Kissinger Nixon Creation Freedom Bangladesh

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Review article

Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup

of Pakistan, 1971

GEOFFREY WARNER

1 Both these volumes are also available on the internet and can be found at www.state.gov./r/pa/ho/frus/nixon.

2 This volume is only available on the internet and can be found at www.state.gov./r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e7/Index htm

Foreign Relations of the United States 19691976Vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy 19691972; 2003, 437 pp.

Vol. XI, South Asia Crisis 1971; 2005, 900 pp.

(Both with index, published in Washington DC by the United States Govern-

ment Printing Office.)1

Vol. E7, Documents on South Asia 196919722

When the editors of the Foreign Relations series embarked upon the volumes

devoted to the Nixon administration, they introduced two important innova-tions. The first was to produce a general volume entitled Foundations of Foreign

Policy 19691972. There have been general volumes before, but this one breaks

new ground in that it includes a significant number of public documents, such

as articles and speeches, as well as hitherto classified material. We thus find such

important texts as Nixons 1967 Foreign Affairs article on Asia after Vietnam and

his announcement on 15 July 1971 of the breakthrough in United States policy

towards communist China reproduced here (Vol. I, Nos 3, 92). If one has access

to good libraries it is not difficult to locate these documents, but it is useful to

have them collected in one volume alongside hitherto classified studies.

The second important innovation is the production of an e-book which

supplements the traditional hardback volume. The series has included supple-

mentary documents before in the form of microfiche, but since the PC is so

much more readily accessible than the microfiche reader, it was sensible to

change to this more modern format. There is, however, a minor irritant. Each

document has to be opened individually. Fortunately, they do not have to be

downloaded individually as well; only the separate chapters into which the e-

book is divided.


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Geoffrey Warner

The e-book covers a broader period than the hardback volume which it

accompanies. It runs from January 1969 to December 1972, while the hardback

concentrates upon the crucial nine months between March and December

1971, i.e. from the Pakistani governments decision to adjourn the first meeting

of the constituent assembly elected in December 1970 and its brutal attempt tosuppress Bengali separatism, the escalation of the fighting into a full-scale war

between India and Pakistan, and the collapse of the Yahya Khan government

in the wake of the defeat inflicted on the Pakistani armed forces. For the period

of overlap many of the most interesting documents are merely summarized in

the hardback volume, and can be read in full only in the e-book. These docu-

ments include transcripts of conversations which were the product of President

Nixons eventually fatal obsession with taping almost everything that went on

in the Oval Office.3

Indeed, these transcriptsspecially declassified for the Foreign Relations series

contain the principal revelations, because United States policy towards

Pakistan in this period has already been the subject of no fewer than three

previous documentary compilations: George Washington Universitys National

Security Archive electronic briefing book, F. S. Aijazuddins edition of docu-

ments from the White House files and Roedad Khans from those of the State

Department.4 There is considerable overlap between these collections and the

Foreign Relations volumes, but the Aijazuddin and Khan compilations in parti-

cular contain much that is not in the documents under review, so that serious

scholars will need to consult them all.

The title of this article, with its reference to Richard Nixon and HenryKissinger, is deliberate. There had been significant partnerships in the formula-

tion of US foreign policy before, most recently between Truman and Acheson

and between Eisenhower and Dulles, but the partnership between Nixon and

Kissinger was unique, not merely because of the eclipse of the State Depart-

ment5which had happened before, under Roosevelt for examplebut

because of the almost total concentration of power in the hands of the

President and his National Security Advisor. A recent historian of the National

Security Council has provided an excellent description of the two men and

their symbiotic relationship in the following words:

3 In the article I shall always refer to the e-book version of a document, even when it is summarized inthe hardback volume.

4 Sajit Gandhi, ed., The tilt: the US and the South Asian crisis of 1971, www.gwu.edu/nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB79/; F. S. Aijazuddin, ed., The White House and Pakistan: secret declassified documents,196974 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2002); Roedad Khan, ed., The American papers: secret andconfidential IndiaPakistanBangladesh documents 19651973 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999).Extracts from the minutes of Henry Kissingers supposedly top secret Washington Special AdvisoryGroup had, of course, appeared at the time in the articles of the syndicated columnist Jack Anderson,and the full minutes of the four meetings involved, presumably made available by Anderson, werepublished in Marta R. Nicholas and Philip Oldenburg, Bangladesh: the birth of a nationa handbook ofbackground information and documentary sources (Madras: M. Seshachalam, 1972), appendix 10.

5 I would tell the people in the State Department not a goddamn thing they dont need to know, Nixontold Kissinger on 8 Dec. 1971 (Vol. E7, No. 165), and it would seem to have been the guiding principleof the Presidents approach to foreign policy making


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Nixon, Kissinger and the breakup of Pakistan, 1971

They were a fascinating pair. In a way, they complemented each other perfectly.

Kissinger was the charming and worldly Mr. Outside who provided the grace and

intellectual-establishment respectability that Nixon lacked, disdained and aspired to.

Kissinger was an international citizen. Nixon very much a classic American. Kissinger

had a worldview and a facility for adjusting it to meet the times, Nixon had pragmatism

and a strategic vision that provided the foundations for their policies. Kissinger would,

of course, say that he was not political like Nixonbut in fact he was just as political as

Nixon, just as calculating, just as relentlessly ambitious; they were two versions of

Sammy Glick, one a Quaker from California, the other Jewish from Germany. And

like Sammy Glick, the hero of the classic American striver novel What Makes Sammy

Run?, these self-made men were driven as much by their need for approval and their

neuroses as by their strengths.6

These characteristics were amply illustrated during the crisis of 1971 which saw

the breakup of Pakistan.

Depending upon ones viewpoint, Pakistan was a major beneficiary or a

victim of the Eisenhower administrations pactomania during the 1950s, joining

both SEATO and CENTO. Its principal rival, India, was of course ostenta-

tiously neutral in the EastWest conflict and there were those who argued that

this, rather than any genuinely perceived threat from the communist world,

was the real reason why Pakistan joined the two alliances, hoping thereby to

gain American military aid for its armed forces and diplomatic support in its

disputes with India, notably over the status of Kashmir.

Whether this was true or not, there is no doubt that Pakistan was a loyal ally

of the United States. To cite only two examples, it was the base for many of theU2 spy-plane flights over the Soviet Union, including the ill-fated one by Gary

Powers in May 1960, the shooting down of which by the Russians led to the

cancellation of the impending four-power summit conference; and it was one

of the few countries that offered troops when the Kennedy administration

contemplated armed intervention in Laos in the spring of 1961.

Kennedy, however, was much more sympathetic towards India than his

predecessor, seeing its democratic system as a rival model for Asia to that of

communist China. An opportunity to draw closer to India was provided by the

Sino-Indian border war of 1962 when, for the first time, the United Statesgovernment began to supply India with military as opposed to economic aid,

although the Indians continued to remain on good terms with the Soviet Union

and to criticize certain aspects of American policy, especially in Vietnam. The

new, more pro-Indian stance understandably upset the Pakistani government,

which responded by normalizing its own relations with China. It also refused,

when approached, to send troops to Vietnam, much to the irritation of President

Kennedys successor, Lyndon Johnson. Then came the Indo-Pakistani war of

1965 over Kashmir, which prompted the US Congress to cut off military aid to

both belligerents. Pakistan continued its flirtation with China, sought military

6 David Rothkopf, Running the world: the inside story of the National Security Council and the architects ofAmerican foreign policy (New York: Public Affairs 2004) pp 111 12


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world in the generations to come will forever be in your debt.11 As we shall

see, the influence of these developments upon both Nixon and Kissinger during

the crisis that engulfed the Indian subcontinent in 1971 was considerable.

The roots of this crisis went back to the partition of India at the time of

independence in 1947. Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the powerfulMuslim League, demanded a separate state for Indias large Muslim population

and persuaded the British colonial power to agree. The trouble was that Indias

Muslim population was not confined to one particular area, so that the new

state of Pakistan, which was designed for them, consisted of two widely separated

parts: West Pakistan, centred upon the Punjab and Sindh; and East Pakistan,

centred on Bengal.12 From the outset, Bengalis felt themselves to be the poor

relations. In the army, for example, which soon emerged as the dominant force

in Pakistani politics, only 1 per cent of soldiers were Bengali at the time of

partition, and the proportion was still only 7 per cent 20 years later. In the

officer corps the ratio was worse. The position was slightly better in the civil

service, but even there only 23 per cent of government officials came from East

Pakistan in 1966 compared to 77 per cent from West Pakistan. At the same

time, although East Pakistan was the countrys major foreign exchange earner,

West Pakistans per capita national income was 61 per cent higher than

Bengals.13 While Bengalis were naturally bitter about this state of affairs, West

Pakistanis, according to a report to the State Department on 7 November 1969,

tended to blame the situation in the east upon the regions appalling weather,14

civil service inefficiency, the absence of an entrepreneurial class and the lack of

investor interest. The principal articulators of Bengali grievances were theAwami League, originally founded in 1949, and its leader, Sheikh Mujibur

Rahman (or Mujib), who was described in the same report to the State

Department as in effect the uncrowned king of East Pakistan.15

Only a few months before this report was written, in June 1969, the British

deputy high commissioner in Pakistan, Roy Fox, had warned the US consul-

general in Daccathe capital of East Pakistanthat he foresaw the breakup of

the country as a result of Mujib winning the elections which Yahya would be

forced to call as a result of political pressure, the Pakistani army attempting in

vain to crush the opposition leading to a reimposition of martial law, and a bank-rupt East Pakistan falling under the influence of pro-Beijing communists.16

With the exception of the communist takeover, this was precisely the scenario

which developed over the next two and a half years. While these alarming

views were duly reported to the State Department, there is no evidence that

they were even seen by the President and his National Security Advisor, let

11 Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, p. 208.12 Even after partition, it was often pointed out, more Muslims continued to live in India than in Pakistan.13 These figures are from Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: between mosque and military (Washington DC: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 61.14 Bangladesh, of course, continues to suffer from hurricanes and widespread flooding.15 Khan, The American papers, pp. 2935.16 Khan The American papers pp 274 5


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Geoffrey Warner

alone that they influenced their conduct.

During discussions in November 1969 on whether the United States should

relax its 1965 ban on the supply of arms to Pakistan, Kissinger remarked that a

major issue involved was where do we want to put US weight in the sub-

continent (Vol. E7, No. 43). The State Departments answer, as set out in amemorandum to the President on 10 February 1970, was that India is relatively

more important to our interests than Pakistan. If arms were supplied to the

latter, India would be bound to take umbrage, so that [i]f we can please only

one of the two countries, we should lean toward India, the larger and more

influential power (Vol. E7, No. 42). The President, however, had already indi-

cated that he did not care about the Indian reaction (E7, No. 46), and was

continually pressing for some urgent action in favour of Pakistan. After much

toing and froing it was eventually decided, in June 1970, to make a one-time

exception to present policy,17 and supply a few planes and 300 armoured

personnel carriers to Pakistan (Vol. E7, No. 67).

As predicted, the Indian reaction to the US governments decision was

extremely negative. When the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, came to

the United States in October for the 25th anniversary of the United Nations,

she refused an invitation to dine at the White House and, in Secretary of State

William Rogerss words, really let her hair down in a conversation with him on

24 October 1969, not only over the arms deal, but also over alleged American

interference in Indias internal affairs, past and present. Kissinger, to whom

Rogers relayed this information, dismissed Mrs Gandhis concerns as paranoia.

The Indians, he said, were suffering because they were the leading non-alignedcountry and now theyre just another undeveloped one, which incidentally

received 40 per cent of American economic aid (Vol. E7, No. 89).18

The contrast between Rogerss conversation with Mrs Gandhi and that

between President Nixon and Yahya Khan on the following day could not have

been more marked. Nixon referred to past difficulties in the relationship

between the United States and Pakistan as the result of difficulties with

Congress, but insisted that we will stick by our friends. And we consider

Pakistan our friend. Expressing his appreciation, Yahya replied that although

Pakistan had been surrounded by enemies when the two countries had firstbecome friends, this was no longer the case and yet they still remained friends.

We are a sentimental people, he said, and we will never do anything to

embarrass you. If Mrs Gandhi had expressed resentment at alleged American

interference in Indias internal affairs, Yahya Khan made no objection when

Nixon suggested Pakistan should keep a strong Presidency as in France. Yahya

agreed. Without it, he said, Pakistan would disintegrate. Our people like the

Parliamentary system only because they have been ruled by the British for so

many centuries, but they cannot make it work. This, he said, was because the

basic prerequisitea two-party systemdid not exist (Vol. E7, No. 90).

17 i.e. the embargo.18 See also Vol E7 No 88 and Aijazuddin The White House and Pakistan p 111


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It was only a matter of weeks before Yahyas assertion that Pakistan did not

have a two-party system was disproved, when the long-awaited elections for a

constituent assembly, which had had to be postponed as a result of a cata-

strophic cyclone and flooding in East Pakistan, finally took place on 7 December

1970. Even before the full results were in, Ray Cline, head of the State Depart-ments Bureau of Intelligence and Research, reported to Secretary Rogers on 8

December 1970 that the outcome was an overwhelming victory in East

Pakistan for Sheikh Mujibur Rahmans Awami League and the apparent capture

of a majority of seats in West Pakistan by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led

by former Foreign Minister and frequent US-baiter, Z[ulfikar] A[li] Bhutto.

Cline described the PPPs performance as surprising and said that, in view of

Bhuttos reputation as a centralist, it made the prospects of an accommodation

between the two parts of Pakistan more problematical (Vol. E7, No. 104).

He was right. On 1 February 1971 Yahya Khan spoke to the US ambassador

of his worries concerning the possibility of East Pakistans secession. Repeating

the words of his predecessor, Ayub Khan, he said that he did not intend to

preside over the dissolution of Pakistan, an eventuality which he warned, in

terms guaranteed to send a shiver up any American spine, would give the

damned Chinese precisely what theyve wanted for yearsa port on the Bay

of Bengal and an outlet to the Indian Ocean, thus paving the way for the

outflanking of the whole of South-East Asia and the fall of Burma and Thailand

(Vol. E7, No. 109). All this flew in the face of the fact that Mujib, unlike

Bhutto for example, was anti-Chinese and pro-American (Vol. E7, No. 121).19

Whether there was any real chance of a compromise between Mujib, Bhuttoand Yahya and, if so, who was primarily responsible for sabotaging it is a moot

point.20 On 1 March 1971, however, Yahya announced the postponement of

the first meeting of the new constituent assembly scheduled for two days later.

Ostensibly, this was to permit more time for negotiation between the political

leaders, but it also provided a convenient breathing space during which the

armed forces in East Pakistan were reinforced. Martial law was reintroduced

and Mujib called for a campaign of civil disobedience until it was lifted. On 25

March 1971 the military commander in East Pakistan launched Operation

Searchlight to reassert central government control. Mujib was arrested andsome of his followers fled cross the border into India, where they proclaimed

East Pakistans independence as Bangladesh (the country of Bengal).

There was clearly a sneaking admiration for the Pakistani governments firm

action in the White House. Reporting to the President on 29 March 1971 that

Yahyas forces had apparently gained control of East Pakistan, Kissinger scoffed

at the predictions that an army of 30,000 could not subdue a population of 75

million. The use of power against seeming odds pays off, he said. Nixon

agreed. [H]ell, he exclaimed, when you look over the history of nations 30,000

19 See also Khan,American papers, pp. 4648.20 See e.g. the discussion in Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the twentieth century: a political history (Karachi:

Oxford University Press 1997) pp 332 54


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Geoffrey Warner

well-disciplined people can take 75 million any time (Vol. XI, No. 14).

Certainly, the sheer ruthlessness of the Pakistani army did not seem to bother

these men. In a cable from the East Pakistani capital of Dacca on 28 March

1971, the US consul, Archer Blood, reported that we are mute and horrified

witnesses to a reign of terror by the Pak[istani] military. Evidence continued tomount, he said, that the authorities had a list of Awami League supporters

whom they are systematically eliminating by seeking them in their homes and

shooting them down (Vol. E7, No. 125). And not only in their homes. Two

days later Blood reported on mass shootings at Dacca University, including an

incident at a womens hall of residence in which students were mown down by

machine-gun fire as they fled the building (Vol. E7, No. 127). Despite learning

that one of his own former students had probably been killed at the university,

Kissinger callously remarked that They [the British] didnt dominate 400 million

Indians all those years by being gentle (Vol. XI, No. 17).21

It soon became clear, however, not only that victory had not been achieved

by the Pakistani forces, but that it might not be achieved at all. An inter-agency

National Intelligence Estimate of 12 April 1971 noted that while the Pakistani

army had occupied the two principal cities of East PakistanDacca and Chitta-

gongits hold over them was being maintained only by severely repressive

measures and rigid curfews, and it was definitely not in control through most

of the countryside, where opposition continued to be active. The Pakistani

militarys hope of a quick victory had therefore been misplaced, and the long-

term prospects for the achievement of its objectives were poor even in the

event of further reinforcement (Vol. E7, No. 131). The consequences for USpolicy were discussed in another inter-agency report prepared for the National

Security Council at about the same time. Historically, it stated, we have

assumed that our interest in regional stability was best served by a united Pakistan.

That assumption now requires reassessment. Indeed, the authors wondered

whether a two-state solution would not be almost as acceptable as a unified

Pakistan, especially if moderate Bengali forces were in control of the East, for

they would be less vulnerable to radical internal pressures more likely to

work for an accommodation with India and have a political mandate

within which developmental activity could resume (Vol. E7, No. 132).Kissinger would have none of this. In a memorandum for Nixon on 28 April

1971, he summarized the three policy options which had emerged from

subsequent discussion of the above report. Option 1, wrote Kissinger, would

be essentially a posture of supporting whatever political and military program

President Yahya chooses to pursue in the East. Option 2 would be to try to

maintain a posture of genuine neutrality which would involve delaying all

21 On 6 April 1971 Blood sent a petition signed by 20 members of the consulate staff, and supported byhimself, criticizing the US governments failure to condemn the Pakistani armys atrocities. Thisinfuriated his superiors in Washington and he was later transferred. Kissingers initial concern seems tohave been that the petition would be leaked to Democrat Senator Ted Kennedy (Vol XI Nos 19 20)


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further economic aid to Pakistan, insistence that food aid be distributed

equitably throughout East Pakistan and not just in the army-controlled areas,

and the deferral of all deliveries of ammunition, death-dealing equipment and

spares for it. Option 3 would be to make a serious effort to help Yahya end

the war and establish an arrangement that could be transitional to East Pakistaniautonomy. No aid would be withheld in order to apply pressure until after the

Pakistani government had been given every chance to negotiate a settlement.

Commenting on the three options, Kissinger said that although Option 1

would preserve the American relationship with the Pakistani government, it

might encourage it to adopt policies which would only lead to a further

deterioration in the situation. Option 2 would be publicly defensible, but

would in effect favour East Pakistan. Option 3, which Kissinger himself

favoured, would have the advantage of making the most of the relationship

with Yahya while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward

conditions less damaging to US and Pakistan interests. Nixon agreed, scraw-

ling at the bottom of Kissingers memorandum, To all hands. Dont squeeze

Yahya at this time (Vol. XI, No. 36).

American policy-makers were also increasingly exercised by the possible

escalation of the conflict in East Pakistan into a war between India and

Pakistan. The National Intelligence Estimate of 12 April 1971 stated that there

was considerable evidence that the Indians were arming the rebels (Vol. E7,

No. 131), and this evidence continued to mount. It was even reported on 25

May 1971 that Mrs Gandhi had ordered her army to prepare a plan for a rapid

take-over of East Pakistan (Vol. XI, No. 57); and on the following dayKissinger told Nixon that there were reports of India massing troops on the

East Pakistani border. The President was furious. [I]f they go in there with

military action, he vowed, by God we will cut off economic aid. Kissinger

did not demur, adding in a clear allusion to the ongoing discussions with China

that the last thing we can afford now [is] to have the Pakistan government

overthrown, given the other things we are doing (Vol. XI, No. 55).

Kenneth Keating, the US ambassador to India, was in Washington in June

1971, and Kissinger told Nixon on the 4th that he thinks we should cut off all

military aid [to Pakistan], all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians topush the Pakistanis out of [East Pakistan]. Nixon retorted: I dont want him to

come in with that kind of jackass thing with me.22 Look, even apart from

the Chinese thing, I wouldnt do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no

goddamn good. Kissinger agreed. Those sons-of-bitches, he said, who have

never lifted a finger for us, why should we get involved in the morass of East

Pakistan? All the more so, I quite agree with the point, if East Pakistan becomes

independent, it is going to become a cesspool. Its going to be 100 million

people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia. This made it a ripe

22 Despite appointing him, Kissinger did not think much of Keating, describing him variously as a traitorand a soft son of a bitch (Vol E7 Nos 156 162)


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Geoffrey Warner

field for Communist infiltration, Kissinger went on, which would put pressure

on India through West Bengal. The Indians, in their usual idiotic way, were

therefore playing for little stakes, unless they had it in the back of their mind

to turn East Pakistan into a protectorate which they could run from Calcutta.

Oh, what they had in the back of their mind, replied Nixon, was to destroyPakistan (Vol. E7, No. 136).

The Indians, of course, denied this. When the Indian foreign minister,

Swaran Singh, saw Nixon in Washington on 16 June 1971, he said that his

country had no fixed position on whether Pakistan should remain united or

not, and added: [W]e leave it up to the Pakistanis and the leaders of the Awami

League to decide about their position in any manner they like (Vol. E7, No.

138). In his conversation with Secretary of State Rogers on the following day,

Singh argued that it was only after the Pakistani military had intervened that

secession had replaced autonomy as the principal demand of the Awami League.

The human consequences of that intervention, moreover, were horrendous: a

six-figure death toll and an influx of refugees from East Pakistan into India

reaching six million. The fate of the refugees, indeed, seemed to be Singhs

main concern. The flow had to be stopped and all the refugees in India had to

be returned to Pakistan. These goals could be achieved, however, only if the

fighting stopped and there was a negotiated political settlement which satisfied

the aspirations of the people of East Pakistan (Vol. XI, No. 74).

Singh was being economical with the truth. According to one authoritative

source, Mrs Gandhis initial and instinctive reaction [to events in East Pakistan]

was to give immediate recognition to a free Bangladesh and to back the liber-ation struggle and the resistance movement with full military support. Swaran

Singh, however, was concerned about the possible international reaction and

the army chiefs urged the need for caution and preparation, especially in view

of the approach of the monsoon season. Finally, there was always the possibility

that the Chinese might intervene on the side of Pakistan. It was therefore

decided to wage a predominantly political campaign for the moment, focusing

upon the genuine plight of the refugees and the delinquencies of the Pakistani

government, although it was also agreed to provide support to both the

Bangladesh government-in-exile and its guerrillas in East Pakistan.23

Kissinger left Washington on 1 July 1971 for a diplomatic journey which

would take him around the world. The principal destination was Beijing, but

no one outside the smallest of inner circles knew this and public attention was

concentrated on the other stops on his itinerary, which included India and

Pakistan. While en route Kissinger received an alarming intelligence report: the

Soviet Union had pledged support for the Indian [sic] guerrilla army operating

in East Bengal, and, upon receipt of a formal request from India promised a

23J. N. Dixit, India and Pakistan in war and peace(London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 1823. At the end of June1971, Dixit, then a middle-ranking Indian Foreign Office official, was appointed head of a special unitto monitor the crisis


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guarantee of military protection to enable India to resist pressure from

Communist China (Vol. XI, No. 87).24 During his conversations in New

Delhi with Mrs Gandhi, Swaram Singh and others, Kissinger emphasized

Nixons view that an Indo-Pakistani war would be a disaster for both countries

and would create the risk that the subcontinent would become an area forconflict among outside powers. Nevertheless, he detected a growing sense of

the inevitability of war or at least widespread HinduMuslim violence. This

was reflected in Mrs Gandhis reply to a question from Kissinger about how

much time remained before the situation caused by the refugee problem

became unmanageable. It was unmanageable already, she said, and the Indians

were just holding it together by sheer willpower (Vol. XI, No. 94).

After Kissingers return to the United States, there was a meeting of the

National Security Council on 16 July 1971 at which the Indo-Pakistani situa-

tion was discussed. The President told those present that it was imperative that

the Pakistanis, if possible, not be embarrassed at this point. Describing the

Indians as a slippery, treacherous people, he said that they would like nothing

better than to use this tragedy to destroy Pakistan, but that we could not

allowover the next threefour months until we take this journey to

Peking25a war in South Asia if we can possibly avoid it. If the Indians did

mess around in East Pakistan, he warned, they would not receive a dime of

aid. Kissinger agreed that the Indians seemed bent on war and, in reply to a

question from the President, added that he thought the Chinese would become

involved if one broke out. In the long run, he argued, East Pakistan would

become independent, but not in time to head off an Indian attack unlessYahya Khan could come up with a comprehensive package to resolve the

refugee problem, thus depriving India of an excuse to intervene. If there was an

international war and China became involved, he concluded, everything we

have done [with China] will go down the drain (Vol. XI, No. 103).26

During subsequent interdepartmental meetings designed to put flesh on the

bones of the discussion on 16 July, Kissinger was horrified to discover that a

more or less complete embargo had been imposed upon the already limited

supply of arms to Pakistan, and that it might also soon be extended to economic

aid as well. This policy, designed to facilitate a political settlement, emanatedfrom inside the State Department and was totally opposed to the wishes of the

President. Nixon, Kissinger emphasized on 30 July 1971, has said repeatedly that

we should lean toward Pakistan, but every proposal that is made goes directly

counter to these instructions. Sometimes I think I am in a nut house (Vol. XI, Nos

24 See also Kissinger, White House years, pp. 85960. Relations between the two Communist powers werevery strained at this time. Soviet and Chinese troops had clashed on the border between the twocountries in 1969.

25 The President had publicly announced Kissingers trip and the Chinese invitation to him (Nixon) tovisit Beijing the previous day (Vol. I, No. 92).

26 Apart from Nixon and Kissinger, those present at the meeting included the Secretary of State, the DeputySecretary of Defense the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff


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Geoffrey Warner

105, 111).27 At Kissingers suggestion, Nixon attended another interdepartmental

meeting on 11 August 1971 to lay down the line to all concerned. Now let me

be very blunt, he said. Every Ambassador who goes to India falls in love with

India. Some have the same experience in Pakistanthough not as many

because the Pakistanis are a different breed. They were straightforwardandsometimes extremely stupid, but the Indians were more devious, sometimes

so smart that we fall for their line, and the United States must not permit the

Indians to use the refugee problem as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan.

Directly addressing the State Departments representatives at the meeting, he

said, [We] have to cool off the pro-Indians in the State Department and out in

South Asia (Vol. XI, No. 121).28

The situation was further complicated by the signature of the SovietIndian

treaty of peace, friendship and cooperation on 9 August 1971. Kissinger refers

in his memoirs to an intelligence estimate of 11 August 1971 which stated that

the treaty served Mrs Gandhis policy of restraint by giving her a diplomatic

success to offset increasing public pressure for tougher action against Pakistan.

[I]t would have been nearly impossible, he commented, to concoct a more

fatuous estimate. The truth, Kissinger thought, was that the treaty cleared the

decks for a war with Pakistan as it assured the Indians of continuing Soviet

military aid and was a possible hedge against Chinese intervention. As for the

Russians, they had seized a strategic opportunity. To demonstrate Chinese

impotence and to humiliate a friend of both China and the United States proved

too tempting.29 The Indian diplomat J. N. Dixit confirms that the specific

objective [of the treaty] was to provide a basis for future support from theSoviet Union in case the US and Pakistan, or Pakistan and China acted in

concert to thwart any military operations India might undertake in support of

Bangladeshs liberation struggle. He adds that a Russian airlift of military material

to India began at the end of October 1971 to replenish the Indian armed forces

inadequate stocks of weapons and munitions.30

Time appeared to be running out for the United States (and Pakistan) when

a self-proclaimed envoy from the Bangladesh government approached the

American consulate-general in Calcutta with proposals for a settlement between

the Awami League and the Pakistani government. The principal conditionposed was that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who was about to go on trial for

treason, should be released to take part in the negotiations. The Americans

27 The quotation is from Vol. XI, No. 111. The sentence in italics is not in the printed record, but comesfrom informal notes cited by Christopher Van Hollen, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Statefor Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in 1971, in his article, The tilt policy revisited: NixonKissingergeopolitics and South Asia,Asian Survey 20: 4, April 1980, p. 347. Van Hollen misdates the meeting astaking place on 31 July 1971. His article is a spirited, although not entirely successful, attempt to refuteKissingers version of events in his memoirs. In the latter Kissinger wrote, On no issueexcept perhapsCambodiawas the split between the White House and the departments so profound as on the IndiaPakistan crisis in the summer of 1971 (White House years, pp. 8634).

28 See also Kissinger, White House years,p. 869.29 Kissinger, White House years,pp. 8667. Unfortunately, the intelligence estimate to which Kissinger

refers is not available in any of the published documents.30 Dixit India and Pakistan pp 184 219


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were told that any compromise negotiated by Mujib would be accepted by the

people, even including a return to the status quo ante (Vol. XI, No. 115).

Unfortunately, although there are a number of documents on the follow-up to

this initiative (Vol. XI, Nos 121, 133, 136, 149, 150 and 164), much is sum-

marized in footnotes and there is not enough information to evaluate its truepotential, especially in view of the additional and contradictory details provided

by Kissinger and Dixit in their respective accounts of the episode. Kissinger

argues that the Indians sabotaged the peace feeler by forcing the Bangladeshis

to raise the ante, and there is some evidence for this in the published docu-

ments; but Dixit suggests that the main reason for the failure of the proposal

was that it did not come from the Bangladeshi government-in-exile at all, but

from an unauthorized faction within it.31 The editors of the Foreign Relations

series might have resolved this issue if they had decided to publish more of the

relevant documents in full, either in the hardback volume or in the e-book.

By the end of October 1971, when the initiative referred to in the previous

paragraph had clearly run into sand, the United States sought to persuade

Yahya Khan to break the deadlock by (a) carrying out a unilateral withdrawal

of Pakistani forces from the western border with India,32 and (b) conveying to

the Bangladeshi leaders in Calcutta a message to the effect that Pakistans new

constitution would not exclude re-entry at some point of Awami League into

political life in East Pakistan, with an amnesty extending to all Awami Leaguers

(Vol. XI, 176). In a conversation with the US ambassador on 2 November

1971, Yahya was surprisingly positive. He accepted the first proposal without

demur, and although he was more cautious about the second, he did notexclude negotiations with Bangladeshi representatives who were prepared to

act constructively. [I]n order to bring normalcy back to the subcontinent, he

emphasized, I will do anything within my power short of simply turning

Pakistan over to India (Vol. XI, No. 177).

These concessions were put to Mrs Gandhi personally by President Nixon

on 4 November 1971 on the occasion of the Indian Prime Ministers visit to

Washington, which had been suggested by Kissinger when he was in New

Delhi the previous July. As Kissinger points out in his memoirs, she did not

respond to them directly, but merely ran over Indias historical grievancesconcerning Pakistan. Nixon was calm and polite throughoutWe really

slobbered over the old witch, he told Kissinger the following daybut he

made it quite clear that nothing could be served by the disintegration of

Pakistan and that [t]he initiation of hostilities by India would be almost

impossible to understand. It would also be impossible, he warned, to calculate

with precision the steps which other great powers might take if India were to

initiate hostilities (Vol. XI, No. 179; Vol. E7, No. 150).33

31 Kissinger, White House years, pp. 86973; Dixit, India and Pakistan, pp. 1956.32 The US had earlier suggested a joint withdrawal, but both India and Pakistan had posed conditions, one

of which on the Indian side was that the Pakistanis should take the initiative (Vol. XI, No. 168).33 See also Kissinger, White House years, pp. 87882; Richard M. Nixon, RN: the memoirs of Richard Nixon

(New York: Grosset & Dunlap 1978) pp 525 6 Nixon begins his account of the crisis with this meeting


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Geoffrey Warner

According to Dixit, the Indian government had already decided to change

gear in its operational support for the guerrillas in East Pakistan at the end of

September 1971. This gear change involved the infiltration of Indian com-

mandos and marines into East Pakistan to support the guerrillas, a policy which

not only improved the military effectiveness of the latter, but also helped toresolve the controversies and quarrels between the various largely autonomous

groups. Even as this increased assistance was being provided, however, Dixit

and a colleague concluded after discussions with the Bangladeshi government-

in-exile that the Pakistani Army was becoming progressively successful in

neutralising the freedom fighters and that the former would overcome the

resistance movement at the latest by January or early February 1972 without

further help from India. The Bangladeshis went so far as to ask for the form-

ation of a joint command between the Indian armed forces and the guerrillas

which would draw up immediate plans for full-scale operations against the

Pakistani armed forces in Bangladesh, a step which Mrs Gandhi approved

before her return from Washington on 12 November 1971.34

As Indian involvement became more obvious, the State Department sug-

gested an approach to the United Nations to try to get some form of restraining

order from the Security Council and to involve the organisation in some form

of mediation exercise. Kissinger was unenthusiastic. [W]e will get caught

between India and Pakistan, he said, and, more important, between the Soviets

and the Chinese. Im confident there will be no approval from this building for

any freewheeling exercise in the UN with no clear idea of what we want to

come out of it (Vol. XI, No. 194). On 24 November 1971, two days after thePakistanis had claimed that India had launched an all-out offensive against East

Pakistan (Vol. XI, No. 195), Kissinger had second thoughts. We have no

doubt that India is involved, he said, and that they are probably across the

border. But we need something [for the UN] to nail down the exact nature of

their activity and we need it in a day or two.

Later on the same occasion, Joseph Sisco, the Assistant Secretary of State for

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, said that he thought Yahya showed

every sign of wanting to wash his hands of the situation. I think his immediate

objective is to proceed with the elections35

and then to turn the situation overto Bhutto, the senior State Department official opined. However, he added,

this would not advance a solution because the Bengalis would not negotiate

with Bhutto, since he and Mujib were rivals for leadership of a united Pakistan.

That was not the issue, replied Kissinger, because India did not want reconci-

liation between East and West Pakistan. And when Sisco said that he did not,

even now, exclude the possibility of some form of loose confederation,

Kissinger replied sarcastically, So, India having attacked Pakistan, the logical

conclusion is that we should squeeze Yahya to talk to Mujib. What Indian

troops cant achieve, we should achieve for them (Vol. XI, No. 198).

34 Dixit, India and Pakistan, pp. 191, 202203, 206207, 209.35 Despite the continuing turmoil Yahya had announced a decision to hold new elections throughout Pakistan


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Any lingering doubts about the existence of a de facto war between Pakistan

and India were dispelled on 3 December 1971, when Pakistan bombed Indian

airfields and shelled Indian positions at several points along the border between

India and West Pakistan. The Indians retaliated in force. There is little doubt

that the Pakistanis were provoked. As one of Mrs Gandhis closest advisers saidon receipt of the news of the Pakistani air raids, The fool [i.e. Yahya] has done

exactly what one had expected.36 The United States did take the matter to the

UN Security Council, and won the vote on 4 December 1971 by 11 to 2. One

of the dissentient votes, however, was that of the Soviet Union, so that the

intended condemnation of Indian aggression fell to the Russian veto.37

On the afternoon of 5 December 1971 Kissinger summoned Yuli Vorontsov,

the minister at the Soviet embassy and the ranking Russian representative in

the ambassadors absence, to tell him that the President did not understand

how the Soviet Union could believe that it was possible to work on the broad

amelioration of our relationships while at the same time encouraging the Indian

military aggression against Pakistan. At the conclusion of their talk, Vorontsov

asked Kissinger about the latters proposed visit to Moscow at the end of

January 1972, and Kissinger replied that there were now substantive as well as

bureaucratic obstacles to overcome. In what was obviously an allusion to the

Indo-Pakistani war, Vorontsov flippantly remarked, In a week the whole

thing will be over. Kissinger shot back, In a week it will not be over, depend-

ing on how it ended (Vol. XI, No. 231). After reporting on this conversation

to Nixon, Kissinger telephoned Vorontsov to inform him that the President

wanted Vorontsov to tell Moscow that, although the war might be over in aweek or so, it wont be over as far as we are concerned and that Nixon

wanted it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relationship (Vol. E7,

No. 160). Nixon followed this up with a personal letter to the Soviet leader,

Leonid Brezhnev, on the 6th which made the same point (Vol. XI, No. 236).

There was a rump meeting of the National Security Council on 6 December

1971, the day on which India officially recognized the state of Bangladesh.

Only the first part of the notes taken by Kissingers assistant, General Al Haig,

was transcribed and it was in the second part, summarized by the Foreign Relations

editors from Haigs cryptic and difficult to decipher handwriting, that Kissingerpointed out that Soviet support for India was intended to embarrass not only

China, but also the United States, whose actions the Chinese would no doubt

be watching to see what its friendship really meant. While conceding that India

was the aggressor and that the conflict had long-range implications, Rogers

wondered whether the US should involve itself too deeply in what was a lost

cause in East Pakistan. Nixon said he was going to cut off all economic aid to

India, a decision which was announced immediately after the meeting, and that

36 Dixit, India and Pakistan, p. 209.37 Britain and France abstained on the US resolution. Nixon said that he supposed that this was because

they were afraid to make Russia mad. Kissinger agreed, saying that these two NATO allies weretrying to position themselves between us and the Russians. Im beginning to think, he added, [that]one of the worst mistakes we made was to push Britain onto the Common Market (Vol IX No 220)


16/23

Geoffrey Warner

he saw no reason to stop third countries from sending military aid to Pakistan, a

decision which was not announced, although he and Kissinger were doing

their very best to organize it (Vol. XI, No. 222). The President said that he was

prepared to work through the UN, but that, if it proved unable to resolve the

crisis, the United States would have to step forward. It could not roll over(Vol. XI, No. 237). What he meant by stepping forward emerged in a

subsequent conversation with Kissinger. He thought, the President said, that

the US should tell the Chinese that some movement on their part toward

the Indian border could be very significant (Vol. E7, No. 162).

On the following day, 7 December 1971, Yahya Khan went some way towards

fulfilling Joseph Siscos earlier prediction by making Bhutto deputy prime

minister and foreign minister in the Pakistani government. In Nixons eyes,

Bhutto was a total demagogue, a terrible bastard or an elitist son-of-a-bitch,

depending on the day one caught him (Vol. E7, Nos 156, 171, 178); but, as the

Pakistani began to demonstrate his chameleon-like ability to adapt to changing

circumstances, he became slightly more acceptable to the White House.

Also on 7 December Nixon received an unhelpful message from the

Russians in reply to his letter to Brezhnev (Vol. XI, No. 241), but the most

important communication of the day was undoubtedly a Central Intelligence

Agency report of what Mrs Gandhi had allegedly told her cabinet on the 6th

about her war aims, namely: A. The quick liberation of Bangladesh, B. The

incorporation into India of the southern part of Azad Kashmir38 for strategic

rather than territorial reasons ; and, finally, C. To destroy Pakistani military

striking power so that it never attempts to challenge India in the future (Vol.XI, No. 246).

Wittingly or unwittingly, Kissinger exaggerated the contents of the CIA

report in a conversation with Nixon later in the day. Theyre going to move

their forces from East Pakistan to the west, he said. They will then smash the

Pakistan land forces and air forces, annex the part of Kashmir that is in Pakistan39

and then call it off When this has happened the centrifugal forces in West

Pakistan would be liberated. He said he had talked to Richard Helms, the

director of the CIA, and that the impact of Indian policy on the Middle East

would be catastrophic. The Arabs would think that, if they received the samebacking from the Soviet Union that India had, they could have another crack

at the Israelis.40 As for the Chinese, if Pakistan were completely dismembered

they would conclude that there was no point in relying on the United States in

38 Azad, or Free, Kashmir is the nominally autonomous province of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir andconsists of a narrow tongue of territory between the province of Punjab and Indian-controlled Kashmir.

39 Emphasis added. Azad Kashmir represents only 15% of Pakistani-controlled Kashmir.40 Whatever Helms may have said to Kissinger, this was not the view of the CIA as a whole. In a

memorandum of 9 December 1971 on the implications of an Indian victory, the Agency stated thatalthough this might reinforce a widely held impression that Soviet power was on the increase, [i]t isanother thing . . . for states involved in confrontation situations in other areas, say the Middle East todraw concrete inferences and to act in different ways than they are now acting. It is unlikely that Egyptwould conclude that the USSR would be willing to take greater risks on its behalf; if it did so, Moscowwould be quick to disabuse Cairo of the notion (Vol E7 No 170)


17/23


order to break out of their encirclement. It was therefore vital to stop India

attacking West Pakistan, and Kissinger proposed three steps to that end: (1) to

get a note to the Chinese, presumably to persuade them to move their troops,

as Nixon had previously suggested; (2) to move a carrier to the Bay of Bengal;

and (3) to get a stem-winder

41

of a note to the Russians to tell them that it will clearly jeopardize everything we have (Vol. E7, No. 165).

Finally on 7 December, a resolution calling for a ceasefire, withdrawal by

both parties and the creation of the necessary conditions for return of refugees

had been carried by a huge majority of 104 to 11 in the General Assembly of the

United Nations, where the veto was inapplicable. The Indians, however, had

already indicated they would ignore it (Vol. XI, No. 237).

Brezhnevs reply to Nixons letter arrived on the morning of 9 December

1971. It proposed a ceasefire and negotiations between Yahya and the Awami

League. Kissinger considered it an acceptable basis for negotiations, as long as

these were based on the assumption of a united Pakistan with maximum auto-

nomy for the East. This would split the Russians from the Indians and simul-

taneously secure what Kissinger now saw as the top priority, a ceasefire in the

West (Vol. XI, No. 253).

It was formally decided to warn the Indians against any annexation of

Pakistani territory and to send a carrier group to the Indian Ocean under the

pretext of prudent contingency measures (Vol. XI, No. 258). On the night of

9 December, Acting Secretary of State John Irwin summoned the Indian

ambassador to the State Department. The ambassador assured him that India

would not annex East Pakistan or turn it into a protectorate. He also deniedthat there had ever been any intention to annex territory in West Pakistan, but,

in response to Irwins probing, said that he would have to check with New

Delhi about Azad Kashmir (Vol. XI, No. 262).

There had never been any illusions in Washington about Pakistans ability to

withstand a full-scale Indian assault. When asked by Kissinger on 1 December

1971 how long it could be expected to hold out, the Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff replied, Two or three weeks (Vol. XI, No. 213). But less than

a week had elapsed when, on 10 December 1971, the Pakistani commander in

the East called for a ceasefire and the handover of the government torepresentatives of East Pakistan (Vol. XI, No. 267). Kissinger told Nixon that

the State Department was ready to run to the Security Council and get that

done, but that [w]e wont want to push the Pakistanis over the cliff. The

major problem now was to protect the West and it was therefore vital to link

any ceasefire in the East with one in the West (Vol. E7, No. 172).

Kissinger accordingly saw Vorontsov, armed with a second letter from

Nixon to Brezhnev which called for an immediate cease-fire in the West, and

41 Since this expression puzzled me, I looked it up on the internet. It apparently means something that isfirst-class of its kind and derives from the superiority of a stem-wound watch over one which is woundby a separate key. It is often used in the United States in the context of political oratory, e.g. a stem-winder of a speech


18/23

Geoffrey Warner

warned that if one did not take place, we would have to conclude that there is

in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly

country toward which we have obligations (Vol. XI, No. 269). Kissinger had

unearthed from the files an aide-mmoireof 5 November 1962 which pledged

the United States to come to Pakistans assistance in the event of aggression byIndia. Now, I hope you understand the significance of this, he said to Vorontsov

after reading it to him. This isnt just an obligation. It will completely defuse

the Democrats because they are not going to attack their own President [It

is] a Kennedy obligation (Vol. E7, No. 173).42

In the afternoon of 10 December, Kissinger flew to New York for a pre-

arranged meeting with Huang Hua, the Chinese delegate to the United

Nations.43 During the course of the meeting, Kissinger frankly admitted that he

had asked for it in order to suggest Chinese military help for India. The actual

request was phrased in impeccably diplomatic language. [T]he President wants

you to know, Kissinger said, that its, of course, up to the Peoples Republic

to decide its own course of action in this situation, but that if the Peoples

Republic were to consider the situation on the Indian subcontinent a threat to

its security, and if it took measures to protect its security, the US would oppose

efforts of others to interfere with the Peoples Republic. Given the previous

two decades of antagonism between the United States and Communist China,

this was a remarkable pledge for any American statesman to make.

Huang Hua replied that the Chinese position was to support a UN resolution

calling for a ceasefire and joint withdrawal. He felt that the United Statess

position was weak, since it no longer insisted on withdrawal, but only aceasefire in place. Kissinger explained that this was because We dont want in

the principle of withdrawal to have West Pakistan go the way of East Pakistan.

Huang also criticized the Americans for having agreed to negotiations between

Pakistan and the rebels, which he said was tantamount to recognizing another

Manchukuo. Kissinger disagreed and protested, I may look weak to you, Mr.

Ambassador, but my colleagues in Washington think Im a raving lunatic. He

assured Huang: We will not recognize Bangla Desh. We will not negotiate with

Bangla Desh. We will not encourage talks between Pakistan and Bangla Desh

(Vol. XI, No. 274).44

Bhutto, who had arrived to head the Pakistani delegation at the United

Nations, agreed with the Chinese on the need for any ceasefire to be combined

with withdrawal. At a meeting on the morning of 11 December 1971, therefore,

it was agreed to introduce a resolution in the Security Council which would

42 See also Kissinger, White House years, p. 905. The aide-mmoireis cited in US Department of State, Foreignrelations of the United States 19611963, Vol. XIX, South Asia (Washington: US Government PrintingOffice, 1996), No. 191, n. 6. The assurance was given in the context of the offer of US military aid toIndia as a result of the latters border war with China. The Pakistanis were fearful that any Americanequipment supplied to India would be used against them. The formal treaties which bound the UnitedStates to defend Pakistan against aggression had, of course, referred only to communist aggression.

43 Communist China had been admitted to the United Nations in October 1971.44 The United States recognized Bangladesh on 4 April 1972


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include both. In the likely event of a Soviet veto, the US and its supporters

would accept a simple ceasefire, but without any reference to negotiations.

Only if necessary would it express willingness to engage in negotiations after a

ceasefire (Vol. XI, No. 276).45

In the evening, Kissinger telephoned Nixon to say that Bhutto had spokento the Chinese and that the latter were still worried about American firmness.

They wanted to know what the United States would do if the Russians put

pressure on them (Vol. XI, No. 278). Kissinger then spoke by telephone with

Vorontsov, saying that the US had waited 48 hours for a reply to Nixons

second letter to Brezhnev and that if the US did not hear from the Russians by

the following morning, it would proceed unilaterally and if we do we will

have to state our view about the involvement of other countries. Vorontsov

replied that Vasily Kuznetsov, the Soviet deputy foreign minister, was en route

to India and that he had reason to believe the visit was in direct connection to

what we have discussed here. Kissinger reiterated that the Americans could

not delay any longer than he had already stated (Vol. XI, No. 279).

Accordingly, Nixon and Kissinger began discussions at 8.45 on 12 December

1971 concerning a White House public statement and a hotline message to

Brezhnev. During their meeting Haig came in to say that the Chinese wanted

to meet urgently. Thats totally unprecedented, Kissinger exclaimed. Theyre

going to move. No question, theyre going to move. There then ensued a

discussion of what the US reaction would be if the Russians retaliated against

China. Nixon cynically remarked, We may not be able to do it, but weve got

to guarantee it. Shit, they lie to us, we lie to them. But Kissinger said that thematter had to be properly thought through. If the Soviets moved and the

Americans did nothing, he said, the United States would be finished. The US

could try and call the Chinese off, but in that case, our China initiative is

pretty well down the drain. His own feeling, Kissinger concluded, was that if

Pakistan were swallowed by India and China, destroyed, defeated [and] humi-

liated by the Soviet Union, there would be a change in the balance of power

of such magnitude that the security of the United States would be threatened

forever, certainly for decades, and there would certainly be a ghastly war in

the Middle East. Kissinger suggested putting in troops and giving the Chinesebombing assistance. Warming to his National Security Advisors suggestions,

Nixon added that, while they were about it, they could use the opportunity to

clean up Vietnam. After all, the Chinese would be in no position to object

(Vol. E7, No. 177).

At this point a reply to Nixons letter was received from the Soviet Union. It

stated that the first contacts with the Indian governmentpresumably via

Kuznetsovtestified to the fact that it had no intention of taking any military

action against West Pakistan (Vol. XI, No. 284). Nevertheless, Nixon and

Kissinger decided to press ahead with the hotline message and the public

45 See also Aijazuddin The White House and Pakistan p 459


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Geoffrey Warner

statement, although it is clear that they thought the Russians were beginning to

back down (Vol. E7, No. 178). The message stated that, in view of the delay,

the United States had decided to go to the UN. It also noted that India had not

provided any concrete assurances. At the same time, Nixons offer of a ceasefire

followed by negotiations, as set out in his letter of 10 December 1971, stillstood (Vol. XI. No. 286).46 It was a sign of Nixons and Kissingers belief that

the situation was improving when both men left Washington for the Azores on

the afternoon of 12 December 1971 to attend a prearranged summit meeting

with the French president and the Portuguese prime minister.

But the crisis was not over yet. In the first place it became clear that the

Chinese were not planning to intervene after all, beyond stepping up support

and assistance to Pakistan, which was a fairly safe bet as the Pakistani army in

the East was on the point of collapse.47 Second, when Haig relayed the Soviet

reply to Nixons hotline message to the Azores on 14 December 1971, he

noted that the Russians had delayed their reply just long enough to ensure the

collapse of Pakistan forces in the East which in turn will ensure that the will of

the East Pakistani population will be expressed in favor of total independence.

Although they had avoided any reference to a Bangladesh government or

independence, they had in fact established conditions in which these would

come about (Vol. XI, No. 296).48 Kissinger adds in his memoirs that the

passage in the Soviet message which referred to firm assurances by the Indian

government that it had no plans to seize West Pakistani territory begged the

principal question of whether India considered Pakistani-held Kashmir as

Pakistani territory. He therefore decidedwithout the Presidents approvalto tell the press on the way back from the Azores that if the Soviet Union did

not exercise more restraint, the United States would have to re-evaluate its entire

relationship with the Soviet Union, including the proposed summit confer-

ence between Nixon and the Russian leaders in May 1972.49

Upon his return to Washington, Kissinger saw Vorontsov on the evening of

14 December 1971 to seek an immediate assurance that India would not attack

in the West and would accept the status quo ante in West Pakistan. A clearly

concerned Vorontsov said that this would also be the Soviet Unions under-

standing (Vol. XI, No. 305). The following morning Kissinger was able to tellNixon that this was, in effect, a Soviet guarantee. He suggested formalizing it

by an exchange of letters between Nixon and Brezhnev. [I]f the game plan

works out, he said, it has the advantage of giving you credit. Where on the

46 This was the first use of the hotline by the Nixon administration. See Kissinger, White House years, p.909. The public statement was also issued. For the text see Vol. XI, No. 285, n. 2.

47 This emerges from the record of the conversation between Haig and Huang Hua on the afternoon of 12December 1971, the full text of which is published in Aijazuddin, The White House and Pakistan, pp.4636. Only the briefest summary is provided in the last paragraph of Vol. XI, No. 281. Huang alsoagreed to support the US resolution at the UN, which was another indication of the softening of theChinese position.

48 To judge from Dixits account of the negotiations between India and the Soviet Union, Haigsassumption was broadly correct. See Dixit, India and Pakistan, pp. 2212.

49 Kissinger White House years p 912 The text of the Soviet message may be found in Vol XI No 295


21/23


previous game plan all that would have happened was that the British put for-

ward a resolution, everybody votes for it, and then they say [t]he Americans

were saved by the goddamn British (Vol. E7, No. 189). Vorontsov, however,

was not keen on a public letter because it would mean that the Soviet Union

was in effect speaking for a friendly country. After all, India was not a clientstate (Vol. XI, No. 312).

In the early evening of 15 December 1971 Kissinger telephoned Nixon to

tell him that the Russians were going to veto a British resolution in the Security

Council which called for a ceasefire on all fronts, and that India was demanding

that the UN agree to turning over East Pakistan to Bangladesh (Vol. XI, No.

315). At 9.30 on the morning of 16 December 1971, he telephoned to tell the

President that Dacca had just fallen to the Indians, and the two men discussed

what to do if the Russians vetoed the British resolution and the Indians

continued the war. The President was all for breaking off diplomatic relations

with India, cutting off talks on the Middle East, pouring arms into Israel and

breaking off the SALT talks with the Soviet Union (Vol. XI, No. 316). But

then the Pakistani commander in the East surrendered to his Indian counterpart

and Mrs Gandhi announced a unilateral ceasefire in the West. Congratulations,

Mr President, Kissinger told Nixon. You saved W[est] Pakistan) (Vol. E7,

No. 191). Although the UN Security Council did not agree on the text of a

ceasefire resolution until 21 December 1971 (Vol. XI, No. 332), the war was

over. Yahya Khan resigned on 19 December and duly turned over the presidency

to Bhutto. A new phase in Pakistans history had begun.

At the height of the crisis, on 9 December 1971, Kissinger had said toNixon, Were going through this agony to prevent the West Pakistani army

from being destroyed. Secondly, to maintain our Chinese arm. Thirdly, to pre-

vent a complete collapse of the worlds psychological balance of power, which

will be produced if a combination of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armed

client state [i.e. India] can tackle a not so insignificant country without any-

body doing anything (Vol. E7, No. 168). Let us look at this justification of US

policy in more detail.

There is no doubt about the agony. The American media and public

opinion, not just the Democrats, were overwhelmingly opposed to theadministrations policy, and when Jack Anderson published some of Kissingers

secret discussions,50 the contradiction between what it was saying in public and

what it was saying, and doing, in private opened up a credibility gap similar to

that which lad plagued the previous Democrat administration over Vietnam.

The West Pakistani army was not destroyed, nor was West Pakistan. The

question is: was either in any real danger? As we have seen, Kissinger exag-

gerated the scale of Indias territorial ambitions as spelled out in the CIA

memorandum of 7 December 1971.51 On the other hand, another of its reports

on an Indian cabinet discussion of 10 December 1971 stated that while Mrs

50 See above, p. 1100, n. 4.51 See above p 1114


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Geoffrey Warner

Gandhi disagreed with some of her generals who argued that there should be

no ceasefire until certain areas in southern Azad Kashmir had been liberated

and until the Pakistani war machine had been destroyed, she still believed that,

after the war, India would be the dominant power in South Asia and the Indian

Ocean, that the current Pakistani military leadership would not survive, andthat both the United States and China would lose interest in Pakistan. In these

circumstances she foresaw greater pressure for autonomy in Pakistans provinces

and hoped that a new democratic Pakistan, based on autonomous republics

would emerge (Vol. E7, No. 183). This scenario was not very far from the

progressive disintegration which both Nixon and Kissinger feared Pakistan

would undergo in the wake of an Indian victory.

Yet Kissingers main arguments relate not to the regional but to the global

balance of power, and here he is on much weaker ground. It would be

extremely hard, for example, to sustain the argument that if the United States

had not backed Yahya and his regime, the opening with China would have

failed. Chinas policy was no more primarily focused upon South Asia than

Americas. What China wanted more than anything was reinsurance against

the Soviet Union, and the NixonKissinger policy towards the subcontinent,

which ran the risk of involving the Chinese in a war with the Russians, surely

imperilled that objective more than it advanced it.

Finally, Kissingers doom-laden prophecies about the possible consequences

of the war for the global balance of power were grossly exaggerated. India was

not a Soviet client state, and to set about the task of portraying it as such

would only result in a self-fulfilling prophecy. As in Vietnam, by overestima-ting the negative effects of a Pakistani defeat the United States was helping to

create the very situation it wished to avoid. Even at the factual, as opposed to

the counterfactual, level, Kissingers reasoning does not add up. If Pakistan

were not saved, he had predicted, there would be a war in the Middle East. It

was saved and there was still a war in the Middle East (in 1973); but it was not

part of the global meltdown of American power which he had feared. One can

only conclude that Henry Kissinger, the supreme realist, did not have as com-

plete a grasp of reality as he liked to believe. In the formulation of policy he

and, even more so, his masterseems to have been guided more by prejudice.


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