UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Diliman, Quezon CityKAMIKAZE JAPANS SPECIAL ATTACK FORCE

IN THE PACIFIC WAR, 1944-1945

A Term Paper submitted to

Dr. Eden M. Griplado

As Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

in the course Kas 151

By:

Frauline Tadle

April 2013TABLE OF CONTENTSTitle Page1

Table of Contents2

I: Introduction3

A. Objectives of the Paper3

B. Hypothesis3

C. Etymology and Historical Background4

II: Discussion5

A. Factors that led to the creation of 'special attack force5

' 1. Rise of the Allied Forces5

2. Decline of the Imperial Force 7

B. Formation, execution, notable missions and effect of the American forces9

1. Recruitment of Pilots9

2. Execution of Kamikaze Attacks10

3. Notable kamikaze missions12

4. Recorded fatalities in both Japanese and American forces17

C. Understanding the psychology of the kamikaze pilots19

1. General profile of the pilots19

2. Factors that motivated the pilots to volunteer20

3. Farewell Letters24

III. Summary and Conclusion25

List of References27

I. INTRODUCTIONThis paper studies in detail the non-conventional military strategy strategically employed by Japan during the Pacific War the special attack forces or kamikaze. It looks into the rationale and effectiveness of the kamikaze attacks and provides an insight into the psychology of the kamikaze pilots. A. Objectives

The Pacific War is a major event that plays a significant role in Japans modern history. A number of historical accounts and literature have been written about the war. Any student of Japans war history would be intrigued by one particular facet of the Japanese peoples character as exemplified by their brave young soldiers their willingness to die for the sake of their Emperor and country.

This paper aims to study the special attack group the Kamikaze pilots conceptualized and employed by the Japanese military at the height of the Pacific War in 1944 to 1945. What were the factors that forced its military to employ such suicidal tactics against the allied powers? How effective were these kamikaze attacks? What motivated the Japanese soldiers to accept such mission knowing fully well that it meant certain death? B. Hypotheses

The kamikaze attack groups failed in its mission of defending Japans territories and their homeland against the Allied forces. While at the onset it caused significant damage to the enemy warships and manpower, the attacks did not deter the attacking forces and turn the war in favor of Japan.

The kamikaze pilots were not suicidal fanatics as perceived by the Westerners during and after the war. They were loyal subjects of the Emperor who volunteered for the mission and willingly chose to embrace death to protect their Emperor and nation.C. Etymology of the term and Historical Background

'Kamikaze' was the colloquial term used by foreign authors referring to the 'special attack groups' of the Japanese Imperial force during the last phase of the Pacific War.1 It was composed of Japanese fighter planes and was formed by Vice Admiral Ohnishi Takijiro on October 19, 1944. He originally named the attack force Shimpu which meant 'God's Wind' that can also be written as 'kamikaze'. The troop was officially named 'tokubetsu kogekitai', shortened as 'tokketai'. The term Kamikaze also pertains to the typhoon that miraculously protected the country of Japan from invasion of Kublai Khan's Army in the 13th century.

Suicidal actions of military men were not new in a war. Even before the official formation of Kamikaze attack group in 1944, several accounts have been recorded about the willingness of Japanese fighters to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the Empire. Since the attack on Pearl Harbor, there were records of Japanese pilots dare-to-die decisions of intentionally crashing their aircrafts into American planes or ships.2. Also, months before the Kamikaze groups were formed, it was believed that the first planned suicide attack happened at Battle of Biak in New Guinea. As their last resort against the stronger American forces which conducted a surprise invasion, Major Katsuhige Takada led five others to intentionally crash their planes into the enemy warship.3

All of the previous suicide attacks were mostly random in nature. This was what made Kamikaze attacks different because, after their supposed accomplishment during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, they were officially employed in every way possible. Suicide weapons may have developed earlier than Kamikaze group but the damage they inflicted on the enemies were not as massive and critical than what Kamikaze had done. Proof of this was the number of recorded sorties which started from 50 to 300 planes in the battles in the Philippine Islands which rose to approximately 1,900 during the Okinawa Islands Campaign when Kamikaze planes composed most of the defensive forces of the Imperial forces. This increase in number proved Japan's heavy reliance on the ability of the Kamikazes in destroying enemy ships. Were the assumptions of the Japanese forces reasonable? Did the Kamikaze groups make significant contributions in Japan's campaign of defending its crumbling Empire?

II. DISCUSSION

A. Factors that led to the creation of special attack forces

1. Rise of the Allied Forces

Events before 1944 largely contributed to the formation of Kamikaze special attack groups. When Japan's naval force was still the mightiest in the Pacific, the American-led Allied forces surprisingly defeated it. It was the historical battles of Coral Sea, Midway and Philippine Sea that reversed the situation and turned the favor over to the American side. Because of the outcomes of these battles, particularly in the Battle of Midway, the American forces began to take momentum while the Imperial forces shifted to defensive mode.

Before the Battle of Coral Sea (May 1942), Japan had already lost two large transports and two other vessels while nine other which includes a light cruiser and two destroyers were damaged.4 In the actual battle in Coral Sea wherein Port Moresby was at stake, Vice Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi met several problems. Vital to this was the fact that the American forces were able to anticipate Japanese movements through the works done by cryptoanalysts and radio traffics analysts.5 Because of this, the American military was able to prepare enough forces to combat Admiral Inoue's forces which only included two carriers namely Shokaku and Zuikaku. Battle of Coral Sea resulted to significant loss in the number of aircrafts and crew which comprised one-third of the strength for Midway6 and Shokoku. Despite this, Vice Admiral Inoue failed to capture Port Moresby.

The Battle of Midway (June 1942) marked the start of the decline of Japanese Imperial forces. Days before the operation, American cryptoanalysts, due to another delay in distribution, were given much time to break almost 90% of the intercepted message.7 Through this, they were able to gather vital information on the incoming operations. Senior officers have not taken this seriously but prepared nonetheless.

On the other hand, Admiral Yamamoto confidently spread the forces in every direction in order to engage with American forces regardless of the direction they would come from. Admiral Yamamoto also did not take reports about suspicious forces seriously. Convinced that the plan would work well, he did not know that they let themselves fall into the American trap. They started the operation, which only confirmed suspicions of the Americans and they hurriedly sent for additional forces to Midway. The battle of Midway caused 60% of its aerial forces8, four of their largest carriers, tankers and significant numbers of veteran crewmen. It was during this battle that Imperial forces began to engage in defensive measures.

Lastly, the Battle of Philippine Sea was part of the Allied campaign to isolate Japan from its sources of fuel as well as effective air bases. Admiral Soemu Toyoda radioed Vice Admiral Ozama Jisaburo who was in-charge of the battle and said The rise and fall of Imperial Japan depends on this one battle. Everyman shall do his utmost.9 Vice Admiral Ozawa was confident of his plan. He, however, underestimated the effects of previous battles, especially the battle of the Midway, to the number of crewmen and aircrafts. During this battle, Japanese forces had only three carriers while their enemies had seven.10

With the hyped-up American soldiers as well as with the dramatic decrease in the strength of the Japanese forces, the battle of Philippine Sea concluded with Japan having lost too much of its power. She had lost her newly commissioned 800-ft long carrier Taiho, two other heavy carriers, 92% of Ozawa's carrier planes, 72% of his float planes as well as 50 Guam-based aircrafts - a total of 475 planes and 2 oilers.11 Combined with the losses of the previous battles, Japan's naval forces which used to be branded as the strongest have lost much of its power and strength, putting Japan in great peril and pressure to maintain the remaining colonies in order to protect the homeland.

2. The Decline of the Japanese Imperial Force During the last months of the World War II, the condition of the Imperial Forces was already critical. Its previous battles which included the battles stated above - Coral Sea, Midway and Philippine Sea - became the turning points of the situation in the Pacific. Japan had lost too many ships, planes and veteran pilots which weakened her forces severely.12

Through those consecutive defeats, several other factors can be considered that contributed to the rapid decline of Japanese Imperial forces. One significant factor was the topography of the Pacific. The Empire of Japan during World War II can be divided into two: those that were part of the mainland Asia while the others were part of the Pacific islands. This kind of topography had large effect on other factors.

One of the elements largely affected by this kind of topography was the supply of fuel. Because part of its empire was archipelagic in nature, aircrafts and ships consumed lots of fuels to travel from point of origin to the battle site. Insufficient supply of fuel posed a dilemma to the officers. They had to conserve it but at the same time, launch an effective attack against the enemies. Lack of fuel also restricted the amount of time the pilots could practice for their operations, lessening the chances that they could learn skills that were necessary during the actual battles. Thus, lack of fuel decreased their capacity to effectively protect the empire.

However, US Strategic Bombing Survey found out that Japan had almost one million barrels of aviation fuel. Hence, fuel was not a limiting factor for the foreseeable future, as all of the planned 5, 350 kamikaze sorties required only about 50,000 barrels of aviation gasoline.13 This could be possible, however, this conclusion seemed to not have made considerations on the loss of two tankers and characteristic of Japan's empire which is mostly archipelagic.

Due to the grave effect of previous battles, particularly, of Midway and Philippine Sea, Japan had lost much of her manpower and aircraft, which was the main vessel in the Pacific War. Among the hundred of deaths in their battles, Japan also lost most of her veteran pilots. Imperial forces had kept on sending their best flyers to battle while the Americans rotated experienced pilots between combat so it can maintain the nucleus of the air forces.14

Last but not the least, Japanese officers have put much confidence on their forces ability and plans. This over-confidence led to carelessness and faulty disposition of forces.15 This was apparent in the battles of Midway and Philippine Sea. Admiral Yamamoto's attitude of underestimating and neglecting earlier warnings of scouting planes led them to a trap and subsequent defeat. Admiral Ozawa made the same mistakes of underrating the forces of the enemies and overestimating the power of their forces. Ironically, it can be said that the successes of the Americans were partly owed to Japan's superior officers themselves.B. Formation, execution, notable missions and effects on the American forces

1. Recruitment of Pilots

The first few batches of Kamikaze attack groups were mostly composed of volunteer pilots. The first group that was personally formed by Admiral Ohnishi in Mabalacat were 23 pilots volunteer pilots under commander Tamai's command.16 In fact, when Admiral Ohnishi decided to extend the Kamikaze Operation by asking for more pilots and aircrafts from Second Air Fleet, many pilots enthusiastically volunteered that they outnumbered the available aircraft. From the vast quantity of flyers, four Kamikaze units were formed within 24 hours.17

Kamikaze attack groups soon became systematic and regular but many pilots had already perished in the battlefield. To address the problem of shortage in pilots, the Imperial force began to recruit candidates. Recruited pilots for Kamikaze groups came from two sources: those who were trained in special training schools and those that were drafted from universities. Those special training schools were established as early as February 1937 and most of them were just elementary and high school graduates.

The other type were drafted from the universities. In response to the increasing needs, the Tojo cabinet shortened the duration of education to 3 to 6 months. Exemptions were made for those who are well-versed with science and education as well as those who were unfit to fight.18 Red letters or akagami issued by Office of the Draft (Choheika) were sent to the families of the students who will be drafted. Those who received an akagami had little chance of refusing it. Eventually, the Tojo cabinet made it legal to draft Korean, Taiwanese and indigenous people of Taiwan. On April 1944 and 1945, Koreans and Taiwanese were mandatorily drafted respectively.

2. Execution of attacks

Vice Admiral Ohnishi had already acknowledged that crash-diving tactics had three serious defects: expenditure of life and material, striking velocity was not enough to penetrate and make critical damage to enemy ships and evaluation of effect of Kamikaze attacks were often over-estimated because operational command could not evaluate their result with complete accuracy.19 Because of this, planning, accuracy and speed were of extreme importance.

The ideal time before Kamikaze attack groups could sortie was two hours upon sighting of the enemy ship. During this time, position of the enemy force, estimation of strength and enemy course would be studied. After this course, quantity of planes that should be launched based on the available aircrafts and time to take off would be planned. Before taking off, pilots were given several ceremonies and rituals to bring them success in their missions and give them a chance to express their feelings to those they would leave behind.20

Accuracy was also a paramount element in every Kamikaze mission. Shortage of fuel supply was the foremost reason. Every sortie made by Kamikaze attack group consumed fuel but because of the decreasing supply of fuel, commanding officers should ensure that every consumption should be maximized to its fullest potential resulting to good results. On the part of the pilots, correct timing of parts of execution- from when to take the angle of attack, accurate point of aim (which is usually on the flight deck or central elevator) up to the moment when to release bomb safety was important for a more effective hit against the enemy.21

Speed was a vital factor in every execution of Kamikaze attacks. Once the pilots have sortied, every part of the plan should be executed with all possible swiftness. To attain the necessary quickness of the operation, they made a standard number for every sortie: five planes composed of three kamikaze planes and two escorts.22 The Japanese believed that the smaller the number of planes, the greater the agility and chances of intercepting the enemy attacks. Of course, this number was not fixed and still depended on the number of planes available as well as on the quantity of invading forces.

Along with speed, formation was also necessary to maintain. Once the group sortied, by all available means, pilots should maintain the formation. Such was the significance of formation that this is where the role of escort comes in. The two escorts had the mission of securing that the Kamikazes would be able to dive into their targets, even if it cost their lives.23 They were not equipped with offensive weapons for it may affect the formation. Instead, they only had the choices of dodging or bluffing the enemies. Thus, it can be assumed that upon acceptance of the role, they had already accepted their fate of death. No wonder, statistics on how many kamikaze planes sortied made no exeption on escort planes for without them, Kamikaze mission would have had less chance of becoming successful.

3. Notable Missions (Battles of Leyte Gulf and Okinawa Islands)

After experiencing massive loss in the Battle of Philippine Sea, the Japanese Imperial Navy was in complete confusion. Reorganization of the remaining forces was done hastily in time for the expected invasion of the Philippines. Japanese forces formally lauched Sho-Go Operation which had the objective of defending Japan from invading American forces by protecting the critical areas Philippines, Formosa, Nansei Shoto, Kyushu, Shikoku, Honshu and Hokkaido.24 Sho Operation line of attack relied heavily on the planes of the Army and Navy which were all concentrated on lands for the first time.25 However, aside from the losses they had experienced in the Battle of Philippine Sea which cost them three aircraft carriers and more than 400 planes and pilots, consecutive air raids done by American forces from September 9 to 22 reduced the number to approximately 100 operable planes for the entire Philippines.26 Desperate enough to strengthen the defensive forces in the Philippines, other measures such as the dangerous skip-bombing was also employed.

It was October 17, 1944 when Vice Admiral Ohnishi Takijiro succeeded Admiral Kimpei Teraoka as commanding officer of the First Air Fleet. He arrived at Mabalacat on October 19 with the task of forming the very first suicide attack group in order to assist Admiral Kurita's force in its mission of penetrating Leyte Gulf by rendering enemy carriers ineffective for at least one week. Ohnishi explained:

We can no longer win the war by adhering to conventional methods of warfare. Instead,

we must seek ourselves against weakness. If fighter pilots set an example by

volunteering for special attack missions, other units will follow suit. These examples will,

in turn, inspire surface forces and army forces.27

After the meeting, Commander Tamai relayed the message to his subordinates. Later that evening, Commander Tamai confirmed that 24 pilots from his group voluntarily accepted the mission. Among those 23 pilots, Lieutenant Yukio Seki was chosen as leader.28 This group was divided into four units: Shikishima, Asahi and Yamazakura which were based at Mabalacat and Yamato at Cebu.29

The Shikishima unit first sortied on October 21 but failed to find enemies. Afternoon of the same day, six planes that would be used for Kamikaze mission were destroyed in Cebu.30 Right after the incident, the Japanese forces sent two kamikaze planes and one escort. Only two returned to the base while the other one which was piloted by Lt. Kuno Yoshiyasu did not return but there was no official record of American ship that was damaged or sunk on that day.31

Shikishima unit continued launching for three consecutive days which all ended up failing. At the same time, Admiral Kurita's forces were attacked constantly and had already received so much damage which includes sinking of two heavy cruisers and disabling a third. Admiral Kurita blamed the Kamikaze for not doing its mission. It was actually the bad weather that blinded them. Still, they felt pressured and anxious, especially Lt. Seki. The sinking of superbattleship Musashi made their feelings grew worse.32

Finally, on October 25, the first successful kamikaze attack happened on day break. They were able to damage three escort carriers.33 At 7:25 in the morning, Shikishima unit led by Lt. Yukio Seki sortied from Mabalacat. At 10:50, the General Quarters was again sounded due to nine approaching planes who flew at mast level then climbed down several thousand feet.34 This was the group of Lt. Seki which to seemed to have used the low-altitude approach in which planes fly close to the surface of the sea to avoid being detected by the radar. Lt. Seki was able to hit carrier St. Lo squarely on its deck, which was followed by another plane and mainly caused the sinking of the ship. Soon enough, the carrier sank. Other casualties inflicted by Seki's group were damages on Escort Aircraft Carrier Kalinin Bay, Kitkun Bay, White Plains, Sangamon, Santee and Suwanee.35 Seki's attack cost America a total of 131 men killed.36

The achievement of Lt. Seki's group further convinced Admiral Ohnishi on the effectiveness of kamikaze tactics compared to the conventional methods. He even extended the kamikaze operation by asking some of the planes and pilots from Second Air Fleet. The extension went on. The kamikaze group that should be limited to 24 planes intended for the Sho Operation only went on until the Battle of Okinawa Islands wherein, number of kamikaze planes which sortied soared up to 3,000 to 4,000.

Okinawa was an elongated island about sixty miles from north to south and only two miles wide near the middle. In spite of this small size compared to the other islands of Japan, Okinawa was considered the last important bastion guarding the homeland.37 Japanese planners had long anticipated that after the fall of Iwo Jima, Okinawa would soon follow. On April 1, 1945, over 180,000 marines and soldiers rode in more than 1,200 ships and had already began invading the island.38

The Kamikaze attack groups now became regular part of the Imperial forces. In the Battle of Okinawa Islands, kamikaze planes were assigned to defend the islands. Lt. General Ushijima who was the commanding officer of 32nd Army assigned to defend Okinawa already knew that his force was not enough to effectively accomplish their mission.39 What could have had concerned him at that time, along with the rest of the Imperial forces was to prevent the battle from reaching Honshu where the Emperor lives. He expected that the massive number of kamikaze aircraft would inflict damages to American fleet in order to decrease their air and naval gunfire support, thus, diminishing the strength of the enemies in the process. He planned that half of the massive air attacks to be sent against the American fleet would be kamikazes.40

Contrary to the battles in the Philippines Islands where they were episodic in nature, kamikaze attacks during the Battle of Okinawa were massive. Main waves of their attacks happened from April 16 to June 22 when 10 mass air attacks occurred, each had 50 to 300 kamikaze planes. Phenomenal among these was when the Imperial forces chose to sacrifice its superbattleship Yamato, which was deprived of any air cover for the sake of kamikaze attacks. Along with other cruiser and destroyers that sunk, 3, 600 men died on the day which was marked as the 'end of the Japanese Imperial Navy.' 41

Sacrifices of kamikaze pilots as well as other navy and army men seemed to have not been in vain. U.S. war records on the casualties caused by kamikaze attacks showed that they made considerable damage on the American invading forces. Because most of the damages inflicted by kamikaze attacks were made worse by succeeding explosions and fires within the ship, the Americans required navy men to learn effective firefighting methods.42 On May 12, Admiral Richard Spruance's flagship, New Mexico had to undergo two weeks repairing after having received an attack from a kamikaze.43 At a certain time, the kamikaze attacks were able to sink two ammunition ships which partially restricted the movement of the American forces since it cut down their supplies of ammunition. Approximately 3, 400 American personnel died because of kamikaze attacks in Battle of Okinawa alone.

In spite of Japanese efforts of defending Okinawa, on June 21, 1945 the resistance in Okinawa ended.44 Officers after the war ended have expressed their amazement on how the Japanese were able to prolong the war - longer than what the Americans had anticipated. Aside from the impairments induced by kamikaze attacks, they were also able to fully utilize the advantages of Okinawa's terrain. Japanese's tenacity was also an additional factor. One commander said the following:

The Japanese did a magnificent job of withdrawing and fighting a delaying action; that

was all that was left to them and they did that beautifully... We poured a tremendous

amount of metal in on those positions. Not only from artillery but from ships at sea. It

seemed nothing could possibly be living in that churning mass where the steels were

falling and roaring but when we next advanced, Japs would still be there, even madder

that they had been before.45

In the end, however, these efforts proved futile because the Japanese Imperial army lost the battle with terrible losses. 4. Recorded fatalities in both Japanese and American forces

Existing records on the number of kamikaze planes sent by the Imperial forces or the casualties caused by it to the American forces are still incomplete. Based on the statistics released by both forces published in Inoguchi Rikihei's The Divine Wind, the number of kamikaze sorties and casualties on American forces from the day it was formed until the war ended are as follows:46AreaNumber of Kamikaze Sorties/Returned/ Expended (includes escort planes)Casualties on the American forces

SortiedReturnedExpendedSunkDamaged

Philippines6601804801687

Okinawa180987993017193

TOTAL(Time Frame: October 1944- August 1945)23141086122834288

Note that Inoguchi mentioned the number of kamikaze which returned. Even if kamikaze missions have 100% possibility of no return, there were instances that kamikaze planes came back for various reasons like not being able to find enemies or they experienced technical problems while flying forcing them to fly back to base.

Based on the data presented by Inoguchi, we can initially perceive that the kamikaze attack did not make any significant effect or damage on the American fleet despite the increase in number of sorties, especially during the campaign in Okinawa. However, we have to bear in mind that the principle behind kamikaze attacks was: 'One plane, one warship'. This may sound impossible and far from the ideal four kamikazes against a large carrier,47 but what they really want to convey in this principle was 'one man who damaged a carrier or battleship take a thousand enemies with him'.48 The kamikaze attacks damaged their enemy's forces not only of ships and other vessels but also of man power.

Such effects were justified by the ratio of number of kamikaze pilots to the number of American soldiers they killed with one attack. In the first major success of kamikaze attack, when carrier St. Lo was sunk by Lt. Seki's group, 131 Americans died compared to the 12 kamikaze pilots who had sacrificed their lives. There were 11 Americans who died to one kamikaze pilot.49 The following statistics is also worth noting the number of American soldiers who died because of kamikaze attacks from its formation in October 1944 to August 1945 was 2,200 from October 1944 to the start of Okinawa campaign and 3,389 deaths during the main waves of battle50 for a total of 5,600 casualties. On the Japanese side, the official count released by Combined Fleet Headquarters put the kamikaze casualties at 2,409.51 These figures clearly show that the kamikaze attacks have caused a considerable loss of American forces during the last 10 months of World War II.

Nevertheless, this can never change the fact that Japan had intentionally brought death to its soldiers. Some said that such tactics further aggravated the situation of Imperial forces. The officers should have maximized the man power of their soldiers rather than expending them in a method that limits it. And no matter how much lives were sacrificed, the fall of Japanese Empire was not avoided.C. UNDERSTANDING THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE KAMIKAZE PILOTS

1. General profile of the Kamikaze pilotsThe kamikaze pilots were of two types: 1) those who graduated from a special Navy training program, and 2) university graduates.

Even prior to World War 2 when Japan was starting to militarize, the military already started training young pilots as young as elementary and middle school graduates. They were called boy pilots.52 They were later enlisted into the Navy and Army and formed the first groups of kamikaze pilots.

The vast majority of the volunteer pilots, however, were University graduates. In 1872, universal conscription was legalized which allowed for mandatory drafting of all male Japanese at age 22. In 1941, university term was shortened by six months for earlier drafting of the students due to the urgent need for more soldiers. Exemptions were granted to the following - Science and Education majors particularly those who were selected as prospective government scientists, those who were physically unfit, eldest/only sons (to honor the primogeniture system and ensure continuity of the family line) and those who had other brothers already serving in the military.

In 1943, in anticipation of the escalation of war, military draft deferment for college students was cancelled. The first massive recruitment took place. Six thousand (6,000) university students were drafted.53 A good number of them came from the major universities like University of Tokyo and Imperial University. Even Koreans and Taiwanese Chinese were drafted. From these pool of reserves came most of the volunteer pilots.

Onishi, the architect of the kamikaze attacks, regarded these young men with self-sacrificing spirits as the treasure of the nation whose purity will usher in the Divine Wind.542. Factors that motivated the pilots to volunteer The pilots age ranged from 17 to 23. They were clearly Japans intellectual cream of the crop. They were young and ambitious men who were just starting to craft their future lives. They were loyal and loving sons who had dreams for their respective families. They were young men who were starting to fall in love and looked forward to getting married someday. They were intellectuals, with a strong zest for learning having been exposed to both Japanese and Western literature. They could have been Japans future leaders. Moreover, the desire to live is a basic human need and yet, these pilots had to overcome that desire in order to perform their duty. How, then, can we explain their willingness to volunteer for the mission which meant certain death?

The special attack force was conceptualized as a voluntary system. The military officers would call for volunteers from among the young pilots during formations in military bases or during graduation rites in military schools. The ritual would proceed as follows : An officer would first give a passionate lecture on the value of patriotism and the need to sacrifice their lives for the sake of the Emperor and Japan. Each soldier would then be given a paper which they would mark with two circles if they were volunteering. A returned unmarked paper would mean refusal to volunteer. Surprisingly, there were no shortages of volunteers. In fact, there were more volunteers than there were available aircrafts. Some who were turned down would even despair about it and plead with their superiors to take them in. For them, dying for the Emperor was their ultimate duty.

While Japans accounts of the war belied any form of coercion during these exercises, some form of pressure was clearly at play. Some survivors claimed that they volunteered because they could not bear seeing their comrades and friends offering their lives. In some farewell letters written by the pilots prior to their mission, they expressed admiration for the courage and self-sacrificing spirit of their fellow pilots. There was also peer pressure because each pilot was representing his university. They did not want to disgrace their university by refusing to volunteer.

Family honor was also at stake. In most farewell letters, some pilots expressed their willingness to die to protect their families. Over and above their duty to their country, it was their duty to protect their loved families and their young wives from the enemies. They rationalized that if they could sink an enemy ship, the war would not reach their native land and kill their loved ones.

For the families of the kamikaze pilots who had to accept the certainty of their sons death, it was part of their duty to the Emperor to offer their sons to the nation.55 They were taught not to oppose, not to cry, but to endure and silently suffer in anguish as they await news of their sons death.

Such indoctrination of the Japanese came at an early age. In school, the Japanese children were taught as little patriots56 or the Emperors children, and as such, they should be ready and willing to die for the sake of the Emperor, their living god. It was impressed upon them early on that the Yamato race was unequalled and that Japan was a superior nation whose mission was to lead the world. That is how they justified the war.

A deeper indoctrination occurred in the military school and bases. The Emperor led the military and therefore was above criticism. Any attack on the military was anti-Emperor. The truth, however, was that there was no mechanism to check the military in cases when it acted on its own discretion.57 The prerogative of the supreme command of the armed forces was beyond the control of the ministers of state who served the Emperor and advised him on matters pertaining to the affairs of the state. Even the highly influential zaibatsus or large business conglomerates did not interfere with the war decisions because they actually profited from the war. The state was almighty and any act of the military perceived as acting on orders of the Emperor was completely justified.

For the young Japanese soldiers, dying for the Emperor was inevitable once they entered the military. The Bushido Code instilled in their young minds the virtues of courage, loyalty and honor. They looked forward to being enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine. Yasukuni Shrine is the resting place for the soldiers who died for the Emperor. It was founded in 1869 to enshrine the 6,991 soldiers who died in the war that ended the Tokugawa shoguns rule and bought the Imperial family to power in the Meiji Restoration.58 This is where the Emperor would, in turn, honor them by paying tribute to them personally. In WWII, to be enshrined and prayed to by the Emperor was the highest honor that could be bestowed on a loyal soldier.

However, there were also survivor accounts of torture and corporal punishments inside the military bases. Those who failed to carry out orders of kamikaze attacks were dealt with extreme penalty. The senior military officers who trained them were resolute and commanded respect and did not tolerate any criticism. Misconceptions about the Kamikaze pilotsDuring the war, the American soldiers, quite understandably, hated what they perceived as the Japanese soldiers recklessness, fanaticism and indifference to death.59 They thought they were facing an insane and barbaric enemy that was not at all human and so the only way to beat the Japanese was to kill them all. Kill him, or he will kill you.60 Some war historians have even suggested that it was this extreme fanaticism exhibited by the kamikaze pilots that somehow contributed to Americas willingness to use the atomic bomb. Even after the war, this perception and negative image of the Kamikaze soldier persisted in the minds of the Westerners and the non-Japanese in general. War literature and movies depicted the Kamikazes as robot-like soldiers who were manipulated into self-immolation. 3. Kamikazes Farewell LettersAfter the war, several documentaries and books were published in Japan detailing the farewell letters and diaries left behind by the pilots. These letters were intended for their families prepared by the pilots on the day prior to their sortie. These poignant and emotionally-moving letters allow the readers to have a deeper and more humane understanding of the psychology of the kamikazes. Faced with imminent death, the pilots poured out their insights and thoughts on life and death. Each letter gave a human face to each of the kamikaze pilot. He was no longer just a nameless and faceless fanatical and suicidal soldier as depicted by war documentaries. Most letters spoke of the pilots love for their families and their regret for having to die at a young age and not be able to support their family. Some expressed their patriotism and hopes for their nation after the war.

The kamikaze idea may have been too barbaric an idea for most non-Japanese. But the personal reflections expressed by the kamikazes themselves in their letters have eventually influenced both Japanese and non-Japanese views of the kamikaze more than anything else. IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Kamikaze attack group was formed out of desperate need of protecting the remaining bastions of Imperial Japan and to protect its homeland during the time when they had a severe insufficiency of aircrafts and pilots. Japan no longer had the means to use conventional tactics. It was initially just a temporary mission to assist the invading forces in the Battle of Leyte Gulf. But after having witnessed its initial success which was unprecedented at that time, Admiral Ohnishi decided to extend it. Soon, it became regular and systematic and was widely used during the final phase of the war in the Battle of Okinawa. The exact casualties it had caused the American forces was still vague, but, based on the available statistics, it did inflict substantial damage on the man power of American forces on which war was highly dependent. Nonetheless, despite of this much sacrifice, it still was not able to stop the fall of the empire.

The idea of dying for the Emperor has its roots in the feudal Japanese Shinto religion. Japanese regard the Emperor as their god and offering ones life for him is the supreme sacrifice. The kamikaze pilots saw themselves as samurai warriors adhering to the old but well-revered and preserved Bushido virtues of honor, loyalty and courage.

However, set against the backdrop of a major war, with Japan pushed to the wall, the creation of the kamikaze can only be seen as a desperate act by the imperial military. The grim reality of war is that one has to win no matter the costs. The soldier is used as a means of destruction. Ohnishis kamikaze concept was clearly a war strategy. Faced with a more formidable enemy, he believed that the Japanese samurai spirit would triumph over Americas military superiority.61 Buoyed by the young soldiers willingness to volunteer and initial successes, the whole military command became convinced that it was their best weapon against the enemy. While substantial damage was inflicted on the American fleet and manpower, the gains were not sustained in the long run. Japan soon ran out of planes and pilots. It was simply no match against the mightier and more adequately-equipped enemy. In the end, Japan lost and eventually surrendered.

However, the young soldiers who volunteered and accepted death as their ultimate sacrifice did not see their act as a useless waste of life. Dying was an honorable duty. They were motivated by their traditional ideals of obligation and gratitude towards the Emperor, family and nation. In dying, they passed on life to those they left behind. And for that, these kamikaze soldiers will always be regarded by the Japanese as true samurai warriors and national heroes.LIST OF READINGSDower, John. War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War. New York, U.S.A.: Pantheon Books, 1986.Dunn, Richard, First Kamikaze? Attack on HMAS Australia- October 21, 1944 or Crash at Biak- May 27th 1944, (http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/rdunn/hms_aust/first_kam.htm).

Field, James Alfred, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: the Sho Operation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947,

Frank, Richard, Downfall: The End of Imperial Japanese Empire, Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1999).

Inoguchi Rikihei, and Others, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1958.

O' Connor, Raymond, intro, The Japanese Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense forces, Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Insitute, c. 1969.

Ohnuki-Tierney, Emiko, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalisms: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History, Chicago, U.S.A.: The University of Chicago Press, 2002.

Robin Reilly, Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A complete history of Japanese suicide attacks on American ships by aircraft and other means. North Carolina, USA: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2010.

Spector, Ronald, Eagle Against The Sun: The American War with Japan. New York, U.S.: The Free Press, 1985.

Toland, John. The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945. Vol. 2. New York, U.S.: Random House, Inc., 1970.

Taya Cook, Haruko and Cook, Theodore, Japan At War: An Oral History. New York : The New Press, 1992 1Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalisms: The militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History. (Chicago, USA: The University of Chicago Press, 2002). 159.

2Richard B. Frank. Downfall: The End of Imperial Japanese Empire. (Toronto: Random House, Inc., 1999). pp. 178.

3Richard L. Dunn. First Kamikaze? Attack on HMAS Australia- October 21, 1944 or Crash at Biak- May 27th 1944. (http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/rdunn/hms_aust/first_kam.htm).

4Ronald Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan (New York, USA: The Free Press, 1985) pp. 150-151.

5Ibid., 157.

6Ibid., p. 163.

7Ibid., p. 168.

8Ibid., p. 171

9John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945 Vol 2 (New york, USA: Random House, 1970) p. 624.

10Ibid., p. 626.

11Ibid., p. 631.

12James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation (England: Princeton University Press, 1947) p. 4.

13Frank, Downfall:The End of Imperial Japanese Empire, p. 181.

14Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, p. 149.

15Ibid., p. 176.

16Inoguchi, Rikihei. The Kamikaze Attack Corps, The Japanee Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, itro. Raymond O' Connor (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, 1958) pp. 121, 123.

17Inoguchi Rikehei, Extension of the Kamikaze Organization, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, by Inoguchi, et. al. (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, c. 1969) p. 68.

18Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalisms: The militarization of aesthetics in Japanese History, p. 162.

19Toshiyuki Yokoi, 'Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,' The Japanese Navy in World War II: An anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air defense force, intro. Raymond O' Connor (Annapolis, Md.: U.S. Naval Institute, c. 1969) p. 130

20Robin Reilly, Kamikaze Attacks of World War II: A complete history of Japanese suicide attacks on American ships,by aircraft and other means (North Carolina, USA: McFarland & Company, Inc. Publishers, 2010) p. 16.

21Inoguchi Rikihei, Final Operations in the Philippines, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, by Inoguchi, et.al., pp. 90-96.

22Nakajima Tadashi, First Successes, The Divine Wind: Japan' s Kamikaze Force in World War II, by Inoguchi, et.al., p. 61.

23Ibid., p. 62.

24James A. Field, The Japanese at Leyte Gulf: The Sho Operation, p. 9.

25Inoguchi Rikihei, The Kamikaze Attack Corps, The Japanese Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, p. 120.

26Inoguchi Rikihei, Marianas Aftermath, The Divine Wind: Japan' s Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 26.

27Inoguchi, 'The Kamikaze Attack Corps,' The Japanese Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, p. 121.

28Ibid., p.123.

29Nakajima Tadashi, The Sho Operation and Early Sorties, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 54.

30Inoguchi, 'The Kamikaze Attack Corps,' The Japanese Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, p. 124.

31Nakajima Tadashi, The Sho Operation and Early Sorties, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 53.

32Ibid., pp. 54- 56.

33Inoguchi, 'The Kamikaze Attack Corps,' The Japanese Navy in World War II: an anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, p. 125.

34Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945, pp. 707-708.

35Inoguchi, et. al., Appendix A: Kamikaze Attack Operations in the Philippine Islands Area,' The Divine Wind: Japan' s Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 121.

36Frank, Downfall: The End of Imperial Japanese Empire, pp. 180

37Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the JapaneseEmpire, p. 845.

38Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, p. 532.

39Ibid., p. 533.

40Ibid., p. 535.

41Ibid., p. 538.

42Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, p.537.

43Ibid., p. 536.

44Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, p. 540.

45Ibid., pp. 539-540.

46Inoguchi, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, pp. 211-234.

47Inoguchi Rikihei, 'Final Operations in the Philippines, The Divine Wind: Japan' s Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 93.

48Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, p. 883.

49Frank, Downfall: The End of Imperial Japanese Empire, p. 180.

50Ibid., pp. 180, 182.

51Toshiyuki, 'Kamikazes in the Okinawa Campaign,' The Japanese Navy in World War II: An anthology of articles by former Japanese Navy and Air Defense Force, p. 135.

52Ohnuki-Tierney, Kamikaze, Cherry Blossoms and Nationalism: The Militarization of Aesthetics in Japanese History, p. 162.

53Ibid., p. 163.

54Inoguchi Rikihei, Admiral Ohnishi's Credo, The Divine Wind: Japan's Kamikaze Force in World War II, p. 181.

55Haruko Cook and Throdore Cook, Japan at War: An Oral History (New York, U.S.A.: The New Press, 1992) p. 323.

56Ibid, p. 328.

57Ibid., p. 442.

58Ibid., p. 448.

59Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with Japan, p. 535.

60John Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War (New York, USA: Pantheon Books, 1986) p. 19.

61Spector, Eagle Against the Sun: The American War with the Japanese, p. 512.

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