in

stability

and

order

through

the

creation of

socially

accepted

(according

to

some, socially constructed)practices,norms,andways of thinking.Institutions

are

understood to

result from

"institution

building"

efforts

and

strategies

on the

part

of

institutional

agents.

These

typically

include the

state,

professions,

interest

groups,

education

professionals,

academics,

courts,

and the

media,

with

institutional

changes

occurring

more

frequently

in

times of

social,

economic,

or

political

crises

(Cibulka, 1995;

DiMaggio

&

Powell,

1991b;

Fligstein

& Mara-

Drita,

1996;

Greenwood &

Hinings,

1996).

Scott

(1995)

describes

three

pillars,

or

ways

of

conceptualizing

institutions,

each

emphasizing

a

different

set of

institutional

attributes.

I

rely

heavily

on

Scott's constructs for

the

framework of

this article.

Scott's Three

Pillars

The

regulative

pillar

is

geared

toward

expedience

with institutions

proliferated

through

coercive

means in

the form of

laws or

sanctions. These

rules

are

legally

sanctioned

by

formal

authority

and

serve

to constrain

and

"regularize"

ehavior.

Enforcement

of

rules

takes

place by

monitoring

and

allocating

penalties

for

451




7/43

Sipple

noncompliance.

When

focusing

on the

regulative

spects

of

institutions,

he

state

plays

a

prominent

role

in

both

the creation of institutions

and

the

monitoring

f rules.With

regard

o

the

impact

of

regulative

nstitutions

n

the

MI-Roundtable,he interest rouphad to followlegalrules or tsparticipation

in

the

policyprocess

as

well

as

learn

where formal

uthority

esideswithin he

public

education

system

so that it could

target

its resources

and

tactics

effectively

and

efficiently.

The normative

pillar

s based

on

the notionsof

prescription,

valuation,

and

obligation

of

normative ules in

the creation

and

maintenance

f

social

order.

Consisting

of

values

and

norms,

preferred

and

desirable

actions are

establishedwith

which

organizational

nd individual

behavior

can be

com-

pared.

Norms

provide

behavioral

rescriptions

nd limit

appropriate oals

to

pursue.Rolescanbecome internalized y theactor,be formally ssigned,or

be taken on after

requent

nteraction

with

others;

hey

can

restrict ehavior

or

grant

pecialpower

and

confer

rights

on

an

actor.

The

MI-Roundtable

ay

have been

constrained

n

its

possible

actions

by

its

role

as a

group

of free-

market

business leaders

or

by

the

expectations

nstitutional

gents

had

for

business eaders.

The third

pillar, ognitive,

s

basedon the

notion hat

ndividuals

nterpret

and

construct heirown

meaning

of the

worldaround

hem.As

noted

by

Scott

(1995),

"To

understandor

explain

any

action,

the

analyst

must

take

into

accountnot onlythe objectiveconditionsbut the actor's ubjectiventerpre-

tationof them"

p.

40).

Meanings

rederived

by

actors

hrough

nteraction

ith

other

actors

and

symbols

but are

preserved

nd

changedby

human

behavior.

Social

identities are

central

to the

understanding

f

cognitive

institutions,

particularly

s

actors

perform

similar

asks.

The MI-Roundtable

reated an

identity

n

which

it viewed

itself

as

being

distinct

rom

he

education stablish-

ment and

yet

had a

valuable

voice

in

the

education

debate.

Few

researchers ave

investigated

and

categorized

he

types

of

institu-

tions found

within

the sector of

public

education.The

complexity

of

the

institutionalnvironment laysanimportantoleinthe behaviorof organiza-

tions

operating

n

that

environment

Greenwood

&

Hinings,

1996).

Organiza-

tions

and their

deas are

rarely

he

subject

of

a narrow

et of

influencesand

pressures,

but

they

are

often

faced

with

competing

and

conflicting

pressures,

even within he same

sector

D'Aunno, utton,

&

Price,1991;

Fligstein

&Mara-

Drita,

1996;

Friedland&

Alford,1991;

Meyer,

1987).

The

U.S.

education

ector

is no

different,

and

thus the

agents

operating

within

that sector

probably

confront

multiple

and

competing

pressures.

In

the late

1980s

and

early

1990s,

herewas no

shortage

of

reform

deas

or

educational eform

rganizationsdvancinghose ideas.Thisresulted nan

increasingly

omplex

environment

s more

and

more

agents

tried

o involve

themselves

in

school reform

(Cibulka,

1995;

Cohen,

1990;

Rowan,

1990).

Given the

multiple

agents

in

the

educational

sector-including

the

state,

professional

organizations,

istorical

recedent,

and

business

nvolvement-

the

MI-Roundtable

robably

aced

multiple

nstitutional

ressures

and

pro-

cesses.

Hence,

the

first

proposition

n

this

study

s as

follows.

452




8/43

Institutional

Constraints

n

BusinessInvolvement

Proposition

1: When

entering

into

the sector of

public

education,

the

MI-

Roundtable

will

encounter

all

three

types

of

institutions-regulative,

norma-

tive,

and

cognitive.

Organizational

Fields and Sectors

DiMaggio

and

Powell

(1991b)

observed that the

increased

rationalization

of

society-the

homogenization

of structureacross

organizational

types-is

less

driven

by competition

and

efficiency

than

by

the

structuration f

organizational

fields.

Meyer,

Scott,

Strang,

and

Creighton

(1988)

suggest

that the United States

public

educational

system

is

becoming

more structuredas a result of a

process

of

societal rationalization

(Meyer,

1994;

Meyer,

Scott,

&

Deal,

1983).

This

increased

rationalization

is

due

not to a

strong

central

state or exclusive

professional control but, rather,to the "profusion

of

professional standards,

court

decisions,

special-purpose

legislative

interests,

and a

huge

network

of

interest

groups"

(Meyer

et

al.,

1988,

p.

165).

Nearly synonymous

with

organizational

fields

are what

Scott

and

Meyer

(1991)

term societal sectors.

They

propose

this

term

to

emphasize

a common

framework of

relationships,

both

horizontal

and

vertical,

that make

up any

given

institutional

ield.

This set of

relationships

may

reach from individualunits

to

national

organizations

and

offices,

serving

to structure

he

flow of

institutions

across as well as

within

sector levels. Scott

and

Meyer

(1991,

p.

117)

define

a sector as

"a

collection

of

organizations

in

the same

domain,

identified

by

the

similarity

of their

services,

products,

or

functions,

together

with those

organi-

zations that

critically

influence

the

performance

of the focal

organizations."

Sectors

comprise

units and

agents

woven

together

in

functional

terms,

al-

though

they

may

be

geographically

distant

(Scott

&

Meyer,

1991).

Societal sectors

typically

have five levels

(Scott

&

Meyer,

1991).

At the

top

are national or

society-wide

offices

and

headquarters

for

government

and

private

officials

and

organizations.

While

plausibly

an additional level

exists

above

the national

(e.g.,

multinational

or

world

sector),

this discussion of

societal sectors is limited to sectors within nations (in this case, the U.S. public

educational

system).

Moving

down,

the fourth level is that of

regional

or

multistate

authorities,

associations,

or

organizations.

This level is

only

modestly

applicable

to the

educational

system,

since

governmental

units and

most

professional

associations

operate

at the

national,

state,

or

local

level. The

third

level consists of state offices and

associations. Formalstate

authorities,

as

well

as

many professional

associations,

operate

at the

state

level. The

second level

consists

of within-state

districtsand

councils,

frequently

representing

or

provid-

ing

services

for

multiple

local units.

Finally,

the

most basic

level is

that of the

local

unit, branch,

or

establishment,

in

this case schools.

Table

1

provides

a

summary

of

the

theoretical levels within the sector of

K-12

public

education.

In

any given

sector,

each level has

its

own

authority,

function,

and

decision-making power.

When

the sector

and

the

related

institutions-whether

flowing up

or

down-are well

established,

the

power,

the

decisions,

and the

authority

at each level are

constrained

and

shaped by

rules,

norms,

or

common

belief

systems.

In

addition,

the

direction

and

flow

of institutions

and institution-

453




9/43

Sipple

Table

1

Sector

Levels of

the

Public Educational

System

in the United

States

Sector level" Public education

5.

Nationalor

society-wide

offices,

headquarters

4.

Regional

or multistate

authorities,

associations

3.

State

offices,

associations

2. - Substateareas,districts, ouncils

1.

Local

units,

branch

offices,

establishments

U.S.

secretary

and

Department

of

Education,NCTM,NCTE,

NBPTS,

NEA/

AFT,

NASSP,

NASB

Regional

research

abs

(e.g.,

NCREL)

nd

accreditation

gencies (e.g.,

North

Central

Accreditation

ssociation)

State

department

and board

of

education,

chief

state school

officer,

MEA/MFT,

MASSP,

MASB

District,board,superintendent,ocal

teachersunions

School,

principal,

eacher

"aScott nd

Meyer

(1991).

Note.

NCTM=National

Council

of

Teachers of

Mathematics,

NCTE=NationalCouncil

of Teachers

of

English,

NBPTS=National

Board for

Professional

Teaching

Standards,

NEA=National

Education

Association,

AFT=American

Federation

of

Teachers,

NCREL=North entral

Regional

Education

Lab,

MEA=Michigan

Education

Association,

MFT=Michigan

Federation of

Teachers,

MASSP=Michigan

Association of

Secondary

School

Principals, MASB=Michigan

Association of

School Boards.

alizationare well

understood,

as

are limitations

f

participants

t

each level

(Scott

&

Meyer,

1991).

Public

education,

like

other

sectors in the

United

States

(e.g.,

energy,

environment,

health

care),

is

inherently

decentralized nd

fragmented.

The

U.S.

Constitution

nsures that

this is so.

Our

system

of

government

was

designed

to

ensurethe

separation

f

powers

within

the national

government

and also

between the

levels of

national, tate,

and

local

governments.

Such

decentralization nd

fragmentation,

owever,

do not

necessarily

ndicatea

feeble

systemguided

by

weak

institutional ules

and norms.

On the

contrary,

the

public

educational

ystem

s

strong

n

its

commitment-legal

and

social-

to

decentralizedand

local

control

of schools.

This

includes the

fragmented

sourcesof

power

seemingly

nverselyproportional

o their

distance

rom

he

classroom.

Although

decentralized,

he

power

relationships,

esource

and

information

lows,

and

acceptable

norms of

practice

are well

established

(Meyer,

1983,

1987;

Meyer

&

Rowan,

1978;

Meyer

t

al.,

1988;

Rowan,

1982).

Given

the

well-established

sector of K-12

education,

the sector

must be

analyzed

in

light

of its theoreticaland

practical

nteractionwith the MI-

Roundtable.

I

suggest

the

MI-Roundtable as more

likely

to

operate

at the

state evel

than either

the

local or

national evel for

several reasons.

First,

he

parent

organization

the

National

Roundtable)

nstructedhe CEOs

o form

coalitions

with

their

governors

and

to

enact

change

within

theirstate.

Second,

the MI-

454




10/43

Institutional Constraints

on Business

Involvement

Roundtable

argeted

ssues of curriculum nd assessment

as foci for reform

n

Michigan.

In

1989,

a move was under

way

in the

Michigan egislature

o

develop

a

model

core curriculumor all K-12 students.

Public

Act

25,

signed

into law in 1990, consolidated the decisions necessaryto create a core

curriculum

t

the

state level

(technicallyby

the StateBoard

of

Education).

Thus,

o effect

widespread

urriculum

hanges

n

Michigan,

he

MI-Roundtable

mustbe involved

at the

state

evel.

Similarly,

he

MI-Roundtable's

econd

major

initiative imedto raise he standards f the

Michigan

ducational ssessment

Program

MEAP)

implemented

by

the State

Department

f

Education)

and

align

the

tests

with the

core

curriculum.

Again, activity

at the state

level

seemed most

appropriate.

Proposition

:

Giventhe

institutionallymposed

evel

of involvement

by

the NationalRoundtable nd the institutionallystablished evel of decision

making

and

authority

within

he sectorof

public

education,

he

MI-Roundtable

will

engage

in the

majority

f

its

activity

at the state level.

Organizational

esponse

o Institutional

ressures

The

earlyyears

of the

"new"

nstitutional

heory

(DiMaggio

&

Powell,

1991b;

Meyer

&

Rowan, 1977,

1978)

focused

on

the

need for

institutionalized

organizations

o

adapt

o

surrounding

nstitutions o that

hey

could obtain

or

maintain

egitimacy.

he

common

mechanism

y

which

organizations

dapted

was throughthe creation of structures-often loosely coupled fromtheir

technical

core-similar

to those

found

in

moresuccessful

or

powerful

nstitu-

tional forms.The

process

by

which

organizations

dopt

similar

tructuress

called

somorphism.

Current

heorizing

n

organizational

daptation

o

institutional

ressures

views

the

process

of

isomorphism

s

incomplete

nd imited.

Today,

he

range

of

strategies

nd

tactics

with

whichto

respond

o or

resist nstitutional

ressures

is believed to be

considerably

more

complex.

In

fact,

Oliver

(1991,

p.

150)

suggests

that

organizations

espond

o

institutional

ressures

n

ways

thatare

self-serving, ncludingncreasedprestige, tability,egitimacy,ocialsupport,

internal nd

external

ommitment,

ccessto

resources,

ttraction f

personnel,

acceptance

n

professions,

nd

nvulnerability

o

questioning.

Oliver

warns hat

the

assumption

of

a

dichotomous

response-passive

or

active,

conform

or

resist-by

an

organization

o

environmental

ressures

s

far

oo

simplistic

nd

not valuable.

Rather,

Oliver

(1991)

argues

that

more

specific

organizational

responses

can

be

predicted

f

careful

attention s

paid

to

the

context of the

pressures

nd

the

organization

f

interest:

Conformity

s

neither

nevitablenor

invariably

nstrumental

n

securing

ongevity"

p.

175).

Scott

(1995)

recently

articulatedhe integratednatureof organization-environmentelations,with

each

agent

involved

nactivedecisions

based

on

the

context

of

the

situation:

Just

as

institutions

onstitute

organizations,

hey

also

constitute

what

are

their

appropriate

ways

of

acting,

ncluding

actsthat

are

responses

to

institutional

ressures.

Strategies

hat

may

be

appropriate

n

one

kindof

industry

r

field

may

be

prohibited

n

another.

Tactics hat

can

455




11/43

Sipple

be

successfully

ursued

n

one

settingmay

be

inconceivable

n

another.

Not

only

structures ut also

strategies

re

institutionally

shaped. (p.

125)

Oliver

(1991,

p.

152)

identifies

ive

generalstrategiesorganizations

se

to

respond

to institutional

rocesses-acquiescing, compromising, voiding,

defying,

and

manipulating-and

several

actics

oreach

type

of

response.

The

responses

fall on

a

continuum rom

passive

agreement

and

acceptance

to

moreactiveand

rebelliousbehavior.

Organizations

ay

acquiesce

by

respond-

ing

out of habit

(i.e.,

"this s the

way

it has

always

been

done"),

imitating

successful

organizationalesponses,

or

simply

complying

o the

pressure.

This

strategy

has been

frequently

described

by

institutional

cholarsand

involves

littleconflictorthoughtonthepartof theorganization. rganizations ayalso

respond

n the

form

of

compromise.

This

may

be

done to

appease

or

balance

multiple

and

conflicting

environmental

pressures.

Pacifying

actics

may

be

employed

by

offeringonly

minimal

resistancewhile

allocating

a

majority

f

resources o

placating

he

agentexerting

he

institutional

ressure.Organiza-

tions

may put up

some

fight,

but

they

mustbe careful

not to

seriously

offend

a

major

ource of

revenue, nformation,

r

legitimacy.

Bargaining

s

another

formof

compromise

n

which

an

organization

ttempts

o

negotiate

conces-

sions or reduce

pressure

rom he

agent

by

adopting

portions

f

the

prescribed

practice, tructure,rnorms.

Avoidance s

another,

moreactive

organizationalesponse

o

institutional

pressures.

Oliverdefines

this

strategy

s

an

attempt

o

preclude

he

necessity

of

conformity;

rganizations

chieve

this

by

concealing

heir

nonconformity,

buffering

hemselves rom

nstitutional

ressures,

r

escaping

rom

nstitutional

rulesor

expectations.

Meyer

and

Rowan

1977)

describedhow

organizations

can

conceal

their

resistance

y adopting

ituals

nd

ceremonies r

by

buffering

and

decoupling

heir

echnical ore

(what

Elmore, 995,

calls

he

"instructional

core"

n

schools)

rom heir

organizational

tructure.

Many

chool

organizations

recentlyadopteda policyof site-basedmanagement s a symbolof progres-

sive

organizational

management,

ut

by

doing

so

school

leaders

may

conceal

the

propagation

f

traditional

lassroom

practices.

f

public

approval

s

inde-

pendent

of an

organization's

nternal

echnical

ractice,

uffering

nd

decoupling

can

be

effective

avoidance

strategies.

A

fourth

strategy

described

by

Oliver

1991)

is for

organizations

o

defy

the

external

nstitutional

ressures.

Suchan

active

approach

s

effective,

and

more

plausible,

when

enforcement f

the

institutional

ressures

s

unlikely

or

when

the

institutional

orms

and

scripts

are n

conflict

with those

of the

target

organization.Organizationsmayalsoovertlychallengeanddismiss heexter-

nally

imposed

institutional

ressures.

This

can

be an

effective

strategy

when

supported

by

an

organization's

ntegrity

r

rational

rgument.

An

organization,

for

example,may

argue

hata

given

nstitutional

ule s

harmfulo

children

nd

that

the

organization

laces

the needs

of

children

irst.

Atthe

farend of

the

passive-active

ontinuum,

n

organization

may

resist

an

institutional

ule or

norm

by

attempting

o

influenceor

control

t.

Organi-

456




12/43

Institutional Constraints on

Business

Involvement

zations

may manipulate

he

rule

by co-opting

it for their own

purposes

or

working

o

change

the

rule

o

better

ervetheir nterests.Scott

1995)

suggests

that

this

type

of

strategy, pecifically

he

techniques

used

by organizations

o

manipulateiews of their egitimacy,sofgreat nteresto institutionalcholars.

Organizations

re

more

prone

o use such

aggressive

nd

controlling trategies

when institutional

xpectations

re

"incipient,

ocalized,

or

weaklypromoted"

(Oliver,

1991,

p.

158).

Two central onstructs

hought

mportant

n

predicting

what

organizations

do

when

confrontedwith institutional

ressures

are

dependence

and

conso-

nance

(Oliver,

1991).

Dependence

can

be

defined as the

fiscal,

social,

or

political

need for one

agent

to be associatedwith another.Oliver

1991)

posits

thatan

organization

hat

s

dependent

on

anotherwill

be less

successful hould

thatrelationshipwane. Therelativedependence mayindicatea rationale or

eitheradherence r

resistanceo the

institutional

ules,

norms,

or

belief

systems

being

advocated.The

second issue

used to

predict

organizationalesponse

s

the consonanceof

the

MI-Roundtable's

deas,beliefs,

and

agenda

with

that

of

the

pressuring

nstitution.

Oliver

1991)

suggests

hatwhen an

organization

s

in

harmony

with

institutional

pressures-similar

in

norms

and

beliefs--the

organization

will

conform

o the

pressure.

Conversely,

hould

the institution

and the

organization

have

diametrically

pposed

belief

systems,

norms,

or

ideas,

the

organization

s more

likely

o

aggressively ppose

compliance

and

activelyattempt o changethe institution dvanced.

With

regard

o the

focus

of this

study,

the

MI-Roundtable

ndoubtedly

faced

nstitutional

ressures

n

conflictwith

its

own

views

of

education eform.

For

example,

some

conservative

rganizations

hatadvocate

imited

powers

for

government

would

strongly argue

against

the state

deciding

what all

studentsshould

learn.

Other

organizations

may

want the

state to

provide

a

curriculum

ut

be

opposed

to a

rigorous,high-stakes

esting

program.

Proposition

3:

The

greater

the

dependence

of the

MI-Roundtable

n

institutional

gents

advancing

nstitutional

ressures,

he

less

likely

the MI-

Roundtable s to resistthe institutional ressuresadvancedby the agents.

Proposition

: The

greater

he

coherence

between

the

MI-Roundtable's

agenda

andan

institutional

gent's

nstitutional

ressures,

he

less

likely

he MI-

Roundtable s

to resist he

institutional

ressures.

Dataand

Research

Methods

The data

for this

study

include

participant

bservation,

extensive archival

documentation,

nd

three

waves of

structured

nterviewswith

central

igures

insideandoutsideof theMI-Roundtable.heparticipantbservationncludes

the

ongoing

involvement

of

the

author and

his

colleagues

with the MI-

Roundtable

n

the

form

of

education

consultants orthe

business eaders.

The

consultation

egan

n

1990

and

continues

oday.Throughout

he

involvement,

the

MI-Roundtableas

relied

on

the

consultants or a

variety

of

support

asks

and

technical

expertise

on

various

topics

relatedto

schools

and

education

policy.

The

consultants

ave

produced

everal ormal

documents or

the

group

457




13/43

Sipple

detailing

he MI-Roundtable's

genda

and

policypositions

n addition

o

several

smaller,

more informal ssessments

and

reports.

My colleagues

and I

conducted hreewavesof

structurednterviews

15

in 1992, 25 in 1994, and 52 in 1995-1996)with membersof both the MI-

Roundtable

and

the

larger

policy community.

The

schedules

used

in

the

interviewswere

developed

for

purposes

other

han his

study,

but at the

same

time the data are

very

relevant and

appropriate

or use

here.

Archival

documents

were

gathered

from

a

variety

of sources

(e.g.,

letters,

e-mail,

published

and

unpublished

documents,

meeting

minutes)

and

cataloguedby

topic

and

date.

Documents

were

used

to

triangulate

nterview

nd

observation

datafor

accuracy

nd

consistencyby

providing

echnical

nformation

uch

as

dates,

membership

nformation,

nd

policy

statements.

Furthermore,

hese

dataprovideaccurateand reliableinformation n the group'sformaland

informal

olicypositions,

characteristicsf the

group

membership

nd

eader-

ship,

and

changes

in

policy

positions

and

membership.

A

case

study approach

s

used

to

carry

out this

investigation

f

the

MI-

Roundtable's

nvolvement n

state

education

policymaking.

Case

study

meth-

ods are

employed

to

structure ata

collection,

guide

the

analysis,

and

focus

conclusions.Yin

(1994)

argues

convincingly

hata

case

study

s a

"comprehen-

sive

research

trategy"p.

13),

not to be

confused

with

issues of

epistemology

or

general

qualitative

research.

Stake

(1994)

describes

three

types

of

case

studies.Intrinsic asestudiesarethosewhose sole interests a betterunder-

standing

f a

particular

ase.

Instrumentalase

studies

are

hose

in

which

a

case

is

examined

n

order o

derive

a

broader

meaning,

gain

nsight

nto

a

particular

issue,

or refine

theory.

Collective

case

studies

focus on

several

cases

that

collectively

provide

inquiry

nto a

phenomenon,

population,

or

condition

(Stake,

1994).

This

study

encompasses

the

first

two of

Stake's

case

study

types:

ntrinsic

nd

instrumental.

iven he

poor

reputation

nd

history

of

case

study

analysis

Miles

&

Huberman,

987;Yin,

1981),

I

heeded the

recommen-

dations

of Yin

and

Miles

and

Huberman n

conducting

a

systematic

and

replicable tudy hroughheuseof multiple ourcesof data,creationof acase

study

database,

development

f

a

chain

of

evidence,

convergence

among

data

types,

and

investigation

f

rival

explanations.

Finally,

my

involvementwith

the

MI-Roundtable

reates

nevitable

rade-

offs in

conducting

research

uch

as

this.On

the one

hand,

he

involvement

of

university

esearchers

ith

the

MI-Roundtable

embership

aises

questions

of

bias

in

this

analysis.

Some

skeptics

may

argue

hat

he

close

relationship

ither

clouds

the

judgment

f

the

researchers r

prohibits

he

researchers

rom

being

critical

f their

associates,

particularlyiven

the

annual

payment

rom

he MI-

Roundtableo the University f Michigan$80,000).On the otherhand,the

close

relationshipprovides

unique

accessibility

o

people,

documents,

and

events

unavailable o

persons

outside

the

organization.

n

addition,

he

close

relationship

ver

7

years

served

o

develop

a

high

degree

of

trust-and,

hence,

candid

responses-between

MI-Roundtable

membersand

the

researchers.

This

degree

of

trust

and

openness

would

not be

possible

without the

close

working

relationship.

Researcher

ias

n

collecting,

nterpreting,

nd

analyzing

458




14/43


Involvement

the

data

was checked

in a

variety

of

ways.

First,

several

researcherswere

responsible

or

the

collectionof the dataover

the

course

of

7

years.

Second,

transcripts

with

names

removed)

were coded

by

three

researchers,

nd

results

werecomparedocheckforanadequatedegreeof interratereliability. inally,

the

editors,

reviewers, nd,

ultimately,

he reader

provide

a finalcheckfor

bias.

Findings:

Institutional

Influences on the

MI-Roundtable

The

1989

annual

meeting

of the Business National Roundtable

proved

to be

a watershed moment for

corporate

involvement

in

education

policy

in

many

states,

including Michigan,

the

focus

of

this

study.

The National

Roundtable

provided

the

leadership

to

expand

business involvement

in

education

beyond

independent, locally

based,

and

often short-term

programs

oward

more broad-

based and

long-term

involvement at the

local,

state,

and national levels. As

reported

in Phi Delta

Kappan:

Those who were

expecting

business to

sweep

in

like a rich uncle

taking

over a school bake sale and

handing

out

computers,

ndowed

chairs,

or

whateverelse is on the wish list

may

find

that this

new

version

of

business involvement s a short-term

isappointment

nd

a

long-term

hock.

(Pipho,

1990,

p.

582)

As K martand the five otherMichiganmembers of the NationalRoundtable

began

the

process

of

creating

a

state-level

coalition

with

the

governor

and

other

interested

parties,

this

new

group

faced

pressures

and influence

on

many

fronts: the National

Roundtable,

the

leadership

of the six

member

companies,

higher

education,

K-12

education,

the

broader business

community,

and the

established

networks,

power relationships,

and

politics

of

the

education

sector.

During

the summer

of

1989,

the CEOof

Kmartand two of his

senior-level

executives

began

to

coalesce the

Michigan

members

of

the

National

Roundtable.

Guiding

their

efforts were the

goals

and

general

tactics outlined

by

the

National

Roundtable, the prioritiesand interestsof the member companies' leadership,

and at least

one other

education reform

organization

representing

small

business

interests. The

individuals

participating

n the

MI-Roundtable

all

came

from

the

corporate

world.

Original

participants

included vice

presidents

and

individuals

assigned

to

public

policy

and

government

relations. Given

the

participants'high-level

positions,

they

were

obviously quite adept

and success-

ful

in

the

corporate

world. The

earliest

data

suggest

that when the

participants

looked at

schools

they

saw

inefficiency,

poor

management,

a

lack

of

account-

ability,

a

stagnating

union,

and

graduates

who

needed

remedial

(and

expen-

sive ) training before they could effectively work with the encroaching tech-

nological

advances on the

showroom

and

shop

floor.Butwhile the

MI-Roundtable

readily

identified

perceived

problems

with the

public

schools,

ascertaining

strategies

and

solutions

proved

more

vexing.

During

the

summer

of

1990,

less than 1

year

after the

group's

formation,

many

of

the

original

participants

admittedly

viewed the

MI-Roundtable

as

"confused"

and unsure

of

what

direction and

strategy

to

take in

reforming

459




15/43

Sipple

Michigan's

K-12

schools.

Probablystemming

from

their

long-standing

involve-

ment

in

private

business,

the

group

assembled a

(wish)

list of ideas

for

altering

school

performance.

This included the

incorporation

of

free-market

mecha-

nisms in the educational system, the abolishment of the teachers' unions,

consolidation of smaller

districts,

and a

longer

school

year.

The

organization

possessed

little

capacity

to

frame

a

systemic

reform

agenda-as

called for

by

the National

Roundtable-and

struggled putting together

its

own

plan.

The

participants

had little

knowledge

outside

of

their

own

personal

K-12

experi-

ences and

so relied on their

business sense. At

this

early

stage,

the

National

Roundtable was

still

developing

its

agenda,

and the

National

Roundtable

Education Task Force

had

just begun

to meet and so

too had little

capacity

to

ensure that each

state

adopted

its

recommendations.

Hence,

in

1990

the

MI-

Roundtable had no template to guide its actions and little capacity to act as a

leader,

or

catalyst,

for

educational

improvement.

Institutional

Agents

Here

I

briefly

describe the

agents

with whom the

MI-Roundtable

nteracted.

The list was

constructed

by identifying

all

agents

with

whom the

MI-Roundtable

had

contact.

I

make

specific

note of the level

at which

the

agent

operated

and

the

messages

advanced.

Business

National

Roundtable.

The

National

Roundtable

functioned

at

the national level, but the decisions it made had a strong impact on the state

coalitions. It

sought

to

control and

direct the

state

initiatives while

continuing

to

maintain a

presence

on

the

national scene. The

National

Roundtable,

particularly

David

Hornbeck,

provided

direct

guidance

and

assessment

of the

state

coalitions,

as

evidenced

by

Hornbeck's

reading

and

commenting

on the

University

of

Michigan's

white

paper.

Its

national

presence

was

reflected

in

its

public

information

campaigns

(e.g.,

editorials)

and

lobbying

efforts

in

Washing-

ton

(e.g.,

Head

Start).

Member

companies.

The

personal

interests and

leadership

of

its

member

CEOs also prodded the fledglingMI-Roundtable.Thisstudycharacterizes he

CEOs of

member

companies

as

agents

external

to the

MI-Roundtable

because

the bulk

of the

work

on behalf

of the

MI-Roundtable

was and is

done

by

senior-

level

executives

within a

working

group,

not

by

CEOs

themselves.

The

organization

operated

with

the

endorsement,

support,

and

knowledge

of

the

CEOs,

but

the

day-to-day

actions did

not include

the chief

executives. For

this

reason,

when the

CEOs

did

act,

their

influence can

be

viewed as

external

to

the

operation

of

the

MI-Roundtable.

The

CEOsexhibited an

interest

in

developing

a

relationship

with the new

governor and in passing legislation.One CEOrevealed his perspective on what

most

needed to be

done:

"Wecan

sit

around

a

room and talk

about

what's

right

and what's

wrong

[with

schools]

but

unless

it's

really

decided

upon

and...put

into

effect

through

legislation,

[education

reform]

won't

work." The

CEOs

also

looked

for

results-evidence

that their

initiativewas

accomplishing something.

The

chief

executives

used

their'position

to

appoint

government

relations

personnel

to the

MI-Roundtableand

forge

a

relationship

with the

governor.

460




16/43


Involvement

They

did not

meet with

local

superintendents

r

gather

nformation n

their

own.

The

only

evidence of CEO

activity

at the national

evel was

attendance

by

some

at

the annual

meeting

of the BusinessNational

Roundtable.

EconomicAllianceofMichigan.Inaddition o the NationalRoundtable

and

the member

companies,

he

only

evidence

of another nstitutional

gent

interacting

with the

MI-Roundtable

uring

he first

year

of

operation

was

an

organization

alled the EconomicAlliance

of

Michigan

hereafterAlliance).'

This

organization

onsisted

f

a

variety

f

business

organizationsncluding

abor

and trade

groups

such as the

Michigan

RealtorsAssociation nd the

Michigan

Manufacturersssociation. heAlliance ad

recently

egun

assembling

ts

own

agenda

for

reforming

Michigan

chools. It acted

by

advancing

pecific

policy

proposals

at the

state

level.

The

Alliance

planned

to affect

egislative

policy

decisions and assumed hatsuchpolicieswould filterdown to the locallevel,

influencing

eachersand schools. One

active MI-Roundtable

articipant

t-

tempted

to

engage

the two

groups, viewing

potential

collaborationas an

opportunity

or the

MI-Roundtableo broaden ts business ies

throughout

he

state and thus increase

ts

politicalcapital.

University

fMichigan.

Through

a

prior

association

with

the

president

of

the

University

f

Michigan,

he

MI-Roundtable

EOs ontacted

he

university

president

n

July

of

1990

to seek

guidance

on their

development

of a K-12

educationreform

agenda.

The

president

ubsequently

ontacted he dean

of

the university'sSchool of Education o inform him of the contactand to

recommendhe be involved.The

university aculty

had

ties to other

scholars

across

the

country,

supplementing

heir

own

expertise

on

policy

issues

of

interest o the

MI-Roundtable,

ystemic

reform,

and

public

policy.

Moreover,

the

university

professional

taff

(e.g.,

the

Government

Relations

Office)

pro-

vided

expertise

in

interacting

with

state

government

and the

media. This

bifaceted

approach

information

evelopment

and

politicalguidance)

proved

valuable

o

the

MI-Roundtable.

Governor's

ffice.

The

election

of

John

Engler

as

governor

n

November

of 1990 played a significantrole in the behavior and impactof the MI-

Roundtable.

Engler

ode

to

victory

on

a wave

of fiscal

conservatism.

A

slogan

repeated

often

by

Engler

alled

for

"new

priorities,

ot

new

taxes."

n

his

first

state-of-the-stateddress

February

1,

1991),

Engler

istedchildren s

his

"one

absolute

spending priority."

He

vowed

to

"put

education back at the

top

of

the

agenda."

The

governor

described"excellence n

every

school"as the

most

important

ational

oal.

Concurrent ith

his

top spending

priority, roperty

ax

reduction became

Engler's

number

one

method of

attracting

business

to

Michigan.

n his

first

peech

on the

topic

of

education,

Engler

mentioned he

MI-Roundtabley name andemphasized he mainpointsof itsagenda.

In

sum,

Engler

and

his staff

used a

bully

pulpit strategy

n which

they

identified and

proclaimed

goals

for

the

state,

but

they

left much of

the

implementation

nd

many

of

the details o

the local

level.

In

doing

this,

Engler

could

call

himself

the

education

governor

and

take

a

strong

eadership

role

while

not

getting

mired in

details,

regulations,

and

the

expense

of

state-

sponsored

programs.

Engler

quickly

consolidated

his

power

over issues of

461




17/43

Sipple

education,

resulting

n broad

agreement

n who

was in

charge

of education

at

the state evel. For he

MI-Roundtable,

his

nearly pelled

disasteras

it

got

off

on the

wrong

foot

with

Engler

by

not

backing

him in

the

1990

gubernatorial

campaign.Throughpriorrelationships ndthehighstatusof MI-Roundtable

participants,

he MI-Roundtable

as able to work

to

gain

the

support

of

the

governor.

Michigan Partnershipor

New

Education. Anotheractor

in

Michigan

education

reform

was

the

MichiganPartnership

or New Education

hereafter

Partnership).

his

organization egan

at

Michigan

tate

University

n

1987

and

was funded

by

both

the stateand

private

ntities.

During

he

MI-Roundtable's

formative

ears,

he

Partnership

as

headed

by

the

dean of the

Michigan

tate

College

of

Education.2

The

primary

thrust

of

the

organization

was

to

reconceptualize he preparation f teachersand the relationshipbetween

universities nd

K-12

schools.

The main

program

romoted

by

the

Partnership

was

the

creationof

professional

development

schools in

which

university

faculty

ollaboratewith

K-12

personnel

o

improve

practice

nd

provide

a rich

environment or the

preparation

f new

teachers.

In

early

October

of

1990,

the

executive director

f the

Partnership

rote

the

MI-Roundtable

eadership.

The

letterwas

in

regard

o the

possibility

of

coordinating

he

efforts

of

the

Partnership

nd the

MI-Roundtable,

n

idea met

with

skepticism

t the

September

MI-Roundtable

orkinggroup

meeting.

The

director tressed heimportance fworking ogetherwith one voice:"Since

clear and

consistent

message

about educational

change

is

critical,

multiple,

conflicting

messages

will

encourage

business-as-usual'

n

Michigan's

chools

and

colleges."

The

director

also reminded he

leader

of

the

working group

about he

National

Roundtable

uidelines

orthe

state

coalitions,

which

stressed

the

importance

of

coalition

building.

Not-so-subtle

pressure

directed

at the

leader to

persuade

his

organization

o

join

forces with

the

Partnership

was

included

n

the

second

etter:

"Only ou

can

help

the

Michigan

artnership

nd

the

Michigan

National

Roundtable

ork

n

concert.

You

are

key

to our

building

a formidable lliance oreducational hangehere inMichigan."

Why

did

the

Partnership

antto

join

forces

with

the

MI-Roundtable?

hy

was the

MI-Roundtable

eluctant o

merge

with

the

Partnership?

he

answers

to these

questions

erveto

illuminate

he

complexities

f the

coalitions n

state

policymaking.

he

Partnership

anted

o

develop

a

close

working

relationship

withthe

MI-Roundtableo

increase ts

political apital

nd

broaden ts

resource

base.

The

Partnership

ad

only

a

single

sourceof

private

unds

(a

prominent

commercial

eal

estate

developer

n

Michigan)

nd

probably

iewed

the

large

MI-Roundtable

orporations

s

a

solid

sourceof

continued

inancial

upport.

TheMI-Roundtableas reluctant o joinwith the Partnershipecauseof the

relatively

narrow

conception

of

reform

advocated

by

the

Partnership.

How-

ever,

given

that he

developer,

Alfred

Taubman,

was also a

major

ontributor

to the

university,

he

president

ndicated hat t

was

very

important

o

include

Taubmanand

Michigan

State

University

President

ohn

DiBiaggio

n

the MI-

Roundtable

ctivities.The

deference

to

DiBiaggio

and the

developer

created

an

artificial

llegiance

to

and

inclusion

of

the

Partnership

n

MI-Roundtable

462


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